FRANK ROSE MAKES REMARKS ON TRANSATLANTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
6/26/2015 12:12 PM EDT
Transatlantic Missile Defense: Defining the Right Threat Set
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
The Atlantic Council
Washington, DC
June 24, 2015
As prepared

Thank you Ian for that kind introduction and for having me here today.

I always appreciate the opportunity to speak at the annual Atlantic Council missile defense conference alongside so many experts in this important field. Today, I would like to focus my remarks on how the Obama Administration has defined the ballistic missile threat and how we are cooperating to address this threat. I'll keep my comments brief to maximize our time to more freely engage on these issues.

The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (or BMDR) makes clear that the United States’ missile defenses are focused on defending against limited missile threats to the U.S. homeland and regional missile threats to our deployed forces, allies and partners throughout the world. The development of ballistic missiles by countries like Iran and North Korea, and the proliferation of these systems around the world is what drives our threat assessment.

Our deployment of missile defenses is focused on strengthening the twin U.S. goals of deterrence and assurance. In so doing, they also contribute to international peace and stability and reinforce our nonproliferation aims.

At the same time, we have made clear both in our policy and in the capabilities we have deployed that our missile defense efforts are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia and China.

As a practical matter, the U.S. experience with missile defense suggests that attempting to develop a comprehensive missile defense system to defend against ballistic missile attack from Russia would be extremely challenging – and costly – given the size and sophistication of Russia’s strategic missile force and the relatively limited number of missile defense interceptors that would be available to defend against such a large force.

It is to address the regional threats from the Middle East and North Korea, and to enhance our regional deterrence posture, that leads us to cooperate with our allies and partners in deploying missile defense systems and architectures today.

For example, I just returned from a trip to the Middle East, where the United States and Gulf Cooperation Council (or GCC) member states have committed to develop a region-wide ballistic missile defense capability, including through the development of a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. At the recent U.S.-GCC Summit, the United States committed to work with the GCC to conduct a study of a GCC-wide missile defense architecture and offered technical assistance in the development of a GCC-wide Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. Finally, we agreed to hold a senior leader missile defense tabletop exercise to examine improved regional ballistic missile defense cooperation.

In Europe, we continue to make excellent progress implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA), which will serve as the U.S. national contribution to NATO’s missile defense system.

Starting in 2011 with Phase 1, we deployed a missile defense radar in Turkey and began the sustained deployment of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable ships in the Mediterranean. With NATO’s declaration of Interim Capability in 2012, the radar in Turkey transitioned to NATO operational control. Additionally, we have been working with Spain to deploy four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the naval facility at Rota which will allow us to increase our rotational presence in the region and respond to potential crises.

We are on track to complete the deployment of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania as part of Phase 2 of the EPAA later this year. When operational, this site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.

Finally, Phase 3 will involve the construction of an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. President Obama’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget request designates approximately $200 million for the establishment of the site, including construction which will begin next year, allowing us to remain on schedule to complete this site by 2018. The Phase 3 site in Poland, when combined with other EPAA assets, will provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory

In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing missile defense cooperation through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships. I’d highlight that the next generation of Aegis missile defense interceptor, the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA, which we are co-developing with Japan, just completed a successful flight test earlier this month. We also recently deployed a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the United States and Japan.

Finally, over the past twenty years, the United States and NATO offered Russia various proposals for missile defense cooperation. Russia declined to accept our proposals. As you’re aware, Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine led to the suspension of our dialogue on missile defense cooperation. But prior to the suspension, Russia continued to demand that the United States provide “legally binding” guarantees that U.S. missile defenses will not harm or diminish Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. These guarantees would have been based on criteria that would have limited our missile defenses and undermined our ability to protect ourselves, our deployed forces, allies and friends against an evolving and growing ballistic missile threat.

The 2010 BMDR is quite clear on our policy: U.S. missile defenses are neither designed nor directed against Russia’s or China’s strategic nuclear forces. However, by the same token, we have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally-binding or other constraints that would limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners. The United States will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats.

Allow me to conclude by emphasizing that U.S. cooperation on missile defense is not a one size fits all approach. Threats are diverse and so must be our solutions. We tailor our unique sets of capabilities to fit with each regional security environment stretching from Europe to the Asia-Pacific. And as more actors develop sophisticated ballistic missile capabilities, it is incumbent upon us to take the appropriate steps to defend the U.S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. I can personally attest that our diplomatic engagements the last six years have made us, and our allies, better equipped to meet the threats of today, and nimble enough to respond to what threats may lay ahead.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions and our discussion.

FRANK ROSE'S REMARKS ON U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
02/25/2015 05:14 PM EST
A Modern U.S.-Japan Alliance
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
American Center
Tokyo, Japan
February 23, 2015

Introduction

Thank you very much for allowing me to join you today.

My name is Frank Rose, and I am the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance.

I have had the privilege of being welcomed to Japan many times to discuss our nations’ shared interest in and commitment to international peace and security.

Those discussions have focused on several important topics, including nuclear policy and disarmament, extended deterrence, missile defense, and outer space security.

I’m especially pleased to be here this week, as our governments are nearing the end of their work to finalize a review of the guidelines for U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation. This review process aims to make the links underlying the U.S.-Japan Alliance stronger than ever and thus contribute more effectively to regional and global peace and security.

So today, I’d like to offer a few comments on our joint efforts to strengthen our alliance, particularly in the areas of new strategic capabilities like cyber and outer space security.

I will also cover two other critical areas of the modern-day U.S.-Japan Alliance: missile defense and space. After that, I look forward to your questions.

A Modern U.S.-Japan Alliance

The United States-Japan Alliance long has been the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

As you know, at the 2013 “2+2” meeting in Tokyo, Secretary of State Kerry, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel, and their Japanese counterparts announced their decision to review the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation.

The bilateral defense guidelines, which serve as the policy framework that outlines each country’s roles, missions, and capabilities within the Alliance, were last updated in 1997.

The world is much changed since 1997. While longstanding threats to Japan such as North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs remain a concern, emerging threats in areas such as cyber security, space security, and freedom of navigation present new challenges.

U.S. policy affirms that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the U.S. nuclear arsenal will play a role in our extended deterrence commitments to Japan and our other allies. That said, it is important that we recognize the full range of strategic capabilities beyond the nuclear that contribute to effective deterrence—to include space, cyber, and missile defense.

The updated guidelines will provide a framework for Japan to expand its contributions to international peace and security in concert with the United States and like-minded partners during the coming decades. This is important as Japan is an increasingly important participant in international security operations, from counter-piracy to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Ultimately, strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance will allow our countries to more effectively contribute to peace and stability both here in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world.

Missile Defense in the Asia Pacific

In 1998, the DPRK irresponsibly test launched a long range ballistic missile that overflew Japan and dropped a rocket stage very near Japanese territory. The launch was not successful, but it did succeed in being highly provocative and, as a result, the United States and Japan initiated a more concerted effort to monitor, deter, and counter North Korean ballistic missiles.

Since 1998, North Korea has continued to make quantitative and qualitative advances in its ballistic missile force. For example, in 2012 North Korea unveiled what appeared to be a mobile ICBM that potentially could reach the United States.

In response to this growing threat the United States and Japan continue to deepen their cooperation on BMD.

Just this past December, the United States and Japan announced the deployment of the second AN/TPY-2 radar to Kyogamisaki, and we greatly appreciate Japan’s hard work in making the deployment possible despite a challenging timeline.

As many of you are aware, this asset will serve as a critical addition to our regional deterrence and defense architecture, enhancing the protection of both Japan and the U.S. homeland against the threat of ballistic missile attack.

This deployment builds on a deep and broad cooperative relationship that includes a AN/TPY-2 deployed to Shariki, Japan in 2006, cooperation on an advanced interceptor known as the SM-3 Block IIA, and continuing work on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.

We also welcomed the inclusion of missile defense in the interim report on the revision of the defense guidelines, and we hope the final revision will reflect the valuable contribution of BMD to our collective self-defense as well as to regional stability.

These regional missile defenses help to reassure Japan and deter North Korea from seeking to coerce or attack its neighbors. Missile defenses contribute to regional stability because the protection that defenses offer can reduce pressures for a preemptive strike, or a large retaliation to a provocation that can escalate a crisis. We continue to encourage our allies to contribute to their own defense but also to provide capabilities in a multilateral context that can enhance their own security and contribute to stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

There has been a lot of discussion in the press recently about the possible deployment of a Terminal High Attitude Area Defense or THAAD system in the region. Let me be clear, this system is a purely defensive system to defend against short- and medium-range regional ballistic missiles from North Korea. It does not and cannot impact broader strategic stability with Russia and China. Such a system would provide additional defensive capabilities to support our forces on the peninsula. That said, there are no negotiations ongoing between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea to deploy THAAD to the Republic of Korea.

U.S.-Japan Cooperation on Outer Space Security

Finally, as some of you may know, I am in Tokyo this week to lead the U.S.-Japan Space Security Dialogue and attend the Japan Space Forum. So let me conclude my remarks with a few thoughts on U.S.-Japan cooperation on outer space security.

Space cooperation between the United States and Japan has a long history, built on the extensive civil and scientific cooperation among NASA, NOAA, and other U.S. agencies and their Japanese counterparts. Our discussions on these issues have grown into one of the most important relationships we have with our Allies and partners on outer space security issues.

The United States’ rebalance in the Asia-Pacific reflects a recognition that we must broaden and deepen our engagement in the region at all levels including the long-term sustainability, stability, safety, and security of the space environment.

Cooperation on space security is now part of the Common Strategic Objectives of the Alliance, and bilateral cooperation on civil and security space was recognized in the outcomes of summits between President Obama and former Prime Minister Noda in 2012 and again with Prime Minister Abe in 2014.

Recognizing the numerous opportunities for cooperation on space issues, the United States and Japan have held several space security dialogues in the last five years, in addition to ongoing civil space dialogues.

In fact, due to the success and robustness of our space security and civil space dialogues, our governments have also established a Comprehensive Dialogue on Space in order to address the bilateral relationship at a strategic level and to ensure a whole-of-government approach to space matters. We have held two Comprehensive Dialogues to date, with a third meeting to be held later this year in Japan.

Through these dialogues, we not only discuss possible avenues of cooperation and exchange space policies; we also have made tremendous progress in furthering our tangible space security cooperation.

In regards to improving our space situational awareness – specifically, improving our shared ability to rapidly detect, warn of, characterize, and attribute natural and man-made disturbances to space systems – in 2013 the United States signed a Space Situational Awareness (SSA) information sharing agreement with Japan.

Building on the foundation of that agreement, we are also exploring the possibility of establishing “two-way” SSA sharing with Japan. We hope that as our space surveillance capabilities improve, we will be able to notify satellite operators earlier and with greater accuracy of a need to maneuver a satellite in order to prevent collisions in space.

We are also looking at how we can expand cooperation on utilizing space systems for maritime domain awareness. To that end, the United States and Japan held the first “Use of Space for Maritime Domain Awareness” table top exercise last year.

Multilateral Cooperation

We also work closely together to cooperate and to coordinate positions on multilateral space issues. We hold an annual trilateral space security dialogue with Australia and Japan to coordinate our positions on these space security issues.

Our joint efforts to advance the work of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) Working Group on Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTS) continue to make progress.

Perhaps one of the most beneficial transparency and confidence-building measures, or TCBMs, for ensuring sustainability and security in space could be the adoption of an International Code of Conduct to prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust in space. A code would establish guidelines, or rules of the road, to reduce the risks of debris-generating events, including collisions.

The United States is working with the European Union and other spacefaring nations, like Japan, to advance such a Code in the Asia-Pacific region. Both Japan and Australia have also endorsed its development.

Conclusion

In his State of the Union Address, President Obama spoke of the need to modernize our alliances in the Asia Pacific to meet common international challenges.

With the Government of Japan as a strong partner both on the guidelines as well as on a host of strategic issues, we are working together to do just that. Thanks very much, and I look forward to the discussion.

REMARKS BY ROSE GOTTENMOELLER ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
America's Commitment to Ballistic Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
Missile Defense Agency
Bucharest, Romania
November 18, 2014

As Prepared

Thank you, Rob, for that introduction. I am so pleased to be here in Romania and at this important time. We congratulate the people of Romania on their election yesterday. We look forward to working with the President-elect and the government of Romania, as we continue to strengthen our already close relationship. I would especially like to thank our Romanian colleagues for their generosity in agreeing to host this influential conference and especially for all of the support they have provided to the deployment of U.S. missile defense site at Deveselu. Thanks also to all of the people here that came from around the world. It is a true testament to our combined efforts that such a large and prestigious crowd has come to participate in this conference.

I know you have already heard from Admiral Syring, Principal Deputy Under Secretary Brian McKeon and Chargé d’Affaires Thompson about the ballistic missile defense systems the United States is deploying in Europe, here in Romania, and around the world. I am not going to re-tread that ground.

I will reiterate one point you have already heard today: The Obama Administration’s commitment to deploying missile defenses to defend the United States homeland, our Allies and partners never waivers. In Europe, we are on track for Phase 2 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach and we are committed to having Phase 3 in Poland completed in 2018. We are working closely across the board with our Israeli Allies on missile defense. We remain committed to missile defense cooperation among our Gulf Cooperation Council partners. In Asia, we also continue to deploy more and more capable missile defense systems and continue our efforts to enhance cooperation with allies and partners.

We are committed to these deployments in the face of constant criticism, particularly from the Russian Federation.

We often hear the refrain from certain corners that missile defenses are destabilizing. With an emphasis on transparency and confidence-building, we have explained that nothing that we are doing with respect to our missile defense plans will undercut international security. It would not be in our interest to do so, it would be prohibitively expensive and from a technical perspective, it would be extremely difficult. So let me take some time to again outline these points, based on logic, physics and math, to prove that our missile defense deployments are a benefit, not a threat, to global strategic stability.

First, the Cold War mindset about ballistic missile defenses is no longer valid. Limited ballistic missile defense capabilities are not capable of threatening Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and are not a threat to strategic stability.

Ballistic missiles during the Cold War were the tools the United States and the Soviet Union used to maintain the strategic balance between our two countries. Today, ballistic missiles are proliferated around the world and are seen as a common battlefield weapon.

That is why today’s limited missile defenses are essential to ensuring regional strategic stability. That is the one and only reason that the United States is pursuing regional missile defense capabilities.

Missile saber rattling is not particularly effective when there are defenses to protect against those missiles. Missile defense can also prevent a country or group from taking cheap shots of one or two launches that it thinks can be used to compel or deter a government. Instead these countries or groups would need to fire a much larger salvo to overcome missile defenses, thereby raising the stakes of entering into a conflict.

Further, missile defenses create uncertainty about the outcome of attacks, thereby increasing the costs to countries and groups attempting to overcome defenses. By reducing a country’s confidence in the effectiveness of missile attacks, we enhance deterrence and regional stability.

Missile defenses and missile defense cooperation also provides reassurance. Reassurance helps reduce a country’s vulnerability to ballistic missile attacks, as well as reassurance regarding the United States’ commitment to their defense. The last part is particularly important since it demonstrates that the United States will stand by our Alliance commitments, even in the face of growth in the military potential of regional adversaries.

Finally, when confronted with an attack, missile defenses can buy time for other courses of actions, such as diplomacy, to help resolve the crisis. All of you know, whether you are policy-makers or military planners, that time- and lack thereof – is one of the most important factors during a crisis.

These are the factors that drive our deployment efforts. Our efforts are aided by the increasing sophistication and accuracy of our ballistic missile defenses, as well as the experience that U.S. forces, our Allies and our partners have gained from being the targets of missile attacks.

Many of our regional defense deployments, like the Patriot system and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system, are inherently designed for theater use. They are not capable of defending against ICBMs launched at the United States. THAAD, however, is capable of defending against the medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missile that North Korea is deploying.

Yet despite our repeated attempts to convey these demonstrable facts, the Russian Federation continues to maintain that our global deployment of these systems is designed somehow to encircle Russia.

Understanding the universal truth of physics, we have also taken care to demonstrate how the systems we are deploying are located in places that are ideal for addressing regional threats. Based on the irrefutable laws of science, these systems cannot do the things the Russian government says they can. You may have seen the Russia trajectory maps that show how the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor could be used against Russian ICBMs. The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the instant – the very second – of a Russian ICBM launch, we would also launch our interceptor. The argument also assumes that we would have perfect knowledge of where that Russian ICBM is going and where it is going to be located several minutes from launch in order to strike the reentry vehicles.

As Admiral Syring attests and our flight tests clearly show, we cannot begin to consider launching an interceptor until well after a ballistic missile has finished its boost phase, the warheads have separated, and we have had time to develop a firing solution. We need considerable time to gather knowledge about where the missile is going before we can launch our interceptor. As a result, the physics just don’t add up. There is no way a U.S. SM-3 IIA interceptor can chase down Russian reentry vehicles.

At one point, we did explore the feasibility of a faster interceptor that had what we called “early intercept” capabilities, but that still relied on intercepting the reentry vehicles after burnout. Again, this was not a boost phase concept. In fact, there are many unclassified reports that discuss the challenges inherent in doing boost phase intercept.

Beyond our theater, capabilities, our Ground-Based Interceptors (known as GBIs) deployed in Alaska and California do not pose a threat to Russian strategic nuclear forces either. Our GBIs are designed to deal with rudimentary systems deployed in limited numbers and with simple countermeasures. Technologically, GBIs cannot counter Russia’s sophisticated ICBM capabilities and countermeasures.

In addition to our other efforts, we have also outlined the plain and simple numbers to the Russians. Our GBI numbers are nowhere remotely near their strategic offensive arsenal numbers. As of October 1st, Russia declared that under the New START counting rules, they were deploying 1,643 warheads on 528 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy Bombers. Let me say that number again: the Russian Federation currently fields 1,643 deployed nuclear warheads. Currently, the United States has 30 ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska. So, hypothetically if all 30 of those GBIs performed perfectly and took out 30 Russian warheads, 1,613 Russian warheads would still get past our defenses.

We will deploy an additional 14 interceptors in Alaska and should we ever deploy an additional east coast site with 20 additional interceptors, Russia would still have 1,579 warheads that could get through our defenses. And while I am optimistic we will negotiate a future nuclear reduction Treaty after New START, even then, our limited numbers of defensive systems cannot even come close to upsetting the strategic balance.

Reversing this equation, I would note that we are not concerned about the impact to strategic stability of Russia’s deployment of 68 interceptors at the Moscow ABM system. Sixty eight deployed interceptors is 24 more than the United States even has plans to deploy. Further, Russia is very open about declaring that the Moscow ABM system is specifically designed against the United States. And just like the United States, Russia is modernizing its radars and interceptors as part of their system. However, that still hasn’t raised concerns in the United States about strategic stability.

Despite our best efforts, none of these facts has made any difference in our discussions with the Russian Federation. They continue instead to argue the system is designed against them. The bottom line is this: The United States will continue to deploy our missile defense systems around the world to defend against limited regional threats. We will continue to deploy the EPAA as our contribution to NATO missile defense. There should be no doubt about our commitment. Moreover, we will not accept any obligations that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships. There is no reason why we should and no reason we would.

Further, at this time, we have serious concerns about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. We continue to work closely with our NATO partners on addressing the changes to European security brought about by the invasion of Ukraine and are seeking Russia’s return to compliance with the INF Treaty.

While Russia has accused the United States of being in violation of the INF Treaty, we are in complete compliance with the INF Treaty. We can describe, in detail, why each of our systems complies with the Treaty. One thing that the United States and Russia have agreed on is that this important Treaty remains in our mutual security interests. May it remain so. In the meantime, we will continue to make our case to the world about the important of limited missile defenses and continue our essential efforts to cooperatively deploy systems around the world.

Thank you for your support with these efforts and thank you again for the opportunity to speak here today.

FRANK ROSE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND MISSILE DEFENSE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
International Security and Missile Defense
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
University of Warsaw
Warsaw, Poland
November 19, 2014

Thank you for that kind introduction, and thanks for having me here today.

At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense issues, including missile defense policy. In this capacity, I served as the lead U.S. negotiator for the missile defense bases in Romania, Turkey, and Poland.

So I’m pleased to be here today to discuss international security and missile defense. In my remarks, I would like to discuss three key issues:

First, the United States’ commitment to ballistic missile defense (BMD) and the Fiscal Year 2015 missile defense budget request;

Second, the significant progress that has been made in implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) over the past year; and;

Third, cooperation on missile defense with allies and partners outside of Europe.

2015 Budget

The United States and NATO are committed to establishing ever more capable missile defenses to address the ballistic missile threat to Europe.

As U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel noted in March 2013, the U.S. commitment to NATO missile defense and the sites in Romania and Poland remains “ironclad.”

On March 4, 2014, President Obama released his Fiscal Year 2015 budget submission that aligns defense program priorities and resources with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Let me highlight a couple of key issues that you may find of interest:

Overall, the budget request provides $8.5 billion for missile defense, including $7.5 billion for the Missile Defense Agency.

With regard to U.S. homeland defense provides funding to increase the number of long-range missile defense interceptors deployed in Alaska and California 30 to 44 by 2017.

It also funds a number of other programs to enhance the long-range system such as a new kill vehicle and new long-range discrimination radar.

With regard to regional missile defense, the budget continues funding to complete work on the missile defense base at Devesulu in Romania and provides additional funding ($225.7 million) for the missile defense base in Poland.

The request also includes $435.4 million for the procurement of SM-3 Block IB interceptors and $263.9 for continued development of the longer-range SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.

The fact that the United States continues to devote such significant resources to the missile defense program is a clear signal of the importance the U.S. places on the program, including the sites in Romania and Poland.

European Phased Adaptive Approach
Let me now take a few moments to discuss where we are with regard to implementation of the President’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense.

In 2009, the President announced that the EPAA would “provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies,” while relying on “capabilities that are proven and cost-effective.”

Since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision. As you know, we have made great progress.

EPAA Phase 1 gained its first operational elements in 2011 with the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis BMD-capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean and the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey.

With the declaration of Interim BMD Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, this radar transitioned to NATO operational control.

Demonstrating its commitment to NATO collective defense, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota as a Spanish contribution to NATO missile defense.

In February 2014, the first of four missile defense-capable Aegis ships, the USS DONALD COOK, arrived in Rota, Spain. Over the next 18 months, three more of these multi-mission ships will deploy to Rota.

These multi-mission ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, bilateral and multilateral training exercises, and support U.S. and NATO operations, including NATO missile defense.

Stationing these naval assets in Spain places them in a position to maximize their operational flexibility for missions in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

With regard to Phase 2, as you know, we have an agreement with Romania, ratified in December of 2011, to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 interceptor site beginning in the 2015 timeframe.

We greatly appreciate Romania’s active role in preparing for the construction of the missile defense facility at the Romanian Deveselu Military Base.

The Romanian prompt whole-of-government support for the timely completion of the implementing arrangements and Romania’s provision of security and its infrastructure efforts have been superb.

In October 2013, I had the honor of attending the ground-breaking ceremony at Deveselu Air Base to commemorate the start of the construction at the site.

And just over a month ago in early October, the U.S. Navy held a historic naval support facility establishment ceremony at the MD facility on Romania’s Deveselu Base. This ceremony established the naval facility and installed its first U.S. commander. We view this as the first step in transitioning the facility from a construction site to the site of operations sometime next year.

When operational, this site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.

I also had the opportunity last year to visit the Lockheed-Martin facility in Moorestown, New Jersey, where they build the Aegis Ashore deck house and components destined for Romania.

We remain on schedule for deploying the system to Romania, with the site becoming operational in 2015.

And finally there is Phase 3.

This phase includes an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, per the Ballistic Missile Defense agreement between the United States and Poland that entered into force in September 2011.

This site is on schedule for deployment in the 2018 time frame. The interceptor site in Poland is key to the EPAA: When combined with other EPAA assets, Phase 3 will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory in the 2018 time frame.

So, as you can see, we are continuing to implement the President’s vision for stronger, smarter and swifter missile defenses.

NATO Cooperation

At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed that the Alliance would develop a missile defense capability to protect Alliance territory, populations, and forces from ballistic missile attack.

At the Chicago and Wales Summits, Allied Heads of State and Government noted the potential opportunities for using synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment.

We need to take full advantage of this opportunity, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, within or outside of NATO.

There are several approaches Allies can take to make important and valuable contributions to NATO BMD.

First, Allies can acquire fully capable BMD systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control capabilities.

Second, Allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key BMD capability.

Finally, Allies can contribute to NATO’s BMD capability by providing essential basing support, such as Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have agreed to do.

In all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is NATO interoperability.

Yes, acquiring a BMD capability is, of course, good in and of itself.

But if the capability is not interoperable with the Alliance then its value as a contribution to Alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished.

It is only through interoperability that the Alliance can gain the synergistic effects from BMD cooperation that enhance the effectiveness of NATO BMD through shared battle-space awareness and reduced interceptor wastage.

Missile Defense Developments in Other Regions

The United States, in consultation with our allies and partners, is continuing to bolster missile defenses in other key regions, such as the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, in order to strengthen regional deterrence architectures.

As with Europe, we are tailoring our approaches to the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific so that they reflect the unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region.

In the Middle East, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through venues such as the recently established U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum.

At the September 26, 2013, Strategic Cooperation Forum (SCF), Secretary Kerry and his Foreign Ministry counterparts reaffirmed their intent, first stated at the September 28, 2012, SCF, to “work toward enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense.”

Speaking on December 7, 2013, at the Manama Dialogue, Secretary Hagel announced several initiatives, one of which was that the “DoD will work with the GCC on better integration of GCC members’ missile defense capabilities.”

Several of our partners in the region have expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the UAE has contracted to buy two THAAD batteries that, when operational, will enhance the UAE’s security as well as regional stability.

The UAE also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets. We look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperability with our GCC partners in the years ahead.

Additionally and separately, we are continuing our long-standing and robust cooperation with Israel on missile defense on key systems such as Arrow 3, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome.

In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing to cooperate through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships.

For example, the United States and Japan already are working closely together to develop an advanced interceptor known as the SM-3 Block IIA and deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, while continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.

As a result of U.S.-Australia Foreign and Defense ministerial consultations this year, the United States and Australia are establishing a bilateral BMD Working Group to examine options for potential Australian contributions to BMD in the Asia-Pacific region.

Additionally, we are also continuing to consult closely with the Republic of Korea (ROK) as it develops the Korean Air and Missile Defense system, which is designed to defend the ROK against air and missile threats from North Korea.

No Constraints

Let me say a few things about missile defense and Russia.

With regard to where things stand today regarding our discussions on missile defense, Russia’s intervention into the crisis in Ukraine, in violation of international law, has led to the suspension of our military-to-military dialogue, and we are not currently engaging Russia on the topic of missile defense.

Prior to the suspension of our dialogue, Russia continued to demand that the United States provide it “legally binding” guarantees that our missile defense will not harm/diminish its strategic nuclear deterrent.

We have made clear to the Russians that EPAA is not directed toward Russia and that we cannot and will not accept legally-binding constraints that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.

As Secretary Hagel’s March 2013 BMD announcement makes clear, the United States must have the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats, without obligations that limit our BMD capabilities.
Conclusion

Let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense over the past several years.

Implementation of the EPAA and NATO missile defense is going well. For example, we broke ground on the missile defense site at Devesulu last October and are on schedule for the base to become operational in 2015.

Additionally, Congress has continued to provide sufficient funding for the missile defense program, even in these challenging times.

The United States looks forward to continuing to work with our allies and friends around to world – and especially Poland – to improve our collective security.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

JAPAN LOOKS TO REINTERPRET COUNTRY'S MILITARY ROLE

FROM:  U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 

Hagel, Onodera Discuss Reinterpretation of Japan’s Constitution

DOD

By Jim Garamone

DoD News, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, July 11, 2014 – Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has held his first meeting with his Japanese counterpart since the government in Tokyo announced it would reinterpret the country’s pacifist constitution to allow Japan to take on greater military responsibilities beyond self-defense.

Hagel met at the Pentagon today with Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera and in a joint press conference afterward said the United States strongly supports the move, calling the decision by Japan’s government bold and historic. If approved by parliament, Hagel said the change would enable the U.S. ally “to significantly increase its contribution to regional and global security and expand its role on the world stage.”

The United States and Japan will work together now to revise U.S.-Japan defense guidelines. “Today, we confirm that these new guidelines should be in place by the end of this year,” Hagel said. The revisions will allow Japan to participate more fully in such areas as ballistic missile defense, counterproliferation, counterpiracy, peacekeeping, and a wide range of military exercises.

The two countries also will be able to work more closely together on maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and other areas, Hagel said. “We can raise our alliance to a new level, and we intend to do that,” he said.
The two said they discussed what the United States and Japan will do to modernize the alliance to ensure it is prepared to address emerging threats and challenges. Onodera said he and Hagel also discussed security in the broader Asia Pacific region.

Hagel reiterated the longstanding U.S. position on a territorial dispute that the Senkaku Islands, also claimed by China, are under Japan’s administrative control and fall under the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty.

“The United States opposes any attempts by any country to change the status quo through destabilizing unilateral actions, and we oppose any effort to restrict overflight or freedom of navigation,” Hagel said. China declared an air defense zone over the islands last year.

Both defense leaders stressed the importance of good relations with China.

FRANK ROSE'S REMARKS ON MISSILE DEFENSE IN MAINZ, GERMANY

FROM:   U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Implementing Missile Defense in a Global Context

Remarks

Frank A. Rose

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

3AF Missile Defense Conference

Mainz, Germany

June 17, 2014

---

Thank you for that kind introduction. It’s great to be back in Germany and I am particularly honored to address the 3AF Missile Defense Conference again this year.
In my remarks this morning, I would like to discuss three key issues:

• First, the Obama Administration’s commitment to ballistic missile defense (BMD) and the Fiscal Year 2015 missile defense budget request;
• Second, the significant progress the United States and our NATO partners are making in implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA); and;
• Third, cooperation on missile defense with allies and partners outside of Europe.

The U.S. Missile Defense Budget
It is no secret that governments around the world, including the United States, are working very hard to do more with less. This, of course, includes our investments in our national security. Despite these challenges, you will see—and the proof is in the numbers—that the United States is continuing to ensure that our missile defense priorities are funded, on track and on budget.

In March of this year, President Obama released his Fiscal Year 2015 budget submission that aligns defense program priorities and resources with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). I would like to highlight for you a few of the missile defense aspects of the President’s request.

Overall, the budget request provides $8.5 billion for our missile defense programs, including $7.5 billion for the Missile Defense Agency. With regard to U.S. homeland defense, the budget request provides funding to increase the number of long-range missile defense interceptors deployed in Alaska and California from 30 to 44 by 2017. The request also funds a number of other programs to enhance the long-range BMD system such as a new kill vehicle and a new long-range discrimination radar. With regard to regional missile defense, the budget continues to provide adequate funding to complete work on the missile defense base at Devesulu, Romania and provides additional funding of $225.7 million for the missile defense base at Slupsk in Poland. The request also includes $435.4 million for the procurement of SM-3 Block IB interceptors and $263.9 for continued development of the longer-range SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.

As you can see from these numbers, the United States continues to devote significant resources to our missile defense programs. These programs are an important part of ensuring the national security of the United States, as well as our allies and partners. With regard to the EPAA, this budget request clearly signals the importance the U.S. places on the program. We believe that the resources we are allocating to our missile defense programs demonstrate our commitment to establish ever more capable missile defenses, both in Europe and other regions, to address growing ballistic missile threats. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel noted in March 2013, the U.S. commitment to NATO missile defense and to the sites in Romania and Poland remains “ironclad.”

European Phased Adaptive Approach
Moving on, I would like to take a few moments to discuss the implementation of the President’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense. In 2009, when the President announced the EPAA, he noted that the EPAA will “provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies,” while relying on “capabilities that are proven and cost-effective.” And since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision—and we have made great progress in doing so. Earlier this month, President Obama noted in Poland that we are “on track” with the EPAA.

Phase 1 of the EPAA gained its first operational elements in 2011 with the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis BMD-capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean and the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey. With the declaration of Interim BMD Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, this radar transitioned to NATO operational control. As part of Phase 1, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota as a Spanish contribution to NATO missile defense, demonstrating its commitment to NATO’s collective defense. In February 2014, the first of four of these ships, USS Donald Cook, arrived in Rota. The next ship, USS Ross, is on its way now. The remaining two will deploy to Rota next year. In addition to their roles in NATO BMD, these ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, bi-lateral and multi-lateral training exercises, and they will support U.S. and NATO operations. By stationing these naval assets in Spain, we are placing them in a position to maximize their operational flexibility for missions in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

With regard to Phase 2, we have an agreement in force with Romania to host a U.S. Aegis Ashore site beginning in 2015. Last October, I had the honor of attending the ground-breaking ceremony at Deveselu Air Base to commemorate the start of construction for this site. When this site is operational, and combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, NATO will gain enhanced coverage from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. I also had the opportunity last year to visit the Lockheed-Martin facility in Moorestown, New Jersey where they built the Aegis Ashore deck house and components destined for Romania. The deck house has been disassembled and is currently in transit to Romania.

In furtherance of Phase 2, on May 21, the United States successfully conducted the first flight test involving components of the Aegis Ashore system, including the SM-3 IB interceptor. During the test, a simulated ballistic missile target was acquired, tracked, and engaged by the Aegis Weapon System. A live target missile launch was not planned for this flight test.
Before moving on to Phase 3, I would like to stress that we remain on schedule for deploying the system to Romania, with the site becoming operational in 2015.

And finally there is Phase 3. Phase 3 includes an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, per the Ballistic Missile Defense agreement between the United States and Poland which entered into force in September 2011. This site is on schedule to be operational in 2018. The interceptor site in Poland is key to the EPAA. When combined with other EPAA assets, Phase 3, which begins in the 2018 timeframe, will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory. So, as you can see; we are continuing to successfully implement the President’s vision for stronger, smarter and swifter missile defenses going forward.

NATO Cooperation
In addition to the support and burden sharing as part of the EPAA undertaken by Spain, Turkey, Poland and Romania, NATO Heads of State and Government noted at the Chicago Summit that there were potential opportunities for using synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment of NATO missile defense.
In our view, with this in mind, there are three approaches Allies can take to make valuable contributions to NATO BMD.

• First, Allies can acquire fully capable BMD systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control capabilities.
• Second, Allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key BMD capability.
• Third, Allies can contribute to NATO’s defense by providing air defense capability for U.S. BMD ships underway on a NATO mission.

In all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is NATO interoperability. While acquiring a BMD capability is, of course, good in and of itself, without interoperability, its value as a contribution to Alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished. It is only through interoperability that the Alliance can gain the synergistic effects from BMD cooperation that enhance the effectiveness of NATO BMD, as well as the security of all NATO members through shared battle-space awareness and reduced interceptor wastage. Given the budget challenges many allies face today, this becomes even more imperative. Looking ahead, we are hopeful that missile defense will be a key deliverable at the Alliance’s Summit later this year in Wales.

Missile Defense Developments in Other Regions
Outside the NATO context, the United States is continuing to increase and deepen its cooperation with partners and allies around the world to protect people, forces, and assets from the growing ballistic missile threats that we face. As in Europe, we are tailoring our approaches to the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific so that they reflect the unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region.

In the Middle East, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through venues such as the recently established U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum. At the September 26, 2013, Strategic Cooperation Forum (SCF), Secretary Kerry and his Foreign Ministry counterparts reaffirmed their intent, first stated at the September 28, 2012 SCF, to “work towards enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense.”

As you know, this is a time of profound change in that region and we are acutely aware of the daily threats and anxieties felt throughout the Gulf. Security cooperation has long stood at the core of the U.S.-Gulf partnership. The United States is not only committed to enhancing U.S.-GCC missile defense cooperation – we see it as a strategic imperative.

As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a key objective of U.S. strategy is to expand international efforts and cooperation on ballistic missile defense. BMD cooperation contributes to regional stability by deterring regional actors, principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of their ballistic missiles, and assuring allies and partners of U.S. defense commitments while enhancing their ability to defend against these threats.
Less than two months ago I travelled to the Gulf to work toward enhanced U.S.—GCC coordination on ballistic missile defense. The message I delivered in the region was clear: the United States remains firmly committed to developing and deploying advanced missile defense capabilities around the world to protect our homeland, our deployed forces, as well as our friends and allies.

Several of our partners in the region have already expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the UAE has contracted to buy two THAAD batteries that, when operational, will enhance the UAE’s security as well as regional stability. The UAE also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets. We look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperability with our GCC partners in the years ahead.

Additionally and separately, we are continuing our long-standing and robust cooperation with Israel on missile defense on key systems such as Arrow 3, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome.

In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing to cooperate through our bilateral alliances. For example, the United States and Japan already are working closely to develop jointly an advanced interceptor known as the SM-3 Block IIA along with deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, while continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces. With the Republic of Korea, we are continuing to consult closely as it develops the Korean Air and Missile Defense system, which is designed to defend the ROK against air and missile threats from North Korea.

No Constraints
Before I conclude, let me speak about missile defense and Russia. Russia continues to demand that the United States provide it with “legally-binding” guarantees that our missile defenses will not negatively impact its strategic nuclear deterrent. What the Russians really mean is that they want legally-binding limitations or constraints on U.S. missile defenses—defenses we and our partners and allies believe must be flexible and unconstrained in order to adequately protect ourselves from emerging ballistic missile threats. Such “legally binding guarantees” would create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional ballistic missile threats such as those we see evolving in the Middle East and North Korea. We have repeatedly made clear to the Russian government that the United States cannot and will not accept any obligations that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships.

As far as where things stand today regarding our discussions with Russia on missile defense, Russia’s intervention into the crisis in Ukraine, in violation of international law, has led to the suspension of our military-to-military dialogue and we are not currently engaging Russia on the topic of missile defense.

Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense over the past several years.

Thanks to the important work of our NATO Allies, implementation of the EPAA and NATO missile defense is going well. We are continuing to engage productively with our partners and allies in the Middle East and East Asia. And, as I noted earlier, Congress has continued to provide sufficient funding for missile defense programs, even in these times of tight budgets.
For our part, we look forward to continuing these successes and working with our allies and friends around the world to deepen our cooperation, both diplomatic and military, in pursuit of ensuring that missile defense remains a key part of deterring and defending against ballistic missile threats.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

DEFENSE SECRETARY HAGEL PROMOTES EXPANDED COOPERATION WITH GULF STATES

FROM:  U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 

Hagel Urges Expanded Cooperation in Gulf Region

By Claudette Roulo

American Forces Press Service

JEDDAH, Saudi Arabia, May 14, 2014 – The importance of expanded cooperation in the Gulf region was the theme of Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s remarks here today at the Gulf Cooperation Council defense ministerial conference.

Defense ministers from all six member nations -- Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates -- joined Hagel at the meeting, which was hosted by Saudi Arabia.

Noting that this is his third trip to the Gulf in a little over a year, Hagel said the visits all have been aimed at encouraging greater collaboration in the region.
“I hope [this meeting] becomes an annual security consultation, and the backbone for renewed cooperation among all the nations of the GCC,” he said. And despite setbacks and challenges, he added, the Gulf Cooperation Council has fostered a common identity and common interests in the region.

“And it has helped protect your common security,” Hagel noted.

The United States is determined to support the Gulf countries as they continue to develop their roles on the world stage, the defense secretary said.

“This has been demonstrated by the United States Central Command’s continued forward military presence, which includes 35,000 personnel; our Navy’s 5th Fleet; our most advanced fighter aircraft; our most sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; and a wide array of missile defense capabilities,” he said. “It has also been demonstrated by recent defense sales agreements, including some of the largest in American history.”

But bilateral ties with the United States and American military presence are not enough to guarantee regional security, the defense secretary told the council’s defense leaders. “As I said at the Manama Dialogue last December, America’s engagement with Gulf nations is intended to and facilitate, not replace, stronger multilateral ties within the GCC.”

The most pressing security challenges threaten the whole region and demand a collective response, the defense secretary said. By strengthening the GCC, he added, the member nations will ensure their collective defense is more than the sum of its parts.

“You will strengthen your ability to prevent and deter aggression,” the defense secretary told the ministers. “You will strengthen, not weaken, each of your nations’ sovereignty. And you will expand your common interests –- not just in defense, but in a more stable and prosperous future.”
This approach is also how the region must address threats posed by Iran, he said.
Today also marks the start of discussions in Vienna between Iran and P5-plus-1 member nations regarding Iran’s nuclear program, Hagel noted. “We got to Vienna thanks to our collective efforts to isolate Iran diplomatically and economically, and to deter it militarily,” the defense secretary said.

As negotiations in Vienna progress, he said, two things should be clear.

“First, these negotiations will under no circumstances trade away regional security for concessions on Iran’s nuclear program,” Hagel said. U.S. commitment to Gulf security and stability is unwavering, he added.

“Second, while our strong preference is for a diplomatic solution, the United States will remain postured and prepared to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon -- and that Iran abides by the terms of any potential agreement,” the defense secretary said.

“No one nation can address these threats alone,” Hagel said. “Our efforts must be coordinated and complementary.”

Hagel made proposals today in several areas, each focused on this coordinated approach -- including integrated missile defense, maritime security and cybersecurity:

-- He proposed designating the Gulf Coordination Council’s Air and Air Defense Chiefs Conference as the GCC’s primary military forum for regional air and missile defense policy.

-- He called on the GCC to assume and maintain command of the Combined Maritime Force’s Gulf operations, Combined Task Force 152, and to commit to a regular heads-of-navy conference.

-- He proposed the establishment of a U.S.-GCC cyber defense cooperation initiative to jump-start collaboration.

-- He suggested that the GCC develop a Foreign Military Sales case, which could “advance regional defense priorities by accelerating the GCC’s progress toward greater interoperability and more sophisticated multinational force development.”
In addition, proposals to expand joint exercises and activities were part of a discussion led by Army Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, commander of U.S. Central Command.

“At the conclusion of our dialogue,” Hagel said, “we should publicly declare our shared resolve, our shared goals, and our shared vision for stronger U.S.-GCC multilateral defense coordination. We must demonstrate our unity at a critical time. And we must send a message of strength to adversaries.”

RECENT U.S MISSILE DEFENSE TEST

FROM:  U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 
Successful Missile Defense Test Against Multiple Targets

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Operational Test Agency, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and U.S. Pacific Command, in conjunction with U.S. Army soldiers from the Alpha Battery, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment, U.S. Navy sailors aboard the guided missile destroyer USS Decatur (DDG-73), and U.S. Air Force airmen from the 613th Air and Operations Center successfully conducted a complex missile defense flight test, resulting in the intercept of two medium-range ballistic missile targets. The flight test was planned more than a year ago, and is not in any way connected to events in the Middle East.



The test was conducted in the vicinity of the U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test Site and surrounding areas in the western Pacific. The test stressed the ability of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) weapon systems to function in a layered defense architecture and defeat a raid of two nearly simultaneously launched ballistic missile targets.



The two medium-range ballistic missile targets were launched on operationally realistic trajectories towards a defended area near Kwajalein. Along with overhead space assets providing launch alerts, an Army-Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control (AN/TPY-2) radar in Forward Based Mode detected the targets and relayed track information to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) system for further transmission to defending BMDS assets.



The USS Decatur with its Aegis Weapon System detected and tracked the first target with its onboard AN/SPY-1 radar. The Aegis BMD weapon system developed a fire control solution, launched a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA missile, and successfully intercepted the target.



In a demonstration of BMDS layered defense capabilities, a second AN/TPY-2 radar in Terminal Mode, located with the THAAD weapon system, acquired and tracked the target missiles. THAAD developed a fire control solution, launched a THAAD interceptor missile, and successfully intercepted the second medium-range ballistic missile target. THAAD was operated by soldiers from the Alpha Battery, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment. As a planned demonstration of THAAD's layered defense capabilities, a second THAAD interceptor was launched at the target destroyed by Aegis as a contingency in the event the SM-3 did not achieve an intercept.



Initial indications are that all components performed as designed. MDA officials will extensively assess and evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during the test.



The event, a designated Flight Test Operational-01 (FTO-01), demonstrated integrated, layered, regional missile defense capabilities to defeat a raid of two threat-representative medium-range ballistic missiles in a combined live-fire operational test. Soldiers, sailors, and airmen from multiple combatant commands operated the systems, and were provided a unique opportunity to refine operational doctrine and tactics while increasing confidence in the execution of integrated air and missile defense plans.



U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System programs have completed 62 successful hit-to-kill intercepts in 78 flight test attempts since 2001.

SUCCESSFUL MISSILE INTERCEPT TEST COMPLETED OVER PACIFIC

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Missile Defense System Completes Successful Intercept Test
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, May 16, 2013 – The Missile Defense Agency and Navy sailors aboard the USS Lake Erie conducted a successful flight test of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system yesterday, Pentagon officials reported.

In the test, the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 4.0 weapon system and a Standard Missile 3 Block IB missile intercepted a separating ballistic missile target over the Pacific Ocean.

A separating short-range ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai, Hawaii, and flew northwest toward a broad ocean area. The USS Lake Erie detected and tracked the missile with its onboard AN/SPY-1 radar. The ship, equipped with the second-generation Aegis BMD weapon system, developed a fire control solution and launched the SM-3 Block IB missile.

The SM-3 maneuvered to a point in space based on guidance from Aegis BMD weapon system and released its kinetic warhead. The warhead acquired the target re-entry vehicle, diverted into its path, and, using only the force of a direct impact, engaged and destroyed the target.

Initial indications are that all components performed as designed, officials said, and program officials will assess and evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during the test.

Last night's event, designated Flight Test Maritime 19, was the third consecutive successful intercept test of the Aegis BMD 4.0 weapon system and the SM-3 Block IB guided missile, and the 25th successful intercept in 31 flight test attempts for the Aegis BMD program since flight testing began in 2002.

Across all Ballistic Missile Defense System programs, this is the 59th successful hit-to-kill intercept in 74 flight tests since 2001, officials said.

Aegis BMD is the naval component of the Missile Defense Agency's Ballistic Missile Defense System. The MDA and the Navy cooperatively manage the Aegis BMD program.

U.S. AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND ANNOUNCES SECOND SPACE-BASED INFRARED SYSTEM LAUNCHES

Photo:  Atlas V Launch.  Credit:  NASA/Wikimedia 

FROM: U.S. AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

SBIRS GEO-2 launches, improves space-based capabilities
3/27/2013 - BUCKLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Colo. -- In support of the Buckley missile warning and awareness mission, the second Space-Based Infrared System geosynchronous earth orbit launched into space March 19 from Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Fla.

The satellite, called GEO-2, provides more advanced space-based capabilities than Defense Support Program satellites, which are being replaced by the GEO satellites after more than four decades in operation.

"While DSP has been the workhorse for missile warning and missile defense for the last 40-plus years, SBIRS GEO takes us into the next generation with a revolutionary increase in detection capability," said Col. DeAnna Burt, 460th Operations Group commander. "The successful launch of GEO-2 continues to bring greater detection capability to the Overhead Persistent Infrared enterprise. GEO-2 will allow the 460th to provide near real time, high fidelity OPIR data to warfighters around the world."

The capabilities of the GEO-2 involve a new era of overhead infrared surveillance that will deliver unprecedented global, persistent and actionable infrared surveillance. Such resources enable the U.S. and its allies to continuously maintain global situational awareness.

SBIRS persistent surveillance capabilities enable detection and reporting of missile launches around the globe, support the nation's ballistic missile defense system, expand technical intelligence, and gather and bolster situational awareness for warfighters on the battlefield.

The GEO-2 was carried by a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket. The launch team consisted of military, government civilians and contractors from the 45th Space Wing, Patrick Air Force Base, Fla.

"The successful launch of GEO-2 is a testament to the partnership between industry, the SBIRS Space Program Office and the 460th Space Wing," Burt said.

The U.S. Air Force Infrared Space Systems Directorate at the Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles Air Force Base, Calif., leads the SBIRS development and acquisition. Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, Sunnyvale, Calif., is the SBIRS prime contractor; Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems, Azusa, Calif., is the payload integrator; and the 14th Air Force operates the SBIRS system.

GENERAL STAVRIDIS WANTS MORE NATO DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA

Stavridis Presses for More NATO-Russia Dialogue
By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, March 25, 2013 - Noting increased cooperation between NATO and Russia in several key areas, the top NATO and U.S. European Command commander emphasized today the importance of working through stumbling blocks in what he called a "complicated partnership."

In a blog post, Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis cited concerted efforts by both parties since NATO's 2010 summit in Lisbon, Portugal, where the alliance's 28 heads of state and government agreed on the need to pursue "a true strategic partnership" between NATO and Russia and noted in the strategic concept that they expect reciprocity from Russia.

Stavridis recognized several areas where increased cooperation has shown signs of paying off: counterpiracy; support for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, military exchanges and training exercises, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, among them.

"Overall, we enjoy cooperation and some level of partnership in a variety of important areas," he said. "On the other hand, there are clearly challenges in the relationship."

Stavridis noted Russia's objections to the European phased adaptive approach for missile defense. "Russia sees the NATO missile defense system as posing a threat to their strategic intercontinental ballistic missile force," he said. "We strongly disagree, and feel that the system is clearly designed to protect populations against Iran, Syria and other ballistic-missile-capable nations that threaten the European continent."

NATO and Russia also disagree over Russian forces stationed in Georgia and NATO's role in Libya, Stavridis said.

"We maintain that we operated under the U.N. Security Council mandate to establish a no-fly zone, provide an arms embargo and protect the people of Libya from attacks," he said, calling NATO's actions "well within the bounds of the [U.N.] mandate and the norms of international law.

"Russia sees this differently," Stavridis continued, "and whenever I discuss this with Russian interlocutors, we find little room for agreement. This tends to create a differing set of views about the dangerous situation in Syria as well."

Stavridis noted Russian Ambassador to NATO Alexander Grushko's stated concerns that these differences -- and the installation of NATO military infrastructure closer to Russia's borders -- threaten to unravel progress made in their relations.

"Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined," Stavridis said, quoting the NATO strategic concept agreed to in Lisbon. "A strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security," it states.

Stavridis recognized areas in which the growing NATO-Russian relationship is bearing fruit:

-- Counterpiracy: Loosely coordinated efforts by NATO and Russian ships have reduced piracy by 70 percent over the past year and caused the number of ships and mariners held hostage to plummet in what the admiral called "a very effective operation."

-- Afghanistan support: Russia contributed small arms and ammunition to the Afghan security forces and sold MI-17 helicopters and maintenance training to the Afghan air force. In addition, Russia provides logistical support, including a transit arrangement that helps to sustain NATO-led ISAF forces and redeployment efforts.

-- Military exchanges and exercises: Russian service members are participating in more of these engagements with the United States and NATO. These exchanges, including port calls in Russia, have been well-received by both militaries, Stavridis noted.

-- Arctic cooperation: Russia is collaborating with other members of the Arctic Council, including the United States, Norway, Denmark, Canada and Iceland, to ensure the Arctic remains a zone of cooperation.

-- Counterterrorism: In the lead-up to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, NATO is offering assistance and information-sharing via a variety of channels, Stavridis reported.

-- Counternarcotics: NATO and Russia are working together to stem the flow of heroin from Afghanistan, a high priority for Russia.

Expressing hopes that NATO and Russia can continue to build on this cooperation, Stavridis said areas of tensions and disagreements need to be addressed.

"No one wants to stumble backwards toward the Cold War, so the best course for the future is open discussion, frank airing of disagreements, and hopefully seeking to build the 'true strategic partnership' set out in the NATO strategic concept," he said. "Clearly, we have some work to do."

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL REMARKS ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Photo:  Missile Launch.  Credit:  U.S. DOD.
FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Missile Defense and European Security
Remarks Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance8th International Conference on Missile Defence
Paris, France
July 3, 2012
Thank you so much for inviting me to speak today. This venue provides an opportunity for constructive dialogue on missile defense, and in this context, I will share an update on the U.S. approach to missile defense. At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense policy issues, including missile defense. In that capacity, it was my responsibility to negotiate the details of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) agreements with Poland, Romania, and Turkey that will enable the United States to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach, the U.S. contribution to NATO missile defense. I will touch more on this later in my presentation, but suffice to say that I have been focused over the last couple of years on ensuring that we are able to meet the vision President Obama laid out in his 2009 announcement regarding the European Phased Adaptive Approach.

Missile Defense Policy
Today, there is a growing threat from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to our deployed forces, allies, and partners. This threat is likely to increase in both quantitative and qualitative terms in the coming years, as some states are increasing their inventories, and making their ballistic missiles more accurate, reliable, and survivable.

Recognizing the seriousness of the ballistic missile threat, the United States seeks to create an environment, based on strong cooperation with allies and partners, which will diminish an adversary’s confidence in the effectiveness of ballistic missile attacks. This will devalue ballistic missiles and provide a disincentive for their development, acquisition, deployment, and use. To that end, President Obama has made international cooperation on missile defense a key priority, and we are pursuing a region-by-region approach based on the following three principles:

1) First, the United States will strengthen regional deterrence architectures built upon solid cooperative relationships with an eye toward efficiently incorporating assets and structures that our partners already have today or are seeking.

2) Second, the United States is pursuing phased adaptive approaches (PAAs) to missile defense within key regions that are tailored to their unique deterrence requirements and threats, including the scale, scope, and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. Specifically, we will phase in the best available technology to meet existing and evolving threats, and adapt to situations that evolve in the future.

3) Third, recognizing that our supply of missile defense assets cannot meet the global demand we face, the United States is developing mobile capabilities that can be relocated to adapt to a changing threat and provide surge defense capabilities where they are most needed.

Missile defense plays an important role in the broader U.S. international security strategy, supporting both deterrence and diplomacy. Missile defense assures our allies and partners that the United States has the will and the means to deter and, if necessary, defeat a limited ballistic missile attack against the U.S. homeland and regional ballistic missile attacks against our deployed forces, allies, and partners.

NATO and European Missile Defense
Today I will focus on our work in Europe, which continues to receive a great deal of attention. In order to augment the defense of the United States against a future long-range threat and provide more comprehensive and more rapid protection to our deployed forces and European Allies against the current short- and medium- range threat, President Obama outlined a four-phase approach for European missile defense called the European Phased Adaptive Approach or EPAA. Through the EPAA, the United States will deploy increasingly capable BMD assets to defend Europe against a ballistic missile threat from the Middle East that is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The EPAA is designed to protect our deployed forces and Allies in Europe, as well as improve protection of the U.S. homeland against potential ICBMs from the Middle East. As part of Phase 1, we have deployed to Turkey a missile defense radar, referred to as the AN/TPY-2 radar in support of NATO’s common missile defense efforts. Also, as part of Phase 1, the United States deployed a BMD-capable Aegis ship to the Mediterranean Sea in March of 2011, and has maintained a BMD-capable ship presence in the region ever since.

Slightly more than a year ago, we reached an agreement with Romania to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 BMD interceptor site, designed to extend missile defense protection to a greater portion of Europe. The land-based SM-3 system to be deployed to Romania is anticipated to become operational in the 2015 timeframe. We also reached an agreement with Poland to place a similar U.S. BMD interceptor site there in the 2018 timeframe, which will extend missile defense protection to all of NATO Europe. Spain has also agreed to host four U.S. Aegis destroyers at the existing naval facility at Rota. These multi-mission ships will support the EPAA as well as other EUCOM and NATO maritime missions.

The Obama Administration is implementing the EPAA within the NATO context. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government approved a new Strategic Concept and took the historic decision to develop the capability to defend NATO European populations and territory against the increasing threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation. The Allies also welcomed the EPAA as a U.S. national contribution to the new NATO territorial missile defense capability, in support of our commitment to the collective defense of the Alliance under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

At the Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government also decided to expand the scope of the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program to serve as the command, control, and communications network to support this new capability. NATO allies have committed to investing over $1 billion for command, control, and communications infrastructure to support NATO missile defense. NATO’s plan for missile defense is based on the principle that individual Allies will make voluntary national contributions of the sensors and interceptor systems, BMD capabilities that will be integrated into the NATO ALTBMD C2 backbone. As with any national contribution, Allies are responsible for the costs associated with their own contributions. NATO agreed at Chicago that only the command and control systems of ALTBMD and their expansion to territorial defense are eligible for common funding.

On May 20-21, the NATO Heads of State and Government met in Chicago for the NATO Summit and announced that NATO has achieved an interim BMD capability. This means that the Alliance has an operationally meaningful standing peacetime ballistic missile defense capability. NATO also agreed on the command and control procedures for ballistic missile defense, designated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) as the commander for this mission, and demonstrated an interoperable command and control capability. As with all of NATO’s operations, full political control by Allies over military actions undertaken pursuant to Interim Capability will be ensured.

To support this interim BMD capability, the United States will offer EPAA assets to the Alliance as voluntary national contributions to the BMD mission, and will welcome contributions by other Allies. For example, President Obama announced in Chicago that he has directed the transfer of the AN/TPY-2 radar deployed in Turkey to NATO operational control. The EPAA also includes BMD-capable Aegis ships that can perform many roles besides BMD. U.S. missile defense-capable ships in Europe are able to operate under NATO operational control when necessary.

These decisions have created a framework for Allies to contribute and optimize their own BMD assets for our collective defense, and the United States welcomes contributions from other Allies. We believe that NATO missile defense will be more effective should Allies decide to provide sensors and interceptors to complement the U.S. EPAA contributions. If Allies should decide to develop their own missile defense capabilities, that would create significant opportunities for European industries. In short, there is absolutely no requirement or assumption that NATO missile defense will be “made in the USA.” The only requirement is that the systems contributed by Allies be interoperable with NATO's missile defense command and control capability. Several NATO Allies possess land- and sea-based sensors that could be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems that can be integrated and used to provide point defense. For example, the Netherlands has indicated that it will spend close to 250 million Euros to modify the radars on its frigates to detect and track ballistic missiles at long ranges and has indicated it will contribute its Patriot BMD systems to the NATO missile defense mission. There are potentially many more opportunities for joint development and procurement.

Russia
An update on missile defense cooperation with Europe should also include a discussion of our efforts to pursue cooperation with the Russian Federation. Missile defense cooperation with Russia is a Presidential priority, as it has been for several Administrations going back to President George H.W. Bush in the early 1990s.

When President Obama announced his new vision for missile defense in Europe in September 2009, he stated that “we welcome Russia’s cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests.” Missile defense cooperation with Russia will not only strengthen our bilateral and NATO-Russia relationships, but also could enhance NATO’s missile defense capabilities. Successful missile defense cooperation would provide concrete benefits to Russia, our NATO Allies, and the United States and will strengthen – not weaken – strategic stability over the long term.

This means it is important to get the Russian Federation inside the missile defense tent now, working alongside the United States and NATO, while we are in the early stages of our efforts. Close cooperation between Russia and the United States and NATO is the best and most enduring way for Russia to gain the assurance that European missile defenses cannot and will not undermine its strategic deterrent.
Russia is not being asked to blindly trust us. Through cooperation, Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed for the ballistic missile threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems will not undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities. Cooperation would send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter their efforts.

That said, Russia has raised the issue of wanting a legal guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria” that could, in effect, create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional ballistic missile threats such as those presented by Iran and North Korea. We have made it clear that we cannot and will not accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of purposes around the world, not just for missile defense.

While we seek to develop ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, it is important to remember that under the terms of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO alone bears responsibility for defending the Alliance from the ballistic missile threat. This is why the United States and NATO cannot agree to Russia’s proposal for “sectoral” missile defense. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of Russian territory, NATO must ensure the defense of NATO territory. NATO cannot and will not outsource its Article 5 commitments.

We would, however, be willing to agree to a political framework for cooperation that includes a statement that our missile defenses are not oriented toward Russia. Any such statement would publicly proclaim our intent to work together and chart the direction for cooperation.

During the G-20 Meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico, President Obama and President Putin announced in their June 18 Joint Statement that “despite differences in assessments, we have agreed to continue a joint search for solutions to challenges in the field of missile defense.”

The United States looks forward to continuing discussions with the Russian Federation to develop a mutually agreed framework for missile defense cooperation.

I want to close by noting the obvious which is that the worst-case scenario for dealing with missile threats is after a missile has launched. We are taking several steps diplomatically to counter missile proliferation and address missile programs of concern. We are working with the other 33 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Partners to create the global standard for controlling the transfer of equipment, software, and technology that could make a contribution to rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles. We also are working to support the efforts of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), and are working through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to help partners improve their ability to stop shipments of proliferation concern. Those are just some of the efforts that are ongoing to address missile threats, and while we do this work quietly, these efforts are having an impact.

Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that today’s ballistic missile threats continue to increase in number and sophistication. This increasing threat reinforces the importance of our collaborative missile defense efforts with allies and partners around the world, which not only strengthen regional stability, but also provide protection for our forces serving abroad and augment the defense of the United States.
Thank you for your time and attention.

UPDATE ON U.S. APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE

Photo:  Missile Interceptor Test Launch.  Credit:  U.S. Navy.
FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Reinforcing Stability Through Missile Defense
Remarks Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation
Vienna, Austria
June 6, 2012
Thank you so much for inviting me to speak today. This venue provides an opportunity for constructive dialogue on current security issues, and in this context, I will share an update on the U.S. approach to missile defense. At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense policy issues, including missile defense. In that capacity, it was my responsibility to negotiate the details of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) agreements with Poland, Romania, and Turkey that will enable the United States to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach. I will touch more on this later in my presentation, but suffice to say that I have been focused over the last couple of years on ensuring that we are able to meet the vision President Obama laid out in his 2009 announcement regarding the European Phased Adaptive Approach.

Missile Defense Policy
Today, the threat from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to our deployed forces, allies, and partners is growing. This regional threat is likely to increase in both quantitative and qualitative terms in the coming years, as some states are increasing their inventories, and making their ballistic missiles more accurate, reliable, mobile, and survivable.

Recognizing the seriousness of the ballistic missile threat, the United States seeks to create an environment, based on strong cooperation with allies and partners, which will diminish an adversary’s confidence in the effectiveness of ballistic missile attacks. This will devalue ballistic missiles and provide a disincentive for their development, acquisition, deployment, and use. To that end, President Obama has made international cooperation on missile defense a key priority, and we are pursuing a region-by-region approach based on the following three principles:

First, the United States will strengthen regional deterrence architectures built upon solid cooperative relationships with an eye toward efficiently incorporating assets and structures that our partners already have today or are seeking.

Second, the United States is pursuing phased adaptive approaches (PAAs) to missile defense within key regions that are tailored to their unique deterrence requirements and threats, including the scale, scope, and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. Specifically, we will phase in the best available technology to meet existing and evolving threats, and adapt to situations that evolve in the future.

Third, recognizing that our supply of missile defense assets cannot meet the global demand we face, the United States is developing mobile capabilities that can be relocated to adapt to a changing threat and provide surge defense capabilities where they are most needed.

Missile defense plays an important role in the broader U.S. international security strategy, supporting both deterrence and diplomacy. Missile defense assures our allies and partners that the United States has the will and the means to deter and, if necessary, defeat a limited ballistic missile attack against the U.S. homeland and regional ballistic missile attacks against our deployed forces, allies, and partners.

NATO and European Missile Defense
Today I will focus on our work in Europe, which continues to receive a great deal of attention. In order to augment the defense of the United States against a future long-range threat and provide more comprehensive and more rapid protection to our deployed forces and European Allies against the current threat, President Obama outlined a four-phase approach for European missile defense called the European Phased Adaptive Approach or EPAA. Through the EPAA, the United States will deploy increasingly capable BMD assets to defend Europe against a ballistic missile threat from the Middle East that is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The EPAA is designed to protect our deployed forces and Allies in Europe, as well as improve protection of the U.S. homeland against potential ICBMs from the Middle East. As part of Phase 1, we have deployed to Turkey, a missile defense radar, referred to as the AN/TPY-2 radar. Also, as part of Phase 1, the United States deployed a BMD-capable Aegis ship to the Mediterranean Sea in March of 2011, and has maintained a BMD-capable ship presence in the region ever since.

Slightly more than a year ago, we concluded negotiations with Romania to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 BMD interceptor site, designed to extend missile defense protection to a greater portion of Europe. The land-based SM-3 system to be deployed to Romania is anticipated to become operational in the 2015 timeframe. We also reached an agreement with Poland to place a similar U.S. BMD interceptor site there in the 2018 timeframe, which will extend missile defense protection to all of NATO Europe.

The Obama Administration is implementing the EPAA within the NATO context. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government approved a new Strategic Concept and took the historic decision to develop the capability to defend NATO European populations and territory against the growing threat from ballistic missile proliferation. The Allies also welcomed the EPAA as a U.S. national contribution to the new NATO territorial missile defense capability, in support of our commitment to the collective defense of the Alliance under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. At the Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government also decided to expand the scope of the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program to serve as the command, control, and communications network to support this new capability. NATO allies have committed to investing over $1 billion for command, control, and communications infrastructure to support NATO missile defense.

On May 20-21, the NATO Heads of State and Government met in Chicago for the NATO Summit and announced that NATO has achieved an interim BMD capability. This means that the Alliance has an operationally meaningful standing peacetime ballistic missile defense capability. NATO also agreed on the command and control procedures for ballistic missile defense, designated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) as the commander for this mission, and demonstrated an interoperable command and control capability funded by all Allies. To support this interim BMD capability, the United States will offer EPAA assets to the Alliance as voluntary national contributions to the BMD mission, and will welcome contributions by other Allies. For example, President Obama announced in Chicago that he has directed the transfer of the AN/TPY-2 radar deployed in Turkey to NATO operational control. The EPAA also includes BMD-capable Aegis ships that can perform many roles besides BMD. If conditions warrant, we will transfer BMD-capable Aegis ships to NATO operational control.

These decisions have created a framework for Allies to contribute and optimize their own BMD assets for our collective defense, and the United States welcomes contributions from other Allies. Several NATO Allies possess land- and sea-based sensors that could be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems that can be integrated and used to provide point defense. For example, the Netherlands has indicated that it will spend close to 250 million Euros to modify the radars on its frigates to detect and track ballistic missiles at long ranges and has indicated it will contribute its Patriot BMD systems to the NATO missile defense mission.

Russia
An update on missile defense cooperation with Europe should also include a discussion of our efforts to pursue cooperation with the Russian Federation. Missile defense cooperation with Russia is a Presidential priority, as it has been for several Administrations going back to President George H.W. Bush in the early 1990s.

When President Obama announced his new vision for missile defense in Europe in September 2009, he stated that “we welcome Russia’s cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests.” Missile defense cooperation with Russia will not only strengthen our bilateral and NATO-Russia relationships, but also could enhance NATO’s missile defense capabilities. Successful missile defense cooperation would provide concrete benefits to Russia, our NATO Allies, and the United States and will strengthen – not weaken – strategic stability over the long term.

This means it is important to get the Russian Federation inside the missile defense tent now, working alongside the United States and NATO, while we are in the early stages of our efforts. Close cooperation between Russia and the United States and NATO is the best and most enduring way for Russia to gain the assurance that European missile defenses cannot and will not undermine its strategic deterrent.

Through this cooperation, Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed for the ballistic missile threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems will not undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities. Working together on missile defense would also send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working to counter their efforts. And in Chicago, the NATO Allies in our Summit Declaration stated that “Through ongoing efforts in the NATO-Russia Council, we seek to determine how independent NATO and Russian missile defence systems can work together to enhance European security. We look forward to establishing the proposed joint NATO-Russia Missile Data Fusion Centre and the joint Planning Operations Centre to cooperate on missile defence.”

That said, Russia has raised the issue of wanting a legal guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria” that could, in effect, create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional ballistic missile threats such as those presented by Iran and North Korea. We have made it clear that we cannot and will not accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of purposes around the world, not just for missile defense.

While we seek to develop ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, it is important to remember that under the terms of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO alone bears responsibility for defending the Alliance from the ballistic missile threat. This is why the United States and NATO cannot agree to Russia’s proposal for “sectoral” missile defense. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of Russian territory, NATO must ensure the defense of NATO territory. NATO cannot and will not outsource its Article 5 commitments.

We would, however, be willing to agree to a political framework including a statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. Any such statement would be politically binding and would publicly proclaim our intent to work together and chart the direction for cooperation.

As the NATO Declaration issued at the Chicago summit stated: “We propose to develop a transparency regime based upon a regular exchange of information about the current respective missile defence capabilities of NATO and Russia. Such concrete missile defence cooperation is the best means to provide Russia with the assurances it seeks regarding NATO’s missile defence plans and capabilities. In this regard, we today reaffirm that the NATO missile defence in Europe will not undermine strategic stability. NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities. NATO missile defence is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. ”

We look forward to continuing discussions with the Russian Federation to develop a mutually agreed framework for missile defense cooperation.

Conclusion
Today’s ballistic missile threats continue to increase in number and sophistication. This increasing threat reinforces the importance of our collaborative missile defense efforts with allies and partners around the world, which not only strengthen regional stability, but also provide protection for our forces serving abroad and augment the defense of the United States. At the same time we are continuing to work with Russia and appreciate the statements of President Putin, Prime Minister Medvedev, and other Russian officials that we should continue to work to find common ground to resolve our differences.
Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to your questions.