U.S. AND KAZAKHSTAN MAKE INITIAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CENTER AGREEMENT

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
United States and Kazakhstan Initial New International Science and Technology Center Agreement
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
June 24, 2015

UNITED STATES EMBASSY ASTANA

On June 22, in Astana, Kazakhstan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Programs Simon Limage initialed on behalf of the United States the Agreement Continuing the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) along with the European Union, Georgia, Japan, the Kingdom of Norway, Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Republic of Korea.

The ISTC, with its new headquarters at Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan, seeks to minimize incentives for scientists and engineers in states with technologies, expertise, and related materials applicable to WMD to engage in activities that could result in the proliferation of WMD or related materials by supporting and cooperating in research and development activities for peaceful purposes. The initialing of the agreement sets the stage for signing the agreement once all parties have completed their internal procedures.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Limage, as the US representative to the ISTC Governing Board, led a U.S. interagency delegation, which included technical experts from the Departments of State and Energy. In the course of the two day Governing Board meeting, significant decisions were made to streamline the ISTC, endorse plans to expand the organization to other regions, and enhance opportunities for scientific projects in new fields.

AGREEMENT FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S.-REPUBLIC OF KOREA

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
U.S.-Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
Fact Sheet
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
June 16, 2015

New 123 Agreement Would Strengthen the U.S.-R.O.K. Bilateral Strategic Relationship and Enhances Cooperation for the Long Term

The United States and the Republic of Korea have signed a successor agreement for civil nuclear cooperation, also known as a “123 Agreement.”

The United States and the R.O.K. have had a strong partnership in the field of peaceful nuclear cooperation for more than half a century, and the United States is pleased that the R.O.K. has become one of the world’s leading nations in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The agreement would enhance the strategic relationship between the United States and the R.O.K. across the spectrum of political, economic, energy, science, and technology issues.

The agreement would establish a new standing, High-Level Bilateral Commission for our two governments to work together to advance mutual objectives such as addressing spent fuel management, an assured stable fuel supply, nuclear security, and enhancing cooperation between the U.S. and R.O.K. nuclear industries.

The new Commission would allow for deepened cooperation and more regular interaction between our two governments on the state of nuclear energy in both countries and allow us to account for new developments in technology, spent fuel management, security, and safety.

The agreement would reinforce the importance of our ongoing Joint Fuel Cycle Study to review and identify appropriate options for addressing spent fuel management challenges, and facilitate cooperation on research and development (R&D) in this context, including R&D at specified facilities on the use of electrochemical reduction.

The new agreement also would provide the R.O.K. with consent to produce radioisotopes for medical and research purposes, as well as to conduct examination of irradiated fuel rods using U.S.-obligated material.

The agreement would allow for the continuation and expansion of our robust and mutually beneficial trade relationship.

For example, the United States supplies enrichment services to the R.O.K. to support its fabrication of nuclear fuel, and the R.O.K. supplies the United States with significant reactor components such as pressure vessels.

Due to this trade relationship, the contract between the R.O.K. and the United Arab Emirates to build four reactors has already brought hundreds of new jobs and approximately $2 billion in additional revenue to U.S. nuclear suppliers.

The agreement would allow this type of cooperation to continue and flourish in the future.

The agreement would be fully reciprocal, requiring the United States to undertake most of the same obligations as the R.O.K. The only exceptions relate to different obligations that each country has under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The New 123 Agreement Would Strengthen Nonproliferation Cooperation Between the United States and the Republic of Korea

Like all our 123 agreements, this agreement contains essential provisions related to nonproliferation and nuclear security, and would thereby enhance the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The terms of the U.S.-R.O.K. 123 agreement strongly reaffirm the two governments’ shared commitment to nonproliferation as the cornerstone of their nuclear cooperation relationship.

The R.O.K. has a strong track record on nonproliferation and the R.O.K. has consistently reiterated its commitment to nonproliferation. It has been an extremely active partner with the United States across a wide breadth of bilateral and multilateral activities designed to ensure the implementation of the highest standards of safety, security, and nonproliferation worldwide.

The agreement would update the nonproliferation conditions from the prior agreement and fully meet the nonproliferation requirements of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA).

The agreement would provide for the cooperation between the United States and the R.O.K. to be subject to the relevant IAEA safeguards requirements, assurance that all activities under the agreement will be for peaceful purposes only, and express reciprocal consent rights over any retransfers or subsequent reprocessing or enrichment of material subject to the agreement.
The R.O.K. Is a Strong Nonproliferation Partner

The R.O.K. is one of the United States’ strongest partners on nonproliferation and has consistently reiterated its commitment to nonproliferation.

It is a member of the four multilateral nonproliferation regimes (Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, and Nuclear Suppliers Group, for which it served as Chair in 2003-2004 and will do so again in 2016-17) and recently completed its term as chair of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

The R.O.K. became a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 23, 1975, and has in force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The R.O.K. has also demonstrated its commitment to nuclear security and addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism, including through hosting the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit and being an active contributor to the Summit process, and through its support for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative.

The R.O.K. has been an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) since 2009, having hosted regional and global meetings and two operational exercises. It has also conducted outreach to states that have not yet endorsed PSI.

The R.O.K. has been a consistent advocate of nonproliferation in the IAEA Board of Governors, including support for strengthening safeguards and calling to account Iran and Syria for violations of their safeguards obligations.

The R.O.K. has also been a strong and close partner in addressing the security and proliferation threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, including at the IAEA and the UN Security Council. The United States and the R.O.K. continue to cooperate closely in our shared objective to achieve North Korea’s complete, irreversible and verifiable denuclearization and to bring North Korea into compliance with its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and its obligations under the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

C.S. ELIOT KANG'S REMARK'S AT DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Diplomatic Conference on the Convention on Nuclear Safety
Remarks
C.S. Eliot Kang
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna, Austria
February 9, 2015

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Colleagues,

Allow me to start by congratulating Ambassador Grossi on his election as President of the Diplomatic Conference, and assuring him of the full support of the United States for his efforts to make this a successful conference. Thank you, Ambassador Grossi, for agreeing to lead the informal working group meetings. Your leadership, guidance, and support were invaluable as we worked together to make the Convention on Nuclear Safety more effective in ensuring a high level of safety at nuclear installations around the world. This is a top priority for the United States.

We recognize and appreciate Switzerland’s efforts to raise the profile of the important issue of nuclear safety. We would also like to thank the parties to the Convention for the active dialogue over the past several months. This Convention was founded on the principle that a multilateral, incentive-based approach provides the best way to ensure a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. It allows safety standards and guidance to be strengthened by taking into account emerging technologies and lessons learned. The process leading up to this conference has once again proven the wisdom of that approach.

The United States strongly supports the Convention and views it as an important instrument for international cooperation. Although safety remains a national responsibility, international cooperation through a process of robust peer review is indispensable for strengthening nuclear safety. Nuclear safety is an ongoing concern, and its continuous, timely improvement should be our shared objective.

The Fukushima accident was a wake-up call for all of us. In the United States, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission conducted an exhaustive review of our nuclear power plants and required significant safety enhancements in light of the lessons learned from Fukushima. Those enhancements are now well under way at U.S. plants, with a most of the major work expected to be completed by the end of 2016.

At the same time, the international community has come together to strengthen safety standards through a variety of efforts. The parties to this Convention led some of the most important of those efforts. In particular, the changes to the Convention’s guidance that we undertook at the 6th Review Meeting in April 2014, demonstrate our collective determination to reinforce nuclear safety. To make this incentive convention function as it should, parties report on their implementation of obligations under the Convention with reference to contemporaneous guidance reflecting internationally formulated safety guidelines. Thanks to the work we have undertaken, the guidance that was updated and put into effect in April 2014 incorporates key lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. This ability to immediately update guidance and safety standards -- without amending the Convention – makes the Convention a modern, relevant, and effective instrument to improve nuclear safety well into the future.

We are now here at this diplomatic conference to consider how to build on that work and continue moving the Convention forward. As many parties have expressed during the preparatory process, the best way to do that is to commit and dedicate ourselves to vigorous implementation of the Convention. The United States appreciates the work of the Chair in helping to put on paper the views of the parties as they have been expressed over the past several months. We believe the proposed Vienna Declaration is an excellent reflection of the consensus among the parties to the Convention and we are ready to support it. Achieving consensus at the Diplomatic Conference sends a crucial message to the international community and the public that we stand united on the importance of nuclear safety and are taking timely and responsive action to improve it.

Mr. Chairman, we all live in an increasingly interdependent world. This certainly holds true for nuclear safety. The declaration before us represents a political commitment to reinvigorate the principles of the Convention itself, and by coming together as a community to endorse it, we will be sending a powerful message to the world. We are telling the world that we understand our responsibilities and are meeting them in a way that can inspire confidence in the future peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology.

We hope that all parties to the Convention will join us in supporting the proposed consensus outcome and commit to follow the principles outlined in the Declaration.

SECRETARY KERRY, KAZAKH FOREIGN MINISTER IDRISOV MAKE REMARKS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Remarks With Kazakh Foreign Minister Yerlan Idrisov Before Their Meeting
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Benjamin Franklin Room
Washington, DC
December 10, 2014

SECRETARY KERRY: It’s my pleasure to welcome Foreign Minister Idrisov of Kazakhstan. You okay? Sorry. I’m really delighted to welcome the foreign minister here and I want to congratulate him and Kazakhstan on the near 23rd anniversary of their independence. It’s on December 16th. And we have enjoyed a growing security partnership, economic partnership, on any number of issues. We are working on the challenge of ISIL, of counterterrorism. We’re very grateful for Kazakhstan’s engagement with us on a number of issues – nonproliferation, issues of Afghanistan, trade, development. We’re working hard on Kazakhstan’s accession to the WTO. And I think it’s fair to say that in the region the relationship between the United States and Kazakhstan is really one of the most consequential for us, and we’re very grateful for the leadership that Kazakhstan has been showing.

So we have a full agenda and I’m very, very pleased to welcome you, Mr. Foreign Minister. Thank you for taking time to be here.

FOREIGN MINISTER IDRISOV: Thank you very much. Thank you very much. It happens so that Kazakhstan is a little bit ahead of the United States and by Kazakh time it’s already almost 11th of December. So first of all, I’d like to congratulate Secretary Kerry with his birthday and wish him every success in his very important global endeavors. As Secretary Kerry said, we have very full agenda. Our bilateral agenda covers all sorts of issues ranging from security, nonproliferation, investment, energy sector, of course nation and democracy building, and education. But we also have very robust global and regional agenda. We do discuss issues on Afghanistan, around negotiations on Iran, on crises like the so-called Islamic State or the Ebola epidemic. So we are tuned to the same wave and we are very happy to have this very meaningful strategic partnership. I am very proud that today we will have the third meeting of our Strategic Partnership Dialogue with Secretary Kerry, and I came here to confirm our strong desire to cement further the strategic partnership between Kazakhstan and the United States and take it to the future.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you, Yerlan.

FOREIGN MINISTER IDRISOV: Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY: I’d like to just mention one other thing which I was reminded of as the foreign minister spoke. Kazakhstan has initiated a very important education program for Afghan students, some $50 million they’ve committed to this effort. There are Afghans who are now in significant numbers studying in Kazakhstan, and this will be a critical component of capacity building for Afghanistan and of stability. So we’re very grateful for that kind of major effort. We thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTER IDRISOV: Thank you. Thank you very much.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you, my friend.

FOREIGN MINISTER IDRISOV: Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY: Come on in and have a --

QUESTION: Secretary Kerry, are you concerned for U.S. personnel overseas following the release of the report?

SECRETARY KERRY: I think we’ve addressed that (inaudible). Thank you.

ADAM SCHEINMAN'S REMARKS, NPT CLUSTER 2

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

NPT Cluster 2: Nonproliferation and Safeguards - U.S. Statement

Remarks

Adam Scheinman, Senior Advisor, International Security and Nonproliferation

Third Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

New York City

May 1, 2014

(As Prepared)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The United States emphasizes the importance of a balanced approach to implementation of the NPT. The three NPT pillars are mutually reinforcing. The nonproliferation pillar plays a central role by strengthening the other two. Together, nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses are complementary not competing goals. We pursue each with equal vigor and in all aspects.

A strong nonproliferation regime contributes to the security conditions that make disarmament easier to achieve, and progress on disarmament helps create political conditions to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. All parties share in the mutual security that derives from a strong nonproliferation regime.

Safeguards, export controls, and other important nonproliferation measures build the mutual confidence that enables the fullest possible cooperation among parties. This in turn helps to realize the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for all parties. The robust nuclear cooperation that results demonstrates the value of a strong nonproliferation regime.

The United States remains fully committed to the Action Plan that was adopted by consensus in 2010, including those actions related to nonproliferation. A complete listing of U.S. implementation of this pillar can be found in our national report to the PrepCom.

U.S. Support for IAEA Safeguards and the Additional Protocol

Mr. Chairman, the Action Plan emphasizes the importance of compliance with IAEA safeguards, which are the established international verification mechanism under the NPT. These safeguards are essential to help ensure that nuclear activities remain in peaceful uses and that material and technology is not diverted to produce nuclear weapons. These safeguards are essential to help ensure that states are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons. Only twelve NPT parties have yet to bring the required safeguards agreement into force. We should aim to reduce that number to zero by next year’s Review Conference, and we encourage states that have not yet done so to update any small quantities protocols.

A comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an Additional Protocol is now recognized as the strengthened safeguards standard. We have learned time and again that the IAEA needs the essential tools provided by the Additional Protocol in order to respond to possible undeclared nuclear activities and provide assurances of their absence. We should redouble efforts to make the Additional Protocol universal. Between now and the Review Conference, states that have signed the Additional Protocol should bring it into force. Those states yet to sign should start the work now to take this forward.

Some states may need assistance in implementing – or preparing to implement – those safeguards measures. The United States devotes considerable resources to this effort, and we encourage those who are in a position to help to offer their support to other states and to the IAEA. We should make sure that all interested states are aware and take advantage of such assistance.

The IAEA should seek to continuously improve the way it implements safeguards by using new technology and taking advantage of all safeguards-relevant information. In doing so the Agency must maintain its objectivity, impartiality, and the technical foundation of its work. This deserves our full financial, technical, and political support. In this regard, we note the IAEA’s development of the state-level concept (SLC), which is the next logical phase in the evolution of IAEA safeguards. We support the Agency’s efforts to transition to the SLC in order that IAEA safeguards remain both effective and efficient.

Thirty-seven years ago, the United States was the first state to establish a Member State Support Program to provide technical and financial assistance to the IAEA for safeguards. Last year alone, we provided $40 million to the IAEA to support its safeguards mission. This figure does not include significant efforts to revitalize our own technology base and work with other international partners to support IAEA safeguards. We also take great encouragement from the contributions of 20 other active Support Programs for IAEA safeguards, a concrete affirmation of the importance those states place in IAEA safeguards.

The United States remains ready to accept the same safeguards on our civil nuclear facilities and activities that non-nuclear-weapon states Parties are required to accept, both under comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols to those agreements, subject only to a national security exclusion. We have made roughly 300 civil nuclear facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards under our “voluntary offer” safeguards agreement. We have welcomed IAEA verification of the downblending of excess U.S. highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium for use in power reactors. Each of our annual reports under the U.S. Additional Protocol since 2010 has included over 300 entries.

Nuclear Security

Mr. Chairman, in addition to the risk of nuclear proliferation by states, we need to address the risks from non-state actors, including the risks of unauthorized removal or sabotage of dangerous nuclear and radiological materials. We welcome the outcome of the Nuclear Security Summit last month in The Hague and take note of the accomplishments made through commitments made at earlier summits by a diverse group of world leaders representing 53 states and four international organizations. This concerted international action, some of which predates the Summits, has enabled 26 states plus Taiwan to rid themselves entirely of an aggregate of over five metric tons of highly enriched uranium.

But more remains to be done not only to secure and eliminate the most dangerous materials, but to promote best practices in securing nuclear and radiological material. We are pleased that two thirds of the countries participating in this year’s Summit, on the initiative of the hosts of all three Summits, pledged to implement robust measures to strengthen their nuclear security practices. As we approach the 2016 Summit, we look forward to further progress as states work to meet the additional commitments undertaken at The Hague, as well as to further progress on nuclear security actions in the three communiqués and the 2010 Action Plan.

Proliferation Challenges

Mr. Chairman, since the early 1990s, we have seen several instances of NPT Parties that failed to comply with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. Some of these cases have been resolved successfully. But other cases remain unresolved and those states stand in violation of their obligations today because they have not taken sufficient action to resolve the underlying compliance concerns. Unresolved cases of noncompliance erode confidence in the NPT as a foundation for international security and for efforts to reduce global nuclear dangers. NPT parties should continue to give utmost attention to these challenges in order to maintain and reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Non-compliant states or non-state actors will not hesitate to take advantage of weaknesses in the nonproliferation system. They will import critical nuclear-related equipment on the black market or traffic in dangerous materials. None of us is immune to these risks. Illicit commerce has taken advantage even of states with the strongest nonproliferation commitments, and its results affect all of us.

This underscores the need for concerted action to shore up our existing controls. We therefore encourage states in position to do so to join us in offering assistance, in export control, border security, safeguards, nuclear and radiological security; we encourage those who need assistance to avail themselves of these offers.

Strengthening the Treaty

Mr. Chairman, universality of the NPT remains our long-term objective, even as we recognize the challenges we face in pursuing that goal. This goal will not be achieved quickly, but it remains an essential element in achieving the broader vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

We welcome the heightened attention to the issue of withdrawal from the NPT. While we do not challenge the right of NPT parties to withdraw in accordance with Article X of the Treaty, nor do we seek to amend that provision in any way, we share the concerns many countries have regarding the potential for states to abuse this right.

Mr. Chairman, the United States encourages all NPT parties to do all they can to strengthen the nonproliferation pillar of the Treaty. This is urgent if we are to preserve the security benefits that derive from our shared commitment to nonproliferation and to all pillars of the NPT regime.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THOMAS COUNTRYMAN'S REMARKS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS RENUNCIATION BY UKRAINE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Twenty Years of Renunciation From Nuclear Weapons by Ukraine: Lessons Learned and Prospects of Nuclear Disarmament"

Remarks

Thomas M. Countryman

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations

New York City

April 28, 2014

---

Introduction
The 2014 PrepCom is an opportunity to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to reinforce our shared responsibilities to uphold it. The United States remains committed to full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. Through this PrepCom we will build on the momentum of the successful 2010 Review Conference and PrepComs in 2012 and 2013. As we approach the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the United States looks to all States Parties to work together towards strengthening this critical treaty which has underpinned international security for nearly 45 years.

I thank our Ukrainian friends for hosting us today. As President Obama and Secretary Kerry have said, the United States strongly supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Last week, Vice President Biden traveled to Kyiv in order to demonstrate our solidarity with the Ukrainian people. He discussed how the United States is supporting the international community’s efforts to stabilize and strengthen Ukraine’s economy and assist Ukraine in political reform and uniting the country. The Vice President announced a U.S. package of assistance totaling $50 million to help Ukraine pursue political and economic reform and strengthen our partnership. He made clear that Ukraine has a difficult road ahead, but it will not walk this road alone. And today the United States announced that it will impose new targeted sanctions on a number of Russian individuals and entities and restricting licenses for certain U.S. exports to Russia.

Budapest Memorandum Commitments

In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom made a commitment to respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of Ukraine. The United States government remains committed to the Budapest Memorandum.
Our partnership with Ukraine goes back many years, and is particularly strong in the area of nonproliferation. We appreciate Ukraine’s continued leadership in this area.

Ukraine’s Nonproliferation Record

This year marks the twentieth anniversary of Ukraine’s historic decision to remove the third largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world from its territory and to accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Ukraine’s unwavering commitment to its obligations under the NPT demonstrates that when a country places itself squarely within the NPT and diligently adheres to all of the Treaty’s obligations, all nations benefit.
Since 1994, Ukraine has a strong record of supporting nuclear nonproliferation and threat reduction. With support from the “Nunn-Lugar” Cooperative Threat Reduction program, Ukraine dismantled an enormous stockpile of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and related delivery systems. In 2004, it began an augmented program with the U.S. Department of Defense that includes weapons of mass destruction proliferation prevention and border security initiatives. By hosting the multilateral Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU), Ukraine has engaged over 20,000 scientists from the former Soviet weapons program in peaceful activities. The United States has been proud to be a partner in those efforts.

Ukraine brought its IAEA safeguards agreement into force in 1995; it signed the Additional Protocol in 2000 and brought it into force in 2006. Ukraine joined the Global Partnership against the spread of WMD in 2005, in 2007 it was one of the first countries to join the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Ukraine participated actively in all three Nuclear Security Summits. In 2012, Ukraine fulfilled its pledge to remove all highly enriched uranium from Ukraine, a highlight of the 2012 Summit.

In 2013, we extended the U.S.-Ukraine Cooperative Threat Reduction Umbrella Agreement for another seven years, as well as an agreement to increase safety and risk reduction at civilian nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Recent events in Ukraine underline the importance of bringing to closure to the legacy of Chernobyl by finishing construction of a landmark shelter to durably protect the population and environment, a project to which the United States has pledged approximately $337 million. Last month, a joint U.S. – Ukraine project to construct a Neutron Source Facility at the Kharkiv Institute for Physics and Technology was completed, providing Ukraine with new research capabilities and the ability to produce industrial and medical isotopes. In short, U.S. – Ukrainian cooperation on nuclear security and nonproliferation is broad and deep.

U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation

We applaud Minister of Foreign Affairs Deshchytsia’s reaffirmation of Ukraine’s longstanding commitment to its nonproliferation obligations at the Nuclear Security Summit last month. Like Ukraine, the United States is committed to achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. This is a central element of President Obama’s nuclear agenda. There is a long road ahead, but we are working to create the conditions for its eventual achievement. As President Obama said in Berlin in June, 2013, the United States can ensure its security and that of its allies while safely pursuing further nuclear reductions with Russia of up to one-third in the deployed strategic warhead level established in the New START Treaty.
As next steps toward nuclear disarmament, the United States remains committed to pursuing entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and consensus to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

I would like to highlight the work done at the P5 Conference earlier this month in Beijing toward implementing the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference
The NPT serves as a key element of international security and the basis for international nuclear cooperation. We will continue to address the serious challenges of cases of noncompliance with Treaty obligations, and will continue to support expanding access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We look forward to a productive Preparatory Committee meeting, and reaffirm our commitment to ensuring the Treaty’s contributions to international peace and security are strengthened.

I thank our Ukrainian hosts again for today and congratulate them again on this important anniversary and their continued leadership within the NPT. I look forward to working with Ukraine, and with all other NPT Parties, over the coming weeks to ensure that the NPT remains strong.

As Secretary Kerry stated last week, the world will remain united for Ukraine.

EXPORT CONTROL REFORM: REMARKS BY STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
The Path Forward on Export Control Reform
Remarks
Tom Kelly
Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington, DC
February 4, 2014

Good morning, great to the here with you today. As Acting Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, I lead the Bureau charged with implementing most of the State Department’s part of the Export Control Reform initiative.

When it comes to implementing ECR, the Administration is focused on creating an export control system that keeps pace with new technologies and supply chain globalization. At the same time, we don’t want this process to sacrifice critical national security and foreign policy objectives, from nonproliferation to supporting human rights.

ECR will streamline U.S. Government decision-making on strategic exports and create a more transparent, predictable system. What it will not do is alter the primacy of foreign policy in the decision-making process for arms exports. Our Foreign Military Sales program, Direct Commercial Sales authorizations, and all exports of munitions from the U.S. will continue to be authorized based on a coordinated review of the foreign policy risks and rewards associated with the transaction. Our newly revised and publicly available Conventional Arms Transfer Policy guides this review. It affirms that the U.S. does not simply allow arms to flow from its borders in response to global demand; we authorize exports that support U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

Over the past four months we achieved the first milestones in implementing ECR. In October 2013, the first major revisions to our export control lists went into effect, transferring controls on certain aircraft and gas turbine engines as well as their parts and components from the control of the Department of State to the Department of Commerce. These two categories potentially represent more than $20 billion in annual exports. And this January, new controls on military vehicles and ships went into effect.

Our allies and partners are responding positively to these changes and see many of their concerns related to security of supply addressed by these reforms. The U.S. defense export community is also supportive.

I do want to take this opportunity to – once again – dispel the myth that ECR equals decontrol of arms exports. Any item that is no longer controlled on the U.S. Munitions List is now controlled on the Commerce Control List.

The goal is an agile, dynamic export control regime responsive to today’s and tomorrow’s national security and foreign policy challenges. These new controls reduce bureaucracy, accelerate goods to market for our close allies and security partners, and still maintain a high level of scrutiny over arms exports. Though the full measure of success remains ahead of us, we’re confident that we are on the right path.

U.S.-PAKISTAN MEET REGARDING SECURITY, STABILITY, NONPROLIFERATION

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Pakistan and United States Discuss Security, Strategic Stability, and Nonproliferation Issues
Media Note
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
November 21, 2013

Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller and Additional Secretary for United Nations and Economic Coordination Ambassador Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry co-chaired the sixth round of the Pakistan–U.S. Security, Strategic Stability, and Nonproliferation (SSS&NP) Working Group in Islamabad on November 21.


The delegations had a productive exchange of views on issues of mutual importance, including international efforts to enhance nuclear security and peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The participants also shared views on nonproliferation challenges as well as on the multilateral regimes on chemical and biological weapons, export controls, and the importance of regional stability and security.

The delegations reaffirmed that the Working Group remains an invaluable forum for discussing issues of critical mutual importance and stated that they looked forward to future sessions.

The SSS&NP Working Group is part of the U.S.–Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, re-energized during the visit of Secretary of State John Kerry to Pakistan in August and reaffirmed by Prime Minister Sharif and President Obama in October. It follows a meeting of the Energy Working Group in Washington, D.C. on November 12. The Defense Consultative Group, a third bilateral forum within the Strategic Dialogue, also met on November 21 in Washington.

U.S. AND EU ON GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION OF WMD

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
U.S., EU Lead Global Nonproliferation, Biosurveillance Efforts
By Cheryl Pellerin
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, May 28, 2013 - As nuclear, biological and chemical threats continue to evolve worldwide, partnership between the United States and European Union countries to counter such threats remains critical, a senior Defense Department official said today in Helsinki.

Andrew C. Weber, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs, spoke at a meeting of the Atlantic Council on U.S.-European Union cooperation in countering the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The Atlantic Council is a public policy institution founded in 1961 to promote transatlantic cooperation and international security.

"In the coming years," Weber said, "our countries must continue to work together to raise safety and security standards, strengthen the Global Partnership and the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons], detect and report threats in real time, and promote disarmament."

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction consists of 25 countries, including 12 members of the European Union, works to reduce the global risk.

Such threats, Weber added, "are evolving in ways that affect all of our countries."

Increasing globalization, advances in dual-use technologies, and the emergence of new microbes and drug-resistant pathogens are complicating the ability to meet nonproliferation and counterproliferation goals, the assistant secretary observed.

Advances in technology and the work of illicit networks are making it easier for nonstate actors to access materials needed to produce weapons of mass destruction, he added, and the regimes in Syria and North Korea "are proving that we must maintain our focus on state-sponsored programs."

The European Union and the United States have made firm commitments to addressing the full range of concerns about weapons of mass destruction, Weber said.

"As Finland's 2012 Security and Defense Policy report points out," he continued, 'In the era of global challenges the EU and the United States, being close strategic partners, are expected to cooperate to achieve lasting solutions.'"

Cooperation is especially important in addressing threats of this magnitude and complexity, he said. "As Finland's defense policy report notes," he added, "the U.S. administration believes strongly in using partnerships and cooperation to mitigate global threats."

Weber called this a guiding principle for efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction threats.

In December, he noted, President Barack Obama said the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction, or CTR, program to reduce nuclear, biological and chemical threats is one of the most important U.S. national security programs and a perfect example of the kind of partnerships needed to meet challenges that no nation can address on its own.

"For two decades, our cooperative threat reduction work focused on the former Soviet Union and on reducing nuclear threats. Since then, it has evolved both geographically and by focus area," Weber said. That evolution, along with other collaborative efforts, is increasing the cooperative threat reduction focus on biological threats, he noted.

"The United States looks forward to working with international partners to launch, enhance and link global networks for real-time biosurveillance, expanding International Health Regulation capabilities across the globe and developing novel diagnostics," he said, adding that many European Union countries with advanced biological-science sectors are helping to build global reporting networks.

Weber said that uniting the health, security and emergency-response sectors in the United States and European Union countries is critical to preparedness for any kind of threat.

"By applying this principal to our international partnerships, both the EU and the United States are contributing to more resilient communities around the world," he added.

The European Union and the United States also lead the world on a path toward disarmament, the assistant secretary said, and strengthening the nonproliferation treaty and other nonproliferation initiatives remains a core principle of their defense strategies.

Weber recognized Finland's leadership on this and its commitment to moving toward a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East. He also commended the efforts of Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, Finnish undersecretary of state for foreign and security policy, to set the conditions for making this vision a reality.

"For the United States," he said, "President Obama has set a bold vision for disarmament and continues to prioritize the Nuclear Security Summit process ... [and] established ambitious goals for a world safe and secure from biological threats."

The assistant secretary quoted part of Obama's 2012 address before the U.N. General Assembly: "We must come together to prevent and detect and fight every kind of biological danger -- whether it's a pandemic like H1N1, or a terrorist threat, or a treatable disease.'"

Under the president's leadership, Weber said, "the United States now has national strategies for countering biological threats and advancing global biosurveillance capabilities."

U.S. SANCTIONS INDIVIDUALS FOR AIDING N. KOREAN WMD PROGRAMS

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
United States Sanctions Individuals Linked To North Korean Weapons Of Mass Destruction Programs
Fact Sheet
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
March 8, 2013
　

The United States welcomes the unanimous passage today of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2094. North Korea's nuclear and missile proliferation activities violate the UN Security Council sanctions regime comprised of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), destabilize the region, and undermine the global nonproliferation regime. The international community has condemned North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation activity and its continued efforts to advance its nuclear and missile programs, including its announced February 12 nuclear test and its April and December 2012 launches using ballistic missile technology. These provocative acts continue to threaten international peace and security and will only result in North Korea becoming further isolated from the international community.

On Thursday, March 7, 2013 the U.S. Department of the Treasury implemented the asset freeze provisions of UNSCR 2094 (2013) by designating Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l, a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) representative who served in Beijing, China; and Yo’n Cho’ng-Nam and Ko Ch’o’l-Chae, both based in Dalian, China, and representatives of Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID), pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of WMD and their supporters. The Second Academy of Natural Sciences and Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation, listed in UNSCR 2094 today, were previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in August 2010 and October 2005 respectively.

"These individuals are important actors within North Korea’s proliferation network who have been working to gain access to international markets," said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. "We will continue to work with our partners around the world to expose these operations and hold North Korea accountable for its provocative and destabilizing acts."

TCB was identified in the annex of E.O. 13382 in June 2005 because it acts as the financial arm of KOMID, Pyongyang’s premier arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. KOMID was also listed in the annex to E.O. 13382 in June 2005 for its role in North Korea’s proliferation of WMD.

KOMID has offices in multiple countries around the world and facilitates weapons sales for the North Korean government. TCB plays a role in financing KOMID’s sales of ballistic missiles and has also been involved in ballistic missile transactions from KOMID to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), the U.S. and UN-sanctioned Iranian organization responsible for developing liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. In addition to their listings under E.O. 13382, both TCB and KOMID were designated by the UNSCR 1718 Committee in April 2009.

Today’s designations under E.O. 13382 generally result in the prohibition of transactions between these individuals and any U.S. person, and the freezing of any assets they may have under U.S. jurisdiction.

Identifying information:

Name: Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l
Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.)
Location: C/O Tanchon Commercial Bank, Saemaeul 1-Dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, North Korea
Title: Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative

Name: Yo’n Cho’ng-Nam
Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.)
Location: Dalian, China
Title: Chief Representative, KOMID

Name: Ko Ch’o’l-Chae
Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.)
Location: Dalian, China
Title: Deputy Representative, KOMID