FRANK ROSE MAKES REMARKS ON TRANSATLANTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
6/26/2015 12:12 PM EDT
Transatlantic Missile Defense: Defining the Right Threat Set
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
The Atlantic Council
Washington, DC
June 24, 2015
As prepared

Thank you Ian for that kind introduction and for having me here today.

I always appreciate the opportunity to speak at the annual Atlantic Council missile defense conference alongside so many experts in this important field. Today, I would like to focus my remarks on how the Obama Administration has defined the ballistic missile threat and how we are cooperating to address this threat. I'll keep my comments brief to maximize our time to more freely engage on these issues.

The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (or BMDR) makes clear that the United States’ missile defenses are focused on defending against limited missile threats to the U.S. homeland and regional missile threats to our deployed forces, allies and partners throughout the world. The development of ballistic missiles by countries like Iran and North Korea, and the proliferation of these systems around the world is what drives our threat assessment.

Our deployment of missile defenses is focused on strengthening the twin U.S. goals of deterrence and assurance. In so doing, they also contribute to international peace and stability and reinforce our nonproliferation aims.

At the same time, we have made clear both in our policy and in the capabilities we have deployed that our missile defense efforts are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia and China.

As a practical matter, the U.S. experience with missile defense suggests that attempting to develop a comprehensive missile defense system to defend against ballistic missile attack from Russia would be extremely challenging – and costly – given the size and sophistication of Russia’s strategic missile force and the relatively limited number of missile defense interceptors that would be available to defend against such a large force.

It is to address the regional threats from the Middle East and North Korea, and to enhance our regional deterrence posture, that leads us to cooperate with our allies and partners in deploying missile defense systems and architectures today.

For example, I just returned from a trip to the Middle East, where the United States and Gulf Cooperation Council (or GCC) member states have committed to develop a region-wide ballistic missile defense capability, including through the development of a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. At the recent U.S.-GCC Summit, the United States committed to work with the GCC to conduct a study of a GCC-wide missile defense architecture and offered technical assistance in the development of a GCC-wide Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. Finally, we agreed to hold a senior leader missile defense tabletop exercise to examine improved regional ballistic missile defense cooperation.

In Europe, we continue to make excellent progress implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA), which will serve as the U.S. national contribution to NATO’s missile defense system.

Starting in 2011 with Phase 1, we deployed a missile defense radar in Turkey and began the sustained deployment of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable ships in the Mediterranean. With NATO’s declaration of Interim Capability in 2012, the radar in Turkey transitioned to NATO operational control. Additionally, we have been working with Spain to deploy four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the naval facility at Rota which will allow us to increase our rotational presence in the region and respond to potential crises.

We are on track to complete the deployment of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania as part of Phase 2 of the EPAA later this year. When operational, this site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.

Finally, Phase 3 will involve the construction of an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. President Obama’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget request designates approximately $200 million for the establishment of the site, including construction which will begin next year, allowing us to remain on schedule to complete this site by 2018. The Phase 3 site in Poland, when combined with other EPAA assets, will provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory

In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing missile defense cooperation through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships. I’d highlight that the next generation of Aegis missile defense interceptor, the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA, which we are co-developing with Japan, just completed a successful flight test earlier this month. We also recently deployed a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the United States and Japan.

Finally, over the past twenty years, the United States and NATO offered Russia various proposals for missile defense cooperation. Russia declined to accept our proposals. As you’re aware, Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine led to the suspension of our dialogue on missile defense cooperation. But prior to the suspension, Russia continued to demand that the United States provide “legally binding” guarantees that U.S. missile defenses will not harm or diminish Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. These guarantees would have been based on criteria that would have limited our missile defenses and undermined our ability to protect ourselves, our deployed forces, allies and friends against an evolving and growing ballistic missile threat.

The 2010 BMDR is quite clear on our policy: U.S. missile defenses are neither designed nor directed against Russia’s or China’s strategic nuclear forces. However, by the same token, we have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally-binding or other constraints that would limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners. The United States will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats.

Allow me to conclude by emphasizing that U.S. cooperation on missile defense is not a one size fits all approach. Threats are diverse and so must be our solutions. We tailor our unique sets of capabilities to fit with each regional security environment stretching from Europe to the Asia-Pacific. And as more actors develop sophisticated ballistic missile capabilities, it is incumbent upon us to take the appropriate steps to defend the U.S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. I can personally attest that our diplomatic engagements the last six years have made us, and our allies, better equipped to meet the threats of today, and nimble enough to respond to what threats may lay ahead.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions and our discussion.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER'S REMARKS AT OPEN SKIES TREATY THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Conventional Arms Control in Europe in a Changing European Security Environment
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Open Skies Treaty Third Review Conference
Vienna, Austria
June 10, 2015

As Delivered

Thank you very much for this opportunity to speak with you this morning. Distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, it is truly a pleasure for me to return to the Hofburg to address the Parties to the Open Skies Treaty.  Thank you, Minister Mikhnich, for your leadership and thanks to Belarus for serving as the chair of this Open Skies Review Conference.  I’m glad that this morning we heard from Professor Jones, Professor Stubbs, and Professor Spitzer on the future potential for this Treaty.

It is vital for Treaty Parties to have the opportunity to reflect on the successes of the past five years and to discuss the challenges that lie ahead and the potential going forward.  Just as we did during our school years, we need to review our progress and identify room for improvement.  It is clear that in regards to our “European security report card,” we did not make passing grades in some areas.  This is the case for Open Skies, as well as other parts of the conventional arms control regime in Europe.  We can and must do better.

As you all know, the security situation in Europe has changed dramatically since we last met in 2010, and not for the better.  Russia’s occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, and its ongoing destabilizing and aggressive activity in and around Ukraine have undermined peace, security, and stability across the region.  While diplomacy continues, no one can ignore that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has violated the very principles upon which cooperation is built.  Russia’s selective implementation of the Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty and long-standing non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (or “CFE)” have eroded the positive contributions of these arms control instruments.

We must find a way to rectify the current situation.  Even during the Cold War, NATO and Warsaw Pact nations agreed it was in their common interest to build trust, provide early warning of developing tensions, and be transparent about military plans and postures.  This was exactly the type of transparency called for by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1955, and again by President George H. W. Bush in 1989 when the concept of the Open Skies Treaty was first advanced.  The arms control and confidence building regimes we developed towards the end of the Cold War showed the world, as President Bush said at the time, “the true meaning of the concept of openness.”

Our success was possible because we shared a commitment to the Helsinki principles and to cooperative approaches to security which, unfortunately, is lacking in Europe today.  We need to find a way forward – not walk away because Russia has veered off course.  We call on Russia to join us in improving security in Europe and to return to full implementation of its OSCE commitments, including the Vienna Document, as well as its obligations under CFE and the Open Skies Treaty.

Russia-Ukraine

While Russian aggression in Ukraine has undermined security and confidence in Europe, the current crisis has also demonstrated the value of functioning arms control agreements.  More than a dozen Open Skies flights over Ukraine and western Russia since last February, including the first use of the Treaty’s provision for “Extraordinary Observation Flights,” demonstrated the commitment of Treaty Parties to uphold this key element of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.  Unfortunately, since the tragic missile shoot-down of flight MH-17 last July from a missile system in separatist-held territory, we have been unable to conduct overflights of either Russia or Ukraine near their shared international border.

In addition to Open Skies flights, other European conventional arms control mechanisms have been used to promote stability and provide transparency. Russia’s suspension of the CFE Treaty in 2007 significantly reduced transparency about its military forces.  But, CFE inspections in Ukraine and elsewhere in the neighborhood have been a source of vital information about the military forces in a time of tension.

The Vienna Document’s Confidence and Security-Building Measures have also been used extensively and in creative ways.  I’m thinking in particular of the voluntary visits to dispel concerns and above-quota inspections that Ukraine has hosted throughout the crisis.

Regrettably, these steps have not been reciprocated.  Russia has refused to provide substantive answers to requests for clarification under the Vienna Document’s Risk Reduction provisions and has chosen not to facilitate transparency on the buildup of Russian forces on Ukraine’s border.    

Compliance

My government is very concerned about Russia’s adherence to its treaty obligations.  Russia’s poor compliance record with CFE and INF is now well documented, as is its practice of selective implementation of the Vienna Document and, as we have discussed, the Open Skies Treaty. We have identified a number of compliance issues that impact the conduct of Open Skies flights, including the imposition of several restrictions that impede the full implementation of these treaties.

Many of these issues are described in the United States Compliance Report for calendar year 2014, which was released last Friday on June 5.  Russia should take steps to remedy these problems immediately.

Looking to the Future

Now, let me look to the future. As I said, there are certainly some problems with our report card.  It is now up to all of us to get European security – and conventional arms control – back on track.  As we work together to rebuild the trust and confidence that has been lost in recent years, we must also look to the future.

During the 2010 Review Conference chaired by the U.S, a major theme was the need to transition to digital sensor capability.  I appreciate that the Open Skies States Parties have made a good start in the transition to digital sensors which was initiated by the Russian Federation.  That first digital sensor certification was more complicated than we imagined and I want to thank everyone who has worked so hard this past year to reach agreement on improved technical decisions for future certification events that will involve digital sensors.

This was a good start, but much work remains ahead to sustain this regime.  In addition to completing the digital sensor transition, we must devote further efforts to modernize and improve the fleet of aircraft. We also need to make the financial investments now that will sustain the Open Skies infrastructure in the future.

We have work to do in other parts of our conventional arms control agenda, as well.  The crisis in Ukraine has highlighted the critical need to update and modernize the Vienna Document CSBMs to reflect modern military realities.  It has also focused our attention on the importance of having sufficient verification opportunities in time of crisis.  This will not be easy work, but it is vital nonetheless.  The United States is developing proposals to contribute to this effort and we encourage all OSCE participating States to engage meaningfully and productively in this effort.

The United States and all members of NATO have consistently said that conventional arms control in Europe, based on longstanding Helsinki principles, has a role to play in building a stable and secure Europe.  You all know that this has proven true in the most difficult of circumstances, building mutual confidence in the Western Balkans through the Dayton Article IV agreement.  We can still explore ways to improve security in the Euro-Atlantic region, even though the security situation is not currently amenable to comprehensive new negotiations.

Mr. Chairman, it is time for everyone here to roll up their sleeves and work together to address our failing grades.  Arms control treaties and confidence- and security-building measures are useful tools for building trust and confidence and they have made a vital contribution to peace and security in Europe, which we should not overlook.

There is no doubt that we need to strengthen and modernize our existing arms control and confidence building tools to increase transparency and better address today’s challenge: the challenge of building mutual confidence.  Some of our problems are being addressed here at the Open Skies Review Conference and others will be addressed through our collective work at the OSCE as it commemorates its fortieth year.  We should begin now by focusing on compliance with existing agreements and on building on lessons learned.

I wish all Treaty members continued success for the future implementation of the Open Skies Treaty, and I look forward to your continued contribution to the larger goal of modernizing conventional arms control in Europe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for everyone’s attention.

U.S. FISSILE MATERIAL REDUCTIONS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Arms Control and International Security: U.S. Support for Fissile Material Reductions
05/05/2015 12:24 PM EDT

U.S. Support for Fissile Material Reductions

Reductions

The total U.S. highly enriched uranium inventory as of 2004 was 686.6 MT. In declarations in 1994 and 2005, the United States declared that a significant portion of that inventory totaling 374 MT of HEU would be removed from further use as fissile material in nuclear warheads.

To date, the United States has down-blended more than 146 MT of HEU—enough material for more than 5,800 nuclear weapons.

The landmark 1993 United States-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement eliminated 500 metric tons of Russian weapons- origin HEU, which was converted to LEU and shipped to the United States where it was used for peaceful purposes as fuel in American nuclear power reactors. The amount downblended was equivalent to roughly three warheads worth of HEU per day for most of the last two decades.

In 2009, the United States reported the plutonium inventory was 95.4 metric tons. In 1994 and 2007, 61.5 metric tons of plutonium had been declared excess and removed from further use as fissile material in nuclear warheads.

The U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement requires each state to dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of plutonium declared excess.
Consolidations

Since the early 1980s, the size of the U.S. nuclear complex has shrunk to approximately half of its original size and reduced the workforce by two-thirds.
Looking forward, the United States anticipates shifting from retaining large numbers of non-deployed nuclear warheads towards a more responsive infrastructure. Investing in a more modern physical infrastructure can allow for further reductions in total nuclear forces.

FRANK ROSE MAKES REMARKS ON USING DIPLOMACY TO ADVANCE SECURITY IN OUTER SPACE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Using Diplomacy to Advance the Long-term Sustainability and Security of the Outer Space Environment
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
31st Space Symposium
Colorado Springs, CO
April 16, 2015
As prepared

Introduction

Thank you for your kind introduction and the opportunity to speak to you today.

My name is Frank Rose, and I am the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. It’s a pleasure to be back at the Space Symposium, and I’d like to thank Elliot Pulham and all the sponsors for inviting me back again.

By way of introduction, while I am the Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, my work at the State Department is focused on enhancing strategic stability around the world. Arms control, verification and compliance are some of the tools we use to enhance strategic stability and reassure our allies and partners that we will meet our security commitments. Given the importance of outer space to our national security, we also work on efforts to ensure the long term sustainability and security of the outer space environment.

This morning I would like to discuss steps the United States is taking diplomatically, in concert with international partners to address the growing threats to space security.


Threats to the Space Environment

First, the threat to outer space is real and growing. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said in his recent Congressional testimony,

“Threats to U.S. space systems and services will increase during 2015 and beyond as potential adversaries pursue disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities. Chinese and Russian military leaders understand the unique information advantages afforded by space systems and services and are developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict.”

In particular, China’s continued development of anti-satellite weapons remains a major challenge to the outer space environment. China’s 2007 anti-satellite test left thousands of pieces of debris in orbit that continues to threaten the space systems of all nations.

The 2010 U.S. National Space Policy makes it clear that it is not in the interest of anyone for armed conflict to extend into space. It states,

“The United States considers the space systems of all nations to have the rights of passage through, and conduct of operations in, space without interference. Purposeful interference with space systems, including supporting infrastructure, will be considered an infringement of a nation’s rights.”

It also states that,

“the United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allies space systems, and if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them.”

It is not in the international community’s interest to engage in a space weapons arms race. Such a race would not bode well for the long-term sustainability of the space environment.

Indeed, protecting U.S. national security by preventing conflict from extending into space in the first place is a major goal of our diplomatic engagements. In that regard, we work to prevent conflict from extending into space via two diplomatic tracks; strengthening our deterrent posture, and encouraging responsible behavior to prevent mishaps, misper­ceptions, and the chances of miscalculation.


Strengthening Our Deterrent Posture

First, we use diplomacy to gain the support of our allies and friends. We have established numerous space security dialogues with our Allies and Partners. These dialogues help them understand the threat, as well as our diplomatic and national security goals, which is critical in persuading them to stand by our side, often in the face of tremendous pressure from our adversaries. Not only have I made numerous trips to meet with our allies in Canada, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific, I have also visited India (where we held our first space security dialogue this March), South Africa, and elsewhere in Africa to raise U.S. concerns about the threats to space systems and to discuss the way forward diplomatically. Furthermore, our Department’s leadership has also carried our message in numerous bilateral and multilateral dialogues.

Diplomacy also prepares the way for closer military-to-military cooperation and allied investment in capabilities compatible with U.S. systems. We work very closely with our interagency colleagues in the Department of Defense to make sure our efforts are synchronized so that investments by our allies and friends contribute to strengthening the resilience of our space architectures and contribute to Space Mission Assurance. The resulting deterrent effect created by such a web of integrated capabilities is greater than the sum of its individual parts.

For example, the Department of State works closely with the Department of Defense on Space Situational Awareness (or SSA) information sharing agreements with foreign partners. The United States has found international cooperation on SSA to be important, as international partnerships bring the resources, capabilities, and geographical advantages. We have also worked to strengthen military-to-military cooperation in satellite communications and space-based maritime domain awareness.


Promoting the Responsible Use of Outer Space

Second, we use diplomacy to promote the responsible use of outer space and especially strategic restraint in the development of anti-satellite weapons.

Diplomacy has an important role in responding to the development of anti-satellite weapons developments that threaten the outer space environment. Responding both privately and publicly to tests of anti-satellite systems is a critical component of our diplomatic strategy.

For example, in 2007, China faced tremendous international pressure following its destructive ASAT test, and this response from the international community appears to have been a factor in China changing its approach. We have not seen a destructive ASAT test since then, although China did conduct a non-destructive test of this system in July 2014. I have not been shy about expressing the U.S. Governments concerns about Chinese anti-satellite tests directly to our Chinese counterparts. We need to continue to call out the disruptive actions of countries like Russia and China both publicly and in cooperation with our allies and partners.

The Department of State is also using diplomacy to reduce the chances for conflict extending into space through the promotion of responsible international norms of behavior, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Norms matter because they help define boundaries and distinguish good behavior from bad behavior.

For example, we have discussed preventing mishaps and reducing potentially destabilizing misperceptions or miscalculations with China.

In addition, and very importantly, through bilateral and multilateral dialogue and diplomatic engagement we seek to identify areas of mutual interest and hopefully reach agreement on how to prevent those interests from being harmed in peacetime, and in conflict.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union found many areas of mutual interest in avoiding potentially destabilizing actions. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, started a fifty-plus-year string of bilateral arms control treaties and agreements with the Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation. We also came to agreement in many other realms, including chemical and biological weapons.

Simply stated, if the United States and the Soviet Union could find areas of mutual interest in the realm of nuclear deterrence and chemical weapons -- with the tensions and stakes as high as they were -- then in today’s climate we should be able to find areas of mutual interest among all space-faring nations regarding space security.

Indeed, I would argue that it is reasonable to assume that most nations, if not all nations, would find it to be in their national interest to prevent conflict from extending into space, knowing that such conflict would degrade the sustainability of the space environment, hinder future space-based scientific activities, and potentially reduce the quality of life for everybody on Earth if the benefits of space-based applications were eroded. Convincing other nations, including China and Russia, of this objective is the role of diplomacy.

The United States and China have already implemented some bilateral transparency and confidence building measures (or TCBMs) to prevent the generation of additional debris in space. As part of the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, led by Secretary of State John Kerry, we reached agreement on the establishment of e-mail contact between China and the United States for the transmission of space object conjunction warnings. Not only does this communication help prevent collision between objects in space, it will help to develop trust and understanding between the United States and China.

Over the past few years the United States has also supported a number of multilateral initiatives that should reduce the chances of mishaps, misperceptions and potential miscalculations. Multilateral TCBMs are means by which governments can address challenges and share information with the aim of creating mutual understanding and reducing tensions. Through TCBMs we can increase familiarity and trust and encourage openness among space actors.

One of the key efforts that we have been pursuing is working with the European Union to advance a non-legally binding International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The Code would establish guidelines to reduce the risks of debris-generating events and to strengthen the long-term sustainability and security of the space environment. Among the draft Code’s most important provisions is a commitment for the subscribing States to refrain from any action -- unless such action is justified by exceptions spelled out in the draft Code -- that brings about, directly or indirectly, damage or destruction of space objects. We view the draft Code as a potential first step in establishing TCBMs for space.

The State Department is also leading U.S. efforts in the framework of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) to move forward in the development of a draft set of guidelines for sustainable space operations to include ways to prevent the generation of space debris.

Another important recent effort was the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) study of outer space transparency and confidence-building measures. That UN group, for which I served as the U.S. expert, published a consensus report in July 2013 endorsing voluntary, non-legally binding TCBMs to strengthen sustainability and security in space. The United States subsequently co-sponsored a resolution with Russia and China referring the GGE report’s recommendations for consideration by the relevant entities and organizations of the United Nations system.

These diplomatic efforts contribute to reducing misperceptions and miscalculations and help lower the chance of conflict extending into space.

I would like to add one more thought for your consideration. If we do not lead with active diplomacy on international space security issues, it is more likely that others will seek to fill the diplomatic vacuum with initiatives that meet their own national interests without regard for the broader interests of the international community.

The United States has focused on TCBMs over the last several years because these can make a real difference in the near term. Such measures can lead to greater mutual understanding and reduce tensions.

In contrast, Russia’s and China’s diplomatic efforts to pursue legally binding treaties and other measures do not reduce the chances for mishaps, misunderstanding or miscalculation and provide little or no verification capability to make sure that everyone is playing by the same rules. Moreover, their diplomatic efforts do not address very real, near-term space security threats such as terrestrial-based anti-satellite weapons like the one China tested in 2007.

To be more specific, Russia and China continue to press for a “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects,” known as the PPWT. Russia also is making concerted diplomatic efforts to gain adherents to its pledge of “No First Placement” of weapons in outer space. These two documents are fundamentally flawed. They do not address the threat of terrestrially-based ASAT capabilities, and they contain no verification provisions. Yet, at the same time, these proposals may gain some support internationally because many countries are attracted, naturally, to the idea of preventing the weaponization of space. As a diplomat, it is my job to explain why support for these Russian and Chinese proposals is misplaced and may even be counterproductive, while offering pragmatic alternatives, such as TCBMs, which demonstrate U.S. leadership and help shape the international space security agenda.


Conclusion

If conflict extends into space, the right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes would be threatened.

If diplomacy fails, and the use of force does extend to space, the United States must be prepared to protect our space capabilities and prevail in conflict. That is absolutely clear.

The goal of our diplomacy, however, is to prevent conflict from extending into space in the first place.

Diplomacy can help strengthen U.S. and allied deterrent posture and help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust among nations.

These two diplomatic tracks, supported by other instruments of U.S. national power and the support of our allies and friends, will hopefully persuade any potential adversary that attacking the United States in space would not be in its best interests.

Thank you for your time and attention.

FRANK A. ROSE MAKES REMARKS ON SPACE SECURITY AND OUTER SPACE EXPLORATION

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
11/25/2014 09:22 AM EST
Promoting Space Security and Sustainability
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
International Institute for Strategic Studies
London, United Kingdom
November 21, 2014
As prepared
Introduction

Thank you for that kind introduction, and thanks to the International Institute of Strategic Studies for having me back here today to discuss an issue of vital interest: ensuring the long-term sustainability, stability, safety, and security of the space environment.

For decades, we have been inspired by humanity’s space endeavors and reaped the benefits of the use and exploration of outer space. While some take these benefits for granted, let me be clear: space assets are essential to U.S. national security as well as the security of our allies and coalition partners. This shared interest is recognized here in the United Kingdom, where HM Government’s National Space Security Policy establishes the promotion of a safe and more secure space environment as a key objective.

Outer space is a domain that no nation owns but on which all rely. Yet today, space is becoming increasingly congested from orbital debris, including man-made threats—such as the testing of debris-generating anti-satellite, or ASAT, systems. Left unchecked, such debris could result in access to some space services being seriously degraded or even lost – creating a direct threat to international security.

The world’s growing dependence on the globe-spanning and interconnected nature of space capabilities mean that it is more important than ever for all citizens to understand that irresponsible acts in space by one entity can have damaging consequences for all. Therefore, all nations must work together to adopt a responsible approach to activities in outer space in order to preserve this domain for future generations.

Today, I would like to cover two aspects in regard to ensuring the security and sustainability of the space environment: first, the risks and dangers to space systems from debris generating ASAT tests; second, the role of international diplomatic initiatives in protecting the long-term sustainability and security of the space environment.

Threats to Outer Space

Let me start with the risks and dangers. On July 23 of this year, the Chinese Government conducted a non-destructive test of a missile designed to destroy satellites in low Earth orbit. Despite China’s claims that this was a missile defense test, let me assure you the United States has high confidence in its assessment, that the event was indeed an ASAT test.

And China is not the only one pursuing these capabilities. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper noted in his January 2014 congressional testimony, “Russian leaders openly maintain that the Russian armed forces have antisatellite weapons and conduct antisatellite research.”

The United States believes that these threats, which include the continued development and testing of destructive anti-satellite systems, are both destabilizing and threaten the long-term security and sustainability of the outer space environment. Moreover, these threats affect all who benefit from outer space including the scientific, commercial, and civil space communities. Indeed, thousands of pieces of debris about 10 cm and larger from the 2007 Chinese ASAT test continue to endanger space systems from all nations, including China.

On the security side, ASAT weapons directly threaten satellites and the strategic and tactical information and services those satellites provide, and their use could be escalatory in a crisis or conflict. They also pose a direct threat to key assets used in arms control verification monitoring, command and control and communication, and warning and attack assessment. A debris generating test or attack may only be minutes in duration, but the consequences can last decades and indiscriminately threaten the space-based assets of all space-faring nations, and the information from space upon which all nations depend.

On the civil space side, between 2007 and 2014, NASA has had to perform eight debris avoidance maneuvers of its robotic spacecraft due to possible collisions with debris from the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. Two of these spacecraft maneuvers were conducted in 2014. Just as these systems threaten our national security space systems, they can threaten the civil satellites that are so essential to our everyday lives.

Multilateral Efforts toward a Stable and Sustainable Space Environment

Given these threats and the current era where many States and nongovernmental organizations are harnessing the benefits of outer space, we have no choice but to work with our allies and partners around the world to ensure the long-term sustainability of the space environment. We also must speak clearly and publicly about what behavior the international community should find both acceptable and unacceptable. Over the past few years, the United States has worked to support a number of multilateral initiatives that seek to establish consensus guidelines for space activities that are both in the national security interests of the United States, and will further the long-term stability and sustainability of the space environment.

Just last year, I served as the United States expert on a United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) study of outer space transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs). The consensus GGE report which was published in July of last year endorsed voluntary, non-legally binding TCBMs to strengthen sustainability and security in space. The GGE benefited immensely from the contributions of Professor Richard Crowther of the U.K. Space Agency, who worked with several other experts to define a rigorous set of criteria for considering space TCBMs. This work contributed to the GGE’s recommendation that States implement measures to promote coordination to enhance safety and predictability in the uses of outer space. The report also endorsed “efforts to pursue political commitments, for example, a multilateral code of conduct, to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, outer space.”

This International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities is another important multilateral initiative. Among the Code’s commitments for signatories is to refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or destruction, of space objects and to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the creation of space debris, in particular, the creation of long-lived space debris. The Code could also help solidify safe operational practices, reduce the chance of collisions or other harmful interference with nations’ activities, contribute to our awareness of the space environment through notifications, and strengthen stability in space by helping establish norms for responsible behavior in space.

Lastly, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) is also doing important work to move forward in the development of new international long-term sustainability guidelines. U.S. and U.K. experts from the private sector as well the federal government have played a leading role in the COPUOS Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities. These efforts contribute to the development of multilateral and bilateral space TCBMs. Exchanges of information between space operations centers also can serve as useful confidence building measures.

Multilateral diplomatic initiatives contribute greatly to defining acceptable and unacceptable behaviors in space and therefore are key components of the United States deterrence strategy. In addition, if we are serious about maintaining the space environment for future generations, we must support such measures that promote positive activities in space and further the creation of norms which dissuade countries from taking destabilizing actions such as the testing of debris-generating ASAT systems. By working with the international community, we can, and must, advance the long-term sustainability and security of the outer space environment for all nations and future generations

With that, I would like to thank you for your time and stop here in order to leave time for questions.

REMARKS BY ROSE GOTTENMOELLER ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
America's Commitment to Ballistic Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
Missile Defense Agency
Bucharest, Romania
November 18, 2014

As Prepared

Thank you, Rob, for that introduction. I am so pleased to be here in Romania and at this important time. We congratulate the people of Romania on their election yesterday. We look forward to working with the President-elect and the government of Romania, as we continue to strengthen our already close relationship. I would especially like to thank our Romanian colleagues for their generosity in agreeing to host this influential conference and especially for all of the support they have provided to the deployment of U.S. missile defense site at Deveselu. Thanks also to all of the people here that came from around the world. It is a true testament to our combined efforts that such a large and prestigious crowd has come to participate in this conference.

I know you have already heard from Admiral Syring, Principal Deputy Under Secretary Brian McKeon and Chargé d’Affaires Thompson about the ballistic missile defense systems the United States is deploying in Europe, here in Romania, and around the world. I am not going to re-tread that ground.

I will reiterate one point you have already heard today: The Obama Administration’s commitment to deploying missile defenses to defend the United States homeland, our Allies and partners never waivers. In Europe, we are on track for Phase 2 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach and we are committed to having Phase 3 in Poland completed in 2018. We are working closely across the board with our Israeli Allies on missile defense. We remain committed to missile defense cooperation among our Gulf Cooperation Council partners. In Asia, we also continue to deploy more and more capable missile defense systems and continue our efforts to enhance cooperation with allies and partners.

We are committed to these deployments in the face of constant criticism, particularly from the Russian Federation.

We often hear the refrain from certain corners that missile defenses are destabilizing. With an emphasis on transparency and confidence-building, we have explained that nothing that we are doing with respect to our missile defense plans will undercut international security. It would not be in our interest to do so, it would be prohibitively expensive and from a technical perspective, it would be extremely difficult. So let me take some time to again outline these points, based on logic, physics and math, to prove that our missile defense deployments are a benefit, not a threat, to global strategic stability.

First, the Cold War mindset about ballistic missile defenses is no longer valid. Limited ballistic missile defense capabilities are not capable of threatening Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and are not a threat to strategic stability.

Ballistic missiles during the Cold War were the tools the United States and the Soviet Union used to maintain the strategic balance between our two countries. Today, ballistic missiles are proliferated around the world and are seen as a common battlefield weapon.

That is why today’s limited missile defenses are essential to ensuring regional strategic stability. That is the one and only reason that the United States is pursuing regional missile defense capabilities.

Missile saber rattling is not particularly effective when there are defenses to protect against those missiles. Missile defense can also prevent a country or group from taking cheap shots of one or two launches that it thinks can be used to compel or deter a government. Instead these countries or groups would need to fire a much larger salvo to overcome missile defenses, thereby raising the stakes of entering into a conflict.

Further, missile defenses create uncertainty about the outcome of attacks, thereby increasing the costs to countries and groups attempting to overcome defenses. By reducing a country’s confidence in the effectiveness of missile attacks, we enhance deterrence and regional stability.

Missile defenses and missile defense cooperation also provides reassurance. Reassurance helps reduce a country’s vulnerability to ballistic missile attacks, as well as reassurance regarding the United States’ commitment to their defense. The last part is particularly important since it demonstrates that the United States will stand by our Alliance commitments, even in the face of growth in the military potential of regional adversaries.

Finally, when confronted with an attack, missile defenses can buy time for other courses of actions, such as diplomacy, to help resolve the crisis. All of you know, whether you are policy-makers or military planners, that time- and lack thereof – is one of the most important factors during a crisis.

These are the factors that drive our deployment efforts. Our efforts are aided by the increasing sophistication and accuracy of our ballistic missile defenses, as well as the experience that U.S. forces, our Allies and our partners have gained from being the targets of missile attacks.

Many of our regional defense deployments, like the Patriot system and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system, are inherently designed for theater use. They are not capable of defending against ICBMs launched at the United States. THAAD, however, is capable of defending against the medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missile that North Korea is deploying.

Yet despite our repeated attempts to convey these demonstrable facts, the Russian Federation continues to maintain that our global deployment of these systems is designed somehow to encircle Russia.

Understanding the universal truth of physics, we have also taken care to demonstrate how the systems we are deploying are located in places that are ideal for addressing regional threats. Based on the irrefutable laws of science, these systems cannot do the things the Russian government says they can. You may have seen the Russia trajectory maps that show how the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor could be used against Russian ICBMs. The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the instant – the very second – of a Russian ICBM launch, we would also launch our interceptor. The argument also assumes that we would have perfect knowledge of where that Russian ICBM is going and where it is going to be located several minutes from launch in order to strike the reentry vehicles.

As Admiral Syring attests and our flight tests clearly show, we cannot begin to consider launching an interceptor until well after a ballistic missile has finished its boost phase, the warheads have separated, and we have had time to develop a firing solution. We need considerable time to gather knowledge about where the missile is going before we can launch our interceptor. As a result, the physics just don’t add up. There is no way a U.S. SM-3 IIA interceptor can chase down Russian reentry vehicles.

At one point, we did explore the feasibility of a faster interceptor that had what we called “early intercept” capabilities, but that still relied on intercepting the reentry vehicles after burnout. Again, this was not a boost phase concept. In fact, there are many unclassified reports that discuss the challenges inherent in doing boost phase intercept.

Beyond our theater, capabilities, our Ground-Based Interceptors (known as GBIs) deployed in Alaska and California do not pose a threat to Russian strategic nuclear forces either. Our GBIs are designed to deal with rudimentary systems deployed in limited numbers and with simple countermeasures. Technologically, GBIs cannot counter Russia’s sophisticated ICBM capabilities and countermeasures.

In addition to our other efforts, we have also outlined the plain and simple numbers to the Russians. Our GBI numbers are nowhere remotely near their strategic offensive arsenal numbers. As of October 1st, Russia declared that under the New START counting rules, they were deploying 1,643 warheads on 528 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy Bombers. Let me say that number again: the Russian Federation currently fields 1,643 deployed nuclear warheads. Currently, the United States has 30 ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska. So, hypothetically if all 30 of those GBIs performed perfectly and took out 30 Russian warheads, 1,613 Russian warheads would still get past our defenses.

We will deploy an additional 14 interceptors in Alaska and should we ever deploy an additional east coast site with 20 additional interceptors, Russia would still have 1,579 warheads that could get through our defenses. And while I am optimistic we will negotiate a future nuclear reduction Treaty after New START, even then, our limited numbers of defensive systems cannot even come close to upsetting the strategic balance.

Reversing this equation, I would note that we are not concerned about the impact to strategic stability of Russia’s deployment of 68 interceptors at the Moscow ABM system. Sixty eight deployed interceptors is 24 more than the United States even has plans to deploy. Further, Russia is very open about declaring that the Moscow ABM system is specifically designed against the United States. And just like the United States, Russia is modernizing its radars and interceptors as part of their system. However, that still hasn’t raised concerns in the United States about strategic stability.

Despite our best efforts, none of these facts has made any difference in our discussions with the Russian Federation. They continue instead to argue the system is designed against them. The bottom line is this: The United States will continue to deploy our missile defense systems around the world to defend against limited regional threats. We will continue to deploy the EPAA as our contribution to NATO missile defense. There should be no doubt about our commitment. Moreover, we will not accept any obligations that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships. There is no reason why we should and no reason we would.

Further, at this time, we have serious concerns about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. We continue to work closely with our NATO partners on addressing the changes to European security brought about by the invasion of Ukraine and are seeking Russia’s return to compliance with the INF Treaty.

While Russia has accused the United States of being in violation of the INF Treaty, we are in complete compliance with the INF Treaty. We can describe, in detail, why each of our systems complies with the Treaty. One thing that the United States and Russia have agreed on is that this important Treaty remains in our mutual security interests. May it remain so. In the meantime, we will continue to make our case to the world about the important of limited missile defenses and continue our essential efforts to cooperatively deploy systems around the world.

Thank you for your support with these efforts and thank you again for the opportunity to speak here today.

STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ON P5+1 TALKS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Arms Control and International Security: Background Briefing on P5+1Talks

09/19/2014 06:39 AM EDT

Background Briefing on P5+1Talks

Special Briefing

Senior Administration Officials

Foreign Press Center

New York City

September 18, 2014

MODERATOR: Welcome. For those of you who I don't know, I’m [Moderator]. This will be all on background tonight with no embargo. So you know who’s up here – obviously not for reporting – this will be all be attributed to senior Administration officials, please no names and no titles. But to the left of me is [Senior Administration Official One and Senior Administration Official Two].

So in a moment, I’ll turn it over to [Senior Administration Official One] to make some opening remarks, and then we’ll go to your questions. Again, background, senior Administration officials. Please keep us all honest on this so we can keep doing this. And with that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you. Good evening. Thank you all for coming tonight, and those of you who don’t live here – I don’t – welcome to New York.

I want to begin tonight on a personal note, not just for me but for many in this room. Michael Adler was one of our most beloved colleagues – one of yours, and in many ways, I considered him a colleague as well. He was someone who had watched and reported on these negotiations as they progressed through many, many years. He was one of the sharpest minds on these issues and one of the kindest people any of us has ever had the pleasure of knowing. He was with us in Geneva when we finished the Joint Plan of Action, and I know how much he wanted to see where these comprehensive talks would take us. He was eager to see the end of the story he had been writing for so long. He was taken from us too soon, and his absence is felt acutely here. These issues were the work of his life, and in many ways, they are ours as well.

Turning now to the talks, the last time we all met at the political director level as the P5+1 led by the European Union group was in July, when, after several weeks of intense negotiations, we decided to extend the Joint Plan of Action until November 24th. We made that decision because there had been enough progress to see a path forward; because it’s important that Iran’s nuclear program not advance further under the terms of the JPOA while we work to negotiate a comprehensive joint plan of action; and because we all know that diplomacy is the best, most enduring way to solve this most pressing security challenge.

Since that time, members of the P5+1 and the European Union have held bilateral meetings with Iran, including the United States. We’ve had expert meetings and coordination sessions, as well as ongoing contact with the Iranians, even when we’re not meeting in person. Coming into New York, I think many of us were not very optimistic. But clearly, over meetings over the last two days both with Iran and with my P5+1 and EU colleagues, it is clear that everyone has come here to go to work.

As you know, the United States and Iran held bilateral consultations over the past two days here in New York. These meetings were constructive and a lot of hard technical work that will need to be part of a comprehensive agreement is being undertaken by all parties.

In terms of this next week and a half, we will begin the P5+1 round tomorrow morning with a plenary session at the United Nations led by High Representative Cathy Ashton and Foreign Minister Zarif. During the weekend and UNGA high-level week, we will continue meeting on the Iran nuclear issue in whatever format makes the most sense. There will be plenaries, expert meetings, bilaterals. There may be a ministerial-level P5+1 meeting. And it’s very likely that Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Zarif will meet bilaterally, as they’ve done throughout these talks.

Over the next week and a half, you’re also going to hear a lot from President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif about these nuclear negotiations, maybe about some other issues as well. It’s worth pointing out, particularly to those of you in this room, that at this moment, while senior Iranian officials have the benefit of the freedom of our press, a U.S. citizen sits in an Iranian prison, a journalist for one of our top newspapers, The Washington Post. Jason Rezaian should be freed immediately. The other American citizens being detained by Iran should also be freed as well. And additionally, we appeal again for Iran’s assistance in locating and bringing Robert Levinson home.

The Iranians have said over these many days and weeks how reasonable and flexible they are in these talks, and about how their current capacity should be acceptable. But the status quo is not doable for any of us. It is not doable for either side. The world will agree to suspend and then lift sanctions only if Iran takes convincing and verifiable steps to show that its nuclear program is and will remain exclusively peaceful.

Given Iran’s public statements that it does not seek a nuclear weapon, including the Supreme Leader’s fatwa, these practical steps should be doable. And we have consistently sought to pave a reasonable path forward in close coordination with our P5+1 partners and the European Union.

In our conversations with the Iranian negotiators, we’ve listened closely to their views about what Iran sees as their legitimate practical needs, and we’ve offered creative solutions to address them. There is a unique opportunity over this next week and a half when heads of state, foreign ministers, and many other world leaders are gathered in New York. There is an opportunity to make progress in these talks and to see whether the outlines, and more importantly, the details of a potential agreement begin to emerge in a fuller way than we’ve seen before.

And with that, I would be glad to take your questions.

MODERATOR: So as always, I’ll call the questions, and I know we know most of you, but please identify yourself and your media outlet. Lou Charbonneau, kick us off.

QUESTION: Thanks for this, and I first wanted to ask – you said that Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Zarif might meet as they have before. Is it possible that the presidents will also meet during this time? They did speak on the phone during last year’s UNGA, and this was one of the issues that was discussed.

And when you had your bilateral meetings with the Iranians yesterday and today, did you get any sense that there’s a willingness on their part to push forward, given their public comments about keeping the status quo and what they’ve said are unreasonable conditions put forth by the U.S. and other members of the P5+1? Thanks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Josh Earnest, the spokesperson for the White House, said that at this point there is no meeting scheduled between the President of the United States and President Rouhani. The President of the United States is well known for being open to such a meeting, but the choice is really Iran’s. We will continue to work and we think that there’s a lot of very important work that will go on this week, but that’s not dependent upon whether that meeting happens or not.

Secondly, in terms of the status quo and Iran saying that we are making unreasonable demands, I would make a couple points. First of all, let’s remember how we got here. We are in these talks because for years upon years, the international community – not just the United States, but through several UN Security Council resolutions – has said that Iran has not met its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that they have taken many steps, some in secret, to undermine those obligations. And that is why we are at the table, and I do not think – and I don’t think the world thinks – that it is an unreasonable demand that says that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon. Indeed, the Supreme Leader has said Iran does not want a nuclear weapon, so showing that, in fact, in verifiable ways that they do not and will not is quite reasonable.

Secondly, I do not think it is an excessive demand to say that any agreement must, in a verifiable and transparent manner, show that Iran’s program today and into the future is exclusively peaceful.

So I don’t think either of those objectives – that Iran not acquire a nuclear weapon and that Iran’s program be exclusively peaceful, and that it be clear to everyone that it is – are unreasonable or excessive demands. I think they’re quite reasonable, and in fact is exactly what Iran has said is its intention. So showing that to the world in verifiable ways seems to me quite doable.

MODERATOR: Great. Let’s go in the middle here and wait for the microphone.

QUESTION: Thank you for doing this. BBC Persian, Bahman Kalbasi. [Senior Administration Official One], yesterday Foreign Minister Zarif in the Council on Foreign Relations talked about sanctions, and he specifically said are these sanctions worth risking not getting a deal and not having a new horizon in cooperation in the region; almost seems to be suggesting that this will open the door for other issues to be discussed, including what’s happening in Iraq.

But is there a sense – and this has been discussed on the Iranian press a lot – that America is not or has not offered a meaningful or reliable way to lift these sanctions? Or at least is the Administration really able to do so, given the situation in Congress? Is that one of the sticking points, that on the other side there is not meaningful sanction relief being discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: I don’t think that’s the case at all. We’re well aware that sanctions relief is a critical part of any agreement. Iran has said so themselves, as you note. And indeed, we have done extensive work on what will be necessary to suspend and then ultimately lift those sanctions. The reason it is suspend first and lift later is because we all need to build confidence that this is a durable agreement, and so there will be many steps that Iran will take almost immediately if we get to an agreement. Some will take more time, and then one has to see whether it’s durable over a period of time, and the duration of that time is something that’s, of course, one of the things that we are discussing.

And we know how to do this. We believe we can offer very meaningful relief. We understand and have listened carefully to what Iran is looking for. We hope that Iran is listening very closely to what is necessary to obtain that relief, but I don’t have any questions that technically we can do what is necessary, and they know that.

MODERATOR: Michael Wilner. Wait, do you have the mike?

QUESTION: Thanks for doing this. Whenever I ask folks in the Administration to weigh or to measure Israeli Government concerns on this matter, they say Israel is rightly concerned with an Iranian nuclear weapon, first and foremost, and they say that the U.S. is working on an unprecedented level to bring the Israelis in, to brief them and the like. And they have expressed publicly that they appreciate that.

But here’s the thing: The Israelis that you are briefing on this unprecedented scale are now saying two months before your deadline that they are deeply, deeply concerned with what they are seeing. And given the relevance of Israel’s concerns, as you describe, it would appear that that is a significant problem. Is it a problem?

And secondly, if you’re in these negotiations to end the crisis, as you say, is it possible to do so without adopting Israel’s baseline for a good deal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: It is not just Israel. It is the world that has said that Iran should not acquire a nuclear weapon, and the Supreme Leader’s fatwa also says that Iran does not have, does not intend to, and does not want to have a nuclear weapon. So that is the objective for everyone. We do indeed consult very closely with Israel, as we do with other partners around the world who are very, very concerned about whether we will be able to reach an agreement and whether that agreement will be a good one, which it must be.

So we appreciate that there are countries around the world that see things a little differently than we do. We have other partners around the world that have other concerns about an agreement and what it will mean in the geopolitics of the world, and what it will mean for nuclear – civilian nuclear energy. Lots of concerns are raised. We listen to all of those concerns, and of course, we listen to Israel’s concern. Israel’s security is very critical from an American point of view.

What I appreciate is that all of these countries – including Israel, with whom we closely consult – have shared their technical know-how, their understanding, their ideas, and that will create potentially a good solution to this very, very tough security challenge that we have in front of us.

At the end of the day, Israel will have to make its own judgment about an agreement, as will every other country in the world. And I understand that, but I also believe that the President of the United States will only sign off on an agreement that he believes is good for the world’s security, including Israel.

MODERATOR: Pam from Voice of America. Right here. It’s behind you.

QUESTION: Good evening. A little bit earlier you said that it was clear that everyone had come here to work and you described some of the initial bilaterals as constructive. A two-part question. First, can you shed more light, provide a little bit more insight on what you mean? And then secondly, specifically, was there any indication of movement on what’s been one of the key sticking points, and that’s the uranium enrichment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: So, we’ve only had a few hours of talks over two days, and not even all day of those two days. We started last evening for a bit of time and then again this morning, and then we had coordination meetings with our partners in the P5+1, or as the Europeans call it the E3+3.

So this is just a beginning, so I don’t have any substantive things to report. Probably wouldn’t anyway in the middle of a negotiation. What I think is that we have – everyone has come here intent on taking whatever time it takes. This can become a very busy time here at the UN General Assembly when the high-level week starts next week. People have committed to canceling meetings if they need to if they are needed for meetings, though I think these meetings will happen in lots of different formats and lots of different ways. Some of our partners in the E3+3 will have meetings with President Rouhani, with Foreign Minister Zarif, as I believe Secretary Kerry will meet with Foreign Minister Zarif. We will have lots of different combinations and expert conversations.

It’s really the tone and the quality of the discussion. And I don’t want to overstate this either. We’re at the beginning of a very intense period here, and one never knows where it will go or whether you’ll get to an issue and hit a wall or whether you’ll break through. But everyone has come here – everyone, all parties – clearly intent on seeing if we can’t work through some of these very difficult issues.

MODERATOR: Laura Rozen, and then I’m coming to this side of the room, I promise.

QUESTION: Laura Rozen from Al-Monitor. Thank you for doing this. Back in May when the going-in bids were made in Vienna, we’ve heard from you all to not be alarmed if the going-in bids on each side were wide apart because that’s the nature of the negotiation. We heard that from you, I think, in Baghdad a few years ago, if I remember as well.

Can you give us a sense of between May, when those positions were put on the table, and I guess now in mid-September, have things narrowed, especially on the enrichment capacity issue (inaudible) from the opening bid?

And secondly, let me just say as you will hear the Iranians say many times over the next week, they kind of raise the prospect that no deal will very quickly result in their breakout time going down very quickly because they already have 20,000 centrifuges in store; they’ll flip back on at 20 percent and very quickly, all the things we’re worried about. So that the best is the enemy of the good, I think is their argument. So how do you respond to that? Thanks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: As I said, we’ve just begun the talks here so I am not going to go into substance, and I probably wouldn’t under any circumstances. What I think has occurred is we probably understand each other a great deal better than we did back in May about the elements that are required, the parameters for how one could get there. We’ve had some creative technological thinking that’s gone on. We understand that there are different paths to the same objective. You all know the infamous Rubik’s cube comparison. So I would say there has been a deepening of understanding, and when that happens sometimes it opens some doors to some possibilities. But I can’t say anyone has walked through them to an answer, or we wouldn’t be here so intensely at work.

On the “no deal, they can break out,” we can all go through lots of escalatory talk about what they would do and what we would do if we don’t have any agreement. I don’t find that particularly productive. We each know what each other would do if things don’t work out. I’d rather be focused right now on what might be possible.

MODERATOR: We’re going to do a few from this side, and then wrap up with a few others. Go ahead, Laurence Norman of The Wall Street Journal.

QUESTION: Hey.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Hey.

QUESTION: How are you? Thanks for doing this. Good to see you again.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: (Laughter.) We’ve having a blast. How about you?

QUESTION: Good, thank you. Two questions, if I may. First of all, I think you said you weren’t very optimistic arriving in New York. Now, I’m assuming that’s because not very much progress was made over the summer in the bilaterals, but could you just say why? And it might link into the second question, which is: What is your current reading of this Russian deal with Iran, and do you think it’s making the Iranians feel like they need a deal less?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: What Russian deal are you referring to?

QUESTION: I’m not quite sure what to call it. The memorandum that they signed to cooperate (inaudible) economics. I’m not sure they even know exactly what it is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: I don’t know all – I don’t know what it is either, so what I would say is that countries have relationships with other countries, and they are working on ways to relate to each other all of the time. What we care about is whether any country makes an agreement that would break the sanctions enforcement of all of the sanctions that are in place. I do not expect Russia to do that. Everyone here knows, and I’m sure someone would ask, “Have all of the tensions around Ukraine entered into this negotiation?” They have not to date. [Sergei Ryabkov] is a professional who understands the nonproliferation world extremely well, and we are all focused on solving this problem in this room.

In terms of over the summer, I wouldn’t say nothing happened over the summer. I think every conversation, even when they’re tough and they seem to not make progress, sometimes people have to hear messages many, many times before realizing that unless people start to open doors, you’re just going to keep having the same conversation. So I think that not only the United States, but all of my partners in the P5+1 in the bilaterals – and all of us have had bilaterals over the last few weeks with Iran – have delivered the same messages. And sometimes messages have to get delivered many times before people really come to believe them.

QUESTION: You said you weren’t very optimistic.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: No, because messages were delivered, they were heard, but there wasn’t something forthcoming in that immediate instance. But this is a process, so I don’t find it surprising either.

MODERATOR: Okay, we’re going to do a few more. George.

QUESTION: George Jahn, Associated Press. Hi. You said in your opening remarks that the status quo is not doable for either side. That could be interpreted to mean that you’re bringing, if not new proposals, modified proposals to the table. I don’t expect you to go into specifics, but --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: What I was referring to is the status quo of – Iran has said, as one of the rest of you said, that when Foreign Minister Zarif did some of his comments – I think it was Foreign Minister Zarif – you all said that he said that we have to maintain what we currently have. Well, that’s – if that were the case, then we wouldn’t be in a negotiation if that were something that everybody could agree to. Iran would say we can’t maintain our sanctions in place in the way that we have. And I would say that the only – as I said, if Iran takes the steps necessary to ensure that they will not acquire a nuclear weapon and that their program is exclusively peaceful, then we have a way to, in fact, suspend and ultimately lift sanctions.

MODERATOR: Okay, we’re going to do two very quick ones. Indira quick and Paul quick, and then we’ll --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Not that I don’t want to spend the evening here, but I know you all want to get to dinner. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Indira Lakshmanan from --

MODERATOR: There will be more opportunities as well.

QUESTION: -- from Bloomberg News. Thank you for doing this. I want to start out by asking you, I mean: What is going to be your goal at the end of this week-and-a-half period where you will be able to check a box and say, “Yes, we’ve made progress; we came in pessimistic, but this shows we’ve taken one step closer.” And then if we come to November 24th and we don’t have a comprehensive deal, are you guys prepared to extend once more?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: So I’m going to do the second part of your question first. Way too early to talk about hypotheticals. We are --

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Huh? Yeah, we – no. (Laughter.) We are not – good try. We are not going to talk about any Plan B because we’re focused on getting Plan A, and we hope Iran is as well. So that’s where I am on that.

On your first part, was – I’m sorry.

QUESTION: It was about what is it going to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Oh, what’s success at the --

QUESTION: What’s your measure? What’s your metric that you will – that you don’t have to be negative, that the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Progress, progress.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: There could be many ways. It could be in many ways. It’s hard to say because this is so complex. And would I like at the end of this week to have a broad understanding on all of the major issues, even if we have to use the next October, November writing all the details? Sure, I’d love to be there. Will we be there at the end of this week? I don’t know. It’s tough, very tough. We are discussing all of the issues. We are discussing all the parameters of all of the issues. And I think this is an opportunity because we have – everybody’s here. Any consultation you have to have with anybody about anything, everybody’s here. So we ought to make use of that to try to deal with some of these very tough issues. We’ll see.

QUESTION: But we’re further than we were in July?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Are we further than we are in July? The reason I have such a hard time answering this question is what I’ve said to you all so many times before: You can get 98 percent of the way there in this agreement and that last 2 percent means you don’t. It’s not a situation where you can say, ah, we’re 50 percent of the way there, we’re 75 percent of the way there, because that last percentage may be the crucial one and you don’t have the deal at all. That’s why this is so hard. It all fits together.

MODERATOR: I think we’re going to end tonight with Paul Richter of the L.A. Times. Wait for the mike. And there will be more opportunities, I promise, for us all to chat. Right here, Paul. Right here. Yeah.

QUESTION: As you know, a lot of people on the outside, other foreign governments, people in Congress and elsewhere, are really focused on the very concrete questions of number of Iranian centrifuges, enrichment capacity. Are those the right terms to be judging progress here?

And I’ve got a second question, too. Did the Iraq/ISIS issue come up at all in the talks with the Iranians?

MODERATOR: I’m surprised it took till the end.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Gosh, I’m surprised that it took till the end. (Laughter.) I was having the same thought.

MODERATOR: Yeah.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Okay. The measure of this agreement – I know you’re sick of hearing me say this. The measure of this agreement is Iran can’t acquire a nuclear weapon and we’re assured its program is exclusively peaceful. There are many components of that. So counting one thing is not going to answer that question. It’s a package of things. If you’re talking about enrichment capacity, you’re talking about infrastructure, you’re talking about centrifuges, you’re talking about SWU, you’re talking about stockpile, you’re talking about the types of equipment in centrifuges, you’re talking about duration, you’re talking about a whole bunch of elements if you’re worried about how long it’s going to take to get a weapon’s worth of fissile material, which is often the terminology used for breakthrough – breakout, sorry.

So it’s a lot of elements. So all of the things that outsiders have said to you or members of Congress are certainly elements, but they’re only elements. They have to come together in a way that gives us and the international community confidence that the program is exclusively peaceful and Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon. That’s what we’re trying to do.

Now, as to your last question, I think you all know that tomorrow – I have to read it because I’m going to say it wrong – the Secretary of State is chairing a ministerial debate of the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Iraq at 2:00. Somebody’s phone is buzzing. Do you care?

QUESTION: I’m just going to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Shall we answer? We can all say hello. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Put them on speaker phone.

MODERATOR: I don’t know what I just – I just think I --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Okay. Well, whosever phone that is --

MODERATOR: I hope it’s still recording, whoever’s phone that is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Yeah. If it’s your mom, tell her I’m sorry. (Laughter.)

Any member can attend, and so the meeting was mentioned in our discussions today on the margins because it’s very present, but we are very clear and continue to be clear, as the Secretary said in his testimony, that we, of course, expect there will be time to time that we discuss this, as we discuss ISIS with everyone – ISIL. The world is focused – and I think this is what this ministerial tomorrow will show – that the world is focused on the mission that the President of the United States has set out, and that is to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. And I think we will all see that in a very powerful way tomorrow at the ministerial, and I believe that Iran thinks that ISIL should not be doing what it is doing either.

MODERATOR: Thank you, everyone.

QUESTION: What (inaudible) Iran (inaudible) come back tomorrow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Ask Iran.

MODERATOR: Thank you, everyone, for coming tonight. Again, this is on background as a senior Administration official. We will have more opportunities to do these things over the next week and a half, so email [us] with any questions. We will have a transcript done later tonight of this as well.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you all.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER'S REMARKS AT ANNUAL DETERRENCE SYMPOSIUM

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

Remarks at the Annual Deterrence Symposium

Remarks

Rose Gottemoeller

Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 

U.S. Strategic Command

Omaha, Nebraska

August 14, 2014

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Thank you for that kind introduction. I am always honored to be a speaker here at the Annual Deterrence Symposium and of course, I am glad to be here at the invitation of Admiral Cecil Haney. Turn about is fair play: The Admiral gave a great speech at my invitation last month in Washington to a group of young people on the threshold of their careers. More on that later. Thank you, Admiral, for all you do for this nation.

While we are gathered here today in Omaha, the world is facing serious challenges: The threats to Ukraine’s sovereignty and Russia’s flagrant disregard for international law, the continuing conflicts in the Middle East, a dangerous Ebola outbreak in West Africa. It goes without saying that most people are not focused on nuclear weapons or nuclear deterrence. But we all know that we have important work to do and we do it. My admiration for this community, in and out of uniform, knows no bounds. We are ready to work. That is the theme I’m striking today: We who focus on the foundation of our nation’s nuclear deterrent are ready to work.
Strategic stability is the cornerstone of American national security, but as all of you know, it is not a static state of being. Threats to strategic stability can surface quickly and it is incumbent upon all of us to recognize those threats, anticipate them when we can, and make moves to counter them. We must be prepared for the unpredictable, and constantly on the look-out so that we see threats emerging while they are still over the horizon. My role as a diplomat is different from your roles on the military side, but our goals are no different. As President Obama said five years ago in Prague, as long as nuclear weapons exist, we will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. And that is as we seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

Violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)

One threat to strategic stability has made news in the last month. As you all know, the Department of State recently delivered the Annual Arms Control Compliance Report to Congress with the determination that the Russian Federation is in violation of its INF Treaty obligations not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.
We have been attempting to address this very serious matter with Russia for some time, as the United States is wholly committed to the continued viability of the INF Treaty. We are asking Russia to return to compliance with the Treaty in a verifiable manner.

This groundbreaking treaty serves the mutual security interests of the parties – not only the United States and Russia, but also the 11 other states bound by its obligations. Moreover, this Treaty contributes to the security of our allies and to regional security in Europe and in the Far East.

When we notified Russia of our determination of a violation, we made it clear that we are prepared to discuss this in a senior-level bilateral dialogue immediately. We hope that this dialogue begins soon, with the goal that Russia return to compliance with its obligations under the Treaty.

There is an expert debate in Russia about its nuclear modernization programs and about the contribution of the INF Treaty to Russia’s security. It is important for Russia to take into account that no military decisions happen in a vacuum. Actions beget actions. Our countries have been down the road of needless, costly and destabilizing arms races. We know where that road leads and we are fortunate that our past leaders had the wisdom and strength to turn us in a new direction. Let us hope that debate in and out of the government leads to a decision to return Russia to compliance with all of its international obligations.

New START and Future Reductions

Despite our serious concerns about Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty, we believe that the New START Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States. The New START Treaty enhances our national security and strategic stability with Russia and both the United States and Russia are implementing the Treaty’s inspection regime.

Current tensions with Russia highlight the importance of both the verification and confidence provided by data exchanges and on-site inspections under the Treaty, and the security and predictability provided by verifiable mutual limits on strategic weapons. We take questions about compliance with arms control treaties very seriously and are closely monitoring Russian compliance with the New START Treaty. We assess that Russia is implementing and complying with the New START Treaty, and that the Treaty remains in our national security interest. The mutual predictability this gives to the U.S.-Russia relationship increases stability, especially during difficult times such as now.

With respect to future agreements, the United States will only pursue agreements that are in our national security interest and that of our allies. The offer that President Obama made in Berlin one year ago, of an up to one-third reduction in operationally deployed warheads beyond the New START limits, is a sound one, and worthy of serious consideration. We will continue to be open to discussion of agreements that would reduce nuclear and other military threats. Of course, we know that the situation is different than it was four years ago, four months ago, four weeks ago.

But cooperation in the arms control realm has been an important facet of strategic stability over the past forty years and it should remain so in the future. Moreover, we need nuclear cooperation with Russia and others to address new threats, first and foremost the risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon or the fissile materials needed to make one. We will continue to pursue arms control and nonproliferation tools, because they are the best - and quite frankly - the only path that we can take to effectively prevent a terrorist nuclear threat and reduce nuclear dangers more broadly.

The United States has taken steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. We have clearly stated that it is in the U.S. interest, and that of all other nations, that the nearly 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.
We are taking time now to prepare the ground for the future. That includes more research into how we incorporate new technologies and innovations into verification and monitoring. We can also shape, maintain, and improve strategic stability through a variety of bilateral and multilateral dialogues, including in the Track 1.5 and Track 2 realms. These engagements reduce the potential for misunderstanding and provide the basis for future agreement and cooperation.

Multilateral agreements like a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) can also enhance global stability. The United States will continue to push for the commencement of negotiations on such an agreement.

And we are working to expand our public outreach and educational efforts on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. As stated in the April 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review: “Ratification of the CTBT is central to leading other nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament.”

As we consider arms control and nonproliferation priorities, we will continue to consult closely with our allies and partners every step of the way. Our security and defense – and theirs – is non-negotiable.

Conventional Deterrence Tools

While nuclear deterrence is and will remain an important part of protecting our nation and our allies, we must also make full use of our non-nuclear capabilities – that includes regional and homeland missile defenses, security cooperation, assurances and conventional arms control.
Of course, the Russian Federation’s challenge to the security of Europe and Ukraine’s territorial integrity has to be factored into our work to modernize conventional arms control.
First and foremost, we need to make the best use of the regimes currently in place. The Vienna Document 2011 and the Open Skies Treaty, which are part of the conventional arms control regime in Europe, are vital tools to maintain stability and have provided transparency about military activities in and around Ukraine.

Second, we must consider our options for the future. We will continue the process of modernizing the Open Skies Treaty, including the upgrade to digital sensors to replace obsolescent film cameras.

With regard to the Vienna Document mechanisms, it is clear to us that there is room to improve provisions for notification of military activity and risk reduction, among other issues. Moving forward, the United States will work with others to update the Vienna Document in a way that builds on our recent experiences. NATO will also continue its review of the future of conventional arms control in Europe. We recognize that now is not the time to engage Russia on this, but we need to be thinking now about how in the future a revitalization of conventional arms control in Europe could contribute to improving mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region.
Of course, we are not without good examples to follow. We can and will benefit from the experience of the so-called Dayton Article IV states. Eighteen years ago, these states in the Western Balkans were emerging from years of bloody conflict. Through hard work, they established military stability and security, despite a range of differences.

The architects of Dayton created a comprehensive arms control agreement that led to significant reductions in heavy weapons and equipment in just six months. Without as much as a breather, the states involved then turned their efforts to the harder step of fulfilling the obligations laid out in the Agreement, to sustain disengagement of military forces and create a stable security environment for all. The Dayton Article IV experience is a testament to what can be achieved through conventional arms control measures at a time when they are being sorely tested elsewhere in Europe.

Space and Cyber Deterrence

In addition to fully realizing the potential of conventional deterrence, we must make sure that we are ahead of the curve on space and cyber issues. I know this was the subject of a panel yesterday and rightly so - it is critical that we identify ways to stabilize behavior in both realms.
My colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank Rose spoke about strategic stability in space yesterday, highlighting the point that it is essential that all nations work together to adopt approaches for responsible activity in space in order to preserve this domain for future generations. China’s recent irresponsible and provocative ASAT test accentuates the importance of these efforts. Russia’s pursuit of anti-satellite weapons is also a matter of concern. Destabilizing actions like these threaten the long-term security and sustainability of the outer space environment.

In the cyber realm, the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues, led by Chris Painter, is leading our efforts to promote an open, secure, and reliable information and communications infrastructure that supports international trade and innovation, strengthens international security, and fosters free expression.

As we move forward, we should continue to cooperate and coordinate both internally and with our friends and allies. Such efforts as the UN Group of Government Experts that convened last month will continue to enhance our common understanding of the ways in which international law is essential to maintaining peace and stability in cyberspace. Cyberspace can be the source of both great societal advances and significant threats. There is no doubt that domain will only remain stable through our collective efforts.

Deterrence in the Future

Of course, you know all of this - all of what we have been talking about - is moot if we don’t attract the next generation to nuclear policy jobs. As I said at the outset, this community is ready to work, but we can’t work forever. We have some recruiting to do. Frank Klotz struck this same note this morning: we need to bring the next generation into the nuclear deterrence enterprise.
That is why I was so pleased that Admiral Haney was able to join the Department of State’s 5th Annual Generation Prague Conference that was focused on engagement with the next generation of nuclear experts. It is one piece of ongoing efforts, but it is not enough. We need to be actively recruiting political scientists, lawyers, physicists, geologists, engineers, and more, if we want to make sure that this essential part of national security will be supported as long as it needs to be.

In closing, I want to leave you with a thought.

History has shown us that when faced with obstacles, we always have several paths. When it comes to our current situation with the Russian Federation, I, for one, want to follow the path that President Reagan took, the path that President George H.W. Bush took. When confronted with a difficult and sometimes unpredictable partner in the Soviet Union, they did not take their ball and go home. They did not let strategic stability become a political punching bag. They set about the hard task of building up strategic stability through arms control treaties and agreements, and they succeeded in making this world a safer place. They worked hard, and achieved much.

So let’s leave Omaha ready to work. In the world of nuclear stability and deterrence, there is much to do.

Thank you.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER'S REMARKS ON NUCLEAR REMEMBRANCE DAY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Republic of Marshall Islands Nuclear Remembrance Day
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
Majuro, Marshall Islands
March 1, 2014

As Delivered


I am so honored to be in the Marshall Islands, a nation that the United States sees as our strategic partner, our ally and our friend. Mr. President, I am honored to be here with such a distinguished group of government, community and faith leaders, members of the diplomatic corps, and honored guests.

Today, here in this beautiful place, we gather to remember and honor the past, but we also gather in the spirit of community and hope. I would like to second Ambassador Armbruster’s message of bromich (condolences); it is the right word for today. The American people remember what took place here and honor the historical and current contributions that the Marshallese people make to help promote peace and stability around the world. For many of you, that means remembering lost family members and loved ones – they are in our thoughts and prayers, as well. Today we honor their memory and I know that words can only go so far in healing wounds, but this nation has played an outsized role in the fight for a safer world and for that the United States, and the world, thanks you.

Our commitment to you, solidified by the 1986 Compact and the 2003 Amended Compact, is borne out by our obligation to defend the Marshall Islands and its people, as the United States and its citizens are defended. Of course, the mutual security of our nations is an underlying element of the special relationship between our nations. Marshallese citizens serve with distinction in our armed forces, sharing our commitment to democracy and freedom. I know that the Marshallese rate of enlistment is higher than in most U.S. states. For the Marshallese citizens that have served in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world, we are so grateful.

On this day – the 60th anniversary of Castle Bravo – and on each and every day, the United States recognizes the effects of its nuclear explosive testing and has accepted and acted on its responsibility. The Department of Energy continues to provide critical medical and environmental programs in the RMI, in addition to improving the provision of such services. In particular, we will continue to work with the local leadership of the four nuclear-affected atolls to assist them in realizing their environmental goals. In this regard, the Department of Energy will be employing the world’s best technologies to aid in this endeavor. This, I can assure you, is a promise from the people of the United States.

Since 2004, the United States has provided over $600 million to the Marshall Islands, in the form of direct assistance and subsidies, as well as financial support for rehabilitation of affected atolls, site monitoring, and ongoing health care programs. This year, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a remarkable sponsorship program to increase the science capacity in the Marshall Islands. Two Marshallese students will live and study in the San Francisco Bay Area, including at Lawrence Livermore National Labs (LLNL) itself. The sponsorship pays tuition, room and board, travel and a living stipend. It also includes a summer internship with LLNL.

As I said at the outset, we are here to remember and honor the past today, but I also want to look to the future with purpose and with hope. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis opened the eyes of the world to the terror of nuclear war, but there were people across the globe who were already all too familiar with nuclear dangers. People in Japan and the Marshall Islands, those downwind from the nuclear test site in Nevada, the mothers who found radioactive material in their children’s milk: all understood in first person the health effects of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. In 1963, about a decade after Castle Bravo, President John F. Kennedy called for a complete ban on nuclear explosive testing.

“The conclusion of such a treaty,” he said, “so near and yet so far -- would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963 -- the further spread of nuclear arms. It would increase our security -- it would decrease the prospects of war.”

We are still so near and yet so far from this goal. We were able to achieve part of this objective through the Limited Test Ban Treaty – banning tests in the water, in space and in the atmosphere. However, 51 years later, the hazard of the further spread of nuclear weapons remains and we still lack a total ban on nuclear explosive testing. Here again, we should heed President Kennedy’s words. “Surely this goal,” he said, “is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.”

In 2009, President Obama took up the mantle of the Presidents who came before him, and laid out his own long-term vision of the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. While the United States will and must maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist, we have properly refocused our nuclear policy for the 21st century. As outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), we are now on a path that confronts the threats we face today and those on the near horizon. This allows us to work with allies and partners to pursue arms control and disarmament measures that can lead us down the path towards a nuclear-free world.

Mindful of the devastating human consequences of nuclear war, the United States has also clearly stated that it is in our interest, and that of all other nations, that the nearly 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever. We also concluded that the time for a complete and total ban on nuclear explosive testing is long overdue. U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a pivotal part of this effort.

Ratification of the CTBT is central to leading other nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament. The United States now maintains a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal through our science-based Stockpile Stewardship program without nuclear explosive testing, which the United States halted in 1992.

The United States will be patient in our pursuit of ratification, but we will also be persistent. It has been a long time since the CTBT was on the front pages of newspapers, so we will need time to make the case for this Treaty. Together, we can work through questions and concerns about the Treaty and explosive nuclear testing. Our answers to those questions continue to grow stronger with the proven and increasing capabilities of the Stockpile Stewardship program and the verification system of the Treaty, including the International Monitoring System.

I cannot emphasize strongly enough that it is precisely our deep understanding of the consequences of nuclear weapons – including the dangerous health effects of nuclear explosive testing – that has guided and motivated our efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate these most dangerous and awe-inspiring weapons. Entry into force of the CTBT is one such essential part of our pragmatic, step by step approach to eliminating nuclear dangers. The Treaty will make the world a safer place for the Marshall Islands, the United States, for every nation around the globe.

This is not just a security issue; this is an issue of humanity, of health, of morality. We are the stewards of this Earth and we owe it to those who have fallen – to those who suffer still – to work together, one step at a time, until nuclear explosive testing is banned worldwide, getting us one step closer to our goal of the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. In closing, I want to reiterate that the United States and the world owe the Marshallese a debt of gratitude. The RMI has been a leader in countering climate change, a contributor to international security, and our partner on global issues. Together, we can and should continue to work for what President Kennedy called “a genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living.”

Finally, I can only say kommol tata! Thank you!