THOMAS COUNTRYMAN'S REMARKS AT INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
03/11/2015 08:22 AM EDT
Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
Remarks
Thomas M. Countryman
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
London, United Kingdom
March 6, 2015

Thank you Mark for the invitation. Having worked with IISS for years on a number of your publications, I am very happy to finally get the chance to visit your headquarters and on a auspicious day. Yesterday marked the 45th anniversary of the entry into force of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty so it is an appropriate time to consider what we have accomplished and how we can approach the Review Conference starting next month. We want to keep in mind the big picture throughout. This treaty in my opinion is the most successful multilateral treaty in the history of diplomacy. It has played a fundamental and irreplaceable role in promoting the security of every state that has become a party to the treaty. It is the common foundation for goals that we share in disarmament and nonproliferation and it lays the basis for the cooperation globally in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Upholding and strengthening the treaty is central to President Obama’s Prague agenda and his commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. The treaty is not perfect, it is not immune to challenge, but it is irreplaceable and could not be replicated if we allow it to fall apart.

The NPT Treaty and Review Conference

So let’s consider the significant accomplishments of the treaty. First it provides a framework for ending the nuclear arms race, for the vast reductions in global nuclear stockpiles we have already achieved, particularly in the United States, and for reinforcing the strong taboo against use of nuclear weapons. It has succeeded in limiting the number of states that possess nuclear weapons. Projections in the 1960s before the treaty was negotiated were that by the turn of the century there would have been dozens of states possessing nuclear weapons. Instead that number has barely increased in the last 45 years. The treaty established durable, international legal obligations designed to prevent proliferation of weapons. It gives direction to safeguards and export control regimes that are needed to sustain the treaty, and it has promoted peaceful nuclear trade and assistance for energy and development throughout the world.

We are looking forward to a successful Review Conference or RevCon or short. We have been working with and will continue to work with all parties, and with particular focus on explaining our position better to Non-aligned states, in order to advance realistic and achievable objectives that reinforce and uphold the treaty. We seek a balanced review of all three pillars. As you know the three pillars are described as disarmament by the nuclear weapons states, nonproliferation and the commitment to avoid acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states, and the benefits of peaceful uses to all states. In the 2010 Review Conference, we agreed on an action plan by consensus. This was a breakthrough achievement. It was the most detailed, and substantive conclusion ever in the history of review processes. That action plan is valid today. It is a useful yardstick for implementing steps that strengthen the treaty. It is not, however, a deadline; it was not a time limited action plan. We need now at next month’s conference to take stock of the action plan and update it. We developed a series of working papers on how to update the action plan which we are now circulating in diplomatic channels. We want to reinforce all the parts that are relevant, which is most of it, and identify what can be advanced as a result of next month’s Review Conference. And of course we are actively studying all the papers produced by friends around the world because they contain valuable ideas on how to advance the goals of disarmament and nonproliferation.

Now one hallmark of our preparation has been greater transparency about U.S. nuclear weapons, about their quantity, their alert status, and their role in our military doctrine. The report we gave last year to the Preparatory Committee was unprecedented in providing insight into our nuclear weapons program. No other state has ever provided so much information and we intend to surpass it next month in the Review Conference. Similarly, we have invited a group of senior, foreign government officials to visit our national nuclear laboratories in New Mexico to encourage a more open and transparent dialogue on U.S. policies.

Nonproliferation Pillar

To get to a success in New York next month does not require consensus on a final document but it is desirable and we will do all we can to achieve it. Success can also be measured by the degree of consensus on advancing all three pillars on nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses. Let me spend just a couple more minutes on our priorities in each of these pillars. On nonproliferation, we want to ensure that the international verification of obligations under the NPT remains effective and robust. That means it requires political, technical, and resource commitments from the world. We will continue to promote the IAEA Additional Protocol which represents the highest standard for verification that states are meeting the NPT safeguards requirements. We have an active program through my bureau of the State Department to help states that seek assistance to implement their safeguard obligations. We need to give a strong statement of support to the International Atomic Energy Agency which has the responsibility for implementing safeguards. Most recently, this includes implementing the advanced idea of the State-level concept about which we could talk more.

The International Atomic Energy Agency deserves the highest degree of independence, expertise, and resources in order to accomplish its crucial mission. We need to underscore that noncompliance by the treaty’s members, that is by a state party, undermines the overall integrity of the NPT. We need to discuss how to hold accountable violators of the their own obligations and we also want to develop a consensus about how to address states that may abuse Article 10 of the treaty which gives states the right to withdraw from the NPT. We’ve been part of a group that has built a very wide consensus on this topic.

Peaceful Uses Pillar

On peaceful uses of nuclear science, at the RevCon we will address and advance our record of promoting the availability and sharing of peaceful benefits of the atom. We will highlight nuclear trade and the considerable amount that we spend in assisting states to provide for safety and security in nuclear energy use. At the 2010 conference then-Secretary Clinton announced the Peaceful Uses Initiative which was intended to expand the fund of money that the IAEA has to provide technical cooperation in developing countries. We have provided nearly $200 million dollars to this and other technical cooperation programs since 2010, and I expect we will make a new commitment on this at the Review Conference.

We will detail the progress made through the Nuclear Security Summit process initiated by President Obama. As a result of this process the number of facilities and countries around the world that possess highly enriched uranium or plutonium has decreased markedly. Security of storage sites of fissile materials is much greater, and more countries are prepared to counter nuclear smuggling. We also of course will discuss nuclear safety. Since the 2010 action plan we’ve seen the tragedy of Fukushima, and we note our support for a more wide range of programs to advance nuclear safety -- for example, the declaration of the diplomatic conference on the Convention of Nuclear Safety issued in Vienna last month. We will also use the Review Conference to seek support for new frameworks for peaceful nuclear cooperation such as an arrangement for a fuel bank facility in Kazakhstan that we hope to see finalized this year.

Disarmament Pillar

On the disarmament pillar, the U.S. commitment to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons remains firm. We continue to actively pursue nuclear disarmament in keeping with the commitment that we made under Article 6 of the treaty. We work hard to put in place the building blocks for nuclear disarmament. This approach of discrete, practical steps has achieved major reductions in nuclear weapons and fissile material stocks over several decades and continues to do so. It is a practical approach. It is a verifiable approach, and we’re prepared to explain it and defend it at the Review Conference. When I say discrete steps, it doesn’t mean one thing at a time; it means we are pursuing many channels in order to lay the groundwork for future efforts in bilateral arms reduction with the Russian Federation and in multilateral arms reduction. This includes not only changes to the U.S. arsenal and U.S. policies, but also requires building confidence and transparency with other nuclear states, including by cooperating on our nonproliferation goals. Each step that we have taken over the years has helped to create the conditions and build momentum for subsequent steps.

Some states party to the treaty are dissatisfied with the recent pace of disarmament but the fact remains that since the last Review Conference the New START Treaty has entered into force, and it is being implemented in terms of its notifications and inspections on a faithful basis by both the Russian Federation and the United States. By the time we reach the levels set by the treaty for 2018, the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal will be at its lowest level since before I was born and that was when Mr. Eisenhower was president. But we also have to show readiness to do more. President Obama offered nearly two years ago to pursue further negotiated reductions with Russia with the goal of cutting our deployed nuclear weapons by another one third. That offer is still on the table. We are ready to engage with Russia on the full range of issues affecting strategic stability, but we’re also realistic about how much can be achieved without a willing partner in the current difficult strategic environment. A new Russian security doctrine which explicitly reprioritizes its nuclear forces is obviously creating a new and direct challenge to bilateral disarmament efforts.

Nuclear Weapons Free Zone – Middle East

Let me speak to one special topic from the 2010 RevCon that I know is of interest around the world. At the 2010 Review Conference the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom, as depositaries of the Nonproliferation Treaty, accepted a commitment that we would before the end of 2012 convene a conference to discuss the creation of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. Well we are now in the 39th month of 2012 and we haven’t yet succeeded in convening a conference. This is a very specific commitment we made and I think it requires explanation to the world of everything that we have done to try to make this possible. Here I would also note that despite differences with Russia on major issues, we have continued to cooperate well with the U.K., Russia and the UN on this particular point.

The commitment to convene a conference said explicitly that it should be attended by all states of the region, which is to include Israel. Israel, however, is not a member of the NPT and has no legal obligation to honor an invitation to the conference. Israel could, however, be persuaded and over the last three and a half years, through tireless efforts of Russia and the U.K. and the United Nations, and our facilitator Ambassador Laajava of Finland, but especially from the United States, we have reached a point where Israel accepts the value of holding such a conference which it sees as a venue for discussing not just creation of a WMD free zone in the Middle East, but a forum for discussing related security issues that must be addressed if a weapons free zone in the Middle East is to be successful. Over the past year and a half Ambassador Laajava and these three states, together with the UN, have convened five unofficial or informal meetings at which multiple Arab delegations and Israeli diplomats sat at the same table and discussed - for the first time in twenty years - regional security issues.

As a consequence, there is a better understanding by all sides of what are the obstacles and political conditions necessary for creation for such a zone are, and there is a better understanding of our Arab friends who have worked very hard on this issue and shown innovation and flexibility at times, a better understanding that this is not simply a technical exercise of taking the Africa Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty and changing the names. It is a political process. It is a diplomatic process. It is a negotiation process, not just a technical drafting process. We remain hopeful even before the RevCon that additional contact between Israel and the Arabs on this issue will allow us to agree on an agenda and set a date for the convening of such a conference.

Conclusion

Let me just conclude by saying that we don’t just focus on the NPT every five years. It is the constant job of my bureau within the State Department to focus on the assignments and specific obligations that the treaty has given not just to the U.S., not just to the five recognized nuclear weapons states, but to every state party to the treaty. It’s a continual process of upholding and strengthening the treaty. It commands vigilance, and effort. It requires states to watch out for the kind of technical trade that they conduct with states such as North Korea and Iran. It means that we have to take greater responsibility to resolve conflicts that could become temptations for proliferation. We have to seek consensus, we have to identify areas of agreement with states that have a different set of priorities than the United States. Of course progress elsewhere will contribute to success at this conference and in subsequent years, and here of course I am particularly hopeful that Iran will be able to take “yes” for an answer and sign a substantive agreement with the P5 + 1 that ends the possibility of Iranian pursuit of a nuclear weapon.

I am less hopeful but never totally pessimistic that we’ll make similar progress with North Korea within the months ahead and of course I hope to see a reduction of tensions in Asia, the one area of the world in which the number of nuclear weapons is increasing. So overall I am optimistic that we can build on the success of the 2010 Review Conference. We look forward to working with all parties who share our interest in achieving an objective, balanced and realistic text. It is essential not just for the security of the world but for the vision that all of us need to keep in our heads, the prospect of finally achieving a world without nuclear weapons. So thank you and I look forward to questions and ideas that you may want to give me.

SECRETARY OF STATE KERRY'S REMARKS IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

FROM:   U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Press Availability
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Geneva, Switzerland
November 10, 2013

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you for hanging in here with all of us in what has obviously been a long and interesting process, but a very productive one if I can say so. I want to thank my colleagues from the United Kingdom, Turkey, France, Russia and China. And I particularly want to thank Lady Catherine Ashton for her leadership and for the European Union’s convening all of us here in order to perform this very important business of trying to deal with the question of a country’s potential move towards nuclear weapons. And obviously, the commitment by the President, by all of the member states of the P5+1 and others in the world makes certain that that doesn’t happen, that Iran does not get a nuclear weapon.

I want to say that the negotiations were conducted with mutual respect. They were very serious. But they were conducted in a very civil and appropriate way for a subject matter as serious as this one. And we came to Geneva determined. As President Obama has said, his goal is, since day one as President, to make certain that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. That remains our goal because we remain committed to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and we remain committed to protecting our allies, particularly our allies in that region where security is so critical. We also are committed to protecting our interests in the world from the consequences of the spread of these weapons.

We came to Geneva to narrow the differences. And I can tell you without any exaggeration we not only narrowed differences and clarified those that remain, but we made significant progress in working through the approaches to this question of how one brings in a program that guarantees this peaceful nature. There’s no question in my mind that we are closer now, as we leave Geneva, than we were when we came, and that with good work and good faith over the course of the next weeks, we can in fact secure our goal.

And over the last two days, a significant amount of progress was made. I am impressed and grateful for the way in which the P5[1] countries joined together and worked effectively together, the teams worked effectively together. And I think that tonight there was a unity in our position and a unity in the purpose as we leave here. We are committed to have our political directors – and I think Lady Catherine Ashton probably shared this with you – meet in the next days, and we are also committed to returning as necessary somewhere over the next weeks, hopefully, with the goal of either building on what was done today or completing the task.

Let me just say that for those who are wondering about this kind of process, it takes time to build confidence between countries that have really been at odds with each other for a long time now – in the case of Iran, since 1979. And so we are working hard to try to overcome mistrust, to try to build confidence, to try to find the ways that both the P5+1 and the united – and Iran have the ability to be able to achieve this goal of ascertaining for certain, without a doubt, that a program is a peaceful nuclear program.

Diplomacy takes time, and all the parties here need time to fully consider the issues – very complicated, technical, difficult issues that we discussed here in the last days. And I particularly am anxious to return to brief the President and to share with Congress and others what we’ve learned and what we are thinking as we look forward. We also understand there are very strong feelings about the consequences of the choices we face for our allies, and we respect that. Some of them are absolutely directly, immediately involved and we have enormous respect, needless to say, for those concerns.

I want to caution everyone from jumping to conclusions or believing premature reports or prejudging outcomes or, particularly, believing either rumors or other little parcels of information that somebody portends to know or that leak out. The fact is that the negotiations are actually taking place enormously privately, and that is a sign of the seriousness of what is taking place. We have been working on this for a long time. The P5+1 has been at this for something like four years or more. I know that I’ve been watching and engaged in this effort as a Senator and now as Secretary of State for some period of time, and so I am aware of the complicated nature of this particular challenge.

But we came to Geneva with the clear purpose of trying to advance the goal of preventing Iran from securing a nuclear weapon, and I believe we leave this round of talks not only committed, recommitted to that goal, but clearly further down the road in understanding what the remaining challenges are and clarifying the ways that we can actually do certain things together to reach that goal.

I would emphasize also that the window for diplomacy does not stay open indefinitely, and we will continue working to find a peaceful solution because we believe that forceful diplomacy is a powerful enough weapon to be able to actually defuse the world’s most threatening weapons of mass destruction. And that’s why we’ll continue to do this.

So with that, I’m happy to answer a couple of questions here, see where we are.

MS. PSAKI: The first question is going to be from Kim Ghattas of BBC.

QUESTION: Good evening, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY KERRY: Good evening – good morning.

QUESTION: Good morning.

SECRETARY KERRY: It’s all right.

QUESTION: I can only imagine how tired you are.

SECRETARY KERRY: (Inaudible.)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two questions. How much coordination takes place between the members of the P5+1 ahead of a meeting like this? Were you blindsided by the French and their objections to the agreement? And a second question is, you don’t have a deal yet; you’re hoping to get one in the coming weeks with further negotiations. But that does give detractors of a deal with Iran time to derail your work. I’m thinking of Israel. I’m thinking of Saudi Arabia, but also of Congress in the U.S. Are you worried that Congress is going to push once again for further sanctions against Iran?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, let me answer the second part of your question first, and just tell you point blank that this is an issue of such consequence that it really needs to rise or fall on the merits, not on politics. People need to stop and think about what happens each day now that you don’t have an agreement. Each day that you don’t have an agreement, Iran will continue to enrich, and Iran will continue to put centrifuges in, and Iran will continue its program. What we were looking to do here – and will do, I believe – is freeze that program in place so that it is not in a position to continue while the real negotiation goes on to figure out what the future final agreement would look like. And that takes time.

Now, it seems to me that the members of Congress and others in the world understand that you need to give diplomacy the chance to exhaust all the remedies available to it if you are ultimately going to exercise your ultimate option, which is the potential use of force. The world wants to know that it was a last resort, not a first resort. So I believe it is essential for Congress, essential for all of our countries – and I think we all share this – the P5+1 is absolutely united in the notion that we must pursue diplomacy as a means of trying to prevent Iran from acquiring a weapon. We know the clock is ticking. That is part of what makes this urgent. But I am convinced that over these next days, the reasonableness of what we were doing and the reality of what we achieve will be taken into account by those who need to know what that is, and that will be shared as appropriate as we get back.

With respect to the negotiation itself, we work very closely with the French. We agreed with the French that there were certain issues that we needed to work through. We came here with bracketed language. That’s the nature of a negotiation. And we knew that we were going to have to negotiate going forward, and we did. And I think we were unified in feeling we needed certain language here that clarified certain things. I certainly came in here intending to do that, and that’s what the President wanted me to do.

The President has repeatedly said we will not rush to an agreement. The President has made clear that no deal is better than a bad deal. And I think it’s good we’re going to take the time we’re taking to make certain that we are dotting the i’s and crossing the t’s and doing what is necessary to have an agreement – that we are assured we can look our allies and our friends in the face and say, “This gets the job done.” That’s the purpose of it.

So we thank the – we’re grateful to the French for the work that we did together, and we worked also – every member there made contributions in one way or another. That’s the nature of the P5[2]. These are sovereign nations. No one country is going to come rolling in here, one point of view or another. We have to work it together, and that is the nature of the process.

And this is something that I think over the next weeks, as the political directors work together, they’ll build on what was achieved here in the last hours, and I feel very confident that this can be done. Not going to tell you it will be, but I can tell you it absolutely can be with good effort over these next days ahead.

MODERATOR: The next question will be from Michael Gordon of The New York Times.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the other day when you were in Israel, you said that the U.S. was asking Iran to agree, as you put it, to a complete freeze over where they are today. How important is it to impose constraints on the plutonium side of the Iranian program as part of a first-step agreement, say, precluding Iran from operating or putting fuel in the heavy water reactor that is being built in Iraq? Is that an important step to take as part of the complete freeze that you were talking about? And lastly, the next meeting, as you just pointed out, sir, is at the political director level, not at the foreign minister level. Doesn’t that suggest that there are significant differences that need to be narrowed before it makes sense to bring the foreign ministers back into the picture here in Geneva?

SECRETARY KERRY: No, it really is a reflection of wanting to get language issues that came up absolutely resolved, so the ministers, when they come, have a sense that everybody is in agreement with respect to the particular language. And the schedules of the ministers – it is not possible for all the ministers. And I think everybody felt they wanted to go back to their capitals, work through a few of these issues that are technical, complicated, and see if we can find the ways to deal with that with the political directors and the appropriate people to work that language at that level. That’s what got us here. And we’ve made a lot of progress. Now we go to the next step and hopefully, when the ministers come back – two weeks or so, something like that – we’ll be in the position to move forward.

But with respect to the plutonium, absolutely. It’s a very central issue and it’s one we spent a significant amount of time on, and one we are absolutely adamant must be addressed in the context of any kind of agreement – among others, and there are a number of others.

MS. PSAKI: Thanks, everyone.

SECRETARY KERRY: Is that it?

MS. PSAKI: We have to finish, unfortunately.

SECRETARY KERRY: I apologize. Thanks.