SECRETARY KERRY'S REMARKS IN MONTREUX, SWITZERLAND

FROM:  THE STATE DEPARTMENT
Remarks in Montreux, Switzerland
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Montreux, Switzerland
March 4, 2015

SECRETARY KERRY: So good afternoon to all, and thank you very, very much for your patience. We’ve been involved in some long discussions over the past few days, and even well before that. And before I leave Montreux, I wanted to quickly share with you where we are.

From the beginning, these negotiations have been tough and intense, and they remain so. And we’ve made some progress from where we were, but there are still significant gaps and important choices that need to be made. The purpose of these negotiations is not to get any deal; it’s to get the right deal, one that can withstand scrutiny – the scrutiny of experts on nuclear affairs all around the world, the scrutiny of other governments, the scrutiny of people, the scrutiny of the Congress of the United States, people in America, and the scrutiny of countries in the region that are affected by it. And so we know that. We approach these negotiations with a full understanding of the test that will be applied to this and of the expectations that exist.

We also want an agreement that is sustainable over time, and particularly that achieves the singular goal of proving that Iran’s nuclear program is and will remain peaceful. We aren’t going to be distracted by external factors or politics. We will continue to be guided by our experts, our scientists, our national interests and those of our partners and allies.

Now, for all the objections that any country has to Iranian activities in the region – and believe me, we have objections and others in the world have objections – the first step is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. And we know that absent a deal, Iran will have the ability to move ahead with its nuclear program; that we know for sure, because that’s exactly what’s happened to date. We also know that any deal that we would agree to would significantly increase the breakout time, leaving Iran further – far further than it is today – from producing enough fissile material for a weapon, while it undertakes the effort of proving to the world that the program is, in fact, peaceful.

Clearly, increased breakout time makes any nation in the vicinity or any nation of concern safer. We also know that any deal that we reach would give us the intrusive access and verification measures necessary to confirm that Iran’s nuclear facilities are indeed on a peaceful path. And that would allow us to promptly detect any attempt to cheat or to break out, and then to respond appropriately. And contrary to some public reports, we are only contemplating a deal in which important access and verification measures will endure.

We also know that the international sanctions, which many want to simply hang their hats on – they may have gotten Iran to the table, but to date they haven’t stopped Iran from advancing its nuclear program. In fact, the first and only thing that had stopped their program from progressing in almost a decade was the Joint Plan of Action that we negotiated and we reached in November of 2013, and that has been adhered to in every single respect since then.

And most importantly, as President Obama said yesterday, we know that no one has presented a more viable, lasting alternative for how you actually prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. So folks, simply demanding that Iran capitulate is not a plan, and nor would any of our P5+1 partners support us in that position. And it’s very important to remember we have partners in this effort – France, Germany, Britain, China, Russia – all of whom have similar feelings about the importance of what must be done here.

So we continue to be focused on reaching a good deal, the right deal, that closes off any paths that Iran could have towards fissile material for a weapon and that protects the world from the enormous threat that we all know a nuclear-armed Iran would pose.

Now, we still don’t know whether we will get there, and it is certainly possible that we won’t. It may be that Iran simply can’t say yes to the type of deal that the international community requires. But we do know that we owe it to the American people in my case, people in the world, to try to find out. And we will return to these talks on the 15th of March, recognizing that time is of the essence, the days are ticking by, and important decisions need to be made. Thank you.

C.S. ELIOT KANG'S REMARK'S AT DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Diplomatic Conference on the Convention on Nuclear Safety
Remarks
C.S. Eliot Kang
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna, Austria
February 9, 2015

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Colleagues,

Allow me to start by congratulating Ambassador Grossi on his election as President of the Diplomatic Conference, and assuring him of the full support of the United States for his efforts to make this a successful conference. Thank you, Ambassador Grossi, for agreeing to lead the informal working group meetings. Your leadership, guidance, and support were invaluable as we worked together to make the Convention on Nuclear Safety more effective in ensuring a high level of safety at nuclear installations around the world. This is a top priority for the United States.

We recognize and appreciate Switzerland’s efforts to raise the profile of the important issue of nuclear safety. We would also like to thank the parties to the Convention for the active dialogue over the past several months. This Convention was founded on the principle that a multilateral, incentive-based approach provides the best way to ensure a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. It allows safety standards and guidance to be strengthened by taking into account emerging technologies and lessons learned. The process leading up to this conference has once again proven the wisdom of that approach.

The United States strongly supports the Convention and views it as an important instrument for international cooperation. Although safety remains a national responsibility, international cooperation through a process of robust peer review is indispensable for strengthening nuclear safety. Nuclear safety is an ongoing concern, and its continuous, timely improvement should be our shared objective.

The Fukushima accident was a wake-up call for all of us. In the United States, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission conducted an exhaustive review of our nuclear power plants and required significant safety enhancements in light of the lessons learned from Fukushima. Those enhancements are now well under way at U.S. plants, with a most of the major work expected to be completed by the end of 2016.

At the same time, the international community has come together to strengthen safety standards through a variety of efforts. The parties to this Convention led some of the most important of those efforts. In particular, the changes to the Convention’s guidance that we undertook at the 6th Review Meeting in April 2014, demonstrate our collective determination to reinforce nuclear safety. To make this incentive convention function as it should, parties report on their implementation of obligations under the Convention with reference to contemporaneous guidance reflecting internationally formulated safety guidelines. Thanks to the work we have undertaken, the guidance that was updated and put into effect in April 2014 incorporates key lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. This ability to immediately update guidance and safety standards -- without amending the Convention – makes the Convention a modern, relevant, and effective instrument to improve nuclear safety well into the future.

We are now here at this diplomatic conference to consider how to build on that work and continue moving the Convention forward. As many parties have expressed during the preparatory process, the best way to do that is to commit and dedicate ourselves to vigorous implementation of the Convention. The United States appreciates the work of the Chair in helping to put on paper the views of the parties as they have been expressed over the past several months. We believe the proposed Vienna Declaration is an excellent reflection of the consensus among the parties to the Convention and we are ready to support it. Achieving consensus at the Diplomatic Conference sends a crucial message to the international community and the public that we stand united on the importance of nuclear safety and are taking timely and responsive action to improve it.

Mr. Chairman, we all live in an increasingly interdependent world. This certainly holds true for nuclear safety. The declaration before us represents a political commitment to reinvigorate the principles of the Convention itself, and by coming together as a community to endorse it, we will be sending a powerful message to the world. We are telling the world that we understand our responsibilities and are meeting them in a way that can inspire confidence in the future peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology.

We hope that all parties to the Convention will join us in supporting the proposed consensus outcome and commit to follow the principles outlined in the Declaration.

FRANK ROSE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND MISSILE DEFENSE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
International Security and Missile Defense
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
University of Warsaw
Warsaw, Poland
November 19, 2014

Thank you for that kind introduction, and thanks for having me here today.

At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense issues, including missile defense policy. In this capacity, I served as the lead U.S. negotiator for the missile defense bases in Romania, Turkey, and Poland.

So I’m pleased to be here today to discuss international security and missile defense. In my remarks, I would like to discuss three key issues:

First, the United States’ commitment to ballistic missile defense (BMD) and the Fiscal Year 2015 missile defense budget request;

Second, the significant progress that has been made in implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) over the past year; and;

Third, cooperation on missile defense with allies and partners outside of Europe.

2015 Budget

The United States and NATO are committed to establishing ever more capable missile defenses to address the ballistic missile threat to Europe.

As U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel noted in March 2013, the U.S. commitment to NATO missile defense and the sites in Romania and Poland remains “ironclad.”

On March 4, 2014, President Obama released his Fiscal Year 2015 budget submission that aligns defense program priorities and resources with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Let me highlight a couple of key issues that you may find of interest:

Overall, the budget request provides $8.5 billion for missile defense, including $7.5 billion for the Missile Defense Agency.

With regard to U.S. homeland defense provides funding to increase the number of long-range missile defense interceptors deployed in Alaska and California 30 to 44 by 2017.

It also funds a number of other programs to enhance the long-range system such as a new kill vehicle and new long-range discrimination radar.

With regard to regional missile defense, the budget continues funding to complete work on the missile defense base at Devesulu in Romania and provides additional funding ($225.7 million) for the missile defense base in Poland.

The request also includes $435.4 million for the procurement of SM-3 Block IB interceptors and $263.9 for continued development of the longer-range SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.

The fact that the United States continues to devote such significant resources to the missile defense program is a clear signal of the importance the U.S. places on the program, including the sites in Romania and Poland.

European Phased Adaptive Approach
Let me now take a few moments to discuss where we are with regard to implementation of the President’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense.

In 2009, the President announced that the EPAA would “provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies,” while relying on “capabilities that are proven and cost-effective.”

Since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision. As you know, we have made great progress.

EPAA Phase 1 gained its first operational elements in 2011 with the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis BMD-capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean and the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey.

With the declaration of Interim BMD Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, this radar transitioned to NATO operational control.

Demonstrating its commitment to NATO collective defense, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota as a Spanish contribution to NATO missile defense.

In February 2014, the first of four missile defense-capable Aegis ships, the USS DONALD COOK, arrived in Rota, Spain. Over the next 18 months, three more of these multi-mission ships will deploy to Rota.

These multi-mission ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, bilateral and multilateral training exercises, and support U.S. and NATO operations, including NATO missile defense.

Stationing these naval assets in Spain places them in a position to maximize their operational flexibility for missions in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

With regard to Phase 2, as you know, we have an agreement with Romania, ratified in December of 2011, to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 interceptor site beginning in the 2015 timeframe.

We greatly appreciate Romania’s active role in preparing for the construction of the missile defense facility at the Romanian Deveselu Military Base.

The Romanian prompt whole-of-government support for the timely completion of the implementing arrangements and Romania’s provision of security and its infrastructure efforts have been superb.

In October 2013, I had the honor of attending the ground-breaking ceremony at Deveselu Air Base to commemorate the start of the construction at the site.

And just over a month ago in early October, the U.S. Navy held a historic naval support facility establishment ceremony at the MD facility on Romania’s Deveselu Base. This ceremony established the naval facility and installed its first U.S. commander. We view this as the first step in transitioning the facility from a construction site to the site of operations sometime next year.

When operational, this site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.

I also had the opportunity last year to visit the Lockheed-Martin facility in Moorestown, New Jersey, where they build the Aegis Ashore deck house and components destined for Romania.

We remain on schedule for deploying the system to Romania, with the site becoming operational in 2015.

And finally there is Phase 3.

This phase includes an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, per the Ballistic Missile Defense agreement between the United States and Poland that entered into force in September 2011.

This site is on schedule for deployment in the 2018 time frame. The interceptor site in Poland is key to the EPAA: When combined with other EPAA assets, Phase 3 will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory in the 2018 time frame.

So, as you can see, we are continuing to implement the President’s vision for stronger, smarter and swifter missile defenses.

NATO Cooperation

At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed that the Alliance would develop a missile defense capability to protect Alliance territory, populations, and forces from ballistic missile attack.

At the Chicago and Wales Summits, Allied Heads of State and Government noted the potential opportunities for using synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment.

We need to take full advantage of this opportunity, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, within or outside of NATO.

There are several approaches Allies can take to make important and valuable contributions to NATO BMD.

First, Allies can acquire fully capable BMD systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control capabilities.

Second, Allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key BMD capability.

Finally, Allies can contribute to NATO’s BMD capability by providing essential basing support, such as Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have agreed to do.

In all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is NATO interoperability.

Yes, acquiring a BMD capability is, of course, good in and of itself.

But if the capability is not interoperable with the Alliance then its value as a contribution to Alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished.

It is only through interoperability that the Alliance can gain the synergistic effects from BMD cooperation that enhance the effectiveness of NATO BMD through shared battle-space awareness and reduced interceptor wastage.

Missile Defense Developments in Other Regions

The United States, in consultation with our allies and partners, is continuing to bolster missile defenses in other key regions, such as the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, in order to strengthen regional deterrence architectures.

As with Europe, we are tailoring our approaches to the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific so that they reflect the unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region.

In the Middle East, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through venues such as the recently established U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum.

At the September 26, 2013, Strategic Cooperation Forum (SCF), Secretary Kerry and his Foreign Ministry counterparts reaffirmed their intent, first stated at the September 28, 2012, SCF, to “work toward enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense.”

Speaking on December 7, 2013, at the Manama Dialogue, Secretary Hagel announced several initiatives, one of which was that the “DoD will work with the GCC on better integration of GCC members’ missile defense capabilities.”

Several of our partners in the region have expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the UAE has contracted to buy two THAAD batteries that, when operational, will enhance the UAE’s security as well as regional stability.

The UAE also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets. We look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperability with our GCC partners in the years ahead.

Additionally and separately, we are continuing our long-standing and robust cooperation with Israel on missile defense on key systems such as Arrow 3, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome.

In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing to cooperate through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships.

For example, the United States and Japan already are working closely together to develop an advanced interceptor known as the SM-3 Block IIA and deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, while continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.

As a result of U.S.-Australia Foreign and Defense ministerial consultations this year, the United States and Australia are establishing a bilateral BMD Working Group to examine options for potential Australian contributions to BMD in the Asia-Pacific region.

Additionally, we are also continuing to consult closely with the Republic of Korea (ROK) as it develops the Korean Air and Missile Defense system, which is designed to defend the ROK against air and missile threats from North Korea.

No Constraints

Let me say a few things about missile defense and Russia.

With regard to where things stand today regarding our discussions on missile defense, Russia’s intervention into the crisis in Ukraine, in violation of international law, has led to the suspension of our military-to-military dialogue, and we are not currently engaging Russia on the topic of missile defense.

Prior to the suspension of our dialogue, Russia continued to demand that the United States provide it “legally binding” guarantees that our missile defense will not harm/diminish its strategic nuclear deterrent.

We have made clear to the Russians that EPAA is not directed toward Russia and that we cannot and will not accept legally-binding constraints that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.

As Secretary Hagel’s March 2013 BMD announcement makes clear, the United States must have the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats, without obligations that limit our BMD capabilities.
Conclusion

Let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense over the past several years.

Implementation of the EPAA and NATO missile defense is going well. For example, we broke ground on the missile defense site at Devesulu last October and are on schedule for the base to become operational in 2015.

Additionally, Congress has continued to provide sufficient funding for the missile defense program, even in these challenging times.

The United States looks forward to continuing to work with our allies and friends around to world – and especially Poland – to improve our collective security.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ON P5+1 TALKS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Arms Control and International Security: Background Briefing on P5+1Talks

09/19/2014 06:39 AM EDT

Background Briefing on P5+1Talks

Special Briefing

Senior Administration Officials

Foreign Press Center

New York City

September 18, 2014

MODERATOR: Welcome. For those of you who I don't know, I’m [Moderator]. This will be all on background tonight with no embargo. So you know who’s up here – obviously not for reporting – this will be all be attributed to senior Administration officials, please no names and no titles. But to the left of me is [Senior Administration Official One and Senior Administration Official Two].

So in a moment, I’ll turn it over to [Senior Administration Official One] to make some opening remarks, and then we’ll go to your questions. Again, background, senior Administration officials. Please keep us all honest on this so we can keep doing this. And with that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you. Good evening. Thank you all for coming tonight, and those of you who don’t live here – I don’t – welcome to New York.

I want to begin tonight on a personal note, not just for me but for many in this room. Michael Adler was one of our most beloved colleagues – one of yours, and in many ways, I considered him a colleague as well. He was someone who had watched and reported on these negotiations as they progressed through many, many years. He was one of the sharpest minds on these issues and one of the kindest people any of us has ever had the pleasure of knowing. He was with us in Geneva when we finished the Joint Plan of Action, and I know how much he wanted to see where these comprehensive talks would take us. He was eager to see the end of the story he had been writing for so long. He was taken from us too soon, and his absence is felt acutely here. These issues were the work of his life, and in many ways, they are ours as well.

Turning now to the talks, the last time we all met at the political director level as the P5+1 led by the European Union group was in July, when, after several weeks of intense negotiations, we decided to extend the Joint Plan of Action until November 24th. We made that decision because there had been enough progress to see a path forward; because it’s important that Iran’s nuclear program not advance further under the terms of the JPOA while we work to negotiate a comprehensive joint plan of action; and because we all know that diplomacy is the best, most enduring way to solve this most pressing security challenge.

Since that time, members of the P5+1 and the European Union have held bilateral meetings with Iran, including the United States. We’ve had expert meetings and coordination sessions, as well as ongoing contact with the Iranians, even when we’re not meeting in person. Coming into New York, I think many of us were not very optimistic. But clearly, over meetings over the last two days both with Iran and with my P5+1 and EU colleagues, it is clear that everyone has come here to go to work.

As you know, the United States and Iran held bilateral consultations over the past two days here in New York. These meetings were constructive and a lot of hard technical work that will need to be part of a comprehensive agreement is being undertaken by all parties.

In terms of this next week and a half, we will begin the P5+1 round tomorrow morning with a plenary session at the United Nations led by High Representative Cathy Ashton and Foreign Minister Zarif. During the weekend and UNGA high-level week, we will continue meeting on the Iran nuclear issue in whatever format makes the most sense. There will be plenaries, expert meetings, bilaterals. There may be a ministerial-level P5+1 meeting. And it’s very likely that Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Zarif will meet bilaterally, as they’ve done throughout these talks.

Over the next week and a half, you’re also going to hear a lot from President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif about these nuclear negotiations, maybe about some other issues as well. It’s worth pointing out, particularly to those of you in this room, that at this moment, while senior Iranian officials have the benefit of the freedom of our press, a U.S. citizen sits in an Iranian prison, a journalist for one of our top newspapers, The Washington Post. Jason Rezaian should be freed immediately. The other American citizens being detained by Iran should also be freed as well. And additionally, we appeal again for Iran’s assistance in locating and bringing Robert Levinson home.

The Iranians have said over these many days and weeks how reasonable and flexible they are in these talks, and about how their current capacity should be acceptable. But the status quo is not doable for any of us. It is not doable for either side. The world will agree to suspend and then lift sanctions only if Iran takes convincing and verifiable steps to show that its nuclear program is and will remain exclusively peaceful.

Given Iran’s public statements that it does not seek a nuclear weapon, including the Supreme Leader’s fatwa, these practical steps should be doable. And we have consistently sought to pave a reasonable path forward in close coordination with our P5+1 partners and the European Union.

In our conversations with the Iranian negotiators, we’ve listened closely to their views about what Iran sees as their legitimate practical needs, and we’ve offered creative solutions to address them. There is a unique opportunity over this next week and a half when heads of state, foreign ministers, and many other world leaders are gathered in New York. There is an opportunity to make progress in these talks and to see whether the outlines, and more importantly, the details of a potential agreement begin to emerge in a fuller way than we’ve seen before.

And with that, I would be glad to take your questions.

MODERATOR: So as always, I’ll call the questions, and I know we know most of you, but please identify yourself and your media outlet. Lou Charbonneau, kick us off.

QUESTION: Thanks for this, and I first wanted to ask – you said that Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Zarif might meet as they have before. Is it possible that the presidents will also meet during this time? They did speak on the phone during last year’s UNGA, and this was one of the issues that was discussed.

And when you had your bilateral meetings with the Iranians yesterday and today, did you get any sense that there’s a willingness on their part to push forward, given their public comments about keeping the status quo and what they’ve said are unreasonable conditions put forth by the U.S. and other members of the P5+1? Thanks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Josh Earnest, the spokesperson for the White House, said that at this point there is no meeting scheduled between the President of the United States and President Rouhani. The President of the United States is well known for being open to such a meeting, but the choice is really Iran’s. We will continue to work and we think that there’s a lot of very important work that will go on this week, but that’s not dependent upon whether that meeting happens or not.

Secondly, in terms of the status quo and Iran saying that we are making unreasonable demands, I would make a couple points. First of all, let’s remember how we got here. We are in these talks because for years upon years, the international community – not just the United States, but through several UN Security Council resolutions – has said that Iran has not met its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that they have taken many steps, some in secret, to undermine those obligations. And that is why we are at the table, and I do not think – and I don’t think the world thinks – that it is an unreasonable demand that says that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon. Indeed, the Supreme Leader has said Iran does not want a nuclear weapon, so showing that, in fact, in verifiable ways that they do not and will not is quite reasonable.

Secondly, I do not think it is an excessive demand to say that any agreement must, in a verifiable and transparent manner, show that Iran’s program today and into the future is exclusively peaceful.

So I don’t think either of those objectives – that Iran not acquire a nuclear weapon and that Iran’s program be exclusively peaceful, and that it be clear to everyone that it is – are unreasonable or excessive demands. I think they’re quite reasonable, and in fact is exactly what Iran has said is its intention. So showing that to the world in verifiable ways seems to me quite doable.

MODERATOR: Great. Let’s go in the middle here and wait for the microphone.

QUESTION: Thank you for doing this. BBC Persian, Bahman Kalbasi. [Senior Administration Official One], yesterday Foreign Minister Zarif in the Council on Foreign Relations talked about sanctions, and he specifically said are these sanctions worth risking not getting a deal and not having a new horizon in cooperation in the region; almost seems to be suggesting that this will open the door for other issues to be discussed, including what’s happening in Iraq.

But is there a sense – and this has been discussed on the Iranian press a lot – that America is not or has not offered a meaningful or reliable way to lift these sanctions? Or at least is the Administration really able to do so, given the situation in Congress? Is that one of the sticking points, that on the other side there is not meaningful sanction relief being discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: I don’t think that’s the case at all. We’re well aware that sanctions relief is a critical part of any agreement. Iran has said so themselves, as you note. And indeed, we have done extensive work on what will be necessary to suspend and then ultimately lift those sanctions. The reason it is suspend first and lift later is because we all need to build confidence that this is a durable agreement, and so there will be many steps that Iran will take almost immediately if we get to an agreement. Some will take more time, and then one has to see whether it’s durable over a period of time, and the duration of that time is something that’s, of course, one of the things that we are discussing.

And we know how to do this. We believe we can offer very meaningful relief. We understand and have listened carefully to what Iran is looking for. We hope that Iran is listening very closely to what is necessary to obtain that relief, but I don’t have any questions that technically we can do what is necessary, and they know that.

MODERATOR: Michael Wilner. Wait, do you have the mike?

QUESTION: Thanks for doing this. Whenever I ask folks in the Administration to weigh or to measure Israeli Government concerns on this matter, they say Israel is rightly concerned with an Iranian nuclear weapon, first and foremost, and they say that the U.S. is working on an unprecedented level to bring the Israelis in, to brief them and the like. And they have expressed publicly that they appreciate that.

But here’s the thing: The Israelis that you are briefing on this unprecedented scale are now saying two months before your deadline that they are deeply, deeply concerned with what they are seeing. And given the relevance of Israel’s concerns, as you describe, it would appear that that is a significant problem. Is it a problem?

And secondly, if you’re in these negotiations to end the crisis, as you say, is it possible to do so without adopting Israel’s baseline for a good deal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: It is not just Israel. It is the world that has said that Iran should not acquire a nuclear weapon, and the Supreme Leader’s fatwa also says that Iran does not have, does not intend to, and does not want to have a nuclear weapon. So that is the objective for everyone. We do indeed consult very closely with Israel, as we do with other partners around the world who are very, very concerned about whether we will be able to reach an agreement and whether that agreement will be a good one, which it must be.

So we appreciate that there are countries around the world that see things a little differently than we do. We have other partners around the world that have other concerns about an agreement and what it will mean in the geopolitics of the world, and what it will mean for nuclear – civilian nuclear energy. Lots of concerns are raised. We listen to all of those concerns, and of course, we listen to Israel’s concern. Israel’s security is very critical from an American point of view.

What I appreciate is that all of these countries – including Israel, with whom we closely consult – have shared their technical know-how, their understanding, their ideas, and that will create potentially a good solution to this very, very tough security challenge that we have in front of us.

At the end of the day, Israel will have to make its own judgment about an agreement, as will every other country in the world. And I understand that, but I also believe that the President of the United States will only sign off on an agreement that he believes is good for the world’s security, including Israel.

MODERATOR: Pam from Voice of America. Right here. It’s behind you.

QUESTION: Good evening. A little bit earlier you said that it was clear that everyone had come here to work and you described some of the initial bilaterals as constructive. A two-part question. First, can you shed more light, provide a little bit more insight on what you mean? And then secondly, specifically, was there any indication of movement on what’s been one of the key sticking points, and that’s the uranium enrichment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: So, we’ve only had a few hours of talks over two days, and not even all day of those two days. We started last evening for a bit of time and then again this morning, and then we had coordination meetings with our partners in the P5+1, or as the Europeans call it the E3+3.

So this is just a beginning, so I don’t have any substantive things to report. Probably wouldn’t anyway in the middle of a negotiation. What I think is that we have – everyone has come here intent on taking whatever time it takes. This can become a very busy time here at the UN General Assembly when the high-level week starts next week. People have committed to canceling meetings if they need to if they are needed for meetings, though I think these meetings will happen in lots of different formats and lots of different ways. Some of our partners in the E3+3 will have meetings with President Rouhani, with Foreign Minister Zarif, as I believe Secretary Kerry will meet with Foreign Minister Zarif. We will have lots of different combinations and expert conversations.

It’s really the tone and the quality of the discussion. And I don’t want to overstate this either. We’re at the beginning of a very intense period here, and one never knows where it will go or whether you’ll get to an issue and hit a wall or whether you’ll break through. But everyone has come here – everyone, all parties – clearly intent on seeing if we can’t work through some of these very difficult issues.

MODERATOR: Laura Rozen, and then I’m coming to this side of the room, I promise.

QUESTION: Laura Rozen from Al-Monitor. Thank you for doing this. Back in May when the going-in bids were made in Vienna, we’ve heard from you all to not be alarmed if the going-in bids on each side were wide apart because that’s the nature of the negotiation. We heard that from you, I think, in Baghdad a few years ago, if I remember as well.

Can you give us a sense of between May, when those positions were put on the table, and I guess now in mid-September, have things narrowed, especially on the enrichment capacity issue (inaudible) from the opening bid?

And secondly, let me just say as you will hear the Iranians say many times over the next week, they kind of raise the prospect that no deal will very quickly result in their breakout time going down very quickly because they already have 20,000 centrifuges in store; they’ll flip back on at 20 percent and very quickly, all the things we’re worried about. So that the best is the enemy of the good, I think is their argument. So how do you respond to that? Thanks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: As I said, we’ve just begun the talks here so I am not going to go into substance, and I probably wouldn’t under any circumstances. What I think has occurred is we probably understand each other a great deal better than we did back in May about the elements that are required, the parameters for how one could get there. We’ve had some creative technological thinking that’s gone on. We understand that there are different paths to the same objective. You all know the infamous Rubik’s cube comparison. So I would say there has been a deepening of understanding, and when that happens sometimes it opens some doors to some possibilities. But I can’t say anyone has walked through them to an answer, or we wouldn’t be here so intensely at work.

On the “no deal, they can break out,” we can all go through lots of escalatory talk about what they would do and what we would do if we don’t have any agreement. I don’t find that particularly productive. We each know what each other would do if things don’t work out. I’d rather be focused right now on what might be possible.

MODERATOR: We’re going to do a few from this side, and then wrap up with a few others. Go ahead, Laurence Norman of The Wall Street Journal.

QUESTION: Hey.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Hey.

QUESTION: How are you? Thanks for doing this. Good to see you again.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: (Laughter.) We’ve having a blast. How about you?

QUESTION: Good, thank you. Two questions, if I may. First of all, I think you said you weren’t very optimistic arriving in New York. Now, I’m assuming that’s because not very much progress was made over the summer in the bilaterals, but could you just say why? And it might link into the second question, which is: What is your current reading of this Russian deal with Iran, and do you think it’s making the Iranians feel like they need a deal less?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: What Russian deal are you referring to?

QUESTION: I’m not quite sure what to call it. The memorandum that they signed to cooperate (inaudible) economics. I’m not sure they even know exactly what it is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: I don’t know all – I don’t know what it is either, so what I would say is that countries have relationships with other countries, and they are working on ways to relate to each other all of the time. What we care about is whether any country makes an agreement that would break the sanctions enforcement of all of the sanctions that are in place. I do not expect Russia to do that. Everyone here knows, and I’m sure someone would ask, “Have all of the tensions around Ukraine entered into this negotiation?” They have not to date. [Sergei Ryabkov] is a professional who understands the nonproliferation world extremely well, and we are all focused on solving this problem in this room.

In terms of over the summer, I wouldn’t say nothing happened over the summer. I think every conversation, even when they’re tough and they seem to not make progress, sometimes people have to hear messages many, many times before realizing that unless people start to open doors, you’re just going to keep having the same conversation. So I think that not only the United States, but all of my partners in the P5+1 in the bilaterals – and all of us have had bilaterals over the last few weeks with Iran – have delivered the same messages. And sometimes messages have to get delivered many times before people really come to believe them.

QUESTION: You said you weren’t very optimistic.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: No, because messages were delivered, they were heard, but there wasn’t something forthcoming in that immediate instance. But this is a process, so I don’t find it surprising either.

MODERATOR: Okay, we’re going to do a few more. George.

QUESTION: George Jahn, Associated Press. Hi. You said in your opening remarks that the status quo is not doable for either side. That could be interpreted to mean that you’re bringing, if not new proposals, modified proposals to the table. I don’t expect you to go into specifics, but --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: What I was referring to is the status quo of – Iran has said, as one of the rest of you said, that when Foreign Minister Zarif did some of his comments – I think it was Foreign Minister Zarif – you all said that he said that we have to maintain what we currently have. Well, that’s – if that were the case, then we wouldn’t be in a negotiation if that were something that everybody could agree to. Iran would say we can’t maintain our sanctions in place in the way that we have. And I would say that the only – as I said, if Iran takes the steps necessary to ensure that they will not acquire a nuclear weapon and that their program is exclusively peaceful, then we have a way to, in fact, suspend and ultimately lift sanctions.

MODERATOR: Okay, we’re going to do two very quick ones. Indira quick and Paul quick, and then we’ll --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Not that I don’t want to spend the evening here, but I know you all want to get to dinner. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Indira Lakshmanan from --

MODERATOR: There will be more opportunities as well.

QUESTION: -- from Bloomberg News. Thank you for doing this. I want to start out by asking you, I mean: What is going to be your goal at the end of this week-and-a-half period where you will be able to check a box and say, “Yes, we’ve made progress; we came in pessimistic, but this shows we’ve taken one step closer.” And then if we come to November 24th and we don’t have a comprehensive deal, are you guys prepared to extend once more?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: So I’m going to do the second part of your question first. Way too early to talk about hypotheticals. We are --

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Huh? Yeah, we – no. (Laughter.) We are not – good try. We are not going to talk about any Plan B because we’re focused on getting Plan A, and we hope Iran is as well. So that’s where I am on that.

On your first part, was – I’m sorry.

QUESTION: It was about what is it going to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Oh, what’s success at the --

QUESTION: What’s your measure? What’s your metric that you will – that you don’t have to be negative, that the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Progress, progress.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: There could be many ways. It could be in many ways. It’s hard to say because this is so complex. And would I like at the end of this week to have a broad understanding on all of the major issues, even if we have to use the next October, November writing all the details? Sure, I’d love to be there. Will we be there at the end of this week? I don’t know. It’s tough, very tough. We are discussing all of the issues. We are discussing all the parameters of all of the issues. And I think this is an opportunity because we have – everybody’s here. Any consultation you have to have with anybody about anything, everybody’s here. So we ought to make use of that to try to deal with some of these very tough issues. We’ll see.

QUESTION: But we’re further than we were in July?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Are we further than we are in July? The reason I have such a hard time answering this question is what I’ve said to you all so many times before: You can get 98 percent of the way there in this agreement and that last 2 percent means you don’t. It’s not a situation where you can say, ah, we’re 50 percent of the way there, we’re 75 percent of the way there, because that last percentage may be the crucial one and you don’t have the deal at all. That’s why this is so hard. It all fits together.

MODERATOR: I think we’re going to end tonight with Paul Richter of the L.A. Times. Wait for the mike. And there will be more opportunities, I promise, for us all to chat. Right here, Paul. Right here. Yeah.

QUESTION: As you know, a lot of people on the outside, other foreign governments, people in Congress and elsewhere, are really focused on the very concrete questions of number of Iranian centrifuges, enrichment capacity. Are those the right terms to be judging progress here?

And I’ve got a second question, too. Did the Iraq/ISIS issue come up at all in the talks with the Iranians?

MODERATOR: I’m surprised it took till the end.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Gosh, I’m surprised that it took till the end. (Laughter.) I was having the same thought.

MODERATOR: Yeah.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Okay. The measure of this agreement – I know you’re sick of hearing me say this. The measure of this agreement is Iran can’t acquire a nuclear weapon and we’re assured its program is exclusively peaceful. There are many components of that. So counting one thing is not going to answer that question. It’s a package of things. If you’re talking about enrichment capacity, you’re talking about infrastructure, you’re talking about centrifuges, you’re talking about SWU, you’re talking about stockpile, you’re talking about the types of equipment in centrifuges, you’re talking about duration, you’re talking about a whole bunch of elements if you’re worried about how long it’s going to take to get a weapon’s worth of fissile material, which is often the terminology used for breakthrough – breakout, sorry.

So it’s a lot of elements. So all of the things that outsiders have said to you or members of Congress are certainly elements, but they’re only elements. They have to come together in a way that gives us and the international community confidence that the program is exclusively peaceful and Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon. That’s what we’re trying to do.

Now, as to your last question, I think you all know that tomorrow – I have to read it because I’m going to say it wrong – the Secretary of State is chairing a ministerial debate of the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Iraq at 2:00. Somebody’s phone is buzzing. Do you care?

QUESTION: I’m just going to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Shall we answer? We can all say hello. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Put them on speaker phone.

MODERATOR: I don’t know what I just – I just think I --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Okay. Well, whosever phone that is --

MODERATOR: I hope it’s still recording, whoever’s phone that is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Yeah. If it’s your mom, tell her I’m sorry. (Laughter.)

Any member can attend, and so the meeting was mentioned in our discussions today on the margins because it’s very present, but we are very clear and continue to be clear, as the Secretary said in his testimony, that we, of course, expect there will be time to time that we discuss this, as we discuss ISIS with everyone – ISIL. The world is focused – and I think this is what this ministerial tomorrow will show – that the world is focused on the mission that the President of the United States has set out, and that is to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. And I think we will all see that in a very powerful way tomorrow at the ministerial, and I believe that Iran thinks that ISIL should not be doing what it is doing either.

MODERATOR: Thank you, everyone.

QUESTION: What (inaudible) Iran (inaudible) come back tomorrow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Ask Iran.

MODERATOR: Thank you, everyone, for coming tonight. Again, this is on background as a senior Administration official. We will have more opportunities to do these things over the next week and a half, so email [us] with any questions. We will have a transcript done later tonight of this as well.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you all.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER'S REMARKS AT ANNUAL DETERRENCE SYMPOSIUM

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

Remarks at the Annual Deterrence Symposium

Remarks

Rose Gottemoeller

Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 

U.S. Strategic Command

Omaha, Nebraska

August 14, 2014

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Thank you for that kind introduction. I am always honored to be a speaker here at the Annual Deterrence Symposium and of course, I am glad to be here at the invitation of Admiral Cecil Haney. Turn about is fair play: The Admiral gave a great speech at my invitation last month in Washington to a group of young people on the threshold of their careers. More on that later. Thank you, Admiral, for all you do for this nation.

While we are gathered here today in Omaha, the world is facing serious challenges: The threats to Ukraine’s sovereignty and Russia’s flagrant disregard for international law, the continuing conflicts in the Middle East, a dangerous Ebola outbreak in West Africa. It goes without saying that most people are not focused on nuclear weapons or nuclear deterrence. But we all know that we have important work to do and we do it. My admiration for this community, in and out of uniform, knows no bounds. We are ready to work. That is the theme I’m striking today: We who focus on the foundation of our nation’s nuclear deterrent are ready to work.
Strategic stability is the cornerstone of American national security, but as all of you know, it is not a static state of being. Threats to strategic stability can surface quickly and it is incumbent upon all of us to recognize those threats, anticipate them when we can, and make moves to counter them. We must be prepared for the unpredictable, and constantly on the look-out so that we see threats emerging while they are still over the horizon. My role as a diplomat is different from your roles on the military side, but our goals are no different. As President Obama said five years ago in Prague, as long as nuclear weapons exist, we will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. And that is as we seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

Violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)

One threat to strategic stability has made news in the last month. As you all know, the Department of State recently delivered the Annual Arms Control Compliance Report to Congress with the determination that the Russian Federation is in violation of its INF Treaty obligations not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.
We have been attempting to address this very serious matter with Russia for some time, as the United States is wholly committed to the continued viability of the INF Treaty. We are asking Russia to return to compliance with the Treaty in a verifiable manner.

This groundbreaking treaty serves the mutual security interests of the parties – not only the United States and Russia, but also the 11 other states bound by its obligations. Moreover, this Treaty contributes to the security of our allies and to regional security in Europe and in the Far East.

When we notified Russia of our determination of a violation, we made it clear that we are prepared to discuss this in a senior-level bilateral dialogue immediately. We hope that this dialogue begins soon, with the goal that Russia return to compliance with its obligations under the Treaty.

There is an expert debate in Russia about its nuclear modernization programs and about the contribution of the INF Treaty to Russia’s security. It is important for Russia to take into account that no military decisions happen in a vacuum. Actions beget actions. Our countries have been down the road of needless, costly and destabilizing arms races. We know where that road leads and we are fortunate that our past leaders had the wisdom and strength to turn us in a new direction. Let us hope that debate in and out of the government leads to a decision to return Russia to compliance with all of its international obligations.

New START and Future Reductions

Despite our serious concerns about Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty, we believe that the New START Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States. The New START Treaty enhances our national security and strategic stability with Russia and both the United States and Russia are implementing the Treaty’s inspection regime.

Current tensions with Russia highlight the importance of both the verification and confidence provided by data exchanges and on-site inspections under the Treaty, and the security and predictability provided by verifiable mutual limits on strategic weapons. We take questions about compliance with arms control treaties very seriously and are closely monitoring Russian compliance with the New START Treaty. We assess that Russia is implementing and complying with the New START Treaty, and that the Treaty remains in our national security interest. The mutual predictability this gives to the U.S.-Russia relationship increases stability, especially during difficult times such as now.

With respect to future agreements, the United States will only pursue agreements that are in our national security interest and that of our allies. The offer that President Obama made in Berlin one year ago, of an up to one-third reduction in operationally deployed warheads beyond the New START limits, is a sound one, and worthy of serious consideration. We will continue to be open to discussion of agreements that would reduce nuclear and other military threats. Of course, we know that the situation is different than it was four years ago, four months ago, four weeks ago.

But cooperation in the arms control realm has been an important facet of strategic stability over the past forty years and it should remain so in the future. Moreover, we need nuclear cooperation with Russia and others to address new threats, first and foremost the risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon or the fissile materials needed to make one. We will continue to pursue arms control and nonproliferation tools, because they are the best - and quite frankly - the only path that we can take to effectively prevent a terrorist nuclear threat and reduce nuclear dangers more broadly.

The United States has taken steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. We have clearly stated that it is in the U.S. interest, and that of all other nations, that the nearly 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.
We are taking time now to prepare the ground for the future. That includes more research into how we incorporate new technologies and innovations into verification and monitoring. We can also shape, maintain, and improve strategic stability through a variety of bilateral and multilateral dialogues, including in the Track 1.5 and Track 2 realms. These engagements reduce the potential for misunderstanding and provide the basis for future agreement and cooperation.

Multilateral agreements like a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) can also enhance global stability. The United States will continue to push for the commencement of negotiations on such an agreement.

And we are working to expand our public outreach and educational efforts on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. As stated in the April 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review: “Ratification of the CTBT is central to leading other nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament.”

As we consider arms control and nonproliferation priorities, we will continue to consult closely with our allies and partners every step of the way. Our security and defense – and theirs – is non-negotiable.

Conventional Deterrence Tools

While nuclear deterrence is and will remain an important part of protecting our nation and our allies, we must also make full use of our non-nuclear capabilities – that includes regional and homeland missile defenses, security cooperation, assurances and conventional arms control.
Of course, the Russian Federation’s challenge to the security of Europe and Ukraine’s territorial integrity has to be factored into our work to modernize conventional arms control.
First and foremost, we need to make the best use of the regimes currently in place. The Vienna Document 2011 and the Open Skies Treaty, which are part of the conventional arms control regime in Europe, are vital tools to maintain stability and have provided transparency about military activities in and around Ukraine.

Second, we must consider our options for the future. We will continue the process of modernizing the Open Skies Treaty, including the upgrade to digital sensors to replace obsolescent film cameras.

With regard to the Vienna Document mechanisms, it is clear to us that there is room to improve provisions for notification of military activity and risk reduction, among other issues. Moving forward, the United States will work with others to update the Vienna Document in a way that builds on our recent experiences. NATO will also continue its review of the future of conventional arms control in Europe. We recognize that now is not the time to engage Russia on this, but we need to be thinking now about how in the future a revitalization of conventional arms control in Europe could contribute to improving mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region.
Of course, we are not without good examples to follow. We can and will benefit from the experience of the so-called Dayton Article IV states. Eighteen years ago, these states in the Western Balkans were emerging from years of bloody conflict. Through hard work, they established military stability and security, despite a range of differences.

The architects of Dayton created a comprehensive arms control agreement that led to significant reductions in heavy weapons and equipment in just six months. Without as much as a breather, the states involved then turned their efforts to the harder step of fulfilling the obligations laid out in the Agreement, to sustain disengagement of military forces and create a stable security environment for all. The Dayton Article IV experience is a testament to what can be achieved through conventional arms control measures at a time when they are being sorely tested elsewhere in Europe.

Space and Cyber Deterrence

In addition to fully realizing the potential of conventional deterrence, we must make sure that we are ahead of the curve on space and cyber issues. I know this was the subject of a panel yesterday and rightly so - it is critical that we identify ways to stabilize behavior in both realms.
My colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank Rose spoke about strategic stability in space yesterday, highlighting the point that it is essential that all nations work together to adopt approaches for responsible activity in space in order to preserve this domain for future generations. China’s recent irresponsible and provocative ASAT test accentuates the importance of these efforts. Russia’s pursuit of anti-satellite weapons is also a matter of concern. Destabilizing actions like these threaten the long-term security and sustainability of the outer space environment.

In the cyber realm, the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues, led by Chris Painter, is leading our efforts to promote an open, secure, and reliable information and communications infrastructure that supports international trade and innovation, strengthens international security, and fosters free expression.

As we move forward, we should continue to cooperate and coordinate both internally and with our friends and allies. Such efforts as the UN Group of Government Experts that convened last month will continue to enhance our common understanding of the ways in which international law is essential to maintaining peace and stability in cyberspace. Cyberspace can be the source of both great societal advances and significant threats. There is no doubt that domain will only remain stable through our collective efforts.

Deterrence in the Future

Of course, you know all of this - all of what we have been talking about - is moot if we don’t attract the next generation to nuclear policy jobs. As I said at the outset, this community is ready to work, but we can’t work forever. We have some recruiting to do. Frank Klotz struck this same note this morning: we need to bring the next generation into the nuclear deterrence enterprise.
That is why I was so pleased that Admiral Haney was able to join the Department of State’s 5th Annual Generation Prague Conference that was focused on engagement with the next generation of nuclear experts. It is one piece of ongoing efforts, but it is not enough. We need to be actively recruiting political scientists, lawyers, physicists, geologists, engineers, and more, if we want to make sure that this essential part of national security will be supported as long as it needs to be.

In closing, I want to leave you with a thought.

History has shown us that when faced with obstacles, we always have several paths. When it comes to our current situation with the Russian Federation, I, for one, want to follow the path that President Reagan took, the path that President George H.W. Bush took. When confronted with a difficult and sometimes unpredictable partner in the Soviet Union, they did not take their ball and go home. They did not let strategic stability become a political punching bag. They set about the hard task of building up strategic stability through arms control treaties and agreements, and they succeeded in making this world a safer place. They worked hard, and achieved much.

So let’s leave Omaha ready to work. In the world of nuclear stability and deterrence, there is much to do.

Thank you.

ADAM SCHEINMAN'S REMARKS, NPT CLUSTER 2

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

NPT Cluster 2: Nonproliferation and Safeguards - U.S. Statement

Remarks

Adam Scheinman, Senior Advisor, International Security and Nonproliferation

Third Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

New York City

May 1, 2014

(As Prepared)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The United States emphasizes the importance of a balanced approach to implementation of the NPT. The three NPT pillars are mutually reinforcing. The nonproliferation pillar plays a central role by strengthening the other two. Together, nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses are complementary not competing goals. We pursue each with equal vigor and in all aspects.

A strong nonproliferation regime contributes to the security conditions that make disarmament easier to achieve, and progress on disarmament helps create political conditions to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. All parties share in the mutual security that derives from a strong nonproliferation regime.

Safeguards, export controls, and other important nonproliferation measures build the mutual confidence that enables the fullest possible cooperation among parties. This in turn helps to realize the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for all parties. The robust nuclear cooperation that results demonstrates the value of a strong nonproliferation regime.

The United States remains fully committed to the Action Plan that was adopted by consensus in 2010, including those actions related to nonproliferation. A complete listing of U.S. implementation of this pillar can be found in our national report to the PrepCom.

U.S. Support for IAEA Safeguards and the Additional Protocol

Mr. Chairman, the Action Plan emphasizes the importance of compliance with IAEA safeguards, which are the established international verification mechanism under the NPT. These safeguards are essential to help ensure that nuclear activities remain in peaceful uses and that material and technology is not diverted to produce nuclear weapons. These safeguards are essential to help ensure that states are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons. Only twelve NPT parties have yet to bring the required safeguards agreement into force. We should aim to reduce that number to zero by next year’s Review Conference, and we encourage states that have not yet done so to update any small quantities protocols.

A comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an Additional Protocol is now recognized as the strengthened safeguards standard. We have learned time and again that the IAEA needs the essential tools provided by the Additional Protocol in order to respond to possible undeclared nuclear activities and provide assurances of their absence. We should redouble efforts to make the Additional Protocol universal. Between now and the Review Conference, states that have signed the Additional Protocol should bring it into force. Those states yet to sign should start the work now to take this forward.

Some states may need assistance in implementing – or preparing to implement – those safeguards measures. The United States devotes considerable resources to this effort, and we encourage those who are in a position to help to offer their support to other states and to the IAEA. We should make sure that all interested states are aware and take advantage of such assistance.

The IAEA should seek to continuously improve the way it implements safeguards by using new technology and taking advantage of all safeguards-relevant information. In doing so the Agency must maintain its objectivity, impartiality, and the technical foundation of its work. This deserves our full financial, technical, and political support. In this regard, we note the IAEA’s development of the state-level concept (SLC), which is the next logical phase in the evolution of IAEA safeguards. We support the Agency’s efforts to transition to the SLC in order that IAEA safeguards remain both effective and efficient.

Thirty-seven years ago, the United States was the first state to establish a Member State Support Program to provide technical and financial assistance to the IAEA for safeguards. Last year alone, we provided $40 million to the IAEA to support its safeguards mission. This figure does not include significant efforts to revitalize our own technology base and work with other international partners to support IAEA safeguards. We also take great encouragement from the contributions of 20 other active Support Programs for IAEA safeguards, a concrete affirmation of the importance those states place in IAEA safeguards.

The United States remains ready to accept the same safeguards on our civil nuclear facilities and activities that non-nuclear-weapon states Parties are required to accept, both under comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols to those agreements, subject only to a national security exclusion. We have made roughly 300 civil nuclear facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards under our “voluntary offer” safeguards agreement. We have welcomed IAEA verification of the downblending of excess U.S. highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium for use in power reactors. Each of our annual reports under the U.S. Additional Protocol since 2010 has included over 300 entries.

Nuclear Security

Mr. Chairman, in addition to the risk of nuclear proliferation by states, we need to address the risks from non-state actors, including the risks of unauthorized removal or sabotage of dangerous nuclear and radiological materials. We welcome the outcome of the Nuclear Security Summit last month in The Hague and take note of the accomplishments made through commitments made at earlier summits by a diverse group of world leaders representing 53 states and four international organizations. This concerted international action, some of which predates the Summits, has enabled 26 states plus Taiwan to rid themselves entirely of an aggregate of over five metric tons of highly enriched uranium.

But more remains to be done not only to secure and eliminate the most dangerous materials, but to promote best practices in securing nuclear and radiological material. We are pleased that two thirds of the countries participating in this year’s Summit, on the initiative of the hosts of all three Summits, pledged to implement robust measures to strengthen their nuclear security practices. As we approach the 2016 Summit, we look forward to further progress as states work to meet the additional commitments undertaken at The Hague, as well as to further progress on nuclear security actions in the three communiqués and the 2010 Action Plan.

Proliferation Challenges

Mr. Chairman, since the early 1990s, we have seen several instances of NPT Parties that failed to comply with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. Some of these cases have been resolved successfully. But other cases remain unresolved and those states stand in violation of their obligations today because they have not taken sufficient action to resolve the underlying compliance concerns. Unresolved cases of noncompliance erode confidence in the NPT as a foundation for international security and for efforts to reduce global nuclear dangers. NPT parties should continue to give utmost attention to these challenges in order to maintain and reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Non-compliant states or non-state actors will not hesitate to take advantage of weaknesses in the nonproliferation system. They will import critical nuclear-related equipment on the black market or traffic in dangerous materials. None of us is immune to these risks. Illicit commerce has taken advantage even of states with the strongest nonproliferation commitments, and its results affect all of us.

This underscores the need for concerted action to shore up our existing controls. We therefore encourage states in position to do so to join us in offering assistance, in export control, border security, safeguards, nuclear and radiological security; we encourage those who need assistance to avail themselves of these offers.

Strengthening the Treaty

Mr. Chairman, universality of the NPT remains our long-term objective, even as we recognize the challenges we face in pursuing that goal. This goal will not be achieved quickly, but it remains an essential element in achieving the broader vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

We welcome the heightened attention to the issue of withdrawal from the NPT. While we do not challenge the right of NPT parties to withdraw in accordance with Article X of the Treaty, nor do we seek to amend that provision in any way, we share the concerns many countries have regarding the potential for states to abuse this right.

Mr. Chairman, the United States encourages all NPT parties to do all they can to strengthen the nonproliferation pillar of the Treaty. This is urgent if we are to preserve the security benefits that derive from our shared commitment to nonproliferation and to all pillars of the NPT regime.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THOMAS COUNTRYMAN'S REMARKS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS RENUNCIATION BY UKRAINE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Twenty Years of Renunciation From Nuclear Weapons by Ukraine: Lessons Learned and Prospects of Nuclear Disarmament"

Remarks

Thomas M. Countryman

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations

New York City

April 28, 2014

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Introduction
The 2014 PrepCom is an opportunity to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to reinforce our shared responsibilities to uphold it. The United States remains committed to full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. Through this PrepCom we will build on the momentum of the successful 2010 Review Conference and PrepComs in 2012 and 2013. As we approach the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the United States looks to all States Parties to work together towards strengthening this critical treaty which has underpinned international security for nearly 45 years.

I thank our Ukrainian friends for hosting us today. As President Obama and Secretary Kerry have said, the United States strongly supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Last week, Vice President Biden traveled to Kyiv in order to demonstrate our solidarity with the Ukrainian people. He discussed how the United States is supporting the international community’s efforts to stabilize and strengthen Ukraine’s economy and assist Ukraine in political reform and uniting the country. The Vice President announced a U.S. package of assistance totaling $50 million to help Ukraine pursue political and economic reform and strengthen our partnership. He made clear that Ukraine has a difficult road ahead, but it will not walk this road alone. And today the United States announced that it will impose new targeted sanctions on a number of Russian individuals and entities and restricting licenses for certain U.S. exports to Russia.

Budapest Memorandum Commitments

In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom made a commitment to respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of Ukraine. The United States government remains committed to the Budapest Memorandum.
Our partnership with Ukraine goes back many years, and is particularly strong in the area of nonproliferation. We appreciate Ukraine’s continued leadership in this area.

Ukraine’s Nonproliferation Record

This year marks the twentieth anniversary of Ukraine’s historic decision to remove the third largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world from its territory and to accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Ukraine’s unwavering commitment to its obligations under the NPT demonstrates that when a country places itself squarely within the NPT and diligently adheres to all of the Treaty’s obligations, all nations benefit.
Since 1994, Ukraine has a strong record of supporting nuclear nonproliferation and threat reduction. With support from the “Nunn-Lugar” Cooperative Threat Reduction program, Ukraine dismantled an enormous stockpile of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and related delivery systems. In 2004, it began an augmented program with the U.S. Department of Defense that includes weapons of mass destruction proliferation prevention and border security initiatives. By hosting the multilateral Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU), Ukraine has engaged over 20,000 scientists from the former Soviet weapons program in peaceful activities. The United States has been proud to be a partner in those efforts.

Ukraine brought its IAEA safeguards agreement into force in 1995; it signed the Additional Protocol in 2000 and brought it into force in 2006. Ukraine joined the Global Partnership against the spread of WMD in 2005, in 2007 it was one of the first countries to join the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Ukraine participated actively in all three Nuclear Security Summits. In 2012, Ukraine fulfilled its pledge to remove all highly enriched uranium from Ukraine, a highlight of the 2012 Summit.

In 2013, we extended the U.S.-Ukraine Cooperative Threat Reduction Umbrella Agreement for another seven years, as well as an agreement to increase safety and risk reduction at civilian nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Recent events in Ukraine underline the importance of bringing to closure to the legacy of Chernobyl by finishing construction of a landmark shelter to durably protect the population and environment, a project to which the United States has pledged approximately $337 million. Last month, a joint U.S. – Ukraine project to construct a Neutron Source Facility at the Kharkiv Institute for Physics and Technology was completed, providing Ukraine with new research capabilities and the ability to produce industrial and medical isotopes. In short, U.S. – Ukrainian cooperation on nuclear security and nonproliferation is broad and deep.

U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation

We applaud Minister of Foreign Affairs Deshchytsia’s reaffirmation of Ukraine’s longstanding commitment to its nonproliferation obligations at the Nuclear Security Summit last month. Like Ukraine, the United States is committed to achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. This is a central element of President Obama’s nuclear agenda. There is a long road ahead, but we are working to create the conditions for its eventual achievement. As President Obama said in Berlin in June, 2013, the United States can ensure its security and that of its allies while safely pursuing further nuclear reductions with Russia of up to one-third in the deployed strategic warhead level established in the New START Treaty.
As next steps toward nuclear disarmament, the United States remains committed to pursuing entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and consensus to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

I would like to highlight the work done at the P5 Conference earlier this month in Beijing toward implementing the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference
The NPT serves as a key element of international security and the basis for international nuclear cooperation. We will continue to address the serious challenges of cases of noncompliance with Treaty obligations, and will continue to support expanding access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We look forward to a productive Preparatory Committee meeting, and reaffirm our commitment to ensuring the Treaty’s contributions to international peace and security are strengthened.

I thank our Ukrainian hosts again for today and congratulate them again on this important anniversary and their continued leadership within the NPT. I look forward to working with Ukraine, and with all other NPT Parties, over the coming weeks to ensure that the NPT remains strong.

As Secretary Kerry stated last week, the world will remain united for Ukraine.

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL'S REMARKS T PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Remarks
Anita Friedt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Strategic Policy
Washington, DC
February 26, 2014

Thank you, Daryl, for that kind introduction. I would like to thank the Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament for organizing this event and for your ongoing engagement on this important set of issues. As the panel is titled, “Steps and Measures by Nuclear-Armed States,” I would like to provide an update on our work implementing the agenda laid out nearly five years ago by President Obama in Prague, when he committed the United States to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a goal that he reaffirmed in his speech in Berlin this past June.

As President Obama noted in Prague and repeated in Berlin, this will not be easy. It will require persistence and patience, and may not happen in his lifetime. Still, over the last four years we have succeeded in moving closer to this goal.

In 2010, the Administration concluded a Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, which outlines the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers, as well as advancing the broader security interests of the United States and its allies. As the NPR states, the international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War: the threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. Concerted action by all states to uphold their NPT obligations – including those related to disarmament – is important for building a sense of common purpose that helps maintain support from partners around the world to uphold and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Russia has been a key partner in our efforts to secure or eliminate these materials. For instance, the downblending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) by Russia under the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement has now been completed. The final delivery of the resultant LEU to the United States took place in December. Under this agreement, 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian weapons has been converted into LEU and delivered to the United States to fuel U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The HEU that was converted by downblending was equivalent to approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads – instead, it has provided nuclear power plant fuel that has been used to generate nearly 10 percent of all U.S. electricity for the past 15 years.

In the United States, an additional 374 metric tons of U.S. HEU has been declared excess to nuclear weapons needs; most of which will be downblended or used as fuel in naval or research reactors. In 2011, the United States and Russia brought into force the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 2010 protocols, which require each side to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium – enough in total for about 17,000 nuclear weapons – and thus permanently remove this material from military programs. Russia has also been an essential partner in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts to convert research reactors worldwide from HEU to LEU and repatriate those reactors’ HEU to the country of origin. These efforts have now converted or verified the shutdown of over 88 research and test reactors and isotope production facilities, and removed over 5,017 kg of HEU for secure storage, downblending and disposition.

In addition to reducing excess stocks of fissile material, we have taken steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. We are not developing new nuclear weapons or pursuing new nuclear missions; we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations; and mindful of the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear war, we have clearly stated that it is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 70-year record of nonuse of nuclear weapons be extended forever.

In June of 2013, in conjunction with his Berlin speech, President Obama issued new guidance that aligns U.S. nuclear policies to the 21st century security environment. This was the latest concrete step the President has taken to advance his Prague agenda and the long-term goal of achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. After a comprehensive review, the President determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons below the limits established in the New START Treaty.

Let me now address what we believe our next steps should be.

The United States and Russia still possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world, and we have a shared responsibility to continue the process of reducing our nuclear arms. The New START Treaty was the first step in that process. The implementation of New START, now in its fourth year, is going well. When New START is fully implemented, the United States and the Russian Federation will each have no more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads – the lowest levels since the 1950s. Our overall nuclear stockpile is 85% below the peak level during the Cold War.

Going forward, the United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to further reduce nuclear arsenals.

To this end, we are engaged in a bilateral dialogue with Russia to promote strategic stability and increase transparency on a reciprocal basis. We are hopeful our dialogue will lead to greater reciprocal transparency and negotiation of even further nuclear weapons reductions.

In addition to bilateral engagement with Russia, We will also be working to expand our public outreach on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. As stated in the April 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review: “Ratification of the CTBT is central to leading other nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament.”

I want to be clear - we have no desire to rush up here for a vote. It’s been 15 years since the CTBT was on the front pages of newspapers and whether we are talking to a Senator or a staffer, a schoolteacher or a student– we know that it is our job to make the case for this Treaty. Together, we can work through questions and concerns about the Treaty and explosive nuclear testing. In particular, the dangerous health effects of nuclear testing is a specific topic that can and should be addressed both here at home and abroad. Once we’ve brought the Treaty back to people’s attention, we can move on to discussion and debate – just like we did with the New START Treaty. We will not be setting timeframes for moving forward. We are going to be patient, but we will also be persistent. Above all, the CTBT is good for American national security and that is why we will continue educating the country on the treaty’s merits.

There are still further initiatives that are part of this Administration’s nuclear agenda. In Berlin, President Obama called on all nations to begin negotiations on a treaty that ends the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or FMCT would codify an end to the production of weapons-grade fissile material needed to create nuclear weapons, cap stockpiles of fissile material worldwide, place sensitive nuclear facilities around the world under international verification, and provide the basis for further, deeper, reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Beginning multilateral negotiations on the FMCT is a priority objective for the United States and for the vast majority of states, and we have been working to initiate such negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. An overwhelming majority of nations support the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations. The United States is consulting with China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, as well as others, including India and Pakistan, to find a way to commence negotiations of an FMCT. And we will, of course, participate in the upcoming Group of Government Experts, which will begin its work this Spring.

In 2009, the five nuclear-weapon states, or “P5,” began to meet regularly for discussions on issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, these discussions have expanded to address P5 implementation of our commitments under the NPT and the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. Russia hosted the most recent P5 conference in Geneva, Switzerland in April 2013, where the P5 reviewed progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and continued discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. We are looking forward to continued discussions at a fifth P5 conference in April in Beijing. In addition to providing a senior level policy forum for discussion and coordination among the P5, this process has spawned a series of discussions among policymakers and government experts on a variety of issues. China is leading a P5 working group on nuclear definitions and terminology. The P5 have agreed to a common format for NPT reporting, and we are also beginning to engage at expert levels on some important verification and transparency issues. As we proceed, we would like the P5 conferences and intersessional meetings of experts to develop further practical transparency measures that build confidence and predictability.

None of this will be easy, but the policies the Administration is pursuing are suited for our security needs and tailored for the global security threats of the 21st century. By maintaining and supporting a safe, secure and effective stockpile — sufficient to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies — at the same time that we pursue responsible verifiable reductions through arms control, we will make this world a safer place.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER'S REMARKS ON NUCLEAR REMEMBRANCE DAY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Republic of Marshall Islands Nuclear Remembrance Day
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
Majuro, Marshall Islands
March 1, 2014

As Delivered


I am so honored to be in the Marshall Islands, a nation that the United States sees as our strategic partner, our ally and our friend. Mr. President, I am honored to be here with such a distinguished group of government, community and faith leaders, members of the diplomatic corps, and honored guests.

Today, here in this beautiful place, we gather to remember and honor the past, but we also gather in the spirit of community and hope. I would like to second Ambassador Armbruster’s message of bromich (condolences); it is the right word for today. The American people remember what took place here and honor the historical and current contributions that the Marshallese people make to help promote peace and stability around the world. For many of you, that means remembering lost family members and loved ones – they are in our thoughts and prayers, as well. Today we honor their memory and I know that words can only go so far in healing wounds, but this nation has played an outsized role in the fight for a safer world and for that the United States, and the world, thanks you.

Our commitment to you, solidified by the 1986 Compact and the 2003 Amended Compact, is borne out by our obligation to defend the Marshall Islands and its people, as the United States and its citizens are defended. Of course, the mutual security of our nations is an underlying element of the special relationship between our nations. Marshallese citizens serve with distinction in our armed forces, sharing our commitment to democracy and freedom. I know that the Marshallese rate of enlistment is higher than in most U.S. states. For the Marshallese citizens that have served in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world, we are so grateful.

On this day – the 60th anniversary of Castle Bravo – and on each and every day, the United States recognizes the effects of its nuclear explosive testing and has accepted and acted on its responsibility. The Department of Energy continues to provide critical medical and environmental programs in the RMI, in addition to improving the provision of such services. In particular, we will continue to work with the local leadership of the four nuclear-affected atolls to assist them in realizing their environmental goals. In this regard, the Department of Energy will be employing the world’s best technologies to aid in this endeavor. This, I can assure you, is a promise from the people of the United States.

Since 2004, the United States has provided over $600 million to the Marshall Islands, in the form of direct assistance and subsidies, as well as financial support for rehabilitation of affected atolls, site monitoring, and ongoing health care programs. This year, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a remarkable sponsorship program to increase the science capacity in the Marshall Islands. Two Marshallese students will live and study in the San Francisco Bay Area, including at Lawrence Livermore National Labs (LLNL) itself. The sponsorship pays tuition, room and board, travel and a living stipend. It also includes a summer internship with LLNL.

As I said at the outset, we are here to remember and honor the past today, but I also want to look to the future with purpose and with hope. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis opened the eyes of the world to the terror of nuclear war, but there were people across the globe who were already all too familiar with nuclear dangers. People in Japan and the Marshall Islands, those downwind from the nuclear test site in Nevada, the mothers who found radioactive material in their children’s milk: all understood in first person the health effects of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. In 1963, about a decade after Castle Bravo, President John F. Kennedy called for a complete ban on nuclear explosive testing.

“The conclusion of such a treaty,” he said, “so near and yet so far -- would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963 -- the further spread of nuclear arms. It would increase our security -- it would decrease the prospects of war.”

We are still so near and yet so far from this goal. We were able to achieve part of this objective through the Limited Test Ban Treaty – banning tests in the water, in space and in the atmosphere. However, 51 years later, the hazard of the further spread of nuclear weapons remains and we still lack a total ban on nuclear explosive testing. Here again, we should heed President Kennedy’s words. “Surely this goal,” he said, “is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.”

In 2009, President Obama took up the mantle of the Presidents who came before him, and laid out his own long-term vision of the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. While the United States will and must maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist, we have properly refocused our nuclear policy for the 21st century. As outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), we are now on a path that confronts the threats we face today and those on the near horizon. This allows us to work with allies and partners to pursue arms control and disarmament measures that can lead us down the path towards a nuclear-free world.

Mindful of the devastating human consequences of nuclear war, the United States has also clearly stated that it is in our interest, and that of all other nations, that the nearly 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever. We also concluded that the time for a complete and total ban on nuclear explosive testing is long overdue. U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a pivotal part of this effort.

Ratification of the CTBT is central to leading other nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament. The United States now maintains a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal through our science-based Stockpile Stewardship program without nuclear explosive testing, which the United States halted in 1992.

The United States will be patient in our pursuit of ratification, but we will also be persistent. It has been a long time since the CTBT was on the front pages of newspapers, so we will need time to make the case for this Treaty. Together, we can work through questions and concerns about the Treaty and explosive nuclear testing. Our answers to those questions continue to grow stronger with the proven and increasing capabilities of the Stockpile Stewardship program and the verification system of the Treaty, including the International Monitoring System.

I cannot emphasize strongly enough that it is precisely our deep understanding of the consequences of nuclear weapons – including the dangerous health effects of nuclear explosive testing – that has guided and motivated our efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate these most dangerous and awe-inspiring weapons. Entry into force of the CTBT is one such essential part of our pragmatic, step by step approach to eliminating nuclear dangers. The Treaty will make the world a safer place for the Marshall Islands, the United States, for every nation around the globe.

This is not just a security issue; this is an issue of humanity, of health, of morality. We are the stewards of this Earth and we owe it to those who have fallen – to those who suffer still – to work together, one step at a time, until nuclear explosive testing is banned worldwide, getting us one step closer to our goal of the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. In closing, I want to reiterate that the United States and the world owe the Marshallese a debt of gratitude. The RMI has been a leader in countering climate change, a contributor to international security, and our partner on global issues. Together, we can and should continue to work for what President Kennedy called “a genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living.”

Finally, I can only say kommol tata! Thank you!