U.S. OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN EAST ASIA

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
02/21/2015 12:53 PM EST
Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability in East Asia
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Federation of American Scientists
Washington, DC
February 20, 2015

Introduction

Thank you all very much, and a special thanks to Bruce and Chuck for having me here today to address this important workshop.

I’m told that this group is exploring China’s potential interest in and deployment of strategic ballistic missile defense and what that means for U.S. and allied security.

At the State Department, we’re taking a hard look at it as well, and in particular, the role of ballistic missile defense in achieving the overarching goal of strategic stability between the United States and China.

Overview of Strategic Stability with China

Before discussing China’s interest in developing a BMD system and the possible implications of such an effort, I’d first like to provide an overview of what the United States is doing to ensure a stable U.S.-China strategic relationship in the region.

As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is committed to maintaining strategic stability in U.S.-China relations and supports initiation of a dialogue on strategic stability and nuclear postures aimed at fostering a more stable, resilient, and transparent security relationship with China.

During the Cold War, many associated strategic stability with what we called “mutual assured destruction,” the notion that the incentive to initiate nuclear use would be discouraged by the fear of suffering unacceptable retaliatory damage. This notion, of course, is ill-suited and too narrow to fully capture the U.S.-China relationship given our multifaceted and shared interests. In today’s world, strategic stability encompasses much more than just nuclear relations and reflects the fact that the U.S.-China relationship, which has both elements of competition and cooperation, is not adversarial.

The strategic relationship between the United States and China is complex, and we each view stability differently. Thus, it is important that we have frank and open dialogue about how our nations define and view strategic stability and how we perceive our nuclear postures and policies impacting this balance. As part of these discussions, the United States is willing to discuss all issues, including missile defense, space-related issues, conventional precision strike capabilities, and nuclear weapons issues, with the goal of improving the conditions for a more predictable and safer security environment.

A sustained and substantive discussion of our national approaches to maintaining effective deterrent postures and modernization of associated strategic capabilities can increase understanding, enhance confidence and reduce mistrust.

Overview of China’s BMD Activities

As you’re all aware, China is continuing to develop its BMD capabilities.

Although China does not say much about its BMD programs, China publicly announced that it conducted ground-based mid-course BMD tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014. I’ll say more about the 2014 “BMD” test later. Chinese state media has stated that such tests are defensive in nature and are not targeted at any country.

I was in Beijing earlier this month, and the message I delivered was clear: It is important that our governments have a sustained dialogue on the role that our BMD systems have in our respective defense policies and strategies. We would welcome an opportunity to learn more about how BMD fits into China’s defense policy and strategy.

More broadly, a sustained dialogue would improve our understanding of China’s strategic perspective and enhance China’s understanding of U.S. policy and strategy. Institutionalizing discussions of strategic issues is a prudent long-term approach to strengthening strategic stability and exploring means for strengthening mutual trust and risk reduction.

To encourage that dialogue, we have taken and will continue to take steps to keep China informed about developments in U.S. BMD policy.

Potential Chinese BMD through the Lens of the U.S. Experience

The U.S. experience with BMD and specifically with our Ground-based Midcourse Defense System, or GMD, provides a useful lens for examining the challenges the Chinese would face in developing a BMD capability to threaten our nuclear deterrent.

We have been clear that our homeland BMD capabilities provide for defense of the U.S. homeland from limited ICBM attack, and are purposely not intended to affect Russia’s or China’s strategic deterrent. The GMD system is designed to support that policy, and it is not scaled, intended, or capable of defending the United States against the larger and more sophisticated arsenals of Russia and China. GMD is designed to protect the U.S. homeland only from limited ICBM attacks from states such as North Korea and Iran.

The U.S. experience with BMD suggests that attempting to develop a comprehensive homeland BMD system to defend against ballistic missile attack from China or Russia would be extremely challenging – and costly - given the size and sophistication of Chinese and Russian ICBMs. This owes to several factors, including the relatively low number of GMD interceptors and the sophistication and large numbers of Russian and Chinese missiles.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated this publically on May 18, 2010, in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when he said that trying to eliminate the viability of the Russian nuclear capability would be “unbelievably expensive.”

Given these factors, we could potentially expect a notional Chinese equivalent to the GMD system to provide at most a limited defense of the Chinese homeland, which would not counter the U.S. strategic deterrent and therefore would not undermine strategic stability.

This is for the same reason that GMD does not impact strategic stability: the number of interceptors is low and they are not designed to deal with complex threats, and developing a comprehensive system to cope with a full-scale attack from another nuclear-armed great power would be expensive and ultimately unsuccessful.

Relationship to ASAT Testing

There is a another important aspect of China’s BMD program that bears discussing, which is its connection with China’s anti-satellite, or ASAT, weapons program.

On July 23, 2014, the Chinese Government conducted a non-destructive test of a missile designed to destroy satellites in low Earth orbit. However, China publicly called this ASAT test a “land-based missile interception test.”

Despite China’s claims that this was not an ASAT test; let me assure you the United States has high confidence in its assessment, that the event was indeed an ASAT test.

The continued development and testing of destructive ASAT systems is both destabilizing and threatens the long-term security and sustainability of the outer space environment. A previous destructive test of the Chinese system in 2007 created thousands of pieces of debris, which continue to present an ongoing danger to the space systems—as well as astronauts—of all nations, including China.

The destructive nature of debris-generating weapons has decades-long consequences: they can increase the potential for further collisions in the future, which only create more debris. A debris-forming test or attack may only be minutes in duration, but the consequences can last for decades. It is for these reasons that the United States believes testing debris-generating ASAT systems threaten the security, economic well-being, and civil endeavors of all nations.

Space systems and their supporting infrastructures enable a wide range of services, including communication; position, navigation, and timing; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and meteorology, which provide vital national, military, civil, scientific, and economic benefits. Other nations recognize these benefits to the United States and seek to counter the U.S. strategic advantage by pursuing capabilities to deny or destroy our access to space services.

The use of such ASAT weapons could be escalatory in a crisis.

China’s ASAT program, and the lack of transparency accompanying it, also impedes bilateral space cooperation. While we prefer cooperation, it will by necessity have to be a product of a step-by-step approach starting with dialogue, leading to modest CBMs, which might then perhaps lead to deeper engagement. However, none of this is possible until China changes its behavior with regard to ASATs.

Conclusion

As many of you know, one of my biggest priorities as Assistant Secretary is to look over the horizon a bit and begin to structure our Bureau to address the emerging security challenges of the 21st Century.

For me, that means an increased focus on developing a stable strategic relationship with China, while at the same time reassuring our Allies.

Managing the U.S.-China relationship will take a lot of time and effort, and we won’t always be successful. It’s a challenge. But as Secretary Kerry likes to remind us, it’s important for us to get caught trying, and that’s what we intend to do.

Thanks very much.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY RUSSEL'S REMARKS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Remarks to the Business Council for International Understanding
Remarks
Daniel R. Russel
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
New York City
January 13, 2015

As prepared for delivery

Thank, Richard, you for the introduction. It’s great to be here at the Business Council for International Understanding. Your organization is a great supporter of shared prosperity – helping to promote wise policies that create jobs and opportunities both here at home, and for America’s partners and friends around the world. And the individual companies you represent are leaders in fields from health care, to food, to banking and more.

Prosperity and security are inseparable

My portfolio covers the full range of American interests in the Asia-Pacific – namely implementing President Obama’s “rebalance” policy of increased engagement and attention to the region. So while I don’t focus exclusively on economics, as Secretary Kerry says, every Foreign Service Officer is an economics officer.

You understand the importance of America’s commercial relations with the East Asia-Pacific region, which has over half a billion middle class consumers and accounts for $1.4 trillion in trade with the U.S.

You’re here because you understand that America’s prosperity and Asia’s prosperity are inseparable.

You also understand that our shared prosperity and shared security are just as tightly linked. And that’s why I’m here.

The most important thing we can do for U.S.-Asia relations this year, for both prosperity and security, is completing the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement. And I’m here to ask for your help. But first, a little background.

Diplomacy and prosperity have enabled each other throughout the Obama administration. Just a few examples:

The global financial crisis of 2008 was the worst global downturn since the Great Depression. Perhaps the decisive difference between the 1930s and this time was that international cooperation in the last six years helped to avoid worst effects. Coordinated action through the G-20 was essential. We’ve also acted to enhance prosperity through our leadership in APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. And we’ve supported ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which is driving economic integration at the sub-regional level.

America’s alliances and partnerships guarantee security within the region, as they have for seven decades. And they have supported growing economic relationships with many countries – trade nearly doubling in the last decade under our FTA with Australia, implementation of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, our Open Skies agreement to liberalize air travel with Japan, and more.

Our work with Asia also supports security and prosperity beyond the region, as we jointly tackle global issues such as climate change, violent extremism now including ISIL, and infectious disease now including Ebola. The economic consequences of all these threats have been clear for many years: the increased costs of natural disasters; the Bali bombings and their devastating effect on tourism; the disruptions to business and travel from SARS. East Asia learned from all these past incidents, and the region’s smart contributions to address today’s global crises helps us reduce the impact of bad disruptions to the regional and global economies.

These are all areas of government-to-government cooperation, but there’s also a huge role for the private sector to play. Businesses like yours are essential to building resilient global supply chains that serve consumers, and also help provide relief in emergencies and support long-term recovery.

Now, let me focus for a bit on what we’ve done recently to support business with one particular country that I know you’re interested in: China. Our diplomacy with China has allowed us to expand the areas where we work together, while managing our clear differences. And that diplomacy over many years, including bringing China into the WTO, has supported China’s economic rise, enabling trade and increased exports to China. In 2014 alone, we made important progress in at least five specific ways:

Let’s start with the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade meetings in Chicago. There, Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker and U.S. Trade Representative Mike Froman made great progress in getting China to open to imports of U.S. biotech corn and soy; medical devices and pharmaceuticals; and fair treatment of U.S. businesses facing the competition regulators.

Second, at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, our biggest bilateral annual gathering held over the summer in Beijing, we intensified negotiations on a Bilateral Investment Treaty. The “negative” list is next, and we’re insisting that it be very high quality – narrowly tailored and widely open to foreign investment, especially since our openness to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has allowed new Chinese FDI into the U.S. to surpass our FDI in China.

Third, during President Obama’s trip to Beijing, we reached a key agreement to expand visa validity for business visitors to ten years, a boon for our tourism industry and a win for our companies with interests in China. We also achieved an important bilateral understanding to help the WTO’s International Technology Agreement move forward. We subsequently suffered a setback and there’s still a lot of work to do, but we remain hopeful.

Fourth, our landmark climate progress, also during the trip, is important for long-term public health, and economic health, and it supports the green economy.

That’s 2014. So what’s next, not just with China, but with the entire region? The United States will continue to, one, underwrite regional security; and two, advocate for American business.

We are watching general security and economic conditions that could affect U.S.-Asia-Pacific commercial relations in 2015.

There’s the continuing risk of tensions in the South China Sea. Diplomacy in this area is “a work in progress.” It’s calm on the surface, but militarization and reclamation of disputed outposts and other drivers of tension remain. ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, has floated ideas to manage the tensions and we’ll remain strongly supportive of these diplomatic efforts, such as establishing a binding Code of Conduct sooner rather than later. We raise concerns over tensions on these issues at the highest levels, including with Chinese leaders.

In a welcome development, China and Japan have said they’ll implement crisis management mechanisms and restore relations. Substantive follow-through to these diplomatic steps will be essential for the region to reap the fruits of rapprochement between these two economic powerhouses.

We’ll continue to push for respect for universal rights and freedoms, which are essential for prosperity in places like Burma, Cambodia, and of course, China. They are essential everywhere.

And we will continue our vigilant and active diplomacy with our five-party partners on North Korea. We had a big 2014 in terms of spotlighting the North’s human rights abuses. We continue to make clear that North Korea will not achieve the security and prosperity it claims to want while it pursues banned nuclear weapons and missile programs. And we’re increasingly vigilant against the North’s offensive cyber programs.

We are working actively to ensure that a stable security environment underwrites economic growth for the Asia-Pacific, instead of instability threatening progress. No country can provide the public good of regional security in the way the United States can.

Now, to business. At the top of our business agenda for 2015 is the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In this uncertain political environment, and with growth flat in the EU and slowing in China, the importance of the TPP could not be clearer – it is central to the rebalance.

It will strengthen America’s role as one of the most competitive, most innovative economies in the world, as well as one of the biggest trading partners, and source and destination of foreign investment in the region. TPP will be a big boost to the U.S. economy, advancing President Obama’s top priority of creating good jobs in America. Exports already account for over 11 million jobs, and have contributed nearly a third of U.S. growth in recent years. By expanding access to some of the largest and most dynamic economies in the world, TPP will make those numbers even stronger, including for New York.

Some 977,000 New York jobs are supported by trade with the TPP region. Those workers – many of them at your companies – are exporting nearly $15 billion in services and nearly $18 billion in goods.

Just as important, a high-quality TPP will strengthen our partner economies – other regional economies that share the priority we place on labor, environmental, and intellectual property standards, and on fair competition. Every decade or two, our economic model is challenged, and we must renew it and advocate for it. History didn’t end 25 years ago.

In short: We need TPP to strengthen growth and create jobs and to advance our values and show that our ongoing commitment to the region extends beyond security. This is important to long-time allies like Australia, with whom we’ve had an FTA for a decade now. It’s important to Japan as PM Abe works on structural reforms, the “third arrow” of his domestic economic recovery program. And it’s important to newer partners like Vietnam; 2015 marks 20 years of normalized relations, and TPP will take us to the next level, driving labor reforms and reducing its economic dependence on China.

And as a regional platform, TPP is also important to those regional economies that are not yet part of it, because the promise of open markets and high standards can propel reforms that will enhance the competitiveness of future TPP candidates in the entire Asia-Pacific economy, as well as in the supply and value chains that operate throughout the region.

Our negotiators have made a lot of progress on the talks in recent months, and we believe the end of the negotiations is coming into focus. And when it’s time to go to Congress, we’ll need a broad range of support to help get TPP, and the supporting tool of Trade Promotion Authority, passed.

As we pursue TPP, we’re also working with the countries outside that group, including the world’s second largest economy: China. We’re working on the BIT, as I mentioned, and pushing for fair application of their competition laws and trade enforcement.

That’s a lot of business-related diplomacy, and we haven’t even gotten to the rest of the region, which includes partners like Taiwan and Indonesia. Taiwan is our 10th largest trading partner, and a great example of an economy that has flourished with our security support.

Indonesia is a country with enormous potential. U.S. companies have invested $65 billion there in the last eight years, and the new President, Jokowi, has a business background and is off to a quick start. His interest in improving infrastructure and education should provide substantial opportunities for foreign investment in Southeast Asia’s largest economy.

In Indonesia, and across the region, there’s a lot of interest in business and investment. And the quality of the investments matters. You are among the best advocates for American values. As we work for you, we appreciate the way you practice the ideals that support sustained success – investing in the workforce through training, and in communities and infrastructure; planning for long term sustainability and environmental protection; avoiding corrupt practices. These are some of the reasons American businesses are often the preferred partner for countries and local businesses across the region.

Take Burma. Our rapprochement has resulted in remarkably rapid market opening since 2012. GE, a storied New York company, is helping modernize Burma’s national airline fleet and power grid, and investing $3 million in public health. Pepsi is working on vocational training and exploring agriculture investments.

Coca-Cola has invested $200 million and is working to economically empower Burmese women. Coke also won the State Department’s Award for Corporate Excellence last year for providing disaster relief to the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan. And there are many more examples of companies ploughing a portion of their profits back into corporate social responsibility activities across the region. This year, we intend to explore how APEC might help expand the practice of CSR to promote more inclusive economic growth in the region.

I believe the United States and the Asia-Pacific region will continue to grow and prosper together, but it depends on wise leadership – in both our political and commercial capitals here and in the region. And it depends on you, the business community, continuing to make and strengthen your connections with businesses and people across the Pacific. Thank you.

U.S. OFFICIAL REMARKS ON NORTH KOREA

Photo Credit:  Wikimedia.
FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Remarks to Press at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Remarks Glyn Davies
Special Representative for North Korea Policy Seoul, South Korea
May 21, 2012
AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Hello everybody. [Pointing to audio recorders on the podium] My goodness, what a collection of machines that you have left here.
Thank you very much for taking time on such a beautiful day in Seoul to come and spend a couple of minutes with me. What I wanted to do very briefly is say a couple of words and then I am very happy to take your questions.

First off, today was an occasion to continue, on a trilateral basis, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the United States, our very close consultations that we have conducted for many years. Now I have been on the job since December of last year. This is my third trip to Seoul, and this is the second time this year that we have had trilateral consultations to talk about North Korea and about regional issues.

My visit to Seoul is the first stop on a three-nation trip in North Asia. I will go on tomorrow morning to Beijing, spend a little over a day there. And then I will go from there to Tokyo back to Washington on Friday. And of course the purpose of all three stops is to consult with, in this instance, allies and partners here in Seoul, and then when I go on to Beijing, to talk to the Chinese who are the chair of the Six-Party process, and to get their thinking about where we are. So today reflects the very close cooperation between the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan on North Korea. And it is a reflection, not just of our alliance relationship which is very important, but also our common interests and values across the Asia Pacific and the world.

I should say a quick word about those accompanying me. In addition to my colleague Ford Hart, Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, along with us today is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jim Zumwalt, from the State Department, and Mr. Syd Seiler, who is the Director for Korea at the White House.

Let me just say a very quick word about the substance of the issues with North Korea and then I want to take your questions. We are obviously in a bit of an uncertain period with North Korea, after the very serious provocation of the launch on April 13 of the Taepyodong-2 missile. In reaction to that you saw that the world community acted very quickly, in a unanimous fashion, and in a very tough fashion, at the United Nations by issuing a unanimous Presidential statement that was followed up by additional sanction designations by the UN Security Council. And we are of course very interested in ensuring that at the level of the allies and at the level, importantly, of all five partners in the Six-Party process, that we have the same understanding, the same analysis of the situation; that we have talked about various contingencies; and we know how it is that we will react if there are future provocations.

It is very important that North Korea not miscalculate again and engage in any future provocations. And that is the main message that we are conveying to North Korea. We are united in our resolve to respond, not just the three allies, but Russia and China as well, if there are additional provocations. And we hope that North Korea does not miscalculate. We expect and hope that North Korea will make a different set of decisions; will cease devoting its resources to its nuclear missile program; will instead open up itself to the outside world; will make decisions that benefit the people of North Korea, rather than just the military, the nuclear, and the missile establishment, and will rejoin the world community. And that is the fundamental message that we are conveying.

So with that, let me stop, and I am very happy to try to answer any questions that you have. Thank you very much.

QUESTION: Do you see any imminent signs of North Korea’s nuclear test?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: I don’t have any particular word to convey to you about that. I mean, we all have followed the same information that you have seen, about what may or may not be going in North Korea to prepare for a nuclear test. I think it would be a serious miscalculation, a mistake, if North Korea were to engage in a nuclear test. This new regime in Pyongyang saw that the world community, the international community, was united in reacting to the missile launch on April 13. And so they know that if they engage in another provocation such as a nuclear test, they will once again be subject to a united action by the international community. And in fact part of what was said at the time of the Security Council deliberations about the missile launch, one of the conclusions that was reached was that we are unanimous, among all of us, that if there is a further provocation such as a nuclear test, that there will be a swift and sure reaction by the international community.

QUESTION: What kind of implied action do you have in mind if North Korea goes ahead with its provocation?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, I, you know, I am not going to sit here and play out what is going to happen. But I am certain that if there is a nuclear test, that you will find the Security Council once again coming together to debate and deliberate, and that there will be a swift and sure reaction from the Security Council should that occur. But beyond that, I don’t have anything specific for you other than the fact that by launching this missile, we have seen the reaction of the international community, and this should be a very strong signal to Pyongyang, that a further miscalculation will be met with similar united action by the world community.

QUESTION: Your two counterparts today said that they are ready for a different path with North Korea. What exactly would that mean? What are the details, and have you already communicated that to the North Koreans?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, this has been one of the main themes of our conversations with the North Koreans since we began our exploratory discussions with them last July in New York, followed on by Geneva and then of course by Beijing. We did a great deal of discussing of alternative futures for North Korea.

So we have explained to them -- and I think you know -- the United States has a dual track policy of engagement on the one hand but pressure on the other. That engagement aspect remains open. If they make the right choices, there can be a different future for North Korea and the people of North Korea. So they understand full well, and we discussed for many hours, in three different cities, on three different continents, over a period of seven or eight months, what those kinds of futures could be. So I think there should be no doubt in the minds of North Koreans that there is a different future that is available for them, if they make the right sorts of decisions; if they put their people first; if they stop spending their resources on developing missiles and nuclear weapons; if they open up to the rest of the world and engage in a positive fashion.
Instead, by miscalculating, by, you know, achieving a deal with the United States and then so soon after we announced it -- a mere two weeks later -- going back on their undertakings, they sent a signal that they cannot be trusted to follow through on their own undertakings and their own promises. So what we are saying to them is you should look at all the promises you have made over many, many years, and of course the centerpiece is the September 2005 Joint Statement, and you should begin to take action. Words are no longer, quite frankly, interesting to us. What we want to see is actions from North Korea. So they know what kinds of futures are available to them, if they step through that door to engagement and sincerely begin to take actions and fulfill the obligations that they themselves have made over many years.
Any other questions?

QUESTION: One question. Can you tell us about the details, the nature of the visit by the U.S. officials to Pyongyang? There have been some news reports that there was a visit by U.S. officials to Pyongyang, around the time that they launched, right before they launched the [unclear] . . .

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: I don’t have anything for you on that.

QUESTION: Well, was there a trip, or you just can’t talk about it?


AMBASSADOR DAVIES: I am just not -- I don’t have anything for you. I understand you need to ask this question, but I cannot help you with . . . Yes?

QUESTION: What kind of things do you plan to talk about tomorrow in Beijing?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, I think I will be talking about the same sorts of things that we spoke about here, in our trilateral consultations. I have had a very good, in depth dialogue with Wu Dawei, who is the senior Chinese official dealing day to day with North Korean issues. So I will come back to the conversations that I had with him in December, that I had with him in February on the margins of our negotiations with the North Koreans. And we will talk about how can continue to cooperate, collaborate, and send unified signals to North Korea about its choices, and about the need for North Korea to follow through in a positive fashion and take action based on the promises that it has made, the obligations that it has pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions. So I look forward to that.

And I should also say that after Beijing, I will go on to Tokyo, because I think it is very important that when we come to this part of the world, that we visit the key capitals. And so I want to stop through Tokyo as well and talk to officials there about these same issues. So, of course, participating in these very excellent discussions today, chaired by Ambassador Lim Sung-nam, was Shinsuke Sugiyama, Director General from the MFA. But I will see him in Tokyo as well as call on other officials in Tokyo.

That is about all I’ve got. It is a beautiful day out there. I would highly recommend, if your editors will let you do it, you take the rest of the day off. Go out and take your kids, go to the zoo, have a great time. Seoul is a beautiful city, and it is a beautiful day. And it is wonderful to be here. Thank you very, very much for meeting with me and I hope to see you again soon when I come back to South Korea. Thanks again. Thanks very much. Bye bye.

U.S. OFFICIAL MAKES REMARKS ON EAST ASIA BEFORE TRIP

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Remarks Before Departing for Japan, South Korea, India, and Singapore
Remarks Kurt M. Campbell
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Dulles Airport
Washington, DC
April 14, 2012
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: First of all, let me apologize for having you have to come out on a lovely Saturday like today. I’m leaving this morning for Japan, South Korea, India, and Singapore for regular consultations on a whole range of issues. In Japan, we will be talking about force posture issues. We will be discussing developments on Okinawa. We will be discussing regional dynamics and upcoming high-level diplomacy. In South Korea, we will review developments on the Peninsula and a variety of other efforts that the United States and South Korea are principally engaged in.

Part of the U.S. approach to the Asia-Pacific region is a deeper dialogue with India and encouraging India’s “Look East” strategy and so we will be talking about specific initiatives that we will be taking with Delhi to support that effort as part of our Asia-Pacific consultations with them. In Singapore, we will be talking about the upcoming ASEAN Regional Forum and various multilateral issues with respect to ASEAN and U.S.-Singapore bilateral relations.

Obviously a key issue of discussion during this trip will be recent developments with regard to North Korea. I think you will have seen through the President’s statement from the White House, the Susan Rice statement yesterday at the United Nations, the G8 statement and others a swift and sure response from the international community on the recent North Korea provocations. There is a very strong determination among international partners in the Asia-Pacific region to send a very clear message to discourage further provocations from North Korea. I’m very much looking forward to consulting closely with our partners and allies in the region about the way forward. I’m happy to take just a couple of questions before I go.

QUESTION: Is the Leap Day agreement completely annulled or is that something that you hope to work on?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: I think Ben Rhodes explained clearly yesterday that it’s impossible to imagine under the current circumstances that we would move forward on that.

QUESTION: Japan seeks a resolution at the UN. Do you think the U.S. can work on that with Japan?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: First of all, Susan Rice is in charge of our diplomacy at the United Nations. We are in very close consultations both bilaterally and up in the UN in a multilateral dialogue with Japan on the way forward. I think Ambassador Rice really was very clear yesterday about where we stand in the diplomacy. I think the partnership with Japan on this issue has been very close. Yes, one last question.

QUESTION: Will you discuss additional steps, such as tougher sanctions, with your counterpart?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: I think Ambassador Rice was clear at this juncture we’re not going to discuss specifics but we will be discussing with our partners in Asia on possible steps and areas of coordination that we will take going forward. Ok. Thank you all.