SECRETARY KERRY'S REMARKS REGARDING MURDER OF BORIS NEMTSOV

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Murder of Boris Nemtsov
Press Statement
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Washington, DC
February 27, 2015

I am shocked and saddened to learn of the brutal murder of former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov in central Moscow. Boris Nemtsov committed his life to a more democratic, prosperous, open Russia, and to strong relationships between Russia and its neighbors and partners, including the United States. He served his country in many roles – in the federal government, in the parliament, as Governor of Nizhniy Novgorod, and as a political leader and activist. In every post, he sought to reform and open Russia, and to empower the Russian people to have a greater say in the life of their country. His absence will be deeply felt in Russia and around the world. The United States urges the Russian authorities to act expeditiously to investigate and bring to justice those responsible. Our thoughts are with the Russian people and with Mr. Nemtsov’s family and friends as we mourn his loss.

SECRETARY KERRY'S PRESS STATEMENT ON 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF JOURNALIST PAUL KLEBNIKOV'S MURDER

FROM:   U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Marking the 10th Anniversary of the Murder of American Journalist Paul Klebnikov

Press Statement

John Kerry

Secretary of State

Washington, DC

July 9, 2014

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Ten years ago today, an American journalist was shot and killed as he left his Moscow office. Paul Klebnikov did more than write about politics and business in Russia. He was a voice of conscience in the fight against corruption.

Paul’s senseless murder was a sickening punch in the gut. Ten years later, we remain deeply troubled that the mystery of who ordered the murder is still unsolved. We continue to call on Russia, as we have over the last decade, to bring the perpetrators of this heinous crime to justice.

It’s not lost on any of us that the unvarnished truth-telling and investigative journalism to which Klebnikov dedicated his life continues to be under attack in Russia. The space for independent voices in Russian media is rapidly shrinking.

Today of all days, we honor the memory of Paul Klebnikov and the other journalists in Russia who have lost their lives. We call on the Russian government to protect journalists from attacks and to respect fundamental freedoms of expression.

SECRETARY OF STATE KERRY'S REMARKS TO STAFF AND FAMILIES OF MOSCOW EMBASSY

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Meeting With Staff and Families of Embassy Moscow
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Spaso House
Moscow, Russia
May 8, 2013

　

AMBASSADOR MCFAUL: Well, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great privilege and honor to have with us today Secretary Kerry. I think we had an extraordinary day of diplomacy yesterday, and two things I just want to say in front of you Secretary Kerry.

Number one, with an incredibly productive, intense at some times, discussion with President Putin, and then later with a marathon day of diplomacy that I think ended at about 2:30 a.m. with Minister Lavrov, we got a new infusion and a new framing and a new strategic vision about how to talk about U.S.-Russian relations. And I want to tell you, Secretary Kerry, your trip could not have come at a better time, and I came away from that meeting thinking we have a very concrete set of issues to work with. We’re not always going to agree, as you said many times yesterday, but I thought the framing at the strategic level was at a very important time in U.S.-Russian relations.

And number two, I just want to say, on Syria in particular, we don’t know how it’s going to end, as you said yesterday many times, but I found it to be extraordinary the amount of time and effort that you are putting to work with our Russians on what I think is one of the biggest issues before our time. So for that infusion of new energy, I thank you greatly. I am enthused to be going back to work tomorrow. I’m glad that you all helped on this trip. And without further ado, ladies and gentlemen, Secretary of State John Kerry. (Applause.)

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you very much. Thank you Mr. Ambassador, Michael. Thanks for the job that you’re doing, and Donna. Where’d Donna go out there? She’s here? Hey, Donna. Thank you very much. I appreciate your work with disabilities and children and everything. Thank you. And that’s Luke. We got Luke here. And Cole’s at school, is that right?

MRS. MCFAUL: Model UN.

SECRETARY KERRY: Oh, no. He’s at the model UN. He’s Helsinki – what am I talking about? – which is very exciting. But anyway, thank you very, very much for what you do.

And it’s always nice to be in the humble home of an ambassador in a foreign country. (Laughter.) I’m looking around here. I was talking to the President the other day, because he’d been to a couple places and I’d been to a couple places. I said, "Boy, these ambassadors have better homes than any of the rest of us." The President said, "Even better than the White House in some cases." But thank you all for coming out here this morning.

And kids, thank you very much for being part of this. You all look terrific. Did I get you out of school? (Laughter.) Yeah. Pretty exciting. So that’s really worthwhile, right? You’ll remember this forever, the guy who got you out of school. You won’t remember who I am or what I do – (laughter) – but gosh, you got out of school for a day and that was really fun.

Anyway, it’s really special for me to be here. Spaso House is an incredible place, historic obviously, when I think that Ambassador Bullitt was here and George Kennan, Ambassador Kennan, and our own Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns. I was here once. I remember doing a big reception here with Bob Strauss when he was here. So historically, we have always had savvy, competent political players who also have a sense of history and an ability to do things in our ambassadors here, and Mike McFaul is no exception to that, and nor are any of you who work here, in terms of the tradition of the importance of this posting.

Russia is complicated, we all know, but vital. And the relationship with a Permanent Five member with as important a capacity to play a global role as Russia is is one of the most important diplomatic postings there is. We have had sort of a merry-go-round/rollercoaster ride over the last 20 years when the Soviet Union no longer – ceased to exist, and we’ve been transitioning. And I don’t think anybody can expect that kind of complicated transition to produce this ideal within this short span of time. It rarely does.

Look at the United States of America. I mean, you think of the 1700s and the turmoil between the Articles of Confederation and then later the Constitution, and then a civil war in the 1860s and then a civil rights movement in the 1960s, and we’re still trying to fill out the full promise of our own country’s Constitution. So we need to be thoughtful as we look at other countries as they go through their economic and social transformations.

And what all of you get to do is not just be sort of present at the creation, to think of a great book about diplomacy, but you get to be shaping the creation and involved in helping people to understand their way forward. There really isn’t a more exciting challenge, to be honest with you. And we can’t do it without you. It doesn’t matter what you do within the Embassy, it doesn’t matter whether you’re a Foreign Service Officer or a Civil Service or whether you are temporarily assigned to duty or whether you are here as a representative of a different agency of government among the many agencies that get housed under an embassy. We all have to work as a team.

And we particularly need the help of the locally hired, locally employed people. Those of you who are Russian or third-party, third-country employees are just as important as anybody else, because we can’t do it without your knowledge of the locality, your ability to guide us, the language abilities, knowing the social customs and the culture. All of that contributes to our ability to be able to be better diplomats.

I had the privilege, last Friday, I think it was – it’s a blur – to swear-in the newest class of young Foreign Service Officers. And it was really interesting. There were a group of former military personnel, former Peace Corps volunteers, former teachers, former journalists. Almost every one of them was coming to this mission with some other work experience behind them. Ninety-eight percent of the people that we brought in in this new class have lived abroad, traveled abroad, studied abroad extensively, and every single one of them had broad language skills.

So I think if you want to pick something to do in life in a world that is going through enormous change and enormous confrontation, there is no more exciting challenge than to be on the frontlines of representing the United States of America, our interests and our values, and working to build relationships with people in other countries. Every single one of you, whether you’re doing an interview in a consulate and you get tired doing it because you got too many people to process every day – you’re the face of America. In many cases, you may be the only government official people ever meet. You’ll be the impression and you’ll be the ambassador of our country to say to those people here’s how we behave in America, here’s what we believe in America, here’s how we treat people in America, here are the door of opportunities that we open to you because we are America.

So stand tall, don’t get tired, keep fighting. I know sometimes it’s frustrating. We’re just starting to get at the bureaucracy and all those kinds of issues. I hate bureaucracy. I’m sure you do too. We’re working hard to try to break down some of the walls and barriers, speed things up. I hope over the course of the next year you’ll begin to see some of those changes.

But from me, from President Obama, from the American people, thank you. A profound thank you to you for being here, for packing up your family, going to a new school. I remember what that was like. I was 11 years old when my dad was in the Foreign Service, and I thought it was the biggest adventure in a lifetime. I didn’t have a clue where I was, but it worked. And so somewhere here, maybe you’re a future Secretary of State. Would you like to be Secretary of State? (Laughter.) She’s nodding her head. Okay, guys. (Laughter.) We got – just wait a few years, when I’m finished. (Laughter.)

It really was a great adventure, and it’s something that has stayed with me all my life, because it helped to open my eyes so I could begin to look at other people not just as an American and not just through our view of the world, but begin to see things through their view of the world. And it’s better to balance things that way and have an understanding of how everybody else thinks works and doesn’t work.

So on behalf of America, thank you for being here in Moscow. And if you’re in a consulate somewhere else and happen to be visiting, thank you for that. But we are profoundly grateful to all of you, and I’m privileged to be here for a couple of days.

We, incidentally, did have a great day yesterday. I think we, hopefully, found a cooperative way forward to maybe try – I can’t guarantee you can – but try to bring people together to deal effectively with Syria and hopefully end bloodshed and see if there isn’t a way to find a way forward. It is not easy. Nothing is easy in this process.

I just met with a group of your civil society folks who are struggling to find their voice in their own country, who courageously stand up and fight for what we take for granted in many cases in America. And so you’re part of that journey too. Every single part of this is a mosaic, are the pieces that all come together to create the values and the policies that represent our great nation.

And I’m very proud to be at the State Department, where I promise you I will have your back. Let me count on you to have mine, and together we’re going to fight hard to make real the values that motivated most of you to join up in the first place. Thank you, and God bless. Appreciate it. (Applause.)

THE ROAD TO MISSILE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

FROM:  U.S. DEPARMENT OF STATE
Missile Defense: Road to Cooperation
Remarks Ellen Tauscher
Special Envoy for Strategic Stability and Missile Defense Missile Defense Conference in Russia
Moscow, Russia
May 3, 2012
It is a pleasure to be here today at this important conference on Missile Defense and to present the views of the United States on how cooperation can help establish a new security environment in Europe.

Let me start by thanking Minister Serdyukov (Ser-dyoo-koff) for inviting me to participate today in this conference. I also want to acknowledge my colleagues, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov and Deputy Defense Minister Antonov, with whom I have had the privilege of working with over the last three years. Together we have worked cooperatively to improve the national security of both the United States and Russia.

That cooperation is the key point that I want to emphasize at the start of this speech. The United States and Russia are working closely together on a range of issues. We are working together to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and reduce global nuclear stockpiles—that includes implementing the New START Treaty, which has been in force for more than a year now. We are working together to move materials to and from Afghanistan. We are working together on counter-narcotic and counter-terrorism operations. And, the United States has worked hard to secure Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization.

The most recent report of the Bilateral Presidential Commission, established by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, highlights what our two governments are doing to broaden and deepen our cooperation and to advance our common interests. The photo on the report’s cover is actually a joint U.S.-Russian inspection mission under the Antarctic Treaty; the U.S. team is led by the Department of State. We’re not just working together in the capitals of the world, we’re actually working together at the ends of the world, too.
Cooperation on missile defense would also facilitate improved relations between the United States and Russia. In fact, it could be a game-changer for those relations. It has the potential to enhance the national security of both the United States and Russia, as well as build a genuine strategic partnership. It presents an opportunity to put aside the vestiges of Cold War thinking and move away from Mutually Assured Destruction toward Mutually Assured Stability.

As we think about the path forward, I want to reiterate a point that Madelyn Creedon just made and that Admiral Hendrickson will make later today. Phases 3 and 4 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (as well as Phases 1 and 2, for that matter) will not undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Nothing we do with respect to our missile defense plans will undercut Russia’s national security. It would not be in our interest to do so, would be expensive and technically extremely difficult.

I urge you to pay close attention to the detailed technical arguments that Madelyn and Randy make about why our system cannot do what the Russian Ministry of Defense says it can do. Russia’s analysis makes incorrect assumptions about the capabilities of our systems. It is these differences and misperceptions that are at the root of this issue. If we cannot agree on those perceptions and assumptions, then we need to figure out a path forward to bridge that gap between our two positions. And that is where cooperation comes into play.

Let’s set aside those misperceptions and look at areas in which we could cooperate, which would provide Russia insight into U.S. and NATO plans and programs that will refute the assumptions used in its models.

Sharing of sensor data, working on developing common pre-planned responses, conducting a joint analysis of missile defense systems, and working together on missile defense exercises will allow Russia to see how we do missile defense. Russia has observed our intercept tests in the past and the invitation to observe a future test still stands. By cooperating with us on missile defense, you will be able to see that the European Phased Adaptive Approach is directed against regional threats. Limited regional threats from outside of Europe… not Russia.

Right now, there are six years until Phase 3 of the EPAA becomes operational in 2018. During those six years, we will be testing an Aegis BMD site in Hawaii (that sounds to me like a nice place to visit). We will be developing and testing the SM-3 Block IIA and IIB interceptors. We will also be working with our NATO Allies to ensure how to best protect NATO European populations and territory. Beginning cooperation now will give Russia a chance to see… with their own eyes… what we are doing. And it will give us time to demonstrate how our missile defense systems operate.

I realize it takes time to build confidence. During that time, if you don’t like what you have learned from your experiences working side-by-side with us, then walk away. At least this way, you will be able to make decisions based on data you have collected and observed directly rather than on assumptions and perceptions developed from afar.

As it is, Russia today is in a position of strength that should allow you to explore cooperation. Our missile defense systems are not directed against Russia’s sophisticated nuclear deterrent force. We do not seek an arms race with Russia; we seek cooperation that can help convince you that your national security and strategic stability is not threatened. While Russia talks about countermeasures as a hedge against our defensive system, we hope that instead, through cooperation and transparency, Russia will conclude such development is unnecessary. So join us now, in the missile defense tent.
One of the best ways to build that confidence would be to work with us on NATO-Russia missile defense Centers where we can share sensor data and develop coordinated pre-planned responses and reach agreement on our collective approach to the projected threat. This will give us collectively a common understanding and foundation. Furthermore, we have seen the positive benefit this cooperation could have on missile defense effectiveness at the recent NATO-Russia Council Theater Missile Defense Computer Aided Exercise.

While we undertake this missile defense cooperation, our two governments could do even more to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. We already cooperate in the Missile Technology Control Regime and in the Proliferation Security Initiative. We are working together in the UN to counter Iran and North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Just last month, we worked together in the UN Security Council to strongly condemn the DPRK’s missile launch and placed additional sanctions on transfers of nuclear and ballistic missile technology to and from North Korea. Working together on missile defense would also send a strong message to proliferators that Russia, NATO and the United States are working to counter their efforts.

Should the regional ballistic missile threats be reduced, our missile defense system can adapt accordingly. That is why it is called the Phased Adaptive Approach. It can and will be adapted to changes in the threat.

But let me be clear. While we can work cooperatively together, we cannot agree to the pre-conditions outlined by the Russian Government. We are committed to deploying effective missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland and our Allies and partners around the world from the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

We will not agree to limitations on the capabilities and numbers of our missile defense systems. We cannot agree to a legally binding guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria,” which would, in effect, limit our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional threats such as Iran and North Korea.
We cannot accept limitations on where we deploy our Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of missions around the world, not just for missile defense.

The United States and NATO also cannot agree to Russia’s proposal for “sectoral” missile defense. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of its own territory, NATO must ensure the defense of its own territory.

We are able to agree to a political statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. I have been saying this for many, many months now. Such a political statement would publicly proclaim our intent to cooperate and chart the direction for cooperation.
The United States has also been transparent about our missile defense programs. We have provided Russia with a number of ideas and approaches for transparency. We are also committed to discussing other approaches to building confidence between our two countries. For example, we have also invited Russia to observe one of our Aegis SM-3 missile defense flight tests. Russia could operate in international waters and observe our missile defense test. This would provide Russia the opportunity to see for itself what we are saying about our system.

Russia is a major global power. European security is central to Russia’s security, as it is to the security of the United States and our European allies. Missile defense is the big new idea in European security. We don’t see any other comparable initiative with such potential to transform our relationship. If we can work together on European missile defense, and make this a subject for cooperation rather than competition, that would be a game-changer for our security relationship. We understand that there are risks involved, and it takes courage to move away from familiar ways. We believe those risks are manageable. We can begin now, and if the benefits we see are not realized, cooperation can be terminated at any time.

In a little over two weeks, President Putin and President Obama will meet in Washington. This is an important opportunity for the leaders of our two countries to chart the path forward on missile defense cooperation.

I continue to hope that my Russian colleagues see this as an opportunity that they should take sooner rather than later. I hope that they recognize we have no capability or intent to undermine strategic stability; that our objective is not about winning public relations points; and that cooperation is a much better approach than sticking to the previous patterns of competition.
The United States seeks genuine cooperation. Our objective is to create lasting cooperation and change outdated thinking. This is too important an opportunity to let it pass by.

So we will keep working to see if we can come up with a plan for cooperation. We will continue to press in the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Joint Staff channels, and we will keep moving forward in the run up to the May meeting of our two Presidents and we will keep going long after May.

And I hope, that someday soon, we can begin this important, gamechanging cooperation.
Thank you again for the opportunity to present the United States’ position on cooperation at this conference today. I look forward to continuing the discussion.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S STATEMENT IN MOSCOW ON "ARMS CONTROL IN THE INFORMATION AGE"

The following excerpt is from a Department of State e-mail:
Arms Control in the Information Age
Remarks Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)
Moscow, Russia
March 29, 2012 

Thank you for the kind introduction. It is always a pleasure to be back here in Moscow. After spending three years at Carnegie Moscow Center, this city feels like a second home.

As you all probably know, we have just passed the one year anniversary of New START Treaty’s entry into force. I am happy to report that implementation of that Treaty is now underway and it is going very well. As Foreign Minister Lavrov has said, the New START Treaty is "a new gold standard for…agreements of this kind. Not only does the treaty facilitate a strengthening of the security of Russia and the USA but it will also have a positive effect on international stability and security in general."

I could not agree more and New START was just the beginning. President Obama made it clear in his now-famous Prague Speech that the United States is committed to the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. He reiterated his vision in Seoul earlier this week. In his remarks at the Nuclear Security Summit, President Obama said that he “knew that this goal would not be reached quickly, perhaps not in [his] lifetime, but [he] knew we had to begin, with concrete steps.”

In order to pursue the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons, we are going to have to think bigger and bolder. With this is mind, I have been challenging myself and my colleagues to think about how we use the knowledge of our past together with the new tools of the information age. I look out at a crowd like you and realize that I don’t need to convince you that the technologies of the 21^st century are changing the world as we know it. While I may still be figuring out how to use my Ipad, I know it too. That is why I have been talking about arms control in the information age at universities around the United States.

Today, I will talk to you the changing nature of diplomacy and the new technologies that can help us on the road to nuclear zero. I have talked about these subjects at several universities now and I would like to start out by saying the same thing I tell students back in the United States- this is not a policy speech, this is an ideas speech. You are my first audience in Russia.

21^st Century Statecraft

Diplomacy today is very different than it was at the dawn of the nuclear age. Treaties and agreements are not being formulated in vaulted, smoke-filled rooms across green baize tables, among grizzled diplomats with endless amounts of time. More often diplomacy is happening in the open, and at quicker speeds. We diplomats must learn to work and thrive under new circumstances.

In my own experience, diplomacy has changed dramatically before my eyes. I was a junior member of the U.S. START delegation in 1990-91, an experience that served me well when negotiating the New START Treaty. I remember how things were done back then: masses of paper had to be shuttled among delegation members—we were constantly burning up Xerox machines, and faxes flowed from Geneva to Washington and back.

When the New START negotiations began in April 2009, the world had changed. The U.S. and Russian delegations launched into the negotiations committed to keeping them respectful and businesslike, even when we did not agree. And we agreed to disagree in private. That was good considering how easily either delegation could have broadcast negative comments that would have reached Moscow or Washington before we could pick up a phone.

For me, the biggest change in how we did business was email. Instead of making hard copies and waiting days or weeks for the snail mail, we could get information around the delegation and to our leaders in Washington within hours, even minutes. Both classified and unclassified materials could be sent, decreasing necessary trips back to Washington.

After some discussion, we also agreed to exchange negotiating documents with the Russian team electronically, although on disks and not via email. Still, even CDs made a big difference to after-hours communication. There was a famous story about how in the 1990s, during the START talks, a member of the U.S. delegation had to hurl a satchel of negotiating documents over the fence of the Soviet mission to his counterpart, because no guard was there to open the gates late at night. Obviously, a CD could be handed more easily between the bars of the fence--which we did from time to time.

In my view, these new approaches to a formal negotiating process, especially our new digital toolbox, were a big factor in the fast pace of our negotiations--exactly one year from our first meeting to our last one. No longer bogged down by paper processes, things moved quickly. Nowadays, I don’t have to wait until the next time I travel to Geneva or Moscow to advance business with my counterparts; I can email or call from my home or office, and hopefully soon, I can walk across the hall and have a video-chat in our conference room.

New Technologies and Arms Control

Even with a full diplomatic toolbox and new methods for diplomacy, we need to think about how new agreements will be verified. Today, we verify that countries are fulfilling their arms control treaty obligations through a combination of information exchange, notifications of weapon status, on-site inspections, and National Means, including so-called National Technical Means (NTM). NTM are big assets—observation satellites, phased-array radars—that individual countries manage and control. It has long been a rule of arms control treaties that we don’t interfere with each other’s National Technical Means—we allow each other these eyes and ears to monitor treaties. All of the elements I’ve listed work together to make an effective verification regime.

I should say what we mean by effective verification. Ambassador Paul Nitze defined it as follows: “if the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violations in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation.” That’s effective verification, and it has been the benchmark for verifying compliance. To help meet this benchmark, I’ve been asking myself, can we incorporate open source information technologies and social networking into arms control verification and monitoring?

New concepts, I recognize, are not invented overnight, and we don’t understand the full range of possibilities inherent in the information age, but we would be remiss if we did not start thinking about whether new technologies can augment over half a century of arms control negotiating expertise?

Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. They exchange and share ideas on a wide variety of topics, why not put this vast problem solving entity to good use?

Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, could be broadcast globally in seconds. That means it is harder to hide things. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool, and it can help us make sure that countries are following the rules of arms control treaties and agreements.

Open source information technologies improve arms control verification in at least two ways: either as a way of generating new information, or as analysis of information that already is out there.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Red Balloon Challenge is an example of the first. In 2009, in recognition of the 40th anniversary of the Internet, DARPA held a competition where 10 red weather balloons were moored at visible fixed locations around the continental United States. The first team to identify the location of all 10 balloons won a sizable cash prize--$40,000. Over 4,300 teams composed of an estimated 2 million people from 25 countries took part in the challenge. A team from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology won the challenge, identifying all of the balloon locations in an astonishing time of 8 hours and 52 minutes. Of course, to win in such a short time or complete the challenge at all, the MIT team did not “find” the balloons themselves. They tapped into social networks with a unique incentive structure that not only incentivized people to identify a balloon location, but also incentivized people to recruit others to the team. Their win showed the enormous potential of social networking and also demonstrated how incentives can motivate large populations to work toward a common goal.

Now, how could something like this work in an arms control context? Let’s just imagine that a country, to establish itsbona fides in a deep nuclear reduction environment, may wish to open itself to a verification challenge. It could seek to prove it was not stashing extra missiles in the woods, for example, or a fissile material production reactor in the desert. Of course, some form of international supervision would likely be required, to ensure the legitimacy of the challenge and its procedures. And we would have to consider whether such a challenge could cope with especially covert environments, such as caves or deep underground facilities.

A technique like this—I call it a “public verification challenge”—might be especially valuable as we move to lower numbers of nuclear weapons. Governments would have an interest in proving that they are meeting their reduction obligations and may want to engage their publics in helping them to make the case.

It would be necessary to work together to make sure nations cannot spoof or manipulate the verification challenges that they devise. We also have to bear in mind that there could be limitations based on the freedoms available to the citizens of said country. These are both big problems, but I am certain that we can tackle them.

In addition to developing new information, harvesting and analyzing existing information can be helpful, too. Many are analyzing twitter streams, for example: Laila Shareen Sakr, a University of Southern California doctoral candidate, designed a computer program to aggregate twitter data and patterns that enabled her to understand events in both Arab Spring and Libya’s revolution as they were unfolding.

The ability to identify patterns and trends in social networks could aid the arms control verification process. In the most basic sense, social media can draw attention to both routine and abnormal events. We may be able to use data mining to understand where strange effluents are flowing, to recognize patterns of industrial activity, to queue sensors and satellites. Such queuing could help us to make better use of our scarce and expensive National Technical Means, or in some cases to supplement them in important ways. This is a major issue in an age of budget austerity, when the price tag for big hardware like satellites continues to rise. We need this “big hardware”, but we need to use it efficiently.

In this same vein, we should think about what there is to gain from using open source geospatial databases like Google Earth. Of course, NGOs, students and private citizens have been using open sources satellite images for research for some time now.

Now even one of the most famous men in the world is applying these new technological tools to aid in the promotion of human rights in Sudan and South Sudan. Actor George Clooney, in conjunction with ngos, academic institutions and businesses, created the Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP). SSP uses commercial satellite images to systematically monitor and report on possible threats to human security in near real-time.

DigitalGlobe satellites passing over Sudan and South Sudan capture imagery of potential threats to civilians. The satellites can pick up types and varieties of helicopters, tanks and multiple rocket launch systems, among many other items of concern. The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative analyzes imagery and information from sources on the ground to produce reports. The Enough Project then releases the reports to the press and policymakers and sounds the alarm by notifying the news media and civic groups.

The synergy is stunning- private citizens and groups conduct their own monitoring project, analyze the information and then publicize the results via traditional news and social media networks.

Beyond movie stars, the Information Age is creating a greater talent pool of individuals to aid in our pursuits. People can reach a broader, diverse market for their products and services. These private citizens can develop web based applications for e-book readers, cell phones and any touch pad communication devices. This “crowd sourcing” lets everyday people solve problems by getting innovative ideas out of their heads and onto the shelves.

Open source technology could be useful in the hands of inspectors. Smart Phone and tablet apps could be created for the express purpose of aiding in the verification and monitoring process. For example, by having all safeguards and verification sensors in an inspected facility wirelessly connected to the inspector’s iPad, he or she could note anomalies and flag specific items for closer inspections, as well as compare readings in real time and interpret them in context. Some of this is already happening.

As we think through new ways to use these tools, we should be aware that there may be trouble ahead. We cannot assume that information will always be so readily available. As nations and private entities continue to debate the line between privacy and security, it is possible to imagine that we are living in a golden age of open source information that will be harder to take advantage of in future. In the end, the goal of using open source information technology and social networks should be to add to our existing arms control verification capabilities.

As I said at the outset, this is not about policy; this is about coming up with the bold ideas that will shape policy in the future. In Seoul, President Obama said that in “your generation, I see the spirit we need in this endeavor -- an optimism that beats in the hearts of so many young people around the world. It’s that refusal to accept the world as it is, the imagination to see the world as it ought to be, and the courage to turn that vision into reality.”

As the U.S. and Russian governments work to enhance and expand our arms control and nonproliferation efforts, we will need your help to find new ways to use the amazing information tools at our disposal to move the world closer to stable peace and security.

Thank you again for inviting me here to speak.