STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUES FACT SHEET TOUTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
04/14/2015 08:22 AM EDT
Myths and Facts Regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Regime
Fact Sheet
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
April 14, 2015

(1) Myth: The NPT has failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has enjoyed tremendous successes over the 45 years since its entry into force. The NPT is the most widely adhered to nuclear treaty in history. It has established an international legal framework against the proliferation of nuclear weapons to which 190 countries have subscribed. Among them are states that abandoned nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs with the NPT serving as an impetus. The vast majority of NPT parties meet their obligations and benefit every day from the security the Treaty provides. For the few that do not, the NPT provides a common international basis for resolving noncompliance where the actions of a country contravene the treaty’s principles.

(2) Myth: Not enough is being done to pursue nuclear disarmament.

When the NPT entered into force in 1970, the United States had a nuclear stockpile of over 26,000 nuclear weapons. By 2013 that number had been reduced by about 82 percent to 4,804 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. From October 1993 through September 2013, the United States dismantled almost 10,000 nuclear warheads. Several thousand additional nuclear weapons are currently retired and awaiting dismantlement. Nuclear weapons reductions continue as we fulfill our obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). When the New START Treaty limits are reached in 2018, the United States and Russia will have reduced our respective operationally deployed strategic forces to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, their lowest level since the 1950s. The United States has reaffirmed our commitment to additional arms control measures, and has proposed negotiations with Russia to achieve another one-third reduction in our strategic nuclear arsenals. We also remain committed to bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and we seek the immediate start to negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

Beyond nuclear arms control negotiations, we seek to broaden our cooperation with non-nuclear weapons states on disarmament verification issues through a new initiative, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. This program aims to develop technical solutions to challenges involved in verifying future nuclear agreements.

(3) Myth: Modernization of nuclear weapons and related infrastructure is a step backwards on disarmament and inconsistent with NPT disarmament obligations.

The United States is committed not to pursue new nuclear warheads, and life extension programs will not provide for new military capabilities. U.S. stockpile stewardship and life extension programs are designed to service the existing nuclear arsenal in order to ensure it remains safe, secure, and effective so long as nuclear weapons exist. The United States is pursuing life extension for a number of warhead types that will enable us to eliminate many of the weapons we maintain in our stockpile as a hedge against technical contingencies.

Modernization of nuclear infrastructure has nothing to do with developing new nuclear weapons. These investments are needed to replace aging infrastructure that will allow us to safely, securely, and more rapidly reduce the total stockpile. Simply put, infrastructure modernization, stockpile stewardship, and life extension programs for U.S. warheads will contribute to and do not detract from progress on our NPT nuclear disarmament obligations.

(4) Myth: There is insufficient cooperation among the nuclear weapons states on promoting nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses.

The NPT Nuclear Weapon States (P5) are working to strengthen implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. Since 2009, the P5 have met annually to jointly pursue an agenda of strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and have institutionalized regular dialogue on nuclear weapons-related issues. One notable result of these meetings has been development of a common reporting framework on implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. We are also pursuing technical work on nuclear terms and definitions that can help lay the foundation for future cooperation or agreements. P5 engagement is a long-term investment to strengthen and advance the NPT, build trust and create a stronger foundation to achieve the Treaty’s disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses goals.

(5) Myth: Nuclear Weapons States are insensitive to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

This is simply not true. Underpinning all of our nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, stretching back decades, has been our clear understanding and recognition of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The United States remains firmly committed to the view that it is in the interest of all states that the 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended indefinitely. The United States participated in the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Vienna, Austria, last December to reinforce the message that it is precisely because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons that we give the highest priority to ensuring these weapons remain safe and secure for as long as they exist. While we share some of the frustration with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, we also recognize that the realization of a world without nuclear weapons will require significant changes in the international system. For this reason, the practical path of step-by-step, verifiable nuclear reductions remains the only realistic route to our shared goal of a nuclear weapons- free world.

(6) Myth: “Hair-trigger” alert status and failures to take proper care of nuclear weapons are accidents waiting to happen, and demonstrate the urgent need to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

U.S. nuclear forces are not on “hair-trigger” alert and the U.S. employs multiple, rigorous and redundant technical and procedural safeguards to protect against accidental or unauthorized launch. Only the President can authorize the employment of U.S. nuclear weapons and we are taking further steps to maximize decision time for the President in a crisis. These steps enhance stability before and during a crisis and avoid the instability and compressed decision times that are inherent to changes in alert status.

The United States is also actively working to reduce the numbers and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. These steps include taking all of our non-strategic nuclear bombers and nuclear-capable heavy bombers off day-to-day alert, engaging in the practice of open-ocean targeting for ICBMs and SLBMs, and reducing the number of warheads each ICBM carries to a single warhead. Converting ICBMs to a single warhead makes these weapons less attractive targets and therefore more stabilizing. Continuing at-sea patrols for submarines carrying nuclear weapons have a similar effect.

(7) Myth: Export controls and discriminatory policies are impeding nuclear cooperation and preventing developing countries from exercising their inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The United States fully supports the right of all Parties to the NPT to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations. An effective, transparent export control regime helps build confidence among states that assistance provided for peaceful nuclear development will not be diverted to illegal weapons purposes. The United States and other major supplier nations do not apply export controls in order to impede legitimate nuclear commerce. Rather, U.S. export controls are designed to maximize legitimate trade while raising barriers to high risk transfers that could result in the diversion or retransfer of U.S. technology, equipment and material to weapons purposes.

The United States actively lends support to NPT Parties that are in compliance with their NPT obligations to help them develop the infrastructure needed for peaceful nuclear applications and safe, secure, and safeguarded nuclear power programs. The United States is by far the largest contributor to IAEA peaceful use programs, including about $142 million in voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation program since 2010 and another $50 million toward the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) that we helped launch. PUI programs have addressed the sustainable development needs of more than 120 Member States in areas such as human health, water resource management, food security, environmental protection, and nuclear power infrastructure development.

(8) Myth: The United States has a double standard with respect to opposing nuclear proliferation.

The United States remains committed to universality of the NPT and has consistently urged the few countries that have never signed the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear weapon states and in the interim to take actions that are supportive of NPT principles and provisions. We have also been consistent in advancing international efforts to hold NPT Parties to account for noncompliance with the Treaty – as President Obama said in his 2009 Prague Speech, rules must be binding, violations must be punished and words must mean something. We are very encouraged with process underway to address Iran’s noncompliance and we remain steadfast in our insistence that North Korea return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards and comply fully with its UN Security Council and nonproliferation obligations.

(9) Myth: The United States is not doing its part to promote a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

The United States remains firmly committed to the goal of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. We continue to work with Russia, the UK, the UN and the Conference Facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, to convene the proposed conference to discuss a regional zone. We have supported five rounds of consultations between Israel and Arab states and encourage these talks to continue. Regional states bear the responsibility to reach consensus on arrangements for the conference. Efforts to turn the NPT process into a referendum on this issue should be rejected.

(10) Myth: Nuclear cooperation with India is inconsistent with the NPT.

Nothing in the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement or in the 2008 policy decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to enable civil nuclear cooperation with India violates the NPT. Such cooperation is permitted provided the supply of material or equipment is under safeguards. Under the parameters of the initiative, India committed to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and has placed all civilian-designated nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. All U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with India is subject to such safeguards, and cooperation on sensitive nuclear technologies is ruled out. India has also worked to bring its export controls into line with internationally-recognized standards and committed to continue its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and support negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty. These commitments constitute significant gains for global nonproliferation efforts.

SECRETARY KERRY'S STATEMENT ON ANNIVERSARY OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Statement on the 45th Anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Press Statement
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Washington, DC
March 5, 2015

All countries share responsibility to confront nuclear proliferation. All countries benefit if nuclear weapons do not spread to additional countries. All countries also profit when there is smart, continuous action in the direction of nuclear disarmament. And all countries gain from cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

That is why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has served the international community well for the past 45 years.

Simply put, it is the bedrock foundation for nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. They include the areas of human health, food and agriculture, water resource management, and the environment.

There are many reasons for the success of the NPT, which entered into force on March 5, 1970.

The international consensus against the spread of nuclear weapons, embodied in the spirit and text of the Treaty, is strong and continues to be upheld. Overwhelming numbers of states have refrained from pursuing nuclear weapons and accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as the standard for verification and peaceful nuclear trade. Several states that abandoned nuclear weapons efforts might have come to a different conclusion in the absence of a robust and widely supported NPT.

Today, as we mark this anniversary, we especially celebrate that more states are party to the NPT than to any other arms control or nonproliferation agreement. But there is more work to do, and we must recommit ourselves to this task.

NPT Parties share a responsibility to reinforce the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, in particular to overcome the challenges posed by a few countries that have violated their international nonproliferation obligations. This should be a concern of all states, as it is the future integrity of the nonproliferation regime that is at stake.

Our common security would be profoundly affected if additional countries crossed the nuclear threshold.

That is why President Obama and I have committed so much time and attention to seeking an agreement that will ensure Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful, and that it will formally commit to it in perpetuity as a signatory to the NPT, and through a science-based, verifiable agreement with the P5+1 member nations and their partners.

We are also working with the international community to achieve the DPRK's complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization, and its return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

The United States is fully committed to continuing to fulfill its own Treaty obligations, as well as to strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Under the New START Treaty, we are reducing our deployed nuclear weapons to levels not seen since the 1950s, and we are prepared to negotiate further reductions. Through bilateral agreements and through the IAEA, we also continue to advance peaceful nuclear cooperation with other NPT Parties. We also are proud of our record as the leading contributor of funds to assist such global development.

The Ninth Review Conference of the NPT will open in New York on April 27. The United States has been working diligently to implement the items in the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, and we seek to strengthen that Plan.

We look forward to working with all NPT Parties to achieve a constructive outcome of the conference.

UNDER SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER'S SPEECH TO UN ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

69th United Nations General Assembly First Committee General Debate

Speech

Rose Gottemoeller

Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 

New York, NY

October 7, 2014

As Delivered

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations, Ambassador Courtenay Rattray, on your election as Chair of the First Committee during its 69th session. The United States pledges to support your leadership and the work of this committee. We are sure that together we can make this a session that puts us on the right path for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon).

As we begin our work, it is important to remember why we are here. We are, as I have said many times, travelling on a long and difficult road. We are facing obstacles – today more clearly than in years past – that slow the pace of progress. We press ahead, because we know that only by continuing our committed, serious work on reducing the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction can we achieve safety and security for generations to come.

That is what motivates and guides U.S. policy. That is the sentiment behind President Obama’s 2009 speech in Prague. That is what we sincerely hope guides the path of every nation represented here. While we have accomplished much over the past five years, we have no intention of diverting from our efforts to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, increase confidence and transparency, strengthen nonproliferation, and address compliance challenges.

Mr. Chairman, on this last point, let me stress that compliance with global agreements is an essential part of international peace and security. That is why the United States is once again sponsoring its triennial resolution on “Compliance with nonproliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments,” which seeks to strengthen the global consensus on this topic. We welcome maximum co-sponsorship and support, and hope that it will be adopted without a vote.

Mr. Chairman, we should view the challenges that face us today as a potent reminder that our work is more important than ever. First and foremost, we must all provide unyielding support for the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime, the NPT.

Achieving a successful RevCon in 2015 is a priority for the United States. We encourage all parties to join with the United States to advance realistic and achievable objectives. The NPT binds nations to a common interest in preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons use. The challenges to the NPT are real, but the treaty is far too important to fail or be held hostage to impractical demands or political agendas that will not command consensus.

Some question U.S. support for nuclear disarmament. This is a mistake. We remain firmly committed to Article VI of the NPT and to achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. The United States has made clear our readiness to discuss further nuclear reductions with the Russian Federation, but progress requires a willing partner and good environment.

The United States will continue to make it clear that arms control regimes and their corresponding nuclear reductions have served the world well for more than 40 years. The United States and Russia, of course, have special responsibilities to protect and preserve those regimes, as our countries still possess over 90% of the global nuclear stockpile.

A critical part of this regime is the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). The United States is deeply concerned about Russia’s violation of its obligations under this landmark treaty. We believe that the INF Treaty benefits the security of the United States, our allies, and Russia. For that reason, we urge Russia to resolve our concerns, return to compliance, and ensure the continued viability of the Treaty.

Now is the time to move forward, not back to postures reminiscent of the Cold War. Despite these challenges, the United States and Russia continue to implement the New START Treaty successfully. When we complete implementation, deployed nuclear weapons will be at their lowest levels since the 1950s. This translates to an 85% reduction to the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile from its Cold War peak. That is indisputable progress in disarmament.

As we consider future reductions, our focus must be on responsible measures that can be trusted and verified. We will learn from our past experience – successes and disappointments – and continue to move ahead with each step building on the last. Actually, perhaps we do ourselves a disservice when we think about disarmament as a metaphorical ladder – one that must be climbed in a linear fashion. Perhaps we are better off thinking in terms of how creeks and streams connect to form rivers. Over time, those mighty rivers are irreversible; they cut through massive and seemingly impenetrable stone on the way to their final destination. In those terms, one can see how the myriad of tasks in front of us will connect to each other and steadily but surely form an irreversible path towards disarmament.

There is no way to skip to the end and forgo the hard work of preparing for the technical and political disarmament challenges that lie ahead. For example, we can all acknowledge that verification will become increasingly complex at lower numbers of nuclear weapons, while requirements for effectiveness will increase. All of us – every nation here – should be devoting ample time and energy to address this challenge right now. As a start, I recommend reviewing the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s recent research on future verification mechanisms, and encourage everyone to attend our October 14 side event on the topic.

Mr. Chairman, the United States is continuing its engagement with the P5 on the issue of disarmament. Collectively, we have created a consensus NPT Reporting Framework, first demonstrated at this year’s NPT PrepCom, and we continue to work on a P5 Glossary that will increase mutual understanding. Ongoing P5 work on critical Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) inspection techniques will help enhance that Treaty’s verification regime.

The United States is pleased that the United Kingdom will host the sixth annual P5 conference early next year. I want to stress that speed is less important than results in this process. The regular interactions and cooperation that are happening now is the foundation on which future P5 multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament will stand.

Patience and persistence is needed from all parties both among and beyond the P5. That is why the United States is interested in engaging non-nuclear weapon states in order to increase transparency and engagement in the disarmament process. Such collaboration can help us ensure the nearly 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons continues forever.

As we consider the agenda for the 2015 RevCon, it is important to focus on all three pillars of the NPT. The United States will seek a balanced review that addresses each.

Ensuring NPT safeguards are upheld and nuclear energy remains in peaceful use are no less important to disarmament as future nuclear reductions. Treaty violations should never be tolerated and demand our attention. That is because NPT pillars are mutually reinforcing and implementation of each is a shared responsibility.

Mr. Chairman, as we approach the 2015 RevCon, the United States will be focusing its efforts on a number of other issues. We will be supporting legally binding assurances against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the context of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty Protocols. We were pleased to sign the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in May. We will continue to work with ASEAN toward signature of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty Protocol. Bringing into force the protocols of all five regional zones is a top priority.

Along with our P5+1 partners, the United States will continue to seek concrete, verifiable steps to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.

The United States is eager to launch negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) – an agreement recognized to be a vital and necessary step in multilateral nuclear disarmament. Nations that continue to block these negotiations should consider how their actions increase nuclear dangers and impede nuclear disarmament.

This year, through a resolution from this body, and under Canada’s leadership, a UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on FMCT was convened. It is our hope that the GGE and its final report will finally break this impasse and allow us to proceed with the negotiation of this important treaty.

The United States will continue to create the conditions that will help us ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz have both recently emphasized the need for this Treaty to finally enter into force.

While we are focused on CTBT ratification in the United States, we call on the seven other Annex 2 States to complete their ratification processes without delay. The time for action is now. The United States asks that all CTBT Signatories continue their commitment to support an effective, operational, and sustainable verification system for the Treaty. We also look forward to participating in the upcoming CTBT Integrated Field Exercise in Jordan.

Mr. Chairman, the United States is also focusing on the long-term sustainability of space. We believe irresponsible behavior in space, such as the testing or use of debris-generating ASAT systems, threatens the security, safety, economic well-being, and space science activities of all nations. We are pleased that the report from the UN GGE on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures for outer space activities was endorsed by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly. It provides a valuable roadmap for practical, near-term solutions, such as an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.

On the subject of conventional arms control and disarmament, the United States recently announced that we will not use anti-personnel landmines (APL) outside the Korean Peninsula, nor will we assist, encourage, or induce anyone outside the Korean Peninsula to engage in activity prohibited by the Ottawa Convention. We will also undertake to destroy APL stockpiles not required for the defense of the Republic of Korea. The United States will continue our diligent efforts to pursue solutions that would be compliant with and ultimately allow us to join the Ottawa Convention. At the same time, we are proud to be the world’s single largest financial supporter of humanitarian mine action.

We are also pleased that the Arms Trade Treaty will enter-into-force before the end of this year. As a signatory, we are working with Mexico and other interested States in pursuit of a successful first Conference of States Parties that will lay the groundwork for a Treaty that lives up to all of our expectations.

I would like to thank all those here who aided in the effort to remove chemical weapons from Syria. Through an unprecedented collaboration of nations and international organizations, we collected, removed, and ultimately destroyed 1,300 tons of chemical weapons and precursors from Syria. Very serious issues with Syria still must be resolved, including the reports of systematic use of chlorine gas in opposition areas. The fact remains that through cooperation, the international community was able to significantly reduce the threat posed by chemical weapons in the region. The framework we developed can serve as a guide for future WMD nonproliferation cooperation.

In sum, it is not enough to have the will to pursue nonproliferation and disarmament; we have to have a way to pursue nonproliferation and disarmament. We will require all the tools we have available: diplomacy, law, science, technology, economic cooperation, and more. We will have to eschew needless arguments, vanity, and political games. We will need the courage and the tenacity to keep chipping away at this problem, day after day, month after month, year after year.

It will not be easy. Just as there is no single solution to our global fight against violent extremism, no single initiative, no matter how noble or well-intentioned, can end the threat from weapons of mass destruction by itself. In both cases, we must commit ourselves to active and engaged cooperation, and, most importantly, we must seek the cooperation and support of people outside of these walls, and outside of our capitals. The global public must both understand the significant humanitarian impacts of weapons of mass destruction and the achievable way we can reduce and then eliminate them.

We are under no illusions – we know there is disagreement on the right path ahead. Instead of focusing on what divides us, I would again ask everyone to remember why we are here and what we are charged with doing. We can and must reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. By focusing on our mutual commitments to the NPT and other established international agreements, we can succeed.

Mr. Chairman, we must succeed and the United States is ready to do its part.

Thank you.

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT REMARKS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY NPT CLUSTER 1

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

NPT Cluster 1: Nuclear Disarmament and Security: U.S. Statement

Remarks

Christopher Buck, Deputy Chief of Mission, Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament Permanent Mission, Geneva

Third Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

United Nations, New York City

May 2, 2014

---

(As Delivered)

Mr. Chairman,

I am pleased to provide an update on ongoing U.S. activities in fulfillment of our obligations and commitments under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 2010 NPT Action Plan. In this context, I highlight the extensive report that the United States has submitted to this Preparatory Committee meeting, consistent with Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

U.S. policy is to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. This remains a central element of President Obama’s nuclear agenda, and we are working to create conditions that can enable its eventual achievement by pursuing a multifaceted, step-by-step approach incorporating national, bilateral, and multilateral actions.

It is because we understand the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons that the United States continues to devote considerable resources in a decades-long effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. There is no “quick fix” to achieving nuclear disarmament. There is no path other than the hard, daily work of verifiable step-by-step disarmament to which we remain resolutely committed.

In line with our support for the NPT, in 2010 the United States changed our nuclear posture to further reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and emphasize the interest of all nations in extending the 69-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons. The President also made it clear that the United States will not develop new nuclear warheads nor will we pursue new military missions for nuclear weapons.

This important shift in U.S. nuclear posture has taken place against the backdrop of dramatic and ongoing reductions in our nuclear arsenal. In fact, when the NPT entered into force in 1970, the United States had a nuclear stockpile of over 26,000 nuclear weapons. As Under Secretary Gottemoeller announced on Tuesday, the U.S. nuclear stockpile now has been reduced to 4,804 warheads, which reflects an 85% decrease from its Cold War peak. During this period, the United States reduced its non-strategic nuclear warheads by 90 percent. To lend a better sense of the scale of this ongoing activity in the post-Cold War period, between 1994 and 2013, the United States dismantled 9,952 nuclear warheads.

Moreover, this effort continues as we fulfill our obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia, now in its fourth year of implementation. When the Treaty limits are reached in 2018, the strategic forces of the United States and Russia will be capped at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, their lowest level since the 1950s.

Contrary to the view expressed by some in this hall, we do not regard the achievement of nuclear disarmament as simply a rhetorical goal. It is one the United States is working on and pursuing every day.

And this work is not done. As outlined by President Obama in Berlin in June 2013, the United States remains open to negotiate further reductions with Russia in all categories of nuclear weapons – including strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.

We are also developing effective verification methodologies and processes that will be essential as we move toward increasingly smaller nuclear arsenals. Our experience with verified bilateral nuclear disarmament provides valuable experience and useful tools for multilateral nuclear disarmament approaches in the future. To that end, we are working closely with all NPT nuclear weapon states (or “P5”) to lay the foundation for future arms control agreements with participants beyond Russia and the United States.

Within the P5 process we have institutionalized regular dialogue on nuclear weapons-related issues. China hosted a fifth P5 Conference in Beijing on April 14 and 15, and the United Kingdom has agreed to host a sixth conference next year. Through these high-level conferences and frequent expert-level meetings, the P5 were able to reach consensus on a framework for reporting to this PrepCom in accordance with their commitments in the Action Plan. P5 CTBT experts have held productive discussions on ways they can collaborate in strengthening the CTBT monitoring regime. And the P5 Working Group on Nuclear Terms and Definitions, chaired by China, has made progress on the development of a P5 nuclear terms glossary.

The significance of this work should not be underestimated. P5 engagement is a long-term investment to strengthen and advance the NPT, build trust and create a stronger foundation to achieve the Treaty’s disarmament and nonproliferation goals. In addition, the United States and the United Kingdom are conducting a joint project to further develop verification procedures and technologies, which we will brief today at 1:15 p.m. in the North Lawn Building, Conference Room 5.

Turning to the broader multilateral context, the United States supports the immediate commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which is the next logical and necessary step toward achieving our shared disarmament goals. A verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is necessary if we are to create conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. All states can contribute to achieving this goal. We are disappointed that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been unable to initiate negotiations on an FMCT. Even as we continue our efforts in the CD, the United States is actively engaged in the meeting of the FMCT Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which can usefully complement efforts to promote negotiations of an FMCT in the CD.

In another important multilateral effort, the ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains a top priority for the U.S. Administration. Our active involvement in all activities of the CTBT Organization’s Preparatory Commission clearly demonstrates our ongoing commitment to the Treaty and the vital importance the United States attaches to completing the verification regime. The United States recognizes that the voluntary adherence to unilateral nuclear testing moratoria is no substitute for a legally binding prohibition against the conduct of such explosions. Entry into force of the CTBT is in the security interests of every nation. All States have an important role to play in providing the necessary resources to complete the Treaty’s verification regime and maximize the capabilities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat.

Mr. Chairman,

The United States recognizes the importance of security assurances in the context of the NPT. Accordingly, the United States updated and strengthened its long-standing negative security assurance policy in the context of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review published in April 2010. The United States declared that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. It was also made clear that the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or our allies and partners.

The United States also supports well-crafted nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) that are vigorously enforced and developed in accordance with the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We are a Party to both Protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and in recent years the United States has worked toward extending legally binding negative security assurances by submitting for ratification the protocols to the African and South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zones. We are pleased to note that the United States and other NPT nuclear weapon states will soon sign the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. The nuclear weapon states are also engaging ASEAN to resolve any remaining differences so that we can sign the revised Protocol to the Southeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone. These actions are a priority for us.

Mr. Chairman,

The United States is committed to achieving a world without nuclear weapons, and we are dedicated to working with all NPT States Parties to make that goal a reality. The pursuit of our shared goal will require patience and persistence from all of us. But we are confident in our purpose, and strengthened in both our methods and morale by the tremendous progress we have made thus far.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GOTTENMOELLER'S REMARKS ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Secretary Rose Gottenmoeller.  Credit:  U.S. State Department

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Forging Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities for the NPT
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Washington, DC
February 12, 2013
As Delivered

Thank you, Yaiv, and thank you to General (Ret.) Yadlin and all the staff at INSS for hosting me. It is an honor to be here. As you all know, John Kerry was sworn in as the new U.S. Secretary of State just about a week and a half ago. He begins his tenure at State fully seized of the challenges that we face around the globe, including the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the direction of our new Secretary, the Department of State will continue its efforts to support this vital regime. The title for this conference is apt. We are at a crossroads, but not a dead-end. Over the course of the last 40 years, the NPT has taken some hits, not least this highly provocative act announced by North Korea today. But it is precisely because of those hits that we have acquired the experience needed to deal more effectively with the challenge of nuclear proliferation.

In order to look to the future, it is important to remember the past. It was just over 50 years ago that tension brought on by the Cuban Missile Crisis threatened to turn the Cold War hot. The world watched in fear for those 13 days in October 1962 when Soviet missile placements in Cuba very nearly became the spark that would start a fire we could not possibly control.

As the United States and the Soviet Union teetered on the edge of nuclear war, leaders in Washington and Moscow sought a diplomatic solution. One of the challenges confronting both sides was making sure that their perceptions, objectives, and proposals were getting across to each other clearly. This was not an easy thing to do without email, dedicated phone lines or fifty years of cooperation across many different issues.

Resolute and sober in their determination, leaders in Washington and Moscow stepped back from the brink of a nuclear conflict, using every avenue available to settle the crisis peacefully. After those frightening 13 days, both sides learned ways to reduce the tension in our relationship.

A New Beginning

To say that things have changed dramatically since October 1962 is an understatement. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a turning point. The United States and the Soviet Union came to the edge of the abyss and then started to back away from it. In the months following the crisis, a "Hotline" between the Kremlin and the White House was established, allowing for direct, immediate communications between our leaders.

In the summer of 1963, in a Commencement Address at American University, President John F. Kennedy laid out a bold vision on how we could turn away from what had seemed like an inevitable march towards nuclear catastrophe.

"Peace need not be impracticable," he said, "and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly, by making it seem more manageable and less remote, we can help all peoples to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it."

I like that concept. Defining goals does make things more manageable. Working step by step, we can slowly fix seemingly intractable, unsolvable problems.

In that particular speech, one of the defined goals was to achieve a ban on nuclear testing. While it was not comprehensive, the Limited Test Ban Treaty went into force just four months later. It outlawed nuclear explosive tests on land, in the sea, in the atmosphere and in space. This was a tremendous step in the right direction and one that helped create political conditions to conclude the NPT, an even more ambitious treaty, several years later.

The Path Before Us

The grand bargain of the NPT, where nuclear weapon states pursue disarmament, non-nuclear weapon states abstain from the pursuit of nuclear weapons and all countries are able to access the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, sets an enduring standard that is as relevant today as it was at the Treaty’s inception. For over forty years, the regime has bent, frayed and broken in places, but it has never collapsed. It has slowed the tide of proliferation; it has facilitated cooperation among its States Parties; and it has institutionalized the norms of nonproliferation and disarmament.

Despite our past successes, there are very pressing challenges all around us and on the horizon. Most critically, we have grave concerns about the actions of a few countries. North Korea, Iran and Syria violated their NPT obligations, and have failed to take the steps necessary to rectify these violations. The United States is gravely concerned about all of these programs, as I am sure is the case for everyone in this room. These transgressions threaten international security and undermine confidence in the nonproliferation regime. These cases also stand directly in the way of our shared disarmament goals.

Addressing these compliance challenges is essential to preserving the integrity of the nonproliferation regime and we have taken important steps in the past several years to do so. The IAEA found Syria in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations for attempting to build a covert nuclear reactor, and we are continuing to build on the stringent sanctions the UN Security Council adopted against Iran in 2010. That, combined with actions taken before 2010, represent clear reinforcement of the importance of full compliance. NPT Parties must be willing to keep the pressure on countries that violate their obligations. As President Obama has said many times, the international community must stand up to States that violate their nonproliferation obligations. NPT rules must be binding and there must be consequences for those who break them.

There is a continued push for universal adherence to the IAEA safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols. As we have learned from past and present safeguards violations from countries such as Iran and Syria, the Additional Protocol must be the standard for verification of the NPT. Since 2010, 18 states have brought Additional Protocols into force, bringing the total to 119. Another 20 have signed the Protocol but not yet completed the ratification process. That is excellent progress, but we must continue to press for more.

The United States will also work with all Parties to discourage states from abusing the NPT’s withdrawal provision, a priority we share with many of our international partners.

Building on our pledge to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our defense strategy, we are also making progress on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). The nuclear-weapon states, also known as the P5, and ASEAN have agreed on a revised Protocol to the Southeast Asia NWFZ (SEANWFZ) Treaty that resolved outstanding differences. We hope that the Protocol signing can take place soon.

For its part, this Administration sent the protocols to the African and South Pacific NWFZs to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent. The United States also remains committed to consulting with the Central Asia NWFZ (CANWFZ) parties to reach an agreement that would allow us – along with the rest of the P5 – to sign the protocol to that treaty.

A longer term goal is achievement of a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. The United States supports this goal and stands ready to help facilitate discussions among states in the region at the proposed Helsinki conference. But we do so recognizing that the mandate for a zone can only come from within the region; it cannot be imposed from outside or without the consent of all concerned states. We regret the Helsinki conference could not be convened last year, but remain committed to working with our partners to create conditions for a successful event.

An immediate concern is securing vulnerable nuclear materials in order to keep them out of hands of terrorists. Under President Obama’s direction, we have held two Nuclear Security Summits, with a third to take place in The Hague next year. In anticipation of the Hague Summit, we will continue to build on pledges that are resulting in more material secured, removed and eliminated. These are real and durable achievements that help protect nations against the threat of nuclear terrorism. We will continue to use the Summits to strengthen the global architecture – the treaties, institutions, norms and rules – that governs nuclear security, and to promote the concept of "assurance;" that is, states execute their sovereign security responsibilities in ways that assure neighbors, allies and rivals that they are doing so effectively. Israel and others here are valued partners in the Summit process, and we look forward to continued cooperation to promote these shared goals.

Regarding the disarmament agenda, there have been successes on both the bilateral and multilateral fronts. The United States is committed to a step-by-step process to reduce the overall numbers of nuclear weapons. The two year anniversary of the New START Treaty’s entry into force has just passed. As many of you know, I was the lead New START negotiator for the United States and it is very satisfying to see how pragmatic, business-like and positive the implementation has been. We are now exploring the possibilities of what a future agreement with Russia would look like – one with reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed.

Beyond bilateral treaties, ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains a top priority for the United States.

As we move forward with our ratification process, we encourage all other nations to do the same. We also remain committed to launch negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. It is unfortunate that, to date, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has been blocked in its efforts to move this agreement forward.

We are also engaging with other P5 states on disarmament-related matters. Following the first meeting in London in 2009, P5 conferences were held in Paris in 2011 and Washington in 2012. At those high-level meetings, we started discussions on key nuclear weapons related issues, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. Russia announced recently that it will host the next P5 conference in April, just before the second NPT PrepCom.

While some are quick to dismiss the utility of meetings and conferences, they would be forgetting their history. As the United States and Russia approach the lowest levels of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950’s – and that will happen when the New START Treaty is fully implemented in 2018 – it is important to remember that their success was born out of direct communication. Communication builds trust. Trust paves the way for cooperation. This is the type of process we are cultivating in the P5 setting.

We also support new frameworks for civil nuclear cooperation that reduce the spread of dangerous technologies. Establishment of an IAEA fuel bank represents an important step forward, as it can help assure the reliability of nuclear fuel supply and avoid the unnecessary investment in indigenous enrichment.

Forging Ahead

Having just run through the challenges and opportunities, the road ahead can seem daunting. Some states continue to forsake their freely taken and legally binding obligations. Proliferation is aided by the speed and anonymity provided by the information age. Conflicts around the globe make cooperation difficult or dangerous. Even in the face of these challenges, it is incumbent upon us to find ways to strengthen nonproliferation norms, bolster compliance and quickly adapt to ever-changing circumstances and security needs.

There are some new tools that could aid us in our travels. The United States is and has always been committed to innovation, and the arms control and nonproliferation arenas are no exception. To respond to the challenges we face, we are thinking about creative ways to use technologies – including open source technologies – to tackle long-standing verification and monitoring problems. We hope that other states will join us in this endeavor.

All of what I have discussed will require hard work. However, we are at a crossroads, not a cliff. We are fully able to choose the path that leads us to a safer, more secure world. We have with us the lessons of the Cold War and the knowledge that even in our darkest hours, we found a way forward. In his speech at American University 50 years ago, President Kennedy left the students with a final thought:

"Confident and unafraid, we labor on--not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace."


We have come a long way since then, but we have a long way to go. We just have to keep moving forward step by step, confident and unafraid.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.