U.S. OFFICIAL'S REMARKS AT PUGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD SECURITY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Sixtieth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Security
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Istanbul, Turkey
November 1, 2013

Thank you for that kind introduction, Sergio. I am pleased to be here at 60th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs and I want to thank Pugwash for organizing this conference.

Today, I would like to provide an update on our work, which the President laid out nearly four years ago in Prague, when he committed the United States to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a goal that he reaffirmed in his speech in Berlin this past June.

As President Obama noted in Prague and repeated in Berlin, this will not be easy. It will require persistence and patience, and may not happen in his lifetime. Still, over the last four years we have succeeded in moving closer to this goal.

In 2010, the Administration concluded a Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, which outlines the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers, as well as advancing the broader security interests of the United States and its allies. As the NPR states, the international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War: the threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. The traditional concept of nuclear deterrence — the idea that a country would not initiate a nuclear war for fear of nuclear retaliation — does not apply to terrorists. While our nuclear arsenal has little relevance in deterring this threat, concerted action by all states to uphold their NPT obligations – including those related to disarmament – is important for building a sense of common purpose that helps maintain support from partners around the world to uphold and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Securing sensitive nuclear materials worldwide will also make it harder for terrorists to acquire those materials.

For instance, the downblending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) by Russia that was required by the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement has now been completed. The final delivery of the resultant LEU to the United States is scheduled for early December. Upon the successful completion of the Agreement, 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian weapons will have been converted into LEU and delivered to the United States to fuel U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The HEU that was converted by downblending was enough to produce approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads.

In the United States, 374 metric tons of U.S. HEU has been declared excess to nuclear weapons; most of which will be downblended or used as fuel in naval or research reactors. In 2011, the United States and Russia brought into force the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 2010 protocols, which require each side to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium – enough in total for about 17,000 nuclear weapons – and thus permanently remove this material from military programs. Russia has also been an essential partner in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts to convert research reactors worldwide from HEU to LEU and repatriate those reactors’ HEU to the country of origin. These efforts have now converted or verified the shutdown of over 88 research and test reactors and isotope production facilities, and removed over 5,017 kg of HEU for secure storage, downblending and disposition.

In addition to working on the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, we have taken steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. We are not developing new nuclear weapons or pursuing new nuclear missions; we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations; and we have clearly stated that it is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the 68-year record of nonuse of nuclear weapons be extended forever.

In June of 2013, in conjunction with his Berlin speech, President Obama issued new guidance that aligns U.S. nuclear policies to the 21st century security environment. This was the latest concrete step the President has taken to advance his Prague agenda and the long-term goal of achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. After a comprehensive review, the President determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty.

Let me now address what we believe our next steps should be.

The United States and Russia still possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world, and we have a shared responsibility to continue the process of reducing our nuclear arms. With that in mind, we have a great example in the New START Treaty. The implementation of New START, now in its third year, is going well. When New START is fully implemented, the United States and the Russian Federation will each have no more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads – the lowest levels since the 1950s. Our overall nuclear stockpile is 85% below Cold War levels.

Going forward, the United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to further reduce nuclear arsenals.

To this end, we are engaged in a bilateral dialogue with Russia to promote strategic stability and increase transparency on a reciprocal basis. We are hopeful our dialogue will lead to greater reciprocal transparency and negotiation of even further nuclear weapons reductions.

The President also said in Berlin, that we will work with our NATO Allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe. The NPR underscores the U.S. position that decision on NATO’s nuclear posture should be made by consensus among Allies. The role of nuclear weapons in NATO was examined as part of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. As you may know, NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of, and reliance on, nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. Allies made clear in the DDPR that NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area. Allies have also affirmed their desire to work with Russia on reciprocal transparency steps regarding NSNW. While seeking to create the conditions for further nuclear reductions, NATO will continue to ensure that the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective, as NATO is committed to remaining a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

There are still further initiatives that are part of this Administration’s nuclear agenda. In Berlin, President Obama called on all nations to begin negotiations on a treaty that ends the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or FMCT would codify an end to the production of weapons-grade fissile material needed to create nuclear weapons, cap stockpiles worldwide, and provide the basis for further, deeper, reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Beginning multilateral negotiations on the FMCT is a priority objective for the United States and for the vast majority of states, and we have been working to initiate such negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. An overwhelming majority of nations support the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations. The United States is consulting with China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, as well as others, including India and Pakistan, to find a way to commence negotiations of an FMCT.

In 2009, the five nuclear-weapon states, or “P5,” began to meet regularly for discussions on issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, these discussions have expanded to address P5 implementation of our commitments under the NPT and the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. Russia hosted the most recent P5 conference in Geneva, Switzerland in April 2013, where the P5 reviewed progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and continued discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. We are looking forward to continued discussions at a fifth P5 conference in 2014.

In addition to providing a senior level policy forum for discussion and coordination among the P5, this process has spawned a series of discussions among policymakers and government experts on a variety of issues. China is leading a P5 working group on nuclear definitions and terminology. The P5 are discussing approaches to a common format for NPT reporting, and we are also beginning to engage at expert levels on some important verification and transparency issues. As we proceed, we would like the P5 conferences and intersessional meetings to develop further practical transparency measures that build confidence and predictability.

I should add at this point that when discussing areas to broaden and deepen our cooperation and to advance our common interests, it’s necessary to address the question of missile defense. Over the past twenty years, both Democratic and Republicans have seen the benefits of missile defense cooperation with Russia.

While we have our differences on this issue, the United States remains convinced that missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, the United States remains open to missile defense cooperation with Russia. To be clear, U.S. missile defense efforts are focused on defending our homeland as well as our European, Middle Eastern, and Asian allies and partners against ballistic missile threats coming from regional actors. These are threats that are growing, and must be met.

In meeting those threats, it is important to note that U.S. missile defenses are not designed for, or capable of, undermining the Russian or Chinese strategic deterrents. For its part, Russia has been insistent on legally binding guarantees that our missile defenses will not threaten its strategic deterrent. Rather than legal guarantees, we believe that the best way for Russia to see that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not undermine its strategic deterrent would be for it to cooperate with us and to engage in mutual transparency measures. In addition to making all of us safer, cooperation would send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter proliferation. With regard to China, the United States welcomes the opportunity to engage in a more robust dialogue about strategic stability, including missile defense.

As our work together with Russia over the past four years has shown, we can produce significant results that benefit both countries. As mentioned earlier, the New START Treaty is a great example of this.

None of this will be easy, but the policies the Administration is pursuing are suited for our security needs and tailored for the global security threats of the 21st century. By maintaining and supporting a safe, secure and effective stockpile — sufficient to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies — at the same time that we pursue responsible verifiable reductions through arms control, we will make this world a safer place.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

REMARKS BY UNDER SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER TO PRAGUE AGENDA IN 2013

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
The Prague Agenda in 2013 - Challenges and Prospects
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Prague, Czech Republic
September 6, 2013
As Delivered

Thank you for the introduction, Veronika. It is lovely to be here in Prague. My thanks to the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, First Deputy Minister Jiri Schnider, the Institute of International Relations Prague, the Metropolitan University Prague and the Faculty of Social Sciences from Charles University Prague for their work in putting this conference together. My last visit to Prague was in April 2010, the day President Obama and then-President Medvedev signed the New START Treaty.

A lot of water has passed under the Charles Bridge since that time and Veronika has already mentioned that we are living in interesting times. That phrase, “May you live in interesting times,” is generally regarded as ominous – the implication being that a person in an interesting world is doomed to a tumultuous and possibly dangerous existence. There is no doubt that we live in interesting times, but I don’t accept the inevitability of uncertainty and danger. We have the power to control and shape our future. We are able to see the challenges facing us and to find ways to overcome those challenges. That is exactly what President Obama had in mind when he came to Prague four years ago to speak about America’s intent to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

His vision – which we call the Prague Agenda –was actually a continuation of the path set forth by previous Presidents. Every U.S. President in the nuclear age, beginning with President Harry Truman in 1945, has felt the weight of responsibility inherent in these weapons of near limitless destruction. I know, from our long experience working together, that that was the case for the leaders of the former Soviet Union and remains true for the leaders of the Russian Federation. These leaders and their advisors – as well as countless others inside and outside governments around the world, have all worked to stem the nuclear threat and to find ways to turn us away from catastrophic nuclear war.

The responsibility is ours to bear, but we are facing new and different threats. While the likelihood of a large-scale nuclear exchange has fortunately diminished through decades of cooperative, but also challenging disarmament work between Moscow and Washington, nuclear dangers have not disappeared. The threat posed by the spread of nuclear materials and technologies remains. The possibility that terrorists or other non-state actors could acquire a nuclear weapon ensures that the nuclear “Sword of Damocles” still hangs over us. While our nuclear arsenals have little direct relevance in deterring these threats, concerted action by the United States and Russia – and indeed, from all nuclear states – to reduce their weapon stockpiles and fissile material will strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. A strong nonproliferation regime makes nuclear theft, unauthorized use and proliferation harder. The ultimate solution is straightforward: take away the tools – fissile materials and nuclear weapons – and you mitigate ultimately the threat.

Of course, that is much easier said than done. President Obama made it clear in the Prague Speech that the road to a world without nuclear weapons would be long and the goal may not be reached in his lifetime. To achieve success, we will need to follow a step by step process in which we maintain nuclear stability at the same time that we pursue responsible reductions in our nuclear capabilities through a number of measures, some of them quiet, and some of them front and center on the world stage.

The New START Treaty, signed here in Prague in April of 2010, was one of those front and center accomplishments, both in its negotiation and its entry into force. Now I am happy to tell you that its quiet, deliberate implementation is going smoothly behind the scenes, providing for mutual predictability and stability on the nuclear front. This is important in any day and age, but especially important in these days when we and the Russians must ensure that we are wisely spending our scarce defense resources.

Another accomplishment on the quiet front is the work that Russia and the United States have done to eliminate fissile material from warheads. Over the past twenty years, we have together eliminated the highly enriched uranium from approximately 20,000 warheads. The HEU has been transformed into low-enriched fuel and sold to power plants in the United States. Did you know that today 10 percent of the electricity generated in the United States is from former Soviet nuclear weapons? That’s a lot of warheads turned to peaceful purposes.

But it is not enough: the United States and Russian Federation still possess over ninety percent of the nuclear weapons in the world. This past June, President Obama spoke in Berlin about the next steps in the Prague Agenda. I will focus today on what he said about nuclear reductions. The President announced in Berlin that “we can ensure the security of America and our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third.”

He also said that we would seek bold steps to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. How we go about these further reductions is not a matter only for Washington and Moscow, but also must involve close consultations with our allies. This work has already begun in Brussels at NATO and in other allied capitals in Europe and Asia.

Another essential element to the step-by-step process is reducing the role that nuclear weapons play in national security strategies. That is why the President’s new nuclear employment guidance directs the U.S. Department of Defense to align its planning with the U.S. policy that the use of nuclear weapons will be considered only in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States and its allies and partners. In addition, the new guidance directs strengthening non-nuclear capabilities and reducing the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks. All of this derives from the underlying principle articulated in our 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, that it is in the interest of the United States and all other countries that nuclear weapons never be used again.

No secret: our efforts to move forward on the next steps are proceeding slowly; many issues of strategic stability and beyond are taking up the metaphorical “dialogue space.” This does not mean we stop trying to move ahead. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War, the United States and Russia found it in our mutual interest to work together on reducing the nuclear threat. Through creativity, patience and persistence, we have had many successes and together have contributed to a safer world.

When New START is fully implemented in 2018, we will be at the lowest levels of deployed strategic nuclear warheads since the 1950s – pre-Cuban Missile Crisis. That is quite a feat, but we have more to do. There is one simple reason to move to the next step – it is in our mutual interest, in political, security and budgetary terms.

To end, I want to read you something by President Reagan’s Secretary of State George Shultz that I came across recently. Speaking to the UN early in his tenure – now about 30 years ago – he outlined principles for action in foreign policy. His comments focused on how and why the United States should conduct negotiations, but I think the ideas ring true for all nations.

We manage our problems more intelligently, and with greater mutual understanding, when we can bring ourselves to recognize them as expressions of mankind’s basic dilemma. We are seldom confronted with simple issues of right and wrong, between good and evil. Only those who do not bear the direct burden of responsibility for decision and action can indulge themselves in the denial of that reality. The task of statesmanship is to mediate between two—or several—causes, each of which often has a legitimate claim…It is on this foundation that the United States stands ready to try to solve the problems of our time—to overcome chaos, deprivation, and the heightened dangers of an era in which ideas and cultures too often tend to clash and technologies threaten to outpace our institutions of control.

Secretary Shultz was right and his words can guide us today. I will end there, but I look forward to hearing from the other panelists and am happy to answer your questions.

Thank you.

25TH ANIVERSARY OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

Photo:  Little Boy.  Credit:  Wikimedia

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
25 Years of Enhanced Strategic Security Through the Nuclear Risk Reduction CentersMedia Note

Office of the Spokesman

Washington, DC

September 15, 2012

Today, the U.S. Department of State commemorates the 25th Anniversary of the creation of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs). Established under President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev with the purpose of opening a communications channel to reduce the risk of conflict, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers at the Department of State in Washington, D.C. and the Russian Ministry of Defense in Moscow operate twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week and are equipped with secure and reliable lines of direct communication to perform the critical mission of sustaining strategic security.

Over the years, the U.S. NRRC has expanded its role in bilateral and multilateral security and confidence building arrangements, supporting conventional treaties and agreements with a wide variety of foreign partners and international institutions.

Today, the U.S. NRRC exchanges thousands of time-sensitive notifications a year under a multitude of arms control treaties and agreements such as the New START Treaty and is a key resource for the promotion of transparency and stability that enhances confidence and directly contributes to our national security interests.

As we meet the security challenges of the 21st century, we will continue to support future arms control measures and explore new ways at strengthening modern confidence building through technical and innovative means.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TESTIMONY REGARDING NEW START TREATY

Photo:  Earth Rise Seen From The Moon.  Credit:  NASA.
B-2 Flies To North Pole.  Credit:  U.S. Air Force.
FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
New START Implementation 
Testimony Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC,  June 21, 2012 
As prepared
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and members of the Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for this opportunity to provide an update on the implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START).

As you know, New START celebrated its first birthday this past February. Its ratification and entry into force would not have been possible without the strong bipartisan support of this body. We are grateful to senators on both sides of the aisle for supporting a treaty that has done so much to strengthen global and national security.

When the Treaty is fully implemented, it will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950s, the first full decade of the nuclear age: 1550 warheads deployed on 700 delivery vehicles, that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers.[1] To illustrate the great distance we have traveled in reducing our nuclear weapons, I would like to mention that when the START Treaty was signed in July 1991, the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) each deployed approximately 10,500 nuclear warheads.

Photo:  Launch of ICBM Minute Man III.  Credit:  U.S. Air Force.

The current implementation process is providing ongoing transparency and predictability regarding the world’s two largest deployed nuclear arsenals, while preserving our ability to maintain the strong nuclear deterrent that remains an essential element of U.S. national security and the security of our allies and friends.

The verification regime for New START is a detailed and extensive set of data exchanges and timely notifications covering all strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, as well as on-site inspections, exhibitions, restrictions on where specified items may be located, and additional transparency measures.

In negotiating the Treaty, both sides worked hard to find innovative new mechanisms to aid in the verification of the Treaty and the results of that work are already evident. The regime provides for effective verification and, at the same time, is simpler to implement and lessens disruptions to the day-to-day operations of both sides’ strategic forces.
These verification mechanisms are enabling us to monitor and inspect Russia’s strategic nuclear forces to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. For both the United States and Russia, accurate and timely knowledge of each other’s nuclear forces helps to prevent the risks of misunderstandings, mistrust, and worst-case analysis and policymaking.

To date, the implementation process has been positive and pragmatic. Under New START, we are continuing the professional working relationship that was established during the negotiation process in Geneva.

In the first Treaty year, the United States and the Russian Federation kept pace with each other on conducting inspections. Both Parties conducted the yearly maximum of 18 inspections. So far this Treaty year, the Russian Federation has conducted 8 inspections and the United States has conducted 7 inspections. These inspections have taken place at intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and heavy bomber bases; storage facilities; conversion or elimination facilities; and test ranges.

Through inspection activities, we have acquired new and valuable information. For example, New START includes intrusive reentry vehicle inspections that are designed to confirm the exact number of reentry vehicles (or warheads) on individual missiles selected for inspection. We are now able to confirm the actual number of warheads on any randomly selected Russian ICBM and SLBM – something we were not able to do under the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

Another new feature in the New START is that each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber has been assigned a unique identifier (UIDs) – a license plate, if you will. These UIDs are helping both sides with a “cradle to grave” tracking of the location and status of strategic offensive arms from arrival at an operating base, movement between facilities, changes in deployment status, maintenance or storage, to eventual conversion or elimination.

Another aspect of Treaty implementation is the exhibition process. The purpose of exhibitions is to demonstrate distinguishing features, to confirm technical characteristics of new types, and to demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of each type of strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty. These exhibitions provide both Parties with an opportunity to see new types of strategic offensive arms, view distinguishing features, and confirm declared data. These exhibitions assist in the conduct of on-site inspections. They also serve to enhance transparency and provide a better understanding of each other’s systems.

Photo:  B-2 Flies To North Pole.  Credit:  U.S. Air Force.

Both sides have conducted delivery vehicle exhibitions. In March 2011, the United States conducted exhibitions of its B-1B and B-2A heavy bombers. Following that, the Russian Federation conducted exhibitions of its RS-24 ICBM and associated mobile launcher. That was the first time we had a chance to see the RS-24, the new Russian mobile missile with multiple warheads. This exhibition provided us with a great amount of information we would have not otherwise had.

In March 2012, the United States conducted the first of four one-time cruise missile submarine (SSGN) exhibitions. The purpose of these exhibitions is to confirm that the launchers on these submarines are incapable of launching SLBMs.

The United States and the Russian Federation have also been sharing a veritable mountain of data with each other. Since entry into force, we have exchanged over 2,500 notifications through our Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC). These notifications help to track movement and changes in the status of systems. For example, a notification is sent every time a heavy bomber is moved out of its home base for more than 24 hours. Additionally, when the United States conducts a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the NRRC will notify the Russian National Center one day in advance of the flight test. The Russians provide the same information for their launches. Our center receives from the Russian NRRC the incoming notification via our secure government-to-government communications link. We translate it, make secure telephonic alerts, and issue a State Department cable to concerned U.S. agencies within one hour.

On top of the individual notifications, we exchange a comprehensive database of strategic forces covered by the Treaty every six months. This full account combines with the notifications to create a living, growing document that continuously tracks each side’s strategic nuclear forces.

These data exchanges are providing us with an even more detailed picture of Russian strategic forces than we were able to obtain from earlier exchanges and the inspections allow us to confirm the validity of that data. Of course, the verification regime is backed up by our own National Technical Means of verification, our satellites and other monitoring platforms.

Another feature of the New START Treaty implementation process is the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). This compliance and implementation body has met three times since entry into force. The BCC has produced Joint Statements and agreements, memorializing shared understandings of technical issues related to implementation activities. As in the implementation of the Treaty overall the environment in the BCC has been one of practical problem-solving on both sides of the table.

The latest session of the BCC was held in Geneva from January 24 to February 7, 2012. During the session, both sides continued their discussion on practical issues related to the implementation of the Treaty. The United States and the Russian Federation reached agreement there on an outstanding issue from the negotiations- the exchange of telemetric information on an agreed number of ICBM and SLBM launches and the procedures for conducting demonstrations of recording media and/or telemetric information playback equipment. Since this agreement, both the United States and the Russian Federation have conducted demonstrations of telemetric information playback equipment and recording media to be used during telemetry exchanges. Telemetric information was exchanged between the Parties on April 6, 2012.

Our experience so far is demonstrating that the New START’s verification regime works, and will help to push the door open to new, more complicated verification techniques for the future. Verification will be crucial to any future nuclear reduction plans and the United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons.

Further, the outstanding working relationship that developed during the negotiations has carried over into the implementation phase, creating an atmosphere of bilateral cooperation to resolve implementation questions as they have arisen. We look forward to reporting further success and additional updates as New START implementation progresses.

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak and I look forward to your questions.

[1] The Treaty’s central limits are as follows: 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers; 1,550 warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers.

THE ROAD TO MISSILE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

FROM:  U.S. DEPARMENT OF STATE
Missile Defense: Road to Cooperation
Remarks Ellen Tauscher
Special Envoy for Strategic Stability and Missile Defense Missile Defense Conference in Russia
Moscow, Russia
May 3, 2012
It is a pleasure to be here today at this important conference on Missile Defense and to present the views of the United States on how cooperation can help establish a new security environment in Europe.

Let me start by thanking Minister Serdyukov (Ser-dyoo-koff) for inviting me to participate today in this conference. I also want to acknowledge my colleagues, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov and Deputy Defense Minister Antonov, with whom I have had the privilege of working with over the last three years. Together we have worked cooperatively to improve the national security of both the United States and Russia.

That cooperation is the key point that I want to emphasize at the start of this speech. The United States and Russia are working closely together on a range of issues. We are working together to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and reduce global nuclear stockpiles—that includes implementing the New START Treaty, which has been in force for more than a year now. We are working together to move materials to and from Afghanistan. We are working together on counter-narcotic and counter-terrorism operations. And, the United States has worked hard to secure Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization.

The most recent report of the Bilateral Presidential Commission, established by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, highlights what our two governments are doing to broaden and deepen our cooperation and to advance our common interests. The photo on the report’s cover is actually a joint U.S.-Russian inspection mission under the Antarctic Treaty; the U.S. team is led by the Department of State. We’re not just working together in the capitals of the world, we’re actually working together at the ends of the world, too.
Cooperation on missile defense would also facilitate improved relations between the United States and Russia. In fact, it could be a game-changer for those relations. It has the potential to enhance the national security of both the United States and Russia, as well as build a genuine strategic partnership. It presents an opportunity to put aside the vestiges of Cold War thinking and move away from Mutually Assured Destruction toward Mutually Assured Stability.

As we think about the path forward, I want to reiterate a point that Madelyn Creedon just made and that Admiral Hendrickson will make later today. Phases 3 and 4 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (as well as Phases 1 and 2, for that matter) will not undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Nothing we do with respect to our missile defense plans will undercut Russia’s national security. It would not be in our interest to do so, would be expensive and technically extremely difficult.

I urge you to pay close attention to the detailed technical arguments that Madelyn and Randy make about why our system cannot do what the Russian Ministry of Defense says it can do. Russia’s analysis makes incorrect assumptions about the capabilities of our systems. It is these differences and misperceptions that are at the root of this issue. If we cannot agree on those perceptions and assumptions, then we need to figure out a path forward to bridge that gap between our two positions. And that is where cooperation comes into play.

Let’s set aside those misperceptions and look at areas in which we could cooperate, which would provide Russia insight into U.S. and NATO plans and programs that will refute the assumptions used in its models.

Sharing of sensor data, working on developing common pre-planned responses, conducting a joint analysis of missile defense systems, and working together on missile defense exercises will allow Russia to see how we do missile defense. Russia has observed our intercept tests in the past and the invitation to observe a future test still stands. By cooperating with us on missile defense, you will be able to see that the European Phased Adaptive Approach is directed against regional threats. Limited regional threats from outside of Europe… not Russia.

Right now, there are six years until Phase 3 of the EPAA becomes operational in 2018. During those six years, we will be testing an Aegis BMD site in Hawaii (that sounds to me like a nice place to visit). We will be developing and testing the SM-3 Block IIA and IIB interceptors. We will also be working with our NATO Allies to ensure how to best protect NATO European populations and territory. Beginning cooperation now will give Russia a chance to see… with their own eyes… what we are doing. And it will give us time to demonstrate how our missile defense systems operate.

I realize it takes time to build confidence. During that time, if you don’t like what you have learned from your experiences working side-by-side with us, then walk away. At least this way, you will be able to make decisions based on data you have collected and observed directly rather than on assumptions and perceptions developed from afar.

As it is, Russia today is in a position of strength that should allow you to explore cooperation. Our missile defense systems are not directed against Russia’s sophisticated nuclear deterrent force. We do not seek an arms race with Russia; we seek cooperation that can help convince you that your national security and strategic stability is not threatened. While Russia talks about countermeasures as a hedge against our defensive system, we hope that instead, through cooperation and transparency, Russia will conclude such development is unnecessary. So join us now, in the missile defense tent.
One of the best ways to build that confidence would be to work with us on NATO-Russia missile defense Centers where we can share sensor data and develop coordinated pre-planned responses and reach agreement on our collective approach to the projected threat. This will give us collectively a common understanding and foundation. Furthermore, we have seen the positive benefit this cooperation could have on missile defense effectiveness at the recent NATO-Russia Council Theater Missile Defense Computer Aided Exercise.

While we undertake this missile defense cooperation, our two governments could do even more to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. We already cooperate in the Missile Technology Control Regime and in the Proliferation Security Initiative. We are working together in the UN to counter Iran and North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Just last month, we worked together in the UN Security Council to strongly condemn the DPRK’s missile launch and placed additional sanctions on transfers of nuclear and ballistic missile technology to and from North Korea. Working together on missile defense would also send a strong message to proliferators that Russia, NATO and the United States are working to counter their efforts.

Should the regional ballistic missile threats be reduced, our missile defense system can adapt accordingly. That is why it is called the Phased Adaptive Approach. It can and will be adapted to changes in the threat.

But let me be clear. While we can work cooperatively together, we cannot agree to the pre-conditions outlined by the Russian Government. We are committed to deploying effective missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland and our Allies and partners around the world from the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

We will not agree to limitations on the capabilities and numbers of our missile defense systems. We cannot agree to a legally binding guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria,” which would, in effect, limit our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional threats such as Iran and North Korea.
We cannot accept limitations on where we deploy our Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of missions around the world, not just for missile defense.

The United States and NATO also cannot agree to Russia’s proposal for “sectoral” missile defense. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of its own territory, NATO must ensure the defense of its own territory.

We are able to agree to a political statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. I have been saying this for many, many months now. Such a political statement would publicly proclaim our intent to cooperate and chart the direction for cooperation.
The United States has also been transparent about our missile defense programs. We have provided Russia with a number of ideas and approaches for transparency. We are also committed to discussing other approaches to building confidence between our two countries. For example, we have also invited Russia to observe one of our Aegis SM-3 missile defense flight tests. Russia could operate in international waters and observe our missile defense test. This would provide Russia the opportunity to see for itself what we are saying about our system.

Russia is a major global power. European security is central to Russia’s security, as it is to the security of the United States and our European allies. Missile defense is the big new idea in European security. We don’t see any other comparable initiative with such potential to transform our relationship. If we can work together on European missile defense, and make this a subject for cooperation rather than competition, that would be a game-changer for our security relationship. We understand that there are risks involved, and it takes courage to move away from familiar ways. We believe those risks are manageable. We can begin now, and if the benefits we see are not realized, cooperation can be terminated at any time.

In a little over two weeks, President Putin and President Obama will meet in Washington. This is an important opportunity for the leaders of our two countries to chart the path forward on missile defense cooperation.

I continue to hope that my Russian colleagues see this as an opportunity that they should take sooner rather than later. I hope that they recognize we have no capability or intent to undermine strategic stability; that our objective is not about winning public relations points; and that cooperation is a much better approach than sticking to the previous patterns of competition.
The United States seeks genuine cooperation. Our objective is to create lasting cooperation and change outdated thinking. This is too important an opportunity to let it pass by.

So we will keep working to see if we can come up with a plan for cooperation. We will continue to press in the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Joint Staff channels, and we will keep moving forward in the run up to the May meeting of our two Presidents and we will keep going long after May.

And I hope, that someday soon, we can begin this important, gamechanging cooperation.
Thank you again for the opportunity to present the United States’ position on cooperation at this conference today. I look forward to continuing the discussion.

RESET OF U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS BRINGS RESULTS

FROM AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE

Official Says U.S.-Russia 'Reset' Holds Challenge, Opportunity

By Karen Parrish

WASHINGTON, April 4, 2012 - The strategic "reset" of relations between the United States and Russia is gradually bringing results, a senior defense policy expert said today.

Celeste A. Wallander, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia policy, discussed challenges and opportunities in U.S.-Russia relations with members of the Women's Foreign Policy Group here today.

The reset strategy is "to cooperate in areas where we can cooperate with Russia, in areas that serve American national interest ... and communicate clearly and honestly" on topics where the two governments don't agree, she said.

The United States and Russia have made some important progress, Wallander noted, including:

-- Implementing the "New START" nuclear arms reduction treaty;

-- Making progress toward agreement on Iran;

-- Achieving some cooperation in the NATO-led Afghanistan mission; and

-- Strengthening defense and security communication both between the two nations and between Russia and NATO.

"The New START treaty was an important achievement. ... It is another step in reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles," she said. The treaty also re-established regular mutual nuclear weapons inspections and meetings involving American and Russian military leaders and nuclear experts, she added.

On Iran, Russia has ended a contract that would have provided that country with Russian-made "very dangerous air defense systems," Wallander said, and Russia supports the Afghanistan effort by allowing U.S. and NATO troops and cargo to travel through its territory.

The U.S.-Russian defense relations working group and the NATO-Russian council allow both regular high-level meetings and daily working-level discussions among U.S., NATO and Russian defense and strategy experts on security issues including countering piracy, narcotics trafficking and terrorism, she added.

Wallander also listed areas where the United States and Russia "don't see eye to eye," including Syria and the U.S. four-phase approach to European missile defense.

Both nations agree the violence in Syria must end, she said, and President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed during their March meeting in Seoul, South Korea, to support the mission to Syria that Kofi Annan has undertaken as a United Nations and Arab League representative.

The two countries have not agreed on whether or when other nations should take action against Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime, she noted, but even in disagreement the U.S.-Russian relationship is "certainly in a better place" than in past years, when representatives and leaders "would have been talking at one another, not with one another."

The United States views Russia as occupying Georgian territory in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Wallander said. While U.S. leaders know Russia's policies about the disputed areas, she added, they "don't accept them."

Georgia and Russia have held regular bilateral talks in Geneva since they first clashed over the two republics in 2008, she noted. She added U.S. support to these talks demonstrates the "reset" strategy, emphasizing that even small steps build transparency and understanding, if not agreement, between Russia and the United States.

The United States takes a similar approach to Russia's objections to the U.S. European missile defense plan, she added. That plan calls for a steady buildup of sea- and land-based systems designed to protect European nations and U.S. troops in Europe from a growing threat of missile attack from the Middle East, particularly Iran, she explained.

Wallander said the plan is based on an assessment that over the next 10 years Iran poses a "small, relatively straightforward nuclear missile threat" to nations in Europe, and the defense systems called for in the phased approach will not have the capability to threaten Russia.

The United States has invited Russia to participate in planning and implementing the missile defense systems, but with little success, she noted. Still, the United States remains "committed to seeking cooperation" on this and other issues, she added.

Civil demonstrations around the recent Russian presidential election demonstrate the long-term potential of the "reset" approach, she noted. The U.S. strategy, she said, aims at a prosperous, secure, militarily modern Russia that has transitioned to fully democratic government and is committed to building regional stability.

"We've seen a Russian ... middle class that wants that, too," Wallander said. "The next couple of years will be really interesting and really important for Russia's future," she said.