FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Using Diplomacy to Advance the Long-term Sustainability and Security of the Outer Space Environment
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
31st Space Symposium
Colorado Springs, CO
April 16, 2015
As prepared
Introduction
Thank you for your kind introduction and the opportunity to speak to you today.
My name is Frank Rose, and I am the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. It’s a pleasure to be back at the Space Symposium, and I’d like to thank Elliot Pulham and all the sponsors for inviting me back again.
By way of introduction, while I am the Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, my work at the State Department is focused on enhancing strategic stability around the world. Arms control, verification and compliance are some of the tools we use to enhance strategic stability and reassure our allies and partners that we will meet our security commitments. Given the importance of outer space to our national security, we also work on efforts to ensure the long term sustainability and security of the outer space environment.
This morning I would like to discuss steps the United States is taking diplomatically, in concert with international partners to address the growing threats to space security.
Threats to the Space Environment
First, the threat to outer space is real and growing. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said in his recent Congressional testimony,
“Threats to U.S. space systems and services will increase during 2015 and beyond as potential adversaries pursue disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities. Chinese and Russian military leaders understand the unique information advantages afforded by space systems and services and are developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict.”
In particular, China’s continued development of anti-satellite weapons remains a major challenge to the outer space environment. China’s 2007 anti-satellite test left thousands of pieces of debris in orbit that continues to threaten the space systems of all nations.
The 2010 U.S. National Space Policy makes it clear that it is not in the interest of anyone for armed conflict to extend into space. It states,
“The United States considers the space systems of all nations to have the rights of passage through, and conduct of operations in, space without interference. Purposeful interference with space systems, including supporting infrastructure, will be considered an infringement of a nation’s rights.”
It also states that,
“the United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allies space systems, and if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them.”
It is not in the international community’s interest to engage in a space weapons arms race. Such a race would not bode well for the long-term sustainability of the space environment.
Indeed, protecting U.S. national security by preventing conflict from extending into space in the first place is a major goal of our diplomatic engagements. In that regard, we work to prevent conflict from extending into space via two diplomatic tracks; strengthening our deterrent posture, and encouraging responsible behavior to prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and the chances of miscalculation.
Strengthening Our Deterrent Posture
First, we use diplomacy to gain the support of our allies and friends. We have established numerous space security dialogues with our Allies and Partners. These dialogues help them understand the threat, as well as our diplomatic and national security goals, which is critical in persuading them to stand by our side, often in the face of tremendous pressure from our adversaries. Not only have I made numerous trips to meet with our allies in Canada, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific, I have also visited India (where we held our first space security dialogue this March), South Africa, and elsewhere in Africa to raise U.S. concerns about the threats to space systems and to discuss the way forward diplomatically. Furthermore, our Department’s leadership has also carried our message in numerous bilateral and multilateral dialogues.
Diplomacy also prepares the way for closer military-to-military cooperation and allied investment in capabilities compatible with U.S. systems. We work very closely with our interagency colleagues in the Department of Defense to make sure our efforts are synchronized so that investments by our allies and friends contribute to strengthening the resilience of our space architectures and contribute to Space Mission Assurance. The resulting deterrent effect created by such a web of integrated capabilities is greater than the sum of its individual parts.
For example, the Department of State works closely with the Department of Defense on Space Situational Awareness (or SSA) information sharing agreements with foreign partners. The United States has found international cooperation on SSA to be important, as international partnerships bring the resources, capabilities, and geographical advantages. We have also worked to strengthen military-to-military cooperation in satellite communications and space-based maritime domain awareness.
Promoting the Responsible Use of Outer Space
Second, we use diplomacy to promote the responsible use of outer space and especially strategic restraint in the development of anti-satellite weapons.
Diplomacy has an important role in responding to the development of anti-satellite weapons developments that threaten the outer space environment. Responding both privately and publicly to tests of anti-satellite systems is a critical component of our diplomatic strategy.
For example, in 2007, China faced tremendous international pressure following its destructive ASAT test, and this response from the international community appears to have been a factor in China changing its approach. We have not seen a destructive ASAT test since then, although China did conduct a non-destructive test of this system in July 2014. I have not been shy about expressing the U.S. Governments concerns about Chinese anti-satellite tests directly to our Chinese counterparts. We need to continue to call out the disruptive actions of countries like Russia and China both publicly and in cooperation with our allies and partners.
The Department of State is also using diplomacy to reduce the chances for conflict extending into space through the promotion of responsible international norms of behavior, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Norms matter because they help define boundaries and distinguish good behavior from bad behavior.
For example, we have discussed preventing mishaps and reducing potentially destabilizing misperceptions or miscalculations with China.
In addition, and very importantly, through bilateral and multilateral dialogue and diplomatic engagement we seek to identify areas of mutual interest and hopefully reach agreement on how to prevent those interests from being harmed in peacetime, and in conflict.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union found many areas of mutual interest in avoiding potentially destabilizing actions. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, started a fifty-plus-year string of bilateral arms control treaties and agreements with the Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation. We also came to agreement in many other realms, including chemical and biological weapons.
Simply stated, if the United States and the Soviet Union could find areas of mutual interest in the realm of nuclear deterrence and chemical weapons -- with the tensions and stakes as high as they were -- then in today’s climate we should be able to find areas of mutual interest among all space-faring nations regarding space security.
Indeed, I would argue that it is reasonable to assume that most nations, if not all nations, would find it to be in their national interest to prevent conflict from extending into space, knowing that such conflict would degrade the sustainability of the space environment, hinder future space-based scientific activities, and potentially reduce the quality of life for everybody on Earth if the benefits of space-based applications were eroded. Convincing other nations, including China and Russia, of this objective is the role of diplomacy.
The United States and China have already implemented some bilateral transparency and confidence building measures (or TCBMs) to prevent the generation of additional debris in space. As part of the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, led by Secretary of State John Kerry, we reached agreement on the establishment of e-mail contact between China and the United States for the transmission of space object conjunction warnings. Not only does this communication help prevent collision between objects in space, it will help to develop trust and understanding between the United States and China.
Over the past few years the United States has also supported a number of multilateral initiatives that should reduce the chances of mishaps, misperceptions and potential miscalculations. Multilateral TCBMs are means by which governments can address challenges and share information with the aim of creating mutual understanding and reducing tensions. Through TCBMs we can increase familiarity and trust and encourage openness among space actors.
One of the key efforts that we have been pursuing is working with the European Union to advance a non-legally binding International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The Code would establish guidelines to reduce the risks of debris-generating events and to strengthen the long-term sustainability and security of the space environment. Among the draft Code’s most important provisions is a commitment for the subscribing States to refrain from any action -- unless such action is justified by exceptions spelled out in the draft Code -- that brings about, directly or indirectly, damage or destruction of space objects. We view the draft Code as a potential first step in establishing TCBMs for space.
The State Department is also leading U.S. efforts in the framework of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) to move forward in the development of a draft set of guidelines for sustainable space operations to include ways to prevent the generation of space debris.
Another important recent effort was the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) study of outer space transparency and confidence-building measures. That UN group, for which I served as the U.S. expert, published a consensus report in July 2013 endorsing voluntary, non-legally binding TCBMs to strengthen sustainability and security in space. The United States subsequently co-sponsored a resolution with Russia and China referring the GGE report’s recommendations for consideration by the relevant entities and organizations of the United Nations system.
These diplomatic efforts contribute to reducing misperceptions and miscalculations and help lower the chance of conflict extending into space.
I would like to add one more thought for your consideration. If we do not lead with active diplomacy on international space security issues, it is more likely that others will seek to fill the diplomatic vacuum with initiatives that meet their own national interests without regard for the broader interests of the international community.
The United States has focused on TCBMs over the last several years because these can make a real difference in the near term. Such measures can lead to greater mutual understanding and reduce tensions.
In contrast, Russia’s and China’s diplomatic efforts to pursue legally binding treaties and other measures do not reduce the chances for mishaps, misunderstanding or miscalculation and provide little or no verification capability to make sure that everyone is playing by the same rules. Moreover, their diplomatic efforts do not address very real, near-term space security threats such as terrestrial-based anti-satellite weapons like the one China tested in 2007.
To be more specific, Russia and China continue to press for a “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects,” known as the PPWT. Russia also is making concerted diplomatic efforts to gain adherents to its pledge of “No First Placement” of weapons in outer space. These two documents are fundamentally flawed. They do not address the threat of terrestrially-based ASAT capabilities, and they contain no verification provisions. Yet, at the same time, these proposals may gain some support internationally because many countries are attracted, naturally, to the idea of preventing the weaponization of space. As a diplomat, it is my job to explain why support for these Russian and Chinese proposals is misplaced and may even be counterproductive, while offering pragmatic alternatives, such as TCBMs, which demonstrate U.S. leadership and help shape the international space security agenda.
Conclusion
If conflict extends into space, the right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes would be threatened.
If diplomacy fails, and the use of force does extend to space, the United States must be prepared to protect our space capabilities and prevail in conflict. That is absolutely clear.
The goal of our diplomacy, however, is to prevent conflict from extending into space in the first place.
Diplomacy can help strengthen U.S. and allied deterrent posture and help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust among nations.
These two diplomatic tracks, supported by other instruments of U.S. national power and the support of our allies and friends, will hopefully persuade any potential adversary that attacking the United States in space would not be in its best interests.
Thank you for your time and attention.
Showing posts with label FRANK A. ROSE. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FRANK A. ROSE. Show all posts
Sunday, April 19, 2015
Friday, April 10, 2015
FRANK ROSE MAKES REMARKS ON MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Enhancing Regional Missile Defense Cooperation
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington, DC
April 7, 2015
Introduction
Thank you for that kind introduction, and thanks for having me here today.
By way of introduction, while I am the Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, my work at the State Department is focused on enhancing strategic stability around the world. Arms control, verification and compliance are some of the tools we use to enhance strategic stability and reassure our allies and partners that we will meet our security commitments.
Missile defense is another tool to do just that. At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense issues, including missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners around the world. In this capacity, I served as the lead U.S. negotiator for the missile defense bases in Romania, Turkey, and Poland.
So I’m pleased to be here today to discuss our efforts at enhancing missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners, one of the key goals outlined in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Now you have already heard from Elaine Bunn and General Todorov about our missile defense policy and operations. So instead, let me focus my remarks on three areas: 1) significant progress we have been made implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA) and NATO missile defense; 2) cooperation on missile defense with allies and partners outside of Europe, and 3) I’ll conclude with a few points on Russia and missile defense.
Before I do that, I do want to reiterate one point that you undoubtedly heard from Elaine and Ken: the President’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget protects and enhances our important missile defense priorities such as the European Phased Adaptive Approach and reflects the high priority we place on these efforts. As such, the U.S. commitment to NATO missile defense and the sites in Romania and Poland remains “ironclad.”
European Phased Adaptive Approach
With that, let me now take a few moments to discuss where we are with regard to overall implementation of the EPAA, the United States’ national contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (or NATO) missile defense system. In 2009, the President announced that the EPAA would “provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies,” while relying on “capabilities that are proven and cost-effective.” Since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision and have made great strides in recent years.
I just returned from Turkey and Romania last week and had the opportunity to discuss our progress with these two key partners.
Turkey was the first country to receive EPPA elements in Phase 1 with the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar to that country in 2011. At the same time, we began the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) -capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean. With the declaration of Interim BMD Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, the radar in Turkey transitioned to NATO operational control.
Additionally, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota as a Spanish contribution to NATO missile defense.
In February 2014, the first of four missile defense-capable Aegis ships, USS DONALD COOK, arrived in Rota, Spain. A second ship, USS ROSS joined her in June. During 2015, two more of these multi-mission ships, USS PORTER and USS CARNEY will forward deploy in Rota.
These multi-mission ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, training exercises, and support U.S. and NATO operations, including NATO missile defense.
Currently, we are focused on completing the deployment of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania as part of Phase 2 of the EPAA. Romania’s strong support for the timely completion of the arrangements needed to implement this deployment and Romania’s provision of security and its infrastructure efforts have been superb.
In October 2014, the U.S. Navy held a historic naval support facility establishment ceremony at the missile defense facility on Deveselu Airbase Base in Romania. This ceremony established the naval facility and installed its first U.S. commander. Currently, this site is on schedule to be completed by the end of this year and when operational, this site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.
And finally there is Phase 3. This phase includes an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. This site is on schedule for deployment in the 2018 time frame. For example, the President’s FY16 budget request includes approximately $200 million for the establishment of the site. The interceptor site in Poland is key to the EPAA: when combined with other EPAA assets, Phase 3 will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory in the 2018 time frame.
So, as you can see, we are continuing to implement the President’s vision for stronger, smarter, and swifter missile defenses in Europe.
National Contributions to NATO Missile Defense
I would also like to highlight the efforts of our NATO Allies to develop and deploy their own national contributions for missile defense. A great example is that today, Patriot batteries from three NATO countries are deployed in Turkey under NATO command and control to augment Turkey’s air defense capabilities in response to the crisis on Turkey’s south-eastern border.
Voluntary national contributions are foundation of the NATO missile defense system, and there are several approaches Allies can take to make important and valuable contributions in this area.
First, Allies can acquire fully capable BMD systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control capabilities.
Second, Allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key ballistic missile defense capability.
Finally, Allies can contribute to NATO’s ballistic missile defense capability by providing essential basing support, such as Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have agreed to do.
In all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is NATO interoperability.
Yes, acquiring a ballistic missile defense capability is, of course, good in and of itself.
But if the capability is not interoperable with the Alliance then its value as a contribution to Alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished.
It is only through interoperability that the Alliance can gain the optimum effects from BMD cooperation that enhance NATO BMD through shared battle-space awareness and reduced interceptor wastage.
Missile Defense Developments in Other Regions
Let me turn now to some of the other regions of the world. The United States, in cooperation with our allies and partners, is continuing to bolster missile defenses in other key regions, such as the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, in order to strengthen regional deterrence architectures.
In the Middle East, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through fora such as the recently established U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (or GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum (or SCF).
At the September 26, 2013, SCF, Secretary Kerry and his Foreign Ministry counterparts reaffirmed their intent, first stated at the September 28, 2012, SCF, to “work toward enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense.”
Several of our partners in the region have expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has contracted to buy two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (or THAAD) batteries that, when operational, will enhance the UAE’s national security as well as regional stability.
The UAE also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets. We look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperability with our GCC partners in the months and years ahead.
Additionally and separately, the United States maintains a strong defense relationship with Israel, and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in comprehensive missile defense architecture for Israel. Israeli programs such as Iron Dome, the David’s Sling Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon System, in conjunction with operational cooperation with the United States, create a multilayered architecture designed to protect the Israeli people from varying types of missile threats.
In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing to cooperate through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships.
For example, the United States and Japan already are working closely together to develop the SM-3 Block IIA, which will make a key contribution to the EPAA as well as being deployed elsewhere in the world. We also recently completed the deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the U.S. and Japan. And finally, we are continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces, which will be aided by recent changes to the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, which we expect to complete soon.
We also continue to consult closely with Australia. For example, as a result of U.S.-Australia Foreign and Defense ministerial-level consultations over the past year, the United States and Australia have established a bilateral BMD Working Group to examine options for potential Australian contributions to the BMD architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.
Additionally, we are also consulting closely with the Republic of Korea as it develops the Korean Air and Missile Defense system, which is designed to defend the Republic of Korea against air and missile threats from North Korea. The Republic of Korea recently announced its plans to purchase Patriot PAC-3 missiles, which will enhance its capability to defend against the North Korean ballistic missile threat.
A Constraint Free Missile Defense
Finally, let me say a few things about missile defense and Russia.
Prior to the suspension of our dialogue as a result of Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine, Russia continued to demand that the United States provide it “legally binding” guarantees that our missile defense will not harm or diminish its strategic nuclear deterrent. These guarantees would have been based on criteria that would have limited our missile defenses and undermined our ability to stay ahead of the ballistic missile threat.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Review is quite clear on our policy: U.S. missile defense is not designed nor directed against Russia and China’s strategic nuclear forces.
However, at the same time, we have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally-binding or other constraints that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.
The security of the United States, its allies and partners is our foremost and solemn responsibility. As such, the United States will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats, free from obligations or other constraints that limit our BMD capabilities.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense cooperation with allies and partners around the world over the past several years. This was a key goal of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review.
In Europe, implementation of the EPAA and NATO missile defense is going well. For example, the missile defense radar in Turkey has been operating since 2011, and the Aegis Ashore site in Romania is scheduled to become operational later this year.
In the Middle East, we are continuing to work bilaterally and multilaterally with our partners in the GCC to deploy effective missile defense. For example, later this year the United Arab Emirates will take delivery of its first THAAD battery.
Furthermore, we continue to work with Israel to expand its multilayered architecture to protect it from missile threats.
In the Asia-Pacific, we are working actively with our allies to enhance our missile defense capabilities in the region. On that note, we recently completed deployment of second missile defense radar in Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the U.S. and Japan.
Finally, we continue to oppose Russia’s attempts to impose limitations on our missile defenses that would limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.
Suffice to say, defense of our allies and partners through assistance on missile defense cooperation is and will remain a key priority of the U.S. Government.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Enhancing Regional Missile Defense Cooperation
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington, DC
April 7, 2015
Introduction
Thank you for that kind introduction, and thanks for having me here today.
By way of introduction, while I am the Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, my work at the State Department is focused on enhancing strategic stability around the world. Arms control, verification and compliance are some of the tools we use to enhance strategic stability and reassure our allies and partners that we will meet our security commitments.
Missile defense is another tool to do just that. At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense issues, including missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners around the world. In this capacity, I served as the lead U.S. negotiator for the missile defense bases in Romania, Turkey, and Poland.
So I’m pleased to be here today to discuss our efforts at enhancing missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners, one of the key goals outlined in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Now you have already heard from Elaine Bunn and General Todorov about our missile defense policy and operations. So instead, let me focus my remarks on three areas: 1) significant progress we have been made implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA) and NATO missile defense; 2) cooperation on missile defense with allies and partners outside of Europe, and 3) I’ll conclude with a few points on Russia and missile defense.
Before I do that, I do want to reiterate one point that you undoubtedly heard from Elaine and Ken: the President’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget protects and enhances our important missile defense priorities such as the European Phased Adaptive Approach and reflects the high priority we place on these efforts. As such, the U.S. commitment to NATO missile defense and the sites in Romania and Poland remains “ironclad.”
European Phased Adaptive Approach
With that, let me now take a few moments to discuss where we are with regard to overall implementation of the EPAA, the United States’ national contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (or NATO) missile defense system. In 2009, the President announced that the EPAA would “provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies,” while relying on “capabilities that are proven and cost-effective.” Since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision and have made great strides in recent years.
I just returned from Turkey and Romania last week and had the opportunity to discuss our progress with these two key partners.
Turkey was the first country to receive EPPA elements in Phase 1 with the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar to that country in 2011. At the same time, we began the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) -capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean. With the declaration of Interim BMD Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, the radar in Turkey transitioned to NATO operational control.
Additionally, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota as a Spanish contribution to NATO missile defense.
In February 2014, the first of four missile defense-capable Aegis ships, USS DONALD COOK, arrived in Rota, Spain. A second ship, USS ROSS joined her in June. During 2015, two more of these multi-mission ships, USS PORTER and USS CARNEY will forward deploy in Rota.
These multi-mission ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, training exercises, and support U.S. and NATO operations, including NATO missile defense.
Currently, we are focused on completing the deployment of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania as part of Phase 2 of the EPAA. Romania’s strong support for the timely completion of the arrangements needed to implement this deployment and Romania’s provision of security and its infrastructure efforts have been superb.
In October 2014, the U.S. Navy held a historic naval support facility establishment ceremony at the missile defense facility on Deveselu Airbase Base in Romania. This ceremony established the naval facility and installed its first U.S. commander. Currently, this site is on schedule to be completed by the end of this year and when operational, this site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.
And finally there is Phase 3. This phase includes an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. This site is on schedule for deployment in the 2018 time frame. For example, the President’s FY16 budget request includes approximately $200 million for the establishment of the site. The interceptor site in Poland is key to the EPAA: when combined with other EPAA assets, Phase 3 will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory in the 2018 time frame.
So, as you can see, we are continuing to implement the President’s vision for stronger, smarter, and swifter missile defenses in Europe.
National Contributions to NATO Missile Defense
I would also like to highlight the efforts of our NATO Allies to develop and deploy their own national contributions for missile defense. A great example is that today, Patriot batteries from three NATO countries are deployed in Turkey under NATO command and control to augment Turkey’s air defense capabilities in response to the crisis on Turkey’s south-eastern border.
Voluntary national contributions are foundation of the NATO missile defense system, and there are several approaches Allies can take to make important and valuable contributions in this area.
First, Allies can acquire fully capable BMD systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control capabilities.
Second, Allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key ballistic missile defense capability.
Finally, Allies can contribute to NATO’s ballistic missile defense capability by providing essential basing support, such as Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have agreed to do.
In all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is NATO interoperability.
Yes, acquiring a ballistic missile defense capability is, of course, good in and of itself.
But if the capability is not interoperable with the Alliance then its value as a contribution to Alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished.
It is only through interoperability that the Alliance can gain the optimum effects from BMD cooperation that enhance NATO BMD through shared battle-space awareness and reduced interceptor wastage.
Missile Defense Developments in Other Regions
Let me turn now to some of the other regions of the world. The United States, in cooperation with our allies and partners, is continuing to bolster missile defenses in other key regions, such as the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, in order to strengthen regional deterrence architectures.
In the Middle East, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through fora such as the recently established U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (or GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum (or SCF).
At the September 26, 2013, SCF, Secretary Kerry and his Foreign Ministry counterparts reaffirmed their intent, first stated at the September 28, 2012, SCF, to “work toward enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense.”
Several of our partners in the region have expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has contracted to buy two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (or THAAD) batteries that, when operational, will enhance the UAE’s national security as well as regional stability.
The UAE also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets. We look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperability with our GCC partners in the months and years ahead.
Additionally and separately, the United States maintains a strong defense relationship with Israel, and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in comprehensive missile defense architecture for Israel. Israeli programs such as Iron Dome, the David’s Sling Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon System, in conjunction with operational cooperation with the United States, create a multilayered architecture designed to protect the Israeli people from varying types of missile threats.
In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing to cooperate through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships.
For example, the United States and Japan already are working closely together to develop the SM-3 Block IIA, which will make a key contribution to the EPAA as well as being deployed elsewhere in the world. We also recently completed the deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the U.S. and Japan. And finally, we are continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces, which will be aided by recent changes to the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, which we expect to complete soon.
We also continue to consult closely with Australia. For example, as a result of U.S.-Australia Foreign and Defense ministerial-level consultations over the past year, the United States and Australia have established a bilateral BMD Working Group to examine options for potential Australian contributions to the BMD architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.
Additionally, we are also consulting closely with the Republic of Korea as it develops the Korean Air and Missile Defense system, which is designed to defend the Republic of Korea against air and missile threats from North Korea. The Republic of Korea recently announced its plans to purchase Patriot PAC-3 missiles, which will enhance its capability to defend against the North Korean ballistic missile threat.
A Constraint Free Missile Defense
Finally, let me say a few things about missile defense and Russia.
Prior to the suspension of our dialogue as a result of Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine, Russia continued to demand that the United States provide it “legally binding” guarantees that our missile defense will not harm or diminish its strategic nuclear deterrent. These guarantees would have been based on criteria that would have limited our missile defenses and undermined our ability to stay ahead of the ballistic missile threat.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Review is quite clear on our policy: U.S. missile defense is not designed nor directed against Russia and China’s strategic nuclear forces.
However, at the same time, we have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally-binding or other constraints that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.
The security of the United States, its allies and partners is our foremost and solemn responsibility. As such, the United States will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats, free from obligations or other constraints that limit our BMD capabilities.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense cooperation with allies and partners around the world over the past several years. This was a key goal of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review.
In Europe, implementation of the EPAA and NATO missile defense is going well. For example, the missile defense radar in Turkey has been operating since 2011, and the Aegis Ashore site in Romania is scheduled to become operational later this year.
In the Middle East, we are continuing to work bilaterally and multilaterally with our partners in the GCC to deploy effective missile defense. For example, later this year the United Arab Emirates will take delivery of its first THAAD battery.
Furthermore, we continue to work with Israel to expand its multilayered architecture to protect it from missile threats.
In the Asia-Pacific, we are working actively with our allies to enhance our missile defense capabilities in the region. On that note, we recently completed deployment of second missile defense radar in Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the U.S. and Japan.
Finally, we continue to oppose Russia’s attempts to impose limitations on our missile defenses that would limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.
Suffice to say, defense of our allies and partners through assistance on missile defense cooperation is and will remain a key priority of the U.S. Government.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Monday, March 9, 2015
REMARKS BY FRANK A. ROSE ON U.S.-INDIA SPACE SECURITY COOPERATION
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
03/06/2015 10:49 AM EST
U.S.-India Space Security Cooperation: A Partnership for the 21st Century
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Observer Research Foundation
New Delhi, India
March 5, 2015
Thank you very much.
Again, my name is Frank Rose. It’s an honor to return to India in my new role as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance.
I’d like to thank the Observer Research Foundation and my good friend Raji for inviting me to speak with you today.
A Renewed U.S.-India Partnership
At the State Department, my colleagues and I are focused on the tools needed to promote global security as well as stable, strategic relationships with friends and partners around the world.
As the world’s two largest democracies, the U.S.-India Partnership is indispensable to global peace, prosperity, and stability.
Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Washington in September and President Obama’s visit to India this January were critical steps towards strengthening and expanding the U.S.-India strategic partnership.
We’ve seen tremendous movement and progress made in all areas of our relationship—infrastructure and investment, civil nuclear cooperation, climate change, defense cooperation and defense trade, health, and global issues like women’s rights and nonproliferation.
But it’s also important to remember that our partnership has deep roots.
As our leaders wrote in their joint op-ed in the Washington Post, “As nations committed to democracy, liberty, diversity, and enterprise, India and the United States are bound by common values and mutual interests. We have each shaped the positive trajectory of human history, and through our joint efforts, our natural and unique partnership can help shape international security and peace for years to come.”
Space Security Cooperation
As we deepen our strategic relationship, we share an interest in addressing the emerging security challenges of the 21st century.
Ensuring the long-term sustainability and security of the outer space environment is one of those challenges, and one that the United States and India are uniquely situated to address together.
Between ISRO and NASA, our two nations have done tremendous work in our exploration of outer space.
I would like to congratulate India on being one of just four space agencies to have reached Mars’ orbit and for being the first Asian nation to do so. It was a pleasant coincidence that NASA’s MAVEN spacecraft and ISRO’s Mars Orbiter Mission entered the orbit of Mars within a couple of days of each other.
We’re also pleased that ISRO and NASA have established a Mars Working Group to explore how our separate Mars missions can work together and coordinate their efforts. This is just one area of the nearly 15 years of strong civil space cooperation between India and the United States. We look forward to the continued growth across all areas of our space cooperation, potentially including India’s participation in research aboard the International Space Station.
U.S.-India civil cooperation in space has not led to extensive cooperation on space security, at least to date.
But I believe that just as this is a time of transformation and progress for our strategic partnership, so too is it a time of growth for our space security relationship.
Our governments recognize the importance of space security; in September our President and Prime Minister called for the establishment of a dialogue to address this important issue. I’m proud to chair that dialogue here next week.
Bilateral Space Security Cooperation
In September of last year, our leaders committed to a new mantra for our relationship, “Chalein saath saath; forward together we go.” I believe this is true for our space security relationship as well.
As we begin bilateral cooperation on space security, it is important we have an open dialogue where we share information, discuss areas in which we disagree as well as those where we agree, and identify areas for cooperation.
I am excited to start that conversation here in New Delhi.
We also need to identify areas of concrete collaboration.
Collaboration in space situational awareness and collision avoidance, as identified by the U.S.-India Joint Statement of September 2014, is one such potential area.
As we all know, space situational awareness, or SSA, is a foundational capability for spaceflight safety and preventing collisions in space. International cooperation on SSA is greatly beneficial, as international partnerships bring the resources, capabilities, and geographical advantages to enhance SSA upon which we increasingly depend.
The Department of State works closely with the Department of Defense on SSA information sharing agreements with foreign partners.
Establishing an arrangement to share information between the United States and India would be one possible way to begin bilateral collaboration.
Another area of potential bilateral collaboration could be on the utilization of space assets for maritime domain awareness.
Maritime domain awareness is greatly enhanced when data from ground- and sea-based sensors and local human observations are combined with data from space-based sensors, whether those data are from Automatic Identification Systems or Earth-observation satellites.
As both of our countries have a strong interest in promoting maritime security, and have developed robust and multi-layered maritime domain awareness architectures which utilize satellite information, I believe it would be worthwhile to explore cooperation and information exchanges in this area.
Multilateral Space Security Cooperation
There is much that our nations can do together in the multilateral arena as well.
Today, India, the United States, and the world all rely on satellites for communications, for disaster management and relief, for treaty monitoring, and for sustainable development, among many other things.
But there are risks and dangers to operating in space. As the United States Director of National Intelligence noted in January 2014, threats to space services are increasing as potential adversaries pursue disruptive and destructive counter-space capabilities. For example, Chinese military writings highlight the need to interfere with, damage, and destroy reconnaissance, navigation, and communication satellites. China has satellite jamming capabilities and is pursuing antisatellite systems.
The United States and India are both strong believers in transparency and rules based on international law and customs. Our Declaration of Friendship released during the President’s visit in January specifically mentions our mutual respect for “an open, just, sustainable, and inclusive rule-based global order.”
Given the threats and risks, and our national principles and laws, I believe that one of the most obvious and most beneficial areas of cooperation between our countries is in the establishment of rules of the road for outer space activities.
As established space-faring nations, India and the United States should work together to clearly and publicly define what behavior the international community should find both acceptable and unacceptable.
Transparency and confidence-building measures, or TCBMs, such as the proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, can contribute to everyone’s awareness of the space environment.
Among the Code’s commitments for signatories is to refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or destruction, of space objects and to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the creation of space debris, in particular, the creation of long-lived space debris.
Political commitments such as the International Code of Conduct are complemented by work on guidelines on space operations and collaborative space situational awareness in multilateral fora such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, or COPUOS.
The Working Group on the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, a part of COPUOS’ Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, which just concluded its meeting in Vienna last month, is doing important work to move forward in the development of new international long-term sustainability guidelines.
Initiatives like the establishment of TCBMs, the Code of Conduct, and the work of UNCOPUOS cannot be successful without the support and active participation of India.
But Indian support for these or other rules of the road initiatives only gets us half-way there. I firmly believe that with U.S.-India collaboration in establishing norms of responsible behavior and Indian leadership in multilateral fora, we can make these and future initiatives even better.
Conclusion
There is much we can do as global partners to ensure the long-term sustainability and security of the outer space environment. Cooperation on space is just one piece of a strategic U.S.-India relationship in the 21st century. As President Obama said in this very city a little more than one month ago, “our nations will be more secure, and the world will be a safer and more just place when our two democracies stand together.”
Thank you again for hosting me here today, and I look forward to your questions and to our first official space security dialogue with India.
Thank you.
03/06/2015 10:49 AM EST
U.S.-India Space Security Cooperation: A Partnership for the 21st Century
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Observer Research Foundation
New Delhi, India
March 5, 2015
Thank you very much.
Again, my name is Frank Rose. It’s an honor to return to India in my new role as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance.
I’d like to thank the Observer Research Foundation and my good friend Raji for inviting me to speak with you today.
A Renewed U.S.-India Partnership
At the State Department, my colleagues and I are focused on the tools needed to promote global security as well as stable, strategic relationships with friends and partners around the world.
As the world’s two largest democracies, the U.S.-India Partnership is indispensable to global peace, prosperity, and stability.
Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Washington in September and President Obama’s visit to India this January were critical steps towards strengthening and expanding the U.S.-India strategic partnership.
We’ve seen tremendous movement and progress made in all areas of our relationship—infrastructure and investment, civil nuclear cooperation, climate change, defense cooperation and defense trade, health, and global issues like women’s rights and nonproliferation.
But it’s also important to remember that our partnership has deep roots.
As our leaders wrote in their joint op-ed in the Washington Post, “As nations committed to democracy, liberty, diversity, and enterprise, India and the United States are bound by common values and mutual interests. We have each shaped the positive trajectory of human history, and through our joint efforts, our natural and unique partnership can help shape international security and peace for years to come.”
Space Security Cooperation
As we deepen our strategic relationship, we share an interest in addressing the emerging security challenges of the 21st century.
Ensuring the long-term sustainability and security of the outer space environment is one of those challenges, and one that the United States and India are uniquely situated to address together.
Between ISRO and NASA, our two nations have done tremendous work in our exploration of outer space.
I would like to congratulate India on being one of just four space agencies to have reached Mars’ orbit and for being the first Asian nation to do so. It was a pleasant coincidence that NASA’s MAVEN spacecraft and ISRO’s Mars Orbiter Mission entered the orbit of Mars within a couple of days of each other.
We’re also pleased that ISRO and NASA have established a Mars Working Group to explore how our separate Mars missions can work together and coordinate their efforts. This is just one area of the nearly 15 years of strong civil space cooperation between India and the United States. We look forward to the continued growth across all areas of our space cooperation, potentially including India’s participation in research aboard the International Space Station.
U.S.-India civil cooperation in space has not led to extensive cooperation on space security, at least to date.
But I believe that just as this is a time of transformation and progress for our strategic partnership, so too is it a time of growth for our space security relationship.
Our governments recognize the importance of space security; in September our President and Prime Minister called for the establishment of a dialogue to address this important issue. I’m proud to chair that dialogue here next week.
Bilateral Space Security Cooperation
In September of last year, our leaders committed to a new mantra for our relationship, “Chalein saath saath; forward together we go.” I believe this is true for our space security relationship as well.
As we begin bilateral cooperation on space security, it is important we have an open dialogue where we share information, discuss areas in which we disagree as well as those where we agree, and identify areas for cooperation.
I am excited to start that conversation here in New Delhi.
We also need to identify areas of concrete collaboration.
Collaboration in space situational awareness and collision avoidance, as identified by the U.S.-India Joint Statement of September 2014, is one such potential area.
As we all know, space situational awareness, or SSA, is a foundational capability for spaceflight safety and preventing collisions in space. International cooperation on SSA is greatly beneficial, as international partnerships bring the resources, capabilities, and geographical advantages to enhance SSA upon which we increasingly depend.
The Department of State works closely with the Department of Defense on SSA information sharing agreements with foreign partners.
Establishing an arrangement to share information between the United States and India would be one possible way to begin bilateral collaboration.
Another area of potential bilateral collaboration could be on the utilization of space assets for maritime domain awareness.
Maritime domain awareness is greatly enhanced when data from ground- and sea-based sensors and local human observations are combined with data from space-based sensors, whether those data are from Automatic Identification Systems or Earth-observation satellites.
As both of our countries have a strong interest in promoting maritime security, and have developed robust and multi-layered maritime domain awareness architectures which utilize satellite information, I believe it would be worthwhile to explore cooperation and information exchanges in this area.
Multilateral Space Security Cooperation
There is much that our nations can do together in the multilateral arena as well.
Today, India, the United States, and the world all rely on satellites for communications, for disaster management and relief, for treaty monitoring, and for sustainable development, among many other things.
But there are risks and dangers to operating in space. As the United States Director of National Intelligence noted in January 2014, threats to space services are increasing as potential adversaries pursue disruptive and destructive counter-space capabilities. For example, Chinese military writings highlight the need to interfere with, damage, and destroy reconnaissance, navigation, and communication satellites. China has satellite jamming capabilities and is pursuing antisatellite systems.
The United States and India are both strong believers in transparency and rules based on international law and customs. Our Declaration of Friendship released during the President’s visit in January specifically mentions our mutual respect for “an open, just, sustainable, and inclusive rule-based global order.”
Given the threats and risks, and our national principles and laws, I believe that one of the most obvious and most beneficial areas of cooperation between our countries is in the establishment of rules of the road for outer space activities.
As established space-faring nations, India and the United States should work together to clearly and publicly define what behavior the international community should find both acceptable and unacceptable.
Transparency and confidence-building measures, or TCBMs, such as the proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, can contribute to everyone’s awareness of the space environment.
Among the Code’s commitments for signatories is to refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or destruction, of space objects and to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the creation of space debris, in particular, the creation of long-lived space debris.
Political commitments such as the International Code of Conduct are complemented by work on guidelines on space operations and collaborative space situational awareness in multilateral fora such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, or COPUOS.
The Working Group on the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, a part of COPUOS’ Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, which just concluded its meeting in Vienna last month, is doing important work to move forward in the development of new international long-term sustainability guidelines.
Initiatives like the establishment of TCBMs, the Code of Conduct, and the work of UNCOPUOS cannot be successful without the support and active participation of India.
But Indian support for these or other rules of the road initiatives only gets us half-way there. I firmly believe that with U.S.-India collaboration in establishing norms of responsible behavior and Indian leadership in multilateral fora, we can make these and future initiatives even better.
Conclusion
There is much we can do as global partners to ensure the long-term sustainability and security of the outer space environment. Cooperation on space is just one piece of a strategic U.S.-India relationship in the 21st century. As President Obama said in this very city a little more than one month ago, “our nations will be more secure, and the world will be a safer and more just place when our two democracies stand together.”
Thank you again for hosting me here today, and I look forward to your questions and to our first official space security dialogue with India.
Thank you.
Monday, February 23, 2015
U.S. OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN EAST ASIA
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
02/21/2015 12:53 PM EST
Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability in East Asia
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Federation of American Scientists
Washington, DC
February 20, 2015
Introduction
Thank you all very much, and a special thanks to Bruce and Chuck for having me here today to address this important workshop.
I’m told that this group is exploring China’s potential interest in and deployment of strategic ballistic missile defense and what that means for U.S. and allied security.
At the State Department, we’re taking a hard look at it as well, and in particular, the role of ballistic missile defense in achieving the overarching goal of strategic stability between the United States and China.
Overview of Strategic Stability with China
Before discussing China’s interest in developing a BMD system and the possible implications of such an effort, I’d first like to provide an overview of what the United States is doing to ensure a stable U.S.-China strategic relationship in the region.
As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is committed to maintaining strategic stability in U.S.-China relations and supports initiation of a dialogue on strategic stability and nuclear postures aimed at fostering a more stable, resilient, and transparent security relationship with China.
During the Cold War, many associated strategic stability with what we called “mutual assured destruction,” the notion that the incentive to initiate nuclear use would be discouraged by the fear of suffering unacceptable retaliatory damage. This notion, of course, is ill-suited and too narrow to fully capture the U.S.-China relationship given our multifaceted and shared interests. In today’s world, strategic stability encompasses much more than just nuclear relations and reflects the fact that the U.S.-China relationship, which has both elements of competition and cooperation, is not adversarial.
The strategic relationship between the United States and China is complex, and we each view stability differently. Thus, it is important that we have frank and open dialogue about how our nations define and view strategic stability and how we perceive our nuclear postures and policies impacting this balance. As part of these discussions, the United States is willing to discuss all issues, including missile defense, space-related issues, conventional precision strike capabilities, and nuclear weapons issues, with the goal of improving the conditions for a more predictable and safer security environment.
A sustained and substantive discussion of our national approaches to maintaining effective deterrent postures and modernization of associated strategic capabilities can increase understanding, enhance confidence and reduce mistrust.
Overview of China’s BMD Activities
As you’re all aware, China is continuing to develop its BMD capabilities.
Although China does not say much about its BMD programs, China publicly announced that it conducted ground-based mid-course BMD tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014. I’ll say more about the 2014 “BMD” test later. Chinese state media has stated that such tests are defensive in nature and are not targeted at any country.
I was in Beijing earlier this month, and the message I delivered was clear: It is important that our governments have a sustained dialogue on the role that our BMD systems have in our respective defense policies and strategies. We would welcome an opportunity to learn more about how BMD fits into China’s defense policy and strategy.
More broadly, a sustained dialogue would improve our understanding of China’s strategic perspective and enhance China’s understanding of U.S. policy and strategy. Institutionalizing discussions of strategic issues is a prudent long-term approach to strengthening strategic stability and exploring means for strengthening mutual trust and risk reduction.
To encourage that dialogue, we have taken and will continue to take steps to keep China informed about developments in U.S. BMD policy.
Potential Chinese BMD through the Lens of the U.S. Experience
The U.S. experience with BMD and specifically with our Ground-based Midcourse Defense System, or GMD, provides a useful lens for examining the challenges the Chinese would face in developing a BMD capability to threaten our nuclear deterrent.
We have been clear that our homeland BMD capabilities provide for defense of the U.S. homeland from limited ICBM attack, and are purposely not intended to affect Russia’s or China’s strategic deterrent. The GMD system is designed to support that policy, and it is not scaled, intended, or capable of defending the United States against the larger and more sophisticated arsenals of Russia and China. GMD is designed to protect the U.S. homeland only from limited ICBM attacks from states such as North Korea and Iran.
The U.S. experience with BMD suggests that attempting to develop a comprehensive homeland BMD system to defend against ballistic missile attack from China or Russia would be extremely challenging – and costly - given the size and sophistication of Chinese and Russian ICBMs. This owes to several factors, including the relatively low number of GMD interceptors and the sophistication and large numbers of Russian and Chinese missiles.
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated this publically on May 18, 2010, in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when he said that trying to eliminate the viability of the Russian nuclear capability would be “unbelievably expensive.”
Given these factors, we could potentially expect a notional Chinese equivalent to the GMD system to provide at most a limited defense of the Chinese homeland, which would not counter the U.S. strategic deterrent and therefore would not undermine strategic stability.
This is for the same reason that GMD does not impact strategic stability: the number of interceptors is low and they are not designed to deal with complex threats, and developing a comprehensive system to cope with a full-scale attack from another nuclear-armed great power would be expensive and ultimately unsuccessful.
Relationship to ASAT Testing
There is a another important aspect of China’s BMD program that bears discussing, which is its connection with China’s anti-satellite, or ASAT, weapons program.
On July 23, 2014, the Chinese Government conducted a non-destructive test of a missile designed to destroy satellites in low Earth orbit. However, China publicly called this ASAT test a “land-based missile interception test.”
Despite China’s claims that this was not an ASAT test; let me assure you the United States has high confidence in its assessment, that the event was indeed an ASAT test.
The continued development and testing of destructive ASAT systems is both destabilizing and threatens the long-term security and sustainability of the outer space environment. A previous destructive test of the Chinese system in 2007 created thousands of pieces of debris, which continue to present an ongoing danger to the space systems—as well as astronauts—of all nations, including China.
The destructive nature of debris-generating weapons has decades-long consequences: they can increase the potential for further collisions in the future, which only create more debris. A debris-forming test or attack may only be minutes in duration, but the consequences can last for decades. It is for these reasons that the United States believes testing debris-generating ASAT systems threaten the security, economic well-being, and civil endeavors of all nations.
Space systems and their supporting infrastructures enable a wide range of services, including communication; position, navigation, and timing; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and meteorology, which provide vital national, military, civil, scientific, and economic benefits. Other nations recognize these benefits to the United States and seek to counter the U.S. strategic advantage by pursuing capabilities to deny or destroy our access to space services.
The use of such ASAT weapons could be escalatory in a crisis.
China’s ASAT program, and the lack of transparency accompanying it, also impedes bilateral space cooperation. While we prefer cooperation, it will by necessity have to be a product of a step-by-step approach starting with dialogue, leading to modest CBMs, which might then perhaps lead to deeper engagement. However, none of this is possible until China changes its behavior with regard to ASATs.
Conclusion
As many of you know, one of my biggest priorities as Assistant Secretary is to look over the horizon a bit and begin to structure our Bureau to address the emerging security challenges of the 21st Century.
For me, that means an increased focus on developing a stable strategic relationship with China, while at the same time reassuring our Allies.
Managing the U.S.-China relationship will take a lot of time and effort, and we won’t always be successful. It’s a challenge. But as Secretary Kerry likes to remind us, it’s important for us to get caught trying, and that’s what we intend to do.
Thanks very much.
02/21/2015 12:53 PM EST
Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability in East Asia
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Federation of American Scientists
Washington, DC
February 20, 2015
Introduction
Thank you all very much, and a special thanks to Bruce and Chuck for having me here today to address this important workshop.
I’m told that this group is exploring China’s potential interest in and deployment of strategic ballistic missile defense and what that means for U.S. and allied security.
At the State Department, we’re taking a hard look at it as well, and in particular, the role of ballistic missile defense in achieving the overarching goal of strategic stability between the United States and China.
Overview of Strategic Stability with China
Before discussing China’s interest in developing a BMD system and the possible implications of such an effort, I’d first like to provide an overview of what the United States is doing to ensure a stable U.S.-China strategic relationship in the region.
As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is committed to maintaining strategic stability in U.S.-China relations and supports initiation of a dialogue on strategic stability and nuclear postures aimed at fostering a more stable, resilient, and transparent security relationship with China.
During the Cold War, many associated strategic stability with what we called “mutual assured destruction,” the notion that the incentive to initiate nuclear use would be discouraged by the fear of suffering unacceptable retaliatory damage. This notion, of course, is ill-suited and too narrow to fully capture the U.S.-China relationship given our multifaceted and shared interests. In today’s world, strategic stability encompasses much more than just nuclear relations and reflects the fact that the U.S.-China relationship, which has both elements of competition and cooperation, is not adversarial.
The strategic relationship between the United States and China is complex, and we each view stability differently. Thus, it is important that we have frank and open dialogue about how our nations define and view strategic stability and how we perceive our nuclear postures and policies impacting this balance. As part of these discussions, the United States is willing to discuss all issues, including missile defense, space-related issues, conventional precision strike capabilities, and nuclear weapons issues, with the goal of improving the conditions for a more predictable and safer security environment.
A sustained and substantive discussion of our national approaches to maintaining effective deterrent postures and modernization of associated strategic capabilities can increase understanding, enhance confidence and reduce mistrust.
Overview of China’s BMD Activities
As you’re all aware, China is continuing to develop its BMD capabilities.
Although China does not say much about its BMD programs, China publicly announced that it conducted ground-based mid-course BMD tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014. I’ll say more about the 2014 “BMD” test later. Chinese state media has stated that such tests are defensive in nature and are not targeted at any country.
I was in Beijing earlier this month, and the message I delivered was clear: It is important that our governments have a sustained dialogue on the role that our BMD systems have in our respective defense policies and strategies. We would welcome an opportunity to learn more about how BMD fits into China’s defense policy and strategy.
More broadly, a sustained dialogue would improve our understanding of China’s strategic perspective and enhance China’s understanding of U.S. policy and strategy. Institutionalizing discussions of strategic issues is a prudent long-term approach to strengthening strategic stability and exploring means for strengthening mutual trust and risk reduction.
To encourage that dialogue, we have taken and will continue to take steps to keep China informed about developments in U.S. BMD policy.
Potential Chinese BMD through the Lens of the U.S. Experience
The U.S. experience with BMD and specifically with our Ground-based Midcourse Defense System, or GMD, provides a useful lens for examining the challenges the Chinese would face in developing a BMD capability to threaten our nuclear deterrent.
We have been clear that our homeland BMD capabilities provide for defense of the U.S. homeland from limited ICBM attack, and are purposely not intended to affect Russia’s or China’s strategic deterrent. The GMD system is designed to support that policy, and it is not scaled, intended, or capable of defending the United States against the larger and more sophisticated arsenals of Russia and China. GMD is designed to protect the U.S. homeland only from limited ICBM attacks from states such as North Korea and Iran.
The U.S. experience with BMD suggests that attempting to develop a comprehensive homeland BMD system to defend against ballistic missile attack from China or Russia would be extremely challenging – and costly - given the size and sophistication of Chinese and Russian ICBMs. This owes to several factors, including the relatively low number of GMD interceptors and the sophistication and large numbers of Russian and Chinese missiles.
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated this publically on May 18, 2010, in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when he said that trying to eliminate the viability of the Russian nuclear capability would be “unbelievably expensive.”
Given these factors, we could potentially expect a notional Chinese equivalent to the GMD system to provide at most a limited defense of the Chinese homeland, which would not counter the U.S. strategic deterrent and therefore would not undermine strategic stability.
This is for the same reason that GMD does not impact strategic stability: the number of interceptors is low and they are not designed to deal with complex threats, and developing a comprehensive system to cope with a full-scale attack from another nuclear-armed great power would be expensive and ultimately unsuccessful.
Relationship to ASAT Testing
There is a another important aspect of China’s BMD program that bears discussing, which is its connection with China’s anti-satellite, or ASAT, weapons program.
On July 23, 2014, the Chinese Government conducted a non-destructive test of a missile designed to destroy satellites in low Earth orbit. However, China publicly called this ASAT test a “land-based missile interception test.”
Despite China’s claims that this was not an ASAT test; let me assure you the United States has high confidence in its assessment, that the event was indeed an ASAT test.
The continued development and testing of destructive ASAT systems is both destabilizing and threatens the long-term security and sustainability of the outer space environment. A previous destructive test of the Chinese system in 2007 created thousands of pieces of debris, which continue to present an ongoing danger to the space systems—as well as astronauts—of all nations, including China.
The destructive nature of debris-generating weapons has decades-long consequences: they can increase the potential for further collisions in the future, which only create more debris. A debris-forming test or attack may only be minutes in duration, but the consequences can last for decades. It is for these reasons that the United States believes testing debris-generating ASAT systems threaten the security, economic well-being, and civil endeavors of all nations.
Space systems and their supporting infrastructures enable a wide range of services, including communication; position, navigation, and timing; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and meteorology, which provide vital national, military, civil, scientific, and economic benefits. Other nations recognize these benefits to the United States and seek to counter the U.S. strategic advantage by pursuing capabilities to deny or destroy our access to space services.
The use of such ASAT weapons could be escalatory in a crisis.
China’s ASAT program, and the lack of transparency accompanying it, also impedes bilateral space cooperation. While we prefer cooperation, it will by necessity have to be a product of a step-by-step approach starting with dialogue, leading to modest CBMs, which might then perhaps lead to deeper engagement. However, none of this is possible until China changes its behavior with regard to ASATs.
Conclusion
As many of you know, one of my biggest priorities as Assistant Secretary is to look over the horizon a bit and begin to structure our Bureau to address the emerging security challenges of the 21st Century.
For me, that means an increased focus on developing a stable strategic relationship with China, while at the same time reassuring our Allies.
Managing the U.S.-China relationship will take a lot of time and effort, and we won’t always be successful. It’s a challenge. But as Secretary Kerry likes to remind us, it’s important for us to get caught trying, and that’s what we intend to do.
Thanks very much.
Tuesday, November 5, 2013
U.S. OFFICIAL'S REMARKS AT PUGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD SECURITY
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Sixtieth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Security
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Istanbul, Turkey
November 1, 2013
Thank you for that kind introduction, Sergio. I am pleased to be here at 60th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs and I want to thank Pugwash for organizing this conference.
Today, I would like to provide an update on our work, which the President laid out nearly four years ago in Prague, when he committed the United States to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a goal that he reaffirmed in his speech in Berlin this past June.
As President Obama noted in Prague and repeated in Berlin, this will not be easy. It will require persistence and patience, and may not happen in his lifetime. Still, over the last four years we have succeeded in moving closer to this goal.
In 2010, the Administration concluded a Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, which outlines the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers, as well as advancing the broader security interests of the United States and its allies. As the NPR states, the international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War: the threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. The traditional concept of nuclear deterrence — the idea that a country would not initiate a nuclear war for fear of nuclear retaliation — does not apply to terrorists. While our nuclear arsenal has little relevance in deterring this threat, concerted action by all states to uphold their NPT obligations – including those related to disarmament – is important for building a sense of common purpose that helps maintain support from partners around the world to uphold and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Securing sensitive nuclear materials worldwide will also make it harder for terrorists to acquire those materials.
For instance, the downblending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) by Russia that was required by the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement has now been completed. The final delivery of the resultant LEU to the United States is scheduled for early December. Upon the successful completion of the Agreement, 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian weapons will have been converted into LEU and delivered to the United States to fuel U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The HEU that was converted by downblending was enough to produce approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads.
In the United States, 374 metric tons of U.S. HEU has been declared excess to nuclear weapons; most of which will be downblended or used as fuel in naval or research reactors. In 2011, the United States and Russia brought into force the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 2010 protocols, which require each side to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium – enough in total for about 17,000 nuclear weapons – and thus permanently remove this material from military programs. Russia has also been an essential partner in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts to convert research reactors worldwide from HEU to LEU and repatriate those reactors’ HEU to the country of origin. These efforts have now converted or verified the shutdown of over 88 research and test reactors and isotope production facilities, and removed over 5,017 kg of HEU for secure storage, downblending and disposition.
In addition to working on the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, we have taken steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. We are not developing new nuclear weapons or pursuing new nuclear missions; we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations; and we have clearly stated that it is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the 68-year record of nonuse of nuclear weapons be extended forever.
In June of 2013, in conjunction with his Berlin speech, President Obama issued new guidance that aligns U.S. nuclear policies to the 21st century security environment. This was the latest concrete step the President has taken to advance his Prague agenda and the long-term goal of achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. After a comprehensive review, the President determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty.
Let me now address what we believe our next steps should be.
The United States and Russia still possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world, and we have a shared responsibility to continue the process of reducing our nuclear arms. With that in mind, we have a great example in the New START Treaty. The implementation of New START, now in its third year, is going well. When New START is fully implemented, the United States and the Russian Federation will each have no more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads – the lowest levels since the 1950s. Our overall nuclear stockpile is 85% below Cold War levels.
Going forward, the United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to further reduce nuclear arsenals.
To this end, we are engaged in a bilateral dialogue with Russia to promote strategic stability and increase transparency on a reciprocal basis. We are hopeful our dialogue will lead to greater reciprocal transparency and negotiation of even further nuclear weapons reductions.
The President also said in Berlin, that we will work with our NATO Allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe. The NPR underscores the U.S. position that decision on NATO’s nuclear posture should be made by consensus among Allies. The role of nuclear weapons in NATO was examined as part of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. As you may know, NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of, and reliance on, nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. Allies made clear in the DDPR that NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area. Allies have also affirmed their desire to work with Russia on reciprocal transparency steps regarding NSNW. While seeking to create the conditions for further nuclear reductions, NATO will continue to ensure that the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective, as NATO is committed to remaining a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist.
There are still further initiatives that are part of this Administration’s nuclear agenda. In Berlin, President Obama called on all nations to begin negotiations on a treaty that ends the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or FMCT would codify an end to the production of weapons-grade fissile material needed to create nuclear weapons, cap stockpiles worldwide, and provide the basis for further, deeper, reductions in nuclear arsenals.
Beginning multilateral negotiations on the FMCT is a priority objective for the United States and for the vast majority of states, and we have been working to initiate such negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. An overwhelming majority of nations support the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations. The United States is consulting with China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, as well as others, including India and Pakistan, to find a way to commence negotiations of an FMCT.
In 2009, the five nuclear-weapon states, or “P5,” began to meet regularly for discussions on issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, these discussions have expanded to address P5 implementation of our commitments under the NPT and the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. Russia hosted the most recent P5 conference in Geneva, Switzerland in April 2013, where the P5 reviewed progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and continued discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. We are looking forward to continued discussions at a fifth P5 conference in 2014.
In addition to providing a senior level policy forum for discussion and coordination among the P5, this process has spawned a series of discussions among policymakers and government experts on a variety of issues. China is leading a P5 working group on nuclear definitions and terminology. The P5 are discussing approaches to a common format for NPT reporting, and we are also beginning to engage at expert levels on some important verification and transparency issues. As we proceed, we would like the P5 conferences and intersessional meetings to develop further practical transparency measures that build confidence and predictability.
I should add at this point that when discussing areas to broaden and deepen our cooperation and to advance our common interests, it’s necessary to address the question of missile defense. Over the past twenty years, both Democratic and Republicans have seen the benefits of missile defense cooperation with Russia.
While we have our differences on this issue, the United States remains convinced that missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, the United States remains open to missile defense cooperation with Russia. To be clear, U.S. missile defense efforts are focused on defending our homeland as well as our European, Middle Eastern, and Asian allies and partners against ballistic missile threats coming from regional actors. These are threats that are growing, and must be met.
In meeting those threats, it is important to note that U.S. missile defenses are not designed for, or capable of, undermining the Russian or Chinese strategic deterrents. For its part, Russia has been insistent on legally binding guarantees that our missile defenses will not threaten its strategic deterrent. Rather than legal guarantees, we believe that the best way for Russia to see that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not undermine its strategic deterrent would be for it to cooperate with us and to engage in mutual transparency measures. In addition to making all of us safer, cooperation would send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter proliferation. With regard to China, the United States welcomes the opportunity to engage in a more robust dialogue about strategic stability, including missile defense.
As our work together with Russia over the past four years has shown, we can produce significant results that benefit both countries. As mentioned earlier, the New START Treaty is a great example of this.
None of this will be easy, but the policies the Administration is pursuing are suited for our security needs and tailored for the global security threats of the 21st century. By maintaining and supporting a safe, secure and effective stockpile — sufficient to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies — at the same time that we pursue responsible verifiable reductions through arms control, we will make this world a safer place.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Sixtieth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Security
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Istanbul, Turkey
November 1, 2013
Thank you for that kind introduction, Sergio. I am pleased to be here at 60th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs and I want to thank Pugwash for organizing this conference.
Today, I would like to provide an update on our work, which the President laid out nearly four years ago in Prague, when he committed the United States to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a goal that he reaffirmed in his speech in Berlin this past June.
As President Obama noted in Prague and repeated in Berlin, this will not be easy. It will require persistence and patience, and may not happen in his lifetime. Still, over the last four years we have succeeded in moving closer to this goal.
In 2010, the Administration concluded a Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, which outlines the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers, as well as advancing the broader security interests of the United States and its allies. As the NPR states, the international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War: the threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. The traditional concept of nuclear deterrence — the idea that a country would not initiate a nuclear war for fear of nuclear retaliation — does not apply to terrorists. While our nuclear arsenal has little relevance in deterring this threat, concerted action by all states to uphold their NPT obligations – including those related to disarmament – is important for building a sense of common purpose that helps maintain support from partners around the world to uphold and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Securing sensitive nuclear materials worldwide will also make it harder for terrorists to acquire those materials.
For instance, the downblending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) by Russia that was required by the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement has now been completed. The final delivery of the resultant LEU to the United States is scheduled for early December. Upon the successful completion of the Agreement, 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian weapons will have been converted into LEU and delivered to the United States to fuel U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The HEU that was converted by downblending was enough to produce approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads.
In the United States, 374 metric tons of U.S. HEU has been declared excess to nuclear weapons; most of which will be downblended or used as fuel in naval or research reactors. In 2011, the United States and Russia brought into force the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 2010 protocols, which require each side to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium – enough in total for about 17,000 nuclear weapons – and thus permanently remove this material from military programs. Russia has also been an essential partner in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts to convert research reactors worldwide from HEU to LEU and repatriate those reactors’ HEU to the country of origin. These efforts have now converted or verified the shutdown of over 88 research and test reactors and isotope production facilities, and removed over 5,017 kg of HEU for secure storage, downblending and disposition.
In addition to working on the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, we have taken steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. We are not developing new nuclear weapons or pursuing new nuclear missions; we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations; and we have clearly stated that it is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the 68-year record of nonuse of nuclear weapons be extended forever.
In June of 2013, in conjunction with his Berlin speech, President Obama issued new guidance that aligns U.S. nuclear policies to the 21st century security environment. This was the latest concrete step the President has taken to advance his Prague agenda and the long-term goal of achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. After a comprehensive review, the President determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty.
Let me now address what we believe our next steps should be.
The United States and Russia still possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world, and we have a shared responsibility to continue the process of reducing our nuclear arms. With that in mind, we have a great example in the New START Treaty. The implementation of New START, now in its third year, is going well. When New START is fully implemented, the United States and the Russian Federation will each have no more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads – the lowest levels since the 1950s. Our overall nuclear stockpile is 85% below Cold War levels.
Going forward, the United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to further reduce nuclear arsenals.
To this end, we are engaged in a bilateral dialogue with Russia to promote strategic stability and increase transparency on a reciprocal basis. We are hopeful our dialogue will lead to greater reciprocal transparency and negotiation of even further nuclear weapons reductions.
The President also said in Berlin, that we will work with our NATO Allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe. The NPR underscores the U.S. position that decision on NATO’s nuclear posture should be made by consensus among Allies. The role of nuclear weapons in NATO was examined as part of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. As you may know, NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of, and reliance on, nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. Allies made clear in the DDPR that NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area. Allies have also affirmed their desire to work with Russia on reciprocal transparency steps regarding NSNW. While seeking to create the conditions for further nuclear reductions, NATO will continue to ensure that the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective, as NATO is committed to remaining a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist.
There are still further initiatives that are part of this Administration’s nuclear agenda. In Berlin, President Obama called on all nations to begin negotiations on a treaty that ends the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or FMCT would codify an end to the production of weapons-grade fissile material needed to create nuclear weapons, cap stockpiles worldwide, and provide the basis for further, deeper, reductions in nuclear arsenals.
Beginning multilateral negotiations on the FMCT is a priority objective for the United States and for the vast majority of states, and we have been working to initiate such negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. An overwhelming majority of nations support the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations. The United States is consulting with China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, as well as others, including India and Pakistan, to find a way to commence negotiations of an FMCT.
In 2009, the five nuclear-weapon states, or “P5,” began to meet regularly for discussions on issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, these discussions have expanded to address P5 implementation of our commitments under the NPT and the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. Russia hosted the most recent P5 conference in Geneva, Switzerland in April 2013, where the P5 reviewed progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and continued discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. We are looking forward to continued discussions at a fifth P5 conference in 2014.
In addition to providing a senior level policy forum for discussion and coordination among the P5, this process has spawned a series of discussions among policymakers and government experts on a variety of issues. China is leading a P5 working group on nuclear definitions and terminology. The P5 are discussing approaches to a common format for NPT reporting, and we are also beginning to engage at expert levels on some important verification and transparency issues. As we proceed, we would like the P5 conferences and intersessional meetings to develop further practical transparency measures that build confidence and predictability.
I should add at this point that when discussing areas to broaden and deepen our cooperation and to advance our common interests, it’s necessary to address the question of missile defense. Over the past twenty years, both Democratic and Republicans have seen the benefits of missile defense cooperation with Russia.
While we have our differences on this issue, the United States remains convinced that missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, the United States remains open to missile defense cooperation with Russia. To be clear, U.S. missile defense efforts are focused on defending our homeland as well as our European, Middle Eastern, and Asian allies and partners against ballistic missile threats coming from regional actors. These are threats that are growing, and must be met.
In meeting those threats, it is important to note that U.S. missile defenses are not designed for, or capable of, undermining the Russian or Chinese strategic deterrents. For its part, Russia has been insistent on legally binding guarantees that our missile defenses will not threaten its strategic deterrent. Rather than legal guarantees, we believe that the best way for Russia to see that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not undermine its strategic deterrent would be for it to cooperate with us and to engage in mutual transparency measures. In addition to making all of us safer, cooperation would send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter proliferation. With regard to China, the United States welcomes the opportunity to engage in a more robust dialogue about strategic stability, including missile defense.
As our work together with Russia over the past four years has shown, we can produce significant results that benefit both countries. As mentioned earlier, the New START Treaty is a great example of this.
None of this will be easy, but the policies the Administration is pursuing are suited for our security needs and tailored for the global security threats of the 21st century. By maintaining and supporting a safe, secure and effective stockpile — sufficient to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies — at the same time that we pursue responsible verifiable reductions through arms control, we will make this world a safer place.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
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