SECRETARY KERRY'S REMARKS IN MONTREUX, SWITZERLAND

FROM:  THE STATE DEPARTMENT
Remarks in Montreux, Switzerland
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Montreux, Switzerland
March 4, 2015

SECRETARY KERRY: So good afternoon to all, and thank you very, very much for your patience. We’ve been involved in some long discussions over the past few days, and even well before that. And before I leave Montreux, I wanted to quickly share with you where we are.

From the beginning, these negotiations have been tough and intense, and they remain so. And we’ve made some progress from where we were, but there are still significant gaps and important choices that need to be made. The purpose of these negotiations is not to get any deal; it’s to get the right deal, one that can withstand scrutiny – the scrutiny of experts on nuclear affairs all around the world, the scrutiny of other governments, the scrutiny of people, the scrutiny of the Congress of the United States, people in America, and the scrutiny of countries in the region that are affected by it. And so we know that. We approach these negotiations with a full understanding of the test that will be applied to this and of the expectations that exist.

We also want an agreement that is sustainable over time, and particularly that achieves the singular goal of proving that Iran’s nuclear program is and will remain peaceful. We aren’t going to be distracted by external factors or politics. We will continue to be guided by our experts, our scientists, our national interests and those of our partners and allies.

Now, for all the objections that any country has to Iranian activities in the region – and believe me, we have objections and others in the world have objections – the first step is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. And we know that absent a deal, Iran will have the ability to move ahead with its nuclear program; that we know for sure, because that’s exactly what’s happened to date. We also know that any deal that we would agree to would significantly increase the breakout time, leaving Iran further – far further than it is today – from producing enough fissile material for a weapon, while it undertakes the effort of proving to the world that the program is, in fact, peaceful.

Clearly, increased breakout time makes any nation in the vicinity or any nation of concern safer. We also know that any deal that we reach would give us the intrusive access and verification measures necessary to confirm that Iran’s nuclear facilities are indeed on a peaceful path. And that would allow us to promptly detect any attempt to cheat or to break out, and then to respond appropriately. And contrary to some public reports, we are only contemplating a deal in which important access and verification measures will endure.

We also know that the international sanctions, which many want to simply hang their hats on – they may have gotten Iran to the table, but to date they haven’t stopped Iran from advancing its nuclear program. In fact, the first and only thing that had stopped their program from progressing in almost a decade was the Joint Plan of Action that we negotiated and we reached in November of 2013, and that has been adhered to in every single respect since then.

And most importantly, as President Obama said yesterday, we know that no one has presented a more viable, lasting alternative for how you actually prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. So folks, simply demanding that Iran capitulate is not a plan, and nor would any of our P5+1 partners support us in that position. And it’s very important to remember we have partners in this effort – France, Germany, Britain, China, Russia – all of whom have similar feelings about the importance of what must be done here.

So we continue to be focused on reaching a good deal, the right deal, that closes off any paths that Iran could have towards fissile material for a weapon and that protects the world from the enormous threat that we all know a nuclear-armed Iran would pose.

Now, we still don’t know whether we will get there, and it is certainly possible that we won’t. It may be that Iran simply can’t say yes to the type of deal that the international community requires. But we do know that we owe it to the American people in my case, people in the world, to try to find out. And we will return to these talks on the 15th of March, recognizing that time is of the essence, the days are ticking by, and important decisions need to be made. Thank you.

SUSAN E. RICE'S REMARKS AT AIPAC

 FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE

Remarks As Prepared for Delivery at AIPAC Annual Meeting by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice
February 2, 2015


Good evening everyone.  It’s great to be back at AIPAC.  Rosy, thank you so much for your warm introduction.


I want to thank Bob Cohen, Michael Kassen, Lillian Pinkus, my old friend Lee Rosenberg, and all of AIPAC’s board and members for welcoming me tonight.  I want to thank all the Members of Congress who represent America’s strong bipartisan support for the State of Israel; and all the young people here today, some 3,000, who represent the bright future of the U.S.-Israel special relationship.


I brought one of those young people with me, my seventeen year-old son Jake, who insisted he had to come to AIPAC.  But, I want to take a moment before I begin, to remember three young men who aren’t with us today.  I want to call us back to those terrible days last summer, when we were united in grief over the horrifying kidnapping and murder of Naftali Fraenkel, Gilad Shaer, and Eyal Yifrah.  As a mother, my heart breaks for such unspeakable loss.  Those boys were our boys, and we all continue to mourn their tragic loss.


The last time I spoke at AIPAC, it was to the synagogue initiative lunch.  This group tonight is… a little larger.  But, when I finished that speech, more than 400 rabbis sang to me.  In Hebrew.  Now, that is something I will never forget.  And the words of their song reflect the spirit that brings me here tonight.  Hinei ma’tov uma-nayim, shevet achim gam yachad.  “How good it is and how pleasant when we sit together in brotherhood.”  It’s a great psalm—though I will admit that where I first encountered it – in church – it was not in the original Hebrew.  That psalm always reminds me how much we can do together when we unite in common purpose.  And, it goes to the heart of what AIPAC is all about—what the relationship between Israel and the United States is all about.  Brotherhood.  Togetherness.  Unity.


That’s because the U.S.-Israel alliance is not just rooted in our mutual interests, vital as they are. It’s also rooted in the values of freedom and democracy that we share.  It’s in the friendship and fellowship between ordinary Israelis and Americans.  And, for me personally, it’s a warmth that’s rooted in my very first visit to Israel.  I was just 14, traveling with my younger brother and my beloved late father.  My Dad was on the Board of TWA – some of you are old enough to remember that once-great airline.  We arrived on one of the first-ever flights from Egypt to Israel, just after the Camp David Accords were signed.  We had an unforgettable visit, the power of which has stayed with me all my life.  We bowed our heads in sorrow at Yad Vashem.  We walked the lanes of the Old City, climbed Masada, floated in the Dead Sea, and picked fruit at a kibbutz.  I learned by heart the words of the sh’ma.  My first memories of Israel remain etched in my soul.


Put simply, the relationship between the U.S. and Israel is not just one between states.  It is between two peoples and the millions of intimate, personal connections that bind us.  Our relationship has deepened and grown through different presidents and prime ministers for nearly 70 years.


It was President Truman, a Democrat, who—just 11 minutes after David Ben-Gurion declared Israel’s independence—made the United States the first country to recognize the State of Israel.


It was President Nixon, a Republican, who made sure America stood with Israel as it fought for survival one terrible Yom Kippur, so that its people could declare am Yisrael Chai --“the people of Israel live.”


It was President Carter who helped Israel forge an historic peace with Egypt that endures to this day.  And, it was President Clinton and President George W. Bush who backed Israel as it took more brave steps for peace, and as it endured terrorist attacks from Hezbollah and Hamas.


The relationship between the United States and the State of Israel is not a partnership between individual leaders, or political parties.  It’s an alliance between two nations, rooted in the unbreakable friendship between our two peoples.  It is not negotiable.  And it never will be.


Our alliance grows l’dor va’dor, from generation to generation. That’s what counts.  That’s what we have to protect.  As John F. Kennedy said, back in 1960, “friendship for Israel is not a partisan matter.  It is a national commitment.”


No one knows this better than all of you.  For decades, AIPAC has built bipartisan support for America’s special relationship with Israel.  That’s why every President—from Harry Truman to Barack Obama—has begun from a fundamental, unshakable premise: strengthening the security of Israel is in the national interest of the United States of America.


President Obama’s commitment to Israel is deep and personal.  I know, because I see it every day.  I first saw it when I accompanied then-Senator Obama to Israel in 2008.  I saw it when he surveyed with horror the stacks of charred rockets that Hamas had fired on Israel, and when he walked through the hollowed out homes of Sderot.


That same year, President Obama came to this conference, still a senator, and he made a promise.  He said, “Israel’s security is sacrosanct.”  And, each day, over the past six years, President Obama has kept that promise.  The President is profoundly committed to ensuring that Israel is never alone.  That’s why, today, security cooperation between our countries is not just strong.  It’s stronger than it has ever been.  Both President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu have called it “unprecedented.”  And that’s the way it’s going to stay.


President Obama has met with Prime Minister Netanyahu more times than with almost any other world leader.  As national security advisor, I am in nearly constant communication with Yossi Cohen, my friend and my Israeli counterpart, who I am so pleased is here tonight.  Thank you, Yossi.  Together, we host the U.S.-Israel consultative group to ensure we’re working closely across the highest levels of our governments.  Our armed forces conduct extensive exercises together, and our military and intelligence leaders consult continually.


Under this Administration, in times of tight budgets, our security assistance to Israel has increased.  Since President Obama took office, the United States has provided Israel with more than $20 billion in foreign military financing.  Last year, we provided Israel with the largest package of security assistance ever.  That’s money well spent, because it goes directly to bolstering Israel’s ability to defend itself in a very tough neighborhood, to protecting Israeli citizens, and to strengthening a vital American ally.


We are maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge with new defense technologies and access to the most advanced military equipment in the world.  President Obama is determined to ensure that Israel can defend itself, by itself.  So, when Israel receives the F-35 joint strike fighter next year, it will be the only nation in the Middle East with a fifth-generation aircraft.


Since 2009, we’ve invested hundreds of millions of dollars in developing and producing the David’s Sling missile defense program and the Arrow anti-missile system.  We’ve invested more than $1 billion dollars in the Iron Dome system.  When I visited Israel last May, I saw this technology first-hand at Palmachim air force base.  And, last summer, as Hamas’ terrorist rockets rained down on Israeli cities, the world saw how Iron Dome saved lives, literally, every day.


During the height of that conflict—with sirens wailing and Israeli civilians huddling in bomb shelters—the United States stood up for Israel’s right to defend itself against rocket and tunnel attacks, even as we worked with the Israeli government to find a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.  And, when the Israeli government made an urgent request for an additional $225 million to support Iron Dome’s batteries, President Obama’s response was immediate and clear: “Let’s do it.”  Within days, legislation was drafted, passed through Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support, and President Obama signed it into law.  At that critical moment, we replenished Israel’s arsenal of Iron Dome interceptor missiles.  That’s what it means to be an ally.





Our unwavering commitment to Israel’s lasting security is why we will also never give up on a just and comprehensive peace between Israelis and Palestinians.  It will require hard decisions, but the United States will remain a steadfast partner.  Like past administrations, Republican and Democratic, we believe that a truly lasting peace can only be forged by direct talks between the two parties.  Like past administrations, we are concerned by unilateral actions that erode trust or assault Israel’s legitimacy.  Like every administration, Republican and Democratic, since the Six Day War, we oppose Israeli settlement activity—and we oppose Palestinian steps that throw up further obstacles to peace, including actions against Israel at the International Criminal Court.  The only path to ensure Israel’s long-term security is to bring about a viable, sovereign Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security with a democratic, Jewish State of Israel.


Israel’s security—our mutual security—is also at the heart of one of President Obama’s most important foreign policy objectives: ensuring that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon.  As President Obama has repeated many times: we are keeping all options on the table to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.  As he said in Jerusalem: “Iran must not get a nuclear weapon. This is not a danger that can be contained.”  And he added, “America will do what we must to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.”


President Obama said it.  He meant it.  And those are his orders to us all.


That is still the way we see the danger of a nuclear Iran today.  Given Iran’s support for terrorism, the risk of a nuclear-arms race in the region, and the danger to the entire global non-proliferation regime, an Iran with a nuclear weapon would not just be a threat to Israel – it’s an unacceptable threat to the United States of America.


We understand the unique concerns of our Israeli friends and partners.  In Jerusalem, President Obama made plain: “when I consider Israel’s security, I also think about a people who have a living memory of the Holocaust, faced with the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iranian government that has called for Israel’s destruction.  It’s no wonder Israelis view this as an existential threat.  But this is not simply a challenge for Israel; it is a danger for the entire world, including the United States.”


I want to be very clear: a bad deal is worse than no deal.  And, if that is the choice, there will be no deal.


Negotiations continue.  And, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.  As of today, significant gaps remain between the international community and Iran.  I’m not going to get into details about ongoing negotiations – nor should sensitive details of an ongoing negotiation be discussed in public.  But, I do want to make five key points about our approach to the negotiation.


First, with the Joint Plan of Action, we have already succeeded in halting Iran’s nuclear program and rolling it back in key areas.  Let’s recall what has been achieved over the last year.  Iran is doing away with its existing stockpile of its most highly enriched uranium.  Iran has capped its stockpile of low enriched uranium.  Iran has not constructed additional enrichment facilities.  Iran has not installed or operated new centrifuges, including its next-generation models.  Iran has stopped construction at its potential plutonium reactor at Arak.  In short, Iran is further away from a nuclear weapon than it was a year ago—and that makes the world safer, including Israel.


Moreover, we’re not taking anything on trust.  What matters are Iran’s actions, not its words.  That’s why, as part of the Joint Plan of Action, we’ve insisted upon—and achieved—unprecedented access to Iran’s nuclear program.  Before the Joint Plan, inspections happened only every few weeks, sometimes every few months.  Today, the International Atomic Energy Agency has daily access at Iran’s key nuclear sites at Natanz and Fordow, verifying that Iran is meeting its commitments.  If I can paraphrase, President Reagan, with a twist, our approach is “distrust and verify.”


Second, we’ve kept the pressure on Iran.  I know this firsthand because, when I was U.N. ambassador, President Obama personally directed me to make sure that the Security Council’s sanctions had bite—and they do.  Today, even with limited sanctions relief, Iran’s economy remains isolated from the international finance system and cut off from the vast majority of its foreign currency reserves.  Iran’s oil exports have dropped almost 60 percent since 2012.  The rial has depreciated by more than 50 percent.  And, Iran’s overall GDP has shrunk by almost 10 percent.  All told, sanctions have deprived Iran of more than $200 billion in lost oil revenues.


But sanctions are a tool, not an end in themselves.  The question now, after the pressure that we and our partners have brought to bear, is whether we can verify that Iran cannot pursue a nuclear weapon.  The question now is whether we can achieve a comprehensive deal.  A good deal.


This is my third point—a good deal is one that would verifiably cut off every pathway for Iran to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon.  Every single one.


Any deal must prevent Iran from developing weapons-grade plutonium at Arak, or anywhere else.


Any deal must prevent Iran from enriching uranium at its nuclear facility at Fordow—a site we uncovered buried deep underground and revealed to the world in 2009.



Any deal must increase the time it takes Iran to reach breakout capacity—the time it would take to produce a single bomb’s worth of weapons-grade uranium.  Today, experts suggest Iran’s breakout window is just two to three months.  We seek to extend that to at least one year.


Any deal must ensure frequent and intrusive inspections at Iran’s nuclear sites—including the uranium mills that produce the material fed into Iran’s enrichment and conversion facilities—to create a multi-layered transparency regime that provides the international community with the confidence it demands.  That’s the best way to prevent Iran from pursuing a covert path to a nuclear weapon—to stop Iran from working toward a bomb in secret.


Any deal must address the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.  And, going forward, we will not accept a deal that fails to provide the access we need to ensure that Iran’s program is peaceful.


And, any deal must last more than a decade—with additional provisions ensuring greater transparency into Iran’s program for an even longer period of time.


That’s what we’re working toward—a good, long-term, comprehensive deal that verifiably prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.


This brings me to my fourth point —we cannot let a totally unachievable ideal stand in the way of a good deal.  I know that some of you will be urging Congress to insist that Iran forego its domestic enrichment capacity entirely.  But, as desirable as that would be, it is neither realistic nor achievable.  Even our closest international partners in the P5+1 do not support denying Iran the ability ever to pursue peaceful nuclear energy.  If that is our goal, our partners will abandon us, undermining the sanctions we have imposed so effectively together.  Simply put, that is not a viable negotiating position.  Nor is it even attainable.  The plain fact is, no one can make Iran unlearn the scientific and nuclear expertise it already possesses.


We must also understand what will happen if these negotiations collapse. I know that some argue we should just impose sanctions and walk away.  But let’s remember that sanctions have never stopped Iran from advancing its program.  So here’s what’s likely to happen without a deal.  Iran will install and operate advanced centrifuges.  Iran will seek to fuel its reactor in Arak.  Iran will rebuild its uranium stockpile.  And, we'll lose the unprecedented inspections and transparency we have today.


Congress has played a hugely important role in helping to build our sanctions on Iran, but they shouldn’t play the spoiler now.  Additional sanctions or restrictive legislation enacted during the negotiation would blow up the talks, divide the international community, and cause the United States to be blamed for the failure to reach a deal—putting us in a much weaker position and endangering the sanctions regime itself.  Meanwhile, the Iranians are well aware that if they walk away from a deal, Congress will pass new sanctions immediately—and President Obama will support them.


So, if Iran refuses to resolve this matter diplomatically—and is clearly to blame for that failure—its isolation will only increase.  The costs will continue to grow.


Finally, I know that some question a deal of any duration.  But, it has always been clear that the pursuit of an agreement of indefinite duration would result in no agreement at all.  The question is, what is the best way to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon?  A deal that extends for a decade or more would accomplish this goal better than any other course of action – longer, by far, than military strikes, which would only set back Iran’s program for a fraction of the time.  And, at the end of any deal, Iran would still be required to offer comprehensive access to its nuclear facilities and to provide the international community the assurance that it was not pursuing nuclear weapons.  And, if it failed to do so, we would have the ability to make our own decisions about how to move forward, just as we do today.  There’s simply no alternative that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon better—or longer—than the type of deal we seek.


We can always bring consequences to bear for the sake of our shared security—harsh consequences.  But, precisely because this is such a serious issue, we must weigh the different options before us and choose the best one.  Sound bites won’t stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.  Strong diplomacy – backed by pressure – can.  And, if diplomacy fails, let’s make it clear to the world that it is Iran’s responsibility.


One final word on Iran: even if we succeed in neutralizing the nuclear threat from Iran, we will still face other threats—Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism, its gross violations of human rights, its efforts to destabilize neighboring states, its support for Assad and Hamas and Hezbollah, its intolerable threats against Israel.  Our sanctions against Iran on these issues will remain in place.  We will continue to counter Iran and the full range of threats it poses.  Tehran must understand—the United States will never, ever waver in the defense of our security or the security of our allies and partners, including Israel.


The bottom line is simple: we have Israel’s back, come hell or high water—and I’ve been right there with you all through some pretty high waters.  I was proud to fight again and again for Israel’s security and its basic legitimacy at the United Nations – from leading the charge against the deeply flawed Goldstone report to casting this administration’s only veto in the Security Council to block a counter-productive resolution.


As Ambassador Power described to you this morning, when it comes to combating the shameful bias against Israel at the U.N., Israel has no better friend than the United States.  Last March, we were the only ‘no’ vote in the Human Rights Council against anti-Israel measures five separate times.  Earlier today, Secretary Kerry told the Human Rights Council in Geneva, point blank, that its obsession with Israel risks undermining the credibility of the entire organization.  And last month, with Israel and the European Union, the U.S. organized the first U.N. General Assembly meeting to combat anti-Semitism.



No country is immune from criticism—take it from a former U.N. Ambassador.  But when criticism singles out one country unfairly, bitterly, viciously, over and over—that’s just wrong, and we all know it.  When one democracy’s legitimacy is attacked, over and over, uniquely among the U.N.’s member states, that’s ugly, and we all know it.  And, when anti-Semitism rears its head around the world, when Jews at a kosher supermarket in Paris are singled out and murdered by terrorists, when synagogues are attacked and cemeteries defaced, we have to call it by name.  It’s hate.  It’s anti-Semitism.  It reminds us of the most terrible chapters of human history.  It has no place in a civilized world, and we have to fight it.


These are big challenges.  But the United States and Israel have mastered plenty of big challenges before.  Israel and the United States are sister democracies built on the bedrock value that we are all created b’tzelem elokim—in the image of God.  And, like the Psalm says, how good it is when we sit in brotherhood together.  But God calls us to do more than sit.  God calls us to stand up.  To act.


This weekend, President Obama will travel to Selma, Alabama, to mark the 50th anniversary of the historic marches there.  He’ll pay tribute to those brave souls who took enormous risks for civil rights, including Jews and rabbis from across the country—from St. Louis and San Francisco; the Northeast and the Deep South.  They faced tear gas and billy clubs, Torahs in hand.  They were jailed.  They conducted Shabbat services behind bars, and they sang “Adon Olam” to the tune of “We Shall Overcome.”  They broke the fast of Esther in prison.  They even started a trend.  Some black marchers, moved by the solidarity of their Jewish brethren, started wearing yarmulkes—they called them “freedom caps.”


As you recalled last night, one of those on the front lines in Selma was the great teacher, Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel.  After marching across the Edmund Pettus Bridge with Dr. King, he reflected, “our legs uttered songs.  Even without words, our march was worship.”  Our march was our worship.


The Jewish community amplified the rightness and the urgency of the civil rights movement with its own unassailable moral compass—guided by the basic principle that people should be free in their own land.  And, I stand before you knowing that I and many others would not be where we are today without all those who fought for equal rights – African Americans and white Americans, including so many Jewish Americans.  As we mark that Selma anniversary, as we gather here to celebrate an improbable dream that grew into the great State of Israel, we remember what we can accomplish together, when we’re at our best.


In a spirit of brotherhood, we have overcome so many trials to reach where we are—as nations, as peoples.  In a spirit of brotherhood, inspired by all those who marched and struggled and sacrificed before us, let us continue the work.  Let us never succumb to hopelessness or cynicism, to division or despair.  Let our legs utter songs, and let our hands reach out together. That is how we fulfill our common commitment to mend our imperfect world, to do the holy work of tikkun olam.  And, as we do, at home and around the world, the United States will always stand with our Israeli friends and allies.


That’s our enduring commitment.  That’s our sacred duty.  That’s the hope and the future for our children.  So, let us keep marching arm in arm together.


Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY'S PRESS AVAILABILITY IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

Press Availability in Vienna, Austria

Press Availability

John Kerry

Secretary of State

Vienna, Austria

July 15, 2014

SECRETARY KERRY: Good morning, everyone. I want to first thank the extraordinary team of diplomats and experts who have been on the ground here for weeks and who have been working tirelessly, actually, for many months in these negotiations. And I’m talking about both our American team as well as our colleagues from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, and Iran, and particularly I would like to thank Baroness Cathy Ashton of the European Union and her team, whose stewardship of these negotiations has been indefatigable and superb.

In today’s world, it’s an understatement to say that diplomacy is difficult. But diplomacy is our preference for meeting the challenges that we do face all over the world, knowing even as we do that solutions are rarely perfect and nor do they all come at once. But that has never deterred us from pursuing the diplomatic course, and that is exactly what we are committed to doing and doing now.

President Obama has made it a top priority to pursue a diplomatic effort to see if we can reach an agreement that assures that the Iranian nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. In that effort, we have built a broad coalition of countries, including our P5+1 colleagues, to ensure that the international community is speaking with one voice. Despite the difficulties of these negotiations, I am confident that the United States and our partners in the P5+1 remain as squarely focused as ever on testing whether or not we can find a negotiated solution to this most pressing international security imperative.

Over the past few days, I have had lengthy conversations with Foreign Minister Zarif about what Iran is willing to do and what it needs to do to not only assure the community of nations, but to adhere to what the foreign minister himself has said repeatedly are Iran’s own limited objectives: not just to declare that they will not obtain a nuclear weapon, but to demonstrate in the actions they take beyond any reasonable doubt that any Iranian nuclear program, now and going forward, is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

In these conversations, and indeed over the last almost six months since the Joint Plan of Action took effect, we have made progress. We have all kept the commitments made in the Joint Plan, and we have all lived up to our obligations. We have all continued to negotiate in good faith. But after my conversations here with both Iran and with our P5+1 partners in particular, it is clear that we still have more work to do.

Our team will continue working very hard to try to reach a comprehensive agreement that resolves the international community’s concerns. I am returning to Washington today to consult with President Obama and with leaders in Congress over the coming days about the prospects for a comprehensive agreement, as well as a path forward if we do not achieve one by the 20th of July, including the question of whether or not more time is warranted, based on the progress we’ve made and how things are going.

As I have said, and I repeat, there has been tangible progress on key issues, and we had extensive conversations in which we moved on certain things. However, there are also very real gaps on other key issues. And what we are trying to do is find a way for Iran to have an exclusively peaceful nuclear program, while giving the world all the assurances required to know that Iran is not seeking a nuclear weapon.

I want to underscore: These goals are not incompatible. In fact, they are realistic. But we have not yet found the right combination or arrived at the workable formula. There are more issues to work through and more provisions to nail down to ensure that Iran’s program will always remain exclusively peaceful. So we are going to continue to work and we’re going to continue to work with the belief that there is a way forward.

But – and this is a critical point – while there is a path forward, Iran needs to choose to take it. And our goal now is to determine the precise contours of that path, and I believe we can.

With that, I’d be happy to take a few questions.

MS. HARF: The first question is from Jo Biddle of the AFP. Go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. You said that you’re returning to Washington for further consultations with President Obama, but you did say that the July 20th deadline is still on the table. How confident are you that you can get an agreement by July 20th? And if we’re talking about an extension, have you any idea how long that could be?

And I wanted to ask you about reports that – today quoting Mr. Foreign Minister Zarif that the Iranians are proposing a freeze on a nuclear program for a few years in return for being later treated as a country with a peaceful nuclear energy.

SECRETARY KERRY: I’m sorry. That got garbled in – take – hold the mike a little bit away.

QUESTION: Sorry.

SECRETARY KERRY: A little bit away, sorry.

QUESTION: There was a report in The New York Times today, an interview with Foreign Minister Zarif, in which he suggested that the Iranians have proposed freezing their nuclear program for a few years in return for being treated later as a country with a peaceful nuclear civilian energy program. Does this meet any U.S. demands or is this one of the real gaps that you’re still talking about?

And if I may, can I just ask you about the crisis in Gaza as well? Did you talk with Foreign Minister Zarif about this? Are you asking the Iranians to use their leverage with Hamas? And what could the United States do to try to achieve an implementation of a ceasefire which Hamas appears to have rejected? Thank you very much.

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, with respect to the issue of July 20th, yes, it’s obviously still on the table and we’re still working, and we’re going to continue to work. The team will be here. They’ll continue to meet. And I will, as I said, go back to Washington to talk to the President and also our team back there in order to assess where we think we are with respect to the progress that we have made.

As I said, we have made progress, and there is work still to do, and we believe there is a path forward, so let’s see what happens in the next hours and days. I’m obviously prepared to come back here if we have the team say to me that there’s a reason to do so, but I have no plans to do so as I leave to go back to Washington to consult with the President.

With respect to the issue of the – what was in The New York Times and the question of a gap or no gap, I am definitively not going to negotiate in public. I’m not going to comment on any stories with respect to substance one way or the other. The real negotiation is not going to be done in the public eye; it’s going to be done in the private meetings that we’re having, and it is being done there. And I might add these are tough negotiations. The Iranians are strong in their positions. They understand what their needs are, we understand what ours are. Both are working in good faith to try to find a way forward.

And as I said, I think we’ve made some progress. Obviously, there’s more work to do. We’ll assess where we are in the next few days and make judgments at that point in time. And we don’t do this, obviously, exclusively. We are part of a team, the P5+1. Our partners, all of them, weigh in equally in this decision, and we need to be consulting as we go forward.

With respect to Gaza, let me say a few words. I cannot condemn strongly enough the actions of Hamas in so brazenly firing rockets in multiple numbers in the face of a goodwill effort to offer a ceasefire in which Egypt and Israel have joined together, and the international community strongly supports the idea of a ceasefire, the need – the compelling need to have a ceasefire. At the same time, there are great risks in what is happening there and in the potential of an even greater escalation of violence. We don’t want to see that – nobody does – and nor does Israel.

But Israel has a right to defend itself, and it is important for Hamas not to be provoking and purposefully trying to play politics in order to gain greater followers for its opposition, and use the innocent lives of civilians who they hide in buildings and use as shields and put in danger. That is against the laws of war and that’s why they are a terrorist organization. So we need to remember what is at stake here, and we will continue to work for a ceasefire.

Now at the moment, one of the reasons I’m going to Washington and not to Egypt, just to answer possibly another question ahead of time, is because there was this offer on the table, and we believe that it was important to give this offer an opportunity. And I still think perhaps reason could prevail if the political wing can deal with the military wing and Egypt can have some leverage. Let’s see what happens.

But we are prepared, as the United States is always prepared – and President Obama has said this again and again – to do everything in our power to help the parties come together to work to create a climate for genuine negotiations to be able to deal with the issues that truly separate these parties, and we stand prepared to do that. I am prepared to fly back to the region tomorrow if I have to, or the next day or the next, in order to pursue the prospects if this doesn’t work. But they deserve – the Egyptians deserve the time and the space to be able to try to make this initiative work, and we hope it will.

We urge all parties to support this ceasefire, and we support and we ask all the members of the Arab community, as they did yesterday at the Arab League meeting in Cairo, to continue to press to try to get Hamas to do the right thing here, which is cease the violence, engage in a legitimate negotiation, and protect the lives of people that they seem all too willing to put to risk.

MS. HARF: Our next question is from Lou Charbonneau of Reuters.

QUESTION: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I wanted to return to the issue of Iran first. The Supreme Leader of Iran last week had a major speech in which he spoke of Iran needing the equivalent of what some see is as many as 190,000 older-generation centrifuges over the long term, a kind of massive industrial scale. How did you respond – how did you react to this speech? And in your meetings here with the Iranians, have you seen any sign of a new and substantial flexibility on the Iranian side since your Washington Post op-ed two weeks ago, enough progress that could, in theory, justify an extension?

And then I wanted to add on a question about Libya, where the situation is quite alarming. The UN is pulling out its staff and there has been shelling of as many as 90 planes at the airport. Thanks.

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, with respect to the Supreme Leader’s speech on the 190,000 centrifuges, that’s not a new figure. It didn’t come as a surprise to me or to others. And what it is is it’s a reflection of Iran’s current ambitions with respect to a nuclear power program, and it reflects a long-term perception of what they currently have in their minds with respect to nuclear plants to provide power. It is not something, I think, that’s meant – and I think it was framed that way, I believe, in the speech.

Obviously, that’s not – I’m not going to get into what we’re talking about in numbers or whatever, but we have made it crystal clear that the 19,000 that are currently part of their program is too many, and that we need to deal with the question of enrichment. And so all I will say to you is that we will continue to press.

Now I do want Iran to understand, I want the Supreme Leader to know, that the United States believes that Iran has a right to have a peaceful nuclear program under Article IV of the NPT – there’s no question about that – a peaceful program. And what we are now working on is: How do you guarantee that what they do have is in fact purely peaceful and that it adheres to the stated intentions of the Supreme Leader and other leaders of Iran never to have a nuclear weapon?

Now, the Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa. We take that very seriously. The fatwa issued by a cleric is an extremely powerful statement about intent. But it is our need to codify it. We can’t take any declaration because that’s not what a negotiation nor a nuclear agreement is about. It’s about verifiable, specific steps by which parties that have disagreed can agree that they know each of them what they’re doing and how they’re living up to their responsibilities. And that’s what we’re seeing in this particular effort.

So Iran can have a peaceful nuclear program and they know how to get there. It’s by living up to the demands of the international community, the United Nations Security Council; the IAEA questions need to be answered, the additional protocol needs to be adhered to; and a specific set of verification and transparency measures need to be put in place among other things that make the promises real. That’s the nature. It’s not specific to Iran. Any country would be in the same place and need to do the same thing, as they do with respect to any kind of agreement.

Libya: We are obviously deeply concerned about the level of violence in Libya, and every single day in the State Department, we make assessments about the level of violence, about our personnel who are there, about our Embassy, about the overall nature of the violence. And that is why President Obama has appointed a special envoy, David Satterfield, a diplomat with a great deal of experience who most recently filled in in Egypt. And he has been working very closely with Jonathan Powell, the British special envoy, and with other special envoys – France, Italy – all of them focused on how we can transition Libya away from this militia violence, which is what is threatening the airport at the moment. It is not violence that has broken out every single day, all day. It’s mostly fighting at night and it is not threatening broadly every interest within Libya, but it is dangerous and it must stop. And we are working very, very hard through our special envoys to find the political cohesion, the glue that can bring people together to create stronger capacity in the governance of Libya so that this violence can end. And we’ll continue to stay very, very precisely focused on it.

MS. HARF: And our final question is from Amir Paivar of BBC Persia.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, Secretary Kerry. Many Iranians wonder – I would like to be very specific – why the U.S. and the world powers would not accept Iran maintain, say, 10,000 centrifuges. And here, I’m not haggling over numbers, but if the other terms of the deal are secure, numbers capped, degree of enrichment low, inspections intrusive – if trust is an issue, they say, both Iran and the United States have their checkered history when it comes to nuclear capability.

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, as I said earlier, when you start asking about specific numbers of centrifuges and so forth, you get into a zone of public disclosure that is just not helpful to the negotiations at this point in time. So I’m not going to talk about a specific number, what number might work, not work, what we will accept, won’t accept. All of those questions belong at the negotiating table, and that’s where they are.

But let me just say, in general terms, this is not an issue of trust. This is an issue of factual process by which you can verify on a day-to-day basis what is happening. Now why do we need to do that? Why are there P5+1 at the table? Why is China joining with Russia, joining with the United States, joining with Germany, France, and Britain – all of them together at the table demanding the same thing, as well as the rest of the world through the United Nations Security Council and the resolutions?

This is not a fabricated issue. The reason that trust has to be built and a process of transparency and accountability has to be created is because over the years, a secret program has been pursued in a deep, under-the-ground, mountaintop facility that was concealed for a long time until it was discovered, and levels of enrichment have been going on on a regular basis and serious questions raised about weaponization in that context.

Now we’re working to answer those questions, and I want to – Foreign Minister Zarif is a tough negotiator. He knows how to fight for what he is fighting for. But he’s been clear, as we have been clear, about what we need to do to try to arrive at a fair, reasonable way to meet both parties’ rights and interests in this situation. And I believe that, as I said, we’ve made progress, and I think both of us can see ways in which we could make further progress and hopefully answer those questions.

But I’m not going to get into why Iran might have done that or who pushed who in what direction or what mistakes were made in the past. You can go back to the 1950s and find lots of things that have happened that have given rise to the relationship we’re in today. What we want to do is try and see if that’s changeable, put that to the test. The first test is to answer the questions and come up with a formula that says to the world this is a peaceful nuclear program, and it cannot be used to make weapons and we know that to a certainty. The test is: Can we know whether or not Iran is able to and is or might be building a nuclear weapon?

Now we’re going to continue to do what we are doing here. We’re going to work hard to try to find this agreement. This is not just important to the United States, Iran, and the P5; it’s important to the world. And it is important for us to try to work hard in order to see if we can find success, and that’s what we’re going to continue to do.

MS. HARF: Great. Thank you, everyone.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you all. Appreciate it very much. We’ll see you again at some point, I’m sure.

STATE DEPARTMENT SPECIAL BRIEFING ON P5+1 TALKS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Background Briefing on the Upcoming P5+1 Talks on Iran's Nuclear Program

Special Briefing

Senior Administration Official

Via Teleconference

April 4, 2014

---

MODERATOR: Thank you so much, and welcome, everyone, to today’s conference call backgrounder. We have a Senior Administration Official with us. For your knowledge, it’s [Senior Administration Official]. From now on, just will be referred to as a Senior Administration Official. Again, all of this is on background. So [Senior Administration Official] will make some opening remarks, and then we will open it up to folks for question per the instructions the operator just gave.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon, everybody, and happy Friday. Thank you for calling into this backgrounder today. We thought it made sense, as we did last time, to do this prior to landing in Vienna to ensure that we can get more of you on the line and sort of tee up what’s upcoming. I’ll start with a few words about this third round of talks in the comprehensive negotiations, and then, of course, take your questions as usual.
We head back to Vienna for this round of talks clear-eyed about the challenges ahead and determined to keep making progress on these very difficult issues. We will have more topical discussions like we had in March, with both sides laying out their positions and trying to better understand where each of us are on the various issues. This process has been helpful in setting the table as we prepare to dive much more deeply into what a comprehensive agreement might actually look like on paper and what everyone might be able to agree to.

As always, these political director conversations follow on the tremendous work of our experts, who have been and are still now in Vienna meeting with their counterparts and will be doing so through probably mid-day on Saturday. And they have had quite intense, and from the initial readouts I’ve gotten, continue to be productive and constructive conversations. As we’ve said, putting this agreement together will really be like solving a Rubik’s cube. We can’t look at any one issue in isolation, but rather will have to consider what package we can all agree to that will meet the objectives that we have.

We are looking to ensure we have the right combination of measures in place to ensure Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon and that it’s program is exclusively peaceful. As we work to bridge the gaps that exist to see if we can find that right combination, the pace of our work will intensify even more than it is today.
And with that, I will be glad to take your questions.

MODERATOR: Great. Thank you. Looks like our first question is from Indira with Bloomberg News.

QUESTION: Thank you. I wanted to ask you two things. First off, about the reports that have resurfaced of a possible Iran-Russia $20 billion oil-for-goods deal. And in the past, the White House and other senior Administration officials have expressed concern that this would be a serious concern, but they have also said that there is no sign of Russia or anyone else violating the oil sanctions. So could we find out from you what is your latest on that? What information do you have about that deal possibly going ahead?

And related to that, has the problems – have the problems with Russia over Crimea bled over into the Iran negotiations at any level? We’ve seen some remarks from Sergei Ryabkov, that suggested that in the aftermath of the last talks that Russia might play the Iran card against the U.S. in this Crimea-Ukraine issue.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks, Indira. On the Russia-Iran oil-for-goods, we’ve seen reports that you all have written on the purported deal or potential for a deal between Russia and Iran. We do not have any information to suggest this deal has been culminated or implemented or begun to be executed or finalized. We’ve been very clear about our concerns with both parties regarding this or any similar deal. If such a deal were to happen, it appears it would be inconsistent with the terms of the P5+1 plus European Union Joint Plan of Action and could potentially trigger U.S. sanctions against the entity and individuals involved in any related transaction. But we have conveyed this directly to all parties, as we do in any situation that we see developing where there might be concerns of sanctionable activity.
Regarding Russia and its illegitimate action in Crimea, which we still do not and the international community does not recognize as legal and legitimate – we believe in the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including Crimea. It has not had any appreciable or substantive impact on the negotiations. As I said at the end of the last round, Sergei Ryabkov was constructive, professional, and very much focused, as were all the members of the P5+1 and the European Union on our work. My understanding is in the experts talks that have been ongoing the same is true. And I’m aware of the remarks, obviously, that Sergei made after the last round. We have all understood privately that we have to be very mindful of the tremendous responsibility that the United Nations has given to the P5+1 and the European Union to try to reach an agreement with Iran, and that has to be the focus of our attention.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MODERATOR: Thanks. It looks like our next question is from Elise Labott of CNN.

QUESTION: Thank you for doing this one, Senior Administration Official. (Laughter.) I’m just wondering – I mean, I know that there’s been this goal to do it within a year, but I mean, how far along do you really think you are in terms of – I know you say it’s a Rubik’s cube, you’ll need to fit all the pieces together. But do you find that you’re making progress towards that goal? And I mean, are you confident that you’re going to be able to finish it within the year? I guess that’s my main question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, thank you, CNN. (Laughter.) Elise, we are committed to – all of the parties are committed to not finishing this in a year but finishing this in the six-month frame of the Joint Plan of Action by July 20^th. And I’m absolutely convinced that we can, though the real issue is not about whether you can write the words on paper, do the drafting; it’s about the choices that Iran has to make, and some of them are very difficult. And in order to ensure that they will not obtain a nuclear weapon and that the international community has the assurances it needs that their program is entirely and exclusively peaceful, they will have to make some significant changes and some significant choices. So this will be about the decisions that Iran makes, but the drafting is certainly doable.

QUESTION: But how close are you? Not – I don’t expect at this point in the process that you would be close to a deal. But in terms of how the negotiations are progressing, do you see --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have – we set out a work plan of how we were going to proceed to get to a comprehensive agreement, and we are on pace with the work plan that was set out. We were very conscious that we were going to use the March and April rounds to go over every single issue that we believed had to be addressed in a comprehensive agreement and make sure we understood each other on those issues, both at a macro level as well as at a technical level, because this is a highly, highly, highly technical agreement. And that’s why – pardon me while I take a sip of water, the allergy season has gotten to me. That is why it’s so critical that our experts spend quite a bit of time in conversation going through the technical details of what each other means by what they are saying.

So we are on pace with that work plan, looking toward beginning drafting in May and as we get through this month and begin to start to work that process. So we’re on pace with the work plan that we all set out with each other.

MODERATOR: Great, thanks. Our next question is from Lou Charbonneau of Reuters.

QUESTION: Hi, thanks for doing this. I wanted to follow up on the question that the – that CNN asked. And the fact that you just said that you’re not going to start drafting until May, I mean, my understanding is that there are still some pretty serious fundamental disagreements on some of the main things expected from the beginning would be difficult, namely enrichment, R&D, the scope of that, how much uranium they’re going to be able to keep and what level at that to keep at any given time. How much progress have you made in the last few weeks in overcoming the differences on those very difficult issues which are going to be the ones that ultimately decide success or failure of this whole process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think I’ve told you all before so you won’t be surprised to hear me say again that I’m not going to negotiate in public. What I will say is that we understand each other very well. We know where we can see points of agreement. We know where the gaps are that have to be bridged. But I’ve also said this is a Rubik’s cube, and where one makes progress on one element may mean there’s more trade space on another element. So it’s very – it’s literally impossible to say okay, I can see a way forward here without understanding its impact on the way forward there. So it has to be looked at in its entirety, not just element by element.

QUESTION: But if I can just follow up quickly, even though – I mean, stepping away from the Rubik’s cube analogy for a moment, what percentage of the issues would you say that you’ve managed to reach some kind of understanding and what percentage remains difficult? And I realize that some – there could be 2 percent of the issues that are unresolved, and those could ultimately break the deal.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think you’ve answered your own question, which is the percentages don’t matter, even if I could give you a percentage, which I can’t. But the percentages don’t matter because the Joint Plan of Action says nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, and I would add to that nothing is agreed till everyone agrees to it.
So it doesn’t matter, exactly as you said. Even if you got agreement on everything but there were two last sticking points, you have to resolve those two last sticking points. As we finished the Joint Plan of Action, there were a handful of brackets, and until you resolved all of those brackets, there was no agreement, even though you’d resolved a great deal of the text. So it only matters when you get to an agreement.

MODERATOR: Great. Thanks, Lou. Our next question is from Barak Ravid of Haaretz.

QUESTION: Hi. Thanks. I was wondering – the last round of talks the U.S. negotiations team didn’t go to Israel after the talks to brief, while that usually used to be the case. I was wondering if there’s any plan to do it now.

And the second question: There was – there were reports that the U.S. gave Iran some kind of a proposal about transforming the Arak reactor from a heavy-water reactor to a light-water reactor. Can you say anything about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So we maintain very close consultations with a number of partners and countries of interest all around the world, including Israel. And sometimes that means that I’ve traveled with my team to brief. Sometimes that means we do it by a video conference or phone or meetings here in Washington. So there are a variety ways, but that close consultation with Israel and with a number of other countries continues on a regular basis, and will for this round as well.

In terms of proposals about the Arak reactor, I’m not going to discuss any specifics in these briefings, as you can imagine. This is a negotiation, and that means it has to stay in the room.

MODERATOR: Great. Thanks. Our next question is from Karen DeYoung of The Washington Post.

QUESTION: Hi. I think this is sort of a variation on the theme that others have spoken on before. The Iranians said at the close of the last negotiations that we’ve done the framework planning, we’ve done the technical stuff, and the next time we’re going to get down to real issues. But it doesn’t sound, from what you’re saying, that that’s necessarily the case, that you’re still – at least until the first of May, you’re still kind of laying the table. Is that – would that be a fair assessment?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: No. Well, Karen, when you lay the table, you get down to real and serious issues. I think Minister Zarif laid out the issues that we held discussions on in the last round, and believe me, they were quite substantive discussions, quite detailed, quite technical. And in those discussions, one begins to – in fact begin to see the areas of agreement and the areas where there are still gaps that have to be overcome.
So I would say we’ve been getting down to the serious business even in the last round. We will do that on all of the remaining issues as well as revisit some of the issues from the last round, because we sent our experts away with a set of work products that we wanted from them to try to be able to advance our discussions further. So all of this work is quite substantive, quite detailed, quite technical, and meant to make the actual drafting an easier process.

QUESTION: Can I just follow up on that for a second? The Iranians have made several comments over the past couple of weeks basically saying under no circumstances will we give up the Arak reactor and things along those lines. Are those things that you just consider part of the chaff as the negotiations go on, or to what extent do you feel that you have to clarify those issues with the negotiators when you sit down?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We’re quite direct and quite straightforward with each other, so I don’t think there’s any mystery about positions. And what we are focused on is what is discussed in the room, not what anyone says on the outside.

MODERATOR: Great. Thanks. Our next question is from Michael Adler.

QUESTION: Hi. Thank you for doing this. Just – I don’t want to beat this to death, but – (laughter) – but when you say you’re getting down to drafting, does that mean that that’s when the give-and-take of finding out how much

concessions people are willing to make is going on, or will that be more in June than in May?
And a second question: What is your assessment at this point about how the sanctions regime overall is holding up? And do you see any signs that the Iranians might be using the time you’re taking to lay the table to determine just how much they’re going to have to give in terms of where the sanctions regime is in May or June?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So what I would say, Michael, is from day one, we were already testing each other, looking at assumptions, seeing where there might be areas of agreement, areas that had to be bridged. So that give-and-take starts the moment you begin a discussion. The negotiations have been going on since before the Joint Plan of Action over the comprehensive agreement, and the Joint Plan of Action, in fact, laid a framework for the comprehensive agreement. So give-and-take has been going on for months now. So we’re not talking about, all of a sudden, this is going to start one day. It began many months ago. And all of it set a frame and all of it set the conditions for a comprehensive agreement.
So I don’t think you can say we’re going to wait until May or going to wait until June or going to wait until July. It is constant. It is constant. And it’ll get refined and refined and refined until we hope we can reach a comprehensive agreement that ensures that Iran will not obtain a nuclear weapon and that the international community is assured that its program is entirely and exclusively peaceful.

As far as the sanctions regime is holding up, I think that it is. We gave limited, targeted relief for the six-month period of the Joint Plan of Action. We have fulfilled our commitments in that regard. And that is all moving forward in the way that had been agreed to. And so Iran is getting that limited targeted relief, and I’m sure that Iran is assessing what it needs for the future, how it needs it, and what impact that has on getting to a comprehensive agreement, just as we are assessing it from the other side of the table.

QUESTION: Can I just – a quick follow-up? If the give-and-take has started, do you already have an idea about how likely it is that you’re going to get an acceptable package and get compromise on those key terms that make up the Rubik’s Cube?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I go back to what I said a moment ago: Until everything is agreed, nothing is agreed.

QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question is from Elliot Waldman of Tokyo Broadcasting.

QUESTION: Hello, hi. Thanks for doing this. I have just a couple questions, one on levels of Iranian oil exports. There are reports that those export levels are rising, have been rising rapidly the past few months. Is it still your understanding that this level is within what’s allowed by the JPOA? And what are you – are you coordinating not only with China but also countries like Japan and the ROK and India, who have shown quite an appetite for Iranian oil?

And then also, how do you expect this issue of the Iranian ambassadorial nomination to the UN, Mr. Aboutalebi, to impact the nomination – the negotiations? I know Marie has said that they’re separate, but realistically, given the importance of congressional involvement and the fact that so many members of Congress have expressed outrage about this, what’s your level of concern that this could be an issue going forward? Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In terms of the oil exports, as we have always said, we expect there to be fluctuations. They go up and down month to month. What we care about is the aggregate over the period of time that’s agreed to. We have had teams talk to each of the remaining importers of Iranian oil, and we feel comfortable that in fact, they will meet the target that we have, and there’s nothing to lead us to believe otherwise at this time. We, of course, keep continuous eye on this and in continuous discussion with all of the importers.
In terms of the report that there is a possible nomination for the Iranian permanent representative at the United Nations, we of course have seen these reports. If in fact this possible nomination were in fact the person nominated, it would be extremely troubling, as both our deputy spokesperson has said and as the White House spokesperson has said. We are taking a close look at this case now and we have raised our serious concerns about this possible nomination with the Government of Iran through a variety of channels that we use to convey our concerns.

QUESTION: All right. Do you expect it to have any specific impact on the P5+1 negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All I can say at this time regarding this is that if this possible nomination were the nomination, it would be extremely troubling, and we have raised those concerns with the Iranians.

QUESTION: All right. Thank you.

MODERATOR: Great, thanks. Our next question is from Kasra Naji of BBC.

QUESTION: Yes. I just wondered – I’ve got two or three questions, actually. The first one: In recent days in Washington, there have been suggestions that there should be some kind of a threat of use of force by President – by the President of the United States to strengthen any kind of agreement that is going to be reached, hopefully. Is that a new development? Is that going to change attitudes in Iran, do you think? A.

B, on the issue of Russia and how they’re going to play this Iranian card or not playing the Iranian card, I just wondered, you said, if they do come with – on that agreement about this huge deal on oil exports and so on, you said it would be inconsistent with Iran +5 talks and its aims. If that happens, what will be the position of the United States within the P5+1?

And a third question: The third question is about these reports from Iran that Iran is actually having trouble getting its hands on the money that was supposed to be released under the Geneva agreement. Have you heard that? Can you confirm that? And do you know why that – there’s a problem there? Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. I think you’re referring to a report about a Brookings Institution publication, and we very much value all of the think tanks in Washington, D.C. Obviously, members of Congress, leaders and thinkers all over the world who have suggested things to us in the negotiation have put down on paper their ideas about how things go forward, and all of this is a very valuable input to our thinking through this negotiation. I would point out, just for a factual matter, I think the way that particular report is written, as you said, is that Congress would take such action if Iran pulled out of a negotiated agreement. So it’s really something that I think they were discussing down the road. But regardless, we listen to all variety of voices with very, very different positions because this is tough, this is difficult, and we’re happy to hear everybody’s ideas.

In terms of the Russia for oil deal, if it – a Russia-Iran oil deal, if it happened, we would take a look at the deal, and if it in fact was sanctionable, we would take the appropriate action. All of the members – rest of the members of the P5+1 and the European Union are well aware of the implications if such an agreement were to occur.

And third, your question about Iran having trouble getting their hands – you’ll have to ask the Iranians for their comments on that. The United States, the European Union, we have done everything that we made a commitment to do in the Joint Plan of Action and our teams have been working very hard to facilitate everything that was required in the JPOA.

MODERATOR: Great, thank you. And I think we have time for one more question from Hannah Kaviani of Radio Free Europe.

QUESTION: Yeah, thank you. Hi. I have a question about a few reports which we’re seeing there about Congress going to move towards a new set of sanctions, non-nuclear terrorism related, on Iran. Al-Monitor also reported on this first. And I wanted to see if the – you’re aware of this move, and if yes, how do you think or how the Administration think it’s going to affect the talks with Iran?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We’ve seen reports that folks are considering some additional legislation that are non-nuclear related. I can’t comment on legislative proposals that I haven’t seen.

MODERATOR: Great. Thank you. I think --

QUESTION: Wait.

MODERATOR: Oops, sorry. Did you have a quick follow-up, or did you say thank you?

QUESTION: No, it’s okay. Thank you.

MODERATOR: Okay, thank you. Well, thanks to everyone for jumping on the phone on a Friday afternoon. As always, this was on background, Senior Administration Official. We’ll send the transcript out, and we will see hopefully many of you very soon in Vienna.

SECRETARY OF STATE KERRY'S STATEMENT ON AGREEMENT WITH IRAN ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, 
The P5+1's First Step Agreement With Iran on its Nuclear Program
Testimony
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Opening Remarks Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Washington, DC
December 10, 2013

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very much. Ranking Member Engel, Members of the Committee, thanks very much for welcoming me back, and I am happy to be back here. There’s no more important issue in American foreign policy than the question of the one we’re focused on here today.

And obviously, from the Chairman’s introduction, you know that I come here with an enormous amount of respect for your prerogatives on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as we did in the Senate. And it’s entirely appropriate that we’re here to satisfy your questions, hopefully allay your concerns and fears, because I believe the agreement that we have ought to do that and I think the path that we’re on should do that. And as I describe it to you, I hope you’ll leave here today with a sense of confidence that we know what we’re doing, our eyes are open, we have no illusions. It’s a tough road. I don’t come here with any guarantees whatsoever. And I think none of what we’ve done in this agreement begs that notion. In other words, everything is either verifiable or clear, and there are a set of requirements ahead of us which will even grow more so in the course of a comprehensive agreement. And we can talk about that – I’m sure we will – in the course of the day.

Let me just begin by saying that President Obama and I have both been very clear, as every member of this committee has been, that Iran must not acquire a nuclear weapon. And it is the President’s centerpiece of his foreign policy: Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon. This imperative is at the top of our national security agenda, and I know it’s at the top of yours as well. So I really do welcome the opportunity to have a discussion not only about what the first-step agreement does, but also to clarify – I hope significantly – what it doesn’t do, because there’s a certain, as there is in any of these kinds of things, a certain mythology that sometimes grows up around them.

The title of today’s hearing is “The Iran Nuclear Deal: Does It Further U.S. National Security?” And I would state to you unequivocally the answer is yes. The national security of the United States is stronger under this first-step agreement than it was before. Israel’s national security is stronger than it was the day before we entered into this agreement. And the Gulf and Middle East interests are more secure than they were the day before we entered this agreement.

Now, here’s how:

Put simply, once implemented – and it will be in the next weeks – this agreement halts the progress of Iran’s nuclear program – halts the progress – and rolls it back in certain places for the first time in nearly ten years. It provides unprecedented monitoring and inspections. While we negotiate to see if we can conclude a comprehensive agreement – if we can conclude – and I came away from our preliminary negotiations with serious questions about whether or not they’re ready and willing to make some of the choices that have to be made. But that’s what we put to test over the next months. While we negotiate to see if we can conclude a comprehensive agreement that addresses all of our concerns, there’s an important fact: Iran’s nuclear program will not move forward.

Under this agreement, Iran will have to neutralize – end – its entire stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium, which you all know is a short step away from weapons-grade uranium. So if you remember when Prime Minister Netanyahu held up that cartoon at the UN with the bomb in it in 2012, he showed the world a chart that highlighted the type of uranium that he was most concerned about – and he was talking about that 20 percent stockpile. Under this agreement, Iran will forfeit all – not part, all – of that 20 percent, that 200 kilogram stockpile. Gone.

Under this agreement, Iran will also halt the enrichment above 5 percent and it will not be permitted to grow its stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium. Iran cannot increase the number of centrifuges in operation, and it will not install or use any next-generation centrifuges to enrich uranium.

Under this agreement, we will have increased transparency of Iran’s nuclear program, giving us a window into their activities that we don’t have today. We will have access to Fordow, a secret facility in a mountaintop that we’ve never been in. We will now get into it not once or twice – every single day. We will get into Natanz and have the ability to know not once or twice, but every single day what is happening in Natanz. And we will have access each month to the Arak facility, where we will have an extraordinary ability to be able to know through inspections whether or not they are complying with their requirements.

Now, this monitoring is going to increase our visibility into Iran’s nuclear program as well as our ability to react should Iran renege on this agreement. And taken together, these first steps will help prevent Iran from using the cover of negotiations to continue advancing its nuclear program in secret – a concern that everybody on this dais shares.

Now, in addition – this is very important – one of our greatest concerns has been the Arak – A-r-a-k – nuclear reactor facility. And this is a heavy-water, plutonium-capable reactor. That’s unacceptable to us. In the first step, we have now succeeded in preventing them from doing any additional fuel testing, from transferring any fuel rods into the reactor, and from installing any of the uninstalled components which are critical to their ability to be able to advance that particular reactor. So it’s frozen stone cold where it is in terms of its nuclear threat and capacity. Iran will not be able to commission the Arak reactor during the course of this interim first-step agreement. That’s very important.

Now, we have strong feelings about what will happen in a final comprehensive agreement. From our point of view, Arak is unacceptable. You can’t have a heavy-water reactor. But we’ve taken the first step in the context of a first step, and they will have to halt production of fuel for this reactor and not transfer any fuel or heavy water to the reactor site. It cannot conduct any additional fuel testing for this. and Iran is required to give us design information for the site. We’re actually going to have the plans for the site delivered to us. We’ve long sought this information, and it will provide critical insight into the reactor that has not been previously available to us through intel or any other sources.

Now, those are the highlights of what we get in this agreement. And I know many of you have asked, “Well, what does Iran get in return?” And I’ve seen outlandish numbers out there in some articles talking about 30, 40, 50 billion dollars and so forth, or disintegration of the sanctions. My friends, that’s just not true. It’s absolutely not true. We have red-teamed and vetted and cross-examined and run through all the possible numbers through the intel community, through the Treasury Department, through the people in charge of sanctions, and our estimates are that at the end of the six months, if they fully comply, if this holds, they would have somewhere in the vicinity of $7 billion total.

And this is something that I think you ought to take great pride in. I was here as chairman when we put his in place. I voted for these sanctions, like we all did in the United States Senate. I think we were 100 to nothing as a matter of fact. And we put them in place for a purpose. The purpose was to get to this negotiation. The purpose was to see whether or not diplomacy and avoidance of war could actually deliver the same thing or better than you might be able to get through confrontation.

Now, sanctions relief is limited to the very few targeted areas that are specified in this agreement for a total of about the $7 billion that I’ve described. And we will continue to vigorously – Ranking Member Engel, we will absolutely not only will we – I mean, this is going to actually result in a greater intensity of focus on the sanctions because I’ve sent a message to every single facility of the United States anywhere in the world that every agency is to be on alert to see any least movement by anybody towards an effort to try to circumvent or undo the sanctions. We don’t believe that will happen. And one of the reasons it won’t happen is we have a united P5+1. Russia, China, the United States, France, Germany, and Great Britain are all united in this assurance that we will not undo the sanctions and that we will stay focused on their enforcement.

Now, all the sanctions on Iran further on its abysmal human rights record, over its support for terrorism, which you’ve mentioned, and over its destabilizing activities in places like Syria – those sanctions will all remain in effect. They’ve nothing to do with the nuclear. They’re there for the reasons they’re there, and we’re not taking them off. This agreement does provide Iran with a very limited, temporary, and reversible relief. And it’s reversible at any time in the process if there is noncompliance. If Iran fails to meet its commitments, we can and will revoke this relief. And we will be the first ones to come to you if this fails to ask you for additional sanctions.

The total amount of relief is somewhere between the 6 and 7 billion that I described. That is less than one percent of Iran’s $1 trillion dollar economy, and it is a small fraction of the $100 billion-plus of oil revenue alone that we have deprived Iran of since 2012.

I want you to keep in mind this really pales in comparison to the amount of pressure that we are leaving in place. Iran will lose $30 billion over the course of this continued sanctions regime over the next six months. So compare that – they may get $7 billion of relief, but they’re going to lose $30 billion. It’s going to go into the frozen accounts. It will be added to the already 45 billion or so that’s in those accounts now that they can’t access.

And during the six-month negotiating period, Iran’s crude oil sales cannot increase. Oil sanctions continue as they are today. There’s no diminishment of the oil and banking sanctions that you put in place. We have not lifted them. We haven’t eased them. That means that as we negotiate, oil sanctions will continue to cost Iran about the 30 billion I just described, and Iran will actually lose more money each month that we negotiate than it will gain in relief as a result of this agreement. And while we provide 4.2 billion in relief over the six months, which is direct money we will release from the frozen account, we are structuring this relief in a way that it is tied to concrete, IAEA-verified steps that they’ve agreed to take on the nuclear program. That means that the funds will be transferred not all at once, but in installments, in order to ensure that Iran fulfills its commitments. And it means that Iran will not get the full measure of relief until the end of the negotiating period, when and if we verify, certify, that they have complied.

So now we have committed – along with our P5+1 partners – to not impose any new nuclear-related sanctions for the period of the six months. I’m sure there are questions about this. I know I’ve seen, and there are some in Congress who’ve suggested they ought to do it. I’m happy to answer them. I will tell you that in my 29 years, just about shy of the full 29 I’ve served in the Senate, I was always a leading proponent of the sanctions against Iran. I’m proud of what we did here. But it was undeniable that the pressure we put on Iran through these sanctions is exactly what has brought Iran to the table today, and I think Congress deserves an enormous amount of credit for that.

But I don’t think that any of us thought we were just imposing these sanctions for the sake of imposing them. We did it because we knew that it would hopefully help Iran dismantle its nuclear program. That was the whole point of the regime.

Now, has Iran changed its nuclear calculus? I honestly don’t think we can say for sure yet. And we certainly don’t just take words at face value. Believe me, this is not about trust. And given the history – and Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the question of deception – given the history, we are all rightly skeptical about whether or not people are ready to make the hard choices necessary to live up to this. But we now have the best chance we’ve ever had to rigorously test this proposition without losing anything. At least twice in this agreement, it is mentioned that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, and that is specific as to the final agreement. In addition, where it does talk about the potential of enrichment in the future, it says “mutually agreed upon” at least four times – three or four times in that paragraph. It has to be agreed. We don’t agree, it doesn’t happen.

Every one of us remembers Ronald Reagan’s maxim when he was negotiating with the Soviet Union: Trust, but verify. We have a new one: Test, but verify. Test, but verify. And that is exactly what we intend to do in the course of this process.

Now, we’ve all been through tough decisions. Those of you in the top dais have been around here a long time, and you’ve seen – we all know the kinds of tough decisions we have to make. But we’re asking you to give our negotiators and our experts the time and the space to do their jobs, and that includes asking you while we negotiate that you hold off imposing new sanctions.

Now, I’m not saying never. I just told you a few minutes ago if this doesn’t work, we’re coming back and asking you for more. I’m just saying not right now. Let me be very clear. This is a very delicate diplomatic moment, and we have a chance to address peacefully one of the most pressing national security concerns that the world faces today with gigantic implications of the potential of conflict. We’re at a crossroads. We’re at one of those, really, hinge points in history. One path could lead to an enduring resolution in international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. The other path could lead to continued hostility and potentially to conflict. And I don’t have to tell you that these are high stakes.

We have an obligation to give these negotiations an opportunity to succeed. And we can’t ask the rest of the P5+1 and our partners around the world to hold up their ends of the bargain if the United States isn’t going to uphold its end of the bargain. If we appear to be going off on our own tangent and do whatever we want, we will potentially lose their support for the sanctions themselves. Because we don’t just enforce them by ourselves; we need their help. And I don’t want to threaten the unity that we currently have with respect to this approach, particularly when it doesn’t cost us a thing to go through this process knowing that we could put sanctions in place additionally in a week, and we would be there with you seeking to do it.

I don’t want to give the Iranians a public excuse to flout the agreement. It could lead our international partners to think that we’re not an honest broker and that we didn’t mean it when we said that sanctions were not an end in and of themselves, but a tool to pressure the Iranians into a diplomatic solution. Well, we’re in that. And six months will fly by so fast, my friends, that before you know it we’re either going to know which end of this we’re at or not.

It's possible, also, that it could even end up decreasing the pressure on Iran by leading to the fraying of the sanctions regime. I will tell you that there were several P5+1 partners at the table ready to accept an agreement significantly less than what we fought for and got in the end.

Mr. Chairman, do you want me to wrap?

CHAIRMAN ROYCE: If you could, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY KERRY: Okay. Let me just say to you that the Iranians know that this threat is on the table.

I do want to say one quick word about Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu. I speak to the Prime Minister usually a couple times a week or several times. I talked to him yesterday morning, and I am leaving tomorrow and I'll be seeing him Thursday night. We are totally agreed that we need to focus on this final comprehensive agreement. And Yossi Cohen, the national security advisor to the Prime Minister, is here in Washington this week working with our experts. And we will work hand in hand closely, not just with Israel, but with our friends in the Gulf and others around the world, to understand everybody's assessment of what constitutes the best comprehensive agreement that absolutely guarantees that the program, whatever it is to be, is peaceful, and that we have expanded by an enormous amount the breakout time.

This first-step agreement, Mr. Chairman, actually does expand the breakout time. Because of the destruction of the 20 percent, because of the lack of capacity to move forward on all those other facilities, we are expanding the amount of time that it would take them to break out. And, clearly, in a final agreement, we intend to make this failsafe that we can guarantee that they will not have access to nuclear weapons.

So I’d just simply put the rest of my testimony in the record, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAGEL DISCUSSES WAY FORWARD IN THE MIDDLE EAST

FROM:  U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 
Hagel Outlines U.S. Posture, Way Ahead in Middle East
By Karen Parrish
American Forces Press Service

MANAMA, Bahrain, Dec. 7, 2013 – In a speech before the Manama Dialogue security conference here today, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel emphasized the strength of America’s presence in the Middle East and called for closer cooperation with the Gulf states.

The six-month interim agreement aimed at preventing Iran from producing nuclear weapons reached in November between Iran and the five permanent member of the United Nations Security Council -- the United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom and France -- plus Germany, Hagel said, will not alter U.S. presence or determination in the region.

“It is only a first step,” he said. “But it could be an important step. It halts any further expansion of Iran’s nuclear program, begins to roll it back in important ways, and provides sweeping access to verify … Iran’s intentions.”
The Defense Department will not adjust its forces in the region or its military planning as a result of the interim agreement with Iran, the secretary said.
“We have bought time for meaningful negotiation, not for deception,” Hagel said. “All of us are clear-eyed … about the challenges that remain to achieving a comprehensive nuclear solution with Iran.”

He noted that in Syria, international pressure and the threat of U.S. military action created an opening for diplomacy with Russia. That led to a U.N. Security Council resolution and the involvement of the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons, which put inspectors on the ground in Syria to oversee the removal and destruction of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons.

“We remain on track to destroy Syria’s arsenal of chemical weapons,” the secretary said. “The United States is working closely with our key allies and the international community in this process and has offered its unique technical capabilities and technology to help dispose of these weapons. … Once the destruction is complete, a major chemical weapons threat will be eliminated. This will benefit the entire region and the world.”

Issues remain in Syria, Hagel said, but he vowed to work with regional partners to find a political settlement to the conflict.

“We must also confront the rise of violent extremist groups in Syria, and we must work together to ensure that our assistance to the opposition does not fall into the wrong hands,” he cautioned. The secretary noted that humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people remains a serious concern.

“The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian aid for displaced Syrians, and we will continue to support Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey as they provide refuge for victims of the conflict,” the secretary said. “The Syrian regime must also allow humanitarian assistance to reach the Syrian people.”

Hagel pointed out that the potent threat of U.S. military intervention helped to spur progress in resolving the nuclear and chemical weapons threats posed by Iran and Syria respectively, though each country continues to pose regional challenges.
The secretary set out the U.S. presence here: ground, air and sea forces number more than 35,000 U.S. troops in the Gulf area, he said, including “more than 10,000 forward-deployed soldiers in the region, along with heavy armor, artillery, and attack helicopters, to serve as a theater reserve and a bulwark against aggression.”

The secretary said the United States has deployed its most advanced aircraft, including F-22 fighters, throughout the region “to ensure that we can quickly respond to contingencies. Coupled with our unique munitions, no target is beyond our reach.”

The United States also employs its most advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets here to provide a continuous picture of activities in and around the Gulf, Hagel said.

“And we have fielded an array of missile defense capabilities -– including ballistic missile defense ships, Patriot [surface-to-air missile] batteries, and sophisticated radar,” he added.

To ensure freedom of navigation throughout the Gulf, the secretary said, the Navy routinely maintains a presence of more than 40 ships in the broader region, including a carrier strike group, and conducts a range of freedom-of-navigation operations.
“These operations include approximately 50 transits of the Strait of Hormuz over the past six months,” he noted.

The Navy has added five coastal patrol ships to U.S. 5th Fleet here this year, the secretary said, and has ramped up its minesweeping capabilities. DOD also will invest $580 million in a construction program to support expanding 5th Fleet capabilities, Hagel said.

“Yesterday, I visited the Navy’s new afloat forward staging base, the USS Ponce,” he said, calling the ship “a unique platform for special operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, in areas where we do not have a permanent, fixed presence.”

Hagel said during this trip, he also will meet with U.S. service members stationed at the Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar, “where we have representatives from our [Gulf Cooperation Council] partners training and working together.”
Hagel called for closer multilateral coordination among council members, the Persian Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

He offered three avenues the United States would like to pursue toward that end:
-- A unified focus on missile defense through the regional Air and Air Defense Chiefs’ Conference, which meets several times a year;
-- Making the Gulf Cooperation Council as an entity eligible for the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program; and

-- Convening a regular forum, beginning within six months, where U.S. and Gulf defense leaders come together annually to assess progress and threats in regional security.

These measures constitute “a natural next step in improving U.S.-GCC collaboration,” Hagel said, adding that foreign military sales “will enable the GCC to acquire critical military capabilities, including items for ballistic missile defense, maritime security and counter-terrorism.”

The secretary noted that during his last trip to the region, in April, “we finalized agreements worth nearly $11 billion that will provide access to high-end capabilities including F-15s, F-16s and advanced munitions such as standoff weapons.” These capabilities are the most advanced the United States has ever provided to the region, he said.

“We will continue to ensure that all of our allies and partners in the region – including both Israel and the Gulf States – have these advanced weapons,” the secretary pledged.

In the future, Hagel said, the Defense Department will place even more emphasis on building the capacity of regional partners to complement the strong, proven and enduring U.S. military presence in the region.

“Nations are stronger, not weaker, when they work together against common threats,” the secretary said. “Closer cooperation between the GCC and the United States is in all of our countries’ interests.”

This year’s Manama Dialogue, the ninth of its kind, drew hundreds of delegates from more than 20 countries. Other speakers at the gathering included representatives from Bahrain, the United Kingdom, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, Iraq, India, Qatar, Canada and Norway.

Yesterday, Hagel met here with Saudi Arabian Deputy Defense Minister Prince Salman bin Sultan to discuss regional issues, including Iran, Egypt and Syria. Assistant Pentagon Press Secretary Carl Woog said the secretary underscored in that meeting the strength of the bilateral relationship and noted that defense partnership is key in maintaining the long-standing ties between the two countries. Hagel said the United States remains committed to regional security and stability, a shared objective with Saudi Arabia, Woog reported.

The secretary indicated U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation is essential to maintaining the two nations’ shared priorities. He highlighted the Saudi purchase of F-15SA aircraft and advanced weapons as an example of future of improved interoperability and coordination between both militaries, Woog said. The defense secretary will visit Saudi Arabia on Dec. 9.

Hagel also met yesterday at the Safria Palace here with King Hamad al Khalifa of Bahrain.

Hagel and the king discussed the long history of the –U.S.-Bahrain bilateral relationship, Woog said. The secretary emphasized U.S. commitment to Gulf security, and the two exchanged views on shared regional security challenges, including Iran and the signed joint plan of action between the P5+1 and Iran.
The meeting included significant discussion of reform in Bahrain and the importance of political inclusiveness for long-term stability. The secretary thanked the king for hosting the U.S. 5th Fleet and for Bahrain’s ongoing security cooperation, Woog said.