U.S. OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN EAST ASIA

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
02/21/2015 12:53 PM EST
Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability in East Asia
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Federation of American Scientists
Washington, DC
February 20, 2015

Introduction

Thank you all very much, and a special thanks to Bruce and Chuck for having me here today to address this important workshop.

I’m told that this group is exploring China’s potential interest in and deployment of strategic ballistic missile defense and what that means for U.S. and allied security.

At the State Department, we’re taking a hard look at it as well, and in particular, the role of ballistic missile defense in achieving the overarching goal of strategic stability between the United States and China.

Overview of Strategic Stability with China

Before discussing China’s interest in developing a BMD system and the possible implications of such an effort, I’d first like to provide an overview of what the United States is doing to ensure a stable U.S.-China strategic relationship in the region.

As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is committed to maintaining strategic stability in U.S.-China relations and supports initiation of a dialogue on strategic stability and nuclear postures aimed at fostering a more stable, resilient, and transparent security relationship with China.

During the Cold War, many associated strategic stability with what we called “mutual assured destruction,” the notion that the incentive to initiate nuclear use would be discouraged by the fear of suffering unacceptable retaliatory damage. This notion, of course, is ill-suited and too narrow to fully capture the U.S.-China relationship given our multifaceted and shared interests. In today’s world, strategic stability encompasses much more than just nuclear relations and reflects the fact that the U.S.-China relationship, which has both elements of competition and cooperation, is not adversarial.

The strategic relationship between the United States and China is complex, and we each view stability differently. Thus, it is important that we have frank and open dialogue about how our nations define and view strategic stability and how we perceive our nuclear postures and policies impacting this balance. As part of these discussions, the United States is willing to discuss all issues, including missile defense, space-related issues, conventional precision strike capabilities, and nuclear weapons issues, with the goal of improving the conditions for a more predictable and safer security environment.

A sustained and substantive discussion of our national approaches to maintaining effective deterrent postures and modernization of associated strategic capabilities can increase understanding, enhance confidence and reduce mistrust.

Overview of China’s BMD Activities

As you’re all aware, China is continuing to develop its BMD capabilities.

Although China does not say much about its BMD programs, China publicly announced that it conducted ground-based mid-course BMD tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014. I’ll say more about the 2014 “BMD” test later. Chinese state media has stated that such tests are defensive in nature and are not targeted at any country.

I was in Beijing earlier this month, and the message I delivered was clear: It is important that our governments have a sustained dialogue on the role that our BMD systems have in our respective defense policies and strategies. We would welcome an opportunity to learn more about how BMD fits into China’s defense policy and strategy.

More broadly, a sustained dialogue would improve our understanding of China’s strategic perspective and enhance China’s understanding of U.S. policy and strategy. Institutionalizing discussions of strategic issues is a prudent long-term approach to strengthening strategic stability and exploring means for strengthening mutual trust and risk reduction.

To encourage that dialogue, we have taken and will continue to take steps to keep China informed about developments in U.S. BMD policy.

Potential Chinese BMD through the Lens of the U.S. Experience

The U.S. experience with BMD and specifically with our Ground-based Midcourse Defense System, or GMD, provides a useful lens for examining the challenges the Chinese would face in developing a BMD capability to threaten our nuclear deterrent.

We have been clear that our homeland BMD capabilities provide for defense of the U.S. homeland from limited ICBM attack, and are purposely not intended to affect Russia’s or China’s strategic deterrent. The GMD system is designed to support that policy, and it is not scaled, intended, or capable of defending the United States against the larger and more sophisticated arsenals of Russia and China. GMD is designed to protect the U.S. homeland only from limited ICBM attacks from states such as North Korea and Iran.

The U.S. experience with BMD suggests that attempting to develop a comprehensive homeland BMD system to defend against ballistic missile attack from China or Russia would be extremely challenging – and costly - given the size and sophistication of Chinese and Russian ICBMs. This owes to several factors, including the relatively low number of GMD interceptors and the sophistication and large numbers of Russian and Chinese missiles.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated this publically on May 18, 2010, in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when he said that trying to eliminate the viability of the Russian nuclear capability would be “unbelievably expensive.”

Given these factors, we could potentially expect a notional Chinese equivalent to the GMD system to provide at most a limited defense of the Chinese homeland, which would not counter the U.S. strategic deterrent and therefore would not undermine strategic stability.

This is for the same reason that GMD does not impact strategic stability: the number of interceptors is low and they are not designed to deal with complex threats, and developing a comprehensive system to cope with a full-scale attack from another nuclear-armed great power would be expensive and ultimately unsuccessful.

Relationship to ASAT Testing

There is a another important aspect of China’s BMD program that bears discussing, which is its connection with China’s anti-satellite, or ASAT, weapons program.

On July 23, 2014, the Chinese Government conducted a non-destructive test of a missile designed to destroy satellites in low Earth orbit. However, China publicly called this ASAT test a “land-based missile interception test.”

Despite China’s claims that this was not an ASAT test; let me assure you the United States has high confidence in its assessment, that the event was indeed an ASAT test.

The continued development and testing of destructive ASAT systems is both destabilizing and threatens the long-term security and sustainability of the outer space environment. A previous destructive test of the Chinese system in 2007 created thousands of pieces of debris, which continue to present an ongoing danger to the space systems—as well as astronauts—of all nations, including China.

The destructive nature of debris-generating weapons has decades-long consequences: they can increase the potential for further collisions in the future, which only create more debris. A debris-forming test or attack may only be minutes in duration, but the consequences can last for decades. It is for these reasons that the United States believes testing debris-generating ASAT systems threaten the security, economic well-being, and civil endeavors of all nations.

Space systems and their supporting infrastructures enable a wide range of services, including communication; position, navigation, and timing; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and meteorology, which provide vital national, military, civil, scientific, and economic benefits. Other nations recognize these benefits to the United States and seek to counter the U.S. strategic advantage by pursuing capabilities to deny or destroy our access to space services.

The use of such ASAT weapons could be escalatory in a crisis.

China’s ASAT program, and the lack of transparency accompanying it, also impedes bilateral space cooperation. While we prefer cooperation, it will by necessity have to be a product of a step-by-step approach starting with dialogue, leading to modest CBMs, which might then perhaps lead to deeper engagement. However, none of this is possible until China changes its behavior with regard to ASATs.

Conclusion

As many of you know, one of my biggest priorities as Assistant Secretary is to look over the horizon a bit and begin to structure our Bureau to address the emerging security challenges of the 21st Century.

For me, that means an increased focus on developing a stable strategic relationship with China, while at the same time reassuring our Allies.

Managing the U.S.-China relationship will take a lot of time and effort, and we won’t always be successful. It’s a challenge. But as Secretary Kerry likes to remind us, it’s important for us to get caught trying, and that’s what we intend to do.

Thanks very much.

DEFENSE SECRETARY HAGEL MEETS WITH AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER ABBOTT

FROM:  U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DEFENSE 

Right:  Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, right, walks with Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott after hosting a full-honors ceremony to welcome him to the Pentagon, June 13, 2014. The two leaders met to discuss issues of mutual importance. DOD photo by U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Aaron Hostutler.  
Hagel Discusses Defense Cooperation With Australia’s Prime Minister

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, June 13, 2014 – Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel welcomed Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott at the Pentagon this morning with a full-honors ceremony followed by what Pentagon Press Secretary Navy Rear Adm. John Kirby called a productive discussion on future defense cooperation between the United States and Australia.

In a statement summarizing the meeting, Kirby said Abbott conveyed his deep commitment to the U.S.-Australia alliance.

“Secretary Hagel expressed appreciation for Australia's past and ongoing contributions to Afghanistan and congratulated Prime Minister Abbott on the force posture agreement that he and President Obama announced yesterday,” Kirby said, “noting that the 25-year agreement will provide an enduring framework for the initiatives that our governments embarked upon in November 2011.”

The agreement is a significant milestone in the U.S.-Australia alliance, the admiral added, and will serve as a foundation for the growth of the current U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force rotational presence and activities in Australia, as well as future initiatives that the United States and Australia pursue.

“The secretary and Prime Minister Abbott agreed that the alliance will continue to be an anchor of stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific as we respond jointly to shared challenges in the region,” Kirby said. “To that end, the secretary and prime minister discussed expanding our bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defense while also working trilaterally with Japan on Australia's submarine program.”

The press secretary said Hagel is looking forward to exploring these topics further at the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultation known as AUSMIN later this year.

Before meeting with the secretary today, Kirby said, Abbott paid his respects at Arlington National Cemetery.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROSE'S REMARKS ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND GULF SECURITY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Gulf Cooperation Council and Ballistic Missile Defense

Remarks

Frank A. Rose

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

Peter Huessy Breakfast Series; Capitol Hill Club

Washington, DC

May 14, 2014

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Thank you, Peter, for that kind introduction and for hosting me again at this series.
I’m very happy to be with you today to address our efforts in working with Gulf Cooperation Council to enhance Ballistic Missile Defense cooperation in the region, as I have just recently returned from the Middle East Missile & Air Defense Symposium in Abu Dhabi.
In my remarks this morning, I’d like to accomplish two things. First, I’d like to share with you a bit about my most recent discussions on missile defense with our partners in the Gulf. Second, I’d like to outline the key takeaways from my latest trip to the region, chief among them is the progress that has been made in developing regional missile defenses with the Gulf Cooperation Council. After that, I’m happy to take your questions.

U.S. Commitment to Gulf Security, Including Missile Defense

As you know, this is a time of profound change in that region. We are experiencing perhaps an unprecedented moment of engagement and dialogue with nations around the world. At the same time, we are also acutely aware of the daily threats and anxieties felt throughout the Gulf.
As you also know, security cooperation has long stood at the core of the U.S.-Gulf partnership. The United States is not only committed to enhancing U.S.-GCC missile defense cooperation – we see it as a strategic imperative.

As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a key objective of U.S. strategy is to expand international efforts and cooperation on ballistic missile defense. BMD cooperation contributes to regional stability by deterring regional actors, principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of their systems, and assuring allies and partners both of the U.S. commitments and by enhancing their ability to defend against these threats should they become necessary.

The message I delivered in the region was clear: the United States remains firmly committed to developing and deploying advanced missile defense capabilities around the world to protect our homeland, our deployed forces, as well as our friends and allies who depend on us for security.

It’s worth mentioning that U.S.-GCC security cooperation extends well beyond the topic of today’s discussion, or BMD. Maritime security is an important focus, given the massive commercial and energy resources that traverse the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. And U.S. and Gulf experts are now meeting as a group to exchange best practices on counterterrorism and border security, within which cyber security is becoming an increasingly prominent topic. Stated plainly, we are committed to working with our GCC partners to strengthen multilateral defense cooperation as an important complement to our strong bilateral partnerships in the region. To help reach that goal, in December 2013 President Obama designated the GCC eligible for Foreign Military Sales. Among other benefits, this designation helps lay the groundwork for the GCC states to address regional ballistic missile defense through multilateral procurement.
That’s the same designation we’ve given NATO, allowing the GCC to invest in shared systems for mutual defense, even as the United States continues a strong bilateral defense partnership with each individual GCC member state. And it demonstrates our commitment to the U.S.-Gulf Partnership, and our ultimate commitment to see the Gulf become a stronger, more capable partner in confronting the many challenges to our shared interests in the region. Earlier today, Secretary Hagel met with his Gulf counterparts in Jeddah for the first ever U.S.-GCC Defense Ministerial, which likewise signals U.S. intent to strengthen and deepen our bilateral and multilateral ties in this critical region.

Progress on Regional Missile Defense

The President’s address at the United Nations General Assembly last fall reaffirmed our continued commitment to Gulf security. Indeed, my principal takeaway from the trip was that our security commitments and partnerships in the Gulf are more extensive today than ever before.
As I discussed several weeks ago in Abu Dhabi, the March 2012 launch of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, or SCF, has enhanced our partnership on policies that advance shared political, security, military, and economic objectives in the Gulf, including intensified efforts on ballistic missile defense cooperation.

At his first Forum last September, Secretary of State John Kerry, my boss, made clear that a top U.S.-GCC priority would continue to be enhancing ballistic missile defense cooperation, including the eventual development of Gulf-wide coordinated missile defense architecture. And we can expect BMD to have been a primary focus at today’s inaugural U.S.-GCC Defense Ministerial.

Burden Sharing

It was clear from my discussions with our partners in the region that the GCC shares our goal of building an effective regional defense against the threat of ballistic missiles, and is willing and ready to defend its own security future.
Several of our Gulf state partners expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the United Arab Emirates has contracted to buy two THAAD batteries that, when operational, will enhance the U.A.E.’s security as well as regional stability. The U.A.E. also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets.

Saudi Arabia is in the process of upgrading its existing Patriot PAC-2 batteries to the PAC-3 configuration. Kuwait also is upgrading its existing batteries to PAC-3, and in December 2013 signed an offer for two additional PAC-3 batteries.

These procurements demonstrate our GCC partners’ determination to provide for their own defense, and when combined with our regional BMD capabilities, represent a significant contribution to regional stability at a time when our own defense spending is under fiscal pressure.

Our GCC partners are investing billions of dollars in missile defense purchases. In today’s austere budget environment, these investments can help achieve greater economies of scale.

Military and Diplomatic Coordination

And I’ll close by looking ahead towards next steps on BMD in the region.
Effective ballistic missile defense is not based on military might alone. Advanced, interoperable systems to intercept and destroy attacking missiles must be combined with diplomatic cooperation and coordination.

Ballistic missiles can destabilize and weaken a region due to their short flight times and potentially devastating consequences. WMD armed missiles in particular can have broad consequences not only within a targeted country but within a region, as the effects of a successful attack are not always limited to that country. And even conventionally armed missiles can be a significant military threat.

But ballistic missiles are also a weapon of choice for an adversary that wants to gain political influence over its regional neighbors. We have seen ballistic missile test firings used as a tool to intimidate, blackmail, or coerce a country’s neighbors.

The nature of the ballistic missile threat means that the United States, and the GCC, must be prepared both diplomatically and militarily well before the first missile is launched.

The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense work as active partners in the Strategic Cooperation Forum to emphasize the need for planning, both diplomatic and military, when it comes to ballistic missile defense.

In fact, our dialogues within the SCF include representatives from the Defense Department and U.S. Air Forces Central Command for one clear reason: because ballistic missile defense requires a whole-of-government approach.

To facilitate further a dialogue with our Gulf partners on BMD issues, President Obama obtained authority from Congress expanding the authority of the U.S. Air Force to conduct integrated air and missile defense training at the U.S.-U.A.E. Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center, which is located in the United Arab Emirates. These integrated defense trainings are uniquely positioned to play a key role in advancing regional BMD policies, procedures, and cooperation.

At a strategic level, we must continue to encourage better planning and preparation among both our military leaders and our senior diplomats. It should also be our shared task with the Gulf to develop strategic communications plans and ensure close and effective consultations with regional partners to advance our joint security and prosperity.

The U.S.-Gulf partnership can therefore bring together the strength of our combined forces with the skill of our strategic planning. We will be much more successful in advancing our shared interests by working together than by going it alone.

Missile Defense Cooperation with Israel

And finally, I want to note that our cooperation with the GCC states will in no way detract from the separate, robust U.S.-Israel BMD cooperation program. Since 2003, the Department of Defense, with the help of Congress, has provided nearly $2.5 billion to Israel to help develop a number of missile defense systems including Iron Dome, Arrow, and David's Sling. This includes $440 million in FY 13 alone. Throughout the development of these systems, our goal has been to ensure there are no shortages in these important systems and that U.S. investments meet Israel's security needs and production capacity.

The President's budget requests $96.8 million in FY15 for Arrow and David’s Sling, and $176 million for Iron Dome. By the end of FY15, the United States will have provided over $875 million in funding for Iron Dome.

Conclusion

In conclusion, ballistic missile defense issues cross military and, most importantly for us at the State Department, diplomatic equities. Moving forward, we hope to encourage deepened understanding and engagement in the Gulf on the need to combine diplomatic and military knowledge and expertise to address the full range of issues on effective missile defenses and strengthen the larger strategic deterrent architecture.

The United States will continue to work closely with each of our partners in the GCC to help them strengthen their capacity. Enhanced missile defense capabilities among the GCC not only protect our partners from the growing regional threat, but strengthened regional deterrence architecture ultimately keeps our interests, and our homeland, secure.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

REMARKS ON IMPLIMENTATION OF EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EUROPEAN

Implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Polish National Defense University
Warsaw, Poland
April 18, 2013

Thank you so much for inviting me to join you today. At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense policy issues, including missile defense policy. In that capacity, it was my responsibility and privilege to negotiate the details of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) agreements with Poland, Romania, and Turkey that will enable the United States to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA), the U.S. contribution to NATO missile defense. Poland is a strong ally and valued friend of the United States. Our bilateral defense ties run deep and are growing -- our new Aviation Detachment and Poland's agreement to host an EPAA missile defense site are but two recent examples of our partnership.

Implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach

Since 2009, the United States Government has focused on carrying out the vision articulated by President Obama when he announced that the EPAA would "provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies," while relying on "capabilities that are proven and cost-effective."

As you know, we have made great progress in implementing the President’s vision in Europe.

EPAA Phase One gained its first operational elements in 2011 with the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis BMD-capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean and the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey. With the declaration of Interim Operational Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago, this radar transitioned to NATO operational control.

Demonstrating their support for both NATO and the EPAA, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota. These ships will arrive in the 2014- 2015 timeframe, in time for EPAA Phase Two.

For Phase Two of the EPAA, we have an agreement with Romania that was ratified in December of 2011 to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 interceptor site beginning in the 2015 timeframe. This site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.

And finally there is Phase 3, which is centered on the first of the three host nations to ratify their hosting agreement – Poland. The Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement between the U.S. and Poland entered into force in September of 2011. This agreement places a land-based interceptor site, similar to Phase 2, in Redzikowo, and includes the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. This EPAA Phase 3 site is on schedule and on budget for deployment in the 2018 timeframe. The interceptor site here in Poland will be key to the EPAA. Not only will it protect Poland itself, but when combined with the rest of the EPAA assets, Phase 3 will be able to protect all of NATO Europe against ballistic missile threats from the Middle East.

On March 15, Secretary Hagel announced changes to U.S. missile defense policy to strengthen U.S. homeland missile defenses due to the growing ballistic missile threat from Iran and North Korea. One of these policy changes is that the SM-3 IIB missile defense interceptor program - the core element of EPAA Phase 4 - is being restructured into a technology development program.

With the SM-3 IIB interceptor, Phase 4 would have provided an intercept capability against ICBMs launched at the U.S. homeland from the Middle East. But the SM-3 IIB program also experienced significant delays, in part due to the U.S. Congress underfunding this interceptor. So as you know, the SM-3 IIB interceptor will no longer be developed or procured. The United States will instead strengthen its homeland defense by procuring additional Ground Based Interceptors – GBIs- for deployment at our existing missile defense site in Fort Greely, Alaska.

As Secretary Hagel announced, we will increase the number of deployed GBIs from the current 30 to 44, providing a nearly 50 percent increase in our capability.

The other two steps that Secretary Hagel announced include:
Deploying, with the support of the Japanese Government, an additional AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan. This will provide improved early warning and tracking of any missile launched from North Korea at the United States and/or Japan; and
Conducting studies for a potential additional GBI site in the United States. While the Obama Administration has not made any decision on whether to proceed with an additional site, conducting these studies would shorten the timeline for construction should that decision be made.
Finally, let me emphasize that the U.S. commitment to Phases One through Three of the EPAA and NATO missile defense remains ironclad, including the planned sites in Poland and Romania. Like the Administration, the U.S. Congress has supported, and continues to support full funding for Phases 1 through 3.

These U.S. missile defense deployments to Europe will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory in the 2018 timeframe.

I know that some may believe that not fielding Phase 4 may weaken the Transatlantic connection of the EPAA. I would tell you that the connection is still strong. I would emphasize that Phases One through Three of the EPAA will continue to provide important contributions to the defense of the United States homeland and U.S. deployed forces in Europe. For example, the radar deployed in Turkey as part of EPAA can provide important early tracking data on any Iranian missile launches against the United States. The interceptor site to be deployed in Poland, as well as BMD-capable ships at sea, will also be key to protecting the U.S. radar at Fylingdales, which is important to the defense of the U.S. homeland.

Cooperation With NATO Allies

Beyond our bilateral cooperation, we have also worked with our NATO Allies, including Poland, to implement a NATO missile defense effort.

After thorough and steady progress within NATO, on May 20-21 of 2012, the NATO Heads of State and Government met in Chicago for a NATO Summit and announced that NATO had achieved an interim BMD capability. This means that the Alliance has an operationally meaningful, standing peacetime BMD capability. NATO also agreed on the BMD-related command and control procedures, designated the Supreme Allied Commander Europe as the commander for this mission, and announced an interoperable command and control capability.

To support this interim BMD capability, the United States has offered EPAA assets to the Alliance as our voluntary national contributions to the BMD mission. The AN/TPY-2 radar deployed in Turkey is under NATO operational control. In addition, U.S. BMD-capable Aegis ships in Europe are also now able to operate under NATO operational control when threat conditions warrant.

These decisions have created a framework for allies to contribute and optimize their own BMD assets for our collective self-defense, and the United States welcomes and encourages such contributions from Allies. NATO BMD will be more effective should Allies provide sensors and interceptors to complement the U.S. EPAA contributions. Several NATO Allies already possess land- and sea-based sensors that could potentially be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems that can be integrated and used to provide point defense such as PATRIOT. It is important that the systems contributed by Allies be interoperable with NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense – or ALTBMD – command and control capability.

Cooperation With the Russian Federation

At the same time as we are developing this missile defense cooperation with NATO, we also seek to work cooperatively with Russia. We remain convinced that missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, missile defense cooperation with Russia remains a Presidential priority for this Administration.

In Chicago, the NATO Allies made a very clear statement of our intent regarding strategic stability and Russia’s strategic deterrent. NATO declared in the Chicago Summit Declaration that "…the NATO missile defense in Europe will not undermine strategic stability. NATO missile defense is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities." Through transparency and cooperation with the United States and NATO, Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed for ballistic missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems can neither negate nor undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent capabilities.

While we seek to develop ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, it is important to remember that in keeping with its collective security obligations, NATO alone bears responsibility for defending the Alliance from ballistic missile threats. This is why the United States and NATO cannot agree to Russia’s proposals for "sectoral" or "joint" missile defense architectures. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of Russian territory, NATO must ensure the defense of NATO territory. NATO cannot and will not outsource its Article 5 commitments. As ballistic missile threats continue to evolve, we cannot place limits or constraints on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners. This includes any limitations on the operating areas of our BMD-capable multi-mission Aegis ships.

Cooperation With Poland

We can’t talk about BMD cooperation without talking about our cooperation right here with the Republic of Poland.

We also now have an enduring Aviation Detachment deployed in Lask, which supports the joint training of U.S. and Polish Air Forces. And I also have to mention our vibrant and longstanding cooperation with Poland on other efforts to combat the threat of WMD and their missile delivery systems. For example, former President Bush chose Warsaw as the site of his May 2003 public call to create a common global effort to stop WMD- and missile-related shipments to and from states of proliferation concern. Poland and the United States then worked closely to heed that call by establishing the Proliferation Security Initiative. Over the following decade, 100 other nations from every part of the world joined our two countries in the PSI to improve our common efforts to take action against WMD shipments. Next month, Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller will have the great pleasure of leading the U.S. delegation to the PSI Tenth Anniversary meeting in Warsaw not only to mark the occasion, but to continue efforts to meet the call that President Obama made in the 2009 Prague speech to ensure the PSI is a durable international effort.

I commend my Polish colleagues for their leadership within NATO and domestically on defense modernization which will lead to new and valuable skill sets for NATO. As everyone knows, Poland is leading by example. Where many NATO countries are reducing their defense modernization, Poland is focusing on it – and the "it" that I follow most closely is the Polish efforts to upgrade its Integrated Air and Missile Defense System. This has been a topic of considerable discussion with my Polish counterparts. I expect it will be a topic of continued discussion. It is clear to me that the Government of Poland intends to embark upon a substantial effort that will provide for a greater national expertise which can contribute to NATO air and missile defense capabilities.

And Poland is not only working on defense modernization – it is also a participant in the U.S. Strategic Command’s NIMBLE TITAN multinational missile defense wargame. Polish military, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials are working closely with over 20 countries and NATO to collaboratively think through how regional and global coalitions might be able to innovate with equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures to provide the best and most agile defense. In a world where the threats and the technology to defend are constantly evolving, it is our responsibility to think through the problems to reach the best and most efficient solutions.

Conclusion
We are proud of how much we have already achieved by working with our allies and partners to counter the threat from ballistic missiles, but admittedly, there is still much to do – and we are looking forward to achieving higher levels of BMD cooperation and effectiveness.

I am very pleased to be here today, and I look forward to your questions.


Thank you.