FRANK ROSE MAKES REMARKS ON MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Enhancing Regional Missile Defense Cooperation
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington, DC
April 7, 2015

Introduction

Thank you for that kind introduction, and thanks for having me here today.

By way of introduction, while I am the Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, my work at the State Department is focused on enhancing strategic stability around the world. Arms control, verification and compliance are some of the tools we use to enhance strategic stability and reassure our allies and partners that we will meet our security commitments.

Missile defense is another tool to do just that. At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense issues, including missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners around the world. In this capacity, I served as the lead U.S. negotiator for the missile defense bases in Romania, Turkey, and Poland.

So I’m pleased to be here today to discuss our efforts at enhancing missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners, one of the key goals outlined in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Now you have already heard from Elaine Bunn and General Todorov about our missile defense policy and operations. So instead, let me focus my remarks on three areas: 1) significant progress we have been made implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA) and NATO missile defense; 2) cooperation on missile defense with allies and partners outside of Europe, and 3) I’ll conclude with a few points on Russia and missile defense.

Before I do that, I do want to reiterate one point that you undoubtedly heard from Elaine and Ken: the President’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget protects and enhances our important missile defense priorities such as the European Phased Adaptive Approach and reflects the high priority we place on these efforts. As such, the U.S. commitment to NATO missile defense and the sites in Romania and Poland remains “ironclad.”


European Phased Adaptive Approach

With that, let me now take a few moments to discuss where we are with regard to overall implementation of the EPAA, the United States’ national contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (or NATO) missile defense system. In 2009, the President announced that the EPAA would “provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies,” while relying on “capabilities that are proven and cost-effective.” Since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision and have made great strides in recent years.

I just returned from Turkey and Romania last week and had the opportunity to discuss our progress with these two key partners.

Turkey was the first country to receive EPPA elements in Phase 1 with the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar to that country in 2011. At the same time, we began the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) -capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean. With the declaration of Interim BMD Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, the radar in Turkey transitioned to NATO operational control.

Additionally, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota as a Spanish contribution to NATO missile defense.

In February 2014, the first of four missile defense-capable Aegis ships, USS DONALD COOK, arrived in Rota, Spain. A second ship, USS ROSS joined her in June. During 2015, two more of these multi-mission ships, USS PORTER and USS CARNEY will forward deploy in Rota.

These multi-mission ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, training exercises, and support U.S. and NATO operations, including NATO missile defense.

Currently, we are focused on completing the deployment of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania as part of Phase 2 of the EPAA. Romania’s strong support for the timely completion of the arrangements needed to implement this deployment and Romania’s provision of security and its infrastructure efforts have been superb.

In October 2014, the U.S. Navy held a historic naval support facility establishment ceremony at the missile defense facility on Deveselu Airbase Base in Romania. This ceremony established the naval facility and installed its first U.S. commander. Currently, this site is on schedule to be completed by the end of this year and when operational, this site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.

And finally there is Phase 3. This phase includes an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. This site is on schedule for deployment in the 2018 time frame. For example, the President’s FY16 budget request includes approximately $200 million for the establishment of the site. The interceptor site in Poland is key to the EPAA: when combined with other EPAA assets, Phase 3 will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory in the 2018 time frame.

So, as you can see, we are continuing to implement the President’s vision for stronger, smarter, and swifter missile defenses in Europe.


National Contributions to NATO Missile Defense

I would also like to highlight the efforts of our NATO Allies to develop and deploy their own national contributions for missile defense. A great example is that today, Patriot batteries from three NATO countries are deployed in Turkey under NATO command and control to augment Turkey’s air defense capabilities in response to the crisis on Turkey’s south-eastern border.

Voluntary national contributions are foundation of the NATO missile defense system, and there are several approaches Allies can take to make important and valuable contributions in this area.

First, Allies can acquire fully capable BMD systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control capabilities.

Second, Allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key ballistic missile defense capability.

Finally, Allies can contribute to NATO’s ballistic missile defense capability by providing essential basing support, such as Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have agreed to do.

In all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is NATO interoperability.

Yes, acquiring a ballistic missile defense capability is, of course, good in and of itself.

But if the capability is not interoperable with the Alliance then its value as a contribution to Alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished.

It is only through interoperability that the Alliance can gain the optimum effects from BMD cooperation that enhance NATO BMD through shared battle-space awareness and reduced interceptor wastage.


Missile Defense Developments in Other Regions

Let me turn now to some of the other regions of the world. The United States, in cooperation with our allies and partners, is continuing to bolster missile defenses in other key regions, such as the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, in order to strengthen regional deterrence architectures.

In the Middle East, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through fora such as the recently established U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (or GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum (or SCF).

At the September 26, 2013, SCF, Secretary Kerry and his Foreign Ministry counterparts reaffirmed their intent, first stated at the September 28, 2012, SCF, to “work toward enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense.”

Several of our partners in the region have expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has contracted to buy two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (or THAAD) batteries that, when operational, will enhance the UAE’s national security as well as regional stability.

The UAE also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets. We look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperability with our GCC partners in the months and years ahead.

Additionally and separately, the United States maintains a strong defense relationship with Israel, and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in comprehensive missile defense architecture for Israel. Israeli programs such as Iron Dome, the David’s Sling Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon System, in conjunction with operational cooperation with the United States, create a multilayered architecture designed to protect the Israeli people from varying types of missile threats.

In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing to cooperate through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships.

For example, the United States and Japan already are working closely together to develop the SM-3 Block IIA, which will make a key contribution to the EPAA as well as being deployed elsewhere in the world. We also recently completed the deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the U.S. and Japan. And finally, we are continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces, which will be aided by recent changes to the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, which we expect to complete soon.

We also continue to consult closely with Australia. For example, as a result of U.S.-Australia Foreign and Defense ministerial-level consultations over the past year, the United States and Australia have established a bilateral BMD Working Group to examine options for potential Australian contributions to the BMD architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.

Additionally, we are also consulting closely with the Republic of Korea as it develops the Korean Air and Missile Defense system, which is designed to defend the Republic of Korea against air and missile threats from North Korea. The Republic of Korea recently announced its plans to purchase Patriot PAC-3 missiles, which will enhance its capability to defend against the North Korean ballistic missile threat.


A Constraint Free Missile Defense

Finally, let me say a few things about missile defense and Russia.

Prior to the suspension of our dialogue as a result of Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine, Russia continued to demand that the United States provide it “legally binding” guarantees that our missile defense will not harm or diminish its strategic nuclear deterrent. These guarantees would have been based on criteria that would have limited our missile defenses and undermined our ability to stay ahead of the ballistic missile threat.

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review is quite clear on our policy: U.S. missile defense is not designed nor directed against Russia and China’s strategic nuclear forces.

However, at the same time, we have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally-binding or other constraints that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.

The security of the United States, its allies and partners is our foremost and solemn responsibility. As such, the United States will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats, free from obligations or other constraints that limit our BMD capabilities.


Conclusion

Let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense cooperation with allies and partners around the world over the past several years. This was a key goal of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review.

In Europe, implementation of the EPAA and NATO missile defense is going well. For example, the missile defense radar in Turkey has been operating since 2011, and the Aegis Ashore site in Romania is scheduled to become operational later this year.

In the Middle East, we are continuing to work bilaterally and multilaterally with our partners in the GCC to deploy effective missile defense. For example, later this year the United Arab Emirates will take delivery of its first THAAD battery.

Furthermore, we continue to work with Israel to expand its multilayered architecture to protect it from missile threats.

In the Asia-Pacific, we are working actively with our allies to enhance our missile defense capabilities in the region. On that note, we recently completed deployment of second missile defense radar in Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the U.S. and Japan.

Finally, we continue to oppose Russia’s attempts to impose limitations on our missile defenses that would limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.

Suffice to say, defense of our allies and partners through assistance on missile defense cooperation is and will remain a key priority of the U.S. Government.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

SEC ISSUES ANNUAL STAFF REPORT REGARDING NRSROs

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
12/23/2014 05:15 PM EST

The Securities and Exchange Commission issued its annual staff report on the findings of examinations of credit rating agencies registered as nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) and submitted a separate report on NRSROs to Congress.

“These reports provide the most current and comprehensive picture of the credit rating industry,” said SEC Chair Mary Jo White.  “The SEC’s enhanced oversight of NRSROs, informed by risk assessment, regular examinations and policy considerations, provides increasingly robust and effective oversight of the industry, as reflected by overall improvements in compliance, documentation, and board oversight.”

The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to examine each NRSRO once a year and issue an annual report summarizing the examination findings.  In addition to covering eight areas required by the Dodd-Frank Act, SEC examiners used risk assessment tools to identify specific areas of focus such as information technology, cybersecurity, or certain ratings activities.  During the 2014 examinations, the staff observed improvements concerning:

Compliance resources, monitoring, and culture
Documentation and resources for criteria and model validation
Document retention
Board of directors or governing committee oversight
The staff made recommendations for improvement in certain areas, including:

Use of affiliates or third-party contractors in the credit rating process
Management of conflicts of interest related to the rating business operations
Adherence to policies and procedures for determining or reviewing credit ratings
“The findings and recommendations in the 2014 examination report demonstrate the impact of rigorous oversight by the SEC and regular examinations by the Office of Credit Ratings,” said Thomas J. Butler, Director of the SEC’s Office of Credit Ratings.

The annual report to Congress, which is required by the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, details the state of competition, transparency, and conflicts of interest at NRSROs.  The staff report includes a discussion of the new requirements for NRSROs adopted by the Commission in August 2014 to improve the quality of credit ratings and increase credit rating agency accountability through enhanced transparency, governance, and protections against conflicts of interest.

The following SEC staff made significant contributions to the examinations and reports:  Diane Audino, Rita Bolger, Patrick Boyle, Matthew Chan, Kristin Costello, Scott Davey, Shawn Davis, Franco Destro, Michael Gerity, Kenneth Godwin, Natalia Kaden, Julia Kiel, Russell Long, Abe Losice, Carlos Maymi, Matt Middleton, David Nicolardi, Sam Nikoomanesh, Harriet Orol, Abraham Putney, Jeremiah Roberts, Mary Ryan, Warren Tong, Evelyn Tuntono, Chris Valtin, Kevin Vasel, and Michele Wilham.  The Office of Credit Ratings appreciates the assistance provided during the examinations by Todd Scharf and Ted Shelkey of the SEC’s Office of Information Technology.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON U.S.-RUSSIA NUCLEAR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Negotiations: Ukraine and Beyond

Remarks

Anita E. Friedt

Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

Testimony Before House Foreign Affairs Committee Joint Subcommittee

Washington, DC

April 29, 2014

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Chairmen Poe and Rohrabacher, Ranking Members Sherman and Keating, and members of this Committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to you about the Administration’s arms control policy toward Russia.

Today, I want to speak to you about: 1) why arms control agreements with Russia continue to be an important tool to enhance the security of the United States, our allies and partners; 2) how we have used numerous arms control tools since the crisis in Ukraine began to increase transparency and stability in support of our broader regional efforts; and 3) the seriousness with which the Administration takes compliance with arms control treaties.

First, as has been recognized for over four decades, arms control is a tool that can be used to enhance the security of the United States, our Allies and our partners. It is one of the many diplomatic, military, and economic tools that the United States uses to address 21^st century challenges. Many of our allies and partners are signatories and States-Parties to these same arms control agreements and we have worked closely with them to negotiate and implement these agreements. The Obama Administration has continued the longstanding bipartisan approach to arms control with Russia that had its origins in the days of the Cold War. The administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush were the architects of many of our most successful and enduring arms control efforts. Let me affirm that the United States is committed to maintaining strategic stability between the United States and Russia and to encouraging mutual steps to foster a more stable, resilient, predictable, and transparent security relationship.

That said, Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine have undermined trust. While diplomacy between the United States and Russia continues, no one can ignore that Russia’s actions in Ukraine have violated the very principles upon which cooperation is built. Further, as we consider arms control priorities this year or in any year, we will continue to consult closely with our allies and partners every step of the way. Our security and defense, as well as that of our allies and partners, is non-negotiable. We will only pursue arms control agreements that advance our national interest.

The New START Treaty and Next Steps

During the Cold War, Washington and Moscow found it in our mutual interest to work together to cap and then to begin reducing the number of nuclear weapons to reverse the nuclear arms race and improve mutual security and stability. For the same reasons, we judged that the New START was in the U.S. national security interest, and that is why we continue to implement the New START Treaty with Russia even today. We are now in the fourth year of implementation and, despite the crisis in Ukraine, we and Russia continue to implement the Treaty in a business-like manner.

Since entry into force in 2011, the United States has inspected—with boots on the ground—Russian nuclear weapons facilities 58 times. Moreover, the United States and the Russian Federation have exchanged more than six thousand notifications on one another’s nuclear forces since entry into force. These notifications provide predictability by enabling the tracking of strategic offensive arms from location to location, giving advance notice of upcoming ballistic missile test launches, and providing updates of changes in the status of systems covered by the Treaty. For example, a notification is sent every time a heavy bomber is moved out of its home base for more than 24 hours. Additionally, when either party conducts a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, they are required to notify the other party one day in advance.

The Treaty’s verification mechanisms allow us to monitor and inspect Russia’s strategic nuclear forces to ensure compliance with the Treaty. For both the United States and Russia, accurate and timely knowledge of each other’s nuclear forces helps to prevent the risks of misunderstandings, mistrust, and worst-case analysis and worst-case policymaking. Put another way, the New START Treaty’s verification regime is a vital tool in ensuring transparency and predictability between the world’s largest nuclear powers.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) highlighted the importance of aligning U.S. forces to address the 21^st century security threats. As a result of further analysis called for by the NPR, the President announced in Berlin last June that, after a comprehensive review of our nuclear forces, we have determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic warheads from the level established in the New START Treaty. We have sought to negotiate reductions with Russia, but to date Russia has not expressed interest in nuclear reductions below the New START levels. We will also continue to work within NATO to develop ideas for reciprocal measures that we could in the future propose to Russia to build confidence and increase transparency with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. This will lay important groundwork for the future when conditions may be more conducive to progress in this area. Any changes to NATO’s nuclear posture must be taken by consensus within the Alliance.

Conventional Arms Control

In the realm of conventional arms control, the United States and our allies have been using arms control mechanisms in an effort to promote stability in Europe, provide transparency on Russia’s provocative actions in and around Ukraine, and assure our allies and partners in the face of Russian aggression.

The Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures is a series of politically binding confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) designed to increase openness and transparency concerning military activities conducted inside the OSCE's zone of application (ZOA), which includes the territory, surrounding sea areas, and air space of all European (Russia from the western border to the Ural Mountains) and Central Asian participating States. The Vienna Document allows for a variety of information exchanges, on-site inspections, evaluation visits, observation visits, and other military-to-military contacts to take place according to Vienna Document provisions. In the case of the United States, only military forces and activities inside the ZOA are impacted.

It was designed to increase openness and transparency on military activities across Europe and Russia. Since the crisis in Ukraine began, allies and partners from six countries have participated in four Vienna Document inspections in Russia and Ukraine. Using additional Vienna Document provisions, inspectors continue a near-continuous presence in Ukraine, providing insight into events there. So far, inspectors from 16 countries have participated in five such missions since March 20.

Ukraine has also implemented provisions of the Vienna Document in order to host observers to dispel any concerns about its own military activities by inviting all OSCE participating States to Ukraine from March 5-20. A total of 77 people from 32 OSCE states and the OSCE Secretariat participated in this visit. Ukraine called on Russia to host a similar visit in western Russia near the border with Ukraine, but Russia has not offered to do so.

The use of these tools in Ukraine demonstrates that the Vienna Document can help provide insight and transparency into military activities during a crisis. However, it is not designed to address a crisis when one OSCE participating State ignores the OSCE principles and commitments it has undertaken. Moving forward, the United States will work with our allies and partners to develop ideas to update the Vienna Document to reflect lessons learned.
The United States and its Treaty partners have also made active use of the Open Skies Treaty to monitor events in Ukraine and Russia. The Open Skies treaty establishes a regime of aerial observation flights over the territories of its signatories. The Treaty is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving Treaty partners the ability to gather information through aerial imaging on military forces and activities of concern to them. During special OSCE meetings on April 7 and 17 that were convened under Vienna Document provisions to address unusual military activities, the U.S. delegation was able to display Open Skies Treaty imagery of the Russian forces, in order to show that concerns about Russia’s actions and military movements are valid and disturbing. Unfortunately, the Russian Federation has refused to provide information that could dispel the concerns of other states.

Since the Ukraine crisis began, the United States and 15 Treaty partners have flown 11 missions over Ukraine and Western Russia yielding imagery of thousands of square miles of territory. These flights have resulted in valuable data and insights for not only the United States but our partners and allies who are also States Parties.

One particularly notable event which has occurred in light of the crisis: the Treaty’s provision for “Extraordinary Observation Flights” was invoked for the first time. Per Ukraine’s request, two extraordinary flights were conducted over Ukrainian territory to observe whether Russia forces had moved beyond Crimea. In response to this request, Sweden flew from Kiev south to Odessa, with observers from Norway, Belgium, and the U.K. on March 13. On March 14, the U.S. flew along Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia, with observers from Canada and Estonia. These flights provided reassurance to Ukraine and demonstrated our commitment to work with allies to uphold key elements of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The following week, Russia accepted an extraordinary flight by Ukraine over its territory near the border. The U.S. is in Kyiv this week flying another extraordinary flight over eastern Ukraine in response to the latest Russian activities.

Since then, a number of allies have conducted observation flights in Russia. We are working closely with allies to maximize the benefit of these missions, coordinating on mission planning as well as sharing imagery and analysis. As an example of the utility of these flights, the German/U.S. mission on March 24 over Russia near the border with Ukraine provided unclassified imagery helping substantiate Russian military activity in Belgorod, Boguchar, and Rostov despite Russia’s denials.

We believe these arms control mechanisms have great importance not only in providing insight and transparency into Russian actions in and around Ukraine, but demonstrating support for our allies and partners in ensuring their sovereignty and territorial integrity. More broadly, such mechanisms contribute to greater transparency and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.
I want to underscore that our NATO allies and other partners in Europe are strong supporters of arms control in Europe and our active participation and leadership in those efforts.

Compliance Report

Let me turn now to the issue of compliance. First and foremost, the Administration takes compliance with all arms control agreements extremely seriously. For this reason, this Administration worked hard to produce a compliance report in July of 2010 – the first delivered to Congress after a five year lapse – and has produced one every year since. Prior to this Administration, 2005 was the last year that a report had been delivered to Congress.
We endeavor every year to produce a compliance report by April 15. This is challenging, as the reporting period ends at the end of each calendar year, leaving us just three and one half months to gather the necessary input from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, as well as the Intelligence Community. Given the volume of information and seriousness with which the Administration conducts its annual compliance review, a thorough collecting, weighing, and reviewing of all available information throughout the reporting period is required and takes time. As such, despite our best efforts we have not always been able to complete the coordination process in time to provide the report by April 15. This will be true again this year, however, the report will be fully coordinated and available later in the spring. The report is currently in final interagency review.

Let me add that when countries do not uphold their arms control obligations, we hold them accountable. Russia ceased implementation of its Conventional-Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) obligations in December 2007. After two intense diplomatic efforts to break the impasse and encourage Russia to resume implementation, in November 2011, the United States ceased carrying out certain obligations under the CFE Treaty with regard to Russia. We were joined by our NATO Allies that are party to the Treaty, as well as Georgia and Moldova, in taking this step – in all, 24 of the 30 countries that are party to the Treaty.

As we have previously stated, we have concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty. We have raised them with Russia and are pressing for clear answers in an effort to resolve our concerns because of the importance of the INF Treaty to Euro-Atlantic security. We’ve briefed our NATO allies on our concerns and will continue to coordinate with them on this and other matters that affect our common security. We have been keeping Congress informed on this matter through briefings with relevant congressional committees and will continue to do so. We will continue to work with Russia to resolve our concerns, and to encourage mutual steps to help foster a more stable, resilient, transparent security relationship. We’re not going to drop the issue until our concerns have been addressed. As I hope you understand, I am not able to go more deeply into this subject in an open hearing, and would ask that you not press me to do so in open session.

As another example of how we seek to address compliance concerns, several years ago we had questions with regard to China’s implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Through active engagement with Chinese officials about whether China should have declared production and subsequent consumption of a particular chemical, our technical experts outlined U.S. concerns and China addressed each of our questions in a collegial and productive manner to close out this issue.

Conclusion

Arms control treaties and agreements continue to be an important tool that can enhance the security of the United States and our friends and allies. The successful implementation of the New START Treaty, and the important contributions that the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Document have played recently in Ukraine, demonstrate the continued relevance of arms control for our national security. Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
As Prepared
The Pryzbyla Center, Catholic University of America
Washington, DC
April 9, 2013

Thank you for that kind introduction, Stephen. I am glad to be here at Catholic University today to talk about U.S. nuclear policy. I want to thank the Catholic Peacebuilding Network for sponsoring this program. It is my pleasure to represent the State Department this afternoon.

Today, I would like to provide an update on our work, which the President laid out four years ago in Prague, when he committed the United States to seeking the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

As President Obama noted in his famous speech, this will not be easy. Nor is it likely to happen in his lifetime. Still, over the last four years we have succeeded in moving closer to this goal.

In 2010, the Administration concluded a Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, which outlines the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers, as well as advancing the broader security interests of the United States and its allies. As the NPR states nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats facing the United States. The traditional concept of nuclear deterrence — the idea that a country would not initiate a nuclear war for fear of nuclear retaliation — does not apply to terrorists. While our nuclear arsenal has little relevance in deterring this threat, concerted action by the United States and Russia – and indeed, by all nuclear weapon states – to reduce their arsenals is key to garnering support from partners around the world for strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, while also securing nuclear materials worldwide to make it harder for terrorists to acquire nuclear materials.

For instance, by the end of this year, we expect the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement to be completed, under which 500 MT of highly enriched uranium or HEU from dismantled Russian weapons will have been converted into low-enriched uranium or LEU to fuel U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. Over 472 MT (equivalent to approximately 18,900 nuclear warheads) has been downblended and sent to the United States so far. In the United States, 374 MT of U.S. HEU has been declared excess to nuclear weapons; most of the remainder will be downblended or used as fuel in naval or research reactors. In 2011, the United States and Russia brought into force the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 2010 protocols, which requires each side to dispose of 34 MT of weapon-grade plutonium – enough in total for about 17,000 nuclear weapons – and thus permanently remove this material from military programs. Russia has also been an essential partner in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts to convert research reactors from HEU to LEU and repatriate those reactors’ HEU to the country of origin. These efforts have now converted or verified the shutdown of over 75 research and test reactors, and repatriated to the United States or to Russia over 3,000 kg of HEU for secure storage, downblending and disposition.

In addition to working on the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, we have taken steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. We are not developing new nuclear weapons or pursuing new nuclear missions; we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations; and we have clearly stated that it is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 68-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.

As President Obama said in Seoul in March of last year:

"[W]e can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need. I firmly believe that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies, maintain a strong deterrent against any threat, and still pursue further reductions in our nuclear arsenal."

Let me now address what we believe our next steps should be.

The Administration continues to believe that the next step in nuclear arms reductions should be pursued on a bilateral basis. The United States and Russia still possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world. With that in mind, we have a great example in the New START Treaty. The implementation of New START, now in its third year, is going well. When New START is fully implemented, the United States and the Russian Federation will each have no more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads – the lowest levels since the 1950s.

Going forward, the United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons, including the pursuit of a future agreement with Russia to address all categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed.

To this end, we are engaged in a bilateral dialogue to promote strategic stability and increase transparency on a reciprocal basis with the Russian Federation. We are hopeful our dialogue will lead to greater reciprocal transparency and negotiation of even further nuclear weapons reductions.

As part of this process, the Administration is consulting with Allies to lay the groundwork for future negotiations. As you may know, NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of, and reliance on, nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. That said, NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area. While seeking to create the conditions for further nuclear reductions, NATO will continue to ensure that the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective as NATO is committed to remaining a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

There are still further initiatives that are part of this Administration’s nuclear agenda. The United States is revitalizing an international effort to advance a new multilateral treaty to verifiably ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or FMCT– would for the first time put an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade fissile material needed to create nuclear weapons and provide the basis for further, deeper, reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Beginning multilateral negotiations on the FMCT is a priority objective for the United States and for the vast majority of states, and we have been working to initiate such negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. An overwhelming majority of nations support the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations. The United States is consulting with China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, as well as others, to find a way to commencing negotiation of an FMCT.

In 2009, the five nuclear-weapon states, or "P5," began to meet regularly to have discussions on issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, these discussions have expanded to address P5 implementation of our commitments under the NPT and the 2010 Review Conference’s Action Plan. The U.S. hosted the most recent P5 conference in Washington in June 2012, where the P5 tackled issues related to all three pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. We are looking forward to a fourth conference on April 18-19, which Russia will host in Geneva prior to the next NPT Preparatory Committee meeting.

In addition to providing a senior level policy forum for discussion and coordination among the P5, this process has spawned a series of discussions among policymakers and government experts on a variety of issues. China is leading a P5 working group on nuclear definitions and terminology. The P5 are discussing approaches to a common format for NPT reporting, and we are also beginning to engage at expert levels on some important verification and transparency issues. In the future, we would like the P5 conferences and intersessional meetings to expand and to develop practical transparency measures that build confidence and predictability.

I should add at this point that when discussing areas to broaden and deepen our cooperation and to advance our common interests, it’s necessary to address the question of Missile Defense. Thirty years ago at the height of the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan saw virtue in cooperating with Moscow on Missile Defense.

While we have our differences on this issue, we remain convinced that missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, missile defense cooperation with Russia remains a priority for the President. To be clear, U.S. missile defense efforts are focused on defending our homeland as well as our European, Middle Eastern, and Asian allies and partners against ballistic missile threats coming from Iran and North Korea. These are threats that are growing, and must be met.

In meeting those threats, it is important to note that U.S. missile defenses are not designed for, or capable of, undermining the Russian or Chinese strategic deterrents. For its part, Russia has been insistent on legally binding guarantees that our missile defenses will not threaten its strategic deterrent. Rather than legal guarantees, we believe that the best way for Russia to see that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not undermine its strategic deterrent would be for it to cooperate with us. In addition to making all of us safer, cooperation would send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter proliferation. With regard to China, the United States welcomes the opportunity to engage in a dialogue about missile defense and other security issues of strategic importance.

As our work together over the past four years has shown, we can produce significant results that benefit both countries. As mentioned earlier, the New START Treaty is a great example of this. Cooperation on missile defense would also facilitate improved relations between the United States and Russia. In fact, it would be a game-changer for those relations. It has the potential to enhance the national security of both the United States and Russia, as well as build a genuine strategic partnership.

None of this will be easy, but the policies the Administration is pursuing are suited for our security needs and tailored for the global security threats of the 21st century. By maintaining and supporting a safe, secure and effective stockpile — sufficient to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies — at the same time that we pursue responsible verifiable reductions through arms control, we will make this world a safer place.

To paraphrase President Kennedy, whose speech 50 years ago at American University launched the NPT process, we will succeed by moving forward step by step, confident and unafraid. There is something very appropriate in mentioning President Kennedy and his era because your generation has a unique advantage. You are not burdened by the memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the experience of duck and cover drills, events that characterize the experience of those who lived through the Cold War at its most dangerous points. You have the freedom to bring fresh thinking and new perspectives to how we can best enhance our national security. Positive change is hard to accomplish, so we will need your energy and your expertise to extend this debate beyond college campuses if we are to move safely and securely to a world without nuclear weapons. Your energy and your commitment are important to our efforts to reduce global nuclear dangers.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.