REMARKS BY ROSE GOTTENMOELLER ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
America's Commitment to Ballistic Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
Missile Defense Agency
Bucharest, Romania
November 18, 2014

As Prepared

Thank you, Rob, for that introduction. I am so pleased to be here in Romania and at this important time. We congratulate the people of Romania on their election yesterday. We look forward to working with the President-elect and the government of Romania, as we continue to strengthen our already close relationship. I would especially like to thank our Romanian colleagues for their generosity in agreeing to host this influential conference and especially for all of the support they have provided to the deployment of U.S. missile defense site at Deveselu. Thanks also to all of the people here that came from around the world. It is a true testament to our combined efforts that such a large and prestigious crowd has come to participate in this conference.

I know you have already heard from Admiral Syring, Principal Deputy Under Secretary Brian McKeon and Chargé d’Affaires Thompson about the ballistic missile defense systems the United States is deploying in Europe, here in Romania, and around the world. I am not going to re-tread that ground.

I will reiterate one point you have already heard today: The Obama Administration’s commitment to deploying missile defenses to defend the United States homeland, our Allies and partners never waivers. In Europe, we are on track for Phase 2 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach and we are committed to having Phase 3 in Poland completed in 2018. We are working closely across the board with our Israeli Allies on missile defense. We remain committed to missile defense cooperation among our Gulf Cooperation Council partners. In Asia, we also continue to deploy more and more capable missile defense systems and continue our efforts to enhance cooperation with allies and partners.

We are committed to these deployments in the face of constant criticism, particularly from the Russian Federation.

We often hear the refrain from certain corners that missile defenses are destabilizing. With an emphasis on transparency and confidence-building, we have explained that nothing that we are doing with respect to our missile defense plans will undercut international security. It would not be in our interest to do so, it would be prohibitively expensive and from a technical perspective, it would be extremely difficult. So let me take some time to again outline these points, based on logic, physics and math, to prove that our missile defense deployments are a benefit, not a threat, to global strategic stability.

First, the Cold War mindset about ballistic missile defenses is no longer valid. Limited ballistic missile defense capabilities are not capable of threatening Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and are not a threat to strategic stability.

Ballistic missiles during the Cold War were the tools the United States and the Soviet Union used to maintain the strategic balance between our two countries. Today, ballistic missiles are proliferated around the world and are seen as a common battlefield weapon.

That is why today’s limited missile defenses are essential to ensuring regional strategic stability. That is the one and only reason that the United States is pursuing regional missile defense capabilities.

Missile saber rattling is not particularly effective when there are defenses to protect against those missiles. Missile defense can also prevent a country or group from taking cheap shots of one or two launches that it thinks can be used to compel or deter a government. Instead these countries or groups would need to fire a much larger salvo to overcome missile defenses, thereby raising the stakes of entering into a conflict.

Further, missile defenses create uncertainty about the outcome of attacks, thereby increasing the costs to countries and groups attempting to overcome defenses. By reducing a country’s confidence in the effectiveness of missile attacks, we enhance deterrence and regional stability.

Missile defenses and missile defense cooperation also provides reassurance. Reassurance helps reduce a country’s vulnerability to ballistic missile attacks, as well as reassurance regarding the United States’ commitment to their defense. The last part is particularly important since it demonstrates that the United States will stand by our Alliance commitments, even in the face of growth in the military potential of regional adversaries.

Finally, when confronted with an attack, missile defenses can buy time for other courses of actions, such as diplomacy, to help resolve the crisis. All of you know, whether you are policy-makers or military planners, that time- and lack thereof – is one of the most important factors during a crisis.

These are the factors that drive our deployment efforts. Our efforts are aided by the increasing sophistication and accuracy of our ballistic missile defenses, as well as the experience that U.S. forces, our Allies and our partners have gained from being the targets of missile attacks.

Many of our regional defense deployments, like the Patriot system and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system, are inherently designed for theater use. They are not capable of defending against ICBMs launched at the United States. THAAD, however, is capable of defending against the medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missile that North Korea is deploying.

Yet despite our repeated attempts to convey these demonstrable facts, the Russian Federation continues to maintain that our global deployment of these systems is designed somehow to encircle Russia.

Understanding the universal truth of physics, we have also taken care to demonstrate how the systems we are deploying are located in places that are ideal for addressing regional threats. Based on the irrefutable laws of science, these systems cannot do the things the Russian government says they can. You may have seen the Russia trajectory maps that show how the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor could be used against Russian ICBMs. The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the instant – the very second – of a Russian ICBM launch, we would also launch our interceptor. The argument also assumes that we would have perfect knowledge of where that Russian ICBM is going and where it is going to be located several minutes from launch in order to strike the reentry vehicles.

As Admiral Syring attests and our flight tests clearly show, we cannot begin to consider launching an interceptor until well after a ballistic missile has finished its boost phase, the warheads have separated, and we have had time to develop a firing solution. We need considerable time to gather knowledge about where the missile is going before we can launch our interceptor. As a result, the physics just don’t add up. There is no way a U.S. SM-3 IIA interceptor can chase down Russian reentry vehicles.

At one point, we did explore the feasibility of a faster interceptor that had what we called “early intercept” capabilities, but that still relied on intercepting the reentry vehicles after burnout. Again, this was not a boost phase concept. In fact, there are many unclassified reports that discuss the challenges inherent in doing boost phase intercept.

Beyond our theater, capabilities, our Ground-Based Interceptors (known as GBIs) deployed in Alaska and California do not pose a threat to Russian strategic nuclear forces either. Our GBIs are designed to deal with rudimentary systems deployed in limited numbers and with simple countermeasures. Technologically, GBIs cannot counter Russia’s sophisticated ICBM capabilities and countermeasures.

In addition to our other efforts, we have also outlined the plain and simple numbers to the Russians. Our GBI numbers are nowhere remotely near their strategic offensive arsenal numbers. As of October 1st, Russia declared that under the New START counting rules, they were deploying 1,643 warheads on 528 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy Bombers. Let me say that number again: the Russian Federation currently fields 1,643 deployed nuclear warheads. Currently, the United States has 30 ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska. So, hypothetically if all 30 of those GBIs performed perfectly and took out 30 Russian warheads, 1,613 Russian warheads would still get past our defenses.

We will deploy an additional 14 interceptors in Alaska and should we ever deploy an additional east coast site with 20 additional interceptors, Russia would still have 1,579 warheads that could get through our defenses. And while I am optimistic we will negotiate a future nuclear reduction Treaty after New START, even then, our limited numbers of defensive systems cannot even come close to upsetting the strategic balance.

Reversing this equation, I would note that we are not concerned about the impact to strategic stability of Russia’s deployment of 68 interceptors at the Moscow ABM system. Sixty eight deployed interceptors is 24 more than the United States even has plans to deploy. Further, Russia is very open about declaring that the Moscow ABM system is specifically designed against the United States. And just like the United States, Russia is modernizing its radars and interceptors as part of their system. However, that still hasn’t raised concerns in the United States about strategic stability.

Despite our best efforts, none of these facts has made any difference in our discussions with the Russian Federation. They continue instead to argue the system is designed against them. The bottom line is this: The United States will continue to deploy our missile defense systems around the world to defend against limited regional threats. We will continue to deploy the EPAA as our contribution to NATO missile defense. There should be no doubt about our commitment. Moreover, we will not accept any obligations that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships. There is no reason why we should and no reason we would.

Further, at this time, we have serious concerns about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. We continue to work closely with our NATO partners on addressing the changes to European security brought about by the invasion of Ukraine and are seeking Russia’s return to compliance with the INF Treaty.

While Russia has accused the United States of being in violation of the INF Treaty, we are in complete compliance with the INF Treaty. We can describe, in detail, why each of our systems complies with the Treaty. One thing that the United States and Russia have agreed on is that this important Treaty remains in our mutual security interests. May it remain so. In the meantime, we will continue to make our case to the world about the important of limited missile defenses and continue our essential efforts to cooperatively deploy systems around the world.

Thank you for your support with these efforts and thank you again for the opportunity to speak here today.

FRANK ROSE'S REMARKS ON MISSILE DEFENSE IN MAINZ, GERMANY

FROM:   U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Implementing Missile Defense in a Global Context

Remarks

Frank A. Rose

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

3AF Missile Defense Conference

Mainz, Germany

June 17, 2014

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Thank you for that kind introduction. It’s great to be back in Germany and I am particularly honored to address the 3AF Missile Defense Conference again this year.
In my remarks this morning, I would like to discuss three key issues:

• First, the Obama Administration’s commitment to ballistic missile defense (BMD) and the Fiscal Year 2015 missile defense budget request;
• Second, the significant progress the United States and our NATO partners are making in implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA); and;
• Third, cooperation on missile defense with allies and partners outside of Europe.

The U.S. Missile Defense Budget
It is no secret that governments around the world, including the United States, are working very hard to do more with less. This, of course, includes our investments in our national security. Despite these challenges, you will see—and the proof is in the numbers—that the United States is continuing to ensure that our missile defense priorities are funded, on track and on budget.

In March of this year, President Obama released his Fiscal Year 2015 budget submission that aligns defense program priorities and resources with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). I would like to highlight for you a few of the missile defense aspects of the President’s request.

Overall, the budget request provides $8.5 billion for our missile defense programs, including $7.5 billion for the Missile Defense Agency. With regard to U.S. homeland defense, the budget request provides funding to increase the number of long-range missile defense interceptors deployed in Alaska and California from 30 to 44 by 2017. The request also funds a number of other programs to enhance the long-range BMD system such as a new kill vehicle and a new long-range discrimination radar. With regard to regional missile defense, the budget continues to provide adequate funding to complete work on the missile defense base at Devesulu, Romania and provides additional funding of $225.7 million for the missile defense base at Slupsk in Poland. The request also includes $435.4 million for the procurement of SM-3 Block IB interceptors and $263.9 for continued development of the longer-range SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.

As you can see from these numbers, the United States continues to devote significant resources to our missile defense programs. These programs are an important part of ensuring the national security of the United States, as well as our allies and partners. With regard to the EPAA, this budget request clearly signals the importance the U.S. places on the program. We believe that the resources we are allocating to our missile defense programs demonstrate our commitment to establish ever more capable missile defenses, both in Europe and other regions, to address growing ballistic missile threats. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel noted in March 2013, the U.S. commitment to NATO missile defense and to the sites in Romania and Poland remains “ironclad.”

European Phased Adaptive Approach
Moving on, I would like to take a few moments to discuss the implementation of the President’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense. In 2009, when the President announced the EPAA, he noted that the EPAA will “provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies,” while relying on “capabilities that are proven and cost-effective.” And since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision—and we have made great progress in doing so. Earlier this month, President Obama noted in Poland that we are “on track” with the EPAA.

Phase 1 of the EPAA gained its first operational elements in 2011 with the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis BMD-capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean and the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey. With the declaration of Interim BMD Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, this radar transitioned to NATO operational control. As part of Phase 1, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota as a Spanish contribution to NATO missile defense, demonstrating its commitment to NATO’s collective defense. In February 2014, the first of four of these ships, USS Donald Cook, arrived in Rota. The next ship, USS Ross, is on its way now. The remaining two will deploy to Rota next year. In addition to their roles in NATO BMD, these ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, bi-lateral and multi-lateral training exercises, and they will support U.S. and NATO operations. By stationing these naval assets in Spain, we are placing them in a position to maximize their operational flexibility for missions in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

With regard to Phase 2, we have an agreement in force with Romania to host a U.S. Aegis Ashore site beginning in 2015. Last October, I had the honor of attending the ground-breaking ceremony at Deveselu Air Base to commemorate the start of construction for this site. When this site is operational, and combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, NATO will gain enhanced coverage from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. I also had the opportunity last year to visit the Lockheed-Martin facility in Moorestown, New Jersey where they built the Aegis Ashore deck house and components destined for Romania. The deck house has been disassembled and is currently in transit to Romania.

In furtherance of Phase 2, on May 21, the United States successfully conducted the first flight test involving components of the Aegis Ashore system, including the SM-3 IB interceptor. During the test, a simulated ballistic missile target was acquired, tracked, and engaged by the Aegis Weapon System. A live target missile launch was not planned for this flight test.
Before moving on to Phase 3, I would like to stress that we remain on schedule for deploying the system to Romania, with the site becoming operational in 2015.

And finally there is Phase 3. Phase 3 includes an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, per the Ballistic Missile Defense agreement between the United States and Poland which entered into force in September 2011. This site is on schedule to be operational in 2018. The interceptor site in Poland is key to the EPAA. When combined with other EPAA assets, Phase 3, which begins in the 2018 timeframe, will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory. So, as you can see; we are continuing to successfully implement the President’s vision for stronger, smarter and swifter missile defenses going forward.

NATO Cooperation
In addition to the support and burden sharing as part of the EPAA undertaken by Spain, Turkey, Poland and Romania, NATO Heads of State and Government noted at the Chicago Summit that there were potential opportunities for using synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment of NATO missile defense.
In our view, with this in mind, there are three approaches Allies can take to make valuable contributions to NATO BMD.

• First, Allies can acquire fully capable BMD systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control capabilities.
• Second, Allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key BMD capability.
• Third, Allies can contribute to NATO’s defense by providing air defense capability for U.S. BMD ships underway on a NATO mission.

In all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is NATO interoperability. While acquiring a BMD capability is, of course, good in and of itself, without interoperability, its value as a contribution to Alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished. It is only through interoperability that the Alliance can gain the synergistic effects from BMD cooperation that enhance the effectiveness of NATO BMD, as well as the security of all NATO members through shared battle-space awareness and reduced interceptor wastage. Given the budget challenges many allies face today, this becomes even more imperative. Looking ahead, we are hopeful that missile defense will be a key deliverable at the Alliance’s Summit later this year in Wales.

Missile Defense Developments in Other Regions
Outside the NATO context, the United States is continuing to increase and deepen its cooperation with partners and allies around the world to protect people, forces, and assets from the growing ballistic missile threats that we face. As in Europe, we are tailoring our approaches to the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific so that they reflect the unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region.

In the Middle East, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through venues such as the recently established U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum. At the September 26, 2013, Strategic Cooperation Forum (SCF), Secretary Kerry and his Foreign Ministry counterparts reaffirmed their intent, first stated at the September 28, 2012 SCF, to “work towards enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense.”

As you know, this is a time of profound change in that region and we are acutely aware of the daily threats and anxieties felt throughout the Gulf. Security cooperation has long stood at the core of the U.S.-Gulf partnership. The United States is not only committed to enhancing U.S.-GCC missile defense cooperation – we see it as a strategic imperative.

As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a key objective of U.S. strategy is to expand international efforts and cooperation on ballistic missile defense. BMD cooperation contributes to regional stability by deterring regional actors, principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of their ballistic missiles, and assuring allies and partners of U.S. defense commitments while enhancing their ability to defend against these threats.
Less than two months ago I travelled to the Gulf to work toward enhanced U.S.—GCC coordination on ballistic missile defense. The message I delivered in the region was clear: the United States remains firmly committed to developing and deploying advanced missile defense capabilities around the world to protect our homeland, our deployed forces, as well as our friends and allies.

Several of our partners in the region have already expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the UAE has contracted to buy two THAAD batteries that, when operational, will enhance the UAE’s security as well as regional stability. The UAE also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets. We look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperability with our GCC partners in the years ahead.

Additionally and separately, we are continuing our long-standing and robust cooperation with Israel on missile defense on key systems such as Arrow 3, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome.

In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing to cooperate through our bilateral alliances. For example, the United States and Japan already are working closely to develop jointly an advanced interceptor known as the SM-3 Block IIA along with deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, while continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces. With the Republic of Korea, we are continuing to consult closely as it develops the Korean Air and Missile Defense system, which is designed to defend the ROK against air and missile threats from North Korea.

No Constraints
Before I conclude, let me speak about missile defense and Russia. Russia continues to demand that the United States provide it with “legally-binding” guarantees that our missile defenses will not negatively impact its strategic nuclear deterrent. What the Russians really mean is that they want legally-binding limitations or constraints on U.S. missile defenses—defenses we and our partners and allies believe must be flexible and unconstrained in order to adequately protect ourselves from emerging ballistic missile threats. Such “legally binding guarantees” would create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional ballistic missile threats such as those we see evolving in the Middle East and North Korea. We have repeatedly made clear to the Russian government that the United States cannot and will not accept any obligations that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships.

As far as where things stand today regarding our discussions with Russia on missile defense, Russia’s intervention into the crisis in Ukraine, in violation of international law, has led to the suspension of our military-to-military dialogue and we are not currently engaging Russia on the topic of missile defense.

Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense over the past several years.

Thanks to the important work of our NATO Allies, implementation of the EPAA and NATO missile defense is going well. We are continuing to engage productively with our partners and allies in the Middle East and East Asia. And, as I noted earlier, Congress has continued to provide sufficient funding for missile defense programs, even in these times of tight budgets.
For our part, we look forward to continuing these successes and working with our allies and friends around the world to deepen our cooperation, both diplomatic and military, in pursuit of ensuring that missile defense remains a key part of deterring and defending against ballistic missile threats.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.