FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Security in the Asia Pacific Region and U.S.-Japan Space Cooperation
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University
Washington, DC
February 13, 2015
Panel Details
9:30 – 10:50 am
Session 1: “Security in the Asia Pacific Region and U.S.-Japan Space Cooperation”
Moderator: Victoria Samson, Secure World Foundation
Yasuaki Hashimoto, National Institute for Defense Studies
Yuichiro Nagai, University of Tokyo
Deputy Assistant Secretary Douglas Loverro, U.S. Department of Defense
Assistant Secretary Frank Rose, U.S. Department of State
Introduction
Thanks to you all for having me this morning. I’m so pleased to be up here with my Japanese colleagues as well as Doug Loverro from the Pentagon. I’d also like to thank the Elliot School and Scott Pace, as well as co-sponsors PARI at the University of Tokyo and the Mitsubishi Research Institute, for organizing this important discussion.
Security in the Asia Pacific
This morning’s panel is particularly well timed, as I’ve recently returned from Japan and will be heading back to the region in just over a week for the U.S.-Japan Space Security Dialogue in Tokyo.
Space cooperation between the United States and Japan has a long history, built on the extensive civil and scientific cooperation among NASA, NOAA, and other U.S. agencies and their Japanese counterparts.
And while U.S.-Japan space security cooperation is relatively new, Japan has taken a critical leadership role in those efforts.
Our discussions on these issues have grown into one of the most important relationships we have with our Allies and partners on outer space security issues.
My work in the region, particularly when it comes to outer space cooperation and security, has really shown me the increasing role Japan is playing to address both regional and global security challenges.
The rebalance in the Asia-Pacific region reflects our recognition that the United States must broaden and deepen our engagement there at all levels, including addressing emerging security challenges such as the long-term sustainability, stability, safety, and security of the space environment.
It’s been a lot of ground to cover in a short amount of time. But as Secretary Kerry will tell you, extraordinary transformations are the norm in the Asia-Pacific region today.
Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance
The United States-Japan Alliance has long been the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.
Our partnership with Asia-Pacific nations not only enhances the national security of our respective countries, but also strengthens strategic stability in the region as well as international peace and security globally.
We recognize the need to enhance our Alliance with Japan in wide-ranging areas of common interest in order to address the changing security environment. Part of our effort to strengthen and modernize our Alliance is through enhanced space cooperation.
Cooperation on space security is now part of the Common Strategic Objectives of the Alliance, and bilateral cooperation on civil and security space was recognized in the outcomes of summits between President Obama and former Prime Minister Noda in 2012 and again with Prime Minister Abe in 2014.
Recognizing the need to confront emerging security challenges and update the alliance for the 21st century, we are currently working closely with Japan to ensure that space security cooperation is included for the first time in the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, which provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination.
Cooperation on space security has expanded alongside the President’s rebalance to Asia. What began as a discussion of threats and possibilities for collaboration has turned into a full-range of cooperative efforts bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally.
Bilateral Space Cooperation
Recognizing the numerous opportunities for cooperation on space issues, the United States and Japan have held several space security dialogues in the last five years, in addition to ongoing civil space dialogues.
In fact, due to the success and robustness of our space security and civil space dialogues, our governments have also established a Comprehensive Dialogue on Space at the request of President Obama and former Prime Minister Noda, in order to address the bilateral relationship at a strategic level and to ensure a whole-of-government approach to space matters. We have held two Comprehensive Dialogues to date, with a third meeting to be held later this year in Japan.
Through these dialogues, we not only discuss possible avenues of cooperation and exchange space policies, we also have made tremendous progress in furthering our tangible space security cooperation.
In regards to improving our space situational awareness – specifically, improving our shared ability to rapidly detect, warn of, characterize, and attribute natural and man-made disturbances to space systems – in 2013 the United States signed a Space Situational Awareness (SSA) information sharing agreement with Japan.
Building on the foundation of that agreement, we are also exploring the possibility of establishing “two-way” SSA sharing with Japan. We hope that as our space surveillance capabilities improve, we will be able to notify satellite operators earlier and with greater accuracy in order to prevent collisions in space.
We are also looking at how we can expand cooperation on utilizing space systems for maritime domain awareness. To that end, the United States and Japan held the first “Use of Space for Maritime Domain Awareness” table top exercise last year.
We have also worked hard to expand our “people-to-people” cooperation. Between Japanese visits to Washington and my own visits to Tokyo, I find myself engaging with my Japanese counterparts nearly every other month.
Members of the Japanese Ministry of Defense attend U.S. Air Force space training out in Colorado Springs, and a member of my own team at AVC, along with a U.S. airman, has just finished a year-long study on space policy within the Japanese government.
Such cooperation has also produced great successes in the academic and NGO communities, such as the excellent work done here at the Space Policy Institute.
Multilateral Cooperation
We also work closely together to cooperate and to coordinate positions on multilateral space issues. We hold an annual trilateral space security dialogue with Australia and Japan to coordinate our positions on these space security issues.
Our joint efforts to advance the work of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) Working Group on Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTS) continue to make progress.
Perhaps one of the most beneficial transparency and confidence-building measures, or TCBMs, for ensuring sustainability and security in space could be the adoption of an International Code of Conduct to prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust in space. A code would establish guidelines, or rules of the road, to reduce the risks of debris-generating events, including collisions.
The United States is working with the European Union and other spacefaring nations, like Japan, to advance such a Code and in the Asia-Pacific region. Both Japan and Australia have also endorsed its development.
Conclusion
In his State of the Union, President Obama spoke of the need to modernize our alliances in the Asia Pacific to meet common international challenges.
In his State of the Union, President Obama spoke of the need to modernize our alliances in the Asia Pacific to meet common international challenges.
With the Government of Japan as a strong partner in space security, we are working together to do just that. Thanks very much, and I look forward to the discussion.
A PUBLICATION OF RANDOM U.S.GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASES AND ARTICLES
Showing posts with label ASIA-PACIFIC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ASIA-PACIFIC. Show all posts
Monday, February 16, 2015
Thursday, January 15, 2015
DEFENSE SECRETARY HAGEL SPEAKS ABOUT TRANSITIONS
FROM: U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Right: Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel speaks to Marines and sailors aboard Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, Calif., Jan. 13, 2015. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Melissa Eschenbrenner.
Hagel Discusses Transitions at Miramar Troop Event
By Jim Garamone
DoD News, Defense Media Activity
WASHINGTON, Jan. 14, 2015 – Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel spoke about transitions with Marines and sailors at the Marine Corps Air Station in Miramar, California, yesterday.
Hagel, who himself transitions upon confirmation of his successor, Dr. Ashton B. Carter, spoke about transition in Afghanistan, transition to the Asia-Pacific region and the dynamic nature of the world that requires a U.S. military that can capably perform during peace or war.
The United States is transitioning around the world, the secretary said. In Afghanistan -- where many of the Marines and sailors served -- the United States is working with Afghans as they assume control of their country. And, U.S. Marines are transitioning back to their maritime roots..
Building Capabilities, Capacities in Asia-Pacific
All service members will participate in the U.S. military’s transition to the Asia-Pacific, Hagel said. A cornerstone of that shift will be to build capabilities and capacities of allies in the region, he said. This will become “more and more a critical component of our own strategic interests as we continue to help our allies build their capabilities,” the secretary said.
The United States will support those countries, “but we can't take on all of the challenges by ourselves,” Hagel said. “They must do it as well.”
The world is a dynamic, ever-changing place, and the American military must be ready, the secretary said. A year ago, he said, no one would have forecast the advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or the Ebola crisis in West Africa or the Russian actions in Ukraine.
Cybersecurity Concerns
Other actions need to be countered as well, the secretary said. Cyberspace remains vulnerable, Hagel said. The cyberattack on Sony Pictures, and the cyberattack on U.S. Central Command public sites are two of the more recent examples of the vulnerability, he said.
The Defense Department’s people are key to success, Hagel said. The secretary urged Marines and sailors in the audience to take care of each other.
“We don’t take care of each other just on the battlefield,” Hagel said. “We’ve got to take care of each other in dorms, in bars, on bases, at parties. You take care of each other, you trust each other, and you have to rely on each other, again, not just in war, but this is a family, and we let each other down if we don’t do that.”
The secretary thanked the service members for what they do for the United States every day. He also thanked the families.
“Again, I want to thank you for what you do for this country, what you’ve done for our country, what you will do for this country,” Hagel said. “It’s been a privilege to be your secretary of defense.”
Right: Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel speaks to Marines and sailors aboard Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, Calif., Jan. 13, 2015. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Melissa Eschenbrenner.
Hagel Discusses Transitions at Miramar Troop Event
By Jim Garamone
DoD News, Defense Media Activity
WASHINGTON, Jan. 14, 2015 – Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel spoke about transitions with Marines and sailors at the Marine Corps Air Station in Miramar, California, yesterday.
Hagel, who himself transitions upon confirmation of his successor, Dr. Ashton B. Carter, spoke about transition in Afghanistan, transition to the Asia-Pacific region and the dynamic nature of the world that requires a U.S. military that can capably perform during peace or war.
The United States is transitioning around the world, the secretary said. In Afghanistan -- where many of the Marines and sailors served -- the United States is working with Afghans as they assume control of their country. And, U.S. Marines are transitioning back to their maritime roots..
Building Capabilities, Capacities in Asia-Pacific
All service members will participate in the U.S. military’s transition to the Asia-Pacific, Hagel said. A cornerstone of that shift will be to build capabilities and capacities of allies in the region, he said. This will become “more and more a critical component of our own strategic interests as we continue to help our allies build their capabilities,” the secretary said.
The United States will support those countries, “but we can't take on all of the challenges by ourselves,” Hagel said. “They must do it as well.”
The world is a dynamic, ever-changing place, and the American military must be ready, the secretary said. A year ago, he said, no one would have forecast the advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or the Ebola crisis in West Africa or the Russian actions in Ukraine.
Cybersecurity Concerns
Other actions need to be countered as well, the secretary said. Cyberspace remains vulnerable, Hagel said. The cyberattack on Sony Pictures, and the cyberattack on U.S. Central Command public sites are two of the more recent examples of the vulnerability, he said.
The Defense Department’s people are key to success, Hagel said. The secretary urged Marines and sailors in the audience to take care of each other.
“We don’t take care of each other just on the battlefield,” Hagel said. “We’ve got to take care of each other in dorms, in bars, on bases, at parties. You take care of each other, you trust each other, and you have to rely on each other, again, not just in war, but this is a family, and we let each other down if we don’t do that.”
The secretary thanked the service members for what they do for the United States every day. He also thanked the families.
“Again, I want to thank you for what you do for this country, what you’ve done for our country, what you will do for this country,” Hagel said. “It’s been a privilege to be your secretary of defense.”
Sunday, July 13, 2014
MICHAEL FUCHS MAKES REMARKS AT SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFERENCE
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Fourth Annual South China Sea Conference
Remarks
Michael Fuchs
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington, DC
July 11, 2014
Good morning. I’d like to thank Ernie Bower and CSIS for organizing this conference.
This is a timely conversation, and I understand that the discussions yesterday were informative and productive. It’s essential to have a wide range of perspectives as we look for creative solutions to the challenges we face in the South China Sea.
In that spirit, today I’ll offer some practical suggestions for how the U.S. and the parties in the region can move forward to reduce tensions and set relations on a better path.
But first I’d like to take a step back and address the regional context surrounding this issue and U.S. policy in the region. We are all familiar with the dynamism of the Asia-Pacific. The trade numbers, the demographics, the transnational challenges – the statistics and the trends are clear and compelling. And they lead us to the inevitable conclusion that what happens there is increasingly important not only to the United States, but also to the world.
That is why President Obama decided to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. That is why we are continuing to modernize our alliances, invest in strengthening regional institutions, expand our trade and investment, deepen engagement with new and emerging regional partners, and why we continue to expand people-to-people ties and promote our values and universal human rights.
And yet, despite our enhanced engagement and long-standing ties to the region, some are questioning and criticizing our policy. These criticisms come in all shapes and sizes.
Some call alliances outdated. But these critics ignore the fact that U.S. alliances have served as the foundation for regional peace and security, providing the environment for countries to prosper and resulting in some of the world’s most remarkable growth stories, from China to South Korea to countries across Southeast Asia. Today, our efforts to modernize these alliances – including new agreements like the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines and the U.S.-Australia Force Posture Agreement – will benefit the entire region.
Some call us “outsiders” and tell us not to intervene in regional issues. But they ignore that for decades the United States has been a Pacific power, integral to regional peace and stability, and that our interests are directly affected by what happens across the Asia-Pacific. They ignore an increased demand for enhanced U.S. engagement and presence from allies and partners across the Asia-Pacific who want us more deeply involved in the region’s future.
And some say that our attention has been diverted by crises elsewhere. But the best demonstration of our how the rebalance continues to move forward despite competing priorities is that the United States – our people, our businesses, and our security presence – is woven into the fabric of the Asia-Pacific. As the numbers show – from trade to travel to student exchanges to the time and attention of our senior leaders and the placement of our resources – U.S. engagement in the region is increasing, and our efforts are bearing fruit. Of course, while the U.S. has been essential to peace and prosperity for decades, we can’t rest on our laurels. We must continue adapting to seize new opportunities and meet new challenges.
We are working to seize new opportunities through trade deals like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which we are looking to conclude soon, and the bilateral investment treaty negotiations with China, which we agreed to begin again last year. But while dynamic economic growth and trade deals bring prospects for jobs and growth in the U.S. and across the region, threats to progress remain. Growing provocative actions, increased military spending, strident nationalism, and rehashing of painful history make up a combustible mix that threatens the region’s stability and its future prosperity.
These challenges highlight the need to strengthen the transparent, rules-based order and institutions that have helped the region thrive for decades. Everyone has benefited from this order, and everyone can continue to benefit, if we work together.
That’s why the U.S. is investing in the institutions that bring the region together to advance common interests and strengthen norms of behavior. Open and inclusive multilateral forums are critical to upholding and enforcing international law and standards that help manage relations between countries and ensure a fair playing field for all.
The Association of Southeast Asian nations is a key partner that sits at the heart of the Asia-Pacific's architecture. Especially since joining the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2009, we have adopted an increasingly proactive role in working with and promoting ASEAN and related institutions, including by joining the East Asia Summit and holding annual summits with ASEAN.
We believe strongly that ASEAN and other regional institutions such as APEC are the key forums where countries can have frank and open discussions about the region’s most concerning challenges, come together to forge solutions, and build habits of cooperation. The tensions arising from competing territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea are a key test of the region’s institutions and their ability to uphold international law and resolve disputes peacefully.
The situation in the South China Sea, no doubt, is complex. Six claimants, plentiful fisheries and potential hydrocarbon reserves, the growing presence of maritime law enforcement vessels, and hundreds of geographic features make for a dynamic situation. Moreover, many of these features are submerged and therefore not subject to sovereignty claims but are nonetheless a source of friction in the region.
Now some may ask why, given the many areas of tension across this part of the world, small features in the middle of the sea are generating so much concern and so much attention. It’s because the way in which countries pursue their claims speaks to whether future disputes will be handled by the threat and use of force on the one hand or the rule of law on the other. It speaks to whether the same rules will apply to all claimants – big and small alike. And it’s because everyone inside and outside the region stands to lose if rules are devalued, dialogue breaks down, misreadings and misinterpretations multiply, and tensions spiral.
Recent events in particular are of great concern. Incidents involving the coercion and the threat of force contribute to an increasingly tenuous situation that could affect not only the claimants, but the entire region and beyond.
No claimant is solely responsible for the state of tensions. However, a pattern of provocative and unilateral behavior by China has raised serious concerns about China’s intentions and willingness to adhere to international law and standards.
Provocative actions include efforts to assert claims in the South China Sea – such as its restrictions on access to Scarborough Reef, pressure on the long-standing Philippine presence at Second Thomas Shoal, and, most recently, the commencement of drilling operations in disputed waters near the Paracel Islands.
While the United States does not take a position on the sovereignty over land features in the South China Sea, we have a strong interest in the manner in which countries address their disputes and whether countries’ maritime claims comport with the international law of the sea.
International law, not power or an ambiguous sense of historical entitlement, should be the basis for making and enforcing maritime claims in the South China Sea.
The ambiguity of some claims, such as China’s nine-dash line, and recent actions in disputed areas heighten regional tensions and inhibit the emergence of cooperative arrangements to jointly manage resources. They undermine possible resolutions to the overlapping disputes.
As a Pacific power with a clear national interest in how these disputes are addressed, the United States is working to lower tensions and help peacefully manage these disputes. First, we have communicated our growing concerns – from the President down – to the Chinese very clearly, both in public and in private – most recently in the Strategic Security Dialogue and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue that were held in Beijing earlier this week. U.S. concerns are also regularly expressed at the highest levels to other claimants, and we consistently encourage all claimants to clarify their claims and base their claims on land features in the manner set out under the international law of the sea, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. Others have also raised their concerns, as evidenced by recent statements from ASEAN and the G-7.
Second, we are working with ASEAN and the international community to help put in place diplomatic and other structures to lower tensions and manage these disputes peacefully. We are reinforcing the importance of exercising restraint, lowering rhetoric, behaving safely and responsibly in the sky and at sea, and resolving the disputes in accordance with international law. This includes building habits of cooperation through mechanisms like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, where we are promoting concrete multilateral cooperation on everything from ensuring the safety of seafarers to working together to respond to oil spills.
Third, the administration has invested considerably in the capabilities of our partners in the maritime domain. For instance, last December Secretary Kerry announced an initial commitment of $32.5 million in new regional and bilateral assistance to advance maritime capacity building in Southeast Asia. Including this new funding, our planned region-wide support for maritime capacity building exceeds $156 million for the next two years.
Fourth, enhanced U.S. presence and posture in the Asia-Pacific as a result of the rebalance continues to help ensure regional stability and deter conflict.
And fifth, we continue to urge all parties to use diplomatic means, including arbitration or other dispute resolution mechanisms, to address these issues. This includes encouraging ASEAN and China to quickly complete a meaningful Code of Conduct. An effective Code of Conduct would help reduce tensions by creating crisis management tools to address contentious issues as they arise.
In the meantime, China and ASEAN already committed under the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea to avoid activities that “would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.”
However, based on the rhetoric we’ve seen from claimant states, there isn’t a consensus or definition of what kinds of activities complicate or escalate disputes.
Recent incidents highlight the need for claimants to be transparent about their respective activities in disputed areas and to reach a shared understanding on appropriate behavior in these areas. As such, we are urging China and ASEAN to have a real and substantive discussion to flesh out elements of the Declaration on Conduct that call for self-restraint.
We have called for claimant states to clarify and agree to voluntarily freeze certain actions and activities that escalate the disputes and cause instability, as described in the DoC. Such commitments would help to lower tensions and expand space for peaceful solutions to emerge. They would be a strong confidence-building measure as more difficult details are worked out in the Code of Conduct negotiations.
Deciding on what elements would be included in a freeze would ultimately be up to the claimants, but there are a number of different types of commitments that could be included in such an agreement and would be relatively easy for the claimants to agree to.
To start, claimants could recommit not to establish new outposts. This is already in the DoC and is an easy first step. More important, claimants could commit not to seize features that another claimant has occupied since before the November 2002 Declaration on Conduct was signed.
Construction and land reclamation by claimants have been another constant source of tension. Claimants could clarify what types of alterations are provocative and what are merely efforts to maintain a long-existing presence in accordance with the 2002 status quo. For example, alterations that fundamentally change the nature, size, or capabilities of the presence could fall under the “freeze,” whereas routine maintenance operations would be permissible. Finally, claimants could agree to refrain from unilateral enforcement measures against other claimants’ long-standing economic activities that have been taking place in disputed areas.
All of these measures that I have listed would more clearly define the type of activities already suggested by the DoC, to which the parties have already committed. And the agreement would not affect any party until all claimants had agreed to abide by its terms. Moreover, if adopted, the freeze would not be prejudicial to the resolution of competing claims. The freeze would simply halt efforts to reinforce claims, pending their resolution.
Exercising self-restraint via this type of voluntary freeze would create a conducive and positive environment for negotiations on a China-ASEAN Code of Conduct and dramatically lower the risk of a dangerous incident. This would benefit all concerned parties. We make this suggestion as an idea to spark serious discussions about ways to reduce tensions and address the disputes; the claimants themselves should get together to decide the parameters of a freeze.
To conclude, the United States is a Pacific power and plays a central role in ensuring regional peace and prosperity. And while we are not a claimant in the South China Sea, the actions of the claimants in the South China Sea are affecting everyone in the region and beyond, and therefore we all have roles to play in tackling this challenge.
I hope that the next month leading up to the ASEAN Regional Forum will see real progress on regional efforts to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea, and I have outlined some specific steps to that end. It’s high time for the region to have a robust discussion on tangible ways to de-escalate the current dispute, and hopefully some of these ideas can help begin that discussion.
Thank you and I’ll be happy to take a few of your questions.
Saturday, April 26, 2014
U.S.-JAPAN JOINT STATEMENT ON ASIA-PACIFIC FUTURE
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
U.S.-Japan Joint Statement: The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond
The relationship between the United States of America and Japan is founded on mutual trust, a common vision for a rules-based international order, a shared commitment to upholding democratic values and promoting open markets, and deep cultural and people-to-people ties. The U.S.-Japan Alliance is the cornerstone for regional peace and security as well as a platform for global cooperation. The U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and Japan’s policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation both contribute to the Alliance playing a leading role in ensuring a peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific.
Close U.S.-Japan cooperation is essential in managing and responding to long-standing and emerging threats and challenges in Asia and around the world. Recent events underscore the importance of coordinated action to uphold regional and global rules and norms. At the March 25 Trilateral Summit in The Hague, the leaders of the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea urged North Korea to take concrete actions to meet its international obligations on nuclear and missile issues and to address, without delay, humanitarian concerns, including the abductions issue. In concert with our G-7 partners, the United States and Japan have condemned Russia over its illegal attempt to annex Crimea and are consulting closely on further measures against Russia over its deplorable conduct, while strongly urging Russia to deescalate tensions in Ukraine. Together, we are taking concrete steps to support Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic stability. The United States and Japan are working collaboratively to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, support Middle East peace efforts, contribute to Afghan reconstruction, and improve the situation in Syria, including through the disposal of its chemical stockpiles. The United States and Japan recognize that China can play an important role in addressing all of these challenges, and both countries reaffirm their interest in building a productive and constructive relationship with China.
The United States and Japan, as maritime nations with global trade networks that depend on open seas, underscore the importance of maintaining a maritime order based upon respect for international law, including the freedom of navigation and overflight. The United States and Japan share strong concern over recent actions that have raised tensions in the East China Sea and South China Sea, such as the uncoordinated declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Our two countries oppose any attempt to assert territorial or maritime claims through the use of intimidation, coercion or force. The United States and Japan urge the establishment of confidence-building measures among governments and militaries in the region to address these tensions. In the South China Sea, we call on countries concerned to clarify the basis of their maritime claims in accordance with international law. We support efforts for the early establishment of an effective Code of Conduct as a way to reduce the risk of an unintended incident. The United States and Japan fully support the use of diplomatic and legal means, including international arbitration, to settle maritime disputes in the South China Sea.
Given the common security challenges our two countries face, the United States and Japan are strengthening and modernizing our security alliance as directed by the Security Consultative Committee, including through the revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The United States has deployed its most advanced military assets to Japan and provides all necessary capabilities to meet its commitments under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. These commitments extend to all the territories under the administration of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands. In that context, the United States opposes any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of the Senkaku Islands. The United States appreciates Japan’s establishment of a National Security Council and creation of a legal framework for information security that will facilitate enhanced policy and intelligence coordination between the two countries. The United States welcomes and supports Japan’s consideration of the matter of exercising the right of collective self-defense. The United States and Japan reaffirmed the importance of the U.S. extended deterrence to maintain regional security. The United States and Japan are also making sustained progress towards realizing a geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable U.S. force posture in the Asia Pacific, including the development of Guam as a strategic hub. The early relocation of Futenma Marine Corps Air Station to Camp Schwab and consolidation of bases in Okinawa will ensure a long-term sustainable presence for U.S. forces. In this context, we reaffirm our commitment to reducing the impact of U.S. forces on Okinawa.
The United States and Japan also coordinate closely in multilateral financial and economic fora to advance trade liberalization and promote economic growth. Our joint efforts are grounded in support for an international economic system that is free, open, and transparent, and embraces innovation. In order to further enhance economic growth, expand regional trade and investment, and strengthen the rules-based trading system, the United States and Japan are committed to taking the bold steps necessary to complete a high-standard, ambitious, comprehensive Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. Today, we have identified a path forward on important bilateral TPP issues. This marks a key milestone in the TPP negotiations and will inject fresh momentum into the broader talks. We now call upon all TPP partners to move as soon as possible to take the necessary steps to conclude the agreement. Even with this step forward, there is still much work to be done to conclude TPP.
We also support Japan’s Chairmanship in the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of its accession to the OECD and support China’s hosting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and Australia’s hosting of the G20 this year. We are working together in the APEC and the G20 on the promotion of the role of women, which is an important domestic and foreign policy priority for both countries. Through the Equal Futures Partnership and upcoming events such as the White House Summit on Working Families and Japan’s international symposium on women’s empowerment, the two countries are committed to ensuring women’s full participation in society. Furthermore, the United States and Japan continue to be world leaders in high-technology, where our collaboration is expanding the frontiers of robotics, space, and medical science.
The United States and Japan view energy security as vital to prosperity and stability. Both sides welcomed the prospect of U.S. LNG exports in the future since additional global supplies will benefit Japan and other strategic partners. The United States welcomed Japan’s new Strategic Energy Plan, which includes global, peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy and acceleration of the introduction of renewable energy. Both countries are working together to promote the development of clean energy, including by facilitating business cooperation and deepening civil nuclear cooperation. These steps are part of a broader effort to address the urgent challenge of global climate change. Both countries plan to put forward robust post-2020 nationally determined contributions, building on decisions taken at the 19th Conference of the Parties (COP-19) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in order to promote the adoption of a protocol, another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC applicable to all Parties at COP-21 in Paris in December 2015. We will continue to work with other countries on complementary initiatives to encourage reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
The United States and Japan are committed to promoting peace, stability, and economic growth throughout the world, including in Africa. Through our recently launched senior-level U.S.-Japan Development Dialogue, we are expanding our development cooperation in these areas. Furthermore, the United States and Japan are continuing bilateral policy coordination to address other global challenges and promote our common agenda, such as women’s empowerment, human security, humanitarian assistance, disaster risk reduction, the post-2015 development agenda, global health, climate change, counter-terrorism and transnational organized crime, cyber policy, the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, nuclear security, and cooperation at the United Nations, including in peacekeeping. The United States looks forward to a reformed UN Security Council that includes Japan as a permanent member. Our two countries are continuing to cooperate in the field of disaster risk management based on the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake.
The United States and Japan renew our commitment to deepening diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), recognizing the importance of ASEAN unity and centrality to regional security and prosperity. We are coordinating closely to support ASEAN and its affiliated fora as its members seek to build a regional economic community and address trans-border challenges, including cybersecurity and cybercrime. In this context, the two countries view the East Asia Summit as the premier political and security forum in the region. We support the Asian Development Bank work to address the region’s infrastructure and connectivity needs. The United States and Japan are collaborating to assist Southeast Asian littoral states in building maritime domain awareness and other capacities for maritime safety and security so that they can better enforce law, combat illicit trafficking and weapons proliferation, and protect marine resources. The robust U.S. and Japanese civilian and military response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines demonstrated our ability to collectively assist the region in disaster relief and risk reduction.
To achieve our shared objectives of promoting peace and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific and around the globe, the United States and Japan are strengthening trilateral cooperation with like-minded partners, including the Republic of Korea, Australia, and India.
The United States and Japan reaffirm our long-standing and indispensable partnership in shaping the future of the Asia-Pacific and beyond through close cooperation and collaboration.
ANNEX: Leaders Statement on U.S.-Japan Bilateral Exchanges
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ANNEX: Leaders Statement on U.S.-Japan Bilateral Exchanges
Broad people-to-people exchange between Japan and the United States has been a key pillar of our Alliance since its inception. Close ties and shared values between the people of the United States and the people of Japan form the foundation of the global partnership between our nations.
To ensure the future strength of the U.S.-Japan relationship, the two governments share the goal, established by the U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (CULCON), of doubling two-way student exchange by the year 2020.
Recognizing that people-to-people exchange is an irreplaceable investment in the future of the Alliance, President Obama and Prime Minister Abe announced their intent to create a new bilateral exchange program that would enable Japanese youth to visit the United States, enhance their English language abilities, and develop professional skills through internship opportunities. The leaders also intend to explore internship opportunities for U.S. youth in Japan.
Furthermore, Japan is going to send 6,000 Japanese students to the United States in fiscal year 2014 through student exchange support programs, including public-private partnerships such as the TOBITATE! Young Ambassador Program, further contributing to reaching our shared goal established by CULCON. Japan and the United States also plan to explore new avenues for exchange, including support for Japanese researchers and programs linking the next generation of Japanese and U.S. leaders and friends.
The Japanese government’s program inviting Japanese-American leaders to Japan has promoted broad understanding and support for the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Building on this successful effort, Japan intends to broaden the scope of this initiative in fiscal year 2014 to further deepen mutual understanding.
The Japanese government’s ongoing KAKEHASHI Project, under which a total of 4,600 young Japanese and U.S. citizens are expected to visit each other’s countries in exchange programs, has made a significant contribution to fostering mutual understanding. In addition, following the March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, the U.S. government and the U.S.-Japan Council launched the TOMODACHI Initiative, a path-breaking public-private partnership that engages the private sector in promoting U.S.-Japan youth exchange. To date, with the support of over eighty U.S. and Japanese companies, organizations, and individuals, more than 2,300 Japanese and U.S. youth have participated in TOMODACHI exchange programs.
These initiatives build on established programs, such as the binational Fulbright Program, which has benefited nearly 10,000 Japanese and U.S. students and scholars over more than 60 years; the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program; the Student Exchange Support Program and the Japanese Government Scholarship provided by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; the National Science Foundation’s Summer Institutes in Japan, funded in cooperation with the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science; the Japan-U.S. Training Exchange Program for English Language Teachers (JUSTE); and the Mansfield Fellowship Program. These programs have for years expanded and strengthened people-to-people connections between our countries.
These government programs are complemented by the many non-governmental programs linking the people of our two countries, such as the Japan-America Societies, the U.S.-Japan Council, and the more than 400 sister-city and sister-state and prefecture relationships between Japan and the United States. Such programs are indispensable, as are the dozens of academic associations, university linkages, and privately-funded exchanges, for example the Crown Prince Akihito Scholarship; the United States-Japan Bridging Foundation Scholarships, the Grew Bancroft Scholarship; and the Japan-America Student Conference, which celebrates its 80th anniversary this year. Japan and the United States aim to further encourage new and expanded non-governmental dialogues to bring together opinion leaders from both nations.
Symbolizing the grassroots friendship uniting our nations, the U.S. government and a range of private sector partners have created the Friendship Blossoms Initiative, which is currently planting 3,000 American dogwood trees throughout Japan on behalf of the people of the United States, to reciprocate the City of Tokyo’s gift of 3,000 flowering cherry trees to Washington, DC in 1912. The 1912 gift from Japan is celebrated each year during the National Cherry Blossom Festival, an iconic spring event in Washington, D.C.
The President and Prime Minister welcomed the invigoration of exchanges between the U.S. Congress and the Diet of Japan, praising the work of the U.S.-Japan Caucus and the Congressional Study Group on Japan in the United States Congress, the Japan-U.S. Parliamentary Friendship League in the Diet of Japan, as well as the U.S.-Japan Legislative Exchange Program and the Japan-U.S. Senate Inter-parliamentary Conference. Nearly 200 Diet Members visited the United States in fiscal year 2013, and the number of Members of Congress visiting Japan in 2013 more than doubled over the previous year and continues to increase in 2014.
Finally, the United States and Japan note that millions of Japanese and U.S. citizens visit each other’s country every year to visit family and friends, enjoy tourist sites and cultural experiences, and conduct the business transactions that underpin the tight economic relationship between two of the world’s largest economies. To facilitate this travel, the United States and Japan plan to expedite work to establish a reciprocal arrangement, including through Japan’s participation in the U.S. Global Entry program, to streamline border formalities for trusted travelers from both our countries, and to make travel between the United States and Japan easier, faster and more secure.
Tuesday, April 22, 2014
U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON POLICY AND DIPLOMACY
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
U.S. Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
Remarks
Tom Kelly
Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies
Fort DeRussy, Waikiki
April 17, 2014
Aloha! I work in the Foreign Ministry of the United States, the U.S. State Department. I’ve been a diplomat my entire life, and so I’m usually dressed a lot more formally than I am today. If it were up to me, I’d always dress like this. For the past few years, I’ve overseen the State Department’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs. This bureau is the connective tissue between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. We work closely with the Department of Defense to make sure that the work that we do is complimentary and consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals.
I know that many of you are leaders in your own nations on issues affecting defense, security, and foreign policy. So I thought that I would spend some time this morning giving you an overview of how, in our own government, we have tried to bring two distinct parts of our government – diplomats and soldiers – together so that we better serve the foreign policy and security interests of the United States. As someone who grew up on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, I’d also like to put the recent U.S. “rebalance to Asia” in proper context, and discuss with you our current security priorities in the Asia-Pacific region.
Now I realize that it may strike some of you as odd that you have a diplomat rather than a soldier standing before you today to talk about U.S. security policy. But from the way we handle national security policy in the United States, it actually makes sense. For us, defense and foreign policy are two sides of the same coin. When the United States enters a military partnership with a foreign country, our bilateral relationship becomes more intimate and enduring. And we diplomats can help our military colleagues to handle the many challenges that confront them in foreign theaters of operation. As all of you know, it’s a complicated world out there.
At the forefront of the United States’ foreign policy is the notion that America helps itself by helping others. At his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State John Kerry said that, “Global leadership is a strategic imperative for America, not a favor we do for other countries. It amplifies our voice and extends our reach….and it really matters to the daily lives of Americans.”
And in a world dominated by sovereign nation states, the United States can’t lead without looking at the question of security, which is the fundamental preoccupation of any nation. Security cooperation plays a central role in American foreign policy. As we in the US Government take on the challenges that this world presents, we look first and foremost to building the right kind of security partnerships to meet them.
The challenges we face today typically can’t be solved by just our military, or our economic engagement, and – while it pains me to say this as a State Department official – we can’t resolve everything just with our diplomatic efforts, either. No, addressing today’s challenges demands we utilize all of these elements of national power. Addressing the world’s toughest problems really does take a whole-of-government effort. So at our President’s behest, the Secretaries of State and Defense are working harder than ever before to improve our cooperation and coordination with the Defense Department and other agencies.
Building security partnerships starts at home. It requires our diplomacy and defense to be on the same page and it requires the Departments of State and Defense to coordinate and work more closely than ever before. And today I can tell you that the current level of cooperation between State and Defense is truly unprecedented. We are seeing more interaction, more coordinated engagements, more personnel exchanges than ever before.
One way we work with the Department of Defense is through personnel exchanges. We have more than 100 Foreign Service Officers working as Political Advisors, or Polads, in various areas within the Department of Defense. They work at, among other places, the Pentagon, Europe and, of course, in PACOM, the Pacific Command. In return, the Department of Defense has a large number of military personnel serving in various capacities at the Department of State. The guy who sits next to me at the State Department is a two-star Navy Admiral. The reason we trade personnel like this is that we understand the need to better understand each other so that we can work together more effectively, now and in the future. To achieve our objectives in today’s globalized world, we want diplomats to be able to think like soldiers, and soldiers to be able to think like diplomats.
When the United States – through our security cooperation efforts – enhances the military capabilities of our allies and partners, we inherently strengthen their ability to handle their own security. All countries benefit from a global environment that is stable and prosperous, and many could do more to take an active role in supporting it.
Building the capacity of our partners and allies reflects more than strategic reality, though. We are also acutely aware that because of the budgetary pressures that our government faces, the U.S. Government is looking for cost-effective ways to achieve its strategic objectives at home and abroad. In short, building partner capacity is a prudent investment which deepens our strategic ties and helps defend our interests in an era of diminishing resources.
One vital tool that I would like to talk a bit more about is our ability to deliver security assistance to allies and partners. These programs can be a critical tool to support states trying to build their security capacity. Security is often the foundation for economic growth, democratic governance, and the preservation of human rights. Therefore, by helping our partners to take on greater security responsibilities, our assistance helps empowers others to advance peace and stability, while at the same time reducing the likelihood of putting our military forces in harm’s way.
To our great fortune and benefit, countries want to partner with the United States. One indication of that is the tremendous growth of U.S. defense trade in recent years. In 2013, we saw $27.80 billion in for foreign military sales by American defense companies. A significant number of these potential sales in the region were with allies such as South Korea, Australia and Japan, but a large proportion was also with partners such as India. These sales strengthen our alliances and partnerships in the region—a top goal of the “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific as well as the Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and our Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs’ Joint Regional Strategy—but also bolster the U.S. economy.
To put that into perspective, 2012 was our largest year in history of foreign military sales to date by American defense companies, amounting to nearly $70 billion in calendar year 2012. The year before that, in 2011 we saw $32.1 billion in Foreign Military Sales, which broke previous record the year before, at $31.6 billion. We also completed the UK and Australia defense trade treaties, which will help our defense industry and make our partnerships with these two nations even closer. In 2013, we also processed more than 78,000 licenses for direct commercial sales with an average processing time of 21 days.
Washington Priorities
Building partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region takes up a lot of time and attention at the top of our government in Washington. For many of us, thinking about Asia and the Pacific is nothing new. The Pacific Ocean has always been a part of my life. For those of you who know the United States, I grew up in Manhattan Beach, a beach town in Southern California that is right next to Los Angeles. And our President was born right here on this island. He still comes back to Hawaii with his family every year. For people like us, and many millions of other Americans, the Pacific isn’t just a strategically important location or a good place to make money. It’s our home.
So it’s no surprise that the Asia-Pacific has been a priority for President Obama since he took office in 2009. The administration based this vision on America's stake in a prosperous and stable region. In this, President Obama’s second term, we continue to build on those commitments to modernize our alliances, strengthen regional institutions and respect for rule of law, and engage more effectively with emerging powers such as China. Our policy is not merely words: we are dedicating more diplomatic, public diplomacy and assistance resources to the region. And we are diversifying to put more of a focus on economic development, on energy, people-to-people exchanges, and education.
The Rebalance Towards Asia: Cooperative Opportunities
The Asia-Pacific is home to many of the world’s most heavily traveled trade and energy routes. $555 billion in U.S. exports to the region last year supported 2.8 million jobs in America. The security and prosperity of the United States are inextricably linked to the peaceful development of the Asia-Pacific. Peaceful development means economic partnership opportunities that can tie our societies closer together.
When I look at the history of the Asia-Pacific over the past sixty years, I see a period of extraordinary prosperity. Hundreds of millions of people have lifted themselves out of poverty, providing an example to the rest of the world. In just a few generations, the Asia-Pacific has fostered innovative economies that today are fueling global growth.
At the Asia Pacific Economic Conference in October, Secretary Kerry described how U.S. economic engagement is good for both the region and good for the United States. Within APEC and as part of our ongoing rebalance toward Asia, we worked to strengthen regional economic integration; promote energy cooperation, private sector investments, and education exchange; reduce barriers to trade and investment; improve connectivity; and support sustainable growth.
On the margins of APEC, Secretary Kerry joined Trans Pacific Partnership Leaders in announcing that the negotiations are on track to complete the historic agreement this year. With its high ambition and pioneering standards for new trade disciplines, the TPP will be a model for future trade agreements and a promising pathway to our APEC goal of building a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific.
The Secretary also spoke at the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in Kuala Lumpur, also in October, to more than 3,000 entrepreneurs, investors, academics, startup organizers, business people, and government officials from over 100 countries.
In short, the Asia-Pacific is a by-word for opportunity for investment and win-win partnerships.
But reaching the goal of universal prosperity also depends on security – in this case, maritime security. We know that you don’t get trade within Asia, and with Asia and the Americas, without open sea lanes. The way we see it, twenty-first century capitalism cannot function unless the sea lanes throughout Asia-Pacific remain secure. A Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific includes freedom of navigation.
In Asia as in the rest of the world, the key to effective security is effective security partnerships. We’re working to modernize our alliances and ensure that we can cooperate seamlessly with partners to respond to crises and contingencies. The potential problems are not limited to those caused by people. Mother Nature sometimes reminds us that she is in charge. Super Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines is a case in point. The U.S. played an important role in supporting the recovery. That crisis demonstrated that a credible U.S. security presence is very important. And that security presence in itself is essential for economic progress to occur.
The most recent example, I think, of our interest in the security of Asia is our joining the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia. This is better known as ReCAAP. We recently signed the accession agreement. I understand that the United States received a warm welcome at the meeting of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center at the beginning of March. We look forward to a long and close relationship. ReCAAP, of course, is not the only multilateral program in which we participate. We also take part in the ASEAN Regional Forum or the East Asia Summit, Pacific Islands Forum, and APEC, as well as in the bilateral engagements on the margins of those multilateral meetings. When you look at U.S. participation in those meetings, you will see again and again evidence of how much the Obama Administration is committed to the Asia-Pacific as a strategic component of our foreign policy and economic agenda.
This island is also the home port of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The United States Navy obviously has a huge role to play in the safety of the Asia-Pacific’s sea lanes. As the U.S. rebalances toward Asia, we will increase the percentage of our surface ships in the Pacific theater from about 50 to over 60. But it’s not just a quantitative shift; it’s also a qualitative one. The United States is moving its most technologically advanced platforms to the Pacific. For example, all the ships of the Zumwalt Guided Missile Destroyer Class will come to the Pacific. The first P-8s—an incredible improvement in Maritime Patrol Aircraft capabilities—will come to the Pacific first. Our Navy’s newest surface combatant, the Littoral Combat Ship, has already completed one deployment to the South China Sea. We’ll see another rotational deployment this summer. When we do field the Joint Strike Fighter, it will go first to the Pacific theater.
The challenges in the maritime domain remain complex and complicated. Our Chief of Naval Operations has spoken at length about partnerships and our Navy’s ability to contribute to the global challenge of maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight. These partnerships will enable all navies to take advantage of each other’s strengths and build a maritime community that enables all of us to sail the seas without intimidation or interference. Working together in partnerships, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, allows us to also respond more quickly to humanitarian and disaster assistance when needed.
The Rebalance as Continuity of U.S. Policy
The story of the rebalance is a story of continuity. The United States has been and will continue to be a Pacific Power. Our strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific recognizes the important role the region will play in the 21st century and the fact that the region is critically important to U.S. security and economics. As a marker of how important we see continuing our support of Asia-Pacific, the Obama administration has begun a process which will increase foreign assistance to the Asia-Pacific region by seven percent.
You may have noticed that in the rebalance much of our effort seems to be aimed at South and Southeast Asia. One of the reasons for that is that we have always had a very strong presence, including the stationing of several thousand American soldiers and sailors, in Northeast Asian countries like the Republic of Korea and Japan. We seek to deepen our engagement with new partners and multilateral institutions in Southeast Asia, to find opportunities to work together to advance our shared interests.
And quickly, I want to address the issue of China. I know that there are some in Beijing who think our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is part of a broader American effort to contain China. Let me be clear: that is not the case. On the contrary, the United States seeks to continue building a cooperative partnership with China. A positive and cooperative relationship with China is a key element of our rebalance strategy. We understand that China will play an important role in critical global challenges like fighting climate change, wildlife trafficking, and countering proliferation. We welcome that role: those problems won’t get fixed without China’s help. And we recognize that our two economies are deeply intertwined. We consistently seek to engage with China on all levels on a wide range of issues. We want to do more with China in many areas, including economic relations. National Security Advisor Susan Rice recently said that the United States welcomes China and any other nation interested in joining and sharing the benefits of the Trans-Pacific Partnership so long as they can commit to the high standards of the agreement.
The United States is committed to building healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relations with China. We maintain a robust schedule of military-to-military exchanges and dialogues in pursuit of that goal and to encourage China to exhibit greater transparency with respect to its military capabilities and intentions. In addition, U.S. military, diplomatic, and defense officials participate in a range of combined civilian-military dialogues with the Chinese in which we work to build mutual trust and understanding. I’ve participated personally in some of them, both in Washington and Beijing.
Farther Into Asia
South Asia, where I’ll travel in a few days, also merits some comment. I’ve travelled several times over the past few years to India. I think it’s fair to say that there is growing interest in both Washington and New Delhi in greater security cooperation. There is a significant degree of coincidence of strategic interests. During the Obama Administration, the United States carried out our first political-military dialogue with India in six years. And it was significant because we were able to help our Indian counterparts work through the challenges of our interagency process on national security issues. Indian officials told us that the dialogue is especially helpful in helping them to coordinate the same issues within their own government, as well as giving them a better idea of how to deal with our own large and admittedly complicated bureaucracy. The Indian military is also increasingly interested in buying equipment from the United States. Our foreign military sales to India have grown from virtually zero in 2008 to more than $9 billion. In comparison, we had only $363 million in military sales with India from 2002-2006.
I’m not going to India on this trip, but I will travel to Bangladesh, another important South Asian partner. I’ll visit the port city of Chittagong, where the Bangladeshi Navy will show me the Somudra Joy, formerly the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Jarvis, which enables the Bangladeshi Navy to promote maritime security. This transfer has achieved real results by contributing to a seventy percent reduction in piracy in the Bay of Bengal.
My conviction and my experience is that our ongoing rebalance strategy that dates back to 2009 is broad, is deep, and encompasses not just regional security, but also economic prosperity, and people-to-people ties. This is the subject of a very intense ongoing interagency collaboration within the U.S. Government, precisely because it is a strategic priority of the President, of the Administration, and of the nation.
This brings me back to the beginning of my speech, and what motivates U.S. leaders to invest significant resources to support U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific and around the globe. Citizens of this country are learning what you already know – that world events are closer to home than we may think, and can change rapidly. That means we need to be on our toes, adapting and evolving to enhance and sustain U.S. global leadership. This can be challenging, but we really need to remember that in this changing world it has been international partnerships that have brought about stability and prosperity, not only to the United States, but across the world.
By tackling the world’s toughest problems together, we can bring new perspectives and expanded capabilities to bear. And we can build partnerships to be proud of – within government, with civil society, and with nations around the world.
Thank you again for your personal contributions to that effort. And with that, I will be happy to take your questions.
I know that many of you are leaders in your own nations on issues affecting defense, security, and foreign policy. So I thought that I would spend some time this morning giving you an overview of how, in our own government, we have tried to bring two distinct parts of our government – diplomats and soldiers – together so that we better serve the foreign policy and security interests of the United States. As someone who grew up on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, I’d also like to put the recent U.S. “rebalance to Asia” in proper context, and discuss with you our current security priorities in the Asia-Pacific region.
Now I realize that it may strike some of you as odd that you have a diplomat rather than a soldier standing before you today to talk about U.S. security policy. But from the way we handle national security policy in the United States, it actually makes sense. For us, defense and foreign policy are two sides of the same coin. When the United States enters a military partnership with a foreign country, our bilateral relationship becomes more intimate and enduring. And we diplomats can help our military colleagues to handle the many challenges that confront them in foreign theaters of operation. As all of you know, it’s a complicated world out there.
At the forefront of the United States’ foreign policy is the notion that America helps itself by helping others. At his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State John Kerry said that, “Global leadership is a strategic imperative for America, not a favor we do for other countries. It amplifies our voice and extends our reach….and it really matters to the daily lives of Americans.”
And in a world dominated by sovereign nation states, the United States can’t lead without looking at the question of security, which is the fundamental preoccupation of any nation. Security cooperation plays a central role in American foreign policy. As we in the US Government take on the challenges that this world presents, we look first and foremost to building the right kind of security partnerships to meet them.
The challenges we face today typically can’t be solved by just our military, or our economic engagement, and – while it pains me to say this as a State Department official – we can’t resolve everything just with our diplomatic efforts, either. No, addressing today’s challenges demands we utilize all of these elements of national power. Addressing the world’s toughest problems really does take a whole-of-government effort. So at our President’s behest, the Secretaries of State and Defense are working harder than ever before to improve our cooperation and coordination with the Defense Department and other agencies.
Building security partnerships starts at home. It requires our diplomacy and defense to be on the same page and it requires the Departments of State and Defense to coordinate and work more closely than ever before. And today I can tell you that the current level of cooperation between State and Defense is truly unprecedented. We are seeing more interaction, more coordinated engagements, more personnel exchanges than ever before.
One way we work with the Department of Defense is through personnel exchanges. We have more than 100 Foreign Service Officers working as Political Advisors, or Polads, in various areas within the Department of Defense. They work at, among other places, the Pentagon, Europe and, of course, in PACOM, the Pacific Command. In return, the Department of Defense has a large number of military personnel serving in various capacities at the Department of State. The guy who sits next to me at the State Department is a two-star Navy Admiral. The reason we trade personnel like this is that we understand the need to better understand each other so that we can work together more effectively, now and in the future. To achieve our objectives in today’s globalized world, we want diplomats to be able to think like soldiers, and soldiers to be able to think like diplomats.
When the United States – through our security cooperation efforts – enhances the military capabilities of our allies and partners, we inherently strengthen their ability to handle their own security. All countries benefit from a global environment that is stable and prosperous, and many could do more to take an active role in supporting it.
Building the capacity of our partners and allies reflects more than strategic reality, though. We are also acutely aware that because of the budgetary pressures that our government faces, the U.S. Government is looking for cost-effective ways to achieve its strategic objectives at home and abroad. In short, building partner capacity is a prudent investment which deepens our strategic ties and helps defend our interests in an era of diminishing resources.
One vital tool that I would like to talk a bit more about is our ability to deliver security assistance to allies and partners. These programs can be a critical tool to support states trying to build their security capacity. Security is often the foundation for economic growth, democratic governance, and the preservation of human rights. Therefore, by helping our partners to take on greater security responsibilities, our assistance helps empowers others to advance peace and stability, while at the same time reducing the likelihood of putting our military forces in harm’s way.
To our great fortune and benefit, countries want to partner with the United States. One indication of that is the tremendous growth of U.S. defense trade in recent years. In 2013, we saw $27.80 billion in for foreign military sales by American defense companies. A significant number of these potential sales in the region were with allies such as South Korea, Australia and Japan, but a large proportion was also with partners such as India. These sales strengthen our alliances and partnerships in the region—a top goal of the “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific as well as the Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and our Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs’ Joint Regional Strategy—but also bolster the U.S. economy.
To put that into perspective, 2012 was our largest year in history of foreign military sales to date by American defense companies, amounting to nearly $70 billion in calendar year 2012. The year before that, in 2011 we saw $32.1 billion in Foreign Military Sales, which broke previous record the year before, at $31.6 billion. We also completed the UK and Australia defense trade treaties, which will help our defense industry and make our partnerships with these two nations even closer. In 2013, we also processed more than 78,000 licenses for direct commercial sales with an average processing time of 21 days.
Washington Priorities
Building partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region takes up a lot of time and attention at the top of our government in Washington. For many of us, thinking about Asia and the Pacific is nothing new. The Pacific Ocean has always been a part of my life. For those of you who know the United States, I grew up in Manhattan Beach, a beach town in Southern California that is right next to Los Angeles. And our President was born right here on this island. He still comes back to Hawaii with his family every year. For people like us, and many millions of other Americans, the Pacific isn’t just a strategically important location or a good place to make money. It’s our home.
So it’s no surprise that the Asia-Pacific has been a priority for President Obama since he took office in 2009. The administration based this vision on America's stake in a prosperous and stable region. In this, President Obama’s second term, we continue to build on those commitments to modernize our alliances, strengthen regional institutions and respect for rule of law, and engage more effectively with emerging powers such as China. Our policy is not merely words: we are dedicating more diplomatic, public diplomacy and assistance resources to the region. And we are diversifying to put more of a focus on economic development, on energy, people-to-people exchanges, and education.
The Rebalance Towards Asia: Cooperative Opportunities
The Asia-Pacific is home to many of the world’s most heavily traveled trade and energy routes. $555 billion in U.S. exports to the region last year supported 2.8 million jobs in America. The security and prosperity of the United States are inextricably linked to the peaceful development of the Asia-Pacific. Peaceful development means economic partnership opportunities that can tie our societies closer together.
When I look at the history of the Asia-Pacific over the past sixty years, I see a period of extraordinary prosperity. Hundreds of millions of people have lifted themselves out of poverty, providing an example to the rest of the world. In just a few generations, the Asia-Pacific has fostered innovative economies that today are fueling global growth.
At the Asia Pacific Economic Conference in October, Secretary Kerry described how U.S. economic engagement is good for both the region and good for the United States. Within APEC and as part of our ongoing rebalance toward Asia, we worked to strengthen regional economic integration; promote energy cooperation, private sector investments, and education exchange; reduce barriers to trade and investment; improve connectivity; and support sustainable growth.
On the margins of APEC, Secretary Kerry joined Trans Pacific Partnership Leaders in announcing that the negotiations are on track to complete the historic agreement this year. With its high ambition and pioneering standards for new trade disciplines, the TPP will be a model for future trade agreements and a promising pathway to our APEC goal of building a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific.
The Secretary also spoke at the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in Kuala Lumpur, also in October, to more than 3,000 entrepreneurs, investors, academics, startup organizers, business people, and government officials from over 100 countries.
In short, the Asia-Pacific is a by-word for opportunity for investment and win-win partnerships.
But reaching the goal of universal prosperity also depends on security – in this case, maritime security. We know that you don’t get trade within Asia, and with Asia and the Americas, without open sea lanes. The way we see it, twenty-first century capitalism cannot function unless the sea lanes throughout Asia-Pacific remain secure. A Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific includes freedom of navigation.
In Asia as in the rest of the world, the key to effective security is effective security partnerships. We’re working to modernize our alliances and ensure that we can cooperate seamlessly with partners to respond to crises and contingencies. The potential problems are not limited to those caused by people. Mother Nature sometimes reminds us that she is in charge. Super Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines is a case in point. The U.S. played an important role in supporting the recovery. That crisis demonstrated that a credible U.S. security presence is very important. And that security presence in itself is essential for economic progress to occur.
The most recent example, I think, of our interest in the security of Asia is our joining the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia. This is better known as ReCAAP. We recently signed the accession agreement. I understand that the United States received a warm welcome at the meeting of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center at the beginning of March. We look forward to a long and close relationship. ReCAAP, of course, is not the only multilateral program in which we participate. We also take part in the ASEAN Regional Forum or the East Asia Summit, Pacific Islands Forum, and APEC, as well as in the bilateral engagements on the margins of those multilateral meetings. When you look at U.S. participation in those meetings, you will see again and again evidence of how much the Obama Administration is committed to the Asia-Pacific as a strategic component of our foreign policy and economic agenda.
This island is also the home port of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The United States Navy obviously has a huge role to play in the safety of the Asia-Pacific’s sea lanes. As the U.S. rebalances toward Asia, we will increase the percentage of our surface ships in the Pacific theater from about 50 to over 60. But it’s not just a quantitative shift; it’s also a qualitative one. The United States is moving its most technologically advanced platforms to the Pacific. For example, all the ships of the Zumwalt Guided Missile Destroyer Class will come to the Pacific. The first P-8s—an incredible improvement in Maritime Patrol Aircraft capabilities—will come to the Pacific first. Our Navy’s newest surface combatant, the Littoral Combat Ship, has already completed one deployment to the South China Sea. We’ll see another rotational deployment this summer. When we do field the Joint Strike Fighter, it will go first to the Pacific theater.
The challenges in the maritime domain remain complex and complicated. Our Chief of Naval Operations has spoken at length about partnerships and our Navy’s ability to contribute to the global challenge of maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight. These partnerships will enable all navies to take advantage of each other’s strengths and build a maritime community that enables all of us to sail the seas without intimidation or interference. Working together in partnerships, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, allows us to also respond more quickly to humanitarian and disaster assistance when needed.
The Rebalance as Continuity of U.S. Policy
The story of the rebalance is a story of continuity. The United States has been and will continue to be a Pacific Power. Our strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific recognizes the important role the region will play in the 21st century and the fact that the region is critically important to U.S. security and economics. As a marker of how important we see continuing our support of Asia-Pacific, the Obama administration has begun a process which will increase foreign assistance to the Asia-Pacific region by seven percent.
You may have noticed that in the rebalance much of our effort seems to be aimed at South and Southeast Asia. One of the reasons for that is that we have always had a very strong presence, including the stationing of several thousand American soldiers and sailors, in Northeast Asian countries like the Republic of Korea and Japan. We seek to deepen our engagement with new partners and multilateral institutions in Southeast Asia, to find opportunities to work together to advance our shared interests.
And quickly, I want to address the issue of China. I know that there are some in Beijing who think our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is part of a broader American effort to contain China. Let me be clear: that is not the case. On the contrary, the United States seeks to continue building a cooperative partnership with China. A positive and cooperative relationship with China is a key element of our rebalance strategy. We understand that China will play an important role in critical global challenges like fighting climate change, wildlife trafficking, and countering proliferation. We welcome that role: those problems won’t get fixed without China’s help. And we recognize that our two economies are deeply intertwined. We consistently seek to engage with China on all levels on a wide range of issues. We want to do more with China in many areas, including economic relations. National Security Advisor Susan Rice recently said that the United States welcomes China and any other nation interested in joining and sharing the benefits of the Trans-Pacific Partnership so long as they can commit to the high standards of the agreement.
The United States is committed to building healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relations with China. We maintain a robust schedule of military-to-military exchanges and dialogues in pursuit of that goal and to encourage China to exhibit greater transparency with respect to its military capabilities and intentions. In addition, U.S. military, diplomatic, and defense officials participate in a range of combined civilian-military dialogues with the Chinese in which we work to build mutual trust and understanding. I’ve participated personally in some of them, both in Washington and Beijing.
Farther Into Asia
South Asia, where I’ll travel in a few days, also merits some comment. I’ve travelled several times over the past few years to India. I think it’s fair to say that there is growing interest in both Washington and New Delhi in greater security cooperation. There is a significant degree of coincidence of strategic interests. During the Obama Administration, the United States carried out our first political-military dialogue with India in six years. And it was significant because we were able to help our Indian counterparts work through the challenges of our interagency process on national security issues. Indian officials told us that the dialogue is especially helpful in helping them to coordinate the same issues within their own government, as well as giving them a better idea of how to deal with our own large and admittedly complicated bureaucracy. The Indian military is also increasingly interested in buying equipment from the United States. Our foreign military sales to India have grown from virtually zero in 2008 to more than $9 billion. In comparison, we had only $363 million in military sales with India from 2002-2006.
I’m not going to India on this trip, but I will travel to Bangladesh, another important South Asian partner. I’ll visit the port city of Chittagong, where the Bangladeshi Navy will show me the Somudra Joy, formerly the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Jarvis, which enables the Bangladeshi Navy to promote maritime security. This transfer has achieved real results by contributing to a seventy percent reduction in piracy in the Bay of Bengal.
My conviction and my experience is that our ongoing rebalance strategy that dates back to 2009 is broad, is deep, and encompasses not just regional security, but also economic prosperity, and people-to-people ties. This is the subject of a very intense ongoing interagency collaboration within the U.S. Government, precisely because it is a strategic priority of the President, of the Administration, and of the nation.
This brings me back to the beginning of my speech, and what motivates U.S. leaders to invest significant resources to support U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific and around the globe. Citizens of this country are learning what you already know – that world events are closer to home than we may think, and can change rapidly. That means we need to be on our toes, adapting and evolving to enhance and sustain U.S. global leadership. This can be challenging, but we really need to remember that in this changing world it has been international partnerships that have brought about stability and prosperity, not only to the United States, but across the world.
By tackling the world’s toughest problems together, we can bring new perspectives and expanded capabilities to bear. And we can build partnerships to be proud of – within government, with civil society, and with nations around the world.
Thank you again for your personal contributions to that effort. And with that, I will be happy to take your questions.
Thursday, December 12, 2013
U.S.-SINGAPORE JOINT STATEMENT OUTLINES SOME FUTURE NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS
FROM: U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Joint Statement by US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Singapore Minister for Defense Dr Ng Eng Hen
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Minister for Defense Dr Ng Eng Hen met today in the Pentagon. Minister Ng is in the United States to witness the Singapore Armed Forces' Exercise Forging Sabre and the 20th anniversary celebrations of the Republic of Singapore Air Force's Peace Carvin II F-16 detachment.
During their meeting, Secretary Hagel and Minister Ng reaffirmed the excellent and longstanding bilateral defense relationship between the United States and Singapore. Minister Ng expressed appreciation for the United States' support of the Republic of Singapore training detachments in the United States. Secretary Hagel thanked Singapore for the logistical support that it provides to United States military aircraft and vessels in the region under the 1990 memorandum of understanding, which is founded on a shared belief that a strong United States presence in the Asia-Pacific is vital for regional peace and stability.
Secretary Hagel and Minister Ng noted the completion of the inaugural rotational deployment of the United States Navy's first Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), USS Freedom to Singapore from April to November 2013 under the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement, and were pleased that the deployment had strengthened the United States' engagement with Singapore and the region. They looked forward to the rotational deployment of the next LCS, USS Fort Worth in late 2014, followed by the third LCS deployment in late 2015, in line with the United States' plans to deploy up to four LCS in the region by end 2016.
Secretary Hagel and Minister Ng were pleased to note the strong military-to-military cooperation between the United States and Singapore Armed Forces, comprising personnel exchanges, joint exercises and joint operations such as the U.S.-led multinational stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. Both militaries have enhanced their interoperability through increasing the complexity of their joint exercises, such as Exercise Commando Sling. They have also identified new opportunities to expand the scope of joint training, such as joint urban training through the use of the Murai Urban Training Facility in Singapore.
Secretary Hagel and Minister Ng also discussed initiatives to promote regional stability in the Asia Pacific region. Trans-national threats related to maritime security, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and large scale natural disasters could only be tackled effectively by the combined efforts of many countries. To meet these challenges, countries and their military forces should build confidence with each other through cooperation in bilateral and multilateral exchanges.
In this regard, Secretary Hagel and Minister Ng recognized the importance of the Shangri-La Dialogue and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) which respectively foster dialogue and practical cooperation among regional countries. Secretary Hagel and Minister Ng agreed that these interactions contributed to a climate of cooperation and opened up the possibility for the ADMM-Plus to pursue practical measures in response to regional security challenges.
Joint Statement by US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Singapore Minister for Defense Dr Ng Eng Hen
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Minister for Defense Dr Ng Eng Hen met today in the Pentagon. Minister Ng is in the United States to witness the Singapore Armed Forces' Exercise Forging Sabre and the 20th anniversary celebrations of the Republic of Singapore Air Force's Peace Carvin II F-16 detachment.
During their meeting, Secretary Hagel and Minister Ng reaffirmed the excellent and longstanding bilateral defense relationship between the United States and Singapore. Minister Ng expressed appreciation for the United States' support of the Republic of Singapore training detachments in the United States. Secretary Hagel thanked Singapore for the logistical support that it provides to United States military aircraft and vessels in the region under the 1990 memorandum of understanding, which is founded on a shared belief that a strong United States presence in the Asia-Pacific is vital for regional peace and stability.
Secretary Hagel and Minister Ng noted the completion of the inaugural rotational deployment of the United States Navy's first Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), USS Freedom to Singapore from April to November 2013 under the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement, and were pleased that the deployment had strengthened the United States' engagement with Singapore and the region. They looked forward to the rotational deployment of the next LCS, USS Fort Worth in late 2014, followed by the third LCS deployment in late 2015, in line with the United States' plans to deploy up to four LCS in the region by end 2016.
Secretary Hagel and Minister Ng were pleased to note the strong military-to-military cooperation between the United States and Singapore Armed Forces, comprising personnel exchanges, joint exercises and joint operations such as the U.S.-led multinational stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. Both militaries have enhanced their interoperability through increasing the complexity of their joint exercises, such as Exercise Commando Sling. They have also identified new opportunities to expand the scope of joint training, such as joint urban training through the use of the Murai Urban Training Facility in Singapore.
Secretary Hagel and Minister Ng also discussed initiatives to promote regional stability in the Asia Pacific region. Trans-national threats related to maritime security, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and large scale natural disasters could only be tackled effectively by the combined efforts of many countries. To meet these challenges, countries and their military forces should build confidence with each other through cooperation in bilateral and multilateral exchanges.
In this regard, Secretary Hagel and Minister Ng recognized the importance of the Shangri-La Dialogue and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) which respectively foster dialogue and practical cooperation among regional countries. Secretary Hagel and Minister Ng agreed that these interactions contributed to a climate of cooperation and opened up the possibility for the ADMM-Plus to pursue practical measures in response to regional security challenges.
Sunday, November 3, 2013
REMARKS BY ROSE GOTTEMOELLER AT 2013 MULTINATIONAL BMD CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Remarks at the 2013 Multinational BMD Conference and Exhibition
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Warsaw, Poland
October 31, 2013
As Delivered
Thank you so much for inviting me to speak here and thank you for your kind introduction, Nancy. It is always a pleasure to visit Warsaw. The United States greatly values its relationship with Poland and looks forward to further strengthening our cooperation.
As you have all heard from my colleagues, Under Secretary Miller and Admiral Syring, the global threat from ballistic missiles is very serious. Missile defense is an important part of how we combat this threat. In our increasingly-connected and fiscally-strained world, efforts and collaboration of allies and partners on missile defense are more important than ever. The United States will continue to do its part in this regard and today, I would like to focus on the broader picture about how missile defenses fit into our larger strategy to respond to the threat, including the defense of the United States, our Allies and friends.
Comprehensive Tools
The United States has a large number of tools available to it to prevent the threat from growing. We are active participants in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which serves as the global standard for controlling the transfer of equipment, software, and technology that could make a contribution to the development of WMD-capable missile and unmanned aerial vehicle delivery systems.
We are also working through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other counter-proliferation activities to help partners improve their ability to stop shipments of missiles or missile parts. My last visit to Warsaw was for the PSI 10th anniversary in the spring. We made some real progress on that occasion in expanding the reach and depth of the PSI, and thank you again to Poland for hosting such an effective meeting. We have worked directly with specific governments to convince them to renounce their missile programs. For example, in 2003, Libya committed to eliminate its long-range ballistic missile programs, which led to the elimination of their 800-km range SCUD missiles. These are just some of our ongoing efforts to tackle the missile threat and prevent missile proliferation. While much of this work is performed quietly, the impact of all of these efforts is of crucial importance to international peace and security.
At the same time, we are realistic that these programs cannot completely halt missile proliferation and that other steps are needed to dissuade countries from acquiring or developing ballistic missiles. That is why missile defense is an important part of our efforts to strengthen regional security. The missile defense systems that we deploy are critical to reassuring our allies. They signal that, in the face of threats from countries like Iran and North Korea, we will meet our defense commitments. As you heard yesterday, missile threats exist around the globe and have been used in recent and current conflicts. In both the Libyan and Syrian conflicts, ballistic missiles were used.
As Iran and North Korea conduct more ballistic missile tests, our defense systems make it more likely that our allies will embrace our diplomatic efforts, whether it is engagement or sanctions, knowing that missile defenses are doing their part to defend against a regional threat. That assurance is critical as we seek regional cooperation to persuade some states to abandon their nuclear programs and stop the proliferation of nuclear material.
Where we can, we seek to integrate our missile defense systems into a broader system of defenses deployed by our allies and friends. We are better off where we can leverage the capabilities of our allies and combine that with a flexible, capable cost effective system. The Obama Administration is improving these regional security architectures by deploying and improving regional missile defenses. These deployments are tailored to the unique requirements of the regional threat. We do not purchase more than what is required and we are very transparent about what we do purchase. Let me discuss some of our efforts around the world related to these efforts.
Cooperation in Europe
First, in Europe, the United States remains firmly committed to defending NATO Europe against ballistic missile threats to populations, territory and forces. We are deploying the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which will provide protection to all NATO European territory in the 2018 timeframe. We are making great progress on EPAA, most recently with Monday’s Phase 2 site ground-breaking in Romania, in which Under Secretary Miller and Admiral Syring participated, as well as my colleague DAS Frank Rose. That site will be operational in the 2015 timeframe. We will also forward-base four BMD-capable Aegis warships to Rota, Spain in the 2015 timeframe to support the EPAA. Our commitment to deploy Phase 3 in Poland is ironclad, and preparations are currently on-time and on-budget for the establishment of the Phase 3 interceptor site at Redzikowo. It will be operational in the 2018 timeframe.
Although not related to EPAA, the Dutch, German and United States deployment of Patriot missile defense units to Turkey this year in response to a Turkish request to NATO for defense against potential Syrian ballistic missile threats is an excellent example of how missile defense can provide reassurance to Allies and deter potential adversaries.
Cooperation in the Middle East
The United States continues its robust BMD partnership with Israel. This cooperation includes the Arrow 2 interceptor, the more advanced Arrow 3, and the David’s Sling Weapon system. And the United States and Israel worked closely together to deploy an AN/TPY-2 radar to Israel in 2008. This powerful radar is linked to U.S. early warning satellites, and intended to enhance Israel’s missile detection and defense capabilities.
In the Gulf, the United States has had a continuous missile defense presence and seeks to strengthen cooperation with its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). We have begun an initiative, launched at the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in March 2012, to strengthen missile defense cooperation.
At the September 26 meeting of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, Ministers resolved to work together to continue to work towards enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), including the eventual development of a Gulf-wide coordinated missile defense architecture built around interoperable U.S. and GCC forces that would serve as an integrated system to defend the territory and assets of the GCC states against the threat of ballistic missiles. A number of states in the region already deploy PATRIOT batteries and are exploring purchases of some missile defense capabilities under the auspices of the foreign military sales (FMS) program. To build a coordinated architecture, it is critical that our partners select systems that are fully interoperable.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) continues to be a leader in the field of ballistic missile defense. On December 25, 2011, the UAE became the first international partner to purchase the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or “THAAD,” system from the United States. This robust area defense capability, in conjunction with the UAE’s acquisition of PAC-3 point defense systems, will provide the UAE with a layered missile defense capability, ensure interoperability with U.S. forces, and contribute to regional stability. These purchases highlight the strong ties and common strategic interests between the United States and the UAE.
As our partners acquire greater missile defense capabilities, the United States will work to promote interoperability and information sharing among the GCC states. This will allow for more efficient missile defenses and greater security cooperation in the region.
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
In the Asia-Pacific region, we have robust missile defense cooperation with Japan and are increasing this cooperation. Japan is one of our closest allies, a leader in missile defense within the region, and one of the United States’ closest BMD partners. The United States and Japan have made significant strides in interoperability. The United States and Japan regularly train together, and our forces have successfully executed cooperative BMD operations.
Japan has acquired a layered integrated BMD system that includes Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile 3 interceptors, Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) fire units, early warning radars, and a command and control system. We also worked cooperatively to deploy a forward-based X-band radar in Japan. At their October 3, 2013, “2+2 meeting, U.S. and Japanese foreign and defense ministers confirmed their intention to designate the Air Self-Defense Force base at Kyogamisaki as the deployment site for a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system that will further enhance the defense of our two countries.
One of our most significant cooperative efforts is the co-development of a next-generation SM-3 interceptor, called the Block IIA. This co-development program represents not only an area of significant technical cooperation but also the basis for enhanced operational cooperation to strengthen regional security. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is another key U.S. ally and with the increasing North Korean missile threat, the United States stands ready to work with the ROK to strengthen its BMD capabilities. We are working together to define possible future ROK BMD requirements and the United States looks forward to taking further steps to build upon this ongoing missile defense relationship.
Defense Against Regional Threats
As we work with partners abroad, the Obama Administration is enhancing our homeland missile defenses; a development which will also provide reassurance to our Allies. On March 15, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced an increase in the number of ground-based interceptors to ensure that the United States remains well hedged against a North Korean ICBM threat. This change in our missile defenses will also provide the United States with additional defenses against an Iranian ICBM capability should that threat emerge.
We also strengthened our defenses of U.S. territory through deployment of a THAAD battery to Guam during the tensions with North Korea earlier this year. Homeland missile defenses ensure that the United States reduces the risks that come with helping to defend our Allies and allows our Allies to be confident that the United States will meet its Treaty and security commitments.
Strategic Stability
As we move forward with our programs, I want to be very clear - our missile defense deployments are not directed at Russia or China. We are committed to maintaining strategic stability with these nations. U.S. missile defenses are not designed to intercept Russian ICBMs or SLBMs, nor are they technically capable of intercepting Russian ICBMs or SLBMs. As stated in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, our homeland missile defenses are to defend against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.
Russia and China both field advanced ICBMs and SLBMs. In addition, with just 44 ground-based interceptors scheduled to be deployed, both Russia and China’s nuclear arsenals far exceed the number of interceptors we have; thus clearly establishing that we are talking about – to use an American phrase – apples and oranges when it comes to how U.S. missile defenses impact strategic stability with those nations. There is therefore no way that U.S. missile defenses could undermine the effectiveness of Russia’s or China’s strategic nuclear forces.
Dialogue with Russia
We remain convinced that increased predictability on missile defense between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, missile defense cooperation with Russia remains a priority for President Obama, as it has been for nearly 20 years with both Democratic and Republican Presidents.
As such, the United States has had discussions with the Russian Federation on increasing predictability on missile defense. Secretary of Defense Hagel and Russian Defense Minister Shoygu agreed in March to reconvene missile defense discussions between Under Secretary of Defense Jim Miller and Deputy Defense Minister Antonov. I also had discussions with my Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs counterpart, Sergei Ryabkov, on strategic stability issues, including missile defense. We are committed to a dialogue on missile defense, both bilaterally and in the NATO-Russia Council, and stand ready to begin practical discussions.
While we seek to develop ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, it is important to remember that in keeping with its collective security obligations, NATO alone bears responsibility for defending the Alliance from ballistic missile threats. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of Russian territory, NATO must ensure the defense of NATO territory. NATO cannot and will not outsource its Article 5 commitments. Russia continues to request legal guarantees that could create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional ballistic missile threats such as those presented by Iran and North Korea. We have made clear that we cannot and will not accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships.
The United States believes that through cooperation and transparency, Russia will see firsthand that this system is designed to respond to ballistic missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems will not undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Cooperation would also send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter their efforts.
Dialogue with China
We are in the beginning stages of holding dialogues with China on these issues that span both governments’ interagencies. In May, I traveled to Beijing to hold a Security Dialogue with my Chinese counterpart. On the State Department side, there are a number of fora in which we discuss important issues, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue led by Secretaries Kerry and Lew and the Strategic Security Dialogue led by the Deputy Secretary of State. The Defense Department also has a number of important dialogues with the Chinese, including the U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks. General Dempsey and other senior defense officials have also met with their Chinese counterparts this year. These mechanisms and opportunities for deep discussion are important for strengthening our strategic stability with China.
Looking Ahead
Looking ahead, the United States knows that we have a lot more work to do on creating opportunities for missile defense cooperation and on defending against ballistic missile proliferation, but that is why forums like these are so important. The discussions, debates and ideas that develop here can help us move to a safer, more secure world.
Thank you.
Remarks at the 2013 Multinational BMD Conference and Exhibition
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Warsaw, Poland
October 31, 2013
As Delivered
Thank you so much for inviting me to speak here and thank you for your kind introduction, Nancy. It is always a pleasure to visit Warsaw. The United States greatly values its relationship with Poland and looks forward to further strengthening our cooperation.
As you have all heard from my colleagues, Under Secretary Miller and Admiral Syring, the global threat from ballistic missiles is very serious. Missile defense is an important part of how we combat this threat. In our increasingly-connected and fiscally-strained world, efforts and collaboration of allies and partners on missile defense are more important than ever. The United States will continue to do its part in this regard and today, I would like to focus on the broader picture about how missile defenses fit into our larger strategy to respond to the threat, including the defense of the United States, our Allies and friends.
Comprehensive Tools
The United States has a large number of tools available to it to prevent the threat from growing. We are active participants in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which serves as the global standard for controlling the transfer of equipment, software, and technology that could make a contribution to the development of WMD-capable missile and unmanned aerial vehicle delivery systems.
We are also working through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other counter-proliferation activities to help partners improve their ability to stop shipments of missiles or missile parts. My last visit to Warsaw was for the PSI 10th anniversary in the spring. We made some real progress on that occasion in expanding the reach and depth of the PSI, and thank you again to Poland for hosting such an effective meeting. We have worked directly with specific governments to convince them to renounce their missile programs. For example, in 2003, Libya committed to eliminate its long-range ballistic missile programs, which led to the elimination of their 800-km range SCUD missiles. These are just some of our ongoing efforts to tackle the missile threat and prevent missile proliferation. While much of this work is performed quietly, the impact of all of these efforts is of crucial importance to international peace and security.
At the same time, we are realistic that these programs cannot completely halt missile proliferation and that other steps are needed to dissuade countries from acquiring or developing ballistic missiles. That is why missile defense is an important part of our efforts to strengthen regional security. The missile defense systems that we deploy are critical to reassuring our allies. They signal that, in the face of threats from countries like Iran and North Korea, we will meet our defense commitments. As you heard yesterday, missile threats exist around the globe and have been used in recent and current conflicts. In both the Libyan and Syrian conflicts, ballistic missiles were used.
As Iran and North Korea conduct more ballistic missile tests, our defense systems make it more likely that our allies will embrace our diplomatic efforts, whether it is engagement or sanctions, knowing that missile defenses are doing their part to defend against a regional threat. That assurance is critical as we seek regional cooperation to persuade some states to abandon their nuclear programs and stop the proliferation of nuclear material.
Where we can, we seek to integrate our missile defense systems into a broader system of defenses deployed by our allies and friends. We are better off where we can leverage the capabilities of our allies and combine that with a flexible, capable cost effective system. The Obama Administration is improving these regional security architectures by deploying and improving regional missile defenses. These deployments are tailored to the unique requirements of the regional threat. We do not purchase more than what is required and we are very transparent about what we do purchase. Let me discuss some of our efforts around the world related to these efforts.
Cooperation in Europe
First, in Europe, the United States remains firmly committed to defending NATO Europe against ballistic missile threats to populations, territory and forces. We are deploying the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which will provide protection to all NATO European territory in the 2018 timeframe. We are making great progress on EPAA, most recently with Monday’s Phase 2 site ground-breaking in Romania, in which Under Secretary Miller and Admiral Syring participated, as well as my colleague DAS Frank Rose. That site will be operational in the 2015 timeframe. We will also forward-base four BMD-capable Aegis warships to Rota, Spain in the 2015 timeframe to support the EPAA. Our commitment to deploy Phase 3 in Poland is ironclad, and preparations are currently on-time and on-budget for the establishment of the Phase 3 interceptor site at Redzikowo. It will be operational in the 2018 timeframe.
Although not related to EPAA, the Dutch, German and United States deployment of Patriot missile defense units to Turkey this year in response to a Turkish request to NATO for defense against potential Syrian ballistic missile threats is an excellent example of how missile defense can provide reassurance to Allies and deter potential adversaries.
Cooperation in the Middle East
The United States continues its robust BMD partnership with Israel. This cooperation includes the Arrow 2 interceptor, the more advanced Arrow 3, and the David’s Sling Weapon system. And the United States and Israel worked closely together to deploy an AN/TPY-2 radar to Israel in 2008. This powerful radar is linked to U.S. early warning satellites, and intended to enhance Israel’s missile detection and defense capabilities.
In the Gulf, the United States has had a continuous missile defense presence and seeks to strengthen cooperation with its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). We have begun an initiative, launched at the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in March 2012, to strengthen missile defense cooperation.
At the September 26 meeting of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, Ministers resolved to work together to continue to work towards enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), including the eventual development of a Gulf-wide coordinated missile defense architecture built around interoperable U.S. and GCC forces that would serve as an integrated system to defend the territory and assets of the GCC states against the threat of ballistic missiles. A number of states in the region already deploy PATRIOT batteries and are exploring purchases of some missile defense capabilities under the auspices of the foreign military sales (FMS) program. To build a coordinated architecture, it is critical that our partners select systems that are fully interoperable.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) continues to be a leader in the field of ballistic missile defense. On December 25, 2011, the UAE became the first international partner to purchase the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or “THAAD,” system from the United States. This robust area defense capability, in conjunction with the UAE’s acquisition of PAC-3 point defense systems, will provide the UAE with a layered missile defense capability, ensure interoperability with U.S. forces, and contribute to regional stability. These purchases highlight the strong ties and common strategic interests between the United States and the UAE.
As our partners acquire greater missile defense capabilities, the United States will work to promote interoperability and information sharing among the GCC states. This will allow for more efficient missile defenses and greater security cooperation in the region.
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
In the Asia-Pacific region, we have robust missile defense cooperation with Japan and are increasing this cooperation. Japan is one of our closest allies, a leader in missile defense within the region, and one of the United States’ closest BMD partners. The United States and Japan have made significant strides in interoperability. The United States and Japan regularly train together, and our forces have successfully executed cooperative BMD operations.
Japan has acquired a layered integrated BMD system that includes Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile 3 interceptors, Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) fire units, early warning radars, and a command and control system. We also worked cooperatively to deploy a forward-based X-band radar in Japan. At their October 3, 2013, “2+2 meeting, U.S. and Japanese foreign and defense ministers confirmed their intention to designate the Air Self-Defense Force base at Kyogamisaki as the deployment site for a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system that will further enhance the defense of our two countries.
One of our most significant cooperative efforts is the co-development of a next-generation SM-3 interceptor, called the Block IIA. This co-development program represents not only an area of significant technical cooperation but also the basis for enhanced operational cooperation to strengthen regional security. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is another key U.S. ally and with the increasing North Korean missile threat, the United States stands ready to work with the ROK to strengthen its BMD capabilities. We are working together to define possible future ROK BMD requirements and the United States looks forward to taking further steps to build upon this ongoing missile defense relationship.
Defense Against Regional Threats
As we work with partners abroad, the Obama Administration is enhancing our homeland missile defenses; a development which will also provide reassurance to our Allies. On March 15, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced an increase in the number of ground-based interceptors to ensure that the United States remains well hedged against a North Korean ICBM threat. This change in our missile defenses will also provide the United States with additional defenses against an Iranian ICBM capability should that threat emerge.
We also strengthened our defenses of U.S. territory through deployment of a THAAD battery to Guam during the tensions with North Korea earlier this year. Homeland missile defenses ensure that the United States reduces the risks that come with helping to defend our Allies and allows our Allies to be confident that the United States will meet its Treaty and security commitments.
Strategic Stability
As we move forward with our programs, I want to be very clear - our missile defense deployments are not directed at Russia or China. We are committed to maintaining strategic stability with these nations. U.S. missile defenses are not designed to intercept Russian ICBMs or SLBMs, nor are they technically capable of intercepting Russian ICBMs or SLBMs. As stated in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, our homeland missile defenses are to defend against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.
Russia and China both field advanced ICBMs and SLBMs. In addition, with just 44 ground-based interceptors scheduled to be deployed, both Russia and China’s nuclear arsenals far exceed the number of interceptors we have; thus clearly establishing that we are talking about – to use an American phrase – apples and oranges when it comes to how U.S. missile defenses impact strategic stability with those nations. There is therefore no way that U.S. missile defenses could undermine the effectiveness of Russia’s or China’s strategic nuclear forces.
Dialogue with Russia
We remain convinced that increased predictability on missile defense between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, missile defense cooperation with Russia remains a priority for President Obama, as it has been for nearly 20 years with both Democratic and Republican Presidents.
As such, the United States has had discussions with the Russian Federation on increasing predictability on missile defense. Secretary of Defense Hagel and Russian Defense Minister Shoygu agreed in March to reconvene missile defense discussions between Under Secretary of Defense Jim Miller and Deputy Defense Minister Antonov. I also had discussions with my Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs counterpart, Sergei Ryabkov, on strategic stability issues, including missile defense. We are committed to a dialogue on missile defense, both bilaterally and in the NATO-Russia Council, and stand ready to begin practical discussions.
While we seek to develop ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, it is important to remember that in keeping with its collective security obligations, NATO alone bears responsibility for defending the Alliance from ballistic missile threats. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of Russian territory, NATO must ensure the defense of NATO territory. NATO cannot and will not outsource its Article 5 commitments. Russia continues to request legal guarantees that could create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional ballistic missile threats such as those presented by Iran and North Korea. We have made clear that we cannot and will not accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships.
The United States believes that through cooperation and transparency, Russia will see firsthand that this system is designed to respond to ballistic missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems will not undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Cooperation would also send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter their efforts.
Dialogue with China
We are in the beginning stages of holding dialogues with China on these issues that span both governments’ interagencies. In May, I traveled to Beijing to hold a Security Dialogue with my Chinese counterpart. On the State Department side, there are a number of fora in which we discuss important issues, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue led by Secretaries Kerry and Lew and the Strategic Security Dialogue led by the Deputy Secretary of State. The Defense Department also has a number of important dialogues with the Chinese, including the U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks. General Dempsey and other senior defense officials have also met with their Chinese counterparts this year. These mechanisms and opportunities for deep discussion are important for strengthening our strategic stability with China.
Looking Ahead
Looking ahead, the United States knows that we have a lot more work to do on creating opportunities for missile defense cooperation and on defending against ballistic missile proliferation, but that is why forums like these are so important. The discussions, debates and ideas that develop here can help us move to a safer, more secure world.
Thank you.
Tuesday, August 20, 2013
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAGEL AND CHINA'S MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE GENERAL WANQUAN
FROM: U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Presenter: : Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and China's Minister of National Defence General Chang Wanquan
Department of Defense Press Briefing with Secretary Hagel and Gen. Chang from the Pentagon
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHUCK HAGEL: Good afternoon. Today, I'm pleased to welcome Minister of Defence General Chang to the Pentagon. We just finished a very productive meeting, where I restated that the United States is committed to building a positive and constructive relationship with China. The China-U.S. relationship is important for stability and security in the Asia Pacific and achieving security and prosperity for our two nations in the 21st century.
One of the themes we emphasized today was that a sustained, substantive military-to-military relationship is an important pillar for this strong bilateral relationship. The United States welcomes and supports the rise of a prosperous and responsible China that help solve regional and global problems.
Our goal is to build trust between our militaries through cooperation. The United States has invited for the first time the PLA navy to join our largest multilateral naval exercise, RIMPAC, that will take place next year. This morning, General Chang and I have affirmed that we will continue expanding our defense exchanges and joint exercises. Earlier this summer, for the first time, Chinese midshipmen joined in a multinational exchange program at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis.
Today, our Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group is meeting in Hawaii to discuss humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. And this weekend, our navies will conduct another counter-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden, building on the first-ever joint counter-piracy exercise we held last year.
General Chang brought up two of the initiatives that President Xi proposed to President Obama at their summit in June, one, a way to notify each other of major military activities, and, two, rules of behavior for military air and naval activities.
I welcomed this discussion and noticed that the transparency that we've had is important to reducing the risk of miscalculation and avoiding unintended tensions or conflicts. Our staffs are exploring those initiatives and will continue discussing them.
General Chang and I have also both welcomed this recent establishment of the new U.S.-China cyber working group as a venue for addressing issues of mutual concern in the area of cyber. We discussed a number of regional security issues, as well, including North Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and I reaffirmed longstanding U.S. policies on these issues.
With respect to competing maritime claims, I noted that while the United States does not take a position on sovereignty in these cases, we do have an interest in these claims being resolved peacefully, without coercion. The general and I affirmed the importance of maintaining open channels of communication, and we agreed that it's important to continue high-level visits, such as, as you all are aware, General Dempsey's visit to China earlier this year.
General Odierno and General Welsh will visit China later this year, and PLA Navy Commander Admiral Wu will visit the United States. Today, General Dempsey also offered to host his counterpart, PLA General Fang, for a visit to the United States next year.
In our meeting this morning, General Chang invited me to visit China next year, and I enthusiastically accepted. I look forward to seeing him again at next week's ASEAN defense ministers meeting in Brunei, as part of my trip to Southeast Asia. I'll also visit Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines on this trip.
Now I'll ask General Chang for his comments before we take questions from all of you. Thank you very much. Thank you.
GENERAL CHANG WANQUAN (through translator): Friends from the press, good afternoon. At the invitation of Secretary Hagel, I am leading this senior military delegation from the People's Liberation Army to visit the United States, bringing the friendship from the Chinese people and the Chinese military. The purpose of my visit is to implement the important consensus reached by President Xi Jinping and President Obama of building a new model of major country relationship based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation, to further increase mutual understanding, to enhance mutual trust, to promote mutual cooperation, and to push forward the sound and stable development of our national and military relations.
In the -- in the past few days, we visited U.S. PACOM, U.S. NORTHCOM, and NORAD. We were well received and experienced warm hospitality from the American people and from the officers and soldiers of the U.S. military. Here let me say thank you on behalf of all my colleagues.
This morning, Secretary Hagel and I had a candid and deepened exchange of views over our national and military relations, international and regional security issues, and other issues of common concerns. We reached five agreements.
Firstly, we both agreed that our military-to-military relationship is an important component of our overall bilateral relations and that the current military relationship is gaining a good momentum. We both agreed to earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the two presidents during their Sunnylands summit to work together to strengthen our military relationship and attempt to elevate it to a new height.
Secondly, we both agreed to continue to strengthen our high-level visits, deepen our consultations and dialogues in order to increase our mutual trust. Specifically, the U.S. welcomes the visit by the PLA chief of general staff in 2014. China welcomes the visit by U.S. secretary of defense and chief of naval operations in 2014.
Secretary Hagel and I agreed to set up an exchange mechanism between the PLA Strategic Planning Department and J5 Strategic, Plans and Policy, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. We also agreed to take use of mechanisms, such as defense consultative talks, military maritime consultative agreements, to actively explore a notification mechanism for major military activities and continue to study the rules of behavior on military air and maritime activities.
Thirdly, we both believe that the Chinese and the U.S. militaries are carrying an increasingly important responsibility in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. Both sides agreed to play a constructive role in regional affairs, promoting the positive interaction between the two militaries in this region. We also agreed to strengthen coordination and cooperation under Asia Pacific multilateral security dialogues, mechanisms, and frameworks. China will participate in the Ring of Pacific exercise in 2014, as invited.
Fourthly, we're in agreement that the two militaries share wide common interests and foundation for cooperation in nontraditional security areas. We both agreed to further enhance exchanges and cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counterterrorism, anti-piracy, and peacekeeping. We both confirmed to conduct the first China-U.S. humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise with active force in Hawaii this November. We also agreed to have an exploratory discussion on logistics issues in support of nontraditional security missions later this year.
Fifthly, we both agreed to further deepen military archives cooperation, setting up a military archives cooperation mechanism in which both sides can build upon the existing cooperation of the PLA assist in U.S. to search those missing in actions and strengthen a two-way exchange of related military archives and materials.
At present, the China-U.S. relationship is in a new historical era. Building a new model of China-U.S. military relationship can help us to increase strategic trust to reduce strategic risks and to maintain world peace and regional stability. China is ready to work with the U.S. to seriously implemented our presidents' important consensus, to -- to raise our military-to-military relationship to a new height by strengthening our dialogue, communication, and practical cooperation, and by properly handle our disputes and differences.
Thank you.
SEC. HAGEL: Thanks.
GEORGE LITTLE: We'll now move to questions. There will be two per side. And we'll pause for translation after each question. And we'll start with Bob Burns of the Associated Press.
Q: Thank you. General Chang, a question for you. The U.S. has spoken quite a lot recently about pivoting to Asia. I'm wondering if you see justification for a larger U.S. military presence in the Asia Pacific. Do you see evidence of that yet? And do you think it's helpful or harmful that the U.S. is trying to increase its influence in the region?
A question for Secretary Hagel on Egypt, in light of the violence there in recent days. You had quite a series of contacts with General Al-Sisi in recent days. Given what transpired over the last several days, do you feel that your message fell on deaf ears? And also, what's the way ahead, in your view? Do you need to cut off military-to-military relations? Do you stop arms transfers? And do you -- are you concerned about the safety of U.S. military personnel in the Sinai, where there's been a lot of violence lately? Thank you.
GEN. CHANG (through translator): Regarding the U.S.-Asia Pacific rebalancing strategy, I would like to first make a point by quoting the chairman of the People's Republic of China. President Xi used to say that the Pacific is wide enough to accommodate both two great countries, China and United States.
It's always the Chinese position to welcome the U.S. to play a constructive role in the Asia Pacific. And we also noted the U.S. statement many times, that the U.S. rebalancing strategy is a comprehensive one, incorporating areas such as economics and social and also including military.
It is also worth to be noted that certain Asia Pacific nations have noted that the military aspect has been highlighted in this comprehensive strategy, including to strengthen the military deployment in the region, enhancing the U.S. alignments in this region by conducting military cooperations and military -- joint military exercises.
We also noticed that the frequency and intensity of such kind of joint military exercises are increasing upon the recent time. From certain degree, this kind of intensified military activities further complicated the situation in the region.
China is a peace-loving nation. And we hope that this strategy does not target a specific country in the region. And the development of China is not only conducive to our own country, to the entire region, but also to United States. Being together with all the Asia Pacific countries, regional countries, including United States, it is a common aspiration of all of the countries that we wish to have peace in the region. Therefore, it is our hope that this rebalancing strategy is a constructive one that could help the peace and stability in the region.
And on the other hand, we would like to have this rebalancing strategy balanced on different countries, as well, because the essence of rebalancing is -- is balance. It would be a -- it would be a balancing strategy if such kind of factors are taken into consideration. What is the most important is China is ready to work with the United States to maintain the regional peace and stability.
Thank you.
SEC. HAGEL: Bob, yes, I have had many phone calls with General Al-Sisi over the last five weeks, but so has all of our national security team been involved in working with the Egyptians on dealing with this -- this issue. I say that because we've all consistently framed the same message.
As President Obama said last week, the violence must end, national emergency lifted. The interim government of Egypt must get back to an inclusive approach to reconciliation in Egypt. All of us have consistently said that.
The United States has a longstanding relationship with Egypt that's based on our respect for the people of Egypt, the country of Egypt. We have interests, clearly, in the Middle East, interests that include hopefully a development of some progress toward an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. So we continue to work with the Egyptian interim government, as well as the Egyptian military.
Yes, we are concerned about our people, Americans, all Americans in Egypt. Protection of Americans in Egypt, not just only our diplomats, but all Americans, is of the highest priority. And we all -- all the American government officials, including American military, have been working very closely with the Egyptian military and police to assure the security and protection of Americans in Egypt, and we'll continue to do that.
Q: Are you concerning reducing that -- the peacekeeping force?
SEC. HAGEL: As President Obama has said, we're reviewing every aspect of our relationship with Egypt. Thank you.
(UNKNOWN): Now Xinhua News Agency, please.
Q (through translator): My question goes to General Chang. General Chang, you just mentioned for many times about the meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Obama and that the two presidents agreed to build a new model of bilateral relationship. And at the same time, President Xi proposed to build a new model of military relationship in accordance to the new model bilateral relationship. So my question is, what is actually the concept of this new model of military relationship?
GEN. CHANG (through translator): Thank you for your question. As we all know that President Xi summarized in three points the new model of this major country relationship between China and the United States, no confrontation, no antagonism, and respect each other towards win-win cooperation.
We believe as a new model of military relationship in accordance with the new model of bilateral relations, there are some is and some isn't in this concept. Firstly, it is a relationship in which both sides respect the other side. It is not a relationship dominated by either side alone.
Both sides respect the others' vital interests and major concerns, pay attention to the others' comfort level, not forcefully imposing one's will onto the other, or not gaining one's own interests at the expense of interests of the other.
Secondly, it is a relationship of cooperation and win-win. It is not a relationship of zero-sum game or antagonism. Both sides work hard to expand our mutual interests and areas of cooperation to take measures to effectively manage our fractions and risks towards the ultimate goal of cooperation and win-win to avoid the recidivist trap.
Thirdly, it's a relationship of mutual trust. It is not a relationship of mutual suspicion. Both sides view each other's strategic intention in objective manner to push forward those mechanisms that help mutual trust to refrain from words and actions that could pose negative effect upon mutual trust, not to make unwarranted accusations and to reduce misperception and miscalculations.
Fourthly, it is a relationship featuring exchanges and cooperation in many areas. It is not a relationship that is imbalanced and only focused on few areas for cooperation. A healthy and mature military-to-military relationship should be a comprehensive one, instead of an imbalanced one. In order to build a new model of military relationship, we need more substantive exchanges in wider areas and more practical cooperation in more diversified forms.
Finally, it is a relationship of openness and inclusiveness. It is not a relationship of exclusiveness or selfishness. While working to ensure the stability of China-U.S. relationship, it is imperative to work with other international community members to strengthen communication, coordination and cooperation, to maintain strategic balance and stability of the world, and in particular of Asia Pacific region.
I'm not sure if I've made my point clear or not. Thank you.
MR. LITTLE: We'll turn now to Jim Miklaszewski of NBC News.
(LAUGHTER)
Q: It easily translates. For General Chang, you spoke today of mutual trust, yet there are persistent reports that the Chinese government and military have launched cyber attacks against U.S. government targets and interests. What -- what is your response to those reports?
And given the fact that this cyber working group has been put together, what steps are the Chinese willing to take to restore the kind of faith and confidence between the Chinese and the U.S. on that front and reduce the potential threat for any cyber warfare?
And for you, Mr. Secretary, despite the persistent pleas from the U.S. government, your own personal efforts, the bloodshed today in Egypt continues. In what appears to be a further blow to democracy, there are reports the government is prepared to release the convicted former president Hosni Mubarak from prison and additional reports that the Saudis have pledged to make up any shortfalls that the Egyptians may run into if the U.S. cuts back any further aid.
And -- and one housekeeping measure. Is the U.S. prepared to cancel or at least postpone the shipment of Apache attack helicopters to Egypt?
GEN. CHANG (through translator): Actually, complete -- trying to complete our extra missions regarding answering questions. As we all know that cyber is a completely new domain, and cyber security has been a worldwide difficulty.
It is always the Chinese government's position to take peaceful use of cyberspace. We oppose of having any kind of arms race in the cyber domain, and we oppose of taking use of information and technology to conduct any kind of operation and hostility towards another party in the cyber domain. And we oppose of taking advantage of the information -- the technological advantage to weaken other parties' sovereign control in this -- in this domain. And we are opposed of taking any kind of double standard in this domain.
China is one of the primary victims from hacker attacks in the world. We are faced to severe threats coming from those cyber attacks. The Chinese government consistently oppose and cracks down the cyber crimes according to our laws. And the Chinese military has never supported any form of hacker activities.
Regarding how to solve the cyber security issue, I believe it requires the common exploration and cooperation between China and United States, rather than ungrounded accusation or suspicion. I believe that Secretary Hagel touched upon this issue in his -- in his remarks that we will work to cooperate to try to solve this issue.
Thank you.
SEC. HAGEL: Jim, three parts to the question. I don't know about a Mubarak report. I'm not aware of it. I can't help you.
Saudi Arabia. As you know, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait announced a couple weeks ago that they committed to a considerable amount of assistance to Egypt. The specifics of your question regarding Saudi Arabia, I -- I don't know about those specifics.
Your question regarding cancellation of Apache helicopters or other parts, as I said to Bob, we're reviewing all aspects of our relationship.
Q: But given all that, Mr. Secretary, is the U.S. powerless to effect any change, to bring an end to the bloodshed in Egypt right now And why not answer the calls from Capitol Hill in particular now, just pull all the aid out, if they're not cooperating or don't appear to be cooperating at any level?
SEC. HAGEL: Well, first, there's not a consistent call from Capitol Hill one way or the other, as you know, on this issue. But more to the point, we have serious interests in Egypt and that part of the world. This is a very complicated problem. We continue to work with all the parties to try to help as much as we can facilitate a reconciliation, a stop of the violence.
Our ability to influence the outcome in Egypt is limited. It's up to the Egyptian people. And they are a large, great, sovereign nation. And it will be their responsibility to sort -- to sort this out. All nations are limited in their influence in another nation's internal issues. I don't think the United States is without influence, but that has to be a collaborative effort focused on what the Egyptian people want, supporting the Egyptian people. And we believe, as I've said, the president's said, Secretary Kerry has said, Ambassador Patterson, Deputy Secretary of State Burns, that should come as an inclusive, open, democratic process, allowing all people to have a role in the future of their country. Thank you.
TRANSLATOR: Do want that translated, sir, for the benefit of the Chinese minister?
SEC. HAGEL: He did that exactly right.
(LAUGHTER)
Thank you. I didn't realize I spoke that long. I'm sorry, Jim.
(UNKNOWN) (through translator): Now last question from (inaudible)
Q (through translator): I have two questions respectively for General Chang and Secretary Hagel. For General Chang, how do you see the current Asia Pacific security situation? And how do you see the interaction between PLA and the U.S. military in the Asia Pacific?
And to Secretary Hagel, would you like to elaborate a little bit on how -- what substantive steps should the U.S. take in building such kind of new model of relationship?
GEN. CHANG (through translator): I understand our friends from the -- press friends' concern about the Asia Pacific security situation. It is also one of our major concerns, because the regional security situation is closely linked to the overall peace and stability -- stability in the world.
And I have several points to make. Firstly, the current situation in Asia Pacific is generally stable, but there remains some hot spots and sensitive issues. Some hot issues are heating, while some other sensitive issues are getting more even sensitive. Improper handling of these issues could lead to a severe impact on the overall security situation in the region.
Secondly, the Chinese people always have their love on peace. China always is a staunch defender of the peace and stability in the Asia Pacific. We always insist that related disputes be solved through dialogue and negotiation. However, no one should fantasize that China would barter away our core interests. And no one should underestimate our will and determination in defending our territory, sovereignty, and maritime rights.
Thirdly, the Asia Pacific is our common homeland. Nations big or small, strong or weak, should make positive and constructive efforts for promoting regional peace and stability. Any action that leads to trouble or provocation, any action -- unwanted action out of the self-interest or further complicates or magnifies the situation would be highly irresponsible and will not lead to a favorable result.
And as just as I mentioned before, that we believe peace is the essence of Pacific, which means the Ocean of Peace in Chinese, or the essence of rebalance is balance. For any country to make a strategic readjustment, it is imperative to take regional peace and stability in mind and is important to balance the security concerns of different -- different regional countries.
The Asia Pacific is a region where the interests of China and United States intertwine the most and where China and United States interact most frequently. The two countries enjoy huge space and potential for cooperation in this region. The People's Liberation Army is ready to work with the U.S. military by strengthening our communication, coordination, and cooperation to pay more concerted contribution to the regional peace, stability, and prosperity. Thank you.
SEC. HAGEL: As to your question regarding new models for our two countries, specifically military-to-military relationships, let me begin this way. I think it's fundamental to the efforts that are underway, as General Chang and I have both noted, and President Xi and President Obama noted, to develop relationships, avenues of opportunity for transparency, for understanding each other's intentions far better than we have in the past.
To carry forward the facilitation of those efforts require institutions, institutions of common interests, like what General Chang talked about this morning in his opening statement, as well as some of the specific items that I addressed, working groups for every general area of challenge, senior-level leadership exchanges, which I noted a number in my remarks, as did General Chang, those are the forms that you build in order to address the great challenges and issues and differences between our countries. And that's what we're doing.
Thank you.
GEN. CHANG (through translator): Thank you.
SEC. HAGEL: Thank you all.
MR. LITTLE: Thank you, everyone.
Presenter: : Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and China's Minister of National Defence General Chang Wanquan
Department of Defense Press Briefing with Secretary Hagel and Gen. Chang from the Pentagon
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHUCK HAGEL: Good afternoon. Today, I'm pleased to welcome Minister of Defence General Chang to the Pentagon. We just finished a very productive meeting, where I restated that the United States is committed to building a positive and constructive relationship with China. The China-U.S. relationship is important for stability and security in the Asia Pacific and achieving security and prosperity for our two nations in the 21st century.
One of the themes we emphasized today was that a sustained, substantive military-to-military relationship is an important pillar for this strong bilateral relationship. The United States welcomes and supports the rise of a prosperous and responsible China that help solve regional and global problems.
Our goal is to build trust between our militaries through cooperation. The United States has invited for the first time the PLA navy to join our largest multilateral naval exercise, RIMPAC, that will take place next year. This morning, General Chang and I have affirmed that we will continue expanding our defense exchanges and joint exercises. Earlier this summer, for the first time, Chinese midshipmen joined in a multinational exchange program at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis.
Today, our Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group is meeting in Hawaii to discuss humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. And this weekend, our navies will conduct another counter-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden, building on the first-ever joint counter-piracy exercise we held last year.
General Chang brought up two of the initiatives that President Xi proposed to President Obama at their summit in June, one, a way to notify each other of major military activities, and, two, rules of behavior for military air and naval activities.
I welcomed this discussion and noticed that the transparency that we've had is important to reducing the risk of miscalculation and avoiding unintended tensions or conflicts. Our staffs are exploring those initiatives and will continue discussing them.
General Chang and I have also both welcomed this recent establishment of the new U.S.-China cyber working group as a venue for addressing issues of mutual concern in the area of cyber. We discussed a number of regional security issues, as well, including North Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and I reaffirmed longstanding U.S. policies on these issues.
With respect to competing maritime claims, I noted that while the United States does not take a position on sovereignty in these cases, we do have an interest in these claims being resolved peacefully, without coercion. The general and I affirmed the importance of maintaining open channels of communication, and we agreed that it's important to continue high-level visits, such as, as you all are aware, General Dempsey's visit to China earlier this year.
General Odierno and General Welsh will visit China later this year, and PLA Navy Commander Admiral Wu will visit the United States. Today, General Dempsey also offered to host his counterpart, PLA General Fang, for a visit to the United States next year.
In our meeting this morning, General Chang invited me to visit China next year, and I enthusiastically accepted. I look forward to seeing him again at next week's ASEAN defense ministers meeting in Brunei, as part of my trip to Southeast Asia. I'll also visit Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines on this trip.
Now I'll ask General Chang for his comments before we take questions from all of you. Thank you very much. Thank you.
GENERAL CHANG WANQUAN (through translator): Friends from the press, good afternoon. At the invitation of Secretary Hagel, I am leading this senior military delegation from the People's Liberation Army to visit the United States, bringing the friendship from the Chinese people and the Chinese military. The purpose of my visit is to implement the important consensus reached by President Xi Jinping and President Obama of building a new model of major country relationship based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation, to further increase mutual understanding, to enhance mutual trust, to promote mutual cooperation, and to push forward the sound and stable development of our national and military relations.
In the -- in the past few days, we visited U.S. PACOM, U.S. NORTHCOM, and NORAD. We were well received and experienced warm hospitality from the American people and from the officers and soldiers of the U.S. military. Here let me say thank you on behalf of all my colleagues.
This morning, Secretary Hagel and I had a candid and deepened exchange of views over our national and military relations, international and regional security issues, and other issues of common concerns. We reached five agreements.
Firstly, we both agreed that our military-to-military relationship is an important component of our overall bilateral relations and that the current military relationship is gaining a good momentum. We both agreed to earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the two presidents during their Sunnylands summit to work together to strengthen our military relationship and attempt to elevate it to a new height.
Secondly, we both agreed to continue to strengthen our high-level visits, deepen our consultations and dialogues in order to increase our mutual trust. Specifically, the U.S. welcomes the visit by the PLA chief of general staff in 2014. China welcomes the visit by U.S. secretary of defense and chief of naval operations in 2014.
Secretary Hagel and I agreed to set up an exchange mechanism between the PLA Strategic Planning Department and J5 Strategic, Plans and Policy, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. We also agreed to take use of mechanisms, such as defense consultative talks, military maritime consultative agreements, to actively explore a notification mechanism for major military activities and continue to study the rules of behavior on military air and maritime activities.
Thirdly, we both believe that the Chinese and the U.S. militaries are carrying an increasingly important responsibility in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. Both sides agreed to play a constructive role in regional affairs, promoting the positive interaction between the two militaries in this region. We also agreed to strengthen coordination and cooperation under Asia Pacific multilateral security dialogues, mechanisms, and frameworks. China will participate in the Ring of Pacific exercise in 2014, as invited.
Fourthly, we're in agreement that the two militaries share wide common interests and foundation for cooperation in nontraditional security areas. We both agreed to further enhance exchanges and cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counterterrorism, anti-piracy, and peacekeeping. We both confirmed to conduct the first China-U.S. humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise with active force in Hawaii this November. We also agreed to have an exploratory discussion on logistics issues in support of nontraditional security missions later this year.
Fifthly, we both agreed to further deepen military archives cooperation, setting up a military archives cooperation mechanism in which both sides can build upon the existing cooperation of the PLA assist in U.S. to search those missing in actions and strengthen a two-way exchange of related military archives and materials.
At present, the China-U.S. relationship is in a new historical era. Building a new model of China-U.S. military relationship can help us to increase strategic trust to reduce strategic risks and to maintain world peace and regional stability. China is ready to work with the U.S. to seriously implemented our presidents' important consensus, to -- to raise our military-to-military relationship to a new height by strengthening our dialogue, communication, and practical cooperation, and by properly handle our disputes and differences.
Thank you.
SEC. HAGEL: Thanks.
GEORGE LITTLE: We'll now move to questions. There will be two per side. And we'll pause for translation after each question. And we'll start with Bob Burns of the Associated Press.
Q: Thank you. General Chang, a question for you. The U.S. has spoken quite a lot recently about pivoting to Asia. I'm wondering if you see justification for a larger U.S. military presence in the Asia Pacific. Do you see evidence of that yet? And do you think it's helpful or harmful that the U.S. is trying to increase its influence in the region?
A question for Secretary Hagel on Egypt, in light of the violence there in recent days. You had quite a series of contacts with General Al-Sisi in recent days. Given what transpired over the last several days, do you feel that your message fell on deaf ears? And also, what's the way ahead, in your view? Do you need to cut off military-to-military relations? Do you stop arms transfers? And do you -- are you concerned about the safety of U.S. military personnel in the Sinai, where there's been a lot of violence lately? Thank you.
GEN. CHANG (through translator): Regarding the U.S.-Asia Pacific rebalancing strategy, I would like to first make a point by quoting the chairman of the People's Republic of China. President Xi used to say that the Pacific is wide enough to accommodate both two great countries, China and United States.
It's always the Chinese position to welcome the U.S. to play a constructive role in the Asia Pacific. And we also noted the U.S. statement many times, that the U.S. rebalancing strategy is a comprehensive one, incorporating areas such as economics and social and also including military.
It is also worth to be noted that certain Asia Pacific nations have noted that the military aspect has been highlighted in this comprehensive strategy, including to strengthen the military deployment in the region, enhancing the U.S. alignments in this region by conducting military cooperations and military -- joint military exercises.
We also noticed that the frequency and intensity of such kind of joint military exercises are increasing upon the recent time. From certain degree, this kind of intensified military activities further complicated the situation in the region.
China is a peace-loving nation. And we hope that this strategy does not target a specific country in the region. And the development of China is not only conducive to our own country, to the entire region, but also to United States. Being together with all the Asia Pacific countries, regional countries, including United States, it is a common aspiration of all of the countries that we wish to have peace in the region. Therefore, it is our hope that this rebalancing strategy is a constructive one that could help the peace and stability in the region.
And on the other hand, we would like to have this rebalancing strategy balanced on different countries, as well, because the essence of rebalancing is -- is balance. It would be a -- it would be a balancing strategy if such kind of factors are taken into consideration. What is the most important is China is ready to work with the United States to maintain the regional peace and stability.
Thank you.
SEC. HAGEL: Bob, yes, I have had many phone calls with General Al-Sisi over the last five weeks, but so has all of our national security team been involved in working with the Egyptians on dealing with this -- this issue. I say that because we've all consistently framed the same message.
As President Obama said last week, the violence must end, national emergency lifted. The interim government of Egypt must get back to an inclusive approach to reconciliation in Egypt. All of us have consistently said that.
The United States has a longstanding relationship with Egypt that's based on our respect for the people of Egypt, the country of Egypt. We have interests, clearly, in the Middle East, interests that include hopefully a development of some progress toward an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. So we continue to work with the Egyptian interim government, as well as the Egyptian military.
Yes, we are concerned about our people, Americans, all Americans in Egypt. Protection of Americans in Egypt, not just only our diplomats, but all Americans, is of the highest priority. And we all -- all the American government officials, including American military, have been working very closely with the Egyptian military and police to assure the security and protection of Americans in Egypt, and we'll continue to do that.
Q: Are you concerning reducing that -- the peacekeeping force?
SEC. HAGEL: As President Obama has said, we're reviewing every aspect of our relationship with Egypt. Thank you.
(UNKNOWN): Now Xinhua News Agency, please.
Q (through translator): My question goes to General Chang. General Chang, you just mentioned for many times about the meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Obama and that the two presidents agreed to build a new model of bilateral relationship. And at the same time, President Xi proposed to build a new model of military relationship in accordance to the new model bilateral relationship. So my question is, what is actually the concept of this new model of military relationship?
GEN. CHANG (through translator): Thank you for your question. As we all know that President Xi summarized in three points the new model of this major country relationship between China and the United States, no confrontation, no antagonism, and respect each other towards win-win cooperation.
We believe as a new model of military relationship in accordance with the new model of bilateral relations, there are some is and some isn't in this concept. Firstly, it is a relationship in which both sides respect the other side. It is not a relationship dominated by either side alone.
Both sides respect the others' vital interests and major concerns, pay attention to the others' comfort level, not forcefully imposing one's will onto the other, or not gaining one's own interests at the expense of interests of the other.
Secondly, it is a relationship of cooperation and win-win. It is not a relationship of zero-sum game or antagonism. Both sides work hard to expand our mutual interests and areas of cooperation to take measures to effectively manage our fractions and risks towards the ultimate goal of cooperation and win-win to avoid the recidivist trap.
Thirdly, it's a relationship of mutual trust. It is not a relationship of mutual suspicion. Both sides view each other's strategic intention in objective manner to push forward those mechanisms that help mutual trust to refrain from words and actions that could pose negative effect upon mutual trust, not to make unwarranted accusations and to reduce misperception and miscalculations.
Fourthly, it is a relationship featuring exchanges and cooperation in many areas. It is not a relationship that is imbalanced and only focused on few areas for cooperation. A healthy and mature military-to-military relationship should be a comprehensive one, instead of an imbalanced one. In order to build a new model of military relationship, we need more substantive exchanges in wider areas and more practical cooperation in more diversified forms.
Finally, it is a relationship of openness and inclusiveness. It is not a relationship of exclusiveness or selfishness. While working to ensure the stability of China-U.S. relationship, it is imperative to work with other international community members to strengthen communication, coordination and cooperation, to maintain strategic balance and stability of the world, and in particular of Asia Pacific region.
I'm not sure if I've made my point clear or not. Thank you.
MR. LITTLE: We'll turn now to Jim Miklaszewski of NBC News.
(LAUGHTER)
Q: It easily translates. For General Chang, you spoke today of mutual trust, yet there are persistent reports that the Chinese government and military have launched cyber attacks against U.S. government targets and interests. What -- what is your response to those reports?
And given the fact that this cyber working group has been put together, what steps are the Chinese willing to take to restore the kind of faith and confidence between the Chinese and the U.S. on that front and reduce the potential threat for any cyber warfare?
And for you, Mr. Secretary, despite the persistent pleas from the U.S. government, your own personal efforts, the bloodshed today in Egypt continues. In what appears to be a further blow to democracy, there are reports the government is prepared to release the convicted former president Hosni Mubarak from prison and additional reports that the Saudis have pledged to make up any shortfalls that the Egyptians may run into if the U.S. cuts back any further aid.
And -- and one housekeeping measure. Is the U.S. prepared to cancel or at least postpone the shipment of Apache attack helicopters to Egypt?
GEN. CHANG (through translator): Actually, complete -- trying to complete our extra missions regarding answering questions. As we all know that cyber is a completely new domain, and cyber security has been a worldwide difficulty.
It is always the Chinese government's position to take peaceful use of cyberspace. We oppose of having any kind of arms race in the cyber domain, and we oppose of taking use of information and technology to conduct any kind of operation and hostility towards another party in the cyber domain. And we oppose of taking advantage of the information -- the technological advantage to weaken other parties' sovereign control in this -- in this domain. And we are opposed of taking any kind of double standard in this domain.
China is one of the primary victims from hacker attacks in the world. We are faced to severe threats coming from those cyber attacks. The Chinese government consistently oppose and cracks down the cyber crimes according to our laws. And the Chinese military has never supported any form of hacker activities.
Regarding how to solve the cyber security issue, I believe it requires the common exploration and cooperation between China and United States, rather than ungrounded accusation or suspicion. I believe that Secretary Hagel touched upon this issue in his -- in his remarks that we will work to cooperate to try to solve this issue.
Thank you.
SEC. HAGEL: Jim, three parts to the question. I don't know about a Mubarak report. I'm not aware of it. I can't help you.
Saudi Arabia. As you know, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait announced a couple weeks ago that they committed to a considerable amount of assistance to Egypt. The specifics of your question regarding Saudi Arabia, I -- I don't know about those specifics.
Your question regarding cancellation of Apache helicopters or other parts, as I said to Bob, we're reviewing all aspects of our relationship.
Q: But given all that, Mr. Secretary, is the U.S. powerless to effect any change, to bring an end to the bloodshed in Egypt right now And why not answer the calls from Capitol Hill in particular now, just pull all the aid out, if they're not cooperating or don't appear to be cooperating at any level?
SEC. HAGEL: Well, first, there's not a consistent call from Capitol Hill one way or the other, as you know, on this issue. But more to the point, we have serious interests in Egypt and that part of the world. This is a very complicated problem. We continue to work with all the parties to try to help as much as we can facilitate a reconciliation, a stop of the violence.
Our ability to influence the outcome in Egypt is limited. It's up to the Egyptian people. And they are a large, great, sovereign nation. And it will be their responsibility to sort -- to sort this out. All nations are limited in their influence in another nation's internal issues. I don't think the United States is without influence, but that has to be a collaborative effort focused on what the Egyptian people want, supporting the Egyptian people. And we believe, as I've said, the president's said, Secretary Kerry has said, Ambassador Patterson, Deputy Secretary of State Burns, that should come as an inclusive, open, democratic process, allowing all people to have a role in the future of their country. Thank you.
TRANSLATOR: Do want that translated, sir, for the benefit of the Chinese minister?
SEC. HAGEL: He did that exactly right.
(LAUGHTER)
Thank you. I didn't realize I spoke that long. I'm sorry, Jim.
(UNKNOWN) (through translator): Now last question from (inaudible)
Q (through translator): I have two questions respectively for General Chang and Secretary Hagel. For General Chang, how do you see the current Asia Pacific security situation? And how do you see the interaction between PLA and the U.S. military in the Asia Pacific?
And to Secretary Hagel, would you like to elaborate a little bit on how -- what substantive steps should the U.S. take in building such kind of new model of relationship?
GEN. CHANG (through translator): I understand our friends from the -- press friends' concern about the Asia Pacific security situation. It is also one of our major concerns, because the regional security situation is closely linked to the overall peace and stability -- stability in the world.
And I have several points to make. Firstly, the current situation in Asia Pacific is generally stable, but there remains some hot spots and sensitive issues. Some hot issues are heating, while some other sensitive issues are getting more even sensitive. Improper handling of these issues could lead to a severe impact on the overall security situation in the region.
Secondly, the Chinese people always have their love on peace. China always is a staunch defender of the peace and stability in the Asia Pacific. We always insist that related disputes be solved through dialogue and negotiation. However, no one should fantasize that China would barter away our core interests. And no one should underestimate our will and determination in defending our territory, sovereignty, and maritime rights.
Thirdly, the Asia Pacific is our common homeland. Nations big or small, strong or weak, should make positive and constructive efforts for promoting regional peace and stability. Any action that leads to trouble or provocation, any action -- unwanted action out of the self-interest or further complicates or magnifies the situation would be highly irresponsible and will not lead to a favorable result.
And as just as I mentioned before, that we believe peace is the essence of Pacific, which means the Ocean of Peace in Chinese, or the essence of rebalance is balance. For any country to make a strategic readjustment, it is imperative to take regional peace and stability in mind and is important to balance the security concerns of different -- different regional countries.
The Asia Pacific is a region where the interests of China and United States intertwine the most and where China and United States interact most frequently. The two countries enjoy huge space and potential for cooperation in this region. The People's Liberation Army is ready to work with the U.S. military by strengthening our communication, coordination, and cooperation to pay more concerted contribution to the regional peace, stability, and prosperity. Thank you.
SEC. HAGEL: As to your question regarding new models for our two countries, specifically military-to-military relationships, let me begin this way. I think it's fundamental to the efforts that are underway, as General Chang and I have both noted, and President Xi and President Obama noted, to develop relationships, avenues of opportunity for transparency, for understanding each other's intentions far better than we have in the past.
To carry forward the facilitation of those efforts require institutions, institutions of common interests, like what General Chang talked about this morning in his opening statement, as well as some of the specific items that I addressed, working groups for every general area of challenge, senior-level leadership exchanges, which I noted a number in my remarks, as did General Chang, those are the forms that you build in order to address the great challenges and issues and differences between our countries. And that's what we're doing.
Thank you.
GEN. CHANG (through translator): Thank you.
SEC. HAGEL: Thank you all.
MR. LITTLE: Thank you, everyone.
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