STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL REMARKS ON THE INFORMATION AGE AND ARMS CONTROL

Photo:  Minute Man III Missile Launch.  Credit:  U.S. Navy
FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Arms Control in the Information Age: Harnessing "Sisu"
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Finnish Institute for International Affairs


Helsinki, Finland
August 29, 2012
Thank you for inviting me to speak here at the Finnish Institute for International Affairs. This is my first visit to Finland and it is an absolutely lovely place. This nation has been a strong partner for the United States in pushing for a safer, more secure world, whether through diplomacy, peacekeeping or arms control efforts.

I would like to start out by saying that this is not a policy speech; this is an ideas speech. The United States has an ambitious arms control agenda and as such, we are doing some big thinking. I know Finns are no strangers to big thinking, so I think I am in the right place to discuss arms control in the information age.

The Challenges Ahead

It has been over 3 years since President Obama made his now-famous speech in Prague, in which he stated that the United States would seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. That speech was not just a rhetorical gesture; the Prague Agenda is a step by step path to the elimination of nuclear weapons. For the first two years of my service in the Administration, I worked on one step in that path – the New START Treaty. I am happy to report that Treaty has now been in force for over 18 months and its implementation is going very well. Both the United States and Russia are benefitting from the enhanced predictability it provides, which in turn enhances security for both nations and the world.

In the context of moving the President’s overall nuclear policy agenda forward, the entry into force of New START is just the beginning. In order to reach our goals, we are going to have to think bigger and bolder. Indeed, persistence, determination and willpower will be important to the next steps in arms control. I believe the Finns have the perfect term for what it will take: "sisu."

As we look towards the next steps in reductions, it is clear that there will be new challenges facing us. We have not tried to limit non-deployed or non-strategic weapons before, which President Obama called for the day he signed New START. We are thinking about how we would verify reductions in those categories and people have different ideas about what terms like ‘non-strategic’ even mean. Even more complicated: the lower the numbers of nuclear weapons and the smaller the components, the harder it will be to effectively verify compliance.

New Concepts

With this is mind, I have been challenging myself to think about how we use the knowledge from our past together with the new tools of the information age. The seed of an idea was planted in my mind in Geneva during the New START negotiations. As we considered verification mechanisms for New START, it occurred to me that, by and large, we were still thinking about verification through the lens of the 1970’s. The advancements in technology since then have been nothing short of revolutionary, but it wasn’t quite clear how to incorporate these advancements into an effective verification regime.

It was actually a conversation with my two tech-guru sons over the dinner table that helped to further develop my thoughts on the subject. We discussed the incorporation of open source technologies – including social networking – into the verification of arms control and nonproliferation treaties.

Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. These people exchange and share ideas on a wide variety of topics: why not put this vast problem-solving entity to good use?

Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, could be broadcast globally in seconds. That means it is harder to hide things. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool, and it can help us make sure that countries are following the rules of arms control treaties and agreements.

I look out at a crowd like you and realize that I don’t need to convince you that the technologies of the 21st century are changing the world as we know it. Finland has been a leading force in innovation in the information age. Over 95% of Finns have access to the internet and broadband access is now considered a legal right. It was not too many generations ago that Finland was a primarily agrarian state and now it is an economic powerhouse, with cutting-edge research and development. I am always amazed that Nokia went from making rubber boots to revolutionizing the communications world with its inexpensive and efficient cellular phones. It is this kind of creativity and adaptability that will be needed as we think about how to verify reductions going forward.

Of course, I should caveat that this is not actually a new idea. Renowned physicist and Nobel-laureate Joseph Rotblat proposed the concept of involving everyday citizens in the verification of arms control agreements back in the 1960’s. But without the tools to "crowd-source" verification, the idea languished. In the 1990s, Joseph Rotblat revived the idea of establishing an international system for public reporting and whistle-blowing as a complement to technological verification. Rotblat termed this concept "societal verification," to reflect the idea that entire communities of non-experts could be involved. While Rotblat and others saw that the new global political conditions could be fertile ground for cultivating societal verification, there was still a need for technical tools. Today, we may finally have those tools.

New Possibilities

So now, armed with an idea and technological capacity, we can start to think about the possibilities.

Social verification can take place on a scale that moves from active participation, like public reporting and crowd-sourced mapping and analysis, or to passive participation, like ubiquitous sensing or data mining and analytics.

On this scale, the open source information technologies in use can improve arms control verification in at least two ways: either by generating new information, or by analyzing information that already is out there.

Let me give you some examples, to give you an idea what I’m talking about.

In 2009, in recognition of the 40th anniversary of the Internet, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) held a competition where 10 red weather balloons were moored at visible fixed locations around the continental United States. The first team to identify the location of all 10 balloons won a sizable cash prize--$40,000. Over 4,300 teams composed of an estimated 2 million people from 25 countries took part in the challenge. A team from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology won the challenge, identifying all of the balloon locations in an astonishing time of 8 hours and 52 minutes. Of course, to win in such a short time or complete the challenge at all, the MIT team did not "find" the balloons themselves. They tapped into social networks using a unique incentive structure that not only incentivized people to identify a balloon location, but also incentivized people to recruit others to the team. Their win showed the enormous potential of social networking, and also demonstrated how incentives can motivate large populations to work toward a common goal.

Social networking is already being incorporated into local safety systems. RAVEN911—the Regional Asset Verification & Emergency Network—is a multilayer mapping tool that supports emergency first response in Cincinnati, Ohio. RAVEN911 uses live data feeds and intelligence gathered through Twitter to provide details that cannot be given on an everyday geographic map, such as the location of downed electric power lines and flooded roads. Authorities are cooperating with communities in Southwestern Ohio, Southeastern Indiana and Northern Kentucky to develop and implement this emergency management system, in order to help fire departments assess the risks and potential dangers before arriving on the scene of an accident. This open source system gives emergency responders a common operating picture, to better execute time-critical activities, such as choosing evacuation routes out of flooded areas.

In addition to collecting useful data, the ability to identify patterns and trends in social networks could aid the arms control verification process. In the most basic sense, social media can draw attention to both routine and abnormal events. We may be able to mine Twitter data to understand where strange effluents are flowing, to recognize if a country has an illegal chemical weapons program or to recognize unexpected patterns of industrial activity at a missile production plant. In this way, we may be able to ensure better compliance with existing arms control treaties and regimes, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Now, how could approaches such as this work, specifically in the arms control context?

Let’s just imagine that a country, to establish its bona fides in a deep nuclear reduction environment, wishes to open itself to a verification challenge, recruiting its citizens and their iPhones to help prove that it is not stashing extra missiles in the woods, for example, or a fissile material production reactor in the desert. Of course, some form of international supervision would likely be required, to ensure the legitimacy of the challenge and its procedures. And we would have to consider whether such a challenge could cope with especially covert environments, such as caves or deep underground facilities.

Sound far-fetched? Just consider that even today, tablets such as your iPad have tiny accelerometers installed – that’s what tells the tablet which way is up. But the accelerometers also have the capability to detect small shakes, like an earth tremor.

Now, imagine a whole community of tablet users, all containing an "earth shake" app, dispersed randomly around the country, and connected into a centralized network node. An individual shake could be something as simple as bumping your iPad on a table. But a whole network of tablets, all shaking at virtually the same time? That tells you that something happened; knowing where all the tablets are and the exact time they started shaking can help you to geo-locate the event. It could be an earthquake, or it could be an illegal nuclear test. Of course, other sensors and analysis would have to be brought to bear to figure out the difference.

This is called "ubiquitous sensing," that is, collecting data and basic analysis through sensors on smartphones and other mobile-computing devices. These sensors would allow citizens to contribute to detecting potential treaty violations, and could build a bridge to a stronger private-public partnership in the realm of treaty verification.

The Challenges Ahead

Of course, for any of this to work, there are technical, legal and political barriers ahead that would need to be overcome—no easy feat to be sure.

On the technical front, it would be necessary to work together to make sure nations cannot spoof or manipulate the public verification challenges that they devise. We also have to bear in mind there could be limitations based on the freedoms available to the citizens of a given country.

On the legal front, there are many questions that must be confronted about active vs. passive participation. How can we prevent governments from extracting information from citizens without their knowledge, or manipulating results collected in databases? Further, in some circumstances, how can active participants be sheltered from reproach by authorities? It may be possible, through careful handling and management, to mask sources, even if locations are public.

On the political front, we cannot assume that information will always be so readily available. As nations and private entities continue to debate the line between privacy and security, it is possible to imagine that we are living in a golden age of open source information that will be harder to take advantage of in future. In the end, the goal of using open source information technology and social networks should be to add to our existing arms control monitoring and verification capabilities, not to supersede them.

Joining Forces

Even with great ideas and fool-proof planning, another issue that we have to consider is: how do we create, organize and, when necessary, fund efforts such as these? Developing partnerships among governments, civil society groups, philanthropic organizations and private businesses will be the key to moving ahead.

We are just now starting to think about how governments can actively enlist their publics to help prove that they are in compliance with their arms control and nonproliferation obligations. To this end, on Tuesday, the U.S. Department of State launched the "Innovation in Arms Control Challenge" asking, "How Can the Crowd Support Arms Control Transparency Efforts?" We want to get ideas on if and how the everyday citizen can help support arms control transparency efforts. While the contest can only be won by U.S. citizens or permanent residents, we encourage anyone who is interested in the subject to participate.

The Future

As I said at the outset, this is not about policy; this is about coming up with the bold ideas that will shape policy in the future. As governments around the world work to enhance and expand our arms control and nonproliferation efforts, we will need your help to find new ways to use the amazing information tools at our disposal. It is increasingly apparent that we are going to need every tool we have, and many we have not yet developed or perhaps even thought of, to fulfill the Prague Agenda. We will need "sisu".

Thank you again for inviting me here to speak. I would now love to take some questions.

2012 DETERRENCE SYMPOSIUM

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
U.S. Strategic Command 2012 Deterrence Symposium

Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Omaha, NE
August 9, 2012
General Kehler, thank you for the opportunity to speak to STRATCOM’s 2012 Deterrence Symposium. It has become the place to talk about U.S. deterrence policy and deterrence relationships. I see a lot of Washington rainmakers in the room, along with their usual talents, I am glad they’ve brought some rain to Nebraska. There’s one other unique thing about this onference: this is the first time I’ve seen two Rose’s as plenary speakers. Is Rose McDermot still here? Good on ya, STRATCOM. Now to get serious - this year, I would like to focus on our extended deterrence relationship with our European allies and partners.
　
But to begin with, I’d like to update you on New START, which has now been in force for 18 months. I am pleased to report that the implementation process is going extremely well. For this Treaty year, which began in February, each side has already conducted nine inspections and the overall number of Treaty notifications is over 2700. The New START Treaty’s robust verification regime is providing the predictability and mutual confidence that will be essential to any future nuclear reduction plans.
　
When President Obama laid out his vision for the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons in Prague in 2009, he made it clear that we will need to maintain our deterrence commitments, while also taking into account the threats of the 21st century. The President knows that the road from Prague will be long. Success will only be reached through a step-by-step process in which we maintain and support a safe, secure, and effective stockpile - sufficient to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies- at the same time that we pursue responsible reductions through arms control.
　
We are now spending a lot time thinking about next steps in deterrence, stability, and arms control. I sometimes refer to it as a homework period, which is not a bad term for what we are doing. We are looking at fundamentals and lessons learned, as we work to develop new policies to advance our security.
　
For arms control, that means pulling back to the basic level. Simply put, arms control contributes to international security by committing nations to submit voluntarily to regimes that limit the development, production, stockpiling, and deployment of weapons. Because arms control is based on reciprocity and is typically accompanied by verification, confidence building and transparency measures, it helps to build predictability into relationships. Limiting force levels and establishing a regime through a mutually verifiable agreement creates boundaries, promotes standard operating procedures, and fosters predictable behavior – these are the building blocks of trust. The relative improvement of trust between parties can help increase stability, in particular when this improvement is underwritten by verification mechanisms. This process can shift a relationship from one based on coercive formulations of deterrence to one based on mutual restraint.
　
Mutual restraint does not remove the need for deterrence, but it does reflect a shared interest in limiting strategic competition. Mutual restraint, along with the stability provided by arms control agreements, can help prevent escalation during crisis by reducing the imperative to go first. It can also create the conditions for further nuclear reductions.
　
The State Department’s International Security Advisory Board, or ISAB, is helping us with some "big thinking." This Federal Advisory Committee was established to provide the Department of State with a continuing source of independent insight, advice, and innovation on scientific, military, diplomatic, political, and public diplomacy aspects of arms control, disarmament, international security, and nonproliferation. The ISAB was asked by former Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher, who is well-known by many of you, to undertake a study of how the United States could pursue and manage a transition from a world of mutual assured destruction to a world of mutual assured stability, characterized by increasingly interdependent states having incentives to cooperate on political, military, and economic issues, thereby reducing the need for adversarial approaches to managing security challenges. Among the topics that the ISAB was asked to examine and assess in this area were the possible components of mutual assured stability: What would the United States need to see happen to have the confidence to consider very low numbers and, eventually, agree to the elimination of nuclear weapons? Their report is forthcoming and when it is released, I encourage you all to take a look.
　
Reducing the Salience of Nuclear Weapons
In addition to exploring new ideas and concepts of deterrence and arms control, this President and his Administration are committed to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. We are not developing new nuclear weapons or pursuing new nuclear missions; we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations; and we have clearly stated that it is in everyone’s interest to extend forever the more than 65-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons.
　
As we continue to reduce global nuclear stockpiles and include additional categories of weapons in that process, the importance of verification and transparency will only grow. Having confidence in what other states are doing is critical for creating conditions for further progress in arms control and disarmament, which is why we made our 2010 Nuclear Posture Review public and revealed the size of our stockpile – 5,113 weapons as of September 2009.
　
As part of the implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S. Government is currently reviewing its nuclear deterrence requirements to ensure that they are aligned to address today’s threats. What we already know, as President Obama said in Seoul back in March, is we have more nuclear weapons than we need. This study will help shape our next negotiations with Russia.
　
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
Both the President and the Senate – in the New START Resolution of Ratification – have placed a priority on seeking to initiate new negotiations with the Russians on nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW).
　
Over the course of the past few years, the Administration has taken a number of steps towards this goal. We have been conducting our own internal reviews, while also reviewing this matter with our Allies through the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) and we’ve also been engaging with the Russians in a strategic stability dialogue. We have also been consulting with our allies.
　
In approving the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review at Chicago this past May, the Allies determined that NATO’s current posture meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture. NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of and reliance on nuclear weapons, but has indicated that it is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of NSNW stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.
　
The Allies have supported and encouraged the United States and Russia to continue their mutual efforts to promote strategic stability, enhance transparency, and further reduce their nuclear weapons in every category.
　
NATO Allies look forward to developing and exchanging transparency and confidence-building ideas with Russia with the goal of developing detailed proposals on and increasing mutual understanding of NATO’s and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe.
　
Conventional Arms Control in Europe
While we continue to work on nonstrategic nuclear force issues, it is important to keep in mind the importance of European security overall. As Secretary Clinton stated in 2010, "[a] strong Europe is critical to our security and our prosperity. Much of what we hope to accomplish globally depends on working together with Europe." In this context, predictable conventional force structures in Europe will contribute to enhancing European security and strengthening trust, including between NATO Allies and Russia.
　
Our conventional arms control agreements in Europe – the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Document confidence-building measures – are vital to providing a foundation for stability in our strategic relationships. NATO confirmed the importance of conventional arms control at the Chicago Summit:
　
Reaffirming the importance of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Allies remain committed to conventional arms control and to preserving, strengthening, and modernizing the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments.
　
Modernization is the key word here. We have made a serious investment in building the current security architecture in Europe. We must devote adequate resources to keep the regimes going strong. However, we must adapt and improve our efforts to meet our current and future security needs, and do it in a way that is efficient and effective for all countries for all countries involved. We need some new thinking, and we have been devoting a lot of time to this task.
　
If we look back over the course of the CFE treaty’s implementation, the regime has been a historic success story. Since its entry into force, more than 72,000 pieces of Cold War military equipment – tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters – have been eliminated. Under CFE, thousands of inspections have taken place at military sites all over Europe, dramatically increasing confidence and military transparency on the continent by providing a means to verify data exchanges.
　
Despite these achievements, the earlier success of the treaty is proving difficult to replicate. In November 2011, the United States, along with 23 other parties to the treaty, ceased carrying out certain obligations under the CFE Treaty with regard to Russia. This was a legal countermeasure to Russia's step in late 2007, when it suspended implementation of the Treaty.
　
While ceasing to implement an arms control obligation is not something that the Administration usually sees as a positive step, in this case there was a silver lining: the November 2011 decision has allowed us to embark upon a ground-up reexamination of the entire conventional arms control enterprise.
　
We’re asking fundamental questions: What are the security concerns in Europe in 2012 that a conventional arms control agreement should address? And, taking into account the lessons learned from the implementation of CFE and other existing agreements, what kinds of arms control measures could address those concerns and uphold core principles of European security?
　
The fact is, the basic problem that the original CFE Treaty was meant to resolve – the destabilizing surplus of conventional arms on the continent – has been resolved, in no small part through implementation of this important treaty.
　
Today, for the most part, quantities of conventional armaments across the continent are way below the negotiated ceilings, and are likely to continue to drop.
　
While the problems of 1989 are no longer, it is my view that conventional arms control, done right, can significantly improve security on the continent by helping to address today’s concerns. It can provide confidence regarding the military forces and intentions of neighbors, especially in sensitive areas. We need to spend our stretched defense budgets wisely. Arms control can help us do that, for the more predictable our relationships, the better we can plan our defense spending.
　
Moving Forward
With that, I would like to stop and take some questions, but I will leave you with a final thought. Our extended deterrence relationship with our NATO allies is made up of many facets, as was recognized in the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. Nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities all contribute to extended deterrence, and they all require constant tending. One more vital facet is the arms control relationship with Europe that has been in place since the Cold War – and that includes Russia. If that relationship goes begging, then we will be the worse for it – and that, too, includes Russia.
　
Thank you.