FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
U.S.-Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
Fact Sheet
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
June 16, 2015
New 123 Agreement Would Strengthen the U.S.-R.O.K. Bilateral Strategic Relationship and Enhances Cooperation for the Long Term
The United States and the Republic of Korea have signed a successor agreement for civil nuclear cooperation, also known as a “123 Agreement.”
The United States and the R.O.K. have had a strong partnership in the field of peaceful nuclear cooperation for more than half a century, and the United States is pleased that the R.O.K. has become one of the world’s leading nations in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The agreement would enhance the strategic relationship between the United States and the R.O.K. across the spectrum of political, economic, energy, science, and technology issues.
The agreement would establish a new standing, High-Level Bilateral Commission for our two governments to work together to advance mutual objectives such as addressing spent fuel management, an assured stable fuel supply, nuclear security, and enhancing cooperation between the U.S. and R.O.K. nuclear industries.
The new Commission would allow for deepened cooperation and more regular interaction between our two governments on the state of nuclear energy in both countries and allow us to account for new developments in technology, spent fuel management, security, and safety.
The agreement would reinforce the importance of our ongoing Joint Fuel Cycle Study to review and identify appropriate options for addressing spent fuel management challenges, and facilitate cooperation on research and development (R&D) in this context, including R&D at specified facilities on the use of electrochemical reduction.
The new agreement also would provide the R.O.K. with consent to produce radioisotopes for medical and research purposes, as well as to conduct examination of irradiated fuel rods using U.S.-obligated material.
The agreement would allow for the continuation and expansion of our robust and mutually beneficial trade relationship.
For example, the United States supplies enrichment services to the R.O.K. to support its fabrication of nuclear fuel, and the R.O.K. supplies the United States with significant reactor components such as pressure vessels.
Due to this trade relationship, the contract between the R.O.K. and the United Arab Emirates to build four reactors has already brought hundreds of new jobs and approximately $2 billion in additional revenue to U.S. nuclear suppliers.
The agreement would allow this type of cooperation to continue and flourish in the future.
The agreement would be fully reciprocal, requiring the United States to undertake most of the same obligations as the R.O.K. The only exceptions relate to different obligations that each country has under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The New 123 Agreement Would Strengthen Nonproliferation Cooperation Between the United States and the Republic of Korea
Like all our 123 agreements, this agreement contains essential provisions related to nonproliferation and nuclear security, and would thereby enhance the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The terms of the U.S.-R.O.K. 123 agreement strongly reaffirm the two governments’ shared commitment to nonproliferation as the cornerstone of their nuclear cooperation relationship.
The R.O.K. has a strong track record on nonproliferation and the R.O.K. has consistently reiterated its commitment to nonproliferation. It has been an extremely active partner with the United States across a wide breadth of bilateral and multilateral activities designed to ensure the implementation of the highest standards of safety, security, and nonproliferation worldwide.
The agreement would update the nonproliferation conditions from the prior agreement and fully meet the nonproliferation requirements of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA).
The agreement would provide for the cooperation between the United States and the R.O.K. to be subject to the relevant IAEA safeguards requirements, assurance that all activities under the agreement will be for peaceful purposes only, and express reciprocal consent rights over any retransfers or subsequent reprocessing or enrichment of material subject to the agreement.
The R.O.K. Is a Strong Nonproliferation Partner
The R.O.K. is one of the United States’ strongest partners on nonproliferation and has consistently reiterated its commitment to nonproliferation.
It is a member of the four multilateral nonproliferation regimes (Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, and Nuclear Suppliers Group, for which it served as Chair in 2003-2004 and will do so again in 2016-17) and recently completed its term as chair of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
The R.O.K. became a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 23, 1975, and has in force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The R.O.K. has also demonstrated its commitment to nuclear security and addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism, including through hosting the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit and being an active contributor to the Summit process, and through its support for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative.
The R.O.K. has been an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) since 2009, having hosted regional and global meetings and two operational exercises. It has also conducted outreach to states that have not yet endorsed PSI.
The R.O.K. has been a consistent advocate of nonproliferation in the IAEA Board of Governors, including support for strengthening safeguards and calling to account Iran and Syria for violations of their safeguards obligations.
The R.O.K. has also been a strong and close partner in addressing the security and proliferation threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, including at the IAEA and the UN Security Council. The United States and the R.O.K. continue to cooperate closely in our shared objective to achieve North Korea’s complete, irreversible and verifiable denuclearization and to bring North Korea into compliance with its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and its obligations under the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
Showing posts with label NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. Show all posts
Tuesday, June 16, 2015
Friday, April 17, 2015
STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUES FACT SHEET TOUTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
04/14/2015 08:22 AM EDT
Myths and Facts Regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Regime
Fact Sheet
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
April 14, 2015
(1) Myth: The NPT has failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has enjoyed tremendous successes over the 45 years since its entry into force. The NPT is the most widely adhered to nuclear treaty in history. It has established an international legal framework against the proliferation of nuclear weapons to which 190 countries have subscribed. Among them are states that abandoned nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs with the NPT serving as an impetus. The vast majority of NPT parties meet their obligations and benefit every day from the security the Treaty provides. For the few that do not, the NPT provides a common international basis for resolving noncompliance where the actions of a country contravene the treaty’s principles.
(2) Myth: Not enough is being done to pursue nuclear disarmament.
When the NPT entered into force in 1970, the United States had a nuclear stockpile of over 26,000 nuclear weapons. By 2013 that number had been reduced by about 82 percent to 4,804 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. From October 1993 through September 2013, the United States dismantled almost 10,000 nuclear warheads. Several thousand additional nuclear weapons are currently retired and awaiting dismantlement. Nuclear weapons reductions continue as we fulfill our obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). When the New START Treaty limits are reached in 2018, the United States and Russia will have reduced our respective operationally deployed strategic forces to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, their lowest level since the 1950s. The United States has reaffirmed our commitment to additional arms control measures, and has proposed negotiations with Russia to achieve another one-third reduction in our strategic nuclear arsenals. We also remain committed to bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and we seek the immediate start to negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
Beyond nuclear arms control negotiations, we seek to broaden our cooperation with non-nuclear weapons states on disarmament verification issues through a new initiative, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. This program aims to develop technical solutions to challenges involved in verifying future nuclear agreements.
(3) Myth: Modernization of nuclear weapons and related infrastructure is a step backwards on disarmament and inconsistent with NPT disarmament obligations.
The United States is committed not to pursue new nuclear warheads, and life extension programs will not provide for new military capabilities. U.S. stockpile stewardship and life extension programs are designed to service the existing nuclear arsenal in order to ensure it remains safe, secure, and effective so long as nuclear weapons exist. The United States is pursuing life extension for a number of warhead types that will enable us to eliminate many of the weapons we maintain in our stockpile as a hedge against technical contingencies.
Modernization of nuclear infrastructure has nothing to do with developing new nuclear weapons. These investments are needed to replace aging infrastructure that will allow us to safely, securely, and more rapidly reduce the total stockpile. Simply put, infrastructure modernization, stockpile stewardship, and life extension programs for U.S. warheads will contribute to and do not detract from progress on our NPT nuclear disarmament obligations.
(4) Myth: There is insufficient cooperation among the nuclear weapons states on promoting nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses.
The NPT Nuclear Weapon States (P5) are working to strengthen implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. Since 2009, the P5 have met annually to jointly pursue an agenda of strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and have institutionalized regular dialogue on nuclear weapons-related issues. One notable result of these meetings has been development of a common reporting framework on implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. We are also pursuing technical work on nuclear terms and definitions that can help lay the foundation for future cooperation or agreements. P5 engagement is a long-term investment to strengthen and advance the NPT, build trust and create a stronger foundation to achieve the Treaty’s disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses goals.
(5) Myth: Nuclear Weapons States are insensitive to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.
This is simply not true. Underpinning all of our nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, stretching back decades, has been our clear understanding and recognition of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The United States remains firmly committed to the view that it is in the interest of all states that the 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended indefinitely. The United States participated in the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Vienna, Austria, last December to reinforce the message that it is precisely because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons that we give the highest priority to ensuring these weapons remain safe and secure for as long as they exist. While we share some of the frustration with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, we also recognize that the realization of a world without nuclear weapons will require significant changes in the international system. For this reason, the practical path of step-by-step, verifiable nuclear reductions remains the only realistic route to our shared goal of a nuclear weapons- free world.
(6) Myth: “Hair-trigger” alert status and failures to take proper care of nuclear weapons are accidents waiting to happen, and demonstrate the urgent need to eliminate all nuclear weapons.
U.S. nuclear forces are not on “hair-trigger” alert and the U.S. employs multiple, rigorous and redundant technical and procedural safeguards to protect against accidental or unauthorized launch. Only the President can authorize the employment of U.S. nuclear weapons and we are taking further steps to maximize decision time for the President in a crisis. These steps enhance stability before and during a crisis and avoid the instability and compressed decision times that are inherent to changes in alert status.
The United States is also actively working to reduce the numbers and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. These steps include taking all of our non-strategic nuclear bombers and nuclear-capable heavy bombers off day-to-day alert, engaging in the practice of open-ocean targeting for ICBMs and SLBMs, and reducing the number of warheads each ICBM carries to a single warhead. Converting ICBMs to a single warhead makes these weapons less attractive targets and therefore more stabilizing. Continuing at-sea patrols for submarines carrying nuclear weapons have a similar effect.
(7) Myth: Export controls and discriminatory policies are impeding nuclear cooperation and preventing developing countries from exercising their inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The United States fully supports the right of all Parties to the NPT to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations. An effective, transparent export control regime helps build confidence among states that assistance provided for peaceful nuclear development will not be diverted to illegal weapons purposes. The United States and other major supplier nations do not apply export controls in order to impede legitimate nuclear commerce. Rather, U.S. export controls are designed to maximize legitimate trade while raising barriers to high risk transfers that could result in the diversion or retransfer of U.S. technology, equipment and material to weapons purposes.
The United States actively lends support to NPT Parties that are in compliance with their NPT obligations to help them develop the infrastructure needed for peaceful nuclear applications and safe, secure, and safeguarded nuclear power programs. The United States is by far the largest contributor to IAEA peaceful use programs, including about $142 million in voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation program since 2010 and another $50 million toward the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) that we helped launch. PUI programs have addressed the sustainable development needs of more than 120 Member States in areas such as human health, water resource management, food security, environmental protection, and nuclear power infrastructure development.
(8) Myth: The United States has a double standard with respect to opposing nuclear proliferation.
The United States remains committed to universality of the NPT and has consistently urged the few countries that have never signed the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear weapon states and in the interim to take actions that are supportive of NPT principles and provisions. We have also been consistent in advancing international efforts to hold NPT Parties to account for noncompliance with the Treaty – as President Obama said in his 2009 Prague Speech, rules must be binding, violations must be punished and words must mean something. We are very encouraged with process underway to address Iran’s noncompliance and we remain steadfast in our insistence that North Korea return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards and comply fully with its UN Security Council and nonproliferation obligations.
(9) Myth: The United States is not doing its part to promote a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.
The United States remains firmly committed to the goal of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. We continue to work with Russia, the UK, the UN and the Conference Facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, to convene the proposed conference to discuss a regional zone. We have supported five rounds of consultations between Israel and Arab states and encourage these talks to continue. Regional states bear the responsibility to reach consensus on arrangements for the conference. Efforts to turn the NPT process into a referendum on this issue should be rejected.
(10) Myth: Nuclear cooperation with India is inconsistent with the NPT.
Nothing in the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement or in the 2008 policy decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to enable civil nuclear cooperation with India violates the NPT. Such cooperation is permitted provided the supply of material or equipment is under safeguards. Under the parameters of the initiative, India committed to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and has placed all civilian-designated nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. All U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with India is subject to such safeguards, and cooperation on sensitive nuclear technologies is ruled out. India has also worked to bring its export controls into line with internationally-recognized standards and committed to continue its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and support negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty. These commitments constitute significant gains for global nonproliferation efforts.
04/14/2015 08:22 AM EDT
Myths and Facts Regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Regime
Fact Sheet
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
April 14, 2015
(1) Myth: The NPT has failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has enjoyed tremendous successes over the 45 years since its entry into force. The NPT is the most widely adhered to nuclear treaty in history. It has established an international legal framework against the proliferation of nuclear weapons to which 190 countries have subscribed. Among them are states that abandoned nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs with the NPT serving as an impetus. The vast majority of NPT parties meet their obligations and benefit every day from the security the Treaty provides. For the few that do not, the NPT provides a common international basis for resolving noncompliance where the actions of a country contravene the treaty’s principles.
(2) Myth: Not enough is being done to pursue nuclear disarmament.
When the NPT entered into force in 1970, the United States had a nuclear stockpile of over 26,000 nuclear weapons. By 2013 that number had been reduced by about 82 percent to 4,804 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. From October 1993 through September 2013, the United States dismantled almost 10,000 nuclear warheads. Several thousand additional nuclear weapons are currently retired and awaiting dismantlement. Nuclear weapons reductions continue as we fulfill our obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). When the New START Treaty limits are reached in 2018, the United States and Russia will have reduced our respective operationally deployed strategic forces to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, their lowest level since the 1950s. The United States has reaffirmed our commitment to additional arms control measures, and has proposed negotiations with Russia to achieve another one-third reduction in our strategic nuclear arsenals. We also remain committed to bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and we seek the immediate start to negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
Beyond nuclear arms control negotiations, we seek to broaden our cooperation with non-nuclear weapons states on disarmament verification issues through a new initiative, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. This program aims to develop technical solutions to challenges involved in verifying future nuclear agreements.
(3) Myth: Modernization of nuclear weapons and related infrastructure is a step backwards on disarmament and inconsistent with NPT disarmament obligations.
The United States is committed not to pursue new nuclear warheads, and life extension programs will not provide for new military capabilities. U.S. stockpile stewardship and life extension programs are designed to service the existing nuclear arsenal in order to ensure it remains safe, secure, and effective so long as nuclear weapons exist. The United States is pursuing life extension for a number of warhead types that will enable us to eliminate many of the weapons we maintain in our stockpile as a hedge against technical contingencies.
Modernization of nuclear infrastructure has nothing to do with developing new nuclear weapons. These investments are needed to replace aging infrastructure that will allow us to safely, securely, and more rapidly reduce the total stockpile. Simply put, infrastructure modernization, stockpile stewardship, and life extension programs for U.S. warheads will contribute to and do not detract from progress on our NPT nuclear disarmament obligations.
(4) Myth: There is insufficient cooperation among the nuclear weapons states on promoting nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses.
The NPT Nuclear Weapon States (P5) are working to strengthen implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. Since 2009, the P5 have met annually to jointly pursue an agenda of strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and have institutionalized regular dialogue on nuclear weapons-related issues. One notable result of these meetings has been development of a common reporting framework on implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. We are also pursuing technical work on nuclear terms and definitions that can help lay the foundation for future cooperation or agreements. P5 engagement is a long-term investment to strengthen and advance the NPT, build trust and create a stronger foundation to achieve the Treaty’s disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses goals.
(5) Myth: Nuclear Weapons States are insensitive to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.
This is simply not true. Underpinning all of our nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, stretching back decades, has been our clear understanding and recognition of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The United States remains firmly committed to the view that it is in the interest of all states that the 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended indefinitely. The United States participated in the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Vienna, Austria, last December to reinforce the message that it is precisely because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons that we give the highest priority to ensuring these weapons remain safe and secure for as long as they exist. While we share some of the frustration with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, we also recognize that the realization of a world without nuclear weapons will require significant changes in the international system. For this reason, the practical path of step-by-step, verifiable nuclear reductions remains the only realistic route to our shared goal of a nuclear weapons- free world.
(6) Myth: “Hair-trigger” alert status and failures to take proper care of nuclear weapons are accidents waiting to happen, and demonstrate the urgent need to eliminate all nuclear weapons.
U.S. nuclear forces are not on “hair-trigger” alert and the U.S. employs multiple, rigorous and redundant technical and procedural safeguards to protect against accidental or unauthorized launch. Only the President can authorize the employment of U.S. nuclear weapons and we are taking further steps to maximize decision time for the President in a crisis. These steps enhance stability before and during a crisis and avoid the instability and compressed decision times that are inherent to changes in alert status.
The United States is also actively working to reduce the numbers and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. These steps include taking all of our non-strategic nuclear bombers and nuclear-capable heavy bombers off day-to-day alert, engaging in the practice of open-ocean targeting for ICBMs and SLBMs, and reducing the number of warheads each ICBM carries to a single warhead. Converting ICBMs to a single warhead makes these weapons less attractive targets and therefore more stabilizing. Continuing at-sea patrols for submarines carrying nuclear weapons have a similar effect.
(7) Myth: Export controls and discriminatory policies are impeding nuclear cooperation and preventing developing countries from exercising their inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The United States fully supports the right of all Parties to the NPT to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations. An effective, transparent export control regime helps build confidence among states that assistance provided for peaceful nuclear development will not be diverted to illegal weapons purposes. The United States and other major supplier nations do not apply export controls in order to impede legitimate nuclear commerce. Rather, U.S. export controls are designed to maximize legitimate trade while raising barriers to high risk transfers that could result in the diversion or retransfer of U.S. technology, equipment and material to weapons purposes.
The United States actively lends support to NPT Parties that are in compliance with their NPT obligations to help them develop the infrastructure needed for peaceful nuclear applications and safe, secure, and safeguarded nuclear power programs. The United States is by far the largest contributor to IAEA peaceful use programs, including about $142 million in voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation program since 2010 and another $50 million toward the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) that we helped launch. PUI programs have addressed the sustainable development needs of more than 120 Member States in areas such as human health, water resource management, food security, environmental protection, and nuclear power infrastructure development.
(8) Myth: The United States has a double standard with respect to opposing nuclear proliferation.
The United States remains committed to universality of the NPT and has consistently urged the few countries that have never signed the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear weapon states and in the interim to take actions that are supportive of NPT principles and provisions. We have also been consistent in advancing international efforts to hold NPT Parties to account for noncompliance with the Treaty – as President Obama said in his 2009 Prague Speech, rules must be binding, violations must be punished and words must mean something. We are very encouraged with process underway to address Iran’s noncompliance and we remain steadfast in our insistence that North Korea return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards and comply fully with its UN Security Council and nonproliferation obligations.
(9) Myth: The United States is not doing its part to promote a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.
The United States remains firmly committed to the goal of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. We continue to work with Russia, the UK, the UN and the Conference Facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, to convene the proposed conference to discuss a regional zone. We have supported five rounds of consultations between Israel and Arab states and encourage these talks to continue. Regional states bear the responsibility to reach consensus on arrangements for the conference. Efforts to turn the NPT process into a referendum on this issue should be rejected.
(10) Myth: Nuclear cooperation with India is inconsistent with the NPT.
Nothing in the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement or in the 2008 policy decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to enable civil nuclear cooperation with India violates the NPT. Such cooperation is permitted provided the supply of material or equipment is under safeguards. Under the parameters of the initiative, India committed to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and has placed all civilian-designated nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. All U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with India is subject to such safeguards, and cooperation on sensitive nuclear technologies is ruled out. India has also worked to bring its export controls into line with internationally-recognized standards and committed to continue its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and support negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty. These commitments constitute significant gains for global nonproliferation efforts.
Thursday, April 2, 2015
SECRETARY KERRY'S PRESS AVAILABILITY IN LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
04/02/2015 06:41 PM EDT
Press Availability in Lausanne, Switzerland
Press Availability
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
Lausanne, Switzerland
April 2, 2015
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, good evening and – excuse me – thank you all very, very much for your patience. And I want to start by expressing an enormous thank you, merci, danke, to the people and the Government of Switzerland for their incredible generosity. The way in which they have welcomed us and the amount of effort is really extraordinary, and we’re very, very grateful to them. And throughout this entire process, certainly over the past week, the people of Switzerland have gone above and beyond in order to facilitate these negotiations, and I don’t think anybody could imagine a much more peaceful setting in order to pursue a peaceful path forward. (In French.)
I also want to thank the very many other nations that have provided a home for these negotiations over the past couple of years – people forget that, it’s been going on that long – and that includes Austria, which was incredibly generous in hosting our delegation in Vienna for a long period of time; Oman, which has not only hosted a number of important meetings, but also played a critical role in getting these talks off the ground in the first place; and then, of course, we say thank you to Turkey, Russia, Kazakhstan, Iraq, and my home country, the United States.
I particularly want to thank President Obama. He has been courageous and determined in his pursuit of a diplomatic path. And from the day that he took office, President Obama has been crystal-clear that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose a threat to our security and the security of our allies in the region, including Israel. He has been just as clear that the best and most effective way to prevent that threat is through diplomacy.
The journey towards a diplomatic solution began years ago. And I can tell you that I’ve personally been involved for about four years, beginning from the time that I was serving in the United States Senate. Others have been on this journey, and some of the others in our team, for even longer than that.
But as Foreign Minister Zarif and High Representative Mogherini announced moments ago, today we have reached a critical milestone in that quest. We, our P5+1, EU partners, and Iran have arrived at a consensus on the key parameters of an arrangement that, once implemented, will give the international community confidence that Iran’s nuclear program is and will remain exclusively peaceful. And over the coming weeks, with all of the conditions of the 2013 Joint Plan of Action still in effect from this moment forward, our experts will continue to work hard to build on the parameters that we have arrived at today and finalize a comprehensive deal by the end of June.
Now we have said from the beginning – I think you’ve heard me say it again and again – that we will not accept just any deal, that we will only accept a good deal. And today, I can tell you that the political understanding with details that we have reached is a solid foundation for the good deal that we are seeking. It is the foundation for a deal that will see Iran reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98 percent for 15 years. It is a deal in which Iran will cut its installed centrifuges by more than two-thirds for 10 years. It is a deal that will increase Iran’s breakout time, which was confirmed publicly today to be two to three months, and that is the time that it would take Iran to speed up its enrichment in order to produce enough fissile material for one potential nuclear weapon. And that will be expanded now, under this deal, to one year from those two to three months. That is obviously as much as six times what it is today, and what it has been for the past three years.
I’d like also to make one more point very, very clear because it has been misinterpreted and misstated, misrepresented for much of this discussion: There will be no sunset to the deal that we are working to finalize – no sunset, none. The parameters of this agreement will be implemented in phases. Some provisions will be in place for 10 years; others will be in place for 15 years; others still will be in place for 25 years. But certain provisions, including many transparency measures, will be in place indefinitely into the future. They will never expire. And the bottom line is that, under this arrangement, the international community will have confidence that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful, providing, of course, that the provisions are adhered to. And if they aren’t, we have provisions that empower us to deal with that.
Ultimately, the parameters that we have agreed to will do exactly what we set out to do – make certain that all pathways to make enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon have been cut off, including the uranium pathway at Natanz and Fordow, and the plutonium pathway at Arak, and, of course, the covert pathway.
Now we, our partners, and Iran have agreed that the only uranium-enrichment facility Iran will operate moving forward will be the facility at Natanz. And even that one will undergo dramatic changes. The vast majority of the centrifuges and their infrastructure will be removed. And for at least the next 15 years, the stockpile will remain at 300 kilograms. And any uranium that is enriched at Natanz will be capped at 3.67 percent, which is a typical level of enrichment for civilian nuclear power, but doesn’t even begin to approach the enrichment level necessary for a weapon.
We have agreed that the facility at Fordow will halt all uranium enrichment, period – all uranium enrichment, and in fact, there will not even be any fissile material present at the site and no enrichment R&D. Instead, the facility will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center.
We have also agreed that Iran will redesign and rebuild its heavy-water reactor at Arak so that it will no longer produce any weapons-grade plutonium. And the United States will be able to sign off, certify, the reactor’s final design, redesign. And through international cooperation, it will be transformed into a reactor supporting only peaceful nuclear research and nuclear medicine. And the calandria, as you heard earlier, will be taken out and destroyed.
We have agreed that Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the Arak reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime. And Iran has agreed to refrain from building any additional heavy-water reactors for the next 15 years at least – “at least” means still open for beyond that period in the course of the next three months.
And we have agreed that Iran will face regular and comprehensive inspections, which is the best possible way to detect any attempt to covertly produce a weapon. Not only will inspectors have regular access to all of Iran’s declared facilities indefinitely, but they will also be able to monitor the facilities that produce the centrifuges themselves and the uranium that supports the nuclear program. And they will be able to do that for at least 20 years.
This critical step will help to guard against diversion of those materials to any clandestine location or plant. In addition, Iran has agreed to allow IAEA to investigate any suspicious site or any allegations of covert nuclear activities anywhere.
So these are just a few of the key – and I mean a few – of the key measures that will make up an extraordinarily comprehensive monitoring and transparency regime when and if it is finally signed and completed over the course of the next months. Now we have been very clear, both publicly and privately, a final agreement will not rely on promises. It will rely on proof.
It is important to note that Iran, to date, has honored all of the commitments that it made under the Joint Plan of Action that we agreed to in 2013. And I ask you to think about that against the backdrop of those who predicted that it would fail and not get the job done.
And in return for Iran’s future cooperation, we and our international partners will provide relief in phases from the sanctions that have impacted Iran’s economy. And if we find at any point that Iran is not complying with this agreement, the sanctions can snap back into place. So together these parameters outline a reasonable standard that Iran can readily meet, and it is the standard that Iran has now agreed to meet.
Throughout history, diplomacy has been necessary to prevent wars and to define international boundaries, to design institutions, and to develop global norms. Simply demanding that Iran capitulate makes a nice soundbite, but it’s not a policy. It is not a realistic plan. So the true measure of this understanding is not whether it meets all the desires of one side at the expense of the other. The test is whether or not it will leave the world safer or more secure than it would be without this agreement. And there can be no question that the comprehensive plan that we are moving toward will more than pass that test.
This isn’t just my assessment. It isn’t just the assessment of the United States delegation and our experts. It is the assessment of every one of our P5+1 partners who stood up here a little while ago in front of the flags of their nations. It is the assessment of our negotiating partners – Germany, the UK, China, France, and Russia – and all of our experts who have analyzed every aspect of this issue also join in that assessment.
From the beginning, we have negotiated as a team, and we are all agreed that this is the best outcome achievable. No viable alternatives – not one – would be nearly as effective at preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon than – over a period of time than the parameters, providing they get completed and are signed.
Our political understanding arrived at today opens the door for a long-term resolution to the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. Now, we have no illusions about the fact that we still have a ways to travel before we’ll arrive at the destination that we seek. We still have many technical details to work out on both sides and still some other issues that we acknowledge still have to be resolved; for example, the duration of the UN arms and ballistic missile restrictions on Iran and the precise timing of and mechanism for the conversion of the Arak reactor and Fordow site. And of course, once we’re able to finalize a comprehensive deal, the process of implementation then remains in front of us as well. But that’s a good challenge to have, frankly.
Throughout this negotiation, we have made a diligent effort to consult with our allies, our partners, including Israel and the Gulf states, and we have vigorously reaffirmed our enduring commitment to their security. No one should mistake that. And we will continue to stand by that commitment in the years and days ahead.
Obviously, we remain deeply concerned about Iran’s destabilizing actions in the region, and we remain fully committed to addressing the full slate of issues that we currently have with Iran. But it is because we are so concerned about those issues and about the region’s security. Precisely because of that concern that we believe this deal is critical. The status quo with respect to Iran’s nuclear program is unacceptable.
And certainly, we will continue to consult closely in the days ahead with the United States Congress. They and we understand that an Iran that had a nuclear weapon in the context of today’s troubles would be even more problematic. I spent almost 30 years in the United States Senate, and I had the privilege and the responsibility of chairing the Foreign Relations Committee when we put tough sanctions in place when this regime was put in place. And that is the regime that indeed has brought this negotiation about.
We are deeply grateful for Congress’s support of the diplomatic path to date, and we appreciate their patience. There were those agitating to take action earlier. Responsible voices held off and they helped us to get to this moment, and we appreciate that. We sincerely hope that members will continue to give us the time and the space that we need to fully explain the political agreement that we have reached and to work out the remaining details of a final deal.
Before I take a few questions, I just want to take a moment to thank some very important people. The team that has been assembled throughout this process is really made up of an extraordinary group of public servants, and believe me, they have served their country and the world well in these days. I want to thank my Cabinet colleague, Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz, who was indispensable in his knowledge and his technical expertise to be able to sit down and work through some very complex issues. His background as a nuclear scientist and his expertise was essential in helping us to arrive at this moment. I also particularly want to thank my colleague at the State Department, the Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman. She has been absolutely superb, indefatigable, organized, strong, clear, visionary, and we are grateful.
I also want to thank the remarkable team of experts who haven’t slept in days, who’ve kept working, who have chased down numbers on – instantaneous call at any hour, and that goes for the team back home in the United States in the laboratories, in the White House, in the State Department, all of whom have contributed to our ability to be able to know what we are doing and to be able to put this initial agreement together.
Now I want to thank the delegations also from the P5+1 countries. As I said earlier, this is a team effort, partnership, and each and every one of their political directors, each and every one of their experts, was essential to help chase down details, help us create a consensus, help us check our own figures and our own thoughts about this effort. And I particularly thank Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius of France, Foreign Secretary Hammond from the United Kingdom, Foreign Minister Lavrov from Russia, Foreign Minister Steinmeier from Germany, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi from China. Every one of them showed an extraordinary commitment to this effort, and they have all contributed to this outcome. And it has been a real partnership, with every country weighing in, every country concerned, every country making suggestions. And I believe that their presence here tonight, their affirmation of this opportunity to try to finalize a deal over the next three months, is a critical component of credibility that should be given to this effort.
I also want to thank the EU for its facilitation of these talks. That begins with Dame Cathy Ashton, who spent many, many hours over several years helping to guide these talks. She worked all the way through last December, and her efforts were essential in getting the formal negotiations structured. Her successor, Federica Mogherini, has seized the baton and done an excellent job of filling right in and helping to move the process forward, and we thank both of them. And Federica’s deputy has just been superb. Helga Schmid, who has been the critical link between the EU and the entire P5+1 – we are very, very grateful for her stamina and her creativity and commitment.
Finally, I want to acknowledge the hard work of the Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Zarif and Dr. Salehi. From the beginning, they have approached these talks with great professionalism and with seriousness of purpose. They’ve been difficult – at times extremely intense; at times emotional; always challenging. Not all of our meetings were easy. In fact, many were quite difficult because the passions are there for everybody. But we have shown, I think, diligence and respect on all sides and always kept the objective, which is a peaceful resolution of this issue, in mind.
I emphasize: We still have a lot of work to do. We have agreed on the most challenging and overarching issues, but now there are a number of technical decisions that need to be made, and there are still policy decisions that have to be made. But we have the outline; we have the basic framing, if you will – the construction. And as we continue on, the United States and our P5+1 partners will exhibit the same vigilance, the same unity of purpose, the same comprehensive approach, and the same good faith among us that has brought us this far. So thank you, and I’d be happy to answer any questions.
HARF: Great, thank you. The first question is from Indira Lakshmanan of Bloomberg News. I think a mike should be coming to you.
QUESTION: Thanks, Marie. Is this on? Okay.
Secretary Kerry, can you tell us which gaps you were unable to reach understanding on, and are any elements not being made public? How long will it take Iran to comply so that sanctions can be eased, and could the deal fall through over the next three months? And lastly, will the three Americans being held in Iran be released as a goodwill measure if this deal is completed? Thank you.
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, yeah, of course. I mean, we have acknowledged there are some gaps. I just listed a few of them a moment ago for you. There are issues that we have to resolve. And I’m not going to go into all of them right now, but I think I listed several of them in my comments. We have to finish dealing with Fordow, in some respects, with respect to transition. That’s one of the things we’re going to be looking at and talking about. We have other considerations with respect to the sanctions themselves and the rate and timing and so forth. But I don’t think it serves any great purpose to go through all that now. In the days ahead, there will be plenty of time to focus on that with Congress and others, and we look forward to those consultations.
It’s really a matter of anywhere from probably six months to a year or so that it will take to begin to comply with all of the nuclear steps that need to be taken in order to then begin into the phasing. Those steps have to happen first. And in the meantime, the interim agreement – the JPOA, as it’s called, Joint Plan of Action – will continue to be implemented in full. And so we believe there is a full continuity in the oversight and accountability that is necessary to proceed forward.
And finally, with respect to our citizens, we, of course, have had a number of conversations; and no meeting, no date when we come together, has been without conversation about our American citizens. I’m not going to go into any details, except to say to you that that conversation is continuing. We have a very specific process in place to try to deal with it. And we call on Iran again today, now, in light of this, to release these Americans and let them get home with their families. And we’re working on that and we will continue to be very focused on it.
HARF: The next question is from Amir Paivar of BBC Persia.
QUESTION: Thank you very much, Secretary Kerry, for the opportunity. As the business correspondent for my channel, the single one question every Iranian, from ordinary Iranians to those in boardrooms of Iranian companies, have been asking me is if on July 1st we have a joint comprehensive plan of action how fast, in what sequence, and in what format will economic sanctions, more specifically banking sanctions, which have been hurting many Iranians inside and outside the country, will be removed? I do understand you said that it will depend on compliance from Iran, but if you could just give us a bit more precise idea.
And also if I can, second question is – you have been – Foreign Secretary Zarif seems to have the world record of having face time with you thanks to these negotiations. Would you say these negotiations will help in future to improve ties between Iran and United States?
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, on the latter question, all I can do is hope, like I think most citizens would hope. I would assume, from what we pick up through the diaspora and otherwise with respect to Iran, there are many, many Iranians who hope that they can join the world. But I’m not going to speculate on that. I have no idea. It would depend entirely on the resolution of a lot of things as we go forward.
The one thing we do know is that if we can eliminate this question of the nuclear issue, it begins to at some point, conceivably, provide an opportunity for change. I’m not going to predict anything. But I do know that stopping having a nuclear weapon makes the world safer, and that is what President Obama and all of us have been focused on.
With respect to the negotiations, I think – what was the first part of your question? It was about --
QUESTION: It’s about sanctions.
SECRETARY KERRY: Oh, the sanctions, yes. On the sanctions, as I said, they were phased. There are a set of requirements, for instance, the dismantlement of some of the centrifuges and the dismantlement of the infrastructure that is associated with those centrifuges. Iran has a responsibility to get the breakout time to the one year. And they can do it as fast as they want, and I assume will try to do it very rapidly. But we think that just the amount of work and the things they have to do will be somewhere in the vicinity of four (inaudible) months to a year, somewhere in there. I can’t say for certain.
But when that is done and certified by the IAEA that they have lived up to that nuclear responsibility, and we make that judgment with them, at that point in time the – there would begin the phasing of the sanctions. And we have stated very clearly that that will begin with the suspension with respect to the economic and financial sanctions at that point in time.
So there will be – I mean, this is part of the nature of any negotiation. In exchange for the restraints and restrictions that Iran is putting in place here, we will, indeed, take the very tool that was calculated to bring people to negotiate, once it has succeeded in achieving the goal, we will begin to phase those out. And that timing on other parts of that obviously remains still to be negotiated. But on the finance and the banking component, the economic components, those the President has committed to move on when that first phase is complete, and we move on to the next phase of implementation.
HARF: The final question’s from Michael Gordon of The New York Times.
QUESTION: Mr. Kerry, Iranian TV also (inaudible).
HARF: No, let’s just do one at a time. Let’s do one at a time. Let’s go to Michael Gordon of The New York Times. Thank you.
QUESTION: Sir, you just said they’re not merely technical issues that remain to be threshed out, but still some policy decisions that need to be made. What are the most important policy issues that need to be confronted before there can be an agreement at the end of June? And also, nothing here has been said on how Iran’s large stock of uranium is to be disposed of, either by shipping it out of the country or dealing with it inside the country. How will that be done?
And lastly, on sanctions, Minister Zarif said the Security Council resolutions will be suspended or eliminated, but can you tell us some more how that will work, especially since they could take years for Iran to address the IAEA’s concerns over PMD? And have you assured the Iranians that the White House will be able to persuade the Congress to revoke the sanctions it has imposed if Iran keeps its commitments?
SECRETARY KERRY: The question of the sanctions, Michael, remains one of the issues of the timing – the exact timing and the exact process associated with it remains one of those issues that is going to be negotiated over the course of the next three months. The commitment is to lift the economic and financial sanctions on the occasion of what I mentioned earlier on the nuclear side. Beyond that, UN sanctions, others with respect to ballistic missile embargo, et cetera, those remain for negotiation.
With respect to the question of the IAEA process, et cetera, and what happens with respect to the stockpile, it has to either be diluted or sold on the international market, one of the two. So whatever excess there is with respect to that will actually be returned right into uranium and not serve any fundamental purpose. But the stockpile is going to have to be diluted or sold in the international marketplace, and that is agreed upon at this point in time.
So thank you all very, very much.
04/02/2015 06:41 PM EDT
Press Availability in Lausanne, Switzerland
Press Availability
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
Lausanne, Switzerland
April 2, 2015
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, good evening and – excuse me – thank you all very, very much for your patience. And I want to start by expressing an enormous thank you, merci, danke, to the people and the Government of Switzerland for their incredible generosity. The way in which they have welcomed us and the amount of effort is really extraordinary, and we’re very, very grateful to them. And throughout this entire process, certainly over the past week, the people of Switzerland have gone above and beyond in order to facilitate these negotiations, and I don’t think anybody could imagine a much more peaceful setting in order to pursue a peaceful path forward. (In French.)
I also want to thank the very many other nations that have provided a home for these negotiations over the past couple of years – people forget that, it’s been going on that long – and that includes Austria, which was incredibly generous in hosting our delegation in Vienna for a long period of time; Oman, which has not only hosted a number of important meetings, but also played a critical role in getting these talks off the ground in the first place; and then, of course, we say thank you to Turkey, Russia, Kazakhstan, Iraq, and my home country, the United States.
I particularly want to thank President Obama. He has been courageous and determined in his pursuit of a diplomatic path. And from the day that he took office, President Obama has been crystal-clear that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose a threat to our security and the security of our allies in the region, including Israel. He has been just as clear that the best and most effective way to prevent that threat is through diplomacy.
The journey towards a diplomatic solution began years ago. And I can tell you that I’ve personally been involved for about four years, beginning from the time that I was serving in the United States Senate. Others have been on this journey, and some of the others in our team, for even longer than that.
But as Foreign Minister Zarif and High Representative Mogherini announced moments ago, today we have reached a critical milestone in that quest. We, our P5+1, EU partners, and Iran have arrived at a consensus on the key parameters of an arrangement that, once implemented, will give the international community confidence that Iran’s nuclear program is and will remain exclusively peaceful. And over the coming weeks, with all of the conditions of the 2013 Joint Plan of Action still in effect from this moment forward, our experts will continue to work hard to build on the parameters that we have arrived at today and finalize a comprehensive deal by the end of June.
Now we have said from the beginning – I think you’ve heard me say it again and again – that we will not accept just any deal, that we will only accept a good deal. And today, I can tell you that the political understanding with details that we have reached is a solid foundation for the good deal that we are seeking. It is the foundation for a deal that will see Iran reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98 percent for 15 years. It is a deal in which Iran will cut its installed centrifuges by more than two-thirds for 10 years. It is a deal that will increase Iran’s breakout time, which was confirmed publicly today to be two to three months, and that is the time that it would take Iran to speed up its enrichment in order to produce enough fissile material for one potential nuclear weapon. And that will be expanded now, under this deal, to one year from those two to three months. That is obviously as much as six times what it is today, and what it has been for the past three years.
I’d like also to make one more point very, very clear because it has been misinterpreted and misstated, misrepresented for much of this discussion: There will be no sunset to the deal that we are working to finalize – no sunset, none. The parameters of this agreement will be implemented in phases. Some provisions will be in place for 10 years; others will be in place for 15 years; others still will be in place for 25 years. But certain provisions, including many transparency measures, will be in place indefinitely into the future. They will never expire. And the bottom line is that, under this arrangement, the international community will have confidence that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful, providing, of course, that the provisions are adhered to. And if they aren’t, we have provisions that empower us to deal with that.
Ultimately, the parameters that we have agreed to will do exactly what we set out to do – make certain that all pathways to make enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon have been cut off, including the uranium pathway at Natanz and Fordow, and the plutonium pathway at Arak, and, of course, the covert pathway.
Now we, our partners, and Iran have agreed that the only uranium-enrichment facility Iran will operate moving forward will be the facility at Natanz. And even that one will undergo dramatic changes. The vast majority of the centrifuges and their infrastructure will be removed. And for at least the next 15 years, the stockpile will remain at 300 kilograms. And any uranium that is enriched at Natanz will be capped at 3.67 percent, which is a typical level of enrichment for civilian nuclear power, but doesn’t even begin to approach the enrichment level necessary for a weapon.
We have agreed that the facility at Fordow will halt all uranium enrichment, period – all uranium enrichment, and in fact, there will not even be any fissile material present at the site and no enrichment R&D. Instead, the facility will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center.
We have also agreed that Iran will redesign and rebuild its heavy-water reactor at Arak so that it will no longer produce any weapons-grade plutonium. And the United States will be able to sign off, certify, the reactor’s final design, redesign. And through international cooperation, it will be transformed into a reactor supporting only peaceful nuclear research and nuclear medicine. And the calandria, as you heard earlier, will be taken out and destroyed.
We have agreed that Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the Arak reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime. And Iran has agreed to refrain from building any additional heavy-water reactors for the next 15 years at least – “at least” means still open for beyond that period in the course of the next three months.
And we have agreed that Iran will face regular and comprehensive inspections, which is the best possible way to detect any attempt to covertly produce a weapon. Not only will inspectors have regular access to all of Iran’s declared facilities indefinitely, but they will also be able to monitor the facilities that produce the centrifuges themselves and the uranium that supports the nuclear program. And they will be able to do that for at least 20 years.
This critical step will help to guard against diversion of those materials to any clandestine location or plant. In addition, Iran has agreed to allow IAEA to investigate any suspicious site or any allegations of covert nuclear activities anywhere.
So these are just a few of the key – and I mean a few – of the key measures that will make up an extraordinarily comprehensive monitoring and transparency regime when and if it is finally signed and completed over the course of the next months. Now we have been very clear, both publicly and privately, a final agreement will not rely on promises. It will rely on proof.
It is important to note that Iran, to date, has honored all of the commitments that it made under the Joint Plan of Action that we agreed to in 2013. And I ask you to think about that against the backdrop of those who predicted that it would fail and not get the job done.
And in return for Iran’s future cooperation, we and our international partners will provide relief in phases from the sanctions that have impacted Iran’s economy. And if we find at any point that Iran is not complying with this agreement, the sanctions can snap back into place. So together these parameters outline a reasonable standard that Iran can readily meet, and it is the standard that Iran has now agreed to meet.
Throughout history, diplomacy has been necessary to prevent wars and to define international boundaries, to design institutions, and to develop global norms. Simply demanding that Iran capitulate makes a nice soundbite, but it’s not a policy. It is not a realistic plan. So the true measure of this understanding is not whether it meets all the desires of one side at the expense of the other. The test is whether or not it will leave the world safer or more secure than it would be without this agreement. And there can be no question that the comprehensive plan that we are moving toward will more than pass that test.
This isn’t just my assessment. It isn’t just the assessment of the United States delegation and our experts. It is the assessment of every one of our P5+1 partners who stood up here a little while ago in front of the flags of their nations. It is the assessment of our negotiating partners – Germany, the UK, China, France, and Russia – and all of our experts who have analyzed every aspect of this issue also join in that assessment.
From the beginning, we have negotiated as a team, and we are all agreed that this is the best outcome achievable. No viable alternatives – not one – would be nearly as effective at preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon than – over a period of time than the parameters, providing they get completed and are signed.
Our political understanding arrived at today opens the door for a long-term resolution to the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. Now, we have no illusions about the fact that we still have a ways to travel before we’ll arrive at the destination that we seek. We still have many technical details to work out on both sides and still some other issues that we acknowledge still have to be resolved; for example, the duration of the UN arms and ballistic missile restrictions on Iran and the precise timing of and mechanism for the conversion of the Arak reactor and Fordow site. And of course, once we’re able to finalize a comprehensive deal, the process of implementation then remains in front of us as well. But that’s a good challenge to have, frankly.
Throughout this negotiation, we have made a diligent effort to consult with our allies, our partners, including Israel and the Gulf states, and we have vigorously reaffirmed our enduring commitment to their security. No one should mistake that. And we will continue to stand by that commitment in the years and days ahead.
Obviously, we remain deeply concerned about Iran’s destabilizing actions in the region, and we remain fully committed to addressing the full slate of issues that we currently have with Iran. But it is because we are so concerned about those issues and about the region’s security. Precisely because of that concern that we believe this deal is critical. The status quo with respect to Iran’s nuclear program is unacceptable.
And certainly, we will continue to consult closely in the days ahead with the United States Congress. They and we understand that an Iran that had a nuclear weapon in the context of today’s troubles would be even more problematic. I spent almost 30 years in the United States Senate, and I had the privilege and the responsibility of chairing the Foreign Relations Committee when we put tough sanctions in place when this regime was put in place. And that is the regime that indeed has brought this negotiation about.
We are deeply grateful for Congress’s support of the diplomatic path to date, and we appreciate their patience. There were those agitating to take action earlier. Responsible voices held off and they helped us to get to this moment, and we appreciate that. We sincerely hope that members will continue to give us the time and the space that we need to fully explain the political agreement that we have reached and to work out the remaining details of a final deal.
Before I take a few questions, I just want to take a moment to thank some very important people. The team that has been assembled throughout this process is really made up of an extraordinary group of public servants, and believe me, they have served their country and the world well in these days. I want to thank my Cabinet colleague, Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz, who was indispensable in his knowledge and his technical expertise to be able to sit down and work through some very complex issues. His background as a nuclear scientist and his expertise was essential in helping us to arrive at this moment. I also particularly want to thank my colleague at the State Department, the Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman. She has been absolutely superb, indefatigable, organized, strong, clear, visionary, and we are grateful.
I also want to thank the remarkable team of experts who haven’t slept in days, who’ve kept working, who have chased down numbers on – instantaneous call at any hour, and that goes for the team back home in the United States in the laboratories, in the White House, in the State Department, all of whom have contributed to our ability to be able to know what we are doing and to be able to put this initial agreement together.
Now I want to thank the delegations also from the P5+1 countries. As I said earlier, this is a team effort, partnership, and each and every one of their political directors, each and every one of their experts, was essential to help chase down details, help us create a consensus, help us check our own figures and our own thoughts about this effort. And I particularly thank Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius of France, Foreign Secretary Hammond from the United Kingdom, Foreign Minister Lavrov from Russia, Foreign Minister Steinmeier from Germany, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi from China. Every one of them showed an extraordinary commitment to this effort, and they have all contributed to this outcome. And it has been a real partnership, with every country weighing in, every country concerned, every country making suggestions. And I believe that their presence here tonight, their affirmation of this opportunity to try to finalize a deal over the next three months, is a critical component of credibility that should be given to this effort.
I also want to thank the EU for its facilitation of these talks. That begins with Dame Cathy Ashton, who spent many, many hours over several years helping to guide these talks. She worked all the way through last December, and her efforts were essential in getting the formal negotiations structured. Her successor, Federica Mogherini, has seized the baton and done an excellent job of filling right in and helping to move the process forward, and we thank both of them. And Federica’s deputy has just been superb. Helga Schmid, who has been the critical link between the EU and the entire P5+1 – we are very, very grateful for her stamina and her creativity and commitment.
Finally, I want to acknowledge the hard work of the Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Zarif and Dr. Salehi. From the beginning, they have approached these talks with great professionalism and with seriousness of purpose. They’ve been difficult – at times extremely intense; at times emotional; always challenging. Not all of our meetings were easy. In fact, many were quite difficult because the passions are there for everybody. But we have shown, I think, diligence and respect on all sides and always kept the objective, which is a peaceful resolution of this issue, in mind.
I emphasize: We still have a lot of work to do. We have agreed on the most challenging and overarching issues, but now there are a number of technical decisions that need to be made, and there are still policy decisions that have to be made. But we have the outline; we have the basic framing, if you will – the construction. And as we continue on, the United States and our P5+1 partners will exhibit the same vigilance, the same unity of purpose, the same comprehensive approach, and the same good faith among us that has brought us this far. So thank you, and I’d be happy to answer any questions.
HARF: Great, thank you. The first question is from Indira Lakshmanan of Bloomberg News. I think a mike should be coming to you.
QUESTION: Thanks, Marie. Is this on? Okay.
Secretary Kerry, can you tell us which gaps you were unable to reach understanding on, and are any elements not being made public? How long will it take Iran to comply so that sanctions can be eased, and could the deal fall through over the next three months? And lastly, will the three Americans being held in Iran be released as a goodwill measure if this deal is completed? Thank you.
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, yeah, of course. I mean, we have acknowledged there are some gaps. I just listed a few of them a moment ago for you. There are issues that we have to resolve. And I’m not going to go into all of them right now, but I think I listed several of them in my comments. We have to finish dealing with Fordow, in some respects, with respect to transition. That’s one of the things we’re going to be looking at and talking about. We have other considerations with respect to the sanctions themselves and the rate and timing and so forth. But I don’t think it serves any great purpose to go through all that now. In the days ahead, there will be plenty of time to focus on that with Congress and others, and we look forward to those consultations.
It’s really a matter of anywhere from probably six months to a year or so that it will take to begin to comply with all of the nuclear steps that need to be taken in order to then begin into the phasing. Those steps have to happen first. And in the meantime, the interim agreement – the JPOA, as it’s called, Joint Plan of Action – will continue to be implemented in full. And so we believe there is a full continuity in the oversight and accountability that is necessary to proceed forward.
And finally, with respect to our citizens, we, of course, have had a number of conversations; and no meeting, no date when we come together, has been without conversation about our American citizens. I’m not going to go into any details, except to say to you that that conversation is continuing. We have a very specific process in place to try to deal with it. And we call on Iran again today, now, in light of this, to release these Americans and let them get home with their families. And we’re working on that and we will continue to be very focused on it.
HARF: The next question is from Amir Paivar of BBC Persia.
QUESTION: Thank you very much, Secretary Kerry, for the opportunity. As the business correspondent for my channel, the single one question every Iranian, from ordinary Iranians to those in boardrooms of Iranian companies, have been asking me is if on July 1st we have a joint comprehensive plan of action how fast, in what sequence, and in what format will economic sanctions, more specifically banking sanctions, which have been hurting many Iranians inside and outside the country, will be removed? I do understand you said that it will depend on compliance from Iran, but if you could just give us a bit more precise idea.
And also if I can, second question is – you have been – Foreign Secretary Zarif seems to have the world record of having face time with you thanks to these negotiations. Would you say these negotiations will help in future to improve ties between Iran and United States?
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, on the latter question, all I can do is hope, like I think most citizens would hope. I would assume, from what we pick up through the diaspora and otherwise with respect to Iran, there are many, many Iranians who hope that they can join the world. But I’m not going to speculate on that. I have no idea. It would depend entirely on the resolution of a lot of things as we go forward.
The one thing we do know is that if we can eliminate this question of the nuclear issue, it begins to at some point, conceivably, provide an opportunity for change. I’m not going to predict anything. But I do know that stopping having a nuclear weapon makes the world safer, and that is what President Obama and all of us have been focused on.
With respect to the negotiations, I think – what was the first part of your question? It was about --
QUESTION: It’s about sanctions.
SECRETARY KERRY: Oh, the sanctions, yes. On the sanctions, as I said, they were phased. There are a set of requirements, for instance, the dismantlement of some of the centrifuges and the dismantlement of the infrastructure that is associated with those centrifuges. Iran has a responsibility to get the breakout time to the one year. And they can do it as fast as they want, and I assume will try to do it very rapidly. But we think that just the amount of work and the things they have to do will be somewhere in the vicinity of four (inaudible) months to a year, somewhere in there. I can’t say for certain.
But when that is done and certified by the IAEA that they have lived up to that nuclear responsibility, and we make that judgment with them, at that point in time the – there would begin the phasing of the sanctions. And we have stated very clearly that that will begin with the suspension with respect to the economic and financial sanctions at that point in time.
So there will be – I mean, this is part of the nature of any negotiation. In exchange for the restraints and restrictions that Iran is putting in place here, we will, indeed, take the very tool that was calculated to bring people to negotiate, once it has succeeded in achieving the goal, we will begin to phase those out. And that timing on other parts of that obviously remains still to be negotiated. But on the finance and the banking component, the economic components, those the President has committed to move on when that first phase is complete, and we move on to the next phase of implementation.
HARF: The final question’s from Michael Gordon of The New York Times.
QUESTION: Mr. Kerry, Iranian TV also (inaudible).
HARF: No, let’s just do one at a time. Let’s do one at a time. Let’s go to Michael Gordon of The New York Times. Thank you.
QUESTION: Sir, you just said they’re not merely technical issues that remain to be threshed out, but still some policy decisions that need to be made. What are the most important policy issues that need to be confronted before there can be an agreement at the end of June? And also, nothing here has been said on how Iran’s large stock of uranium is to be disposed of, either by shipping it out of the country or dealing with it inside the country. How will that be done?
And lastly, on sanctions, Minister Zarif said the Security Council resolutions will be suspended or eliminated, but can you tell us some more how that will work, especially since they could take years for Iran to address the IAEA’s concerns over PMD? And have you assured the Iranians that the White House will be able to persuade the Congress to revoke the sanctions it has imposed if Iran keeps its commitments?
SECRETARY KERRY: The question of the sanctions, Michael, remains one of the issues of the timing – the exact timing and the exact process associated with it remains one of those issues that is going to be negotiated over the course of the next three months. The commitment is to lift the economic and financial sanctions on the occasion of what I mentioned earlier on the nuclear side. Beyond that, UN sanctions, others with respect to ballistic missile embargo, et cetera, those remain for negotiation.
With respect to the question of the IAEA process, et cetera, and what happens with respect to the stockpile, it has to either be diluted or sold on the international market, one of the two. So whatever excess there is with respect to that will actually be returned right into uranium and not serve any fundamental purpose. But the stockpile is going to have to be diluted or sold in the international marketplace, and that is agreed upon at this point in time.
So thank you all very, very much.
Saturday, December 20, 2014
STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S RECENT REMARKS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
U.S. Perspectives on the Opportunities and Challenges of Nuclear Disarmament
Remarks
Robert Wood
Special Representative to the Conference on Disarmament
Geneva Center for Security Policy
Geneva, Switzerland
December 17, 2014
Professor Mohamedou, thank you for that gracious introduction, and for hosting this event. It is an honor to join the ranks of distinguished visitors who have spoken at GCSP venues. Ladies and gentlemen, I also appreciate your interest in American perspectives on the opportunities and challenges of nuclear disarmament.
Disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation are the focus of my professional life here in Geneva, and nuclear disarmament is under particularly close scrutiny as we approach the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which we refer to in the shorthand of this business as the “NPT RevCon.” The last NPT RevCon, in 2010, generated a consensus Action Plan for all States Parties. We put great stock in that historic achievement, we are working on it, and want to see it through. Acknowledging that the pace of nuclear disarmament is under criticism in some quarters, I would underline that the United States remains firmly committed to achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons – but I would also emphasize that there are no easy solutions to the challenge of advancing nuclear disarmament while also maintaining vital strategic stability and enhancing security for all.
So: Where are we now? And most important, where we are going?
As vital as those questions are, it can be easy to lose sight of the significant progress that has been made in this area. Indeed, in the forums in which I routinely work it is regrettably common for some participants to state flatly that “nothing has happened” or “nothing is happening” on nuclear disarmament. This is not the case.
How can such misperceptions persist? It is well known that global stocks of nuclear weapons are at their lowest level in over half a century, far below the levels existing when the NPT entered into force in 1970. This largely reflects very significant treaty-based arms reductions by the United States of America and the Russian Federation. The latest such bilateral arms control treaty, the New START Treaty, entered into force on February 5, 2011, and when it is fully implemented in 2018, New START will limit deployed strategic nuclear warheads to their lowest levels since the 1950s.
Behind these headlines is an ongoing, intense web of daily, practical implementation activities that support strategic stability and transparency, which are conducive to future progress in disarmament. For example, the United States and Russian Federation together continue to implement successfully the New START Treaty. The two sides have exchanged more than 7,700 New START Treaty notifications through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. These notifications include biannual New START Treaty data exchanges, which provide a detailed picture of U.S. and Russian strategic forces. In addition, the Treaty’s on-site inspections continue to enable each side to verify the validity of those data. These exchanges and inspections, together with detailed discussions in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, help build confidence, stability, and predictability. Historically, implementation of strategic arms control treaties with the former Soviet Union and Russia has proceeded without interruption even during the most challenging periods in the bilateral relationship.
The United States also has reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy as outlined in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Specifically, as outlined in the 2010 NPR, the United States will not develop new nuclear warheads, and life extension programs for existing weapons will not support new military capabilities or provide for new military capabilities. Additionally, as reflected in the NPR, the United States has strengthened the negative security assurances that it provides to non-nuclear weapon states who are party to the NPT, and made clear that the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.
Proceeding further to the heart of the matter, we reported earlier this year that over the past two decades alone the United States has dismantled 9,952 nuclear warheads. That works out to dismantling an average of more than one warhead per day, every day, for 20 years. And the work continues. By the way, the dismantlement of just one nuclear warhead is not an easy process – it is extremely demanding work.
I hope that does not surprise you. But unfortunately, since taking up my duties as ambassador here four months ago, I have repeatedly heard the claim that, while non-nuclear weapons states have by and large honored their nonproliferation obligations, nuclear weapons states have abdicated their nuclear disarmament obligations.
I will let other Nuclear Weapons States speak for themselves. I think that the U.S. can be very proud of our own record. Please consider these facts:
• Over all, the United States has slashed its nuclear arsenal from its Cold War high by 85%. 85%. That is not a percentage pulled out of a hat. It is not fiction or fantasy. It is real!
• Before 1991, the U.S. eliminated an entire category of missiles, scrapping all of its intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-launched nuclear- and conventional-capable missiles and their associated launchers and equipment in accordance with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
• And just since 1991, the United States has reduced its non-strategic nuclear arsenal by approximately 90%.
When we pledge to continue to pursue nuclear disarmament and to keep faith with our NPT Article VI disarmament obligations, those are not empty words. Our responsible approach to disarmament has borne fruit in the form of major reductions in nuclear weapons, fissile material stocks, and infrastructure. Our nuclear complex has been completely transformed from one built for the mass production of fissile material and warheads and the design and testing of new weapons to one dedicated to the maintenance of a steadily shrinking stockpile.
Underpinning all of our efforts, stretching back decades, has been our clear understanding and recognition of the severe consequences of the use of these weapons. That is the message the United States took to the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Vienna last week. We participated to reinforce the message that the practical step-by-step path we have followed so successfully remains the only realistic route to our shared goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. We cannot and will not support efforts to move to a nuclear weapons convention or the false hope of a fixed timeline for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. We cannot support and will oppose any effort to move to an international legal ban on nuclear weapons.
Looking ahead, it remains the policy of the United States to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. And we are facing new challenges as we consider how to responsibly eliminate the last 15% of those weapons. As we move to smaller and smaller numbers, leading to zero globally, we must in turn become rigorously more and more confident and trusting that all are fulfilling their commitments.
In considering future reductions, the United States believes that the focus must be on responsible measures that can be trusted and verified. We will learn from our past experience and continue to move ahead with each step building on the last. While there is no pre-determined sequence of steps, and indeed we should pursue progress on multiple paths, there is no way to skip to the end and forgo the hard work of preparing for the technical and political disarmament challenges that lie ahead. Patience and persistence are needed from all NPT parties both among and beyond the P5.
Earlier this month in Prague, Under Secretary Gottemoeller announced a new International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. We propose to work with nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states to better understand the challenges of verifying nuclear disarmament and to develop solutions to address those challenges.
This new partnership will draw on the talents of experts around the world, both inside and outside government. It will build on the pathbreaking efforts of the U.K.-Norway initiative, begun in 2007, to investigate ways to address nuclear disarmament verification challenges. The Nuclear Threat Initiative will be a prime partner in organizing this exciting new effort.
The United States is committed to a responsible approach to nuclear disarmament in accordance with our obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The United States has made it clear that we are ready to engage Russia to discuss the full range of issues related to strategic stability, and that we should take real and important actions that can contribute to creating a more predictable and secure world. We hope that these negotiations will take place when the conditions become more favorable for constructive interaction.
Broadening the aperture, I would underline that NPT Parties have committed as a next step in the multilateral nuclear disarmament sphere to negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). This goal was embraced by all NPT Parties. Indeed, the 2010 NPT Action 15 notes that “All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should . . . begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. . . .”
Achieving such a ban would support our collective Article VI obligations. The United States regrets that the CD remains in deadlock, unable to agree on a Program of Work that takes us forward and puts us on a path toward FMCT negotiations. It is clear that we still have our work cut out for us. And it is difficult to have a meaningful discussion, to set the stage for productive negotiations in the CD, without a better grasp of the facts, without recognition of what has been accomplished as well as the challenges that remain.
For the United States, the CD remains an essential multilateral institution for the negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements. As a consensus-based body, it is the ideal venue to deal with the most sensitive national security issues multilaterally. While the United States and many other Member States are frustrated by the inability of the CD to get back to the business of negotiating, we need to find creative ways to energize it and put it back to work.
In conclusion, I would emphasize that it is a welcome fact that there remains strong support among governments and publics for nuclear disarmament. For the United States, the task at hand is to help to channel that support into constructive, effective measures that will strengthen international security while further reducing the number of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the United States has led the international community in responsibly reducing nuclear arsenals in a safe and practical step-by-step manner, and we remain firmly committed to our obligations under the NPT. We welcome contributions by all to this important task, but will firmly resist any efforts to oversimplify the path forward and ignore the real security challenges we face along that path. As President Obama has said, the path to zero will require patience and persistence. It requires a broad strategy aimed at strengthening the nonproliferation regime, preventing nuclear terrorism, and pursuing concrete steps that build a foundation for future progress and lead in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Thank you for your attention.
U.S. Perspectives on the Opportunities and Challenges of Nuclear Disarmament
Remarks
Robert Wood
Special Representative to the Conference on Disarmament
Geneva Center for Security Policy
Geneva, Switzerland
December 17, 2014
Professor Mohamedou, thank you for that gracious introduction, and for hosting this event. It is an honor to join the ranks of distinguished visitors who have spoken at GCSP venues. Ladies and gentlemen, I also appreciate your interest in American perspectives on the opportunities and challenges of nuclear disarmament.
Disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation are the focus of my professional life here in Geneva, and nuclear disarmament is under particularly close scrutiny as we approach the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which we refer to in the shorthand of this business as the “NPT RevCon.” The last NPT RevCon, in 2010, generated a consensus Action Plan for all States Parties. We put great stock in that historic achievement, we are working on it, and want to see it through. Acknowledging that the pace of nuclear disarmament is under criticism in some quarters, I would underline that the United States remains firmly committed to achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons – but I would also emphasize that there are no easy solutions to the challenge of advancing nuclear disarmament while also maintaining vital strategic stability and enhancing security for all.
So: Where are we now? And most important, where we are going?
As vital as those questions are, it can be easy to lose sight of the significant progress that has been made in this area. Indeed, in the forums in which I routinely work it is regrettably common for some participants to state flatly that “nothing has happened” or “nothing is happening” on nuclear disarmament. This is not the case.
How can such misperceptions persist? It is well known that global stocks of nuclear weapons are at their lowest level in over half a century, far below the levels existing when the NPT entered into force in 1970. This largely reflects very significant treaty-based arms reductions by the United States of America and the Russian Federation. The latest such bilateral arms control treaty, the New START Treaty, entered into force on February 5, 2011, and when it is fully implemented in 2018, New START will limit deployed strategic nuclear warheads to their lowest levels since the 1950s.
Behind these headlines is an ongoing, intense web of daily, practical implementation activities that support strategic stability and transparency, which are conducive to future progress in disarmament. For example, the United States and Russian Federation together continue to implement successfully the New START Treaty. The two sides have exchanged more than 7,700 New START Treaty notifications through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. These notifications include biannual New START Treaty data exchanges, which provide a detailed picture of U.S. and Russian strategic forces. In addition, the Treaty’s on-site inspections continue to enable each side to verify the validity of those data. These exchanges and inspections, together with detailed discussions in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, help build confidence, stability, and predictability. Historically, implementation of strategic arms control treaties with the former Soviet Union and Russia has proceeded without interruption even during the most challenging periods in the bilateral relationship.
The United States also has reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy as outlined in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Specifically, as outlined in the 2010 NPR, the United States will not develop new nuclear warheads, and life extension programs for existing weapons will not support new military capabilities or provide for new military capabilities. Additionally, as reflected in the NPR, the United States has strengthened the negative security assurances that it provides to non-nuclear weapon states who are party to the NPT, and made clear that the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.
Proceeding further to the heart of the matter, we reported earlier this year that over the past two decades alone the United States has dismantled 9,952 nuclear warheads. That works out to dismantling an average of more than one warhead per day, every day, for 20 years. And the work continues. By the way, the dismantlement of just one nuclear warhead is not an easy process – it is extremely demanding work.
I hope that does not surprise you. But unfortunately, since taking up my duties as ambassador here four months ago, I have repeatedly heard the claim that, while non-nuclear weapons states have by and large honored their nonproliferation obligations, nuclear weapons states have abdicated their nuclear disarmament obligations.
I will let other Nuclear Weapons States speak for themselves. I think that the U.S. can be very proud of our own record. Please consider these facts:
• Over all, the United States has slashed its nuclear arsenal from its Cold War high by 85%. 85%. That is not a percentage pulled out of a hat. It is not fiction or fantasy. It is real!
• Before 1991, the U.S. eliminated an entire category of missiles, scrapping all of its intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-launched nuclear- and conventional-capable missiles and their associated launchers and equipment in accordance with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
• And just since 1991, the United States has reduced its non-strategic nuclear arsenal by approximately 90%.
When we pledge to continue to pursue nuclear disarmament and to keep faith with our NPT Article VI disarmament obligations, those are not empty words. Our responsible approach to disarmament has borne fruit in the form of major reductions in nuclear weapons, fissile material stocks, and infrastructure. Our nuclear complex has been completely transformed from one built for the mass production of fissile material and warheads and the design and testing of new weapons to one dedicated to the maintenance of a steadily shrinking stockpile.
Underpinning all of our efforts, stretching back decades, has been our clear understanding and recognition of the severe consequences of the use of these weapons. That is the message the United States took to the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Vienna last week. We participated to reinforce the message that the practical step-by-step path we have followed so successfully remains the only realistic route to our shared goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. We cannot and will not support efforts to move to a nuclear weapons convention or the false hope of a fixed timeline for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. We cannot support and will oppose any effort to move to an international legal ban on nuclear weapons.
Looking ahead, it remains the policy of the United States to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. And we are facing new challenges as we consider how to responsibly eliminate the last 15% of those weapons. As we move to smaller and smaller numbers, leading to zero globally, we must in turn become rigorously more and more confident and trusting that all are fulfilling their commitments.
In considering future reductions, the United States believes that the focus must be on responsible measures that can be trusted and verified. We will learn from our past experience and continue to move ahead with each step building on the last. While there is no pre-determined sequence of steps, and indeed we should pursue progress on multiple paths, there is no way to skip to the end and forgo the hard work of preparing for the technical and political disarmament challenges that lie ahead. Patience and persistence are needed from all NPT parties both among and beyond the P5.
Earlier this month in Prague, Under Secretary Gottemoeller announced a new International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. We propose to work with nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states to better understand the challenges of verifying nuclear disarmament and to develop solutions to address those challenges.
This new partnership will draw on the talents of experts around the world, both inside and outside government. It will build on the pathbreaking efforts of the U.K.-Norway initiative, begun in 2007, to investigate ways to address nuclear disarmament verification challenges. The Nuclear Threat Initiative will be a prime partner in organizing this exciting new effort.
The United States is committed to a responsible approach to nuclear disarmament in accordance with our obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The United States has made it clear that we are ready to engage Russia to discuss the full range of issues related to strategic stability, and that we should take real and important actions that can contribute to creating a more predictable and secure world. We hope that these negotiations will take place when the conditions become more favorable for constructive interaction.
Broadening the aperture, I would underline that NPT Parties have committed as a next step in the multilateral nuclear disarmament sphere to negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). This goal was embraced by all NPT Parties. Indeed, the 2010 NPT Action 15 notes that “All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should . . . begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. . . .”
Achieving such a ban would support our collective Article VI obligations. The United States regrets that the CD remains in deadlock, unable to agree on a Program of Work that takes us forward and puts us on a path toward FMCT negotiations. It is clear that we still have our work cut out for us. And it is difficult to have a meaningful discussion, to set the stage for productive negotiations in the CD, without a better grasp of the facts, without recognition of what has been accomplished as well as the challenges that remain.
For the United States, the CD remains an essential multilateral institution for the negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements. As a consensus-based body, it is the ideal venue to deal with the most sensitive national security issues multilaterally. While the United States and many other Member States are frustrated by the inability of the CD to get back to the business of negotiating, we need to find creative ways to energize it and put it back to work.
In conclusion, I would emphasize that it is a welcome fact that there remains strong support among governments and publics for nuclear disarmament. For the United States, the task at hand is to help to channel that support into constructive, effective measures that will strengthen international security while further reducing the number of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the United States has led the international community in responsibly reducing nuclear arsenals in a safe and practical step-by-step manner, and we remain firmly committed to our obligations under the NPT. We welcome contributions by all to this important task, but will firmly resist any efforts to oversimplify the path forward and ignore the real security challenges we face along that path. As President Obama has said, the path to zero will require patience and persistence. It requires a broad strategy aimed at strengthening the nonproliferation regime, preventing nuclear terrorism, and pursuing concrete steps that build a foundation for future progress and lead in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Thank you for your attention.
Thursday, June 12, 2014
U.S. FACT SHEET: G-7 DECLARATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT FOR 2014
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
G-7 Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament for 2014
Fact Sheet
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
June 5, 2014
1. We are committed to seeking a safer world for all. Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery remains a top priority. Such proliferation poses a major threat to international peace and security as recognized in UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1540, 1673, 1810, 1887, and 1977. During this tenth anniversary year of UNSCR 1540, we reaffirm our commitment to working together towards full implementation of the resolution by 2021 and to strengthen our efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery.
2. In seeking this safer world, we reiterate our commitment to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, based on the principle of equal and undiminished security for all, and underlining the vital importance of non-proliferation for achieving this goal.
3. We reaffirm our unconditional support for all three pillars of the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
4. We call on all NPT Parties to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty and to preserve and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 2015 NPT Review Conference presents a vital opportunity for all NPT Parties to further strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects. We recall the successful, consensus outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including its Action Plan. We remain fully committed to the Action Plan’s implementation, and call on all States Parties to implement its actions. In this regard, we welcome and encourage continued engagement of and among the NPT nuclear-weapon States on verification, transparency and confidence-building measures, with a view to strengthening implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. We welcome the April 2014 meeting of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States (P5) in Beijing, the latest in this ongoing dialogue, and welcome the timely submission of the individual reports made to the third session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York in April, 2014, pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the Action Plan. We encourage all States Parties, consistent with Action 20 of the Action Plan, to make similar reports.
5. The G7 partners continue to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear weapon free zones, established on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, in line with the principles set out by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999 and recognize the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving security assurances from nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. These protocols enhance regional and international security by helping to build confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. We welcome the signature of the protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia. We also welcome the commitment of the P5 States to continue to consult with the States Parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
6. We reaffirm the importance of commitments and assurances given by the NPT nuclear weapons States to the NPT non-nuclear weapon States. We deplore the recent and ongoing breaches of the commitments given to Ukraine by the Russian Federation in the Budapest Memorandum. In this Memorandum, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to respect Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty and existing borders; reaffirmed their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine to refrain from economic coercion. We consider that Ukraine’s historic decisions in 1994 were significant steps in promoting its own and wider regional and international security. We also welcome Ukraine’s statement at the 2014 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee that Ukraine remains committed to the provisions of the NPT.
7. The G-7 strongly support the goal of a zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East. Recalling the decision at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to hold a Conference on the establishment of such a zone, we strongly support Finnish Ambassador Laajava’s work as facilitator of the Conference, and welcome the continued commitment of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States). We call upon the States of the region to continue their direct engagement with each other in order to finalize the preparation and convening of the Conference in the nearest future.
8. While acknowledging the right of withdrawal from the NPT contained in Article X.1, we consider that modalities and measures to address withdrawal from that Treaty are needed as demonstrated by North Korea’s announcement of withdrawal. We underscore the role of the UN Security Council in addressing announcements of withdrawal promptly and without delay, assessing the consequences of such withdrawal, including possible adoption of measures in this regard. We also emphasize that a State Party will remain responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal. We also underscore that nuclear transfers received prior to withdrawal should remain in peaceful uses and subject to IAEA safeguards. We welcome the growing recognition that this issue needs to be addressed urgently at the 2015 Review Conference and we support the adoption of appropriate recommendations on measures that address withdrawal in the Final Document.
Nuclear Proliferation Challenges
9. We underscore our support for E3+3 efforts led by High Representative Ashton to reach a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that resolves fully the international community’s concerns regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and ensures Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. We welcome the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) between the E3+3 and Iran and the essential role played by the IAEA in verifying the nuclear-related measures. We commend those states which made financial contributions in this context for the monitoring work of the IAEA. We reaffirm our strong support for the IAEA’s ongoing efforts to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and we call on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program, the satisfactory resolution of which will be critical for a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
10. We call on Syria to remedy its noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations, and to cooperate fully with the IAEA in resolving all outstanding questions regarding the nature of its nuclear program.
11. We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear armed state and urge North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards and come into full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations. We condemn in the strongest possible terms North Korea’s continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094. In this regard, we condemn North Korea’s February and March 2014 ballistic missile launches in clear violation of its UNSCR obligations and call on North Korea to refrain from further provocations. We urge North Korea to halt any efforts to restart, readjust, and expand its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and cease immediately all nuclear activities including the ones related to its uranium enrichment and plutonium programs. We reaffirm our collective hope for lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and call on North Korea to refrain from any actions that escalate tensions in the region. We firmly support diplomatic efforts to implement the 2005 Joint Statement and to bring North Korea into compliance with its UN Security Council obligations, and call on North Korea to take concrete steps toward complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. We commend the international community’s unified resolve in the face of North Korea’s defiance of it and urge continued vigilance by all states to curtail North Korea’s proliferation activities and impede the continued pursuit of its proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
Nuclear Disarmament
12. We encourage the P5 to continue their important dialogue, including on nuclear arms reductions and their work on confidence-building and transparency that represent major steps in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and the Action Plan adopted by the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. We welcome the continued implementation of the New START Treaty by the U.S. and Russia and the disarmament-related actions already made by France and the UK, as well as urge others that possess nuclear weapons but have not yet engaged in nuclear disarmament efforts to reduce their arsenals.
13. Early entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is in the security interests of every nation. States that have yet to sign or ratify the Treaty should do so without waiting for others. For the Treaty to be an effective mechanism for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, we believe all States must maintain the political will and provide adequate resources to complete the Treaty’s verification regime and maximize the capabilities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat. We welcome the voluntary adherence to unilateral moratoria on nuclear explosive tests and call on all States to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. We also welcome the establishment of the Group of Eminent Persons and support its activities, which will inject new energy and dynamics into the push for entry into force.
14. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) and its predecessor bodies have a long history of delivering landmark agreements, but we share the growing impatience of many in the international community at the impasse at the CD. We believe the next logical step in multilateral negotiations to advance both nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament goals is the negotiation of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. While we welcome declared moratoria by some states on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a binding and verifiable ban on such production is a necessary step toward a world without nuclear weapons. We welcome the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which will make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to a future Treaty, and can build momentum towards eventual negotiations in the CD.
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
15. All States Parties to the NPT have an inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in compliance with their international obligations. We reiterate our willingness to cooperate with States that meet their nuclear non-proliferation obligations and wish to develop a civil nuclear program in a manner that meets the highest standards of safety, security, non-proliferation, and respect for the environment.
16. We urge strong support for implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Safety Action Plan, including working towards establishing a global nuclear liability regime, and welcome the progress in enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. We emphasize the importance of the establishment, implementation and continuous improvement of national emergency preparedness and response measures.
17. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle contribute to nuclear energy programs. We support the IAEA’s work to establish a bank of Low Enriched Uranium in Kazakhstan and urge the conclusion of a Host State Agreement at an early date in order to allow for the beginning of operation of the bank.
IAEA Safeguards
18. We support the central role of the IAEA, and in particular its safeguards system, which remains essential for the effective implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The IAEA must continue to have the necessary resources and legal authorities to be able to carry out its mission in full, in accordance with its statutory mandate. We will continue to help promote an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol as the universally accepted international verification standard, which should be a consideration in decisions on the supply of nuclear fuel, equipment, or technology. We call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and bring into force the Additional Protocol and apply its provisions as soon as possible.
Nuclear Security
19. We welcome the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague on 24-25 March 2014 where 58 world leaders worked to further reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by securing vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material around the globe. The Hague Summit participants agreed to a Communique that reaffirms the fundamental responsibility of States, the need to further strengthen and coordinate international cooperation, and the need for a strengthened and comprehensive international security architecture. Many countries agreed to multilateral joint commitments intended to advance the goal of nuclear security. We highlight Belgian and Italian work to complete the removal of their excess supplies of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for elimination, and Japan for announcing that it will work with the United States to eliminate hundreds of kilograms of nuclear material from one of its experimental reactors. We call on others to take additional transparency measures. We also continue to encourage nations to join existing relevant international initiatives that support Summit goals.
20. We urge all States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to ratify, accept or approve the 2005 Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible. In addition to securing nuclear and radiological material at their source, we recognize the need to locate and secure material currently available on the illicit market and prosecute those involved in the trafficking of these materials.
21. We commend the work of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and other international efforts to counter nuclear smuggling and combat nuclear terrorism. The ongoing occurrence for more than 20 years of nuclear and radioactive trafficking highlights the threat that terrorists or other malicious actors can acquire these dangerous materials. The international community must be vigilant to prevent the world’s most dangerous materials from falling into the wrong hands.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group
22. We welcome the call by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on all states to exercise vigilance to ensure that the supply of nuclear related technologies and materials is for peaceful purposes and to make best efforts to ensure that none of their exports of goods and technologies contributes to the spread of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we recognize that the NSG Guidelines serve as the standard for nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. We call on NSG Participating Governments to strictly observe the Guidelines and encourage nuclear supplier states that are not NSG participating governments to act in conformity with the Guidelines on a voluntary basis. We also support the discussion of the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to enhance nuclear non-proliferation efforts. We welcome the progress that is being made by the Technical Experts Group to ensure that control lists remain current, and we welcome the Group’s outreach efforts to enhance non-proliferation. We welcome the membership of Mexico in 2012 and Serbia in 2013.
Chemical Weapons
23. We reaffirm our unconditional support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the functions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We applaud the success of the Convention and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the OPCW for its ongoing work to eliminate an entire class of WMD and toward preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. We look forward to continuing the work set out in the final document of the 2013 Review Conference and support efforts to ensure the universalisation and effective implementation of the Convention, and we call on all states not party to the Convention to adhere to it now. Destroying chemical weapons remains a key objective of the Convention together with refraining from the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, use and proliferation of chemical weapons. We welcome the progress being made by the possessor states as reported recently to the OPCW Executive Council (EC) and Conference of the States Parties. We encourage all possessor states to continue to take every necessary measure to complete their destruction processes as soon as possible in a transparent fashion, and within the framework of the existing verification regime. We reiterate the importance of an effective industry verification regime.
24. We share deep concern over the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime against its citizens. We share further concern about the more recent allegations of use of a toxic chemical as a weapon in Syria and we support the OPCW fact-finding mission. We urge the regime to cooperate fully with the mission to ensure those who are responsible for such attacks are brought to account. The continued possession of chemical weapons material by the Assad regime represents a sustained danger to Syria’s population and all of its neighbors. We support the full implementation of the OPCW Executive Council Decision of September 27, 2013 and UN Security Council Resolution (2118), which resulted from the Russia U.S. Geneva framework to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program. We welcome the efforts of the Joint OPCW-UN Mission and the assistance provided by individual States and by the international community at large to support safe elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Whilst efforts have been made, the removal process remains behind schedule. We call upon Syria to make sustained efforts in meeting its obligations under the CWC, OPCW EC decisions and UNSCR 2118. International confidence that the program has been completely eliminated requires further review of Syria’s declaration of its CW program. Syria must also take immediate steps to physically destroy the remaining 13 chemical production facilities in accordance with the CWC.
Biological Weapons
25. We welcome the work undertaken so far to implement the outcome of the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). We are committed to achieving real progress to promote national implementation, confidence-building measures, and cooperation and assistance, to reviewing developments in science and technology, and to strengthening the Convention’s Article VII on responding to use of biological or toxin weapons. We support further exploration or consideration of practical approaches to promote the exchange of best practices, enhance transparency, and build trust among states parties, such as peer review, voluntary transparency visits and briefings, and constructive approaches to raising and addressing concerns where they arise. Such approaches may play a role in strengthening implementation and enhancing assurance of compliance with BWC obligations. We reaffirm our commitment to promote universal membership of the BTWC, and we are determined to work with all the State Parties to reinforce its regime.
Addressing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
26. WMD and delivery means- related export controls by members of the international nonproliferation regimes (Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group) and the Zangger Committee has significantly reduced the availability to proliferators of support from countries with the most advanced technology. These controls, and the information-sharing, best practices, and patterns of cooperation fostered by the regimes, have made it more difficult, time-consuming, and costly for proliferators to produce or acquire WMD and their delivery systems. We plan to continue to work through the regimes to reduce the global proliferation threat and urge all countries to unilaterally adopt and apply on a national basis the guidelines and standards of the regimes.
27. We fully support the key role played by the United Nations Security Council in addressing proliferation issues. We welcome the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 1977, which renewed the mandate of the 1540 Committee for ten years and reaffirmed Resolution 1540’s obligations. We invite all States to nominate a national point of contact and to work toward full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We stand ready to provide assistance to States in this regard and we reiterate our support to the 1540 Committee in the discharge of its mandate.
28. We strongly believe that the proliferation of missiles, especially those capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a serious concern to us all and a threat to international peace and security, as reaffirmed in UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1887, and 1977. We believe that a multilateral response and international norms are the most adequate and effective way to address this issue. We strongly endorse the MTCR and the Hague Code of Conduct in that regard.
29. We affirm our commitment to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) and this commitment remains unwavering. We therefore commend the Global Partnership on its efforts to coordinate and collaborate on programs and activities in the areas of nuclear and radiological security, biological security, chemical security, scientist engagement and countering knowledge proliferation, and in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The Global Partnership has continued its valuable work on engagement with centers of excellence and the expansion of its membership. Since 2013, the Global Partnership has welcomed the Philippines, Hungary and Spain as new members. Members of the Global Partnership also welcome the ongoing participation and closer cooperation of relevant international organizations and bodies in global efforts to improve information sharing and coordination of WMD threat reduction projects. The sub-groups that focused on each of the substantive areas of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological security helped the Global Partnership improve information sharing, funding and project coordination. The Global Partnership has provided significant funding for the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria. In addition, strengthened matchmaking has begun to enable the Global Partnership to improve coordination of projects globally.
30. We continue to promote robust counter-proliferation tools. We support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The list of endorsing nations continues to grow, with Vietnam recently being the 104th endorsing nation. We commit to undertake further measures to enhance the capabilities and authorities required to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. We promote outreach for enhanced participation in the PSI and continue to focus on legal and operational issues.
Conventional
31. Conventional arms play a legitimate role in enabling governments to defend their citizens, as enshrined in the UN Charter. However, in the wrong hands they pose a threat to global, regional and national security. Improperly controlled, they can fuel terrorism and threaten peace and stability. For this reason, we welcome the adoption of UNSCR 2117 and stress the need for full and effective implementation by States at the national, regional and international levels, of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. In this context, we also reiterate our support for full implementation of UNSCR 2017 in order to stem arms proliferation from Libya. In addition, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies contributes to preventing de-stabilizing accumulations of these arms, goods and technologies. We urge those which currently sit outside the regime to make every effort to apply the Wassenaar Arrangement’s standards and control lists. Conventional arms agreements and commitments can also address specific regional security concerns. The Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty have provided useful transparency about military activities in Ukraine and western Russia in recent months, reflecting the importance of continued implementation and modernization of these agreements and commitments.
32. We welcome the rapid progress that has been made towards entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty since it was opened for signature on 3 June 2013. We call upon States who have not yet done so to join the Treaty as soon as possible. Effective implementation of the Treaty’s obligations will contribute to saving lives, reducing human suffering, protecting human rights, preventing the diversion of conventional arms to the illegal market and combating terrorism, while upholding the legitimate trade in arms, which is vital for national defense and security. We urge States in a position to do so to render assistance in capacity building to enable States Parties needing such assistance to fulfill and implement the Treaty’s obligations.
Outer Space
33. Outer space activities continue to play a significant role in the social, economic, scientific, and technological development of states, as well as in maintaining international peace and security. We acknowledge the need to take collaborative, timely, and pragmatic steps to enhance the long-term safety, security, sustainability, and stability of the space environment. In this context, the G-7 supports and encourages constructive discussion on the development and implementation of transparency and confidence building measures to enhance stability in space, taking into account the recommendations of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space. The G7 continues to support ongoing efforts to develop a non-legally-binding International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and strongly encourages completion of the Code in the near future or in the first half of 2015 at the latest. We also support the efforts to complete the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Guidelines on Long-Term Sustainability for Space Activities in 2015.
2. In seeking this safer world, we reiterate our commitment to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, based on the principle of equal and undiminished security for all, and underlining the vital importance of non-proliferation for achieving this goal.
3. We reaffirm our unconditional support for all three pillars of the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
4. We call on all NPT Parties to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty and to preserve and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 2015 NPT Review Conference presents a vital opportunity for all NPT Parties to further strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects. We recall the successful, consensus outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including its Action Plan. We remain fully committed to the Action Plan’s implementation, and call on all States Parties to implement its actions. In this regard, we welcome and encourage continued engagement of and among the NPT nuclear-weapon States on verification, transparency and confidence-building measures, with a view to strengthening implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. We welcome the April 2014 meeting of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States (P5) in Beijing, the latest in this ongoing dialogue, and welcome the timely submission of the individual reports made to the third session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York in April, 2014, pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the Action Plan. We encourage all States Parties, consistent with Action 20 of the Action Plan, to make similar reports.
5. The G7 partners continue to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear weapon free zones, established on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, in line with the principles set out by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999 and recognize the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving security assurances from nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. These protocols enhance regional and international security by helping to build confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. We welcome the signature of the protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia. We also welcome the commitment of the P5 States to continue to consult with the States Parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
6. We reaffirm the importance of commitments and assurances given by the NPT nuclear weapons States to the NPT non-nuclear weapon States. We deplore the recent and ongoing breaches of the commitments given to Ukraine by the Russian Federation in the Budapest Memorandum. In this Memorandum, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to respect Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty and existing borders; reaffirmed their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine to refrain from economic coercion. We consider that Ukraine’s historic decisions in 1994 were significant steps in promoting its own and wider regional and international security. We also welcome Ukraine’s statement at the 2014 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee that Ukraine remains committed to the provisions of the NPT.
7. The G-7 strongly support the goal of a zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East. Recalling the decision at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to hold a Conference on the establishment of such a zone, we strongly support Finnish Ambassador Laajava’s work as facilitator of the Conference, and welcome the continued commitment of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States). We call upon the States of the region to continue their direct engagement with each other in order to finalize the preparation and convening of the Conference in the nearest future.
8. While acknowledging the right of withdrawal from the NPT contained in Article X.1, we consider that modalities and measures to address withdrawal from that Treaty are needed as demonstrated by North Korea’s announcement of withdrawal. We underscore the role of the UN Security Council in addressing announcements of withdrawal promptly and without delay, assessing the consequences of such withdrawal, including possible adoption of measures in this regard. We also emphasize that a State Party will remain responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal. We also underscore that nuclear transfers received prior to withdrawal should remain in peaceful uses and subject to IAEA safeguards. We welcome the growing recognition that this issue needs to be addressed urgently at the 2015 Review Conference and we support the adoption of appropriate recommendations on measures that address withdrawal in the Final Document.
Nuclear Proliferation Challenges
9. We underscore our support for E3+3 efforts led by High Representative Ashton to reach a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that resolves fully the international community’s concerns regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and ensures Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. We welcome the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) between the E3+3 and Iran and the essential role played by the IAEA in verifying the nuclear-related measures. We commend those states which made financial contributions in this context for the monitoring work of the IAEA. We reaffirm our strong support for the IAEA’s ongoing efforts to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and we call on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program, the satisfactory resolution of which will be critical for a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
10. We call on Syria to remedy its noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations, and to cooperate fully with the IAEA in resolving all outstanding questions regarding the nature of its nuclear program.
11. We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear armed state and urge North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards and come into full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations. We condemn in the strongest possible terms North Korea’s continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094. In this regard, we condemn North Korea’s February and March 2014 ballistic missile launches in clear violation of its UNSCR obligations and call on North Korea to refrain from further provocations. We urge North Korea to halt any efforts to restart, readjust, and expand its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and cease immediately all nuclear activities including the ones related to its uranium enrichment and plutonium programs. We reaffirm our collective hope for lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and call on North Korea to refrain from any actions that escalate tensions in the region. We firmly support diplomatic efforts to implement the 2005 Joint Statement and to bring North Korea into compliance with its UN Security Council obligations, and call on North Korea to take concrete steps toward complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. We commend the international community’s unified resolve in the face of North Korea’s defiance of it and urge continued vigilance by all states to curtail North Korea’s proliferation activities and impede the continued pursuit of its proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
Nuclear Disarmament
12. We encourage the P5 to continue their important dialogue, including on nuclear arms reductions and their work on confidence-building and transparency that represent major steps in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and the Action Plan adopted by the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. We welcome the continued implementation of the New START Treaty by the U.S. and Russia and the disarmament-related actions already made by France and the UK, as well as urge others that possess nuclear weapons but have not yet engaged in nuclear disarmament efforts to reduce their arsenals.
13. Early entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is in the security interests of every nation. States that have yet to sign or ratify the Treaty should do so without waiting for others. For the Treaty to be an effective mechanism for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, we believe all States must maintain the political will and provide adequate resources to complete the Treaty’s verification regime and maximize the capabilities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat. We welcome the voluntary adherence to unilateral moratoria on nuclear explosive tests and call on all States to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. We also welcome the establishment of the Group of Eminent Persons and support its activities, which will inject new energy and dynamics into the push for entry into force.
14. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) and its predecessor bodies have a long history of delivering landmark agreements, but we share the growing impatience of many in the international community at the impasse at the CD. We believe the next logical step in multilateral negotiations to advance both nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament goals is the negotiation of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. While we welcome declared moratoria by some states on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a binding and verifiable ban on such production is a necessary step toward a world without nuclear weapons. We welcome the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which will make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to a future Treaty, and can build momentum towards eventual negotiations in the CD.
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
15. All States Parties to the NPT have an inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in compliance with their international obligations. We reiterate our willingness to cooperate with States that meet their nuclear non-proliferation obligations and wish to develop a civil nuclear program in a manner that meets the highest standards of safety, security, non-proliferation, and respect for the environment.
16. We urge strong support for implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Safety Action Plan, including working towards establishing a global nuclear liability regime, and welcome the progress in enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. We emphasize the importance of the establishment, implementation and continuous improvement of national emergency preparedness and response measures.
17. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle contribute to nuclear energy programs. We support the IAEA’s work to establish a bank of Low Enriched Uranium in Kazakhstan and urge the conclusion of a Host State Agreement at an early date in order to allow for the beginning of operation of the bank.
IAEA Safeguards
18. We support the central role of the IAEA, and in particular its safeguards system, which remains essential for the effective implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The IAEA must continue to have the necessary resources and legal authorities to be able to carry out its mission in full, in accordance with its statutory mandate. We will continue to help promote an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol as the universally accepted international verification standard, which should be a consideration in decisions on the supply of nuclear fuel, equipment, or technology. We call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and bring into force the Additional Protocol and apply its provisions as soon as possible.
Nuclear Security
19. We welcome the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague on 24-25 March 2014 where 58 world leaders worked to further reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by securing vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material around the globe. The Hague Summit participants agreed to a Communique that reaffirms the fundamental responsibility of States, the need to further strengthen and coordinate international cooperation, and the need for a strengthened and comprehensive international security architecture. Many countries agreed to multilateral joint commitments intended to advance the goal of nuclear security. We highlight Belgian and Italian work to complete the removal of their excess supplies of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for elimination, and Japan for announcing that it will work with the United States to eliminate hundreds of kilograms of nuclear material from one of its experimental reactors. We call on others to take additional transparency measures. We also continue to encourage nations to join existing relevant international initiatives that support Summit goals.
20. We urge all States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to ratify, accept or approve the 2005 Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible. In addition to securing nuclear and radiological material at their source, we recognize the need to locate and secure material currently available on the illicit market and prosecute those involved in the trafficking of these materials.
21. We commend the work of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and other international efforts to counter nuclear smuggling and combat nuclear terrorism. The ongoing occurrence for more than 20 years of nuclear and radioactive trafficking highlights the threat that terrorists or other malicious actors can acquire these dangerous materials. The international community must be vigilant to prevent the world’s most dangerous materials from falling into the wrong hands.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group
22. We welcome the call by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on all states to exercise vigilance to ensure that the supply of nuclear related technologies and materials is for peaceful purposes and to make best efforts to ensure that none of their exports of goods and technologies contributes to the spread of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we recognize that the NSG Guidelines serve as the standard for nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. We call on NSG Participating Governments to strictly observe the Guidelines and encourage nuclear supplier states that are not NSG participating governments to act in conformity with the Guidelines on a voluntary basis. We also support the discussion of the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to enhance nuclear non-proliferation efforts. We welcome the progress that is being made by the Technical Experts Group to ensure that control lists remain current, and we welcome the Group’s outreach efforts to enhance non-proliferation. We welcome the membership of Mexico in 2012 and Serbia in 2013.
Chemical Weapons
23. We reaffirm our unconditional support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the functions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We applaud the success of the Convention and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the OPCW for its ongoing work to eliminate an entire class of WMD and toward preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. We look forward to continuing the work set out in the final document of the 2013 Review Conference and support efforts to ensure the universalisation and effective implementation of the Convention, and we call on all states not party to the Convention to adhere to it now. Destroying chemical weapons remains a key objective of the Convention together with refraining from the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, use and proliferation of chemical weapons. We welcome the progress being made by the possessor states as reported recently to the OPCW Executive Council (EC) and Conference of the States Parties. We encourage all possessor states to continue to take every necessary measure to complete their destruction processes as soon as possible in a transparent fashion, and within the framework of the existing verification regime. We reiterate the importance of an effective industry verification regime.
24. We share deep concern over the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime against its citizens. We share further concern about the more recent allegations of use of a toxic chemical as a weapon in Syria and we support the OPCW fact-finding mission. We urge the regime to cooperate fully with the mission to ensure those who are responsible for such attacks are brought to account. The continued possession of chemical weapons material by the Assad regime represents a sustained danger to Syria’s population and all of its neighbors. We support the full implementation of the OPCW Executive Council Decision of September 27, 2013 and UN Security Council Resolution (2118), which resulted from the Russia U.S. Geneva framework to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program. We welcome the efforts of the Joint OPCW-UN Mission and the assistance provided by individual States and by the international community at large to support safe elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Whilst efforts have been made, the removal process remains behind schedule. We call upon Syria to make sustained efforts in meeting its obligations under the CWC, OPCW EC decisions and UNSCR 2118. International confidence that the program has been completely eliminated requires further review of Syria’s declaration of its CW program. Syria must also take immediate steps to physically destroy the remaining 13 chemical production facilities in accordance with the CWC.
Biological Weapons
25. We welcome the work undertaken so far to implement the outcome of the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). We are committed to achieving real progress to promote national implementation, confidence-building measures, and cooperation and assistance, to reviewing developments in science and technology, and to strengthening the Convention’s Article VII on responding to use of biological or toxin weapons. We support further exploration or consideration of practical approaches to promote the exchange of best practices, enhance transparency, and build trust among states parties, such as peer review, voluntary transparency visits and briefings, and constructive approaches to raising and addressing concerns where they arise. Such approaches may play a role in strengthening implementation and enhancing assurance of compliance with BWC obligations. We reaffirm our commitment to promote universal membership of the BTWC, and we are determined to work with all the State Parties to reinforce its regime.
Addressing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
26. WMD and delivery means- related export controls by members of the international nonproliferation regimes (Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group) and the Zangger Committee has significantly reduced the availability to proliferators of support from countries with the most advanced technology. These controls, and the information-sharing, best practices, and patterns of cooperation fostered by the regimes, have made it more difficult, time-consuming, and costly for proliferators to produce or acquire WMD and their delivery systems. We plan to continue to work through the regimes to reduce the global proliferation threat and urge all countries to unilaterally adopt and apply on a national basis the guidelines and standards of the regimes.
27. We fully support the key role played by the United Nations Security Council in addressing proliferation issues. We welcome the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 1977, which renewed the mandate of the 1540 Committee for ten years and reaffirmed Resolution 1540’s obligations. We invite all States to nominate a national point of contact and to work toward full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We stand ready to provide assistance to States in this regard and we reiterate our support to the 1540 Committee in the discharge of its mandate.
28. We strongly believe that the proliferation of missiles, especially those capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a serious concern to us all and a threat to international peace and security, as reaffirmed in UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1887, and 1977. We believe that a multilateral response and international norms are the most adequate and effective way to address this issue. We strongly endorse the MTCR and the Hague Code of Conduct in that regard.
29. We affirm our commitment to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) and this commitment remains unwavering. We therefore commend the Global Partnership on its efforts to coordinate and collaborate on programs and activities in the areas of nuclear and radiological security, biological security, chemical security, scientist engagement and countering knowledge proliferation, and in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The Global Partnership has continued its valuable work on engagement with centers of excellence and the expansion of its membership. Since 2013, the Global Partnership has welcomed the Philippines, Hungary and Spain as new members. Members of the Global Partnership also welcome the ongoing participation and closer cooperation of relevant international organizations and bodies in global efforts to improve information sharing and coordination of WMD threat reduction projects. The sub-groups that focused on each of the substantive areas of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological security helped the Global Partnership improve information sharing, funding and project coordination. The Global Partnership has provided significant funding for the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria. In addition, strengthened matchmaking has begun to enable the Global Partnership to improve coordination of projects globally.
30. We continue to promote robust counter-proliferation tools. We support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The list of endorsing nations continues to grow, with Vietnam recently being the 104th endorsing nation. We commit to undertake further measures to enhance the capabilities and authorities required to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. We promote outreach for enhanced participation in the PSI and continue to focus on legal and operational issues.
Conventional
31. Conventional arms play a legitimate role in enabling governments to defend their citizens, as enshrined in the UN Charter. However, in the wrong hands they pose a threat to global, regional and national security. Improperly controlled, they can fuel terrorism and threaten peace and stability. For this reason, we welcome the adoption of UNSCR 2117 and stress the need for full and effective implementation by States at the national, regional and international levels, of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. In this context, we also reiterate our support for full implementation of UNSCR 2017 in order to stem arms proliferation from Libya. In addition, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies contributes to preventing de-stabilizing accumulations of these arms, goods and technologies. We urge those which currently sit outside the regime to make every effort to apply the Wassenaar Arrangement’s standards and control lists. Conventional arms agreements and commitments can also address specific regional security concerns. The Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty have provided useful transparency about military activities in Ukraine and western Russia in recent months, reflecting the importance of continued implementation and modernization of these agreements and commitments.
32. We welcome the rapid progress that has been made towards entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty since it was opened for signature on 3 June 2013. We call upon States who have not yet done so to join the Treaty as soon as possible. Effective implementation of the Treaty’s obligations will contribute to saving lives, reducing human suffering, protecting human rights, preventing the diversion of conventional arms to the illegal market and combating terrorism, while upholding the legitimate trade in arms, which is vital for national defense and security. We urge States in a position to do so to render assistance in capacity building to enable States Parties needing such assistance to fulfill and implement the Treaty’s obligations.
Outer Space
33. Outer space activities continue to play a significant role in the social, economic, scientific, and technological development of states, as well as in maintaining international peace and security. We acknowledge the need to take collaborative, timely, and pragmatic steps to enhance the long-term safety, security, sustainability, and stability of the space environment. In this context, the G-7 supports and encourages constructive discussion on the development and implementation of transparency and confidence building measures to enhance stability in space, taking into account the recommendations of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space. The G7 continues to support ongoing efforts to develop a non-legally-binding International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and strongly encourages completion of the Code in the near future or in the first half of 2015 at the latest. We also support the efforts to complete the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Guidelines on Long-Term Sustainability for Space Activities in 2015.
Wednesday, May 7, 2014
U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT REMARKS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY NPT CLUSTER 1
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
NPT Cluster 1: Nuclear Disarmament and Security: U.S. Statement
Remarks
Christopher Buck, Deputy Chief of Mission, Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament Permanent Mission, Geneva
Third Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
United Nations, New York City
May 2, 2014
(As Delivered)
Mr. Chairman,
I am pleased to provide an update on ongoing U.S. activities in fulfillment of our obligations and commitments under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 2010 NPT Action Plan. In this context, I highlight the extensive report that the United States has submitted to this Preparatory Committee meeting, consistent with Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan.
U.S. policy is to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. This remains a central element of President Obama’s nuclear agenda, and we are working to create conditions that can enable its eventual achievement by pursuing a multifaceted, step-by-step approach incorporating national, bilateral, and multilateral actions.
It is because we understand the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons that the United States continues to devote considerable resources in a decades-long effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. There is no “quick fix” to achieving nuclear disarmament. There is no path other than the hard, daily work of verifiable step-by-step disarmament to which we remain resolutely committed.
In line with our support for the NPT, in 2010 the United States changed our nuclear posture to further reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and emphasize the interest of all nations in extending the 69-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons. The President also made it clear that the United States will not develop new nuclear warheads nor will we pursue new military missions for nuclear weapons.
This important shift in U.S. nuclear posture has taken place against the backdrop of dramatic and ongoing reductions in our nuclear arsenal. In fact, when the NPT entered into force in 1970, the United States had a nuclear stockpile of over 26,000 nuclear weapons. As Under Secretary Gottemoeller announced on Tuesday, the U.S. nuclear stockpile now has been reduced to 4,804 warheads, which reflects an 85% decrease from its Cold War peak. During this period, the United States reduced its non-strategic nuclear warheads by 90 percent. To lend a better sense of the scale of this ongoing activity in the post-Cold War period, between 1994 and 2013, the United States dismantled 9,952 nuclear warheads.
Moreover, this effort continues as we fulfill our obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia, now in its fourth year of implementation. When the Treaty limits are reached in 2018, the strategic forces of the United States and Russia will be capped at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, their lowest level since the 1950s.
Contrary to the view expressed by some in this hall, we do not regard the achievement of nuclear disarmament as simply a rhetorical goal. It is one the United States is working on and pursuing every day.
And this work is not done. As outlined by President Obama in Berlin in June 2013, the United States remains open to negotiate further reductions with Russia in all categories of nuclear weapons – including strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
We are also developing effective verification methodologies and processes that will be essential as we move toward increasingly smaller nuclear arsenals. Our experience with verified bilateral nuclear disarmament provides valuable experience and useful tools for multilateral nuclear disarmament approaches in the future. To that end, we are working closely with all NPT nuclear weapon states (or “P5”) to lay the foundation for future arms control agreements with participants beyond Russia and the United States.
Within the P5 process we have institutionalized regular dialogue on nuclear weapons-related issues. China hosted a fifth P5 Conference in Beijing on April 14 and 15, and the United Kingdom has agreed to host a sixth conference next year. Through these high-level conferences and frequent expert-level meetings, the P5 were able to reach consensus on a framework for reporting to this PrepCom in accordance with their commitments in the Action Plan. P5 CTBT experts have held productive discussions on ways they can collaborate in strengthening the CTBT monitoring regime. And the P5 Working Group on Nuclear Terms and Definitions, chaired by China, has made progress on the development of a P5 nuclear terms glossary.
The significance of this work should not be underestimated. P5 engagement is a long-term investment to strengthen and advance the NPT, build trust and create a stronger foundation to achieve the Treaty’s disarmament and nonproliferation goals. In addition, the United States and the United Kingdom are conducting a joint project to further develop verification procedures and technologies, which we will brief today at 1:15 p.m. in the North Lawn Building, Conference Room 5.
Turning to the broader multilateral context, the United States supports the immediate commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which is the next logical and necessary step toward achieving our shared disarmament goals. A verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is necessary if we are to create conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. All states can contribute to achieving this goal. We are disappointed that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been unable to initiate negotiations on an FMCT. Even as we continue our efforts in the CD, the United States is actively engaged in the meeting of the FMCT Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which can usefully complement efforts to promote negotiations of an FMCT in the CD.
In another important multilateral effort, the ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains a top priority for the U.S. Administration. Our active involvement in all activities of the CTBT Organization’s Preparatory Commission clearly demonstrates our ongoing commitment to the Treaty and the vital importance the United States attaches to completing the verification regime. The United States recognizes that the voluntary adherence to unilateral nuclear testing moratoria is no substitute for a legally binding prohibition against the conduct of such explosions. Entry into force of the CTBT is in the security interests of every nation. All States have an important role to play in providing the necessary resources to complete the Treaty’s verification regime and maximize the capabilities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat.
Mr. Chairman,
The United States recognizes the importance of security assurances in the context of the NPT. Accordingly, the United States updated and strengthened its long-standing negative security assurance policy in the context of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review published in April 2010. The United States declared that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. It was also made clear that the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or our allies and partners.
The United States also supports well-crafted nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) that are vigorously enforced and developed in accordance with the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We are a Party to both Protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and in recent years the United States has worked toward extending legally binding negative security assurances by submitting for ratification the protocols to the African and South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zones. We are pleased to note that the United States and other NPT nuclear weapon states will soon sign the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. The nuclear weapon states are also engaging ASEAN to resolve any remaining differences so that we can sign the revised Protocol to the Southeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone. These actions are a priority for us.
Mr. Chairman,
The United States is committed to achieving a world without nuclear weapons, and we are dedicated to working with all NPT States Parties to make that goal a reality. The pursuit of our shared goal will require patience and persistence from all of us. But we are confident in our purpose, and strengthened in both our methods and morale by the tremendous progress we have made thus far.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman,
I am pleased to provide an update on ongoing U.S. activities in fulfillment of our obligations and commitments under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 2010 NPT Action Plan. In this context, I highlight the extensive report that the United States has submitted to this Preparatory Committee meeting, consistent with Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan.
U.S. policy is to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. This remains a central element of President Obama’s nuclear agenda, and we are working to create conditions that can enable its eventual achievement by pursuing a multifaceted, step-by-step approach incorporating national, bilateral, and multilateral actions.
It is because we understand the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons that the United States continues to devote considerable resources in a decades-long effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. There is no “quick fix” to achieving nuclear disarmament. There is no path other than the hard, daily work of verifiable step-by-step disarmament to which we remain resolutely committed.
In line with our support for the NPT, in 2010 the United States changed our nuclear posture to further reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and emphasize the interest of all nations in extending the 69-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons. The President also made it clear that the United States will not develop new nuclear warheads nor will we pursue new military missions for nuclear weapons.
This important shift in U.S. nuclear posture has taken place against the backdrop of dramatic and ongoing reductions in our nuclear arsenal. In fact, when the NPT entered into force in 1970, the United States had a nuclear stockpile of over 26,000 nuclear weapons. As Under Secretary Gottemoeller announced on Tuesday, the U.S. nuclear stockpile now has been reduced to 4,804 warheads, which reflects an 85% decrease from its Cold War peak. During this period, the United States reduced its non-strategic nuclear warheads by 90 percent. To lend a better sense of the scale of this ongoing activity in the post-Cold War period, between 1994 and 2013, the United States dismantled 9,952 nuclear warheads.
Moreover, this effort continues as we fulfill our obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia, now in its fourth year of implementation. When the Treaty limits are reached in 2018, the strategic forces of the United States and Russia will be capped at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, their lowest level since the 1950s.
Contrary to the view expressed by some in this hall, we do not regard the achievement of nuclear disarmament as simply a rhetorical goal. It is one the United States is working on and pursuing every day.
And this work is not done. As outlined by President Obama in Berlin in June 2013, the United States remains open to negotiate further reductions with Russia in all categories of nuclear weapons – including strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
We are also developing effective verification methodologies and processes that will be essential as we move toward increasingly smaller nuclear arsenals. Our experience with verified bilateral nuclear disarmament provides valuable experience and useful tools for multilateral nuclear disarmament approaches in the future. To that end, we are working closely with all NPT nuclear weapon states (or “P5”) to lay the foundation for future arms control agreements with participants beyond Russia and the United States.
Within the P5 process we have institutionalized regular dialogue on nuclear weapons-related issues. China hosted a fifth P5 Conference in Beijing on April 14 and 15, and the United Kingdom has agreed to host a sixth conference next year. Through these high-level conferences and frequent expert-level meetings, the P5 were able to reach consensus on a framework for reporting to this PrepCom in accordance with their commitments in the Action Plan. P5 CTBT experts have held productive discussions on ways they can collaborate in strengthening the CTBT monitoring regime. And the P5 Working Group on Nuclear Terms and Definitions, chaired by China, has made progress on the development of a P5 nuclear terms glossary.
The significance of this work should not be underestimated. P5 engagement is a long-term investment to strengthen and advance the NPT, build trust and create a stronger foundation to achieve the Treaty’s disarmament and nonproliferation goals. In addition, the United States and the United Kingdom are conducting a joint project to further develop verification procedures and technologies, which we will brief today at 1:15 p.m. in the North Lawn Building, Conference Room 5.
Turning to the broader multilateral context, the United States supports the immediate commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which is the next logical and necessary step toward achieving our shared disarmament goals. A verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is necessary if we are to create conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. All states can contribute to achieving this goal. We are disappointed that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been unable to initiate negotiations on an FMCT. Even as we continue our efforts in the CD, the United States is actively engaged in the meeting of the FMCT Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which can usefully complement efforts to promote negotiations of an FMCT in the CD.
In another important multilateral effort, the ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains a top priority for the U.S. Administration. Our active involvement in all activities of the CTBT Organization’s Preparatory Commission clearly demonstrates our ongoing commitment to the Treaty and the vital importance the United States attaches to completing the verification regime. The United States recognizes that the voluntary adherence to unilateral nuclear testing moratoria is no substitute for a legally binding prohibition against the conduct of such explosions. Entry into force of the CTBT is in the security interests of every nation. All States have an important role to play in providing the necessary resources to complete the Treaty’s verification regime and maximize the capabilities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat.
Mr. Chairman,
The United States recognizes the importance of security assurances in the context of the NPT. Accordingly, the United States updated and strengthened its long-standing negative security assurance policy in the context of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review published in April 2010. The United States declared that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. It was also made clear that the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or our allies and partners.
The United States also supports well-crafted nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) that are vigorously enforced and developed in accordance with the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We are a Party to both Protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and in recent years the United States has worked toward extending legally binding negative security assurances by submitting for ratification the protocols to the African and South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zones. We are pleased to note that the United States and other NPT nuclear weapon states will soon sign the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. The nuclear weapon states are also engaging ASEAN to resolve any remaining differences so that we can sign the revised Protocol to the Southeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone. These actions are a priority for us.
Mr. Chairman,
The United States is committed to achieving a world without nuclear weapons, and we are dedicated to working with all NPT States Parties to make that goal a reality. The pursuit of our shared goal will require patience and persistence from all of us. But we are confident in our purpose, and strengthened in both our methods and morale by the tremendous progress we have made thus far.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Monday, November 25, 2013
REMARKS BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE DAVIES ON NORTH KOREA
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Remarks to Press at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Remarks
Glyn Davies
Special Representative for North Korea Policy
Tokyo, Japan
November 25, 2013
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: What I would like to do very much – first of all, let me thank you all for coming out. I appreciate that very much. I would like to say something at the beginning since it’s been a long visit here to North Asia and I’ve had good talks in Tokyo. First of all, I want to thank Director General Ihara and Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Kanehara for giving me so much time today here in Tokyo. We had very in-depth and useful talks, and I believe that our visit here today and the talks I’ve had in Tokyo today demonstrate our close collaboration on North Korea.
We talked of course about the nuclear issue. Japan and the United States are in complete agreement, complete sync about that. We also talked about North Korean human rights – we’ll do more of that in a minute at lunch – and touched on the abductions issue. And we’ll again have more to say about that at lunch. I want to reiterate again, as I always do here in Tokyo, about how we in the United States share the pain and the suffering of abductee families and the Japanese people and pledge once again that we will work tirelessly in cooperation with Japan to try to resolve this important matter.
But as I wrap up a very productive week in the three key North Asian capitals – Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo – I want to report a strong convergence of views on North Korea. All of us are in quite close alignment, and I believe Russia, an essential partner in the Six-Party process, agrees that we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. There are of course some differences among the five – but not at all among the three allies, who are in complete solidarity – but some differences over secondary issues such as the precise threshold or timing of talks, but there is unanimity on what North Korea must do: North Korea must abandon its nuclear weapons and agree to begin that process.
So we are looking for concrete indications from Pyongyang of its commitment to do that. This is because the core purpose of the Six-Party process is the complete, verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on a clear and quick timetable.
North Korea, however, is moving in the opposite direction. They have made clear through words and actions that they reject that premise. We have heard them say repeatedly that instead they demand acceptance as a nuclear weapons state, that they demand prior lifting of sanctions, that they demand a weakening of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which has kept the peace on the Korean Peninsula now for 60 years. I’ve spoken – I did so in Beijing – about North Korea’s “Byungjin” policy of prioritizing nuclear weapons development, which I call a dead end.
I also want to underscore that Pyongyang’s attempts to engage in dialogue while keeping its program running are completely unacceptable. So it’s understandable, we believe, after so many broken promises, after the nuclear and missile tests, the threats against its neighbors and the United States, that not just its negotiating partners in the Six-Party process, but the international community writ large would have high standards of evidence to measure North Korean intentions.
That’s why the United States and its allies call on North Korea to make convincing indications, take concrete steps to demonstrate its seriousness of purpose. We will continue this process of joining with our partners – especially China, given its unique role – to keep the onus for action on North Korea.
With that, I’m very happy to take any questions that you have.
QUESTION: Could you be more specific about what is the concrete step you want North Korea to take?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, this is now a matter of diplomatic discussion among the diplomatic partners in the five-party process, so I don’t want to go into a great deal of detail now. We’re talking about this between governments. We commend China for its tireless efforts to try to move forward on this discussion of what the appropriate threshold for Six-Party Talks would look like. My friend and colleague Ambassador Wu Dawei was just in Washington, some weeks ago, and we had the opportunity there to talk about it, and of course I followed up in Beijing on that same subject. And of course the discussions we had in Washington with separately the ROK and Japan, and then we had a trilateral session, and then again out here in the region – all are meant to define to our collective satisfaction what the threshold for talks should look like. So with your permission I do not plan at this stage to go into a great deal of detail about it.
The North Koreans know full well the kinds of things that we are looking for and talking about. We’ve been at this diplomacy now for a generation, through bilateral talks, trilateral talks, quadrilateral talks and Six-Party Talks, and we’ll keep it up.
QUESTION: Ambassador Davies, what is the U.S. currently doing to pull its citizen out of North Korea, and did you discuss it with the allies?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Of course. This issue of the fate of American citizens who are in North Korean custody is one that we’ve raised – that I’ve raised at each stop, but particularly in Beijing, given their relationship with North Korea. I’m not going to get into, again, the specific discussion of the measures that we’re taking, but I will use this occasion to once again call on North Korea to make the right decision and to respect our concerns and let American citizens who are there go free. I also want to commend our Swedish protecting power. The Government of Sweden has been magnificent in trying every day to work on these issues in Pyongyang with the North Korean government, and that is very important. It is very important to us that this be resolved, that it be resolved quickly.
QUESTION: There have been reports that it is Mr. Newman who has been detained. Can you confirm that identity?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: I’m not at liberty to do that. We have a law that we take very seriously in the United States called the Privacy Act, and because there is no signed Privacy Act waiver, I’m not in position to speak specifically about that issue, out of respect for the law.
QUESTION: Ambassador, your opening remark was very strong, and it comes obviously after the deal with Iran. Is the United States ready to deepen the sanctions, to make the sanctions more strict, to make them more effective?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, look, I’m glad you raised that. I actually – since I knew you’d raise the issue of Iran, and this gives me an occasion to talk about it, so let me say some general things about that, since I know it’s the topic of the moment. Other than the nuclear denominator, the cases could not be more different, frankly, between Iran and North Korea. The two states, simply put, are on opposite sides of the nuclear weapons divide. I would point you to the remarks just made by Secretary of State Kerry. He pointed out that there is the very significant difference on the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that, as I think many of you know, North Korea is the only nation on earth to have first signed that treaty and then renounced its signature. Iran is a signatory of the non-proliferation treaty. Also North Korea has said repeatedly, with increasing frequency, has asserted that it is a nuclear weapons state. They have now placed provisions in their constitution to enshrine that. They’ve sought acceptance as a nuclear weapons state. Iran in contrast has pledged not to build nuclear weapons.
But the starkest contrast of all – and I think this is the most important point to make – is that in the 21st century, North Korea is the only nation on earth that has exploded nuclear devices. They’ve done it not once, not twice, but three times.
There are other differences between the two cases. North Korea walked away from its membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, the agency where I spent several years representing the United States, that is now under the direction of Director General Yukiya Amano. Iran is and has always been a very active and engaged member of the IAEA although we have often had differences with them in the past. I would also remind that I’ve alluded to this before, that North Korea has elevated the pursuit of nuclear weapons to one of its two strategic priorities in its “Byungjin” policy that I spoke to a minute ago.
One way the cases are similar – and I think this is very important – is that pressure, particularly in the form of sanctions, do play a critical role. Sanctions helped convince Iran to agree to this interim deal that’s just been announced. We believe sanctions and pressure are key to sharpening the choices that Pyongyang faces. So given North Korea’s continued flouting of its international obligations and international law, given its testing of nuclear devices, given its repeated threats of nuclear attack, its elevation of its nuclear weapons program pursuit to its highest national priority, we will continue to keep pressure on North Korea, to keep the screws to North Korea.
But it’s pressure not for its own sake; it’s pressure with a purpose, and this is important because what we seek is a negotiated, diplomatic solution to this long-running problem. Here we believe we are making progress with our partners to define an appropriate threshold for resumed multilateral talks, and we will keep that up.
QUESTION: There have been many rumors that the two countries, Iran and North Korea, have been cooperating on nuclear programs. How do you address these concerns?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, proliferation is a concern. It’s a big concern, and it’s something that we work on every day and about which we have conversations with our partners. I’m not going to get into what we do or don’t know about the state of affairs between North Korea and Iran. That would dip into intelligence matters which I can’t comment on, but this issue of proliferation of the spread of nuclear technologies, in particular from North Korea, remains an area of key concern to us, and of vigorous action.
QUESTION: Ambassador, regarding the sanctions, are you suggesting that we don’t have the right level or the right mix as we stand?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Sanctions are always a work in progress. I mean, I think that there are always more sanctions we could put in place if needed. But what I want to put the emphasis on here is what I said at the end of my earlier remarks, that we want the sanctions to help clarify for Pyongyang the choices that they face. If they continue to defy the international community, pursue nuclear weapons and missile technologies, all they will do is continue to isolate themselves, quite frankly to impoverish their people, to keep North Korea outside the community of nations. So we’re saying to North Korea – and we’re doing this increasingly with one voice across not just the six parties, not just the northeast Asian region, but across the world – take a different approach; take a different decision; come in the direction of the concerns of the international community; give up your nuclear weapons; pledge to eliminate your nuclear program; stop this relentless pursuit of these technologies; stop threatening the outside world, testing weapons and declaring yourself at odds with the international community.
If you do that, there is hope going forward for diplomacy, but we’ve seen just the opposite. I’ve detailed that. I won’t go back into that. And that’s why we’re so concerned, that North Korea seems uninterested in meeting the concerns of the international community, and that’s where pressure and sanctions come into play. And so we will keep the pressure on North Korea, and if necessary if they cannot in the near term go in a different direction, we’ll have to ramp up that pressure in order to continue to try to bring home to them that this is a mistake, it’s not in their interest, and that if they wish a better relationship with the United States, their neighbors in the world, they have to give up the nuclear weapons.
QUESTION: What is the latest (inaudible)?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: I’ve talked about this before. I actually talked about it at length in Beijing, and I don’t want to really repeat myself. What I said was that it remains a matter of some wonderment that they haven’t understood that if, as they say, they want a better relationship with the United States, one thing they could do is release these Americans and answer our calls to take seriously our concerns about the fate of those being held there. And you know Kenneth Bae has been there for over a year. He’s been in North Korean custody longer than any American in quite a while. His family is understandably concerned. We talk to them frequently. They are keeping their hope up, and I believe that’s the case with the family of the other individual concerned. And we want them to know that we’re with them, and we’re doing everything we can to convince North Korea to let these men go.
QUESTION: The current level of sanctions hasn’t quite persuaded North Korea to think as you suggested. Is it time for a different tactic?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, that time will come soon, but we’re not there yet. There’s still room for diplomacy. We’d like to get something going here, and that’s why the pace of diplomacy has increased, to see if we can’t agree on an appropriate threshold for Six-Party Talks. But at the same time, we keep up our pressure. We keep up our sanctions, and if we do not see signs of North Korean sincerity, if they do not act to demonstrate that they understand they must fulfill their obligations to give up their nuclear weapons, then there is more pressure that will be brought to bear on them.
QUESTION: Did you give them a deadline?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: You know, I’m not in the business of giving deadlines. I’m not going to do that. Let me – if there’s one more question, I’m happy to take it, but I’ve been invited to lunch by Director General Ihara, and I would not like to be rude. I want to show up for that lunch, so any other questions here? No? Excellent. Thank you very much for coming here and listening to me. I really appreciate it. I look forward to seeing many of you in the near future either in Washington or back here in Tokyo. Thanks again. All the best.
Remarks to Press at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Remarks
Glyn Davies
Special Representative for North Korea Policy
Tokyo, Japan
November 25, 2013
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: What I would like to do very much – first of all, let me thank you all for coming out. I appreciate that very much. I would like to say something at the beginning since it’s been a long visit here to North Asia and I’ve had good talks in Tokyo. First of all, I want to thank Director General Ihara and Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Kanehara for giving me so much time today here in Tokyo. We had very in-depth and useful talks, and I believe that our visit here today and the talks I’ve had in Tokyo today demonstrate our close collaboration on North Korea.
We talked of course about the nuclear issue. Japan and the United States are in complete agreement, complete sync about that. We also talked about North Korean human rights – we’ll do more of that in a minute at lunch – and touched on the abductions issue. And we’ll again have more to say about that at lunch. I want to reiterate again, as I always do here in Tokyo, about how we in the United States share the pain and the suffering of abductee families and the Japanese people and pledge once again that we will work tirelessly in cooperation with Japan to try to resolve this important matter.
But as I wrap up a very productive week in the three key North Asian capitals – Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo – I want to report a strong convergence of views on North Korea. All of us are in quite close alignment, and I believe Russia, an essential partner in the Six-Party process, agrees that we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. There are of course some differences among the five – but not at all among the three allies, who are in complete solidarity – but some differences over secondary issues such as the precise threshold or timing of talks, but there is unanimity on what North Korea must do: North Korea must abandon its nuclear weapons and agree to begin that process.
So we are looking for concrete indications from Pyongyang of its commitment to do that. This is because the core purpose of the Six-Party process is the complete, verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on a clear and quick timetable.
North Korea, however, is moving in the opposite direction. They have made clear through words and actions that they reject that premise. We have heard them say repeatedly that instead they demand acceptance as a nuclear weapons state, that they demand prior lifting of sanctions, that they demand a weakening of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which has kept the peace on the Korean Peninsula now for 60 years. I’ve spoken – I did so in Beijing – about North Korea’s “Byungjin” policy of prioritizing nuclear weapons development, which I call a dead end.
I also want to underscore that Pyongyang’s attempts to engage in dialogue while keeping its program running are completely unacceptable. So it’s understandable, we believe, after so many broken promises, after the nuclear and missile tests, the threats against its neighbors and the United States, that not just its negotiating partners in the Six-Party process, but the international community writ large would have high standards of evidence to measure North Korean intentions.
That’s why the United States and its allies call on North Korea to make convincing indications, take concrete steps to demonstrate its seriousness of purpose. We will continue this process of joining with our partners – especially China, given its unique role – to keep the onus for action on North Korea.
With that, I’m very happy to take any questions that you have.
QUESTION: Could you be more specific about what is the concrete step you want North Korea to take?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, this is now a matter of diplomatic discussion among the diplomatic partners in the five-party process, so I don’t want to go into a great deal of detail now. We’re talking about this between governments. We commend China for its tireless efforts to try to move forward on this discussion of what the appropriate threshold for Six-Party Talks would look like. My friend and colleague Ambassador Wu Dawei was just in Washington, some weeks ago, and we had the opportunity there to talk about it, and of course I followed up in Beijing on that same subject. And of course the discussions we had in Washington with separately the ROK and Japan, and then we had a trilateral session, and then again out here in the region – all are meant to define to our collective satisfaction what the threshold for talks should look like. So with your permission I do not plan at this stage to go into a great deal of detail about it.
The North Koreans know full well the kinds of things that we are looking for and talking about. We’ve been at this diplomacy now for a generation, through bilateral talks, trilateral talks, quadrilateral talks and Six-Party Talks, and we’ll keep it up.
QUESTION: Ambassador Davies, what is the U.S. currently doing to pull its citizen out of North Korea, and did you discuss it with the allies?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Of course. This issue of the fate of American citizens who are in North Korean custody is one that we’ve raised – that I’ve raised at each stop, but particularly in Beijing, given their relationship with North Korea. I’m not going to get into, again, the specific discussion of the measures that we’re taking, but I will use this occasion to once again call on North Korea to make the right decision and to respect our concerns and let American citizens who are there go free. I also want to commend our Swedish protecting power. The Government of Sweden has been magnificent in trying every day to work on these issues in Pyongyang with the North Korean government, and that is very important. It is very important to us that this be resolved, that it be resolved quickly.
QUESTION: There have been reports that it is Mr. Newman who has been detained. Can you confirm that identity?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: I’m not at liberty to do that. We have a law that we take very seriously in the United States called the Privacy Act, and because there is no signed Privacy Act waiver, I’m not in position to speak specifically about that issue, out of respect for the law.
QUESTION: Ambassador, your opening remark was very strong, and it comes obviously after the deal with Iran. Is the United States ready to deepen the sanctions, to make the sanctions more strict, to make them more effective?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, look, I’m glad you raised that. I actually – since I knew you’d raise the issue of Iran, and this gives me an occasion to talk about it, so let me say some general things about that, since I know it’s the topic of the moment. Other than the nuclear denominator, the cases could not be more different, frankly, between Iran and North Korea. The two states, simply put, are on opposite sides of the nuclear weapons divide. I would point you to the remarks just made by Secretary of State Kerry. He pointed out that there is the very significant difference on the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that, as I think many of you know, North Korea is the only nation on earth to have first signed that treaty and then renounced its signature. Iran is a signatory of the non-proliferation treaty. Also North Korea has said repeatedly, with increasing frequency, has asserted that it is a nuclear weapons state. They have now placed provisions in their constitution to enshrine that. They’ve sought acceptance as a nuclear weapons state. Iran in contrast has pledged not to build nuclear weapons.
But the starkest contrast of all – and I think this is the most important point to make – is that in the 21st century, North Korea is the only nation on earth that has exploded nuclear devices. They’ve done it not once, not twice, but three times.
There are other differences between the two cases. North Korea walked away from its membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, the agency where I spent several years representing the United States, that is now under the direction of Director General Yukiya Amano. Iran is and has always been a very active and engaged member of the IAEA although we have often had differences with them in the past. I would also remind that I’ve alluded to this before, that North Korea has elevated the pursuit of nuclear weapons to one of its two strategic priorities in its “Byungjin” policy that I spoke to a minute ago.
One way the cases are similar – and I think this is very important – is that pressure, particularly in the form of sanctions, do play a critical role. Sanctions helped convince Iran to agree to this interim deal that’s just been announced. We believe sanctions and pressure are key to sharpening the choices that Pyongyang faces. So given North Korea’s continued flouting of its international obligations and international law, given its testing of nuclear devices, given its repeated threats of nuclear attack, its elevation of its nuclear weapons program pursuit to its highest national priority, we will continue to keep pressure on North Korea, to keep the screws to North Korea.
But it’s pressure not for its own sake; it’s pressure with a purpose, and this is important because what we seek is a negotiated, diplomatic solution to this long-running problem. Here we believe we are making progress with our partners to define an appropriate threshold for resumed multilateral talks, and we will keep that up.
QUESTION: There have been many rumors that the two countries, Iran and North Korea, have been cooperating on nuclear programs. How do you address these concerns?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, proliferation is a concern. It’s a big concern, and it’s something that we work on every day and about which we have conversations with our partners. I’m not going to get into what we do or don’t know about the state of affairs between North Korea and Iran. That would dip into intelligence matters which I can’t comment on, but this issue of proliferation of the spread of nuclear technologies, in particular from North Korea, remains an area of key concern to us, and of vigorous action.
QUESTION: Ambassador, regarding the sanctions, are you suggesting that we don’t have the right level or the right mix as we stand?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Sanctions are always a work in progress. I mean, I think that there are always more sanctions we could put in place if needed. But what I want to put the emphasis on here is what I said at the end of my earlier remarks, that we want the sanctions to help clarify for Pyongyang the choices that they face. If they continue to defy the international community, pursue nuclear weapons and missile technologies, all they will do is continue to isolate themselves, quite frankly to impoverish their people, to keep North Korea outside the community of nations. So we’re saying to North Korea – and we’re doing this increasingly with one voice across not just the six parties, not just the northeast Asian region, but across the world – take a different approach; take a different decision; come in the direction of the concerns of the international community; give up your nuclear weapons; pledge to eliminate your nuclear program; stop this relentless pursuit of these technologies; stop threatening the outside world, testing weapons and declaring yourself at odds with the international community.
If you do that, there is hope going forward for diplomacy, but we’ve seen just the opposite. I’ve detailed that. I won’t go back into that. And that’s why we’re so concerned, that North Korea seems uninterested in meeting the concerns of the international community, and that’s where pressure and sanctions come into play. And so we will keep the pressure on North Korea, and if necessary if they cannot in the near term go in a different direction, we’ll have to ramp up that pressure in order to continue to try to bring home to them that this is a mistake, it’s not in their interest, and that if they wish a better relationship with the United States, their neighbors in the world, they have to give up the nuclear weapons.
QUESTION: What is the latest (inaudible)?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: I’ve talked about this before. I actually talked about it at length in Beijing, and I don’t want to really repeat myself. What I said was that it remains a matter of some wonderment that they haven’t understood that if, as they say, they want a better relationship with the United States, one thing they could do is release these Americans and answer our calls to take seriously our concerns about the fate of those being held there. And you know Kenneth Bae has been there for over a year. He’s been in North Korean custody longer than any American in quite a while. His family is understandably concerned. We talk to them frequently. They are keeping their hope up, and I believe that’s the case with the family of the other individual concerned. And we want them to know that we’re with them, and we’re doing everything we can to convince North Korea to let these men go.
QUESTION: The current level of sanctions hasn’t quite persuaded North Korea to think as you suggested. Is it time for a different tactic?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, that time will come soon, but we’re not there yet. There’s still room for diplomacy. We’d like to get something going here, and that’s why the pace of diplomacy has increased, to see if we can’t agree on an appropriate threshold for Six-Party Talks. But at the same time, we keep up our pressure. We keep up our sanctions, and if we do not see signs of North Korean sincerity, if they do not act to demonstrate that they understand they must fulfill their obligations to give up their nuclear weapons, then there is more pressure that will be brought to bear on them.
QUESTION: Did you give them a deadline?
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: You know, I’m not in the business of giving deadlines. I’m not going to do that. Let me – if there’s one more question, I’m happy to take it, but I’ve been invited to lunch by Director General Ihara, and I would not like to be rude. I want to show up for that lunch, so any other questions here? No? Excellent. Thank you very much for coming here and listening to me. I really appreciate it. I look forward to seeing many of you in the near future either in Washington or back here in Tokyo. Thanks again. All the best.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)