PRESS STATEMENT ON DEPARTURE OF U.S. AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA

FROM:  STATE DEPARTMENT 
Ambassador McFaul's Departure from Russia
Press Statement
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Washington, DC
February 4, 2014

I join President Obama in expressing my deep gratitude to one of our very best, Ambassador Mike McFaul, for his exemplary service as U.S. Ambassador to Russia. After five years promoting U.S.-Russian relations, and the past seven months separated from his family, I understand Mike’s desire to return home to California. We will all miss Mike at the State Department, but we know he’ll just be a phone call or a tweet away.

In my time as Foreign Relations Committee Chairman and now as Secretary, I’ve learned firsthand that Mike McFaul  isn’t just exceptionally talented, fiercely conscientious, and whip-smart, he really understands the dynamics in Russia better than just about anybody. He’s worked creatively and tenaciously to enlist Moscow to act not just as a great power but also as a global partner. From the New START Treaty to securing Russian cooperation on Iran’s nuclear program, to resupplying our troops in Afghanistan and expanding our trade, there’s scarcely an issue in our bilateral agenda that didn’t benefit from Mike’s steady hand and good old fashioned willpower.

Mike has a clear-eyed understanding of the realities of diplomacy, but his realism is matched by an equally deep appreciation for enduring American values and their appeal across the globe. That’s why he engaged directly with Russian civil society. That’s why he stood up for the rights of LGBT individuals. And that’s why he was a relentless advocate for rule of law and an independent media.

Where our countries disagreed, Mike has spoken up clearly – privately and publicly. All you need to do is look at his Twitter account to know that he was truly a groundbreaking Ambassador in a groundbreaking era. He grasped the importance of social media in an information age, but he also grasped a much more essential truth: that all people everywhere should be able to express themselves and, ultimately, determine how they are governed. That’s an enduring conviction, and Mike leaves behind an enduring legacy.

ARMS CONTROL DATA U.S. AND RUSSIA

           FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms
Fact Sheet
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
April 6, 2012
(As of March 1, 2012, as drawn from the exchange of data by the Parties)[1]
     Category of Data                                                     United States of America          Russian Federation   
                                                                                                                                       

Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs,                                          812                                      494 

and Deployed Heavy Bombers                                                                                   

 

Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs,             1737                                       1492
and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy
Bombers

Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs,                  1040                                          881
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and 
Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers


[1] Data in this Fact Sheet comes from the biannual exchange of data required by the Treaty. It contains data declared current as of March 1, 2012. Data will be updated each six month period after entry into force of the Treaty.

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U.S.-RUSSIAN OFFICIALS MEETING ON INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL COOPERATION

FROM U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Tara Sonenshine Meets with Russian Special Presidential Representative for International Cultural Cooperation Mikhail E. Shvydkoy

Media Note Office of the Spokesperson Washington, DC
April 6, 2012
On April 6, Under Secretary Tara Sonenshine welcomed Special Presidential Representative Mikhail Shvydkoy at the State Department to discuss future plans for collaboration in the areas of education, media, sports and professional exchanges. The two senior officials jointly chair the U.S.-Russia Presidential Commission’s Education, Culture, Sports, and Media (ECSM) Working Group. Presidents Obama and Medvedev established the U.S.-Russia Presidential Commission (BPC) in July 2009 to improve coordination between both countries, to address shared challenges, and to explore new opportunities for partnership in areas of mutual interest. The ECSM Working Group is focused on developing personal connections and innovative collaboration to promote new dialogue and understanding between the people of the United States and Russia.

Under Secretary Sonenshine took this opportunity to congratulate Special Presidential Representative Shvydkoy on his contributions to the success of the ECSM Working Group. Over the past three years, more than 100 different groups of American musicians, dancers, artists, and writers have introduced Russians to the depth and diversity of U.S. culture as part of the “American Seasons” in Russia program. U.S. audiences similarly enjoyed the rich heritage of Russian culture through performances and artistic events in the United States. Both the United States and Russia have worked together to promote educational exchanges at all levels. In February 2012, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Educational Cooperation that will foster future exchanges.

Under Secretary Sonenshine and Special Presidential Representative Shvydkoy also discussed plans for the Media Sub-Working Group to develop our first young media professionals exchange, operated by the International Center for Journalists and the Moscow Union of Journalists, with support from the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation. In the coming months, the Education, Culture, Sports, and Media Working Group looks forward to working in partnership to increase opportunities for educational exchanges. The next meeting of the U.S. and Russian Sub-Working Group is scheduled to take place in Washington, D.C., in October 2012.

RESET OF U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS BRINGS RESULTS

FROM AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE

Official Says U.S.-Russia 'Reset' Holds Challenge, Opportunity

By Karen Parrish

WASHINGTON, April 4, 2012 - The strategic "reset" of relations between the United States and Russia is gradually bringing results, a senior defense policy expert said today.

Celeste A. Wallander, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia policy, discussed challenges and opportunities in U.S.-Russia relations with members of the Women's Foreign Policy Group here today.

The reset strategy is "to cooperate in areas where we can cooperate with Russia, in areas that serve American national interest ... and communicate clearly and honestly" on topics where the two governments don't agree, she said.

The United States and Russia have made some important progress, Wallander noted, including:

-- Implementing the "New START" nuclear arms reduction treaty;

-- Making progress toward agreement on Iran;

-- Achieving some cooperation in the NATO-led Afghanistan mission; and

-- Strengthening defense and security communication both between the two nations and between Russia and NATO.

"The New START treaty was an important achievement. ... It is another step in reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles," she said. The treaty also re-established regular mutual nuclear weapons inspections and meetings involving American and Russian military leaders and nuclear experts, she added.

On Iran, Russia has ended a contract that would have provided that country with Russian-made "very dangerous air defense systems," Wallander said, and Russia supports the Afghanistan effort by allowing U.S. and NATO troops and cargo to travel through its territory.

The U.S.-Russian defense relations working group and the NATO-Russian council allow both regular high-level meetings and daily working-level discussions among U.S., NATO and Russian defense and strategy experts on security issues including countering piracy, narcotics trafficking and terrorism, she added.

Wallander also listed areas where the United States and Russia "don't see eye to eye," including Syria and the U.S. four-phase approach to European missile defense.

Both nations agree the violence in Syria must end, she said, and President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed during their March meeting in Seoul, South Korea, to support the mission to Syria that Kofi Annan has undertaken as a United Nations and Arab League representative.

The two countries have not agreed on whether or when other nations should take action against Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime, she noted, but even in disagreement the U.S.-Russian relationship is "certainly in a better place" than in past years, when representatives and leaders "would have been talking at one another, not with one another."

The United States views Russia as occupying Georgian territory in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Wallander said. While U.S. leaders know Russia's policies about the disputed areas, she added, they "don't accept them."

Georgia and Russia have held regular bilateral talks in Geneva since they first clashed over the two republics in 2008, she noted. She added U.S. support to these talks demonstrates the "reset" strategy, emphasizing that even small steps build transparency and understanding, if not agreement, between Russia and the United States.

The United States takes a similar approach to Russia's objections to the U.S. European missile defense plan, she added. That plan calls for a steady buildup of sea- and land-based systems designed to protect European nations and U.S. troops in Europe from a growing threat of missile attack from the Middle East, particularly Iran, she explained.

Wallander said the plan is based on an assessment that over the next 10 years Iran poses a "small, relatively straightforward nuclear missile threat" to nations in Europe, and the defense systems called for in the phased approach will not have the capability to threaten Russia.

The United States has invited Russia to participate in planning and implementing the missile defense systems, but with little success, she noted. Still, the United States remains "committed to seeking cooperation" on this and other issues, she added.

Civil demonstrations around the recent Russian presidential election demonstrate the long-term potential of the "reset" approach, she noted. The U.S. strategy, she said, aims at a prosperous, secure, militarily modern Russia that has transitioned to fully democratic government and is committed to building regional stability.

"We've seen a Russian ... middle class that wants that, too," Wallander said. "The next couple of years will be really interesting and really important for Russia's future," she said.
 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S STATEMENT IN MOSCOW ON "ARMS CONTROL IN THE INFORMATION AGE"

The following excerpt is from a Department of State e-mail:
Arms Control in the Information Age
Remarks Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)
Moscow, Russia
March 29, 2012 

Thank you for the kind introduction. It is always a pleasure to be back here in Moscow. After spending three years at Carnegie Moscow Center, this city feels like a second home.

As you all probably know, we have just passed the one year anniversary of New START Treaty’s entry into force. I am happy to report that implementation of that Treaty is now underway and it is going very well. As Foreign Minister Lavrov has said, the New START Treaty is "a new gold standard for…agreements of this kind. Not only does the treaty facilitate a strengthening of the security of Russia and the USA but it will also have a positive effect on international stability and security in general."

I could not agree more and New START was just the beginning. President Obama made it clear in his now-famous Prague Speech that the United States is committed to the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. He reiterated his vision in Seoul earlier this week. In his remarks at the Nuclear Security Summit, President Obama said that he “knew that this goal would not be reached quickly, perhaps not in [his] lifetime, but [he] knew we had to begin, with concrete steps.”

In order to pursue the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons, we are going to have to think bigger and bolder. With this is mind, I have been challenging myself and my colleagues to think about how we use the knowledge of our past together with the new tools of the information age. I look out at a crowd like you and realize that I don’t need to convince you that the technologies of the 21^st century are changing the world as we know it. While I may still be figuring out how to use my Ipad, I know it too. That is why I have been talking about arms control in the information age at universities around the United States.

Today, I will talk to you the changing nature of diplomacy and the new technologies that can help us on the road to nuclear zero. I have talked about these subjects at several universities now and I would like to start out by saying the same thing I tell students back in the United States- this is not a policy speech, this is an ideas speech. You are my first audience in Russia.

21^st Century Statecraft

Diplomacy today is very different than it was at the dawn of the nuclear age. Treaties and agreements are not being formulated in vaulted, smoke-filled rooms across green baize tables, among grizzled diplomats with endless amounts of time. More often diplomacy is happening in the open, and at quicker speeds. We diplomats must learn to work and thrive under new circumstances.

In my own experience, diplomacy has changed dramatically before my eyes. I was a junior member of the U.S. START delegation in 1990-91, an experience that served me well when negotiating the New START Treaty. I remember how things were done back then: masses of paper had to be shuttled among delegation members—we were constantly burning up Xerox machines, and faxes flowed from Geneva to Washington and back.

When the New START negotiations began in April 2009, the world had changed. The U.S. and Russian delegations launched into the negotiations committed to keeping them respectful and businesslike, even when we did not agree. And we agreed to disagree in private. That was good considering how easily either delegation could have broadcast negative comments that would have reached Moscow or Washington before we could pick up a phone.

For me, the biggest change in how we did business was email. Instead of making hard copies and waiting days or weeks for the snail mail, we could get information around the delegation and to our leaders in Washington within hours, even minutes. Both classified and unclassified materials could be sent, decreasing necessary trips back to Washington.

After some discussion, we also agreed to exchange negotiating documents with the Russian team electronically, although on disks and not via email. Still, even CDs made a big difference to after-hours communication. There was a famous story about how in the 1990s, during the START talks, a member of the U.S. delegation had to hurl a satchel of negotiating documents over the fence of the Soviet mission to his counterpart, because no guard was there to open the gates late at night. Obviously, a CD could be handed more easily between the bars of the fence--which we did from time to time.

In my view, these new approaches to a formal negotiating process, especially our new digital toolbox, were a big factor in the fast pace of our negotiations--exactly one year from our first meeting to our last one. No longer bogged down by paper processes, things moved quickly. Nowadays, I don’t have to wait until the next time I travel to Geneva or Moscow to advance business with my counterparts; I can email or call from my home or office, and hopefully soon, I can walk across the hall and have a video-chat in our conference room.

New Technologies and Arms Control

Even with a full diplomatic toolbox and new methods for diplomacy, we need to think about how new agreements will be verified. Today, we verify that countries are fulfilling their arms control treaty obligations through a combination of information exchange, notifications of weapon status, on-site inspections, and National Means, including so-called National Technical Means (NTM). NTM are big assets—observation satellites, phased-array radars—that individual countries manage and control. It has long been a rule of arms control treaties that we don’t interfere with each other’s National Technical Means—we allow each other these eyes and ears to monitor treaties. All of the elements I’ve listed work together to make an effective verification regime.

I should say what we mean by effective verification. Ambassador Paul Nitze defined it as follows: “if the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violations in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation.” That’s effective verification, and it has been the benchmark for verifying compliance. To help meet this benchmark, I’ve been asking myself, can we incorporate open source information technologies and social networking into arms control verification and monitoring?

New concepts, I recognize, are not invented overnight, and we don’t understand the full range of possibilities inherent in the information age, but we would be remiss if we did not start thinking about whether new technologies can augment over half a century of arms control negotiating expertise?

Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. They exchange and share ideas on a wide variety of topics, why not put this vast problem solving entity to good use?

Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, could be broadcast globally in seconds. That means it is harder to hide things. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool, and it can help us make sure that countries are following the rules of arms control treaties and agreements.

Open source information technologies improve arms control verification in at least two ways: either as a way of generating new information, or as analysis of information that already is out there.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Red Balloon Challenge is an example of the first. In 2009, in recognition of the 40th anniversary of the Internet, DARPA held a competition where 10 red weather balloons were moored at visible fixed locations around the continental United States. The first team to identify the location of all 10 balloons won a sizable cash prize--$40,000. Over 4,300 teams composed of an estimated 2 million people from 25 countries took part in the challenge. A team from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology won the challenge, identifying all of the balloon locations in an astonishing time of 8 hours and 52 minutes. Of course, to win in such a short time or complete the challenge at all, the MIT team did not “find” the balloons themselves. They tapped into social networks with a unique incentive structure that not only incentivized people to identify a balloon location, but also incentivized people to recruit others to the team. Their win showed the enormous potential of social networking and also demonstrated how incentives can motivate large populations to work toward a common goal.

Now, how could something like this work in an arms control context? Let’s just imagine that a country, to establish itsbona fides in a deep nuclear reduction environment, may wish to open itself to a verification challenge. It could seek to prove it was not stashing extra missiles in the woods, for example, or a fissile material production reactor in the desert. Of course, some form of international supervision would likely be required, to ensure the legitimacy of the challenge and its procedures. And we would have to consider whether such a challenge could cope with especially covert environments, such as caves or deep underground facilities.

A technique like this—I call it a “public verification challenge”—might be especially valuable as we move to lower numbers of nuclear weapons. Governments would have an interest in proving that they are meeting their reduction obligations and may want to engage their publics in helping them to make the case.

It would be necessary to work together to make sure nations cannot spoof or manipulate the verification challenges that they devise. We also have to bear in mind that there could be limitations based on the freedoms available to the citizens of said country. These are both big problems, but I am certain that we can tackle them.

In addition to developing new information, harvesting and analyzing existing information can be helpful, too. Many are analyzing twitter streams, for example: Laila Shareen Sakr, a University of Southern California doctoral candidate, designed a computer program to aggregate twitter data and patterns that enabled her to understand events in both Arab Spring and Libya’s revolution as they were unfolding.

The ability to identify patterns and trends in social networks could aid the arms control verification process. In the most basic sense, social media can draw attention to both routine and abnormal events. We may be able to use data mining to understand where strange effluents are flowing, to recognize patterns of industrial activity, to queue sensors and satellites. Such queuing could help us to make better use of our scarce and expensive National Technical Means, or in some cases to supplement them in important ways. This is a major issue in an age of budget austerity, when the price tag for big hardware like satellites continues to rise. We need this “big hardware”, but we need to use it efficiently.

In this same vein, we should think about what there is to gain from using open source geospatial databases like Google Earth. Of course, NGOs, students and private citizens have been using open sources satellite images for research for some time now.

Now even one of the most famous men in the world is applying these new technological tools to aid in the promotion of human rights in Sudan and South Sudan. Actor George Clooney, in conjunction with ngos, academic institutions and businesses, created the Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP). SSP uses commercial satellite images to systematically monitor and report on possible threats to human security in near real-time.

DigitalGlobe satellites passing over Sudan and South Sudan capture imagery of potential threats to civilians. The satellites can pick up types and varieties of helicopters, tanks and multiple rocket launch systems, among many other items of concern. The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative analyzes imagery and information from sources on the ground to produce reports. The Enough Project then releases the reports to the press and policymakers and sounds the alarm by notifying the news media and civic groups.

The synergy is stunning- private citizens and groups conduct their own monitoring project, analyze the information and then publicize the results via traditional news and social media networks.

Beyond movie stars, the Information Age is creating a greater talent pool of individuals to aid in our pursuits. People can reach a broader, diverse market for their products and services. These private citizens can develop web based applications for e-book readers, cell phones and any touch pad communication devices. This “crowd sourcing” lets everyday people solve problems by getting innovative ideas out of their heads and onto the shelves.

Open source technology could be useful in the hands of inspectors. Smart Phone and tablet apps could be created for the express purpose of aiding in the verification and monitoring process. For example, by having all safeguards and verification sensors in an inspected facility wirelessly connected to the inspector’s iPad, he or she could note anomalies and flag specific items for closer inspections, as well as compare readings in real time and interpret them in context. Some of this is already happening.

As we think through new ways to use these tools, we should be aware that there may be trouble ahead. We cannot assume that information will always be so readily available. As nations and private entities continue to debate the line between privacy and security, it is possible to imagine that we are living in a golden age of open source information that will be harder to take advantage of in future. In the end, the goal of using open source information technology and social networks should be to add to our existing arms control verification capabilities.

As I said at the outset, this is not about policy; this is about coming up with the bold ideas that will shape policy in the future. In Seoul, President Obama said that in “your generation, I see the spirit we need in this endeavor -- an optimism that beats in the hearts of so many young people around the world. It’s that refusal to accept the world as it is, the imagination to see the world as it ought to be, and the courage to turn that vision into reality.”

As the U.S. and Russian governments work to enhance and expand our arms control and nonproliferation efforts, we will need your help to find new ways to use the amazing information tools at our disposal to move the world closer to stable peace and security.

Thank you again for inviting me here to speak.

U.S. OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED BY ROSE GOTTEMOELLER OF KOMMERSANT DAILY

The following excerpt is from a Department of State e-mail:
Interview by Elena Chernenko of Kommersant Daily
Interview Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Moscow, Russia
March 28, 2012
Question: What’s the purpose of your visit to Moscow?

Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller: I’m traveling to Moscow to meet with my counterparts to discuss arms control issues of mutual interest to the U.S. and Russia, in particular, the future of conventional arms control in Europe. Also, I will be speaking to students at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations on arms control in the information age, and will be meeting with experts at my old “home base” in Moscow, the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Question: Quite recently you took on a new position in the State Department. What do you intend to focus on? And what do you want to achieve in relations with Russia?

Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller: I want to stress that I am continuing with my responsibilities as U.S. Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance. But now I’ll combine my previous functions with the responsibilities of Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security.

In listing the parts of my portfolio, I want to start with something that I believe is vitally important for both the U.S. and Russia. I’m talking about nuclear terrorism. Today this is one of the most extreme threats to global security. President Obama has spoken about this on many occasions. The U.S. and Russia have been cooperating in this area for a long time, making every effort to see that nuclear materials do not fall into the hands of terrorists. The physical protection, control, and accounting of nuclear materials are priority issues for both of our countries. This was one of the key topics at the recently concluded Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea, in which Presidents Obama and Medvedev personally participated.

The second part of my portfolio has been much in the press in Russia, especially in recent months – I’m referring to our efforts to develop missile defense cooperation. The U.S. wants, and is prepared, to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, and we intend to continue negotiations with Moscow on this subject both in diplomatic channels and at the military-to-military level. Our goal is to bring together the capabilities of the U.S., Europe, NATO, and Russia to jointly address common missile threats. So we’re working with Russia bilaterally and also through NATO channels to find forms of cooperation that will benefit the U.S. and Russia and our European partners.

The third part of my portfolio involves conventional arms control. We intend to revitalize the system of conventional arms control in Europe and are prepared to begin working on that in the coming months. Conventional arms control has three pillars: one is the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the CFE Treaty, which has had a great historical role; the second is the Vienna Document on strengthening confidence-building measures in Europe; and the third is the Open Skies Treaty, where Russia is playing a very important role in its implementation. The U.S. intends to work on all three areas in order to revitalize the negotiations on conventional arms control in Europe.

And, of course, I’ll continue working on implementation of the new treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (the New START Treaty). After all, I spent many years working to prepare this treaty.

Question: Yes, in Russia you’re best known as the American “face” of START.

Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller: (Laughs.) When President Obama signed the treaty, he talked about the need for further reductions in all categories of nuclear arms, including deployed strategic nuclear arms, non-deployed – for example, those held in storage facilities – and nonstrategic nuclear arms – or, as they’re also called, tactical nuclear weapons. And we’re interested in conducting the relevant negotiating process with Russia in the future. But in order to do that, right now it’s necessary to work on confidence-building and security measures.

Question: Well, you certainly have a lot to do.

Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller: And that’s not all! I don’t want to overwhelm Kommersant’s readers, but there are a few other areas that I feel are extremely important. One is U.S.-Russian cooperation to counter piracy. Russia is making a major contribution to international counter-piracy efforts, in particular, to the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. Not a lot is said about this, but it’s a very important area of cooperation.

One other problem that I feel is extremely important at this particular time is man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), specifically, their uncontrolled proliferation. In December of last year we stepped up the negotiations in this area, primarily because of the situation in Libya. We would like to continue to work with Russia and other countries in stopping the smuggling of MANPADS from Libya. Together, it’s easier for us to create barriers to traffickers dealing in this dangerous kind of weapon and to combat its proliferation around the world. I’m glad the U.S. and Russia are cooperating in this area.
Those are some of my priorities, but I felt it was very important to show you how diverse the work of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security is and the wide variety of areas in which the U.S. and Russia have experience in cooperating to ensure security.

Question: You already mentioned the New START Treaty. It’s now been a bit over a year since the exchange of instruments of ratification. What can you say about the implementation of the Treaty?

Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller: New START, indeed, has recently passed its first birthday. In my view, this first year was very successful. Implementation of the treaty has already contributed significantly to increasing confidence between the U.S. and Russia, and therefore it has improved the relationship between our countries in general. Over the year both the U.S. and Russia have carried out their obligations under the treaty, but at the same time they have fully exercised the rights and utilized the opportunities provided to them. The two countries have each conducted the maximum of 18 permitted inspections.
I found it amusing that as soon as one side would announce its intention to conduct an inspection, the other side immediately expressed a desire to do the same. We’re playing tag (laughs). And the sides also exchanged more than 2,000 notifications about their strategic arms. The U.S. was learning about Russian arms, while Russia was learning about U.S. arms. I want to stress that this is an equitable and mutually beneficial process.

Question: How did it make you feel when President Dmitriy Medvedev said in November of last year that because of differences on missile defense Russia could withdraw from the New START Treaty?

Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller: Out of all President Medvedev’s remarks the most notable for me were his words about his firm intention to continue searching for ways to cooperate with the U.S. on missile defense. President Obama, I know, shares that view regarding cooperation with Russia. But in general, I want to note that withdrawal clauses are part of almost all international agreements dealing with security issues. New START has basically the same provisions for withdrawal by one side as previous agreements of this kind. I want to stress that each country has the right, if a treaty is no longer in its national security interests, to withdraw from the treaty. But I think the first year of New START implementation made it very clear that this treaty benefits all the participants.

Question: But how do you propose to break the impasse on missile defense?

Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller: President Obama has said on many occasions that the U.S. is committed to finding a mutually acceptable approach on missile defense cooperation with Russia. We believe that such cooperation can enhance the security of the United States, our allies in Europe, and Russia. And we don’t intend to conceal anything about our plans and intentions. President Obama has also indicated that we can’t limit the U.S. and NATO missile defense system to a legally binding framework. But he has repeatedly stressed both publicly and privately that U.S. and NATO missile defense efforts are not intended nor are they capable of threatening Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence forces. And we are prepared to put that in writing. We are definitely prepared to do that.
I’m not naive and I know this is a difficult process, for both Moscow and Washington. It’s going to take a lot of time and effort to find a mutually acceptable solution. But I’m convinced that cooperation in this area is possible and is worth the effort.

Question: Recently the U.S. media reported that Washington is allegedly prepared to accommodate Moscow and provide some sort of “secret” information on its missile defense components. Is that true?

Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller: The United States is committed to missile defense cooperation with Russia as President Obama and Secretary Clinton have repeatedly made clear. Our governments are continuing to discuss a mutually acceptable approach to practical missile defense cooperation. However, I am not going to comment on our diplomatic discussions.

Question: Not long ago it was officially announced that the Russia-NATO Summit in Chicago was being postponed indefinitely. This is thought to be due to the lack of progress on missile defense. Could you comment on that?

Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller: Russia insisted that the summit agenda should be solid and substantive. But the NATO countries wanted the same thing! Also, it’s important to understand that the relations between the alliance and Moscow aren’t just limited to missile defense. It’s certainly a very important area of cooperation, but it’s by no means the only one.

NATO and Russia are successfully cooperating on Afghanistan – by July of this year, under a contract with the U.S. Defense Department, Russia will be shipping 12 more Mi-17 helicopters to Afghanistan, in addition to the 9 that have already been delivered. NATO and the Russian Federation are cooperating to combat smuggling of drugs from Afghanistan. The NATO-Russia Cooperative Airspace Initiative will begin full operations this spring. So we would have issues that would make up a solid and substantive agenda for the summit. But, of course, we understand that the problem of missile defense is important and we are prepared to discuss it.

Question: And what about the U.S. proposal for Russian experts to visit the Missile Defense Agency in Colorado Springs and participate in U.S. missile defense tests this spring – is it still on the table?

Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller: Yes, the invitation is still on the table. We’re discussing a whole series of confidence-building and transparency measures with Russian officials. I don’t know all the technical details, but I do know that they’re still expecting the Russian experts in Colorado Springs. In fact, this kind of cooperation has already taken place: in the summer of 2011 Dimitriy Rogozin, who was then Russia’s ambassador to NATO and is now Deputy Prime Minister, personally met with military staff and observed U.S. missile defense tests in Colorado Springs. This was a worthy precedent, and I hope it will be continued this year.

Question: We already talked a bit about conventional arms control in Europe. In 2007 the Russian Federation declared a moratorium on its participation in the CFE Treaty. In addition, the NATO Countries have not ratified the adapted CFE Treaty, insisting on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. How do you propose breaking this impasse?

Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller: To repeat, we’re prepared to work on revitalizing the negotiations in this area, both with Russia and with our other partners. But in order to break the impasse on this problem we will have to agree on some basic items and concepts. Otherwise we won’t understand where we want to go. Right now, in 2012, we have time to do that “homework.”

But, of course, international arms control agreements cannot and should not resolve all the bilateral and other problems, like the frozen conflicts you mentioned. Such agreements, can, however, build confidence between the parties to such territorial disputes and improve security in the zone of the conflicts.

FIRST U.S.-RUSSIAN INNOVATION WORKING GROUP MEETING IS COMPLETED

The following excerpt is from a Department of State e-mail:
U.S.-Russia Innovation Working Group Completes Inaugural Meeting in Silicon Valley, Memorandum of Understanding Signed on Skolkovo Innovation Center
Media Note Office of the Spokesperson Washington, DC
March 28, 2012
In the course of a day-long series of discussions, Working Group members examined policies that encourage successful innovation systems around the world, as well as concrete cooperative projects to promote innovation coordination between the United States and Russia. The group also discussed plans to link innovation centers and regional innovation clusters, assessed the legal framework for innovation, and considered ways of leveraging resources and connections in the private and academic sectors to support the commercialization of innovative technologies in Russia and the United States.

U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment Robert Hormats addressed the group via video conference. U.S. Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs Lorraine Hariton and Russian Deputy Minister of Economic Development Oleg Fomichev led their respective delegations, chaired the meeting, and signed the Memorandum of Understanding. Working group members include innovation experts from the Russian and U.S. private sectors, non-governmental sectors, universities, and governments.

President Obama and President Medvedev created the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) in July 2009 to improve coordination between our countries, identify areas of cooperation, and pursue joint projects and actions that strengthen strategic stability, international security, economic well-being, and the development of ties between the Russian and American peoples. The BPC now consists of 20 working groups and numerous sub-working groups