FRANK ROSE MAKES REMARKS ON MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Enhancing Regional Missile Defense Cooperation
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington, DC
April 7, 2015

Introduction

Thank you for that kind introduction, and thanks for having me here today.

By way of introduction, while I am the Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, my work at the State Department is focused on enhancing strategic stability around the world. Arms control, verification and compliance are some of the tools we use to enhance strategic stability and reassure our allies and partners that we will meet our security commitments.

Missile defense is another tool to do just that. At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense issues, including missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners around the world. In this capacity, I served as the lead U.S. negotiator for the missile defense bases in Romania, Turkey, and Poland.

So I’m pleased to be here today to discuss our efforts at enhancing missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners, one of the key goals outlined in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Now you have already heard from Elaine Bunn and General Todorov about our missile defense policy and operations. So instead, let me focus my remarks on three areas: 1) significant progress we have been made implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA) and NATO missile defense; 2) cooperation on missile defense with allies and partners outside of Europe, and 3) I’ll conclude with a few points on Russia and missile defense.

Before I do that, I do want to reiterate one point that you undoubtedly heard from Elaine and Ken: the President’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget protects and enhances our important missile defense priorities such as the European Phased Adaptive Approach and reflects the high priority we place on these efforts. As such, the U.S. commitment to NATO missile defense and the sites in Romania and Poland remains “ironclad.”


European Phased Adaptive Approach

With that, let me now take a few moments to discuss where we are with regard to overall implementation of the EPAA, the United States’ national contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (or NATO) missile defense system. In 2009, the President announced that the EPAA would “provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies,” while relying on “capabilities that are proven and cost-effective.” Since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision and have made great strides in recent years.

I just returned from Turkey and Romania last week and had the opportunity to discuss our progress with these two key partners.

Turkey was the first country to receive EPPA elements in Phase 1 with the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar to that country in 2011. At the same time, we began the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) -capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean. With the declaration of Interim BMD Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, the radar in Turkey transitioned to NATO operational control.

Additionally, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota as a Spanish contribution to NATO missile defense.

In February 2014, the first of four missile defense-capable Aegis ships, USS DONALD COOK, arrived in Rota, Spain. A second ship, USS ROSS joined her in June. During 2015, two more of these multi-mission ships, USS PORTER and USS CARNEY will forward deploy in Rota.

These multi-mission ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, training exercises, and support U.S. and NATO operations, including NATO missile defense.

Currently, we are focused on completing the deployment of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania as part of Phase 2 of the EPAA. Romania’s strong support for the timely completion of the arrangements needed to implement this deployment and Romania’s provision of security and its infrastructure efforts have been superb.

In October 2014, the U.S. Navy held a historic naval support facility establishment ceremony at the missile defense facility on Deveselu Airbase Base in Romania. This ceremony established the naval facility and installed its first U.S. commander. Currently, this site is on schedule to be completed by the end of this year and when operational, this site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.

And finally there is Phase 3. This phase includes an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. This site is on schedule for deployment in the 2018 time frame. For example, the President’s FY16 budget request includes approximately $200 million for the establishment of the site. The interceptor site in Poland is key to the EPAA: when combined with other EPAA assets, Phase 3 will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory in the 2018 time frame.

So, as you can see, we are continuing to implement the President’s vision for stronger, smarter, and swifter missile defenses in Europe.


National Contributions to NATO Missile Defense

I would also like to highlight the efforts of our NATO Allies to develop and deploy their own national contributions for missile defense. A great example is that today, Patriot batteries from three NATO countries are deployed in Turkey under NATO command and control to augment Turkey’s air defense capabilities in response to the crisis on Turkey’s south-eastern border.

Voluntary national contributions are foundation of the NATO missile defense system, and there are several approaches Allies can take to make important and valuable contributions in this area.

First, Allies can acquire fully capable BMD systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control capabilities.

Second, Allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key ballistic missile defense capability.

Finally, Allies can contribute to NATO’s ballistic missile defense capability by providing essential basing support, such as Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have agreed to do.

In all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is NATO interoperability.

Yes, acquiring a ballistic missile defense capability is, of course, good in and of itself.

But if the capability is not interoperable with the Alliance then its value as a contribution to Alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished.

It is only through interoperability that the Alliance can gain the optimum effects from BMD cooperation that enhance NATO BMD through shared battle-space awareness and reduced interceptor wastage.


Missile Defense Developments in Other Regions

Let me turn now to some of the other regions of the world. The United States, in cooperation with our allies and partners, is continuing to bolster missile defenses in other key regions, such as the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, in order to strengthen regional deterrence architectures.

In the Middle East, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through fora such as the recently established U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (or GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum (or SCF).

At the September 26, 2013, SCF, Secretary Kerry and his Foreign Ministry counterparts reaffirmed their intent, first stated at the September 28, 2012, SCF, to “work toward enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense.”

Several of our partners in the region have expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has contracted to buy two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (or THAAD) batteries that, when operational, will enhance the UAE’s national security as well as regional stability.

The UAE also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets. We look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperability with our GCC partners in the months and years ahead.

Additionally and separately, the United States maintains a strong defense relationship with Israel, and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in comprehensive missile defense architecture for Israel. Israeli programs such as Iron Dome, the David’s Sling Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon System, in conjunction with operational cooperation with the United States, create a multilayered architecture designed to protect the Israeli people from varying types of missile threats.

In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing to cooperate through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships.

For example, the United States and Japan already are working closely together to develop the SM-3 Block IIA, which will make a key contribution to the EPAA as well as being deployed elsewhere in the world. We also recently completed the deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the U.S. and Japan. And finally, we are continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces, which will be aided by recent changes to the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, which we expect to complete soon.

We also continue to consult closely with Australia. For example, as a result of U.S.-Australia Foreign and Defense ministerial-level consultations over the past year, the United States and Australia have established a bilateral BMD Working Group to examine options for potential Australian contributions to the BMD architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.

Additionally, we are also consulting closely with the Republic of Korea as it develops the Korean Air and Missile Defense system, which is designed to defend the Republic of Korea against air and missile threats from North Korea. The Republic of Korea recently announced its plans to purchase Patriot PAC-3 missiles, which will enhance its capability to defend against the North Korean ballistic missile threat.


A Constraint Free Missile Defense

Finally, let me say a few things about missile defense and Russia.

Prior to the suspension of our dialogue as a result of Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine, Russia continued to demand that the United States provide it “legally binding” guarantees that our missile defense will not harm or diminish its strategic nuclear deterrent. These guarantees would have been based on criteria that would have limited our missile defenses and undermined our ability to stay ahead of the ballistic missile threat.

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review is quite clear on our policy: U.S. missile defense is not designed nor directed against Russia and China’s strategic nuclear forces.

However, at the same time, we have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally-binding or other constraints that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.

The security of the United States, its allies and partners is our foremost and solemn responsibility. As such, the United States will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats, free from obligations or other constraints that limit our BMD capabilities.


Conclusion

Let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense cooperation with allies and partners around the world over the past several years. This was a key goal of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review.

In Europe, implementation of the EPAA and NATO missile defense is going well. For example, the missile defense radar in Turkey has been operating since 2011, and the Aegis Ashore site in Romania is scheduled to become operational later this year.

In the Middle East, we are continuing to work bilaterally and multilaterally with our partners in the GCC to deploy effective missile defense. For example, later this year the United Arab Emirates will take delivery of its first THAAD battery.

Furthermore, we continue to work with Israel to expand its multilayered architecture to protect it from missile threats.

In the Asia-Pacific, we are working actively with our allies to enhance our missile defense capabilities in the region. On that note, we recently completed deployment of second missile defense radar in Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the U.S. and Japan.

Finally, we continue to oppose Russia’s attempts to impose limitations on our missile defenses that would limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.

Suffice to say, defense of our allies and partners through assistance on missile defense cooperation is and will remain a key priority of the U.S. Government.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS REMARKS ON PROJECT SAPPHIRE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Project Sapphire 20 Years Later
Remarks
Richard E. Hoagland
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Washington, DC
November 17, 2014

(As Prepared)

Ambassador Umarov, Senator Nunn, Senator Lugar (the distinguished senator from my home state of Indiana), honored guests, ladies and gentlemen: It is such an honor to participate in this conference marking the 20th Anniversary of Project Sapphire. Thank you to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) for making this important dialogue possible. This is a hugely significant anniversary, and I am grateful that CSIS and the Embassy of Kazakhstan have made this public event possible. I have to admit, I feel a little bit like the U.S. Zelig of Central Asia, because I’ve been there since 1993 – and am so proud to have been there.

After the United States became the first country to recognize Kazakhstan’s independence in 1991, our two nations built a foundation of mutual trust, working together to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There is no better symbol of that trust than Project Sapphire, which rid Kazakhstan of approximately 600 kilograms or weapons grade uranium.

Kazakhstan, this new member of the community of nations, through its decision to carry out Project Sapphire, earned respect from around the world for its commitment to strengthening global security and for its support for international norms.

Since then, Kazakhstan has been at the forefront of nuclear nonproliferation efforts and a major force in the multilateral institutions that underpin those efforts. And nuclear nonproliferation cooperation remains a seminal pillar of the U.S.-Kazakhstan strategic partnership.

We appreciate Kazakhstan’s ongoing participation in the Nuclear Security Summit process – a priority for President Obama. The Summits have been an important venue in helping to secure vulnerable nuclear material worldwide, and Kazakhstan’s contributions in this regard have been very valuable.

For example, Kazakhstan shut down the BN-350 reactor on the Caspian coast and shipped its spent fuel to secure storage. I was there at the dedication ceremony, outside Kurchatov, snow sweeping across the steppe, and I was deeply proud – and deeply moved – to be privileged to represent my country at that important event. In other milestones of nuclear non-proliferation, Kazakhstan down-blended 33 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from its Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) to low enriched uranium, and it also secured weapon-usable nuclear material at the Semipalatinsk Test Site through upgraded physical protection.

We are also proud of our growing partnership on science and technology and anticipate deepening our collaboration with Kazakhstan through the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), which Kazakhstan will host at Nazarbayev University in Astana beginning in 2015.

The ISTC has played a pivotal role in the prevention of WMD-expertise proliferation over the past two decades, and Kazakhstan’s leadership in hosting the Center will be critical to the continued success of the organization.

Kazakhstan is also working with the United States on another priority issue. In his April 2009 Prague speech, President Obama called for the creation of a bank of low enriched uranium (LEU) under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s auspices, as part of a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation.

The fuel bank will provide an emergency backup source of reactor fuel in the event that the international market could not meet a country’s needs, and would thereby support the expansion of peaceful nuclear energy without increasing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. We support the LEU bank and appreciate Kazakhstan’s offer to host it.

In conclusion, today Kazakhstan is a leader in the region and a strong partner of the United States. It continues to set high goals and is taking on a leadership role on the global stage. The United States and Kazakhstan have an ambitious agenda together to address the challenges of the 21st century, whether in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons or in building an open and inclusive trade network linking Central and South Asia with China and Europe. This is a great expansion from Project Sapphire 20 years ago. I want to assure you that our broadening cooperation will help us to achieve these goals.

EXPORT CONTROL REFORM: REMARKS BY STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
The Path Forward on Export Control Reform
Remarks
Tom Kelly
Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington, DC
February 4, 2014

Good morning, great to the here with you today. As Acting Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, I lead the Bureau charged with implementing most of the State Department’s part of the Export Control Reform initiative.

When it comes to implementing ECR, the Administration is focused on creating an export control system that keeps pace with new technologies and supply chain globalization. At the same time, we don’t want this process to sacrifice critical national security and foreign policy objectives, from nonproliferation to supporting human rights.

ECR will streamline U.S. Government decision-making on strategic exports and create a more transparent, predictable system. What it will not do is alter the primacy of foreign policy in the decision-making process for arms exports. Our Foreign Military Sales program, Direct Commercial Sales authorizations, and all exports of munitions from the U.S. will continue to be authorized based on a coordinated review of the foreign policy risks and rewards associated with the transaction. Our newly revised and publicly available Conventional Arms Transfer Policy guides this review. It affirms that the U.S. does not simply allow arms to flow from its borders in response to global demand; we authorize exports that support U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

Over the past four months we achieved the first milestones in implementing ECR. In October 2013, the first major revisions to our export control lists went into effect, transferring controls on certain aircraft and gas turbine engines as well as their parts and components from the control of the Department of State to the Department of Commerce. These two categories potentially represent more than $20 billion in annual exports. And this January, new controls on military vehicles and ships went into effect.

Our allies and partners are responding positively to these changes and see many of their concerns related to security of supply addressed by these reforms. The U.S. defense export community is also supportive.

I do want to take this opportunity to – once again – dispel the myth that ECR equals decontrol of arms exports. Any item that is no longer controlled on the U.S. Munitions List is now controlled on the Commerce Control List.

The goal is an agile, dynamic export control regime responsive to today’s and tomorrow’s national security and foreign policy challenges. These new controls reduce bureaucracy, accelerate goods to market for our close allies and security partners, and still maintain a high level of scrutiny over arms exports. Though the full measure of success remains ahead of us, we’re confident that we are on the right path.

GEN. DEMPSEY SAYS GULF CRITICAL TO U.S.

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Gulf Remains Critical to U.S. Interests, Dempsey Says
By Karen Parrish
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, March 18, 2013 - The U.S. commitment to security in the Persian Gulf remains firm, the nation's senior military officer said here today.

Speaking as part of a recurring Persian Gulf forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discussed how budget pressures and a force drawdown will affect U.S. military engagement in the Gulf region.

Countries bordering the Persian Gulf include Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates and Oman.

Dempsey noted he lived and worked in Iraq and Saudi Arabia for many years. "I came here today with a message of assurance -- a little peace of mind in the context of uncertainty," the general told the audience.

Nations and people share an interest in a common future, he said, "and that will always be the case, and always factor into the decisions we make about distribution of forces, partnering, engaging -- all the things we've done, really, for the past 25 or 30 years -- to make sure that the Middle East, in particular, is on a path for greater security and stability."

The U.S. presence in the Gulf since 1991 was originally because of Saddam Hussein's aggression, Dempsey said. "But we stayed there because, I think, we came to a realization that the future of the region was tied to our future ... [through] shared interests in a common future where people would be able to build a better life, and where threats could be managed collaboratively -- not by the United States uniquely, but by the relationships we would build," he added.

Dempsey said his view is that while the number of U.S. boots on the ground or airplanes in the sky varies over time, that's not a good measure of regional commitment. He said multinational training and military school exchanges, for example, offer U.S. and allied forces opportunities to build commitment and partnerships in the Gulf region.

Dempsey noted the 10-year anniversary of the start of the Iraq War serves as an occasion to reflect on U.S. actions there.

"I spent three years in Iraq. ... We're all aware that tomorrow is the 10-year anniversary, and the debate goes on about whether we should have, whether it was worth it -- and that debate will go on," he said.

Dempsey said his personal belief is the United States achieved two significant results in Iraq.

"First of all, there is no longer the strongman, the dictator, and the threat to the region ... that there was," he said, referring to the fall from power and subsequent execution of Saddam Hussein.

"Secondly, and I think importantly, we've given the Iraqi people an incredible opportunity," the chairman said. While he acknowledged the Iraq War included missteps and opportunities gained and lost, he noted that, in the end, the nation gained a partner and lost an adversary.

"It remains to be seen, still, about how strong a partner they are willing [to] and can become," he said. "But we have a partner."

Dempsey said he seeks to build relationships in the Gulf, as in other regions, that are not measured simply in terms of air wings or carrier battle groups. Where allied and partner nations are willing to build their capabilities, he said, the United States is eager to help. He noted a recent counter-mine exercise involving some 24 nations.

"That's the future," he said. "Not necessarily the United States of America sitting there with half of the United States Navy positioned in the Gulf, but rather ... a long-term strategy that's feasible given the resources available."

The United States has strong Gulf allies in countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Dempsey said.

"We just have to figure out, 'How do we help you do more, so we can do less?" he said. "But that doesn't mean less well."

From September 2001 to June 2003, Dempsey served in Saudi Arabia, training and advising the Saudi Arabian National Guard. In June 2003, he took command of the Army's 1st Armored Division in Baghdad, where he led the division for 14 months. In August 2005, he returned to Iraq for two years to train and equip the Iraqi security forces. From August 2007 through October 2008, Dempsey served as the deputy commander and then acting commander of U.S. Central Command.

THE NEW ASIA-PACIFIC FOCUS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Pentagon Official Explains Asia-Pacific Focus
FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

By Army Sgt. 1st Class Tyrone C. Marshall Jr.
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, Sept. 24, 2012 - The entire U.S. government has made a concerted effort to improve U.S.-China relations while implementing the tenets in the defense strategic guidance, a senior Pentagon official said here today.

Speaking to an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Kathleen Hicks, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy explained the U.S. military's strategic shift in focus toward the Asia-Pacific region.

"The investment of time and resources that the entire U.S. government is making in our relationships in this region includes a strong emphasis on improving relations with China," she said. But as President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta and Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter have emphasized, the rebalance is not just about China, she added.

"It is not just about the U.S. goal in the region, and it's not an attempt by the U.S. to contain China," she said.

Hicks said the need for rebalancing became apparent in 2011 as the Defense Department's senior leaders, along with the president's staff, engaged in a strategic review of how to achieve the objectives of the national defense strategy amid changes to the geo-strategic and resource environments.

"The end of the war in Iraq and the onset of our transition to Afghan leadership for security in Operation Enduring Freedom were among the dynamics we felt necessitated a re-look prior to the next [Quadrennial Defense Review]," she said.

Hicks noted Clinton, Panetta and Carter all have visited Asia in recent months.

"These travels provide our leaders venue to describe the United States vision for a prosperous and peaceful Asia-Pacific," she said. "[It will be] supported by a shared commitment to the values of free and open commerce, unimpeded access to the global commons and a system based on a rule of law.

"This vision scans the spectrum of our diplomatic, economic and defense policies," she continued. "Our whole-of-government efforts include strengthening our alliances and partnerships, deepening working relationships with emerging powers, engaging in and strengthening multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment and advancing principles of democracy and human rights."

Hicks said the rebalancing reflects the larger picture of the entire region "including U.S. engagement with China, including military-to-military relations."

"The stability and prosperity in this region will be shaped by our ability to work together," she said.

Hicks explained some of the changes to come during the course of the rebalancing to the region.

"As U.S. forces return from Afghanistan and reset globally, one of our priorities is having forces present and positioned in the Pacific to assure regional allies and partners, deter threats to regional stability and prevail in conflicts if necessary," she said.

"This includes the Army aligning specific forces to U.S. Pacific Command, as well as the return of Marine Corps units to the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force," Hicks said. "We're also shifting our overall naval presence to the Pacific region."

She noted that Panetta has said the United States intends to have 60 percent of its naval assets based in the Pacific by 2020.

"The department continues to work with our allies and partners in the region to increase the number and size of bilateral and multilateral exercises," Hicks said. "For example, just a few weeks ago, and for the first time, Indonesian [forces] participated alongside Thai, U.S., and Australian fighters in the biannual exercise 'Pitch Black' in Australia's northern territory."

Hicks said these exercises and training with allied and partner militaries are essential to the United States remaining the "security partner of choice" in the region, while encouraging others to share the burden.

"Our forward presence and engagement play an essential role in strengthening the capabilities of Pacific nations to defend and secure themselves," she said. "Building strong partnership in the Asia-Pacific region requires us to sustain and enhance American military strength there."