REMARKS BY ROSE GOTTENMOELLER ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
America's Commitment to Ballistic Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
Missile Defense Agency
Bucharest, Romania
November 18, 2014

As Prepared

Thank you, Rob, for that introduction. I am so pleased to be here in Romania and at this important time. We congratulate the people of Romania on their election yesterday. We look forward to working with the President-elect and the government of Romania, as we continue to strengthen our already close relationship. I would especially like to thank our Romanian colleagues for their generosity in agreeing to host this influential conference and especially for all of the support they have provided to the deployment of U.S. missile defense site at Deveselu. Thanks also to all of the people here that came from around the world. It is a true testament to our combined efforts that such a large and prestigious crowd has come to participate in this conference.

I know you have already heard from Admiral Syring, Principal Deputy Under Secretary Brian McKeon and Chargé d’Affaires Thompson about the ballistic missile defense systems the United States is deploying in Europe, here in Romania, and around the world. I am not going to re-tread that ground.

I will reiterate one point you have already heard today: The Obama Administration’s commitment to deploying missile defenses to defend the United States homeland, our Allies and partners never waivers. In Europe, we are on track for Phase 2 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach and we are committed to having Phase 3 in Poland completed in 2018. We are working closely across the board with our Israeli Allies on missile defense. We remain committed to missile defense cooperation among our Gulf Cooperation Council partners. In Asia, we also continue to deploy more and more capable missile defense systems and continue our efforts to enhance cooperation with allies and partners.

We are committed to these deployments in the face of constant criticism, particularly from the Russian Federation.

We often hear the refrain from certain corners that missile defenses are destabilizing. With an emphasis on transparency and confidence-building, we have explained that nothing that we are doing with respect to our missile defense plans will undercut international security. It would not be in our interest to do so, it would be prohibitively expensive and from a technical perspective, it would be extremely difficult. So let me take some time to again outline these points, based on logic, physics and math, to prove that our missile defense deployments are a benefit, not a threat, to global strategic stability.

First, the Cold War mindset about ballistic missile defenses is no longer valid. Limited ballistic missile defense capabilities are not capable of threatening Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and are not a threat to strategic stability.

Ballistic missiles during the Cold War were the tools the United States and the Soviet Union used to maintain the strategic balance between our two countries. Today, ballistic missiles are proliferated around the world and are seen as a common battlefield weapon.

That is why today’s limited missile defenses are essential to ensuring regional strategic stability. That is the one and only reason that the United States is pursuing regional missile defense capabilities.

Missile saber rattling is not particularly effective when there are defenses to protect against those missiles. Missile defense can also prevent a country or group from taking cheap shots of one or two launches that it thinks can be used to compel or deter a government. Instead these countries or groups would need to fire a much larger salvo to overcome missile defenses, thereby raising the stakes of entering into a conflict.

Further, missile defenses create uncertainty about the outcome of attacks, thereby increasing the costs to countries and groups attempting to overcome defenses. By reducing a country’s confidence in the effectiveness of missile attacks, we enhance deterrence and regional stability.

Missile defenses and missile defense cooperation also provides reassurance. Reassurance helps reduce a country’s vulnerability to ballistic missile attacks, as well as reassurance regarding the United States’ commitment to their defense. The last part is particularly important since it demonstrates that the United States will stand by our Alliance commitments, even in the face of growth in the military potential of regional adversaries.

Finally, when confronted with an attack, missile defenses can buy time for other courses of actions, such as diplomacy, to help resolve the crisis. All of you know, whether you are policy-makers or military planners, that time- and lack thereof – is one of the most important factors during a crisis.

These are the factors that drive our deployment efforts. Our efforts are aided by the increasing sophistication and accuracy of our ballistic missile defenses, as well as the experience that U.S. forces, our Allies and our partners have gained from being the targets of missile attacks.

Many of our regional defense deployments, like the Patriot system and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system, are inherently designed for theater use. They are not capable of defending against ICBMs launched at the United States. THAAD, however, is capable of defending against the medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missile that North Korea is deploying.

Yet despite our repeated attempts to convey these demonstrable facts, the Russian Federation continues to maintain that our global deployment of these systems is designed somehow to encircle Russia.

Understanding the universal truth of physics, we have also taken care to demonstrate how the systems we are deploying are located in places that are ideal for addressing regional threats. Based on the irrefutable laws of science, these systems cannot do the things the Russian government says they can. You may have seen the Russia trajectory maps that show how the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor could be used against Russian ICBMs. The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the instant – the very second – of a Russian ICBM launch, we would also launch our interceptor. The argument also assumes that we would have perfect knowledge of where that Russian ICBM is going and where it is going to be located several minutes from launch in order to strike the reentry vehicles.

As Admiral Syring attests and our flight tests clearly show, we cannot begin to consider launching an interceptor until well after a ballistic missile has finished its boost phase, the warheads have separated, and we have had time to develop a firing solution. We need considerable time to gather knowledge about where the missile is going before we can launch our interceptor. As a result, the physics just don’t add up. There is no way a U.S. SM-3 IIA interceptor can chase down Russian reentry vehicles.

At one point, we did explore the feasibility of a faster interceptor that had what we called “early intercept” capabilities, but that still relied on intercepting the reentry vehicles after burnout. Again, this was not a boost phase concept. In fact, there are many unclassified reports that discuss the challenges inherent in doing boost phase intercept.

Beyond our theater, capabilities, our Ground-Based Interceptors (known as GBIs) deployed in Alaska and California do not pose a threat to Russian strategic nuclear forces either. Our GBIs are designed to deal with rudimentary systems deployed in limited numbers and with simple countermeasures. Technologically, GBIs cannot counter Russia’s sophisticated ICBM capabilities and countermeasures.

In addition to our other efforts, we have also outlined the plain and simple numbers to the Russians. Our GBI numbers are nowhere remotely near their strategic offensive arsenal numbers. As of October 1st, Russia declared that under the New START counting rules, they were deploying 1,643 warheads on 528 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy Bombers. Let me say that number again: the Russian Federation currently fields 1,643 deployed nuclear warheads. Currently, the United States has 30 ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska. So, hypothetically if all 30 of those GBIs performed perfectly and took out 30 Russian warheads, 1,613 Russian warheads would still get past our defenses.

We will deploy an additional 14 interceptors in Alaska and should we ever deploy an additional east coast site with 20 additional interceptors, Russia would still have 1,579 warheads that could get through our defenses. And while I am optimistic we will negotiate a future nuclear reduction Treaty after New START, even then, our limited numbers of defensive systems cannot even come close to upsetting the strategic balance.

Reversing this equation, I would note that we are not concerned about the impact to strategic stability of Russia’s deployment of 68 interceptors at the Moscow ABM system. Sixty eight deployed interceptors is 24 more than the United States even has plans to deploy. Further, Russia is very open about declaring that the Moscow ABM system is specifically designed against the United States. And just like the United States, Russia is modernizing its radars and interceptors as part of their system. However, that still hasn’t raised concerns in the United States about strategic stability.

Despite our best efforts, none of these facts has made any difference in our discussions with the Russian Federation. They continue instead to argue the system is designed against them. The bottom line is this: The United States will continue to deploy our missile defense systems around the world to defend against limited regional threats. We will continue to deploy the EPAA as our contribution to NATO missile defense. There should be no doubt about our commitment. Moreover, we will not accept any obligations that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships. There is no reason why we should and no reason we would.

Further, at this time, we have serious concerns about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. We continue to work closely with our NATO partners on addressing the changes to European security brought about by the invasion of Ukraine and are seeking Russia’s return to compliance with the INF Treaty.

While Russia has accused the United States of being in violation of the INF Treaty, we are in complete compliance with the INF Treaty. We can describe, in detail, why each of our systems complies with the Treaty. One thing that the United States and Russia have agreed on is that this important Treaty remains in our mutual security interests. May it remain so. In the meantime, we will continue to make our case to the world about the important of limited missile defenses and continue our essential efforts to cooperatively deploy systems around the world.

Thank you for your support with these efforts and thank you again for the opportunity to speak here today.

STATE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECRETARY ROSE GOTTEMOELLER'S REMARKS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Nuclear Weapons Testing: History, Progress, Challenges: Verification and Entry Into Force of the CTBT

Remarks

Rose Gottemoeller

Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 

Washington, DC

September 15, 2014

As Prepared

Thank you, Daryl. Thank you also to my esteemed colleague, General Klotz. I think this might be the first time we have been on a panel together in our current positions, but I hope it won’t be the last. On this subject in particular, it is great to have the opportunity for us to communicate why the entire Administration sees this Treaty as effective, verifiable and absolutely beneficial to our national security.

Thank you also to the Embassy of Kazakhstan, Deputy Chief of Mission Yerkin Akhinzhanov, the Embassy of Canada, the Arms Control Association, Global Green and partners for hosting us here at USIP. Finally, thank you to my former boss, Secretary Moniz for his remarks earlier.

Secretary Kerry was actually right here just a year ago, speaking about nuclear security and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). He quoted a line from President Kennedy’s American University speech that talked about a total ban on nuclear explosive test being “so near and yet so far.” We remain somewhat in this place today, fifty years later – “so near and yet so far.” We know the goal remains worthy and we know that it is still the right one for American national security. The difference today is that we know we have the tools to make it a reality.

General Klotz has just covered some stockpile and verification issues, so I would like to focus on the national security benefits of the Treaty and the process of moving the United States towards entry into force. I will also give you a little readout on how I’ve used my time this year to advance the case for the Treaty.

First and foremost, it is clear that CTBT is a key part of leading nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament.

An in-force CTBT will hinder states that do not have nuclear weapons from developing advanced nuclear weapons capabilities.

States interested in pursuing or advancing a nuclear weapons program would have to either risk deploying weapons without the confidence that they would work properly, or accept the international condemnation and reprisals that would follow a nuclear explosive test.

An in-force Treaty would also impede states with more established nuclear weapon capabilities from confirming the performance of advanced nuclear weapon designs that they have not tested successfully in the past.

Because of this, an in-force CTBT will also constrain regional arms races. These constraints will be particularly important in Asia, where states are building up and modernizing nuclear forces.

For our part, ratification will help enhance our leadership role in nonproliferation and strengthen our hand in pursuing tough actions against suspected proliferators. That is more important than ever, in our current global environment. Nuclear security is a preeminent goal for President Obama and this Administration.

All told, it is in our interest to close the door on nuclear explosive testing forever.

As many of you know, I was invited to speak in the Marshall Islands on the 60th anniversary of the Castle Bravo nuclear test. It was quite an honor and while there, I was able to meet with government and community leaders, as well as displaced communities. I told them that it is the United States’ deep understanding of the consequences of nuclear weapons – including the devastating health effects– that has guided and motivated our efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate these most hazardous of weapons.

About a month after visiting the Marshall Islands, I travelled to Hiroshima. Upon arriving, I visited the Cenotaph and the Peace Museum and spoke with an atomic survivor. The day was a somber, but critically important reminder that all nations should avoid the horrors of nuclear war.

We have made great strides over the past forty years, achieving an 85 percent reduction in the U.S. nuclear stockpile since 1967 and creating agreements such as the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, START, New START and more. But, we still have far to go.

It was President Ronald Reagan who, speaking before the Japanese Diet, pronounced clearly and with conviction that “there can be only one policy for preserving our precious civilization in this modern age. A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought.”

Those words had great resonance for the students that I spoke with at Hiroshima University last April. My conversation with them focused on the CTBT and how it could contribute to reducing global nuclear threats.

Bright, engaged and motivated, the students were eager to know what they could do to help in the push towards entry into force. I told them, as I tell all the students I meet, that the most important thing that supporters of the Treaty can do is to educate their friends, their family and their communities.

That is something that I will be continuing to do throughout the year, with trips to various U.S. states to speak with students, faith and community groups, as well as expert audiences. In fact, I will be at Stanford on Wednesday to do just that.

Now, I will pivot to the question that is asked each and every time this Treaty is discussed: “What is the plan for Senate ratification?”

The answer is simple. First comes education, and then comes discussion and last and most importantly, comes debate. It is only through that process that you get to a place where a vote could happen.

We are reintroducing this Treaty to the American public, since it has been quite some time it has been discussed outside the Capital Beltway. We are and will continue to outline the clear and convincing facts about our ability to maintain the nuclear stockpile without explosive testing and our ability to effectively monitor and verify Treaty compliance. Both Secretary Moniz and General Klotz have spoken about these two issues this afternoon and they are strong allies in this effort.

We are and will continue to make it clear that a global ban on nuclear explosive testing will hinder regional arms races and impede advancements in nuclear stockpiles around the world.

With an emphasis on a healthy, open dialogue, rather than a timeline, we are working with the Senate to re-familiarize Members with the Treaty. A lot of CTBT-related issues have changed since 1999, but the Senate has changed a lot since then, too. It is up to us, as policymakers and experts before the American people, to practice due diligence in consideration of this Treaty – that means briefings, hearings at the appropriate time, more briefings, trips to Labs, trips to Vienna and the CTBTO, more briefings, etc., etc.. The Senators should have every opportunity to ask questions, many questions, until they are satisfied.

I want to make one thing very clear: this Administration has no intention of rushing this or demanding premature action before we have had a thorough and rigorous discussion and debate.

I know that it is the official sport of Washington, but I would ask people to refrain from counting votes right now. Our first priority is education and our focus should be on the hard work that goes into any Senate consideration of a Treaty. The New START process can serve as our touchstone. I realize that is less fun than reading tea leaves. I realize that it’s unglamorous and deliberate, but that is how good policy is made and that is how treaties get across the finish line.

Of course, as we have said many times, there is no reason for the remaining Annex 2 states to wait for the United States before completing their own ratification processes. We have been pleased to hear some positive statements coming from Annex 2 states in recent months, and we hope that positive vibe turns into action. I would also like to congratulate Congo, which very recently ratified the CTBT.

Finally, we urge States to provide adequate financial and political support for the completion of the CTBT verification regime and its provisional operations between now and the entry into force of the treaty. The CTBTO, now under the able guidance of Dr. Zerbo, has and will continue to do a fantastic job of readying the Treaty’s verification regime for eventual entry into force. For those of you who have the chance to visit the CTBTO headquarters in Vienna, I recommend the tour of the radionuclide detection equipment on the roof. It’s really impressive!

In closing, I will reiterate that we have a lot of work to do, but the goal is worthy. An in-force CTBT will benefit the United States and indeed, the whole world.

Let’s get to work on it together. Thank you.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER'S REMARKS ON NUCLEAR REMEMBRANCE DAY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Republic of Marshall Islands Nuclear Remembrance Day
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
Majuro, Marshall Islands
March 1, 2014

As Delivered


I am so honored to be in the Marshall Islands, a nation that the United States sees as our strategic partner, our ally and our friend. Mr. President, I am honored to be here with such a distinguished group of government, community and faith leaders, members of the diplomatic corps, and honored guests.

Today, here in this beautiful place, we gather to remember and honor the past, but we also gather in the spirit of community and hope. I would like to second Ambassador Armbruster’s message of bromich (condolences); it is the right word for today. The American people remember what took place here and honor the historical and current contributions that the Marshallese people make to help promote peace and stability around the world. For many of you, that means remembering lost family members and loved ones – they are in our thoughts and prayers, as well. Today we honor their memory and I know that words can only go so far in healing wounds, but this nation has played an outsized role in the fight for a safer world and for that the United States, and the world, thanks you.

Our commitment to you, solidified by the 1986 Compact and the 2003 Amended Compact, is borne out by our obligation to defend the Marshall Islands and its people, as the United States and its citizens are defended. Of course, the mutual security of our nations is an underlying element of the special relationship between our nations. Marshallese citizens serve with distinction in our armed forces, sharing our commitment to democracy and freedom. I know that the Marshallese rate of enlistment is higher than in most U.S. states. For the Marshallese citizens that have served in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world, we are so grateful.

On this day – the 60th anniversary of Castle Bravo – and on each and every day, the United States recognizes the effects of its nuclear explosive testing and has accepted and acted on its responsibility. The Department of Energy continues to provide critical medical and environmental programs in the RMI, in addition to improving the provision of such services. In particular, we will continue to work with the local leadership of the four nuclear-affected atolls to assist them in realizing their environmental goals. In this regard, the Department of Energy will be employing the world’s best technologies to aid in this endeavor. This, I can assure you, is a promise from the people of the United States.

Since 2004, the United States has provided over $600 million to the Marshall Islands, in the form of direct assistance and subsidies, as well as financial support for rehabilitation of affected atolls, site monitoring, and ongoing health care programs. This year, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a remarkable sponsorship program to increase the science capacity in the Marshall Islands. Two Marshallese students will live and study in the San Francisco Bay Area, including at Lawrence Livermore National Labs (LLNL) itself. The sponsorship pays tuition, room and board, travel and a living stipend. It also includes a summer internship with LLNL.

As I said at the outset, we are here to remember and honor the past today, but I also want to look to the future with purpose and with hope. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis opened the eyes of the world to the terror of nuclear war, but there were people across the globe who were already all too familiar with nuclear dangers. People in Japan and the Marshall Islands, those downwind from the nuclear test site in Nevada, the mothers who found radioactive material in their children’s milk: all understood in first person the health effects of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. In 1963, about a decade after Castle Bravo, President John F. Kennedy called for a complete ban on nuclear explosive testing.

“The conclusion of such a treaty,” he said, “so near and yet so far -- would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963 -- the further spread of nuclear arms. It would increase our security -- it would decrease the prospects of war.”

We are still so near and yet so far from this goal. We were able to achieve part of this objective through the Limited Test Ban Treaty – banning tests in the water, in space and in the atmosphere. However, 51 years later, the hazard of the further spread of nuclear weapons remains and we still lack a total ban on nuclear explosive testing. Here again, we should heed President Kennedy’s words. “Surely this goal,” he said, “is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.”

In 2009, President Obama took up the mantle of the Presidents who came before him, and laid out his own long-term vision of the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. While the United States will and must maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist, we have properly refocused our nuclear policy for the 21st century. As outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), we are now on a path that confronts the threats we face today and those on the near horizon. This allows us to work with allies and partners to pursue arms control and disarmament measures that can lead us down the path towards a nuclear-free world.

Mindful of the devastating human consequences of nuclear war, the United States has also clearly stated that it is in our interest, and that of all other nations, that the nearly 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever. We also concluded that the time for a complete and total ban on nuclear explosive testing is long overdue. U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a pivotal part of this effort.

Ratification of the CTBT is central to leading other nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament. The United States now maintains a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal through our science-based Stockpile Stewardship program without nuclear explosive testing, which the United States halted in 1992.

The United States will be patient in our pursuit of ratification, but we will also be persistent. It has been a long time since the CTBT was on the front pages of newspapers, so we will need time to make the case for this Treaty. Together, we can work through questions and concerns about the Treaty and explosive nuclear testing. Our answers to those questions continue to grow stronger with the proven and increasing capabilities of the Stockpile Stewardship program and the verification system of the Treaty, including the International Monitoring System.

I cannot emphasize strongly enough that it is precisely our deep understanding of the consequences of nuclear weapons – including the dangerous health effects of nuclear explosive testing – that has guided and motivated our efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate these most dangerous and awe-inspiring weapons. Entry into force of the CTBT is one such essential part of our pragmatic, step by step approach to eliminating nuclear dangers. The Treaty will make the world a safer place for the Marshall Islands, the United States, for every nation around the globe.

This is not just a security issue; this is an issue of humanity, of health, of morality. We are the stewards of this Earth and we owe it to those who have fallen – to those who suffer still – to work together, one step at a time, until nuclear explosive testing is banned worldwide, getting us one step closer to our goal of the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. In closing, I want to reiterate that the United States and the world owe the Marshallese a debt of gratitude. The RMI has been a leader in countering climate change, a contributor to international security, and our partner on global issues. Together, we can and should continue to work for what President Kennedy called “a genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living.”

Finally, I can only say kommol tata! Thank you!

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER'S REMARKS AT UN CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

FROM:  STATE DEPARTMENT 
Remarks to the UN Conference on Disarmament
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
Geneva, Switzerland
February 4, 2014

As Delivered

Mr. President, Acting Secretary-General Moeller, I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament. To start, I would like to congratulate Israel and Ambassador Manor and his team on assuming the first Presidency of the 2014 CD session, and to thank them for their very dedicated efforts in guiding our deliberations. I would also like to extend our best wishes to the other CD Presidents for 2014 – Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, and Malaysia. We look forward to working with all of you in the year ahead.

In his January 21 remarks to the Conference, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon spoke about the importance of substantive discussion in laying groundwork for future CD negotiations. The United States believes it is crucial for the CD to adopt a program of work, but we also believe we must continue to engage substantively with one another – both about the disarmament steps we are taking and the steps we hope to take next – as we work to break this body’s impasse.

As colleagues here are well aware, we stand ready to begin negotiations on an FMCT, the next logical – and necessary – step in creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. It has been frustrating to watch the CD remain deadlocked over this issue, but negotiation of an FMCT is an essential prerequisite for global nuclear disarmament. In recognition of this fact, Action 15 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan included an agreement that the CD should begin immediate negotiation of an FMCT. The United States will continue to urge negotiation of an FMCT in this body, convinced that FMCT negotiations at the CD will provide each member state the ability not only to protect, but also to enhance its national security. With that as our guiding conviction, we look forward to engaging fully in the upcoming meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), with a view to providing further impetus to long-sought FMCT negotiations in the CD.

As disappointed as we are that a Program of Work for the CD remains elusive, we are not standing still. The United States has slashed its nuclear stockpile by 85% from Cold War levels. Under the New START Treaty, US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear warheads will decline to their lowest levels in over half a century. Recently, the US-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement culminated with the final shipment of low enriched uranium converted from the equivalent of 20,000 dismantled Russian nuclear warheads to fuel US nuclear reactors. Those former warheads have been providing ten percent of all US electricity. One in ten light bulbs in the U.S. are lit by former Soviet weapon material

Historic efforts like this one reflect the ongoing and significant progress we are making toward our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Article VI commitments. Here I would add that there are no shortcuts to reaching our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons. It is necessarily an incremental process that requires hard work by governments operating in the realm of supreme national and international security commitments impacting regional and global stability. The United States is expending tremendous effort to meet its commitments, and we look forward to continuing to engage the Russian Federation regarding issues of strategic stability and with a view to achieving further bilateral reductions.

Like many of you, we are preparing for the upcoming meeting of the NPT Third Preparatory Committee, where we look forward to discussing the important roles both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states play in implementing the 2010 Action Plan, in anticipation of the 2015 NPT Review Conference. We are also preparing for the fifth P5 Conference, which we thank China for hosting this year.

The United States attaches great value to the P5 process. I like to stress, the importance of the P5 process is not what it can produce in the immediate-term, but rather what it means for the prospects of multilateral nuclear disarmament efforts in years to come. These conferences are an essential means for laying the foundation for future agreements that could involve parties beyond the United States and Russia. Most people understand that we and Russia likely will need to take some additional bilateral steps before our arsenals are to a level where other nuclear weapon states would be prepared to join us at the negotiating table. The work we are doing now in these conferences will help to ensure that when that day arrives, we will not be starting at square one. Our partners will have the opportunity to benefit from the experience we have gained and shared regarding how monitoring activities like on-site inspections can be conducted to gain an understanding about the technology required to conduct arms control activities and methods of information sharing that build confidence that treaty partners are adhering to the agreement.

We also hope this process will lead to cooperative work in addressing the significant verification challenges we will face as we move to lower numbers and categories of nuclear weapons beyond strategic weapons. The United States and the UK have begun some of this work on developing verification procedures and technologies, and we have briefed our P5 partners on the results. The P5 are uniquely positioned to engage in such research and development given their experience as nuclear weapon states. In the context of a P5 working group chaired by China, we continue to develop a common glossary of nuclear weapons-related terms. A glossary may not sound important or interesting, until you consider that verifiable multilateral nuclear disarmament will require clear agreement on the definitions and concepts for the vital aspects that must be covered in future treaties.

We continue to work to build support for ratification of the CTBT, making the case to our citizens and legislators that the Treaty will serve to enhance our collective security. We ask for the support of the international community in continuing to build and maintain the International Monitoring System and On-Site Inspection regime. As we make the case for the Treaty’s verifiability, this support will be crucial.

These are just a few of the practical measures we are taking to advance toward our shared goal. We celebrate the progress these step-by-step efforts have achieved, but we know we still have much work to do. We remain committed to fulfilling our obligations and working to take additional practical and meaningful steps. Like UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the United States agrees the CD continues to possess promise. It must surmount its deadlock regarding a Program of Work, and in pursuit f that goal the United States is open to renewing the Informal Working Group. At the same time, we believe that CD member states should foster substantive discussions aimed at future progress, with a view to promoting the prospects for work on issues ripe for negotiation, above all, an FMCT. Like the Secretary General, we hope the CD helps to build “a safer world and a better future” because we also believe “that is its very mission.” Thank you.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER'S REMARKS AT 68TH FIRST COMMITTEE GENERAL DEBATE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Statement by Rose E. Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
68th UNGA First Committee General Debate
New York, NY
October 9, 2013

As Delivered

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations, Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi, on your election as Chair of the First Committee during its 68th session. We pledge to support your leadership and the work of this committee. We look forward to a productive session.

This is the fourth year in a row that I have spoken to the UNGA First Committee on behalf of the United States. I look back to 2009 and I am proud of all we have accomplished. That said, we have a long path in front of us.

The conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons do not yet exist, but together we are completely capable of creating these conditions. I am sure of this, because of the examples of our predecessors.

As you all may know, tomorrow is the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). This groundbreaking Treaty went from a seemingly unattainable goal on the horizon to an international law on the books within a year of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Perhaps it was those dark days that helped solidify U.S. President Kennedy’s view that it was possible – in fact, imperative – that we work to address nuclear dangers through multilateral diplomacy.

“Peace need not be impracticable,” he said, “and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly -- by making it seem more manageable and less remote -- we can help all people to see it, to draw hope from it and to move irresistibly towards it.”

Mr. Chairman, that idea should be our touchstone as we move forward with the Committee’s work. If our predecessors could accomplish a Treaty like the LTBT in the midst of the Cold War, surely we can find ways to work on further arms reductions, increased transparency, banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and more.

Over the last fifty years, we have had many unprecedented successes. We have gone from the brink of nuclear war to successful strategic reduction treaties – the latest of which will bring us by 2018 to the lowest number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons since the 1950s.

We have continued to limit nuclear explosive testing over the years through treaties, including the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) that prohibited the United States and the Soviet Union from conducting a nuclear explosive test in excess of 150 kilotons. Before the TTBT entered into force, some voiced concerns that the parties had different ways to measure explosive yields. To deal with this problem, the United States and the Soviet Union undertook an unprecedented step in transparency and confidence-building. They invited each other to their respective nuclear test sites to observe a nuclear test and use their preferred methods for measuring explosive yields as they applied to the TTBT. That event, known as the Joint Verification Experiment, happened 25 years ago and it paved the way for subsequent negotiations of new verification protocols for both the TTBT and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). Our joint work would ultimately help the international community negotiate a total ban on nuclear explosive testing, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

This year also marks a significant nonproliferation accomplishment: the 1993 United States-Russian Federation Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement will reach a major milestone with the final delivery of low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from downblending 500 metric tons of Russian weapons origin HEU. The LEU that results from this downblending process is delivered to the United States, fabricated into nuclear fuel, and used by nearly all U.S. nuclear power plants to generate approximately half of the nuclear energy in the United States. Approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads have been eliminated under this unique government-industry partnership. Over the past 15 years, nuclear fuel from this source has accounted for approximately 10% of all electricity produced in the United States.

We expect to meet with our Russian partners this November to observe the loading in St. Petersburg of the final containers of LEU downblended under the Agreement, and we will meet again in the United States when that ship delivers this important cargo in December. We look forward to jointly celebrating this historic achievement.

Another success that flies under the radar is the Open Skies Treaty. It just marked its 1000th completed mission in August. It is a great example of a Euro-Atlantic transparency and confidence building measure, and it has proven itself as a valuable arms control monitoring tool, for both strategic and conventional purposes.

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the Obama Administration, working with international partners, has made many of its own significant achievements in nonproliferation and disarmament: entry into force of the New START Treaty, the launching of the Nuclear Security Summit process, an agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to each verifiably dispose of 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium, and more recently, signature of an agreement between the United States and Russia on threat reduction that reinforces our longstanding partnership on nonproliferation.

But it is not enough: the United States and Russian Federation still possess over ninety percent of the nuclear weapons in the world, and it is time we move beyond Cold War postures.

That is why in June, the President announced in Berlin that we would pursue further reductions of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. This decision flowed from the Administration’s extensive analysis of the current strategic environment and deterrence requirements. That analysis confirmed that the United States can ensure its security and that of our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third below the level established by the New START Treaty. The President said on that occasion, “I intend to seek negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War postures.” Toward that end, we will pursue a treaty with the Russian Federation.

We are also making sure our lines of communication on strategic issues are solid. On Monday in Bali, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov signed a new agreement to strengthen the connection between our Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs). Today’s NRRC-to-NRRC relationship and communications link continue to provide vital transparency in strategic and conventional forces, facilitate verification of arms control treaties and agreements, and support strategic stability. Actually, we just passed a significant milestone -- the two Centers have now exchanged over five thousand New START Treaty notifications since its entry into force, which provide us day-to-day updates on the status of each others' nuclear forces. These are joined by the 97 on-site inspections that we have now conducted under New START, which give us even more insights into each others' nuclear forces, thus enhancing predictability for both countries.

We are also working with the other Nuclear Weapons States (P5) on disarmament-related issues to support implementation of the NPT and the 2010 NPT Action Plan. The P5 have now had four official conferences, with China hosting the fifth meeting next year. But we are not just meeting; through dialogue at the political level and concrete work at the expert level, our engagement has moved from concepts to concrete actions.

For example, P5 experts are meeting to address issues related to the CTBT, especially those relating to the On-Site Inspection (OSI) element of the CTBT’s verification regime and to the OSI Integrated Field Exercise to be conducted in Jordan in 2014. The objective of this effort is to define and engage in technical collaborative work based on our unique expertise with past nuclear explosive tests.

In the broader multilateral context, the United States continues to hold to its long-standing position calling for the immediate commencement of long delayed negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). This treaty is the obvious next step in multilateral disarmament and it is time to get to the table. We hope that the upcoming UN Group of Governmental Experts on FMCT will provide useful impetus. Another priority for the United States is to continue to build support for the ratification of the CTBT, as affirmed by President Obama this past June. We encourage all Annex 2 nations to join us in this pursuit.

Mr. Chairman, we will have a lot of things to discuss and debate this session, from cyber and space security to conventional arms control, from humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. It is critical that we continue our work together. Two weeks ago, the international community reached a landmark with UN Security Council Resolution 2118 and the Executive Council decision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Together, they enable a strong international partnership to eliminate chemical weapons from Syria and end this threat to the Syrian people.

And elsewhere, we should be cautious, but cognizant of potentially historic opportunities. We must continue our push to bring Iran back into line with its international nuclear obligations. We will also continue to make clear to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that should it meet its own denuclearization commitments, it too can have an opportunity to reintegrate into the international community. The United States is ready to talk, we are ready to listen, we are ready to work hard, and we hope that every country in this room is ready to join us.

It is no secret there are issues on which we disagree. This does not mean that we stop trying to move ahead in a step-by-step fashion. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union found it in our mutual interest to work together on reducing the nuclear threat. Of course, today, this is not just the responsibility of the United States and Russia. All states can and must contribute to the conditions for disarmament, as well as nonproliferation; they are two sides of the same coin.

Mr. Chairman, the road toward the next steps might not be familiar and it will require difficult negotiations and complicated diplomacy. Nevertheless, armed with patience and persistence, we can keep our compasses pointed at the one reason we are here: to pursue disarmament in ways that promote mutual security, because it is in our mutual interest.

The United States asks that we all commit ourselves to the hard work ahead.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER ON GEOPOLITICS AND NUCLEAR ENERGY

Rose Gottemoeller

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Geopolitics and Nuclear Energy: The View from the State Department
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Nuclear Energy Institute
Washington, DC
May 15, 2013

Thank you for that introduction and thank you for having me here today. It is a pleasure to talk to the principal nuclear industry organization in the United States. Your involvement in all parts of the nuclear energy sector, as well as your work with universities, research laboratories, and labor unions is so important to our energy future. Congratulations on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Atomic Industrial Forum, your predecessor organization. It is sometimes hard to believe that nuclear energy is over a half century old.

I am sure that most of you are familiar with the Obama Administration’s "all of the above" energy strategy – and that it unequivocally includes nuclear energy – but it bears repeating. President Obama has stated clearly that "we must harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to combat climate change and advance peace and opportunity for all people."

Since taking office in 2009, the President has worked continuously to improve our nation’s energy security, efficiency, and sustainability. With his recently proposed FY2014 budget, the President has made it clear that he will not back down from energy issues and has proposed significant targets – and budgetary resources – to dramatically improve our economy’s energy productivity, lessen our oil imports, and deploy clean power generation technologies.

Energy and Geopolitics

There are three fundamental reasons that energy issues matter to American foreign policy.

First, energy rests at the core of geopolitics – an issue of both wealth and power, which means it can be both a source of conflict and a basis for international cooperation. It is in the interest of the United States to resolve disputes over energy peacefully. We must keep energy supplies and markets stable during global crises and ensure that countries don’t use their energy resources to force others to bend to their will or forgive their bad behavior.

Second, energy is essential to how we will power our economy and manage our environment in the 21st century. We will work to promote new technologies and sources of energy to reduce pollution, to diversify the global energy supply, to create jobs, and to address the threat of climate change. Nuclear energy can play a role in each of these efforts.

Third, energy is the key to development and political stability. There are 1.3 billion people worldwide who don’t have access to energy. That is unacceptable in economic terms and security terms.

Our nuclear exports are a key strategic asset- a mature energy technology that does not emit greenhouse gases, while also providing a source of base-load electric power. Nuclear energy has an important role to play in pursuing our foreign policy objectives. Our top priority, though, is to make sure that U.S. access to energy is secure, reliable, affordable, and sustainable.

The Administration is working hard to make sure that countries are using nuclear energy safely. In comparison to other energy sources, nuclear power presents a unique set of challenges, most notably those related to safety, security, and nonproliferation.

Of course, when another country buys a U.S. reactor, both of us be confident that the design is safe because it has been certified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). U.S. nuclear exports also increase the transparency of the importing country’s nuclear programs, thus indirectly supporting our nonproliferation policies. When we export U.S. technology, we are also exporting our safety and security cultures.

Looking Ahead

The future of nuclear exports cannot be discussed without considering the future of nuclear energy, in general. It is well known that, following the incident at Fukushima, Japan in 2011, some major economies decided to decrease, and eventually eliminate, their reliance on nuclear power. Despite these shifts, there is still a considerable market for nuclear energy.

The International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Technology Review (NTR) for 2012 concluded that, "globally the [Fukushima] accident is expected to slow or delay the growth of nuclear power, but not to reverse it." In fact, the NTR projects significant growth in the use of nuclear energy worldwide, between 35% and 100% by 2030.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) has reached similar conclusions. In its World Energy Outlook for 2012, the IEA concluded that while nuclear power would expand more slowly due to Fukushima and lower prices for fossil fuels, by 2035 nuclear generating capacity could increase to 580 gigawatts of electricity, compared to 371 gigawatts in 2010.

The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates the international marketplace for civil nuclear technology at $500 to $740 billion over the next ten years, with the potential to generate more than $100 billion in U.S. exports and thousands of new jobs.

This growth is welcome, as electricity demand is growing rapidly, particularly in emerging economies. By 2035, as much as 80 percent of this growth will take place in China, India and other non-OECD countries. These are the markets of the future. We see nuclear energy playing a critical role in meeting this increasing demand in a way that helps to provide efficient, low-cost power that also mitigates CO2 emissions.

Support for Industry

As we approach these new markets, we know that American nuclear exporters continue to face obstacles in the international market. That said, the U.S. nuclear industry has a number of assets that allow it to remain competitive, and I never bet against American ingenuity.

Our edge in technology is our greatest asset. American reactor designs on the market today are among the most advanced in the world, and some of them include passive safety features that would have been helpful at Fukushima.

The United States has unmatched experience with civil nuclear energy, operating the largest number of nuclear reactors in the world and generating the most nuclear power with the largest installed capacity worldwide.

The United States has top-performing companies all along the nuclear value chain. According to the World Nuclear Association, 12 of the world’s 25 highest-performing reactors are in the United States.

Further, while the NRC is careful not to engage in the promotion of nuclear power or exports, its very existence gives U.S. exporters an advantage. The NRC is widely regarded as the most effective and independent nuclear regulator in the world. By setting the bar for such safety standards we are also working to raise standards for nuclear safety around the world.

Some of the challenges of financing a nuclear power plant can be eased by the Export-Import Bank, the official U.S. export credit agency. While the Bank cannot engage in equity investing, it does offer direct loans and loan guarantees to support U.S. exports, including nuclear exports. This past fall, for the first time in decades, the Ex-Im Bank approved a two billion dollar loan to support a nuclear-related export.

It may not be the first impulse of export firm executives to think of the U.S. Government as a business asset, but there is much that we can do to help. We are developing what we call a "Team USA" approach to civil nuclear engagement abroad. In January 2012, the White House created a new position - Director of Nuclear Energy Policy – to lead this effort. Going forward, this will help us present a unified U.S. message on these issues and increase our presence in the civil nuclear commercial spaces.

Another service that the government can provide is advocacy. Once a potential nuclear project is approved for advocacy by the Department of Commerce’s Advocacy Center, the State Department and other U.S. government agencies can, through active diplomacy with the host country, put U.S. Government support behind the American bidder. Even when more than one American firm is bidding on a nuclear power plant, we may be able to engage in generic advocacy, expressing to the host government our support for a U.S. firm winning the contract.

We also try to ensure that a foreign government’s decisions are being made in a transparent manner on a "level playing field." Our diplomatic posts are sensitive to any evidence that undue influence is affecting a host government’s decision, and those posts are prepared to protest unwarranted discrimination against U.S sellers.

There are a number of other steps that the Administration has taken to ensure that our nuclear exports receive the attention they deserve. The Department of Commerce has established a Civil Nuclear Trade Initiative, the goal of which is to identify the U.S. nuclear industry’s trade policy challenges and commercial opportunities and coordinate public-private sector responses to support the growth of the U.S. civil nuclear industry.

There are important initiatives we are undertaking to significantly reduce the proliferation side-effects of the spread of nuclear energy. For example, in the field of radiopharmaceuticals, the United States plays an active role on several fronts. The Department of Energy is engaged in four cooperative agreements to support the development of domestic production of medical isotopes (in particular molybdenum-99) without the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU).

Last June, the White House established a policy that includes steps to further minimize the export of HEU where possible and preferentially procure non-HEU-based isotopes. The "American Medical Isotopes Production Act," passed in January, further supports these efforts by providing for a complete phase-out of HEU exports for such isotopes by 2020.

Let me close by reaffirming the Administration’s support for American nuclear exports. You all face stiff competition on the international market, but you also have strong resources to draw upon. I want to avoid the cliché, but we are here to help, and I hope we continue to work closely together in the future.

Thank you. I am happy to take a few questions and also eager to hear some thoughts and suggestions from you.

STATE DEPARTENT'S GOTTEMOELLER SPEAKS ON STRENGTHENING GLOBAL SECURITY

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Mobilizing Ingenuity to Strengthen Global Security
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
South by Southwest Conference (SXSW)
Austin, TX
March 8, 2013

Thank you so much for the introduction, Daniel and thank you all for being here. I’m really excited about being here in Austin at the South by Southwest Conference.

Now, I realize that being the government’s chief arms control negotiator might seem a little out of place here. What can the tech community do to help is get rid of the thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons still in the world? We worry about them getting into the hands of terrorists. Add to that the increased threat from chemical and biological agents – you can see the threat from CW in Syria -- and technologies that are easily switched from peaceful to threatening purposes. We have a big problem on our hands.

In truth, I came here for your help. The United States has laid out a comprehensive approach to dealing with these threats. But we need new ideas, and the information revolution is an obvious place to look. I hope you come away from this session energized to help us in our efforts to combat the threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

A Problem

Let me start by giving you a feel for our nuclear treaty verification problem. When signing our most recent treaty – New START – with the Russian Federation, the President said our next step would be to pursue reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, even nuclear weapons held in secret storage facilities. In the past, we focused on eliminating nuclear weapons on big missiles or bombers – items you could count from satellites in space. The idea was, eliminate the missile and you eliminate the threat of the warhead.

Now the President has said that is not good enough – if we’re worried terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weapons, we have to reduce and eliminate those weapons, even if they’re hidden away in storage. That is a big challenge for a nuclear arms controller: how can we monitor warheads, know where they are and that the other guys don’t have hidden stashes somewhere?

For bomb-making material, these challenges only increase. This stuff is portable and easy to hide. Major ports have radiation detectors, but these systems are very sensitive and can pick up the radioactivity coming from everyday items like bananas, kitty litter and porcelain toilets. Bet you didn’t know those things were radioactive.

For biological and chemical agents, the main problem comes from the dual-use nature of the work and technologies. How can we tell if work being done is good or bad? Or if we cannot, how do we build in activities to reassure people that the work being done is safe and peaceful?

So our goal is to devise and enhance systems for tracking and monitoring, as well as devise new ways to verify compliance with future agreements and treaties. Of course, as you who work in technology know, no system is ever 100% foolproof. To paraphrase Douglas Adams, foolproof systems tend to underestimate the ingenuity of complete fools and for that matter, highly-motivated cheaters.

How do we even come close to 100% verification? In the treaty context, we are looking for effective verification. Paul Nitze, a brilliant, esteemed national security expert and long-serving government official, explained effective verification as follows:

"[I]f the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violations in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation."

That’s effective verification. Nitze’s definition has been and continues to be the benchmark for verifying arms control treaties. But the world is changing, as I’ve described, and with it, the nature of what we need to monitor and verify. To help us meet the challenges ahead, we need your help.

A Light Bulb

New information tools are popping up everywhere and their potential impact is magnified by the global connectivity of the Internet. Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, could be broadcast globally in seconds. That means it is harder to hide things. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool, and it can help us to verify the treaties and agreements we’ve created.

A New Plan

The way we at the State Department see it so far, there are two elements we are working with when it comes to incorporating the information age into WMD verification and monitoring – tools for inspectors and data acquisition and analysis.

Using Tools

First, it is already apparent that digital tools are revolutionizing the way diplomacy is conducted, much like the telegraph did in the 19th century. Email is a good example: it rapidly accelerated the pace of the negotiation of New START, in comparison with the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

Information technologies could also be useful in the hands of a WMD inspector. Smartphone and tablet apps could be created for the express purpose of aiding in the verification and monitoring process. For example, by having all safeguards and verification sensors in an inspected facility wirelessly connected through the cloud to the inspector’s tablet, he or she could note anomalies and flag specific items for closer inspections, as well as compare readings in real time and interpret them in context. In the 90’s, U.S. weapons inspectors in Russia had to be able to cross country ski to do their jobs. They had to ski around the perimeters of facilities searching for things – with the kinds of tablet apps I mentioned, perhaps we could make the cardio optional.

Using the Crowd

The second way we could incorporate the new tools of the information age into WMD verification and monitoring is by harnessing of the power of the crowd to generate data and then analyze it.

Already, critical information generated through social networking is being incorporated into local safety systems in the United States. RAVEN911—the Regional Asset Verification & Emergency Network—is a multilayer mapping tool that supports emergency first response in Cincinnati, Ohio and its regional neighbors. RAVEN911 uses live data feeds, geospatial imagery, and information gathered through Twitter and other public sources to provide details that cannot be shown on an everyday geographic map, such as the location of downed electric power lines and flooded roads. This helps emergency first responders get to where they need to go more quickly.

Sound far-fetched to extend such ideas to arms control? It shouldn’t. There are apps that can convert your smartphone camera into a radiation detector. Your tablet could help detect nuclear explosions! Tablets have tiny accelerometers installed – that’s what tells the tablet which way is up. But the accelerometers also have the capability to detect small earth tremors.

You can imagine a whole community of tablets, all containing an "earth tremor" app. Users are dispersed randomly around the country, their tablets connected to a centralized network. If the sensors all start shaking at once, you may have a natural occurrence – an earthquake – or you may have an illicit nuclear weapon test. Which is which would need to be confirmed with official sensors and analysis.

This kind of ubiquitous sensing I see as one of the most exciting areas for new arms control monitoring tools.

A Hitch?

So, we have a brand new set of exciting possibilities to pursue, but there is a hitch. For any of this to work, there are a lot of technical, legal, political, and diplomatic barriers ahead that would need to be overcome—never easy.

In the end, the goal of using information technology and social networks should add to our existing arms control monitoring and verification capabilities, not to supersede them.

A Challenge

Last summer, we launched our first Innovation in Arms Control Challenge and asked the American public, "How Can the Crowd Support Arms Control Transparency Efforts?" This challenge sought creative ideas from the public to use commonly available technologies to support arms control policy and education efforts.

We received interest from more than 500 people from across the United States with solutions that largely fell into four broad categories: smartphone apps, internet websites and games, sensor array schemes, and "big data" crunching.

Our first prize winner is Ms. Lovely Umayam, a graduate student from the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. She developed "Bombshelltoe", an online education platform that examines the intersection of culture and nuclear issues in order to facilitate better public understanding. Mr. Allan Childers, an Aerospace/Defense industry consultant from Florida, was a runner-up with his proposal for a mobile application that provides a platform for users to connect and interact, as well as a rewards program for sharing information on various arms agreement regimes. Dr. Rudolph "Chip" Mappus, a research scientist at Georgia Tech Research Institute working on computational neurology and brain-machine interfaces, was also a runner up. He proposed a geographically-based online game about verifying treaty compliance that experts and everyday citizens could play together.

This challenge was a first step focused on public education, and I am excited about the results and our prizewinners. This spring we’re preparing to launch a second Innovation in Arms Control Challenge that will ask the American public to design an information technology tool that can aid arms control inspections, so please stay tuned to www.state.gov on that front. We would love to get submissions from SxSW Interactive attendees!

A Pitch

So now I am eager to hear from you. As many of you are aware, there is a grand tradition of citizen science in this country – two of the greatest were among our earliest diplomats: Thomas Jefferson and Ben Franklin. I hope that this State Department tradition continues as we tackle these enormous challenges. Experts like you, particularly experts outside of the Beltway, can help us think bigger and bolder. It is sometimes strange to think that the government helped plant the seed of the information revolution, but at times seems to have no clue about how to harvest its rewards. That is why speaking to people like you is so important.

Thanks again for your attention and I would now love to take some questions and even better – to hear some ideas!

GOTTENMOELLER'S REMARKS ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Secretary Rose Gottenmoeller.  Credit:  U.S. State Department

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Forging Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities for the NPT
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Washington, DC
February 12, 2013
As Delivered

Thank you, Yaiv, and thank you to General (Ret.) Yadlin and all the staff at INSS for hosting me. It is an honor to be here. As you all know, John Kerry was sworn in as the new U.S. Secretary of State just about a week and a half ago. He begins his tenure at State fully seized of the challenges that we face around the globe, including the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the direction of our new Secretary, the Department of State will continue its efforts to support this vital regime. The title for this conference is apt. We are at a crossroads, but not a dead-end. Over the course of the last 40 years, the NPT has taken some hits, not least this highly provocative act announced by North Korea today. But it is precisely because of those hits that we have acquired the experience needed to deal more effectively with the challenge of nuclear proliferation.

In order to look to the future, it is important to remember the past. It was just over 50 years ago that tension brought on by the Cuban Missile Crisis threatened to turn the Cold War hot. The world watched in fear for those 13 days in October 1962 when Soviet missile placements in Cuba very nearly became the spark that would start a fire we could not possibly control.

As the United States and the Soviet Union teetered on the edge of nuclear war, leaders in Washington and Moscow sought a diplomatic solution. One of the challenges confronting both sides was making sure that their perceptions, objectives, and proposals were getting across to each other clearly. This was not an easy thing to do without email, dedicated phone lines or fifty years of cooperation across many different issues.

Resolute and sober in their determination, leaders in Washington and Moscow stepped back from the brink of a nuclear conflict, using every avenue available to settle the crisis peacefully. After those frightening 13 days, both sides learned ways to reduce the tension in our relationship.

A New Beginning

To say that things have changed dramatically since October 1962 is an understatement. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a turning point. The United States and the Soviet Union came to the edge of the abyss and then started to back away from it. In the months following the crisis, a "Hotline" between the Kremlin and the White House was established, allowing for direct, immediate communications between our leaders.

In the summer of 1963, in a Commencement Address at American University, President John F. Kennedy laid out a bold vision on how we could turn away from what had seemed like an inevitable march towards nuclear catastrophe.

"Peace need not be impracticable," he said, "and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly, by making it seem more manageable and less remote, we can help all peoples to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it."

I like that concept. Defining goals does make things more manageable. Working step by step, we can slowly fix seemingly intractable, unsolvable problems.

In that particular speech, one of the defined goals was to achieve a ban on nuclear testing. While it was not comprehensive, the Limited Test Ban Treaty went into force just four months later. It outlawed nuclear explosive tests on land, in the sea, in the atmosphere and in space. This was a tremendous step in the right direction and one that helped create political conditions to conclude the NPT, an even more ambitious treaty, several years later.

The Path Before Us

The grand bargain of the NPT, where nuclear weapon states pursue disarmament, non-nuclear weapon states abstain from the pursuit of nuclear weapons and all countries are able to access the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, sets an enduring standard that is as relevant today as it was at the Treaty’s inception. For over forty years, the regime has bent, frayed and broken in places, but it has never collapsed. It has slowed the tide of proliferation; it has facilitated cooperation among its States Parties; and it has institutionalized the norms of nonproliferation and disarmament.

Despite our past successes, there are very pressing challenges all around us and on the horizon. Most critically, we have grave concerns about the actions of a few countries. North Korea, Iran and Syria violated their NPT obligations, and have failed to take the steps necessary to rectify these violations. The United States is gravely concerned about all of these programs, as I am sure is the case for everyone in this room. These transgressions threaten international security and undermine confidence in the nonproliferation regime. These cases also stand directly in the way of our shared disarmament goals.

Addressing these compliance challenges is essential to preserving the integrity of the nonproliferation regime and we have taken important steps in the past several years to do so. The IAEA found Syria in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations for attempting to build a covert nuclear reactor, and we are continuing to build on the stringent sanctions the UN Security Council adopted against Iran in 2010. That, combined with actions taken before 2010, represent clear reinforcement of the importance of full compliance. NPT Parties must be willing to keep the pressure on countries that violate their obligations. As President Obama has said many times, the international community must stand up to States that violate their nonproliferation obligations. NPT rules must be binding and there must be consequences for those who break them.

There is a continued push for universal adherence to the IAEA safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols. As we have learned from past and present safeguards violations from countries such as Iran and Syria, the Additional Protocol must be the standard for verification of the NPT. Since 2010, 18 states have brought Additional Protocols into force, bringing the total to 119. Another 20 have signed the Protocol but not yet completed the ratification process. That is excellent progress, but we must continue to press for more.

The United States will also work with all Parties to discourage states from abusing the NPT’s withdrawal provision, a priority we share with many of our international partners.

Building on our pledge to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our defense strategy, we are also making progress on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). The nuclear-weapon states, also known as the P5, and ASEAN have agreed on a revised Protocol to the Southeast Asia NWFZ (SEANWFZ) Treaty that resolved outstanding differences. We hope that the Protocol signing can take place soon.

For its part, this Administration sent the protocols to the African and South Pacific NWFZs to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent. The United States also remains committed to consulting with the Central Asia NWFZ (CANWFZ) parties to reach an agreement that would allow us – along with the rest of the P5 – to sign the protocol to that treaty.

A longer term goal is achievement of a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. The United States supports this goal and stands ready to help facilitate discussions among states in the region at the proposed Helsinki conference. But we do so recognizing that the mandate for a zone can only come from within the region; it cannot be imposed from outside or without the consent of all concerned states. We regret the Helsinki conference could not be convened last year, but remain committed to working with our partners to create conditions for a successful event.

An immediate concern is securing vulnerable nuclear materials in order to keep them out of hands of terrorists. Under President Obama’s direction, we have held two Nuclear Security Summits, with a third to take place in The Hague next year. In anticipation of the Hague Summit, we will continue to build on pledges that are resulting in more material secured, removed and eliminated. These are real and durable achievements that help protect nations against the threat of nuclear terrorism. We will continue to use the Summits to strengthen the global architecture – the treaties, institutions, norms and rules – that governs nuclear security, and to promote the concept of "assurance;" that is, states execute their sovereign security responsibilities in ways that assure neighbors, allies and rivals that they are doing so effectively. Israel and others here are valued partners in the Summit process, and we look forward to continued cooperation to promote these shared goals.

Regarding the disarmament agenda, there have been successes on both the bilateral and multilateral fronts. The United States is committed to a step-by-step process to reduce the overall numbers of nuclear weapons. The two year anniversary of the New START Treaty’s entry into force has just passed. As many of you know, I was the lead New START negotiator for the United States and it is very satisfying to see how pragmatic, business-like and positive the implementation has been. We are now exploring the possibilities of what a future agreement with Russia would look like – one with reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed.

Beyond bilateral treaties, ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains a top priority for the United States.

As we move forward with our ratification process, we encourage all other nations to do the same. We also remain committed to launch negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. It is unfortunate that, to date, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has been blocked in its efforts to move this agreement forward.

We are also engaging with other P5 states on disarmament-related matters. Following the first meeting in London in 2009, P5 conferences were held in Paris in 2011 and Washington in 2012. At those high-level meetings, we started discussions on key nuclear weapons related issues, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. Russia announced recently that it will host the next P5 conference in April, just before the second NPT PrepCom.

While some are quick to dismiss the utility of meetings and conferences, they would be forgetting their history. As the United States and Russia approach the lowest levels of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950’s – and that will happen when the New START Treaty is fully implemented in 2018 – it is important to remember that their success was born out of direct communication. Communication builds trust. Trust paves the way for cooperation. This is the type of process we are cultivating in the P5 setting.

We also support new frameworks for civil nuclear cooperation that reduce the spread of dangerous technologies. Establishment of an IAEA fuel bank represents an important step forward, as it can help assure the reliability of nuclear fuel supply and avoid the unnecessary investment in indigenous enrichment.

Forging Ahead

Having just run through the challenges and opportunities, the road ahead can seem daunting. Some states continue to forsake their freely taken and legally binding obligations. Proliferation is aided by the speed and anonymity provided by the information age. Conflicts around the globe make cooperation difficult or dangerous. Even in the face of these challenges, it is incumbent upon us to find ways to strengthen nonproliferation norms, bolster compliance and quickly adapt to ever-changing circumstances and security needs.

There are some new tools that could aid us in our travels. The United States is and has always been committed to innovation, and the arms control and nonproliferation arenas are no exception. To respond to the challenges we face, we are thinking about creative ways to use technologies – including open source technologies – to tackle long-standing verification and monitoring problems. We hope that other states will join us in this endeavor.

All of what I have discussed will require hard work. However, we are at a crossroads, not a cliff. We are fully able to choose the path that leads us to a safer, more secure world. We have with us the lessons of the Cold War and the knowledge that even in our darkest hours, we found a way forward. In his speech at American University 50 years ago, President Kennedy left the students with a final thought:

"Confident and unafraid, we labor on--not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace."


We have come a long way since then, but we have a long way to go. We just have to keep moving forward step by step, confident and unafraid.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

2012 DETERRENCE SYMPOSIUM

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
U.S. Strategic Command 2012 Deterrence Symposium

Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Omaha, NE
August 9, 2012
General Kehler, thank you for the opportunity to speak to STRATCOM’s 2012 Deterrence Symposium. It has become the place to talk about U.S. deterrence policy and deterrence relationships. I see a lot of Washington rainmakers in the room, along with their usual talents, I am glad they’ve brought some rain to Nebraska. There’s one other unique thing about this onference: this is the first time I’ve seen two Rose’s as plenary speakers. Is Rose McDermot still here? Good on ya, STRATCOM. Now to get serious - this year, I would like to focus on our extended deterrence relationship with our European allies and partners.
　
But to begin with, I’d like to update you on New START, which has now been in force for 18 months. I am pleased to report that the implementation process is going extremely well. For this Treaty year, which began in February, each side has already conducted nine inspections and the overall number of Treaty notifications is over 2700. The New START Treaty’s robust verification regime is providing the predictability and mutual confidence that will be essential to any future nuclear reduction plans.
　
When President Obama laid out his vision for the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons in Prague in 2009, he made it clear that we will need to maintain our deterrence commitments, while also taking into account the threats of the 21st century. The President knows that the road from Prague will be long. Success will only be reached through a step-by-step process in which we maintain and support a safe, secure, and effective stockpile - sufficient to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies- at the same time that we pursue responsible reductions through arms control.
　
We are now spending a lot time thinking about next steps in deterrence, stability, and arms control. I sometimes refer to it as a homework period, which is not a bad term for what we are doing. We are looking at fundamentals and lessons learned, as we work to develop new policies to advance our security.
　
For arms control, that means pulling back to the basic level. Simply put, arms control contributes to international security by committing nations to submit voluntarily to regimes that limit the development, production, stockpiling, and deployment of weapons. Because arms control is based on reciprocity and is typically accompanied by verification, confidence building and transparency measures, it helps to build predictability into relationships. Limiting force levels and establishing a regime through a mutually verifiable agreement creates boundaries, promotes standard operating procedures, and fosters predictable behavior – these are the building blocks of trust. The relative improvement of trust between parties can help increase stability, in particular when this improvement is underwritten by verification mechanisms. This process can shift a relationship from one based on coercive formulations of deterrence to one based on mutual restraint.
　
Mutual restraint does not remove the need for deterrence, but it does reflect a shared interest in limiting strategic competition. Mutual restraint, along with the stability provided by arms control agreements, can help prevent escalation during crisis by reducing the imperative to go first. It can also create the conditions for further nuclear reductions.
　
The State Department’s International Security Advisory Board, or ISAB, is helping us with some "big thinking." This Federal Advisory Committee was established to provide the Department of State with a continuing source of independent insight, advice, and innovation on scientific, military, diplomatic, political, and public diplomacy aspects of arms control, disarmament, international security, and nonproliferation. The ISAB was asked by former Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher, who is well-known by many of you, to undertake a study of how the United States could pursue and manage a transition from a world of mutual assured destruction to a world of mutual assured stability, characterized by increasingly interdependent states having incentives to cooperate on political, military, and economic issues, thereby reducing the need for adversarial approaches to managing security challenges. Among the topics that the ISAB was asked to examine and assess in this area were the possible components of mutual assured stability: What would the United States need to see happen to have the confidence to consider very low numbers and, eventually, agree to the elimination of nuclear weapons? Their report is forthcoming and when it is released, I encourage you all to take a look.
　
Reducing the Salience of Nuclear Weapons
In addition to exploring new ideas and concepts of deterrence and arms control, this President and his Administration are committed to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. We are not developing new nuclear weapons or pursuing new nuclear missions; we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations; and we have clearly stated that it is in everyone’s interest to extend forever the more than 65-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons.
　
As we continue to reduce global nuclear stockpiles and include additional categories of weapons in that process, the importance of verification and transparency will only grow. Having confidence in what other states are doing is critical for creating conditions for further progress in arms control and disarmament, which is why we made our 2010 Nuclear Posture Review public and revealed the size of our stockpile – 5,113 weapons as of September 2009.
　
As part of the implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S. Government is currently reviewing its nuclear deterrence requirements to ensure that they are aligned to address today’s threats. What we already know, as President Obama said in Seoul back in March, is we have more nuclear weapons than we need. This study will help shape our next negotiations with Russia.
　
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
Both the President and the Senate – in the New START Resolution of Ratification – have placed a priority on seeking to initiate new negotiations with the Russians on nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW).
　
Over the course of the past few years, the Administration has taken a number of steps towards this goal. We have been conducting our own internal reviews, while also reviewing this matter with our Allies through the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) and we’ve also been engaging with the Russians in a strategic stability dialogue. We have also been consulting with our allies.
　
In approving the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review at Chicago this past May, the Allies determined that NATO’s current posture meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture. NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of and reliance on nuclear weapons, but has indicated that it is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of NSNW stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.
　
The Allies have supported and encouraged the United States and Russia to continue their mutual efforts to promote strategic stability, enhance transparency, and further reduce their nuclear weapons in every category.
　
NATO Allies look forward to developing and exchanging transparency and confidence-building ideas with Russia with the goal of developing detailed proposals on and increasing mutual understanding of NATO’s and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe.
　
Conventional Arms Control in Europe
While we continue to work on nonstrategic nuclear force issues, it is important to keep in mind the importance of European security overall. As Secretary Clinton stated in 2010, "[a] strong Europe is critical to our security and our prosperity. Much of what we hope to accomplish globally depends on working together with Europe." In this context, predictable conventional force structures in Europe will contribute to enhancing European security and strengthening trust, including between NATO Allies and Russia.
　
Our conventional arms control agreements in Europe – the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Document confidence-building measures – are vital to providing a foundation for stability in our strategic relationships. NATO confirmed the importance of conventional arms control at the Chicago Summit:
　
Reaffirming the importance of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Allies remain committed to conventional arms control and to preserving, strengthening, and modernizing the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments.
　
Modernization is the key word here. We have made a serious investment in building the current security architecture in Europe. We must devote adequate resources to keep the regimes going strong. However, we must adapt and improve our efforts to meet our current and future security needs, and do it in a way that is efficient and effective for all countries for all countries involved. We need some new thinking, and we have been devoting a lot of time to this task.
　
If we look back over the course of the CFE treaty’s implementation, the regime has been a historic success story. Since its entry into force, more than 72,000 pieces of Cold War military equipment – tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters – have been eliminated. Under CFE, thousands of inspections have taken place at military sites all over Europe, dramatically increasing confidence and military transparency on the continent by providing a means to verify data exchanges.
　
Despite these achievements, the earlier success of the treaty is proving difficult to replicate. In November 2011, the United States, along with 23 other parties to the treaty, ceased carrying out certain obligations under the CFE Treaty with regard to Russia. This was a legal countermeasure to Russia's step in late 2007, when it suspended implementation of the Treaty.
　
While ceasing to implement an arms control obligation is not something that the Administration usually sees as a positive step, in this case there was a silver lining: the November 2011 decision has allowed us to embark upon a ground-up reexamination of the entire conventional arms control enterprise.
　
We’re asking fundamental questions: What are the security concerns in Europe in 2012 that a conventional arms control agreement should address? And, taking into account the lessons learned from the implementation of CFE and other existing agreements, what kinds of arms control measures could address those concerns and uphold core principles of European security?
　
The fact is, the basic problem that the original CFE Treaty was meant to resolve – the destabilizing surplus of conventional arms on the continent – has been resolved, in no small part through implementation of this important treaty.
　
Today, for the most part, quantities of conventional armaments across the continent are way below the negotiated ceilings, and are likely to continue to drop.
　
While the problems of 1989 are no longer, it is my view that conventional arms control, done right, can significantly improve security on the continent by helping to address today’s concerns. It can provide confidence regarding the military forces and intentions of neighbors, especially in sensitive areas. We need to spend our stretched defense budgets wisely. Arms control can help us do that, for the more predictable our relationships, the better we can plan our defense spending.
　
Moving Forward
With that, I would like to stop and take some questions, but I will leave you with a final thought. Our extended deterrence relationship with our NATO allies is made up of many facets, as was recognized in the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. Nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities all contribute to extended deterrence, and they all require constant tending. One more vital facet is the arms control relationship with Europe that has been in place since the Cold War – and that includes Russia. If that relationship goes begging, then we will be the worse for it – and that, too, includes Russia.
　
Thank you.