THOMAS COUNTRYMAN'S REMARKS AT INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
03/11/2015 08:22 AM EDT
Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
Remarks
Thomas M. Countryman
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
London, United Kingdom
March 6, 2015

Thank you Mark for the invitation. Having worked with IISS for years on a number of your publications, I am very happy to finally get the chance to visit your headquarters and on a auspicious day. Yesterday marked the 45th anniversary of the entry into force of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty so it is an appropriate time to consider what we have accomplished and how we can approach the Review Conference starting next month. We want to keep in mind the big picture throughout. This treaty in my opinion is the most successful multilateral treaty in the history of diplomacy. It has played a fundamental and irreplaceable role in promoting the security of every state that has become a party to the treaty. It is the common foundation for goals that we share in disarmament and nonproliferation and it lays the basis for the cooperation globally in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Upholding and strengthening the treaty is central to President Obama’s Prague agenda and his commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. The treaty is not perfect, it is not immune to challenge, but it is irreplaceable and could not be replicated if we allow it to fall apart.

The NPT Treaty and Review Conference

So let’s consider the significant accomplishments of the treaty. First it provides a framework for ending the nuclear arms race, for the vast reductions in global nuclear stockpiles we have already achieved, particularly in the United States, and for reinforcing the strong taboo against use of nuclear weapons. It has succeeded in limiting the number of states that possess nuclear weapons. Projections in the 1960s before the treaty was negotiated were that by the turn of the century there would have been dozens of states possessing nuclear weapons. Instead that number has barely increased in the last 45 years. The treaty established durable, international legal obligations designed to prevent proliferation of weapons. It gives direction to safeguards and export control regimes that are needed to sustain the treaty, and it has promoted peaceful nuclear trade and assistance for energy and development throughout the world.

We are looking forward to a successful Review Conference or RevCon or short. We have been working with and will continue to work with all parties, and with particular focus on explaining our position better to Non-aligned states, in order to advance realistic and achievable objectives that reinforce and uphold the treaty. We seek a balanced review of all three pillars. As you know the three pillars are described as disarmament by the nuclear weapons states, nonproliferation and the commitment to avoid acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states, and the benefits of peaceful uses to all states. In the 2010 Review Conference, we agreed on an action plan by consensus. This was a breakthrough achievement. It was the most detailed, and substantive conclusion ever in the history of review processes. That action plan is valid today. It is a useful yardstick for implementing steps that strengthen the treaty. It is not, however, a deadline; it was not a time limited action plan. We need now at next month’s conference to take stock of the action plan and update it. We developed a series of working papers on how to update the action plan which we are now circulating in diplomatic channels. We want to reinforce all the parts that are relevant, which is most of it, and identify what can be advanced as a result of next month’s Review Conference. And of course we are actively studying all the papers produced by friends around the world because they contain valuable ideas on how to advance the goals of disarmament and nonproliferation.

Now one hallmark of our preparation has been greater transparency about U.S. nuclear weapons, about their quantity, their alert status, and their role in our military doctrine. The report we gave last year to the Preparatory Committee was unprecedented in providing insight into our nuclear weapons program. No other state has ever provided so much information and we intend to surpass it next month in the Review Conference. Similarly, we have invited a group of senior, foreign government officials to visit our national nuclear laboratories in New Mexico to encourage a more open and transparent dialogue on U.S. policies.

Nonproliferation Pillar

To get to a success in New York next month does not require consensus on a final document but it is desirable and we will do all we can to achieve it. Success can also be measured by the degree of consensus on advancing all three pillars on nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses. Let me spend just a couple more minutes on our priorities in each of these pillars. On nonproliferation, we want to ensure that the international verification of obligations under the NPT remains effective and robust. That means it requires political, technical, and resource commitments from the world. We will continue to promote the IAEA Additional Protocol which represents the highest standard for verification that states are meeting the NPT safeguards requirements. We have an active program through my bureau of the State Department to help states that seek assistance to implement their safeguard obligations. We need to give a strong statement of support to the International Atomic Energy Agency which has the responsibility for implementing safeguards. Most recently, this includes implementing the advanced idea of the State-level concept about which we could talk more.

The International Atomic Energy Agency deserves the highest degree of independence, expertise, and resources in order to accomplish its crucial mission. We need to underscore that noncompliance by the treaty’s members, that is by a state party, undermines the overall integrity of the NPT. We need to discuss how to hold accountable violators of the their own obligations and we also want to develop a consensus about how to address states that may abuse Article 10 of the treaty which gives states the right to withdraw from the NPT. We’ve been part of a group that has built a very wide consensus on this topic.

Peaceful Uses Pillar

On peaceful uses of nuclear science, at the RevCon we will address and advance our record of promoting the availability and sharing of peaceful benefits of the atom. We will highlight nuclear trade and the considerable amount that we spend in assisting states to provide for safety and security in nuclear energy use. At the 2010 conference then-Secretary Clinton announced the Peaceful Uses Initiative which was intended to expand the fund of money that the IAEA has to provide technical cooperation in developing countries. We have provided nearly $200 million dollars to this and other technical cooperation programs since 2010, and I expect we will make a new commitment on this at the Review Conference.

We will detail the progress made through the Nuclear Security Summit process initiated by President Obama. As a result of this process the number of facilities and countries around the world that possess highly enriched uranium or plutonium has decreased markedly. Security of storage sites of fissile materials is much greater, and more countries are prepared to counter nuclear smuggling. We also of course will discuss nuclear safety. Since the 2010 action plan we’ve seen the tragedy of Fukushima, and we note our support for a more wide range of programs to advance nuclear safety -- for example, the declaration of the diplomatic conference on the Convention of Nuclear Safety issued in Vienna last month. We will also use the Review Conference to seek support for new frameworks for peaceful nuclear cooperation such as an arrangement for a fuel bank facility in Kazakhstan that we hope to see finalized this year.

Disarmament Pillar

On the disarmament pillar, the U.S. commitment to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons remains firm. We continue to actively pursue nuclear disarmament in keeping with the commitment that we made under Article 6 of the treaty. We work hard to put in place the building blocks for nuclear disarmament. This approach of discrete, practical steps has achieved major reductions in nuclear weapons and fissile material stocks over several decades and continues to do so. It is a practical approach. It is a verifiable approach, and we’re prepared to explain it and defend it at the Review Conference. When I say discrete steps, it doesn’t mean one thing at a time; it means we are pursuing many channels in order to lay the groundwork for future efforts in bilateral arms reduction with the Russian Federation and in multilateral arms reduction. This includes not only changes to the U.S. arsenal and U.S. policies, but also requires building confidence and transparency with other nuclear states, including by cooperating on our nonproliferation goals. Each step that we have taken over the years has helped to create the conditions and build momentum for subsequent steps.

Some states party to the treaty are dissatisfied with the recent pace of disarmament but the fact remains that since the last Review Conference the New START Treaty has entered into force, and it is being implemented in terms of its notifications and inspections on a faithful basis by both the Russian Federation and the United States. By the time we reach the levels set by the treaty for 2018, the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal will be at its lowest level since before I was born and that was when Mr. Eisenhower was president. But we also have to show readiness to do more. President Obama offered nearly two years ago to pursue further negotiated reductions with Russia with the goal of cutting our deployed nuclear weapons by another one third. That offer is still on the table. We are ready to engage with Russia on the full range of issues affecting strategic stability, but we’re also realistic about how much can be achieved without a willing partner in the current difficult strategic environment. A new Russian security doctrine which explicitly reprioritizes its nuclear forces is obviously creating a new and direct challenge to bilateral disarmament efforts.

Nuclear Weapons Free Zone – Middle East

Let me speak to one special topic from the 2010 RevCon that I know is of interest around the world. At the 2010 Review Conference the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom, as depositaries of the Nonproliferation Treaty, accepted a commitment that we would before the end of 2012 convene a conference to discuss the creation of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. Well we are now in the 39th month of 2012 and we haven’t yet succeeded in convening a conference. This is a very specific commitment we made and I think it requires explanation to the world of everything that we have done to try to make this possible. Here I would also note that despite differences with Russia on major issues, we have continued to cooperate well with the U.K., Russia and the UN on this particular point.

The commitment to convene a conference said explicitly that it should be attended by all states of the region, which is to include Israel. Israel, however, is not a member of the NPT and has no legal obligation to honor an invitation to the conference. Israel could, however, be persuaded and over the last three and a half years, through tireless efforts of Russia and the U.K. and the United Nations, and our facilitator Ambassador Laajava of Finland, but especially from the United States, we have reached a point where Israel accepts the value of holding such a conference which it sees as a venue for discussing not just creation of a WMD free zone in the Middle East, but a forum for discussing related security issues that must be addressed if a weapons free zone in the Middle East is to be successful. Over the past year and a half Ambassador Laajava and these three states, together with the UN, have convened five unofficial or informal meetings at which multiple Arab delegations and Israeli diplomats sat at the same table and discussed - for the first time in twenty years - regional security issues.

As a consequence, there is a better understanding by all sides of what are the obstacles and political conditions necessary for creation for such a zone are, and there is a better understanding of our Arab friends who have worked very hard on this issue and shown innovation and flexibility at times, a better understanding that this is not simply a technical exercise of taking the Africa Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty and changing the names. It is a political process. It is a diplomatic process. It is a negotiation process, not just a technical drafting process. We remain hopeful even before the RevCon that additional contact between Israel and the Arabs on this issue will allow us to agree on an agenda and set a date for the convening of such a conference.

Conclusion

Let me just conclude by saying that we don’t just focus on the NPT every five years. It is the constant job of my bureau within the State Department to focus on the assignments and specific obligations that the treaty has given not just to the U.S., not just to the five recognized nuclear weapons states, but to every state party to the treaty. It’s a continual process of upholding and strengthening the treaty. It commands vigilance, and effort. It requires states to watch out for the kind of technical trade that they conduct with states such as North Korea and Iran. It means that we have to take greater responsibility to resolve conflicts that could become temptations for proliferation. We have to seek consensus, we have to identify areas of agreement with states that have a different set of priorities than the United States. Of course progress elsewhere will contribute to success at this conference and in subsequent years, and here of course I am particularly hopeful that Iran will be able to take “yes” for an answer and sign a substantive agreement with the P5 + 1 that ends the possibility of Iranian pursuit of a nuclear weapon.

I am less hopeful but never totally pessimistic that we’ll make similar progress with North Korea within the months ahead and of course I hope to see a reduction of tensions in Asia, the one area of the world in which the number of nuclear weapons is increasing. So overall I am optimistic that we can build on the success of the 2010 Review Conference. We look forward to working with all parties who share our interest in achieving an objective, balanced and realistic text. It is essential not just for the security of the world but for the vision that all of us need to keep in our heads, the prospect of finally achieving a world without nuclear weapons. So thank you and I look forward to questions and ideas that you may want to give me.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER'S REMARKS AT 68TH FIRST COMMITTEE GENERAL DEBATE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Statement by Rose E. Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
68th UNGA First Committee General Debate
New York, NY
October 9, 2013

As Delivered

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations, Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi, on your election as Chair of the First Committee during its 68th session. We pledge to support your leadership and the work of this committee. We look forward to a productive session.

This is the fourth year in a row that I have spoken to the UNGA First Committee on behalf of the United States. I look back to 2009 and I am proud of all we have accomplished. That said, we have a long path in front of us.

The conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons do not yet exist, but together we are completely capable of creating these conditions. I am sure of this, because of the examples of our predecessors.

As you all may know, tomorrow is the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). This groundbreaking Treaty went from a seemingly unattainable goal on the horizon to an international law on the books within a year of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Perhaps it was those dark days that helped solidify U.S. President Kennedy’s view that it was possible – in fact, imperative – that we work to address nuclear dangers through multilateral diplomacy.

“Peace need not be impracticable,” he said, “and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly -- by making it seem more manageable and less remote -- we can help all people to see it, to draw hope from it and to move irresistibly towards it.”

Mr. Chairman, that idea should be our touchstone as we move forward with the Committee’s work. If our predecessors could accomplish a Treaty like the LTBT in the midst of the Cold War, surely we can find ways to work on further arms reductions, increased transparency, banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and more.

Over the last fifty years, we have had many unprecedented successes. We have gone from the brink of nuclear war to successful strategic reduction treaties – the latest of which will bring us by 2018 to the lowest number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons since the 1950s.

We have continued to limit nuclear explosive testing over the years through treaties, including the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) that prohibited the United States and the Soviet Union from conducting a nuclear explosive test in excess of 150 kilotons. Before the TTBT entered into force, some voiced concerns that the parties had different ways to measure explosive yields. To deal with this problem, the United States and the Soviet Union undertook an unprecedented step in transparency and confidence-building. They invited each other to their respective nuclear test sites to observe a nuclear test and use their preferred methods for measuring explosive yields as they applied to the TTBT. That event, known as the Joint Verification Experiment, happened 25 years ago and it paved the way for subsequent negotiations of new verification protocols for both the TTBT and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). Our joint work would ultimately help the international community negotiate a total ban on nuclear explosive testing, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

This year also marks a significant nonproliferation accomplishment: the 1993 United States-Russian Federation Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement will reach a major milestone with the final delivery of low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from downblending 500 metric tons of Russian weapons origin HEU. The LEU that results from this downblending process is delivered to the United States, fabricated into nuclear fuel, and used by nearly all U.S. nuclear power plants to generate approximately half of the nuclear energy in the United States. Approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads have been eliminated under this unique government-industry partnership. Over the past 15 years, nuclear fuel from this source has accounted for approximately 10% of all electricity produced in the United States.

We expect to meet with our Russian partners this November to observe the loading in St. Petersburg of the final containers of LEU downblended under the Agreement, and we will meet again in the United States when that ship delivers this important cargo in December. We look forward to jointly celebrating this historic achievement.

Another success that flies under the radar is the Open Skies Treaty. It just marked its 1000th completed mission in August. It is a great example of a Euro-Atlantic transparency and confidence building measure, and it has proven itself as a valuable arms control monitoring tool, for both strategic and conventional purposes.

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the Obama Administration, working with international partners, has made many of its own significant achievements in nonproliferation and disarmament: entry into force of the New START Treaty, the launching of the Nuclear Security Summit process, an agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to each verifiably dispose of 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium, and more recently, signature of an agreement between the United States and Russia on threat reduction that reinforces our longstanding partnership on nonproliferation.

But it is not enough: the United States and Russian Federation still possess over ninety percent of the nuclear weapons in the world, and it is time we move beyond Cold War postures.

That is why in June, the President announced in Berlin that we would pursue further reductions of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. This decision flowed from the Administration’s extensive analysis of the current strategic environment and deterrence requirements. That analysis confirmed that the United States can ensure its security and that of our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third below the level established by the New START Treaty. The President said on that occasion, “I intend to seek negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War postures.” Toward that end, we will pursue a treaty with the Russian Federation.

We are also making sure our lines of communication on strategic issues are solid. On Monday in Bali, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov signed a new agreement to strengthen the connection between our Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs). Today’s NRRC-to-NRRC relationship and communications link continue to provide vital transparency in strategic and conventional forces, facilitate verification of arms control treaties and agreements, and support strategic stability. Actually, we just passed a significant milestone -- the two Centers have now exchanged over five thousand New START Treaty notifications since its entry into force, which provide us day-to-day updates on the status of each others' nuclear forces. These are joined by the 97 on-site inspections that we have now conducted under New START, which give us even more insights into each others' nuclear forces, thus enhancing predictability for both countries.

We are also working with the other Nuclear Weapons States (P5) on disarmament-related issues to support implementation of the NPT and the 2010 NPT Action Plan. The P5 have now had four official conferences, with China hosting the fifth meeting next year. But we are not just meeting; through dialogue at the political level and concrete work at the expert level, our engagement has moved from concepts to concrete actions.

For example, P5 experts are meeting to address issues related to the CTBT, especially those relating to the On-Site Inspection (OSI) element of the CTBT’s verification regime and to the OSI Integrated Field Exercise to be conducted in Jordan in 2014. The objective of this effort is to define and engage in technical collaborative work based on our unique expertise with past nuclear explosive tests.

In the broader multilateral context, the United States continues to hold to its long-standing position calling for the immediate commencement of long delayed negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). This treaty is the obvious next step in multilateral disarmament and it is time to get to the table. We hope that the upcoming UN Group of Governmental Experts on FMCT will provide useful impetus. Another priority for the United States is to continue to build support for the ratification of the CTBT, as affirmed by President Obama this past June. We encourage all Annex 2 nations to join us in this pursuit.

Mr. Chairman, we will have a lot of things to discuss and debate this session, from cyber and space security to conventional arms control, from humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. It is critical that we continue our work together. Two weeks ago, the international community reached a landmark with UN Security Council Resolution 2118 and the Executive Council decision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Together, they enable a strong international partnership to eliminate chemical weapons from Syria and end this threat to the Syrian people.

And elsewhere, we should be cautious, but cognizant of potentially historic opportunities. We must continue our push to bring Iran back into line with its international nuclear obligations. We will also continue to make clear to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that should it meet its own denuclearization commitments, it too can have an opportunity to reintegrate into the international community. The United States is ready to talk, we are ready to listen, we are ready to work hard, and we hope that every country in this room is ready to join us.

It is no secret there are issues on which we disagree. This does not mean that we stop trying to move ahead in a step-by-step fashion. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union found it in our mutual interest to work together on reducing the nuclear threat. Of course, today, this is not just the responsibility of the United States and Russia. All states can and must contribute to the conditions for disarmament, as well as nonproliferation; they are two sides of the same coin.

Mr. Chairman, the road toward the next steps might not be familiar and it will require difficult negotiations and complicated diplomacy. Nevertheless, armed with patience and persistence, we can keep our compasses pointed at the one reason we are here: to pursue disarmament in ways that promote mutual security, because it is in our mutual interest.

The United States asks that we all commit ourselves to the hard work ahead.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
As Prepared
The Pryzbyla Center, Catholic University of America
Washington, DC
April 9, 2013

Thank you for that kind introduction, Stephen. I am glad to be here at Catholic University today to talk about U.S. nuclear policy. I want to thank the Catholic Peacebuilding Network for sponsoring this program. It is my pleasure to represent the State Department this afternoon.

Today, I would like to provide an update on our work, which the President laid out four years ago in Prague, when he committed the United States to seeking the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

As President Obama noted in his famous speech, this will not be easy. Nor is it likely to happen in his lifetime. Still, over the last four years we have succeeded in moving closer to this goal.

In 2010, the Administration concluded a Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, which outlines the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers, as well as advancing the broader security interests of the United States and its allies. As the NPR states nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats facing the United States. The traditional concept of nuclear deterrence — the idea that a country would not initiate a nuclear war for fear of nuclear retaliation — does not apply to terrorists. While our nuclear arsenal has little relevance in deterring this threat, concerted action by the United States and Russia – and indeed, by all nuclear weapon states – to reduce their arsenals is key to garnering support from partners around the world for strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, while also securing nuclear materials worldwide to make it harder for terrorists to acquire nuclear materials.

For instance, by the end of this year, we expect the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement to be completed, under which 500 MT of highly enriched uranium or HEU from dismantled Russian weapons will have been converted into low-enriched uranium or LEU to fuel U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. Over 472 MT (equivalent to approximately 18,900 nuclear warheads) has been downblended and sent to the United States so far. In the United States, 374 MT of U.S. HEU has been declared excess to nuclear weapons; most of the remainder will be downblended or used as fuel in naval or research reactors. In 2011, the United States and Russia brought into force the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 2010 protocols, which requires each side to dispose of 34 MT of weapon-grade plutonium – enough in total for about 17,000 nuclear weapons – and thus permanently remove this material from military programs. Russia has also been an essential partner in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts to convert research reactors from HEU to LEU and repatriate those reactors’ HEU to the country of origin. These efforts have now converted or verified the shutdown of over 75 research and test reactors, and repatriated to the United States or to Russia over 3,000 kg of HEU for secure storage, downblending and disposition.

In addition to working on the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, we have taken steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. We are not developing new nuclear weapons or pursuing new nuclear missions; we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations; and we have clearly stated that it is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 68-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.

As President Obama said in Seoul in March of last year:

"[W]e can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need. I firmly believe that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies, maintain a strong deterrent against any threat, and still pursue further reductions in our nuclear arsenal."

Let me now address what we believe our next steps should be.

The Administration continues to believe that the next step in nuclear arms reductions should be pursued on a bilateral basis. The United States and Russia still possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world. With that in mind, we have a great example in the New START Treaty. The implementation of New START, now in its third year, is going well. When New START is fully implemented, the United States and the Russian Federation will each have no more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads – the lowest levels since the 1950s.

Going forward, the United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons, including the pursuit of a future agreement with Russia to address all categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed.

To this end, we are engaged in a bilateral dialogue to promote strategic stability and increase transparency on a reciprocal basis with the Russian Federation. We are hopeful our dialogue will lead to greater reciprocal transparency and negotiation of even further nuclear weapons reductions.

As part of this process, the Administration is consulting with Allies to lay the groundwork for future negotiations. As you may know, NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of, and reliance on, nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. That said, NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area. While seeking to create the conditions for further nuclear reductions, NATO will continue to ensure that the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective as NATO is committed to remaining a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

There are still further initiatives that are part of this Administration’s nuclear agenda. The United States is revitalizing an international effort to advance a new multilateral treaty to verifiably ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or FMCT– would for the first time put an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade fissile material needed to create nuclear weapons and provide the basis for further, deeper, reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Beginning multilateral negotiations on the FMCT is a priority objective for the United States and for the vast majority of states, and we have been working to initiate such negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. An overwhelming majority of nations support the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations. The United States is consulting with China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, as well as others, to find a way to commencing negotiation of an FMCT.

In 2009, the five nuclear-weapon states, or "P5," began to meet regularly to have discussions on issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, these discussions have expanded to address P5 implementation of our commitments under the NPT and the 2010 Review Conference’s Action Plan. The U.S. hosted the most recent P5 conference in Washington in June 2012, where the P5 tackled issues related to all three pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. We are looking forward to a fourth conference on April 18-19, which Russia will host in Geneva prior to the next NPT Preparatory Committee meeting.

In addition to providing a senior level policy forum for discussion and coordination among the P5, this process has spawned a series of discussions among policymakers and government experts on a variety of issues. China is leading a P5 working group on nuclear definitions and terminology. The P5 are discussing approaches to a common format for NPT reporting, and we are also beginning to engage at expert levels on some important verification and transparency issues. In the future, we would like the P5 conferences and intersessional meetings to expand and to develop practical transparency measures that build confidence and predictability.

I should add at this point that when discussing areas to broaden and deepen our cooperation and to advance our common interests, it’s necessary to address the question of Missile Defense. Thirty years ago at the height of the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan saw virtue in cooperating with Moscow on Missile Defense.

While we have our differences on this issue, we remain convinced that missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, missile defense cooperation with Russia remains a priority for the President. To be clear, U.S. missile defense efforts are focused on defending our homeland as well as our European, Middle Eastern, and Asian allies and partners against ballistic missile threats coming from Iran and North Korea. These are threats that are growing, and must be met.

In meeting those threats, it is important to note that U.S. missile defenses are not designed for, or capable of, undermining the Russian or Chinese strategic deterrents. For its part, Russia has been insistent on legally binding guarantees that our missile defenses will not threaten its strategic deterrent. Rather than legal guarantees, we believe that the best way for Russia to see that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not undermine its strategic deterrent would be for it to cooperate with us. In addition to making all of us safer, cooperation would send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter proliferation. With regard to China, the United States welcomes the opportunity to engage in a dialogue about missile defense and other security issues of strategic importance.

As our work together over the past four years has shown, we can produce significant results that benefit both countries. As mentioned earlier, the New START Treaty is a great example of this. Cooperation on missile defense would also facilitate improved relations between the United States and Russia. In fact, it would be a game-changer for those relations. It has the potential to enhance the national security of both the United States and Russia, as well as build a genuine strategic partnership.

None of this will be easy, but the policies the Administration is pursuing are suited for our security needs and tailored for the global security threats of the 21st century. By maintaining and supporting a safe, secure and effective stockpile — sufficient to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies — at the same time that we pursue responsible verifiable reductions through arms control, we will make this world a safer place.

To paraphrase President Kennedy, whose speech 50 years ago at American University launched the NPT process, we will succeed by moving forward step by step, confident and unafraid. There is something very appropriate in mentioning President Kennedy and his era because your generation has a unique advantage. You are not burdened by the memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the experience of duck and cover drills, events that characterize the experience of those who lived through the Cold War at its most dangerous points. You have the freedom to bring fresh thinking and new perspectives to how we can best enhance our national security. Positive change is hard to accomplish, so we will need your energy and your expertise to extend this debate beyond college campuses if we are to move safely and securely to a world without nuclear weapons. Your energy and your commitment are important to our efforts to reduce global nuclear dangers.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

STATE DEPARTENT'S GOTTEMOELLER SPEAKS ON STRENGTHENING GLOBAL SECURITY

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Mobilizing Ingenuity to Strengthen Global Security
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
South by Southwest Conference (SXSW)
Austin, TX
March 8, 2013

Thank you so much for the introduction, Daniel and thank you all for being here. I’m really excited about being here in Austin at the South by Southwest Conference.

Now, I realize that being the government’s chief arms control negotiator might seem a little out of place here. What can the tech community do to help is get rid of the thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons still in the world? We worry about them getting into the hands of terrorists. Add to that the increased threat from chemical and biological agents – you can see the threat from CW in Syria -- and technologies that are easily switched from peaceful to threatening purposes. We have a big problem on our hands.

In truth, I came here for your help. The United States has laid out a comprehensive approach to dealing with these threats. But we need new ideas, and the information revolution is an obvious place to look. I hope you come away from this session energized to help us in our efforts to combat the threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

A Problem

Let me start by giving you a feel for our nuclear treaty verification problem. When signing our most recent treaty – New START – with the Russian Federation, the President said our next step would be to pursue reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, even nuclear weapons held in secret storage facilities. In the past, we focused on eliminating nuclear weapons on big missiles or bombers – items you could count from satellites in space. The idea was, eliminate the missile and you eliminate the threat of the warhead.

Now the President has said that is not good enough – if we’re worried terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weapons, we have to reduce and eliminate those weapons, even if they’re hidden away in storage. That is a big challenge for a nuclear arms controller: how can we monitor warheads, know where they are and that the other guys don’t have hidden stashes somewhere?

For bomb-making material, these challenges only increase. This stuff is portable and easy to hide. Major ports have radiation detectors, but these systems are very sensitive and can pick up the radioactivity coming from everyday items like bananas, kitty litter and porcelain toilets. Bet you didn’t know those things were radioactive.

For biological and chemical agents, the main problem comes from the dual-use nature of the work and technologies. How can we tell if work being done is good or bad? Or if we cannot, how do we build in activities to reassure people that the work being done is safe and peaceful?

So our goal is to devise and enhance systems for tracking and monitoring, as well as devise new ways to verify compliance with future agreements and treaties. Of course, as you who work in technology know, no system is ever 100% foolproof. To paraphrase Douglas Adams, foolproof systems tend to underestimate the ingenuity of complete fools and for that matter, highly-motivated cheaters.

How do we even come close to 100% verification? In the treaty context, we are looking for effective verification. Paul Nitze, a brilliant, esteemed national security expert and long-serving government official, explained effective verification as follows:

"[I]f the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violations in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation."

That’s effective verification. Nitze’s definition has been and continues to be the benchmark for verifying arms control treaties. But the world is changing, as I’ve described, and with it, the nature of what we need to monitor and verify. To help us meet the challenges ahead, we need your help.

A Light Bulb

New information tools are popping up everywhere and their potential impact is magnified by the global connectivity of the Internet. Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, could be broadcast globally in seconds. That means it is harder to hide things. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool, and it can help us to verify the treaties and agreements we’ve created.

A New Plan

The way we at the State Department see it so far, there are two elements we are working with when it comes to incorporating the information age into WMD verification and monitoring – tools for inspectors and data acquisition and analysis.

Using Tools

First, it is already apparent that digital tools are revolutionizing the way diplomacy is conducted, much like the telegraph did in the 19th century. Email is a good example: it rapidly accelerated the pace of the negotiation of New START, in comparison with the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

Information technologies could also be useful in the hands of a WMD inspector. Smartphone and tablet apps could be created for the express purpose of aiding in the verification and monitoring process. For example, by having all safeguards and verification sensors in an inspected facility wirelessly connected through the cloud to the inspector’s tablet, he or she could note anomalies and flag specific items for closer inspections, as well as compare readings in real time and interpret them in context. In the 90’s, U.S. weapons inspectors in Russia had to be able to cross country ski to do their jobs. They had to ski around the perimeters of facilities searching for things – with the kinds of tablet apps I mentioned, perhaps we could make the cardio optional.

Using the Crowd

The second way we could incorporate the new tools of the information age into WMD verification and monitoring is by harnessing of the power of the crowd to generate data and then analyze it.

Already, critical information generated through social networking is being incorporated into local safety systems in the United States. RAVEN911—the Regional Asset Verification & Emergency Network—is a multilayer mapping tool that supports emergency first response in Cincinnati, Ohio and its regional neighbors. RAVEN911 uses live data feeds, geospatial imagery, and information gathered through Twitter and other public sources to provide details that cannot be shown on an everyday geographic map, such as the location of downed electric power lines and flooded roads. This helps emergency first responders get to where they need to go more quickly.

Sound far-fetched to extend such ideas to arms control? It shouldn’t. There are apps that can convert your smartphone camera into a radiation detector. Your tablet could help detect nuclear explosions! Tablets have tiny accelerometers installed – that’s what tells the tablet which way is up. But the accelerometers also have the capability to detect small earth tremors.

You can imagine a whole community of tablets, all containing an "earth tremor" app. Users are dispersed randomly around the country, their tablets connected to a centralized network. If the sensors all start shaking at once, you may have a natural occurrence – an earthquake – or you may have an illicit nuclear weapon test. Which is which would need to be confirmed with official sensors and analysis.

This kind of ubiquitous sensing I see as one of the most exciting areas for new arms control monitoring tools.

A Hitch?

So, we have a brand new set of exciting possibilities to pursue, but there is a hitch. For any of this to work, there are a lot of technical, legal, political, and diplomatic barriers ahead that would need to be overcome—never easy.

In the end, the goal of using information technology and social networks should add to our existing arms control monitoring and verification capabilities, not to supersede them.

A Challenge

Last summer, we launched our first Innovation in Arms Control Challenge and asked the American public, "How Can the Crowd Support Arms Control Transparency Efforts?" This challenge sought creative ideas from the public to use commonly available technologies to support arms control policy and education efforts.

We received interest from more than 500 people from across the United States with solutions that largely fell into four broad categories: smartphone apps, internet websites and games, sensor array schemes, and "big data" crunching.

Our first prize winner is Ms. Lovely Umayam, a graduate student from the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. She developed "Bombshelltoe", an online education platform that examines the intersection of culture and nuclear issues in order to facilitate better public understanding. Mr. Allan Childers, an Aerospace/Defense industry consultant from Florida, was a runner-up with his proposal for a mobile application that provides a platform for users to connect and interact, as well as a rewards program for sharing information on various arms agreement regimes. Dr. Rudolph "Chip" Mappus, a research scientist at Georgia Tech Research Institute working on computational neurology and brain-machine interfaces, was also a runner up. He proposed a geographically-based online game about verifying treaty compliance that experts and everyday citizens could play together.

This challenge was a first step focused on public education, and I am excited about the results and our prizewinners. This spring we’re preparing to launch a second Innovation in Arms Control Challenge that will ask the American public to design an information technology tool that can aid arms control inspections, so please stay tuned to www.state.gov on that front. We would love to get submissions from SxSW Interactive attendees!

A Pitch

So now I am eager to hear from you. As many of you are aware, there is a grand tradition of citizen science in this country – two of the greatest were among our earliest diplomats: Thomas Jefferson and Ben Franklin. I hope that this State Department tradition continues as we tackle these enormous challenges. Experts like you, particularly experts outside of the Beltway, can help us think bigger and bolder. It is sometimes strange to think that the government helped plant the seed of the information revolution, but at times seems to have no clue about how to harvest its rewards. That is why speaking to people like you is so important.

Thanks again for your attention and I would now love to take some questions and even better – to hear some ideas!

SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY CLINTON'S LAST TOWN HALL MEETING WITH STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Remarks at Final Town Hall Meeting With Department of State Personnel
Remarks
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
Dean Acheson Auditorium
Washington, DC
January 30, 2013
　

Thank you. Thank you. Oh, boy. This is an incredible experience for me. I thank you for joining me and I know that other rooms are filled to capacity and there is a big crowd that is outside in the hallway and hello to everyone watching on BNET or online.

I have to begin by saying I’m here with a full heart. These last four years have been a remarkable honor and experience for me, and that is thanks to all of you, to the professionals, men and women who get up every day and work for the State Department and USAID on behalf of our common mission and values and the country that we love. Every day during my tenure over the last four years, whether I was in Washington or in some remote corner of the world, I have been so proud of your dedication, your professionalism, your ingenuity, your integrity. And you have big jobs to do here and you do them superbly. So I am proud to have been a colleague, to leave here as a very grateful member of the team.

I walked into the door of the State Department more than four years ago now determined to elevate diplomacy and development as pillars of our foreign policy alongside defense, because I was convinced they were critical for solving problems and seizing opportunities worldwide. And I will walk out the door this Friday even more convinced of that because of the work that we have done together during some challenging and even tumultuous times.

We have faced all manners of events, from democratic revolutions in North Africa, to earthquakes in Haiti and Japan, to the end of the war in Iraq, the beginning of the transition in Afghanistan, the rebuilding of the global economy, breakthroughs in places like Burma and Somalia, the signing of a New START Treaty, and on and on. Diplomacy and development have been vital to these and so many other efforts that we have undertaken together.

And as I’ve looked back over the past four years, I think, through it all, we have remained focused on our long term goals: advancing American interests, defending universal values, protecting our security, helping more people in more places live up to their God-given potential. And along the way we’ve lost friends and loved ones. Some, like Richard Holbrooke and Chris Stevens, were giants of American diplomacy. Others were men and women, many far too young, with long futures ahead of them, so much promise and passion. All of them were patriots, and we honor their memories by carrying forward this important work.

Our current efforts to improve security and implement the recommendations of the recent Accountability Review Board are part of a broader push to strengthen both State and USAID. I’m also very proud to have overseen the first QDDR, which identifies ways in which our agencies could become more effective, more innovative for the future. Many of the QDDR recommendations are already in place, such as our increased focus on economic statecraft and energy, the steps we’ve taken on global security and justice issues, new strategies to address climate change, and everything we’ve done to integrate women and girls into our policies.

And just a few days ago, we appointed a sanctions coordinator to focus on governments like Iran and Syria and North Korea. Now, these steps are smart, sensible, and suited to today’s world. I believe they’ve already made State and USAID stronger. The same goes for the investments we’ve made in training and mentoring our workforce. The new job opportunities we’ve created, the improvements we’ve made in recruitment, all the other steps we’ve taken to ensure we are finding the most talented people out there for the Foreign Service and the Civil Service and giving them, giving you, the professional support you need to thrive.

Now, many other steps outlined in the QDDR are in the process of being implemented, and now we need to make sure that the QDDR itself continues, because I’ve always said that the Q is the most important letter in that recitation. Last year, we came close to having Congress pass legislation that would mandate future reviews, just as the Defense Department has done for many years. In fact, John Kerry himself introduced that legislation, so I’m confident that he will carry on this work. Congress would be wise to pass the QDDR because it does make State and USAID stronger, and thereby making our nation stronger.

Four years ago when I sat across the table up in the Senate from my then-Senate colleagues at my own confirmation hearing, I said I was thrilled to be considered for the role of Secretary, but also sad about leaving a place that I had loved also and all the people that I cared for so much there and in New York, the state that I was so privileged to represent. Now I find myself feeling the exact same way. I am looking forward to the next chapter. It’s like one of those books you buy that has blank pages.

And I know I’m leaving the Department in excellent hands. John Kerry was a very accomplished senator, and he will be the same as Secretary of State. He brings judgment, experience, vision, and a deep understanding, because of his own family with his father having been in the Foreign Service, to what diplomacy requires.

But I am very sad to leave all of you and to leave behind the institution here where I have been so proud to serve on behalf of the American people. It will be very hard over the next few days to say goodbye to the terrific men and women at State and USAID because I will truly miss you. I will miss the incredible sense of commitment that you bring to the work we do, the exacting standards you hold yourselves and others to, the fun that we’ve occasionally had in traveling and working together. But I will mostly be very proud and grateful that I had the chance to be the 67th Secretary of State. I will look forward to doing my part from the outside to try to stand up for and explain why this is such important work and to always feel that I am in some way connected to you and to that work’s continuity.

U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS

 

Photo: Saint Basil's Cathedral, Moscow in winter. From: CIA World Factbook

 
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
U.S. Relations With Russia
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Fact Sheet
December 14, 2012
The United States seeks a relationship with Russia based on cooperation in the pursuit of mutual interests and a frank and open discussion of disagreements based on mutual respect as the two countries seek to address the shared challenges of the 21st century.

Russia matters for the defense and promotion of U.S. national interests in a way matched by few other countries in the world. Russia is the world’s largest country by landmass and is a key geopolitical player in the East Asia-Pacific region, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. Russia and the U.S. collectively control over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, and Russia is the world’s largest producer of hydrocarbons. It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a member of the G8 and G20, and a key player in the Quartet on Middle East peace, the P5+1 talks on Iran, and the Six-Party talks on North Korea.

On such critical issues as preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, countering narcotics, addressing the effects of climate change, increasing trade and investment to enhance economic prosperity, and managing global financial markets, the United States is better positioned to advance our national interests if we can work with Russia in the spirit of cooperation. Russia’s long-term prosperity, modernity, integration into the global economy, and political liberalization are all in the interest of the United States.

The New START Treaty was signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on February 5, 2011, and demonstrates U.S. and Russian leadership in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. New START reduces the limits on the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arms by a third and restores important verification and inspection measures. On April 13, 2010, the two countries also signed a Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, which will enable the disposal of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium on each side, or enough for about 17,000 nuclear weapons. On January 11, 2011, the U.S. and Russia concluded an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, establishing a legal basis for cooperation and expanding opportunities for U.S. companies in Russia.

In terms of stabilizing Afghanistan, Russia has been a critical partner. Thanks to Russia’s agreement to allow the transit of U.S. personnel and equipment across Russian territory in support of the ISAF mission, as of June 2012, more than 2,374 flights and over 404,000 military personnel have transited this corridor, while Russia’s ground transit arrangement with NATO has resulted in the shipment of over 50,000 containers of supplies to Afghanistan.

We are working together to prevent Iran and North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons programs. Together with Russia, we crafted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, which introduced the most comprehensive set of multilateral sanctions to date on Iran. In 2010 Russia canceled the planned sale of an advanced air-defense system (the S-300) to Iran, further advancing our non-proliferation aims. The U.S. also worked closely with Russia to pass United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, which strengthens financial and arms embargoes on North Korea.

The United States and Russia are increasing people-to-people connections through education, culture, sports, media, and other professional interactions. The objective of these efforts is to promote the mutual understanding required to build lasting ties between our two peoples. In the field of cultural and public diplomacy, the "American Seasons" program in Russia has brought a wide spectrum of cultural offerings to the Russian public. In 2012, the Chicago Symphony Orchestra completed its first tour to Russia in more than two decades. Also in 2012, U.S. audiences applauded the return of the Bolshoi Ballet to the Kennedy Center and enjoyed the Mariinsky Ballet’s performances of "Cinderella". The "Russian Seasons" cultural program in America included the bicentennial celebration of the founding of the Russian settlement at Fort Ross, California. Bilateral agreements have also been concluded on cooperation in intercountry adoptions as well as liberalization of practices governing entry visas. The bilateral Agreement Regarding Cooperation in Adoption of Children which was signed in 2011 by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov provides better safeguards for adoptive children taking into account the interests and obligations of the adoptive parents. In September 2012, a historic U.S.-Russia visa agreement entered into effect, making Russian and American travelers for business or tourism eligible to receive visas valid for multiple entries during a period of 36 months.

The United States and Russia do not see eye to eye on all issues, but our relationship accommodates frank discussion of disagreements in a spirit of mutual respect with the aim of managing our differences. Where we have differences – on Georgia, Syria, human rights, etc., – we will address them openly and honestly, and will stand by our principles. Pursuing cooperation where it is in our mutual interest enables a more substantial, less polemical dialogue on the hard issues. Our full bilateral agenda for 2013 features deepening economic ties with Russia, the newest member of the WTO; making progress where we can on missile defense; and expanding the work of the Bilateral Presidential Commission.

Bilateral Presidential Commission

In April 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed to the formation of the Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC). The Bilateral Presidential Commission is the premier forum for cooperation between the United States and Russia, and provides a framework for dialogue and the identification of new opportunities based on our shared interests.

The Bilateral Presidential Commission’s 21 working groups continue to produce concrete, substantive results that impact not only our governments but also regular people living in both our countries. Its ongoing expansion – including recently-added working groups on innovation, rule of law and military technical cooperation – and new initiatives demonstrate that our vast bureaucracies are learning the habits and recognizing the benefits of continuing cooperation in between presidential and other high-level meetings.

The BPC continues to function as the vehicle that provides regular attention to our biggest mutual policy objectives via a transparent and structured mechanism. It brings together over 40 U.S. and Russian agencies, as well as numerous NGOs and businesses.

The BPC’s principal objectives include the strengthening of strategic stability, international security, economic well-being, and the development of ties between Russians and Americans. Its core principles include a focus on common interests, a two-way partnership and exchange, a frank dialogue respectful of differences, and the completion of tangible results.

The BPC aims to institutionalize the government-to-government and people-to-people aspects of the bilateral relationship. Increased participation by the non-government sphere – involving private enterprise, NGOs, and other elements of civil society in both countries – is and will remain an important goal of the Commission.


Bilateral Economic Relations

The United States is working vigorously to expand bilateral trade and investment cooperation to benefit both Russia and the United States. Over the past three years, the positive atmosphere resulting from the "reset" of bilateral relations has led to an unprecedented advance in economic cooperation between our countries. From 2009 to 2011, U.S. exports to Russia rose 57 percent and total U.S.-Russia trade increased over 80 percent. U.S. companies reported numerous major business deals in Russia in 2012, including the ExxonMobil-Rosneft deal in May for exploration in the Arctic shelf, Boeing’s $15 billion in aircraft sales in Russia over the past five years, and Ex-Im Bank’s June MOU signing with Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank, to support up to $1 billion in exports to Russia.

In December 2011, culminating 18 years of hard work and dedication, Russia was invited to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), a major accomplishment that will bring the world’s largest economy outside the WTO into the organization and bind it to a set of rules governing trade, as well as a dispute-resolution mechanism to enforce those rules. To ensure that U.S. companies and workers can take full advantage of Russia’s WTO membership, Congress enacted legislation to extend permanent normal trade relations to Russia.

Our governments are also engaged in a wide range of joint efforts under the Bilateral Presidential Commission in the areas of trade, investment, multilateral economic cooperation, commercial engagement, and innovation that will benefit the people of both countries

Russian Membership in International Organizations

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia took steps to become a full partner in the world's principal political groupings. In December 1991, Russia assumed the permanent UN Security Council seat formerly held by the Soviet Union. Over the years, Russia has increased its international profile and played a growing role in regional issues. Russia and the United States both belong to a number of other international organizations and groupings, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Middle East Quartet, P5+1 on Iran, Six-Party Talks on North Korea, G-8, and G-20.

In 1994 Russia joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace initiative. In 1997 the NATO-Russia Founding Act established formal relations between the NATO and Russia, and in 2002 the NATO-Russia Council was created.

25TH ANIVERSARY OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

Photo:  Little Boy.  Credit:  Wikimedia

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
25 Years of Enhanced Strategic Security Through the Nuclear Risk Reduction CentersMedia Note

Office of the Spokesman

Washington, DC

September 15, 2012

Today, the U.S. Department of State commemorates the 25th Anniversary of the creation of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs). Established under President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev with the purpose of opening a communications channel to reduce the risk of conflict, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers at the Department of State in Washington, D.C. and the Russian Ministry of Defense in Moscow operate twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week and are equipped with secure and reliable lines of direct communication to perform the critical mission of sustaining strategic security.

Over the years, the U.S. NRRC has expanded its role in bilateral and multilateral security and confidence building arrangements, supporting conventional treaties and agreements with a wide variety of foreign partners and international institutions.

Today, the U.S. NRRC exchanges thousands of time-sensitive notifications a year under a multitude of arms control treaties and agreements such as the New START Treaty and is a key resource for the promotion of transparency and stability that enhances confidence and directly contributes to our national security interests.

As we meet the security challenges of the 21st century, we will continue to support future arms control measures and explore new ways at strengthening modern confidence building through technical and innovative means.

THE ROAD TO MISSILE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

FROM:  U.S. DEPARMENT OF STATE
Missile Defense: Road to Cooperation
Remarks Ellen Tauscher
Special Envoy for Strategic Stability and Missile Defense Missile Defense Conference in Russia
Moscow, Russia
May 3, 2012
It is a pleasure to be here today at this important conference on Missile Defense and to present the views of the United States on how cooperation can help establish a new security environment in Europe.

Let me start by thanking Minister Serdyukov (Ser-dyoo-koff) for inviting me to participate today in this conference. I also want to acknowledge my colleagues, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov and Deputy Defense Minister Antonov, with whom I have had the privilege of working with over the last three years. Together we have worked cooperatively to improve the national security of both the United States and Russia.

That cooperation is the key point that I want to emphasize at the start of this speech. The United States and Russia are working closely together on a range of issues. We are working together to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and reduce global nuclear stockpiles—that includes implementing the New START Treaty, which has been in force for more than a year now. We are working together to move materials to and from Afghanistan. We are working together on counter-narcotic and counter-terrorism operations. And, the United States has worked hard to secure Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization.

The most recent report of the Bilateral Presidential Commission, established by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, highlights what our two governments are doing to broaden and deepen our cooperation and to advance our common interests. The photo on the report’s cover is actually a joint U.S.-Russian inspection mission under the Antarctic Treaty; the U.S. team is led by the Department of State. We’re not just working together in the capitals of the world, we’re actually working together at the ends of the world, too.
Cooperation on missile defense would also facilitate improved relations between the United States and Russia. In fact, it could be a game-changer for those relations. It has the potential to enhance the national security of both the United States and Russia, as well as build a genuine strategic partnership. It presents an opportunity to put aside the vestiges of Cold War thinking and move away from Mutually Assured Destruction toward Mutually Assured Stability.

As we think about the path forward, I want to reiterate a point that Madelyn Creedon just made and that Admiral Hendrickson will make later today. Phases 3 and 4 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (as well as Phases 1 and 2, for that matter) will not undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Nothing we do with respect to our missile defense plans will undercut Russia’s national security. It would not be in our interest to do so, would be expensive and technically extremely difficult.

I urge you to pay close attention to the detailed technical arguments that Madelyn and Randy make about why our system cannot do what the Russian Ministry of Defense says it can do. Russia’s analysis makes incorrect assumptions about the capabilities of our systems. It is these differences and misperceptions that are at the root of this issue. If we cannot agree on those perceptions and assumptions, then we need to figure out a path forward to bridge that gap between our two positions. And that is where cooperation comes into play.

Let’s set aside those misperceptions and look at areas in which we could cooperate, which would provide Russia insight into U.S. and NATO plans and programs that will refute the assumptions used in its models.

Sharing of sensor data, working on developing common pre-planned responses, conducting a joint analysis of missile defense systems, and working together on missile defense exercises will allow Russia to see how we do missile defense. Russia has observed our intercept tests in the past and the invitation to observe a future test still stands. By cooperating with us on missile defense, you will be able to see that the European Phased Adaptive Approach is directed against regional threats. Limited regional threats from outside of Europe… not Russia.

Right now, there are six years until Phase 3 of the EPAA becomes operational in 2018. During those six years, we will be testing an Aegis BMD site in Hawaii (that sounds to me like a nice place to visit). We will be developing and testing the SM-3 Block IIA and IIB interceptors. We will also be working with our NATO Allies to ensure how to best protect NATO European populations and territory. Beginning cooperation now will give Russia a chance to see… with their own eyes… what we are doing. And it will give us time to demonstrate how our missile defense systems operate.

I realize it takes time to build confidence. During that time, if you don’t like what you have learned from your experiences working side-by-side with us, then walk away. At least this way, you will be able to make decisions based on data you have collected and observed directly rather than on assumptions and perceptions developed from afar.

As it is, Russia today is in a position of strength that should allow you to explore cooperation. Our missile defense systems are not directed against Russia’s sophisticated nuclear deterrent force. We do not seek an arms race with Russia; we seek cooperation that can help convince you that your national security and strategic stability is not threatened. While Russia talks about countermeasures as a hedge against our defensive system, we hope that instead, through cooperation and transparency, Russia will conclude such development is unnecessary. So join us now, in the missile defense tent.
One of the best ways to build that confidence would be to work with us on NATO-Russia missile defense Centers where we can share sensor data and develop coordinated pre-planned responses and reach agreement on our collective approach to the projected threat. This will give us collectively a common understanding and foundation. Furthermore, we have seen the positive benefit this cooperation could have on missile defense effectiveness at the recent NATO-Russia Council Theater Missile Defense Computer Aided Exercise.

While we undertake this missile defense cooperation, our two governments could do even more to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. We already cooperate in the Missile Technology Control Regime and in the Proliferation Security Initiative. We are working together in the UN to counter Iran and North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Just last month, we worked together in the UN Security Council to strongly condemn the DPRK’s missile launch and placed additional sanctions on transfers of nuclear and ballistic missile technology to and from North Korea. Working together on missile defense would also send a strong message to proliferators that Russia, NATO and the United States are working to counter their efforts.

Should the regional ballistic missile threats be reduced, our missile defense system can adapt accordingly. That is why it is called the Phased Adaptive Approach. It can and will be adapted to changes in the threat.

But let me be clear. While we can work cooperatively together, we cannot agree to the pre-conditions outlined by the Russian Government. We are committed to deploying effective missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland and our Allies and partners around the world from the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

We will not agree to limitations on the capabilities and numbers of our missile defense systems. We cannot agree to a legally binding guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria,” which would, in effect, limit our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional threats such as Iran and North Korea.
We cannot accept limitations on where we deploy our Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of missions around the world, not just for missile defense.

The United States and NATO also cannot agree to Russia’s proposal for “sectoral” missile defense. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of its own territory, NATO must ensure the defense of its own territory.

We are able to agree to a political statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. I have been saying this for many, many months now. Such a political statement would publicly proclaim our intent to cooperate and chart the direction for cooperation.
The United States has also been transparent about our missile defense programs. We have provided Russia with a number of ideas and approaches for transparency. We are also committed to discussing other approaches to building confidence between our two countries. For example, we have also invited Russia to observe one of our Aegis SM-3 missile defense flight tests. Russia could operate in international waters and observe our missile defense test. This would provide Russia the opportunity to see for itself what we are saying about our system.

Russia is a major global power. European security is central to Russia’s security, as it is to the security of the United States and our European allies. Missile defense is the big new idea in European security. We don’t see any other comparable initiative with such potential to transform our relationship. If we can work together on European missile defense, and make this a subject for cooperation rather than competition, that would be a game-changer for our security relationship. We understand that there are risks involved, and it takes courage to move away from familiar ways. We believe those risks are manageable. We can begin now, and if the benefits we see are not realized, cooperation can be terminated at any time.

In a little over two weeks, President Putin and President Obama will meet in Washington. This is an important opportunity for the leaders of our two countries to chart the path forward on missile defense cooperation.

I continue to hope that my Russian colleagues see this as an opportunity that they should take sooner rather than later. I hope that they recognize we have no capability or intent to undermine strategic stability; that our objective is not about winning public relations points; and that cooperation is a much better approach than sticking to the previous patterns of competition.
The United States seeks genuine cooperation. Our objective is to create lasting cooperation and change outdated thinking. This is too important an opportunity to let it pass by.

So we will keep working to see if we can come up with a plan for cooperation. We will continue to press in the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Joint Staff channels, and we will keep moving forward in the run up to the May meeting of our two Presidents and we will keep going long after May.

And I hope, that someday soon, we can begin this important, gamechanging cooperation.
Thank you again for the opportunity to present the United States’ position on cooperation at this conference today. I look forward to continuing the discussion.

RESET OF U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS BRINGS RESULTS

FROM AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE

Official Says U.S.-Russia 'Reset' Holds Challenge, Opportunity

By Karen Parrish

WASHINGTON, April 4, 2012 - The strategic "reset" of relations between the United States and Russia is gradually bringing results, a senior defense policy expert said today.

Celeste A. Wallander, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia policy, discussed challenges and opportunities in U.S.-Russia relations with members of the Women's Foreign Policy Group here today.

The reset strategy is "to cooperate in areas where we can cooperate with Russia, in areas that serve American national interest ... and communicate clearly and honestly" on topics where the two governments don't agree, she said.

The United States and Russia have made some important progress, Wallander noted, including:

-- Implementing the "New START" nuclear arms reduction treaty;

-- Making progress toward agreement on Iran;

-- Achieving some cooperation in the NATO-led Afghanistan mission; and

-- Strengthening defense and security communication both between the two nations and between Russia and NATO.

"The New START treaty was an important achievement. ... It is another step in reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles," she said. The treaty also re-established regular mutual nuclear weapons inspections and meetings involving American and Russian military leaders and nuclear experts, she added.

On Iran, Russia has ended a contract that would have provided that country with Russian-made "very dangerous air defense systems," Wallander said, and Russia supports the Afghanistan effort by allowing U.S. and NATO troops and cargo to travel through its territory.

The U.S.-Russian defense relations working group and the NATO-Russian council allow both regular high-level meetings and daily working-level discussions among U.S., NATO and Russian defense and strategy experts on security issues including countering piracy, narcotics trafficking and terrorism, she added.

Wallander also listed areas where the United States and Russia "don't see eye to eye," including Syria and the U.S. four-phase approach to European missile defense.

Both nations agree the violence in Syria must end, she said, and President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed during their March meeting in Seoul, South Korea, to support the mission to Syria that Kofi Annan has undertaken as a United Nations and Arab League representative.

The two countries have not agreed on whether or when other nations should take action against Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime, she noted, but even in disagreement the U.S.-Russian relationship is "certainly in a better place" than in past years, when representatives and leaders "would have been talking at one another, not with one another."

The United States views Russia as occupying Georgian territory in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Wallander said. While U.S. leaders know Russia's policies about the disputed areas, she added, they "don't accept them."

Georgia and Russia have held regular bilateral talks in Geneva since they first clashed over the two republics in 2008, she noted. She added U.S. support to these talks demonstrates the "reset" strategy, emphasizing that even small steps build transparency and understanding, if not agreement, between Russia and the United States.

The United States takes a similar approach to Russia's objections to the U.S. European missile defense plan, she added. That plan calls for a steady buildup of sea- and land-based systems designed to protect European nations and U.S. troops in Europe from a growing threat of missile attack from the Middle East, particularly Iran, she explained.

Wallander said the plan is based on an assessment that over the next 10 years Iran poses a "small, relatively straightforward nuclear missile threat" to nations in Europe, and the defense systems called for in the phased approach will not have the capability to threaten Russia.

The United States has invited Russia to participate in planning and implementing the missile defense systems, but with little success, she noted. Still, the United States remains "committed to seeking cooperation" on this and other issues, she added.

Civil demonstrations around the recent Russian presidential election demonstrate the long-term potential of the "reset" approach, she noted. The U.S. strategy, she said, aims at a prosperous, secure, militarily modern Russia that has transitioned to fully democratic government and is committed to building regional stability.

"We've seen a Russian ... middle class that wants that, too," Wallander said. "The next couple of years will be really interesting and really important for Russia's future," she said.
 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S STATEMENT IN MOSCOW ON "ARMS CONTROL IN THE INFORMATION AGE"

The following excerpt is from a Department of State e-mail:
Arms Control in the Information Age
Remarks Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)
Moscow, Russia
March 29, 2012 

Thank you for the kind introduction. It is always a pleasure to be back here in Moscow. After spending three years at Carnegie Moscow Center, this city feels like a second home.

As you all probably know, we have just passed the one year anniversary of New START Treaty’s entry into force. I am happy to report that implementation of that Treaty is now underway and it is going very well. As Foreign Minister Lavrov has said, the New START Treaty is "a new gold standard for…agreements of this kind. Not only does the treaty facilitate a strengthening of the security of Russia and the USA but it will also have a positive effect on international stability and security in general."

I could not agree more and New START was just the beginning. President Obama made it clear in his now-famous Prague Speech that the United States is committed to the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. He reiterated his vision in Seoul earlier this week. In his remarks at the Nuclear Security Summit, President Obama said that he “knew that this goal would not be reached quickly, perhaps not in [his] lifetime, but [he] knew we had to begin, with concrete steps.”

In order to pursue the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons, we are going to have to think bigger and bolder. With this is mind, I have been challenging myself and my colleagues to think about how we use the knowledge of our past together with the new tools of the information age. I look out at a crowd like you and realize that I don’t need to convince you that the technologies of the 21^st century are changing the world as we know it. While I may still be figuring out how to use my Ipad, I know it too. That is why I have been talking about arms control in the information age at universities around the United States.

Today, I will talk to you the changing nature of diplomacy and the new technologies that can help us on the road to nuclear zero. I have talked about these subjects at several universities now and I would like to start out by saying the same thing I tell students back in the United States- this is not a policy speech, this is an ideas speech. You are my first audience in Russia.

21^st Century Statecraft

Diplomacy today is very different than it was at the dawn of the nuclear age. Treaties and agreements are not being formulated in vaulted, smoke-filled rooms across green baize tables, among grizzled diplomats with endless amounts of time. More often diplomacy is happening in the open, and at quicker speeds. We diplomats must learn to work and thrive under new circumstances.

In my own experience, diplomacy has changed dramatically before my eyes. I was a junior member of the U.S. START delegation in 1990-91, an experience that served me well when negotiating the New START Treaty. I remember how things were done back then: masses of paper had to be shuttled among delegation members—we were constantly burning up Xerox machines, and faxes flowed from Geneva to Washington and back.

When the New START negotiations began in April 2009, the world had changed. The U.S. and Russian delegations launched into the negotiations committed to keeping them respectful and businesslike, even when we did not agree. And we agreed to disagree in private. That was good considering how easily either delegation could have broadcast negative comments that would have reached Moscow or Washington before we could pick up a phone.

For me, the biggest change in how we did business was email. Instead of making hard copies and waiting days or weeks for the snail mail, we could get information around the delegation and to our leaders in Washington within hours, even minutes. Both classified and unclassified materials could be sent, decreasing necessary trips back to Washington.

After some discussion, we also agreed to exchange negotiating documents with the Russian team electronically, although on disks and not via email. Still, even CDs made a big difference to after-hours communication. There was a famous story about how in the 1990s, during the START talks, a member of the U.S. delegation had to hurl a satchel of negotiating documents over the fence of the Soviet mission to his counterpart, because no guard was there to open the gates late at night. Obviously, a CD could be handed more easily between the bars of the fence--which we did from time to time.

In my view, these new approaches to a formal negotiating process, especially our new digital toolbox, were a big factor in the fast pace of our negotiations--exactly one year from our first meeting to our last one. No longer bogged down by paper processes, things moved quickly. Nowadays, I don’t have to wait until the next time I travel to Geneva or Moscow to advance business with my counterparts; I can email or call from my home or office, and hopefully soon, I can walk across the hall and have a video-chat in our conference room.

New Technologies and Arms Control

Even with a full diplomatic toolbox and new methods for diplomacy, we need to think about how new agreements will be verified. Today, we verify that countries are fulfilling their arms control treaty obligations through a combination of information exchange, notifications of weapon status, on-site inspections, and National Means, including so-called National Technical Means (NTM). NTM are big assets—observation satellites, phased-array radars—that individual countries manage and control. It has long been a rule of arms control treaties that we don’t interfere with each other’s National Technical Means—we allow each other these eyes and ears to monitor treaties. All of the elements I’ve listed work together to make an effective verification regime.

I should say what we mean by effective verification. Ambassador Paul Nitze defined it as follows: “if the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violations in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation.” That’s effective verification, and it has been the benchmark for verifying compliance. To help meet this benchmark, I’ve been asking myself, can we incorporate open source information technologies and social networking into arms control verification and monitoring?

New concepts, I recognize, are not invented overnight, and we don’t understand the full range of possibilities inherent in the information age, but we would be remiss if we did not start thinking about whether new technologies can augment over half a century of arms control negotiating expertise?

Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. They exchange and share ideas on a wide variety of topics, why not put this vast problem solving entity to good use?

Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, could be broadcast globally in seconds. That means it is harder to hide things. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool, and it can help us make sure that countries are following the rules of arms control treaties and agreements.

Open source information technologies improve arms control verification in at least two ways: either as a way of generating new information, or as analysis of information that already is out there.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Red Balloon Challenge is an example of the first. In 2009, in recognition of the 40th anniversary of the Internet, DARPA held a competition where 10 red weather balloons were moored at visible fixed locations around the continental United States. The first team to identify the location of all 10 balloons won a sizable cash prize--$40,000. Over 4,300 teams composed of an estimated 2 million people from 25 countries took part in the challenge. A team from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology won the challenge, identifying all of the balloon locations in an astonishing time of 8 hours and 52 minutes. Of course, to win in such a short time or complete the challenge at all, the MIT team did not “find” the balloons themselves. They tapped into social networks with a unique incentive structure that not only incentivized people to identify a balloon location, but also incentivized people to recruit others to the team. Their win showed the enormous potential of social networking and also demonstrated how incentives can motivate large populations to work toward a common goal.

Now, how could something like this work in an arms control context? Let’s just imagine that a country, to establish itsbona fides in a deep nuclear reduction environment, may wish to open itself to a verification challenge. It could seek to prove it was not stashing extra missiles in the woods, for example, or a fissile material production reactor in the desert. Of course, some form of international supervision would likely be required, to ensure the legitimacy of the challenge and its procedures. And we would have to consider whether such a challenge could cope with especially covert environments, such as caves or deep underground facilities.

A technique like this—I call it a “public verification challenge”—might be especially valuable as we move to lower numbers of nuclear weapons. Governments would have an interest in proving that they are meeting their reduction obligations and may want to engage their publics in helping them to make the case.

It would be necessary to work together to make sure nations cannot spoof or manipulate the verification challenges that they devise. We also have to bear in mind that there could be limitations based on the freedoms available to the citizens of said country. These are both big problems, but I am certain that we can tackle them.

In addition to developing new information, harvesting and analyzing existing information can be helpful, too. Many are analyzing twitter streams, for example: Laila Shareen Sakr, a University of Southern California doctoral candidate, designed a computer program to aggregate twitter data and patterns that enabled her to understand events in both Arab Spring and Libya’s revolution as they were unfolding.

The ability to identify patterns and trends in social networks could aid the arms control verification process. In the most basic sense, social media can draw attention to both routine and abnormal events. We may be able to use data mining to understand where strange effluents are flowing, to recognize patterns of industrial activity, to queue sensors and satellites. Such queuing could help us to make better use of our scarce and expensive National Technical Means, or in some cases to supplement them in important ways. This is a major issue in an age of budget austerity, when the price tag for big hardware like satellites continues to rise. We need this “big hardware”, but we need to use it efficiently.

In this same vein, we should think about what there is to gain from using open source geospatial databases like Google Earth. Of course, NGOs, students and private citizens have been using open sources satellite images for research for some time now.

Now even one of the most famous men in the world is applying these new technological tools to aid in the promotion of human rights in Sudan and South Sudan. Actor George Clooney, in conjunction with ngos, academic institutions and businesses, created the Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP). SSP uses commercial satellite images to systematically monitor and report on possible threats to human security in near real-time.

DigitalGlobe satellites passing over Sudan and South Sudan capture imagery of potential threats to civilians. The satellites can pick up types and varieties of helicopters, tanks and multiple rocket launch systems, among many other items of concern. The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative analyzes imagery and information from sources on the ground to produce reports. The Enough Project then releases the reports to the press and policymakers and sounds the alarm by notifying the news media and civic groups.

The synergy is stunning- private citizens and groups conduct their own monitoring project, analyze the information and then publicize the results via traditional news and social media networks.

Beyond movie stars, the Information Age is creating a greater talent pool of individuals to aid in our pursuits. People can reach a broader, diverse market for their products and services. These private citizens can develop web based applications for e-book readers, cell phones and any touch pad communication devices. This “crowd sourcing” lets everyday people solve problems by getting innovative ideas out of their heads and onto the shelves.

Open source technology could be useful in the hands of inspectors. Smart Phone and tablet apps could be created for the express purpose of aiding in the verification and monitoring process. For example, by having all safeguards and verification sensors in an inspected facility wirelessly connected to the inspector’s iPad, he or she could note anomalies and flag specific items for closer inspections, as well as compare readings in real time and interpret them in context. Some of this is already happening.

As we think through new ways to use these tools, we should be aware that there may be trouble ahead. We cannot assume that information will always be so readily available. As nations and private entities continue to debate the line between privacy and security, it is possible to imagine that we are living in a golden age of open source information that will be harder to take advantage of in future. In the end, the goal of using open source information technology and social networks should be to add to our existing arms control verification capabilities.

As I said at the outset, this is not about policy; this is about coming up with the bold ideas that will shape policy in the future. In Seoul, President Obama said that in “your generation, I see the spirit we need in this endeavor -- an optimism that beats in the hearts of so many young people around the world. It’s that refusal to accept the world as it is, the imagination to see the world as it ought to be, and the courage to turn that vision into reality.”

As the U.S. and Russian governments work to enhance and expand our arms control and nonproliferation efforts, we will need your help to find new ways to use the amazing information tools at our disposal to move the world closer to stable peace and security.

Thank you again for inviting me here to speak.