U.S. OFFICIAL'S REMARKS AT PUGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD SECURITY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Sixtieth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Security
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Istanbul, Turkey
November 1, 2013

Thank you for that kind introduction, Sergio. I am pleased to be here at 60th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs and I want to thank Pugwash for organizing this conference.

Today, I would like to provide an update on our work, which the President laid out nearly four years ago in Prague, when he committed the United States to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a goal that he reaffirmed in his speech in Berlin this past June.

As President Obama noted in Prague and repeated in Berlin, this will not be easy. It will require persistence and patience, and may not happen in his lifetime. Still, over the last four years we have succeeded in moving closer to this goal.

In 2010, the Administration concluded a Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, which outlines the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers, as well as advancing the broader security interests of the United States and its allies. As the NPR states, the international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War: the threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. The traditional concept of nuclear deterrence — the idea that a country would not initiate a nuclear war for fear of nuclear retaliation — does not apply to terrorists. While our nuclear arsenal has little relevance in deterring this threat, concerted action by all states to uphold their NPT obligations – including those related to disarmament – is important for building a sense of common purpose that helps maintain support from partners around the world to uphold and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Securing sensitive nuclear materials worldwide will also make it harder for terrorists to acquire those materials.

For instance, the downblending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) by Russia that was required by the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement has now been completed. The final delivery of the resultant LEU to the United States is scheduled for early December. Upon the successful completion of the Agreement, 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian weapons will have been converted into LEU and delivered to the United States to fuel U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The HEU that was converted by downblending was enough to produce approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads.

In the United States, 374 metric tons of U.S. HEU has been declared excess to nuclear weapons; most of which will be downblended or used as fuel in naval or research reactors. In 2011, the United States and Russia brought into force the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 2010 protocols, which require each side to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium – enough in total for about 17,000 nuclear weapons – and thus permanently remove this material from military programs. Russia has also been an essential partner in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts to convert research reactors worldwide from HEU to LEU and repatriate those reactors’ HEU to the country of origin. These efforts have now converted or verified the shutdown of over 88 research and test reactors and isotope production facilities, and removed over 5,017 kg of HEU for secure storage, downblending and disposition.

In addition to working on the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, we have taken steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. We are not developing new nuclear weapons or pursuing new nuclear missions; we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations; and we have clearly stated that it is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the 68-year record of nonuse of nuclear weapons be extended forever.

In June of 2013, in conjunction with his Berlin speech, President Obama issued new guidance that aligns U.S. nuclear policies to the 21st century security environment. This was the latest concrete step the President has taken to advance his Prague agenda and the long-term goal of achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. After a comprehensive review, the President determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty.

Let me now address what we believe our next steps should be.

The United States and Russia still possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world, and we have a shared responsibility to continue the process of reducing our nuclear arms. With that in mind, we have a great example in the New START Treaty. The implementation of New START, now in its third year, is going well. When New START is fully implemented, the United States and the Russian Federation will each have no more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads – the lowest levels since the 1950s. Our overall nuclear stockpile is 85% below Cold War levels.

Going forward, the United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to further reduce nuclear arsenals.

To this end, we are engaged in a bilateral dialogue with Russia to promote strategic stability and increase transparency on a reciprocal basis. We are hopeful our dialogue will lead to greater reciprocal transparency and negotiation of even further nuclear weapons reductions.

The President also said in Berlin, that we will work with our NATO Allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe. The NPR underscores the U.S. position that decision on NATO’s nuclear posture should be made by consensus among Allies. The role of nuclear weapons in NATO was examined as part of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. As you may know, NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of, and reliance on, nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. Allies made clear in the DDPR that NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area. Allies have also affirmed their desire to work with Russia on reciprocal transparency steps regarding NSNW. While seeking to create the conditions for further nuclear reductions, NATO will continue to ensure that the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective, as NATO is committed to remaining a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

There are still further initiatives that are part of this Administration’s nuclear agenda. In Berlin, President Obama called on all nations to begin negotiations on a treaty that ends the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or FMCT would codify an end to the production of weapons-grade fissile material needed to create nuclear weapons, cap stockpiles worldwide, and provide the basis for further, deeper, reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Beginning multilateral negotiations on the FMCT is a priority objective for the United States and for the vast majority of states, and we have been working to initiate such negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. An overwhelming majority of nations support the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations. The United States is consulting with China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, as well as others, including India and Pakistan, to find a way to commence negotiations of an FMCT.

In 2009, the five nuclear-weapon states, or “P5,” began to meet regularly for discussions on issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, these discussions have expanded to address P5 implementation of our commitments under the NPT and the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. Russia hosted the most recent P5 conference in Geneva, Switzerland in April 2013, where the P5 reviewed progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and continued discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. We are looking forward to continued discussions at a fifth P5 conference in 2014.

In addition to providing a senior level policy forum for discussion and coordination among the P5, this process has spawned a series of discussions among policymakers and government experts on a variety of issues. China is leading a P5 working group on nuclear definitions and terminology. The P5 are discussing approaches to a common format for NPT reporting, and we are also beginning to engage at expert levels on some important verification and transparency issues. As we proceed, we would like the P5 conferences and intersessional meetings to develop further practical transparency measures that build confidence and predictability.

I should add at this point that when discussing areas to broaden and deepen our cooperation and to advance our common interests, it’s necessary to address the question of missile defense. Over the past twenty years, both Democratic and Republicans have seen the benefits of missile defense cooperation with Russia.

While we have our differences on this issue, the United States remains convinced that missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, the United States remains open to missile defense cooperation with Russia. To be clear, U.S. missile defense efforts are focused on defending our homeland as well as our European, Middle Eastern, and Asian allies and partners against ballistic missile threats coming from regional actors. These are threats that are growing, and must be met.

In meeting those threats, it is important to note that U.S. missile defenses are not designed for, or capable of, undermining the Russian or Chinese strategic deterrents. For its part, Russia has been insistent on legally binding guarantees that our missile defenses will not threaten its strategic deterrent. Rather than legal guarantees, we believe that the best way for Russia to see that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not undermine its strategic deterrent would be for it to cooperate with us and to engage in mutual transparency measures. In addition to making all of us safer, cooperation would send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter proliferation. With regard to China, the United States welcomes the opportunity to engage in a more robust dialogue about strategic stability, including missile defense.

As our work together with Russia over the past four years has shown, we can produce significant results that benefit both countries. As mentioned earlier, the New START Treaty is a great example of this.

None of this will be easy, but the policies the Administration is pursuing are suited for our security needs and tailored for the global security threats of the 21st century. By maintaining and supporting a safe, secure and effective stockpile — sufficient to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies — at the same time that we pursue responsible verifiable reductions through arms control, we will make this world a safer place.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE STRATCOM MISSION

A B-2 Spirit bomber is towed to a parking spot at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. The B-2 is a key element of the U.S. nuclear triad, which includes ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable heavy bombers and associated aerial tankers, and the assured warning and command-and-control system that interconnects them. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Shane A. Cuomo

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Nuclear Deterrence Remains Key Stratcom Mission, Commander Says
By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, Neb., April 5, 2013 - Twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and with the United States and Russia committed to deep cuts in their already-reduced nuclear arsenals, some might be tempted to think U.S. Strategic Command's most important mission is fading into the history books.

Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent -- and the ability to operate its nuclear capabilities effectively if directed by the president -- was a foundation of U.S. national security throughout the Cold War, said Air Force Gen. C. Robert Kehler, the Stratcom commander.

Yet Stratcom's nuclear deterrence mission remains as critical as at any time in U.S. history, Kehler said, injected with a renewed focus and sense of urgency by the president's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the new national defense strategy.

So even as the United States began withdrawing numerous weapons abroad, deactivated entire classes of weapons and reduced its nuclear stockpile by 75 percent since the height of the Cold War, it has ensured that it maintains sufficient deterrent capability.

"As long as nuclear weapons exist, U.S. Strategic Command's top priority must be to deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure and effective strategic nuclear deterrent force," Kehler told the House and Senate armed services committees earlier this month.

Kehler's job is to look across the entire nuclear enterprise to ensure it remains operationally viable, and to verify the safety and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile. That includes the triad of ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable heavy bombers and associated aerial tankers, and the assured warning and command-and-control system that interconnects them.

"I can assure you that today's nuclear weapons and triad of delivery platforms are safe, secure and effective," Kehler reported in testimony to the congressional panels.

Looking to the future, he said, the challenge will be to modernize and sustain the myriad aspects of the nuclear enterprise: from delivery systems and stockpile surveillance activities to upgrades to the nuclear command, control and communications capabilities.

"Our nuclear weapons and platforms are aging and are in need of either modernization or recapitalization, the majority occurring within the next 10 to 20 years," Navy Cmdr. Robert Thomas Jr., Stratcom's deputy division chief for global strike capabilities, resources and integration, told American Forces Press Service.

"We are talking about every platform -- the bombers, the submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles -- and also every weapon employed on those platforms," Thomas said.

So Stratcom is working with the services and its interagency partners to develop a replacement for the Ohio-class submarine and to modernize or replace the Minuteman III ICBM and the B-52 Stratofortress and B-2 Spirit bombers, as well as the weapons they deliver.

"We are not talking about developing any new capabilities or new weapons. That is not what we are doing," Thomas emphasized. "What we are doing is maintaining the capability of our nuclear deterrent."

That deterrent remains vital, he said, not only to the United States, but also to the allies and partners it has pledged to protect.

Based on this threat and the approaching end of much of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure's life-cycle, Thomas said, Stratcom's efforts aren't occurring a minute too soon.

The Ohio-class submarines that are capable of launching ballistic missiles are slated to operate through the late 2020s and early 2030s. At that point, they will have reached their maximum life expectancy, serving for 42 years -- longer than any other submarine in Navy history.

"Last year's decision to delay the Ohio-class replacement program by two years is all the risk I would recommend in this critical program," Kehler said during his congressional testimony.

Replacement submarines are being developed now, with the first of 12 on schedule for delivery in 2031, just as the Ohio-class subs they replace go into retirement.

Meanwhile, Stratcom is working with the Air Force to determine whether to replace or extend the life of the Minuteman III ICBMs that have been in service since the 1970s. The current system has undergone several modernization programs since it was fielded, Thomas said, and Congress has mandated that the current force remain viable and credible through the 2030 timeframe.

A study of alternatives to sustain the ground-based leg of the triad beyond 2030 is underway.

The Air Force also is assessing how to modernize the nuclear-capable B-52 and B-2 bombers. The B-52 has undergone several modernization programs since it was first fielded in the early 1950s, and is expected to remain in service through 2040. The B-2, introduced in the late 1990s, will require similar efforts to remain viable into the 2050 timeframe, Thomas said.

In addition, Stratcom is working with the National Nuclear Security Administration to ensure the weapons development under its purview meets the command's strategic requirements.

"We are fairly unique in our role as a combatant command in looking holistically across the entire enterprise and making sure all these activities remain synchronized and aligned so we don't have capability gaps," Thomas said.

This synchronizing mission presents challenges in terms of not only budget constraints, but also of manufacturing capability to make it all happen within the required timeframe. "Schedules are important, because it does no good to deliver a weapon at the wrong time," Thomas said. "And if a platform or weapon is aging out, we have to have its replacement ahead of time so we can be confident the system works as designed to meet the mission requirements."

Further complicating the effort is the Nuclear Posture Review's emphasis on refurbishing existing nuclear weapons capabilities rather than developing new ones. Thomas said he recognizes the rationale, with the intent of reducing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons as part of its national security strategy. "Building new weapons is not in line with that strategy or that position," he said.

Thomas compared the current approach to driving a 1965 Mustang that's been refitted with new systems and replacements for parts no longer made. Essentially, it's still a 1965 Mustang, he said, but now it relies on modern parts to keep running.

"In many respects, it would be a lot easier to go out and buy a new car, but we can't do that. We have to maintain the car we have," he said.

Another complication is the unilateral moratorium the United States has maintained on nuclear testing for the past two decades. This, Kehler told Congress, presents the challenge of certifying the effectiveness and reliability of nuclear weapons without actually testing them with nuclear explosions.

He noted advances in the computer simulations, modeling and other scientific and surveillance programs used instead for testing, and the importance of attracting the proper talent pool to the mission to sustain it into the future.

"We've got to maintain the science that underpins those weapons," Kehler told Congress. "We've got to make sure we are sustaining those weapons and surveilling those weapons as they age, as well as introducing life-extension programs as needed.

Ensuring the viability of the U.S. nuclear enterprise provides deterrence and, should that fail, gives the president options in how to deploy forces, Thomas said. But it also helps stem proliferation by assuring U.S. allies and partners, he added, so they do not feel a need to pursue their own nuclear-weapon capability.

"So it is as important now -- and perhaps even more important in a world that is more uncertain -- and into the future that we maintain a very credible nuclear force," he said. "And as long as we have these weapons, we are ensuring that they are safe, secure, credible and effective. And we are taking the appropriate steps to accomplish that."