FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
Readout of the President's Call with President Poroshenko of Ukraine
President Obama spoke today with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko about the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the upcoming discussions about Ukraine at the G-7 Summit. The President and President Poroshenko expressed their deep concern about the recent assault by combined Russian-separatist forces across the current line of contact near Donetsk, Ukraine, and once more called on Russia and the separatists it backs to abide strictly by the terms of the February Minsk Implementation Plan. The President reaffirmed the strong support of the United States for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and reiterated his determination to continue working with international partners to provide the support Ukraine needs as it undertakes transformational reforms. The President also underscored the commitment of the United States to supporting a diplomatic resolution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the need to maintain costs on Russia and the separatists until they fulfill all provisions of the Minsk agreements.
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Showing posts with label G-7. Show all posts
Showing posts with label G-7. Show all posts
Saturday, June 6, 2015
Saturday, February 14, 2015
G-7 LEADERS MAKE STATEMENT ON UKRAINE
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
February 13, 2015
G-7 Leaders Statement on Ukraine
We, the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission welcome the “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements” adopted by their original signatories on 12th February 2015 in Minsk. Implementation of the “Minsk Package” offers a way forward to a comprehensive, sustainable, and peaceful resolution to the crisis in eastern Ukraine.
However, the G7 remains concerned about the situation in Ukraine, in particular in view of the fighting around Debaltseve where Russian-backed separatist militias are operating beyond the line of contact agreed upon in the Minsk agreements of September 2014, causing numerous civilian casualties. We urge all sides to adhere strictly to the provisions of the Package and to carry out its measures without delay, starting with a ceasefire on the 15th of February. All parties should refrain from actions in the coming days that would hinder the start of the ceasefire. The G7 stands ready to adopt appropriate measures against those who violate the “Minsk package” and therefore intensify the costs for them, in particular against those who do not observe the agreed comprehensive ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons.
We again condemn Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea which is in violation of international law.
The G7 welcomes the agreement in principle reached on the 12th of February by the IMF and the government of Ukraine on a new economic reform program that will be supported by an IMF Extended Fund Facility. The G7 members look forward to prompt consideration of the program by the IMF Executive Board. We are providing financial assistance to support Ukraine. This international assistance will help Ukraine in the ambitious economic reforms it is undertaking to restore economic growth and improve the living standards of the Ukrainian people. We commend the government of Ukraine for its commitment to implement this ambitious reform agenda with regard to economic, rule-of-law, and democratic reforms.
February 13, 2015
G-7 Leaders Statement on Ukraine
We, the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission welcome the “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements” adopted by their original signatories on 12th February 2015 in Minsk. Implementation of the “Minsk Package” offers a way forward to a comprehensive, sustainable, and peaceful resolution to the crisis in eastern Ukraine.
However, the G7 remains concerned about the situation in Ukraine, in particular in view of the fighting around Debaltseve where Russian-backed separatist militias are operating beyond the line of contact agreed upon in the Minsk agreements of September 2014, causing numerous civilian casualties. We urge all sides to adhere strictly to the provisions of the Package and to carry out its measures without delay, starting with a ceasefire on the 15th of February. All parties should refrain from actions in the coming days that would hinder the start of the ceasefire. The G7 stands ready to adopt appropriate measures against those who violate the “Minsk package” and therefore intensify the costs for them, in particular against those who do not observe the agreed comprehensive ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons.
We again condemn Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea which is in violation of international law.
The G7 welcomes the agreement in principle reached on the 12th of February by the IMF and the government of Ukraine on a new economic reform program that will be supported by an IMF Extended Fund Facility. The G7 members look forward to prompt consideration of the program by the IMF Executive Board. We are providing financial assistance to support Ukraine. This international assistance will help Ukraine in the ambitious economic reforms it is undertaking to restore economic growth and improve the living standards of the Ukrainian people. We commend the government of Ukraine for its commitment to implement this ambitious reform agenda with regard to economic, rule-of-law, and democratic reforms.
Friday, November 21, 2014
REMARKS AT CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS: 2014 POLICY CONFERENCE
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
U.S. Mission to the United Nations: Remarks at the Center for American Progress' Making Progress: 2014 Policy Conference
Samantha Power
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Washington, DC
November 19, 2014
AS DELIVERED
Senator Tom Daschle, Moderator: Let me begin the conversation, if I could, by talking about America’s role. There’s a growing debate across the political spectrum, within really both political parties, about what America’s role in the world should be in this day and age; what sort of leadership we should play in foreign affairs. Over the years, especially in the last two decades in particular, we’ve experienced everything from unilateralism to coalitions of the willing to a reliance on our core alliance structure of leading from behind. But there are little consensus about the role of America today and how we should play it, and how best to advance American interests. U.S. leaders face – many U.S. leaders have called for retrenchment, and some have even called for isolation on both the right and the left. So, Ambassador Power, I’d like to start by asking you the question: is it up to America to be the lead actor in the world today? How should we look at that role? Is there a correct model as we look at the circumstances we’re facing worldwide?
Ambassador Power: Thank you, Tom. And thank you everybody for being here, and to CAP for putting on this conference and doing such important work. I mean, you put your finger on a key question for our times. I think that what we see today in the fall of 2014 is American leadership being used on key issues, whether climate, Ebola, ISIL, but whereby we don’t take simple ownership of the issue and decide that we’re going to bear the entire burden alone. We invest our resources, we lead the world, and we bring other coalitions to our side.
So, in the effort against ISIL, in Iraq, in order to support the Iraqi government forces as they try to fend off this monstrous movement, our use of airstrikes. And then we went around the world and said, “Okay, who wants to join on airstrikes? Who wants to join in providing training and equipment to these forces as they reconstitute? Who is going to take care of the humanitarian burden of all the millions of people who’ve been displaced as a result of ISIL’s explosive move across that region?” And now we have a coalition of 60 countries.
Ebola, equally dramatically; President Obama goes before the United Nations in September and says, “Look, here’s what I’m going to do. But if I do this,” and it’s a lot, “it’s not going to suffice.” And if we tackle the problem only in Liberia where the U.S. is deploying more than 2,000 troops and hundreds of CDC and USAID personnel, and aid workers and partnering with Doctors without Borders – but if we just do Liberia, and other countries don’t take the lead in Sierra Leone and Guinea, then our efforts in Liberia are going to be pyrrhic, because people can just cross the border and so forth.
So, you lead by articulating to the American people in the first instance, and to the world why it’s in your interest, and in the collective interest, to act. And then you mobilize other countries to make sure that you’re not bearing these huge burdens alone. And it’s not just even about burden-sharing and resources, which are major issues, but also just the very nature of these kinds of transnational threats, as you all know, are ones where, even if we had all the resources in the world and could bear every burden, you just, you can’t. You know, the foreign fighters in Syria, unless you get other countries to tighten their controls on their borders and prevent people from traveling, the United States, even if it wanted to, couldn’t deal with the foreign terrorist fighter problem alone. And so I think the mobilization of the world around what President Obama said way back when he was a candidate, are common security, common humanity.
Senator Daschle: This conference, as you know, is about making progress, and that applies both domestically as well as in our international efforts in our agenda. We talk at a lot at conferences like this about core progressive values. How would you say core progressive values align with American interests internationally today?
Ambassador Power: Well, I think probably people would define core progressive values in different ways. For me, it would start with regard for human dignity; the dignity of work, the dignity of a fair wage, the dignity to be treated with respect by your neighbors or respect for your own preferences in the way you live your life. And I think President Obama has really urged us to inject concern for human dignity in our policymaking, whether that’s being hugely generous in the face of ethnic violence in South Sudan, or in the face of the horrible displacement out of Syria, or wanting to close Guantanamo, recognizing again that that is – remains even – a recruitment tool and something that terrorist movements use a way of mobilizing their base and so forth.
But I think dignity is one piece of it. And then I think not only looking to make sure that you have domestic legal authority, but also being very conscientious and very dedicated to international norms and international law, while of course always pursuing U.S. interests. So, I think that those: dignity and recognizing that we live in a broad – we live on a planet where our interests also depend on having other people play by the rules, so we are stronger when we lead ourselves by playing by the rules of the road.
Senator Daschle: One of the important roles for the United States historically, and I think especially today, is bringing other countries together in multilateral forums. And there could be no one more sensitized to the need to do that and the importance of doing that, than you at the UN. But whether at the UN or as we saw with the ASEAN and G-20 forums last week, there are multilateral settings that offer opportunities for progress, but can also get bogged down, in part because –
Ambassador Power: I’ve noticed.
Senator Daschle: – of conflicting agendas, in part because you get into just a lot of talkathons that come with the very nature of groups wanting to make points. So how can America balance the importance of working with partners around the world, and the efficiency of our ability to pursue core interests on our own?
Ambassador Power: Well, I get to live a daily talkathon up in New York, so I feel I have a privileged positioned on which to talk. You know, there are a lot of inefficiencies in the international system. Just as within governments, we need to constantly try to streamline and simplify and enhance the interface that citizens have with governments as they regulate, you know, so too in the international system. If you imagine aggregating government habits across 193 governments, imagine what you end up with, right? I mean, that is not ideal. It’s not – if you were starting from scratch in 2014, you’d build a different, a different airplane, probably.
Having said that, if the United Nations didn’t exist, you would definitely build it, because you want a venue to come together. And even those countries with whom we are estranged or not cooperating in visible ways, it’s a channel for communication so you don’t have misunderstanding. It’s a way of pooling resources. You know, it is very, very obvious on the one hand, but also striking to live it where you see that the things that matter most to us, you know, may be very low on the mattering map for other countries. And so too the things that matter the most for them may not be in the top five for us. And so finding – but yet we need them to cooperate with us, let’s say on foreign terrorist fighters, where they think maybe that’s a distant problem compared to, you know, economic development or even climate change, and they need us of course to invest in their economic development and in their dignity, particularly in developing countries.
So we've tried to – I’ve certainly tried to mix it up in New York. And my impatience is the stuff of legend now, insofar as, “How are we still talking about this? I mean, what are you doing?” So, I think you’ve got to inject that spirit. You can’t accept that these institutions need to just be talkathons. We’re trying to do much more brainstorming, you know, much more – trying to bring countries together sort of staring out at a common problem and defining it as such, and then being in a position of, what could we do about it, rather than this sort of positional form of diplomacy that we’ve done, and where there’s certainly a place for that.
The one thing I’d just add finally is it’s tempting to sort of see bilateral dealings as somehow separate from or juxtaposed with the multilateral framework. But the fact of the matter is the way multilateralism works at its best is you start small, and then you expand the circle of consensus and the circle of problem-solving. But ultimately, successful multilateralism will turn also on the extent to which we have maintained, you know, stable and healthy partnerships with different countries around the world. Aggregating those friendships is what allows us to come together. And aggregating the sense of shared destiny and shared interest is what allows us to get a lot of countries to the table around shared threats.
Senator Daschle: So, how does our approach to multilateralism compare or contrast to other great powers, like China or Russia, or even allies like Britain or Japan? Similar or a lot different?
Ambassador Power: That’s an interesting question. I think that – we have embassies in just about every country in the world. And every minute of every day, we have a foreign policy of some kind with that country. And I think we view the multilateral system as a place to advance, whether human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country, or economic prosperity or trade relationships, etc. So, we’re constantly looking to advance our very particular foreign policy objectives in particular countries.
So, for instance yesterday we had very important General Assembly votes on resolutions on the human rights horrors in Syria, those in the DPRK, and those in Iran. And these votes – you know, we treat each of those votes as if it’s a huge priority for the United States. We have our embassies fanning out around the world trying to make sure that countries in the Caribbean or countries in the Middle East are voting a certain way vis-à-vis DPRK, in order to send the strongest possible signal to the regime there that they’re going to be held accountable, particularly in light of the recent commission of inquiry, the horrible commission of inquiry report on the camps and the human rights conditions in DPRK.
That ambition, you know, that range, that ability to draw on those resources, I think, is distinct about the United States. And that belief that it is in our interest to go all out on the DPRK at the same time we go out on Iran at the same time. Most of the time with other countries you’ll see some subset of the larger global agenda prioritized and that kind of effort perhaps being brought to bear, although without the resources and the reach that we have. So, and even countries like China that are taking more and more assertive leadership roles within the UN system, including by increasing in a very helpful development, increasing their contributions to UN peacekeeping in a substantial way, sending doctors and other medical professionals to deal with Ebola. So, you’re seeing them begin to step up. But, still, that – what I just described in terms of campaigning around a discrete issue, whether on economic development, on climate, on human rights in any particular country – you wouldn’t see, again, that same kind of ground game or yet that prioritization of that set of issues, certainly with human rights issues, needless to say.
Senator Daschle: So, as I look at our options, is there a downside to bilateralism, like what we’ve just recently seen with our announcement on climate with China, versus taking the traditional multilateral approach?
Ambassador Power: You know, I think that when we do strike big deals and deepen partnerships in very visible ways, it’s a lot – the relations between countries are a lot like that between individuals. Like there’ll be someone over there saying, “What about me?” Like, “Why wasn't I a part of that?” And I think you see that a little bit here and there in the margins, but compared to the good it does – for instance, if you take the historic agreement, the CAP alone – that past and present CAP leader John Podesta, his leadership in helping negotiate that on the president’s behalf; hugely important agreement. And with China and the United States leading together and early, and constituting the two biggest economies and the two biggest emitters, that puts us in a position to lead the world. And the leverage associated with us doing that together, I think, vastly outweighs any momentary kind of sense of, “Oh, I wish that would’ve been a bigger multilateral framework.” And as I said earlier, that is the way you do multilateralism. You start and get key stakeholders to make agreements, and then you broaden out the circle. And that’s of course what our hope is to do on the climate.
Senator Daschle: So let me ask one more question on multilateral institutional infrastructure before I – I want to give to couple of other issues before we run out of time. A lot of the institutions created from multilateral cooperation were created after World War II. We had a big role to fill. Those institutions really haven’t changed much, whether it’s the UN Security Council, the IMF. To what extent do they reflect today and the world as we see it globally? And to what extent, if it’s not as reflective as they should be, is there a potential for reform as we look at making these institutions perhaps more reflective of the current lay of the land?
Ambassador Power: Well, let me separate a couple of different planes on which one can look at that question. I mean, I think you’ve seen over the life of the Obama administration a real emphasis on the G-20 as a hugely important global forum, not only to deal with economic issues, but as we just saw, the G-20 issued a very strong statement on Ebola. And we would view that group of countries as in the first instance the most likely group of countries to contribute health professionals, money, building materials, etc. in the context of Ebola. So, it’s a convenient proxy for those who should have resources that they’re prepared to invest in dealing with common threats and common challenges.
So, that, I think, shift and that emphasis has occurred over the life of the Obama administration. With the crisis in the Ukraine, of course, the G-7, now, has taken on new importance, particularly with regard again to that set of issues. That’s a very useful forum for that, and for a host of other things. So, again, that venue remains important, but the G-20 is of a different order than it would’ve been back even in 2008. And this was happening with the Bush administration toward the end, as well.
In the United Nations, Security Council reform has been something that many have aspired to, for many, many years, for the obvious reason which you state, which is surely 69 years after the founding of the UN, the dynamics, the power dynamics, the economic dynamics, and so forth in the world, the demographics, everything has changed and surely there should be some modernization. The challenge is that one of the reasons that we would, that one would wish to see an updated set of international institutions is to enhance legitimacy and effectiveness, and to enhance a sense of shared ownership over the entire United Nations, because there’s a sense of alienation by some of the powerful countries that have been doing more than their fair share, like Germany and Japan – you know, tremendous contributors to the UN over many years, but were not part of the regular decision-making body.
But having said that, and with that alienation, and with that aspiration to render it more effective, there is no more divisive issue in the UN membership. And so there just hasn’t been a proposal that has attracted a kind of plurality or a majority because everybody wants – at a moment when things are being revisited, everybody wants in. And so, just as I was describing earlier in the context of bilateral deals, so too this is something where people want UN Security Council reform, but they, again, have very different views as to how you would bring it about.
So, we remain open, you know, and as these debates play themselves out – they’re heating up now because it’s the 70th anniversary approaching. And the question it poses of course rightly being asked. But it’s not clear that there’s a pathway that could gather a critical mass. And, of course, we would remain very attached to our veto, which is a hugely important feature of our leadership within the UN system. So that’s not something we’d be prepared to give up. But on the membership, we certainly see the case.
Senator Daschle: Let me turn to a couple of very specific challenges that you’re very involved with. The first is Ebola. You just came back from Africa a couple of weeks ago.
Ambassador Power: I did. Thank you for giving me a hug earlier.
[Laughter]
Senator Daschle: Yeah, and I’d do it anytime. But I’m curious, as you explored the challenges we face, as you saw firsthand what we’re up against, and the progress or in some cases maybe the lack thereof, how would you characterize our biggest challenge today?
Ambassador Power: Well, we just still don’t have enough. There’s not enough that has been committed. Progress in – whether it’s funds, health workers, beds, as in beds in isolation units, ambulances, fuel. I mean, since again, President Obama went to the UN and stood with the Secretary General and made this appeal and we waged a full-court press around the world to get people to contribute, we have closed, we have narrowed, we say, a very large number of gaps.
But, again, particularly as you get out into the rural areas in the three countries, I mean you still have people who have never heard of Ebola. Our ambassador in Guinea was just out hiking in the countryside away from Conakry, the capital, and just went up to a group of women and said have you heard of Ebola, speaking to them in the local dialect and everything – we have a wonderful ambassador in Guinea. And so, just, social mobilization, basic, again things that money can buy: SIM cards for cellphones, cellphone coverage in parts of the country that doesn’t exist, and how that – and these are the kinds of things you can’t turn on a dime.
So, what is so gratifying is in my own experience in dealing with crises and foreign policy challenges, there’s something very unique about the anti-Ebola effort, in that you can really measure progress. You can – on my trip a couple of weeks ago, four days before I arrived, the rate of safe burial within 24 hours in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, was only 30 percent. The British had come in, they revamped the command of control working with the Sierra Leone military and civilian authorities, and that safe burial rate, just in a four-day period, had gone up to 98 percent within 24 hours, which stands to play a really important role in infection control, because unsafe burial is a huge source of infection. Same in Monrovia, because of the U.S. effort.
The U.S. has deployed these mobile labs around Liberia. We visited one about an hour flight away from Monrovia, about an eight-hour drive in Bong Country, and there are these three Navy microbiologists who had just set up this lab two weeks before we arrived. One of them had decided to become a microbiologist 20 years ago because he read Hot Zone, the Preston book about Ebola. So he can’t believe his fortune that he’s sitting here looking at Ebola under a microscope to test local samples. Before this little three-person unit of microbiologists, contributed by the U.S. Navy, arrived, the testing in that area was taking as much as a week. The samples were being driven on motorcycle, and sometimes getting lost en route to Monrovia. There was only one lab in Monrovia, and everyone in the country had to wait in order to get their test results.
So, just by showing up, that one-week time has now been cut to between three and five hours. Now what does that mean? Tangibly, it means that before, people who were Ebola-positive and Ebola-negative but didn’t know it were cohabitating within Ebola treatment units for a week. That’s not good. That’s not isolation; that’s not what one would seek. Moreover, the beds were full. And now the testing results are coming back, and 70 percent don’t have Ebola; they may have malaria, they may have a cold. If you’re lucky, if there has been social mobilization, people will be coming forward. So, now those beds are being freed up, and you’re starting to see efficiencies.
But back to your original question, I am personally, I think we’ve done a very good job on the hardware, which is the Ebola treatment units, building the facilities where people can be isolated. The software, now, is what is needed: more healthcare workers in the here and now, but also if you look out four weeks or six weeks, that next tranche, who’s going to replace the people in-country today? And this is where us making clear as the American people just how much we value the work that American doctors and nurses are doing as they go over there. So, health workers and the social mobilization, getting the locals to do away with the stigma and the fear that pervades, so that the next time our ambassador goes hiking in the countryside, everyone you meet is telling you about Ebola, rather than again, it being perceived to be foisted upon the countryside by the center, which is a bit of a risk right now.
Senator Daschle: So let me ask you – it may be too early to be able to answer this with any clarity – but to what to what extent are there already lessons learned for the next Ebola, the next H1N1, the next SARS? What can we take from this experience that might help us prepare more proactively for the next one?
Ambassador Power: I think if you look at the funding request, the resource request that President Obama sent up a week or two ago to the Hill and that we are working very constructively with both parties now to refine, I think you see some of those lessons already put in place: making sure that every state has the capability to deal with infectious disease or viruses like this that may be foreign in the first instance, but where you have training protocols that are put in place very quickly. Research into vaccines, you know, investing more in the prevention side of things. In the countries in question, part also of our funding request is to make sure that we don’t invest billions of dollars here in dealing with Ebola, get to the back end of the crisis, and then the Ebola treatment units get dismantled because they’re just tents and bricks, and they’re not themselves sustainable structures, the white vehicles belonging to the international community all get put back on cargo ships. And then what’s left of the health infrastructure of these countries?
The reason that it spread so quickly, in addition to some of the issues related to where the outbreak first occurred, being in a border region and with travel and so forth, but is that the systems were too weak to deal with it – unlike Nigeria, which was able to draw on the expertise acquired in an anti-polio – a polio eradication campaign – a generation ago. That expertise was tapped to deal with the challenge in Nigeria. Nothing like that existed in these three countries. So in addition to the U.S. preparedness, which is very, very important in making sure it’s done at the relevant, with relevant health officials at the state level, really investing not only in these countries’ health infrastructure, by bringing the World Bank and others into that effort, but also looking across the continent. And this is what the President’s global health security agenda, which predated the Ebola crisis, is now, but now has new adherents in the international community because of what’s happened. Hopefully, that’ll be the venue in which some of these changes will take place.
Senator Daschle: We didn’t get to ISIS, we didn't get to Syria, we didn’t get to Iran. There is a whole list of things we didn’t get –
Ambassador Power: Sorry about that.
Senator Daschle: But your answers were terrific, and I just can’t thank you enough for taking time out of what I know is an incredibly busy schedule to be here.
Ambassador Power: My pleasure.
Senator Daschle: And I know I speak for every person in this room in thanking you for the incredible leadership you give us every day. Thank you.
Ambassador Power: Thank you. Thank you so much.
U.S. Mission to the United Nations: Remarks at the Center for American Progress' Making Progress: 2014 Policy Conference
Samantha Power
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Washington, DC
November 19, 2014
AS DELIVERED
Senator Tom Daschle, Moderator: Let me begin the conversation, if I could, by talking about America’s role. There’s a growing debate across the political spectrum, within really both political parties, about what America’s role in the world should be in this day and age; what sort of leadership we should play in foreign affairs. Over the years, especially in the last two decades in particular, we’ve experienced everything from unilateralism to coalitions of the willing to a reliance on our core alliance structure of leading from behind. But there are little consensus about the role of America today and how we should play it, and how best to advance American interests. U.S. leaders face – many U.S. leaders have called for retrenchment, and some have even called for isolation on both the right and the left. So, Ambassador Power, I’d like to start by asking you the question: is it up to America to be the lead actor in the world today? How should we look at that role? Is there a correct model as we look at the circumstances we’re facing worldwide?
Ambassador Power: Thank you, Tom. And thank you everybody for being here, and to CAP for putting on this conference and doing such important work. I mean, you put your finger on a key question for our times. I think that what we see today in the fall of 2014 is American leadership being used on key issues, whether climate, Ebola, ISIL, but whereby we don’t take simple ownership of the issue and decide that we’re going to bear the entire burden alone. We invest our resources, we lead the world, and we bring other coalitions to our side.
So, in the effort against ISIL, in Iraq, in order to support the Iraqi government forces as they try to fend off this monstrous movement, our use of airstrikes. And then we went around the world and said, “Okay, who wants to join on airstrikes? Who wants to join in providing training and equipment to these forces as they reconstitute? Who is going to take care of the humanitarian burden of all the millions of people who’ve been displaced as a result of ISIL’s explosive move across that region?” And now we have a coalition of 60 countries.
Ebola, equally dramatically; President Obama goes before the United Nations in September and says, “Look, here’s what I’m going to do. But if I do this,” and it’s a lot, “it’s not going to suffice.” And if we tackle the problem only in Liberia where the U.S. is deploying more than 2,000 troops and hundreds of CDC and USAID personnel, and aid workers and partnering with Doctors without Borders – but if we just do Liberia, and other countries don’t take the lead in Sierra Leone and Guinea, then our efforts in Liberia are going to be pyrrhic, because people can just cross the border and so forth.
So, you lead by articulating to the American people in the first instance, and to the world why it’s in your interest, and in the collective interest, to act. And then you mobilize other countries to make sure that you’re not bearing these huge burdens alone. And it’s not just even about burden-sharing and resources, which are major issues, but also just the very nature of these kinds of transnational threats, as you all know, are ones where, even if we had all the resources in the world and could bear every burden, you just, you can’t. You know, the foreign fighters in Syria, unless you get other countries to tighten their controls on their borders and prevent people from traveling, the United States, even if it wanted to, couldn’t deal with the foreign terrorist fighter problem alone. And so I think the mobilization of the world around what President Obama said way back when he was a candidate, are common security, common humanity.
Senator Daschle: This conference, as you know, is about making progress, and that applies both domestically as well as in our international efforts in our agenda. We talk at a lot at conferences like this about core progressive values. How would you say core progressive values align with American interests internationally today?
Ambassador Power: Well, I think probably people would define core progressive values in different ways. For me, it would start with regard for human dignity; the dignity of work, the dignity of a fair wage, the dignity to be treated with respect by your neighbors or respect for your own preferences in the way you live your life. And I think President Obama has really urged us to inject concern for human dignity in our policymaking, whether that’s being hugely generous in the face of ethnic violence in South Sudan, or in the face of the horrible displacement out of Syria, or wanting to close Guantanamo, recognizing again that that is – remains even – a recruitment tool and something that terrorist movements use a way of mobilizing their base and so forth.
But I think dignity is one piece of it. And then I think not only looking to make sure that you have domestic legal authority, but also being very conscientious and very dedicated to international norms and international law, while of course always pursuing U.S. interests. So, I think that those: dignity and recognizing that we live in a broad – we live on a planet where our interests also depend on having other people play by the rules, so we are stronger when we lead ourselves by playing by the rules of the road.
Senator Daschle: One of the important roles for the United States historically, and I think especially today, is bringing other countries together in multilateral forums. And there could be no one more sensitized to the need to do that and the importance of doing that, than you at the UN. But whether at the UN or as we saw with the ASEAN and G-20 forums last week, there are multilateral settings that offer opportunities for progress, but can also get bogged down, in part because –
Ambassador Power: I’ve noticed.
Senator Daschle: – of conflicting agendas, in part because you get into just a lot of talkathons that come with the very nature of groups wanting to make points. So how can America balance the importance of working with partners around the world, and the efficiency of our ability to pursue core interests on our own?
Ambassador Power: Well, I get to live a daily talkathon up in New York, so I feel I have a privileged positioned on which to talk. You know, there are a lot of inefficiencies in the international system. Just as within governments, we need to constantly try to streamline and simplify and enhance the interface that citizens have with governments as they regulate, you know, so too in the international system. If you imagine aggregating government habits across 193 governments, imagine what you end up with, right? I mean, that is not ideal. It’s not – if you were starting from scratch in 2014, you’d build a different, a different airplane, probably.
Having said that, if the United Nations didn’t exist, you would definitely build it, because you want a venue to come together. And even those countries with whom we are estranged or not cooperating in visible ways, it’s a channel for communication so you don’t have misunderstanding. It’s a way of pooling resources. You know, it is very, very obvious on the one hand, but also striking to live it where you see that the things that matter most to us, you know, may be very low on the mattering map for other countries. And so too the things that matter the most for them may not be in the top five for us. And so finding – but yet we need them to cooperate with us, let’s say on foreign terrorist fighters, where they think maybe that’s a distant problem compared to, you know, economic development or even climate change, and they need us of course to invest in their economic development and in their dignity, particularly in developing countries.
So we've tried to – I’ve certainly tried to mix it up in New York. And my impatience is the stuff of legend now, insofar as, “How are we still talking about this? I mean, what are you doing?” So, I think you’ve got to inject that spirit. You can’t accept that these institutions need to just be talkathons. We’re trying to do much more brainstorming, you know, much more – trying to bring countries together sort of staring out at a common problem and defining it as such, and then being in a position of, what could we do about it, rather than this sort of positional form of diplomacy that we’ve done, and where there’s certainly a place for that.
The one thing I’d just add finally is it’s tempting to sort of see bilateral dealings as somehow separate from or juxtaposed with the multilateral framework. But the fact of the matter is the way multilateralism works at its best is you start small, and then you expand the circle of consensus and the circle of problem-solving. But ultimately, successful multilateralism will turn also on the extent to which we have maintained, you know, stable and healthy partnerships with different countries around the world. Aggregating those friendships is what allows us to come together. And aggregating the sense of shared destiny and shared interest is what allows us to get a lot of countries to the table around shared threats.
Senator Daschle: So, how does our approach to multilateralism compare or contrast to other great powers, like China or Russia, or even allies like Britain or Japan? Similar or a lot different?
Ambassador Power: That’s an interesting question. I think that – we have embassies in just about every country in the world. And every minute of every day, we have a foreign policy of some kind with that country. And I think we view the multilateral system as a place to advance, whether human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country, or economic prosperity or trade relationships, etc. So, we’re constantly looking to advance our very particular foreign policy objectives in particular countries.
So, for instance yesterday we had very important General Assembly votes on resolutions on the human rights horrors in Syria, those in the DPRK, and those in Iran. And these votes – you know, we treat each of those votes as if it’s a huge priority for the United States. We have our embassies fanning out around the world trying to make sure that countries in the Caribbean or countries in the Middle East are voting a certain way vis-à-vis DPRK, in order to send the strongest possible signal to the regime there that they’re going to be held accountable, particularly in light of the recent commission of inquiry, the horrible commission of inquiry report on the camps and the human rights conditions in DPRK.
That ambition, you know, that range, that ability to draw on those resources, I think, is distinct about the United States. And that belief that it is in our interest to go all out on the DPRK at the same time we go out on Iran at the same time. Most of the time with other countries you’ll see some subset of the larger global agenda prioritized and that kind of effort perhaps being brought to bear, although without the resources and the reach that we have. So, and even countries like China that are taking more and more assertive leadership roles within the UN system, including by increasing in a very helpful development, increasing their contributions to UN peacekeeping in a substantial way, sending doctors and other medical professionals to deal with Ebola. So, you’re seeing them begin to step up. But, still, that – what I just described in terms of campaigning around a discrete issue, whether on economic development, on climate, on human rights in any particular country – you wouldn’t see, again, that same kind of ground game or yet that prioritization of that set of issues, certainly with human rights issues, needless to say.
Senator Daschle: So, as I look at our options, is there a downside to bilateralism, like what we’ve just recently seen with our announcement on climate with China, versus taking the traditional multilateral approach?
Ambassador Power: You know, I think that when we do strike big deals and deepen partnerships in very visible ways, it’s a lot – the relations between countries are a lot like that between individuals. Like there’ll be someone over there saying, “What about me?” Like, “Why wasn't I a part of that?” And I think you see that a little bit here and there in the margins, but compared to the good it does – for instance, if you take the historic agreement, the CAP alone – that past and present CAP leader John Podesta, his leadership in helping negotiate that on the president’s behalf; hugely important agreement. And with China and the United States leading together and early, and constituting the two biggest economies and the two biggest emitters, that puts us in a position to lead the world. And the leverage associated with us doing that together, I think, vastly outweighs any momentary kind of sense of, “Oh, I wish that would’ve been a bigger multilateral framework.” And as I said earlier, that is the way you do multilateralism. You start and get key stakeholders to make agreements, and then you broaden out the circle. And that’s of course what our hope is to do on the climate.
Senator Daschle: So let me ask one more question on multilateral institutional infrastructure before I – I want to give to couple of other issues before we run out of time. A lot of the institutions created from multilateral cooperation were created after World War II. We had a big role to fill. Those institutions really haven’t changed much, whether it’s the UN Security Council, the IMF. To what extent do they reflect today and the world as we see it globally? And to what extent, if it’s not as reflective as they should be, is there a potential for reform as we look at making these institutions perhaps more reflective of the current lay of the land?
Ambassador Power: Well, let me separate a couple of different planes on which one can look at that question. I mean, I think you’ve seen over the life of the Obama administration a real emphasis on the G-20 as a hugely important global forum, not only to deal with economic issues, but as we just saw, the G-20 issued a very strong statement on Ebola. And we would view that group of countries as in the first instance the most likely group of countries to contribute health professionals, money, building materials, etc. in the context of Ebola. So, it’s a convenient proxy for those who should have resources that they’re prepared to invest in dealing with common threats and common challenges.
So, that, I think, shift and that emphasis has occurred over the life of the Obama administration. With the crisis in the Ukraine, of course, the G-7, now, has taken on new importance, particularly with regard again to that set of issues. That’s a very useful forum for that, and for a host of other things. So, again, that venue remains important, but the G-20 is of a different order than it would’ve been back even in 2008. And this was happening with the Bush administration toward the end, as well.
In the United Nations, Security Council reform has been something that many have aspired to, for many, many years, for the obvious reason which you state, which is surely 69 years after the founding of the UN, the dynamics, the power dynamics, the economic dynamics, and so forth in the world, the demographics, everything has changed and surely there should be some modernization. The challenge is that one of the reasons that we would, that one would wish to see an updated set of international institutions is to enhance legitimacy and effectiveness, and to enhance a sense of shared ownership over the entire United Nations, because there’s a sense of alienation by some of the powerful countries that have been doing more than their fair share, like Germany and Japan – you know, tremendous contributors to the UN over many years, but were not part of the regular decision-making body.
But having said that, and with that alienation, and with that aspiration to render it more effective, there is no more divisive issue in the UN membership. And so there just hasn’t been a proposal that has attracted a kind of plurality or a majority because everybody wants – at a moment when things are being revisited, everybody wants in. And so, just as I was describing earlier in the context of bilateral deals, so too this is something where people want UN Security Council reform, but they, again, have very different views as to how you would bring it about.
So, we remain open, you know, and as these debates play themselves out – they’re heating up now because it’s the 70th anniversary approaching. And the question it poses of course rightly being asked. But it’s not clear that there’s a pathway that could gather a critical mass. And, of course, we would remain very attached to our veto, which is a hugely important feature of our leadership within the UN system. So that’s not something we’d be prepared to give up. But on the membership, we certainly see the case.
Senator Daschle: Let me turn to a couple of very specific challenges that you’re very involved with. The first is Ebola. You just came back from Africa a couple of weeks ago.
Ambassador Power: I did. Thank you for giving me a hug earlier.
[Laughter]
Senator Daschle: Yeah, and I’d do it anytime. But I’m curious, as you explored the challenges we face, as you saw firsthand what we’re up against, and the progress or in some cases maybe the lack thereof, how would you characterize our biggest challenge today?
Ambassador Power: Well, we just still don’t have enough. There’s not enough that has been committed. Progress in – whether it’s funds, health workers, beds, as in beds in isolation units, ambulances, fuel. I mean, since again, President Obama went to the UN and stood with the Secretary General and made this appeal and we waged a full-court press around the world to get people to contribute, we have closed, we have narrowed, we say, a very large number of gaps.
But, again, particularly as you get out into the rural areas in the three countries, I mean you still have people who have never heard of Ebola. Our ambassador in Guinea was just out hiking in the countryside away from Conakry, the capital, and just went up to a group of women and said have you heard of Ebola, speaking to them in the local dialect and everything – we have a wonderful ambassador in Guinea. And so, just, social mobilization, basic, again things that money can buy: SIM cards for cellphones, cellphone coverage in parts of the country that doesn’t exist, and how that – and these are the kinds of things you can’t turn on a dime.
So, what is so gratifying is in my own experience in dealing with crises and foreign policy challenges, there’s something very unique about the anti-Ebola effort, in that you can really measure progress. You can – on my trip a couple of weeks ago, four days before I arrived, the rate of safe burial within 24 hours in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, was only 30 percent. The British had come in, they revamped the command of control working with the Sierra Leone military and civilian authorities, and that safe burial rate, just in a four-day period, had gone up to 98 percent within 24 hours, which stands to play a really important role in infection control, because unsafe burial is a huge source of infection. Same in Monrovia, because of the U.S. effort.
The U.S. has deployed these mobile labs around Liberia. We visited one about an hour flight away from Monrovia, about an eight-hour drive in Bong Country, and there are these three Navy microbiologists who had just set up this lab two weeks before we arrived. One of them had decided to become a microbiologist 20 years ago because he read Hot Zone, the Preston book about Ebola. So he can’t believe his fortune that he’s sitting here looking at Ebola under a microscope to test local samples. Before this little three-person unit of microbiologists, contributed by the U.S. Navy, arrived, the testing in that area was taking as much as a week. The samples were being driven on motorcycle, and sometimes getting lost en route to Monrovia. There was only one lab in Monrovia, and everyone in the country had to wait in order to get their test results.
So, just by showing up, that one-week time has now been cut to between three and five hours. Now what does that mean? Tangibly, it means that before, people who were Ebola-positive and Ebola-negative but didn’t know it were cohabitating within Ebola treatment units for a week. That’s not good. That’s not isolation; that’s not what one would seek. Moreover, the beds were full. And now the testing results are coming back, and 70 percent don’t have Ebola; they may have malaria, they may have a cold. If you’re lucky, if there has been social mobilization, people will be coming forward. So, now those beds are being freed up, and you’re starting to see efficiencies.
But back to your original question, I am personally, I think we’ve done a very good job on the hardware, which is the Ebola treatment units, building the facilities where people can be isolated. The software, now, is what is needed: more healthcare workers in the here and now, but also if you look out four weeks or six weeks, that next tranche, who’s going to replace the people in-country today? And this is where us making clear as the American people just how much we value the work that American doctors and nurses are doing as they go over there. So, health workers and the social mobilization, getting the locals to do away with the stigma and the fear that pervades, so that the next time our ambassador goes hiking in the countryside, everyone you meet is telling you about Ebola, rather than again, it being perceived to be foisted upon the countryside by the center, which is a bit of a risk right now.
Senator Daschle: So let me ask you – it may be too early to be able to answer this with any clarity – but to what to what extent are there already lessons learned for the next Ebola, the next H1N1, the next SARS? What can we take from this experience that might help us prepare more proactively for the next one?
Ambassador Power: I think if you look at the funding request, the resource request that President Obama sent up a week or two ago to the Hill and that we are working very constructively with both parties now to refine, I think you see some of those lessons already put in place: making sure that every state has the capability to deal with infectious disease or viruses like this that may be foreign in the first instance, but where you have training protocols that are put in place very quickly. Research into vaccines, you know, investing more in the prevention side of things. In the countries in question, part also of our funding request is to make sure that we don’t invest billions of dollars here in dealing with Ebola, get to the back end of the crisis, and then the Ebola treatment units get dismantled because they’re just tents and bricks, and they’re not themselves sustainable structures, the white vehicles belonging to the international community all get put back on cargo ships. And then what’s left of the health infrastructure of these countries?
The reason that it spread so quickly, in addition to some of the issues related to where the outbreak first occurred, being in a border region and with travel and so forth, but is that the systems were too weak to deal with it – unlike Nigeria, which was able to draw on the expertise acquired in an anti-polio – a polio eradication campaign – a generation ago. That expertise was tapped to deal with the challenge in Nigeria. Nothing like that existed in these three countries. So in addition to the U.S. preparedness, which is very, very important in making sure it’s done at the relevant, with relevant health officials at the state level, really investing not only in these countries’ health infrastructure, by bringing the World Bank and others into that effort, but also looking across the continent. And this is what the President’s global health security agenda, which predated the Ebola crisis, is now, but now has new adherents in the international community because of what’s happened. Hopefully, that’ll be the venue in which some of these changes will take place.
Senator Daschle: We didn’t get to ISIS, we didn't get to Syria, we didn’t get to Iran. There is a whole list of things we didn’t get –
Ambassador Power: Sorry about that.
Senator Daschle: But your answers were terrific, and I just can’t thank you enough for taking time out of what I know is an incredibly busy schedule to be here.
Ambassador Power: My pleasure.
Senator Daschle: And I know I speak for every person in this room in thanking you for the incredible leadership you give us every day. Thank you.
Ambassador Power: Thank you. Thank you so much.
Thursday, September 11, 2014
PRESIDENT OBAMA'S STATEMENT ON INTENSIFYING COORDINATED SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
September 11, 2014
Statement by the President on New Sanctions Related to Russia
We will deepen and broaden sanctions in Russia’s financial, energy, and defense sectors. These measures will increase Russia’s political isolation as well as the economic costs to Russia, especially in areas of importance to President Putin and those close to him. My Administration will outline the specifics of these new sanctions tomorrow.
The international community continues to seek a genuine negotiated solution to the crisis in Ukraine. I encourage President Putin to work with Ukraine and other international partners, within the context of the Minsk agreement and without setting unreasonable conditions, to reach a lasting resolution to the conflict. As I said last week, if Russia fully implements its commitments, these sanctions can be rolled back. If, instead, Russia continues its aggressive actions and violations of international law, the costs will continue to rise.
Wednesday, July 30, 2014
G-7 LEADERS EXPRESS "GRAVE CONCERN" REGARDING RUSSIA'S ACTIONS IN UKRAINE
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
G-7 Leaders Statement on Ukraine
We, the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the President of the European Council, and the President of the European Commission, join in expressing our grave concern about Russia’s continued actions to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. We once again condemn Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, and actions to de-stabilize eastern Ukraine. Those actions are unacceptable and violate international law.
We condemn the tragic downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 and the deaths of 298 innocent civilians. We demand a prompt, full, unimpeded, and transparent international investigation. We call upon all sides to establish, maintain, and fully respect a cease-fire at and around the crash site, as demanded by UN Security Council resolution 2166, so that the investigators can take up their work and to recover the remains of all victims and their personal possessions.
This terrible event should have marked a watershed in this conflict, causing Russia to suspend its support for illegal armed groups in Ukraine, secure its border with Ukraine, and stop the increasing flow of weapons, equipment, and militants across the border in order to achieve rapid and tangible results in de-escalation.
Regrettably, however, Russia has not changed course. This week, we have all announced additional coordinated sanctions on Russia, including sanctions on specific companies operating in key sectors of the Russian economy. We believe it is essential to demonstrate to the Russian leadership that it must stop its support for the separatists in eastern Ukraine and tangibly participate in creating the necessary conditions for the political process.
We remain convinced that there must be a political solution to the current conflict, which is causing rising numbers of civilian casualties. We call for a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Ukraine and underline the need to implement President Poroshenko’s peace plan without any further delay. To this end, we urge all parties to establish a swift, genuine, and sustainable general cease-fire on the basis of the Berlin Declaration of 2 July with the aim of maintaining Ukraine’s territorial integrity. We call upon Russia to use its influence with the separatist groups and ensure effective border control, including through OSCE observers. We support the OSCE and the Trilateral Contact Group as central players in creating the conditions for a ceasefire.
Russia still has the opportunity to choose the path of de-escalation, which would lead to the removal of these sanctions. If it does not do so, however, we remain ready to further intensify the costs of its adverse actions.
Thursday, June 12, 2014
U.S. FACT SHEET: G-7 DECLARATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT FOR 2014
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
G-7 Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament for 2014
Fact Sheet
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
June 5, 2014
1. We are committed to seeking a safer world for all. Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery remains a top priority. Such proliferation poses a major threat to international peace and security as recognized in UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1540, 1673, 1810, 1887, and 1977. During this tenth anniversary year of UNSCR 1540, we reaffirm our commitment to working together towards full implementation of the resolution by 2021 and to strengthen our efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery.
2. In seeking this safer world, we reiterate our commitment to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, based on the principle of equal and undiminished security for all, and underlining the vital importance of non-proliferation for achieving this goal.
3. We reaffirm our unconditional support for all three pillars of the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
4. We call on all NPT Parties to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty and to preserve and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 2015 NPT Review Conference presents a vital opportunity for all NPT Parties to further strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects. We recall the successful, consensus outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including its Action Plan. We remain fully committed to the Action Plan’s implementation, and call on all States Parties to implement its actions. In this regard, we welcome and encourage continued engagement of and among the NPT nuclear-weapon States on verification, transparency and confidence-building measures, with a view to strengthening implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. We welcome the April 2014 meeting of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States (P5) in Beijing, the latest in this ongoing dialogue, and welcome the timely submission of the individual reports made to the third session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York in April, 2014, pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the Action Plan. We encourage all States Parties, consistent with Action 20 of the Action Plan, to make similar reports.
5. The G7 partners continue to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear weapon free zones, established on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, in line with the principles set out by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999 and recognize the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving security assurances from nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. These protocols enhance regional and international security by helping to build confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. We welcome the signature of the protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia. We also welcome the commitment of the P5 States to continue to consult with the States Parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
6. We reaffirm the importance of commitments and assurances given by the NPT nuclear weapons States to the NPT non-nuclear weapon States. We deplore the recent and ongoing breaches of the commitments given to Ukraine by the Russian Federation in the Budapest Memorandum. In this Memorandum, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to respect Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty and existing borders; reaffirmed their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine to refrain from economic coercion. We consider that Ukraine’s historic decisions in 1994 were significant steps in promoting its own and wider regional and international security. We also welcome Ukraine’s statement at the 2014 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee that Ukraine remains committed to the provisions of the NPT.
7. The G-7 strongly support the goal of a zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East. Recalling the decision at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to hold a Conference on the establishment of such a zone, we strongly support Finnish Ambassador Laajava’s work as facilitator of the Conference, and welcome the continued commitment of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States). We call upon the States of the region to continue their direct engagement with each other in order to finalize the preparation and convening of the Conference in the nearest future.
8. While acknowledging the right of withdrawal from the NPT contained in Article X.1, we consider that modalities and measures to address withdrawal from that Treaty are needed as demonstrated by North Korea’s announcement of withdrawal. We underscore the role of the UN Security Council in addressing announcements of withdrawal promptly and without delay, assessing the consequences of such withdrawal, including possible adoption of measures in this regard. We also emphasize that a State Party will remain responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal. We also underscore that nuclear transfers received prior to withdrawal should remain in peaceful uses and subject to IAEA safeguards. We welcome the growing recognition that this issue needs to be addressed urgently at the 2015 Review Conference and we support the adoption of appropriate recommendations on measures that address withdrawal in the Final Document.
Nuclear Proliferation Challenges
9. We underscore our support for E3+3 efforts led by High Representative Ashton to reach a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that resolves fully the international community’s concerns regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and ensures Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. We welcome the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) between the E3+3 and Iran and the essential role played by the IAEA in verifying the nuclear-related measures. We commend those states which made financial contributions in this context for the monitoring work of the IAEA. We reaffirm our strong support for the IAEA’s ongoing efforts to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and we call on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program, the satisfactory resolution of which will be critical for a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
10. We call on Syria to remedy its noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations, and to cooperate fully with the IAEA in resolving all outstanding questions regarding the nature of its nuclear program.
11. We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear armed state and urge North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards and come into full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations. We condemn in the strongest possible terms North Korea’s continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094. In this regard, we condemn North Korea’s February and March 2014 ballistic missile launches in clear violation of its UNSCR obligations and call on North Korea to refrain from further provocations. We urge North Korea to halt any efforts to restart, readjust, and expand its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and cease immediately all nuclear activities including the ones related to its uranium enrichment and plutonium programs. We reaffirm our collective hope for lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and call on North Korea to refrain from any actions that escalate tensions in the region. We firmly support diplomatic efforts to implement the 2005 Joint Statement and to bring North Korea into compliance with its UN Security Council obligations, and call on North Korea to take concrete steps toward complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. We commend the international community’s unified resolve in the face of North Korea’s defiance of it and urge continued vigilance by all states to curtail North Korea’s proliferation activities and impede the continued pursuit of its proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
Nuclear Disarmament
12. We encourage the P5 to continue their important dialogue, including on nuclear arms reductions and their work on confidence-building and transparency that represent major steps in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and the Action Plan adopted by the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. We welcome the continued implementation of the New START Treaty by the U.S. and Russia and the disarmament-related actions already made by France and the UK, as well as urge others that possess nuclear weapons but have not yet engaged in nuclear disarmament efforts to reduce their arsenals.
13. Early entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is in the security interests of every nation. States that have yet to sign or ratify the Treaty should do so without waiting for others. For the Treaty to be an effective mechanism for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, we believe all States must maintain the political will and provide adequate resources to complete the Treaty’s verification regime and maximize the capabilities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat. We welcome the voluntary adherence to unilateral moratoria on nuclear explosive tests and call on all States to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. We also welcome the establishment of the Group of Eminent Persons and support its activities, which will inject new energy and dynamics into the push for entry into force.
14. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) and its predecessor bodies have a long history of delivering landmark agreements, but we share the growing impatience of many in the international community at the impasse at the CD. We believe the next logical step in multilateral negotiations to advance both nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament goals is the negotiation of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. While we welcome declared moratoria by some states on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a binding and verifiable ban on such production is a necessary step toward a world without nuclear weapons. We welcome the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which will make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to a future Treaty, and can build momentum towards eventual negotiations in the CD.
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
15. All States Parties to the NPT have an inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in compliance with their international obligations. We reiterate our willingness to cooperate with States that meet their nuclear non-proliferation obligations and wish to develop a civil nuclear program in a manner that meets the highest standards of safety, security, non-proliferation, and respect for the environment.
16. We urge strong support for implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Safety Action Plan, including working towards establishing a global nuclear liability regime, and welcome the progress in enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. We emphasize the importance of the establishment, implementation and continuous improvement of national emergency preparedness and response measures.
17. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle contribute to nuclear energy programs. We support the IAEA’s work to establish a bank of Low Enriched Uranium in Kazakhstan and urge the conclusion of a Host State Agreement at an early date in order to allow for the beginning of operation of the bank.
IAEA Safeguards
18. We support the central role of the IAEA, and in particular its safeguards system, which remains essential for the effective implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The IAEA must continue to have the necessary resources and legal authorities to be able to carry out its mission in full, in accordance with its statutory mandate. We will continue to help promote an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol as the universally accepted international verification standard, which should be a consideration in decisions on the supply of nuclear fuel, equipment, or technology. We call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and bring into force the Additional Protocol and apply its provisions as soon as possible.
Nuclear Security
19. We welcome the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague on 24-25 March 2014 where 58 world leaders worked to further reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by securing vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material around the globe. The Hague Summit participants agreed to a Communique that reaffirms the fundamental responsibility of States, the need to further strengthen and coordinate international cooperation, and the need for a strengthened and comprehensive international security architecture. Many countries agreed to multilateral joint commitments intended to advance the goal of nuclear security. We highlight Belgian and Italian work to complete the removal of their excess supplies of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for elimination, and Japan for announcing that it will work with the United States to eliminate hundreds of kilograms of nuclear material from one of its experimental reactors. We call on others to take additional transparency measures. We also continue to encourage nations to join existing relevant international initiatives that support Summit goals.
20. We urge all States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to ratify, accept or approve the 2005 Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible. In addition to securing nuclear and radiological material at their source, we recognize the need to locate and secure material currently available on the illicit market and prosecute those involved in the trafficking of these materials.
21. We commend the work of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and other international efforts to counter nuclear smuggling and combat nuclear terrorism. The ongoing occurrence for more than 20 years of nuclear and radioactive trafficking highlights the threat that terrorists or other malicious actors can acquire these dangerous materials. The international community must be vigilant to prevent the world’s most dangerous materials from falling into the wrong hands.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group
22. We welcome the call by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on all states to exercise vigilance to ensure that the supply of nuclear related technologies and materials is for peaceful purposes and to make best efforts to ensure that none of their exports of goods and technologies contributes to the spread of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we recognize that the NSG Guidelines serve as the standard for nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. We call on NSG Participating Governments to strictly observe the Guidelines and encourage nuclear supplier states that are not NSG participating governments to act in conformity with the Guidelines on a voluntary basis. We also support the discussion of the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to enhance nuclear non-proliferation efforts. We welcome the progress that is being made by the Technical Experts Group to ensure that control lists remain current, and we welcome the Group’s outreach efforts to enhance non-proliferation. We welcome the membership of Mexico in 2012 and Serbia in 2013.
Chemical Weapons
23. We reaffirm our unconditional support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the functions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We applaud the success of the Convention and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the OPCW for its ongoing work to eliminate an entire class of WMD and toward preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. We look forward to continuing the work set out in the final document of the 2013 Review Conference and support efforts to ensure the universalisation and effective implementation of the Convention, and we call on all states not party to the Convention to adhere to it now. Destroying chemical weapons remains a key objective of the Convention together with refraining from the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, use and proliferation of chemical weapons. We welcome the progress being made by the possessor states as reported recently to the OPCW Executive Council (EC) and Conference of the States Parties. We encourage all possessor states to continue to take every necessary measure to complete their destruction processes as soon as possible in a transparent fashion, and within the framework of the existing verification regime. We reiterate the importance of an effective industry verification regime.
24. We share deep concern over the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime against its citizens. We share further concern about the more recent allegations of use of a toxic chemical as a weapon in Syria and we support the OPCW fact-finding mission. We urge the regime to cooperate fully with the mission to ensure those who are responsible for such attacks are brought to account. The continued possession of chemical weapons material by the Assad regime represents a sustained danger to Syria’s population and all of its neighbors. We support the full implementation of the OPCW Executive Council Decision of September 27, 2013 and UN Security Council Resolution (2118), which resulted from the Russia U.S. Geneva framework to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program. We welcome the efforts of the Joint OPCW-UN Mission and the assistance provided by individual States and by the international community at large to support safe elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Whilst efforts have been made, the removal process remains behind schedule. We call upon Syria to make sustained efforts in meeting its obligations under the CWC, OPCW EC decisions and UNSCR 2118. International confidence that the program has been completely eliminated requires further review of Syria’s declaration of its CW program. Syria must also take immediate steps to physically destroy the remaining 13 chemical production facilities in accordance with the CWC.
Biological Weapons
25. We welcome the work undertaken so far to implement the outcome of the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). We are committed to achieving real progress to promote national implementation, confidence-building measures, and cooperation and assistance, to reviewing developments in science and technology, and to strengthening the Convention’s Article VII on responding to use of biological or toxin weapons. We support further exploration or consideration of practical approaches to promote the exchange of best practices, enhance transparency, and build trust among states parties, such as peer review, voluntary transparency visits and briefings, and constructive approaches to raising and addressing concerns where they arise. Such approaches may play a role in strengthening implementation and enhancing assurance of compliance with BWC obligations. We reaffirm our commitment to promote universal membership of the BTWC, and we are determined to work with all the State Parties to reinforce its regime.
Addressing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
26. WMD and delivery means- related export controls by members of the international nonproliferation regimes (Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group) and the Zangger Committee has significantly reduced the availability to proliferators of support from countries with the most advanced technology. These controls, and the information-sharing, best practices, and patterns of cooperation fostered by the regimes, have made it more difficult, time-consuming, and costly for proliferators to produce or acquire WMD and their delivery systems. We plan to continue to work through the regimes to reduce the global proliferation threat and urge all countries to unilaterally adopt and apply on a national basis the guidelines and standards of the regimes.
27. We fully support the key role played by the United Nations Security Council in addressing proliferation issues. We welcome the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 1977, which renewed the mandate of the 1540 Committee for ten years and reaffirmed Resolution 1540’s obligations. We invite all States to nominate a national point of contact and to work toward full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We stand ready to provide assistance to States in this regard and we reiterate our support to the 1540 Committee in the discharge of its mandate.
28. We strongly believe that the proliferation of missiles, especially those capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a serious concern to us all and a threat to international peace and security, as reaffirmed in UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1887, and 1977. We believe that a multilateral response and international norms are the most adequate and effective way to address this issue. We strongly endorse the MTCR and the Hague Code of Conduct in that regard.
29. We affirm our commitment to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) and this commitment remains unwavering. We therefore commend the Global Partnership on its efforts to coordinate and collaborate on programs and activities in the areas of nuclear and radiological security, biological security, chemical security, scientist engagement and countering knowledge proliferation, and in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The Global Partnership has continued its valuable work on engagement with centers of excellence and the expansion of its membership. Since 2013, the Global Partnership has welcomed the Philippines, Hungary and Spain as new members. Members of the Global Partnership also welcome the ongoing participation and closer cooperation of relevant international organizations and bodies in global efforts to improve information sharing and coordination of WMD threat reduction projects. The sub-groups that focused on each of the substantive areas of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological security helped the Global Partnership improve information sharing, funding and project coordination. The Global Partnership has provided significant funding for the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria. In addition, strengthened matchmaking has begun to enable the Global Partnership to improve coordination of projects globally.
30. We continue to promote robust counter-proliferation tools. We support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The list of endorsing nations continues to grow, with Vietnam recently being the 104th endorsing nation. We commit to undertake further measures to enhance the capabilities and authorities required to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. We promote outreach for enhanced participation in the PSI and continue to focus on legal and operational issues.
Conventional
31. Conventional arms play a legitimate role in enabling governments to defend their citizens, as enshrined in the UN Charter. However, in the wrong hands they pose a threat to global, regional and national security. Improperly controlled, they can fuel terrorism and threaten peace and stability. For this reason, we welcome the adoption of UNSCR 2117 and stress the need for full and effective implementation by States at the national, regional and international levels, of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. In this context, we also reiterate our support for full implementation of UNSCR 2017 in order to stem arms proliferation from Libya. In addition, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies contributes to preventing de-stabilizing accumulations of these arms, goods and technologies. We urge those which currently sit outside the regime to make every effort to apply the Wassenaar Arrangement’s standards and control lists. Conventional arms agreements and commitments can also address specific regional security concerns. The Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty have provided useful transparency about military activities in Ukraine and western Russia in recent months, reflecting the importance of continued implementation and modernization of these agreements and commitments.
32. We welcome the rapid progress that has been made towards entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty since it was opened for signature on 3 June 2013. We call upon States who have not yet done so to join the Treaty as soon as possible. Effective implementation of the Treaty’s obligations will contribute to saving lives, reducing human suffering, protecting human rights, preventing the diversion of conventional arms to the illegal market and combating terrorism, while upholding the legitimate trade in arms, which is vital for national defense and security. We urge States in a position to do so to render assistance in capacity building to enable States Parties needing such assistance to fulfill and implement the Treaty’s obligations.
Outer Space
33. Outer space activities continue to play a significant role in the social, economic, scientific, and technological development of states, as well as in maintaining international peace and security. We acknowledge the need to take collaborative, timely, and pragmatic steps to enhance the long-term safety, security, sustainability, and stability of the space environment. In this context, the G-7 supports and encourages constructive discussion on the development and implementation of transparency and confidence building measures to enhance stability in space, taking into account the recommendations of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space. The G7 continues to support ongoing efforts to develop a non-legally-binding International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and strongly encourages completion of the Code in the near future or in the first half of 2015 at the latest. We also support the efforts to complete the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Guidelines on Long-Term Sustainability for Space Activities in 2015.
2. In seeking this safer world, we reiterate our commitment to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, based on the principle of equal and undiminished security for all, and underlining the vital importance of non-proliferation for achieving this goal.
3. We reaffirm our unconditional support for all three pillars of the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
4. We call on all NPT Parties to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty and to preserve and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 2015 NPT Review Conference presents a vital opportunity for all NPT Parties to further strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects. We recall the successful, consensus outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including its Action Plan. We remain fully committed to the Action Plan’s implementation, and call on all States Parties to implement its actions. In this regard, we welcome and encourage continued engagement of and among the NPT nuclear-weapon States on verification, transparency and confidence-building measures, with a view to strengthening implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. We welcome the April 2014 meeting of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States (P5) in Beijing, the latest in this ongoing dialogue, and welcome the timely submission of the individual reports made to the third session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York in April, 2014, pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the Action Plan. We encourage all States Parties, consistent with Action 20 of the Action Plan, to make similar reports.
5. The G7 partners continue to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear weapon free zones, established on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, in line with the principles set out by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999 and recognize the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving security assurances from nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. These protocols enhance regional and international security by helping to build confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. We welcome the signature of the protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia. We also welcome the commitment of the P5 States to continue to consult with the States Parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
6. We reaffirm the importance of commitments and assurances given by the NPT nuclear weapons States to the NPT non-nuclear weapon States. We deplore the recent and ongoing breaches of the commitments given to Ukraine by the Russian Federation in the Budapest Memorandum. In this Memorandum, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to respect Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty and existing borders; reaffirmed their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine to refrain from economic coercion. We consider that Ukraine’s historic decisions in 1994 were significant steps in promoting its own and wider regional and international security. We also welcome Ukraine’s statement at the 2014 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee that Ukraine remains committed to the provisions of the NPT.
7. The G-7 strongly support the goal of a zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East. Recalling the decision at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to hold a Conference on the establishment of such a zone, we strongly support Finnish Ambassador Laajava’s work as facilitator of the Conference, and welcome the continued commitment of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States). We call upon the States of the region to continue their direct engagement with each other in order to finalize the preparation and convening of the Conference in the nearest future.
8. While acknowledging the right of withdrawal from the NPT contained in Article X.1, we consider that modalities and measures to address withdrawal from that Treaty are needed as demonstrated by North Korea’s announcement of withdrawal. We underscore the role of the UN Security Council in addressing announcements of withdrawal promptly and without delay, assessing the consequences of such withdrawal, including possible adoption of measures in this regard. We also emphasize that a State Party will remain responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal. We also underscore that nuclear transfers received prior to withdrawal should remain in peaceful uses and subject to IAEA safeguards. We welcome the growing recognition that this issue needs to be addressed urgently at the 2015 Review Conference and we support the adoption of appropriate recommendations on measures that address withdrawal in the Final Document.
Nuclear Proliferation Challenges
9. We underscore our support for E3+3 efforts led by High Representative Ashton to reach a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that resolves fully the international community’s concerns regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and ensures Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. We welcome the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) between the E3+3 and Iran and the essential role played by the IAEA in verifying the nuclear-related measures. We commend those states which made financial contributions in this context for the monitoring work of the IAEA. We reaffirm our strong support for the IAEA’s ongoing efforts to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and we call on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program, the satisfactory resolution of which will be critical for a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
10. We call on Syria to remedy its noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations, and to cooperate fully with the IAEA in resolving all outstanding questions regarding the nature of its nuclear program.
11. We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear armed state and urge North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards and come into full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations. We condemn in the strongest possible terms North Korea’s continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094. In this regard, we condemn North Korea’s February and March 2014 ballistic missile launches in clear violation of its UNSCR obligations and call on North Korea to refrain from further provocations. We urge North Korea to halt any efforts to restart, readjust, and expand its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and cease immediately all nuclear activities including the ones related to its uranium enrichment and plutonium programs. We reaffirm our collective hope for lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and call on North Korea to refrain from any actions that escalate tensions in the region. We firmly support diplomatic efforts to implement the 2005 Joint Statement and to bring North Korea into compliance with its UN Security Council obligations, and call on North Korea to take concrete steps toward complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. We commend the international community’s unified resolve in the face of North Korea’s defiance of it and urge continued vigilance by all states to curtail North Korea’s proliferation activities and impede the continued pursuit of its proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
Nuclear Disarmament
12. We encourage the P5 to continue their important dialogue, including on nuclear arms reductions and their work on confidence-building and transparency that represent major steps in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and the Action Plan adopted by the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. We welcome the continued implementation of the New START Treaty by the U.S. and Russia and the disarmament-related actions already made by France and the UK, as well as urge others that possess nuclear weapons but have not yet engaged in nuclear disarmament efforts to reduce their arsenals.
13. Early entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is in the security interests of every nation. States that have yet to sign or ratify the Treaty should do so without waiting for others. For the Treaty to be an effective mechanism for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, we believe all States must maintain the political will and provide adequate resources to complete the Treaty’s verification regime and maximize the capabilities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat. We welcome the voluntary adherence to unilateral moratoria on nuclear explosive tests and call on all States to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. We also welcome the establishment of the Group of Eminent Persons and support its activities, which will inject new energy and dynamics into the push for entry into force.
14. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) and its predecessor bodies have a long history of delivering landmark agreements, but we share the growing impatience of many in the international community at the impasse at the CD. We believe the next logical step in multilateral negotiations to advance both nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament goals is the negotiation of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. While we welcome declared moratoria by some states on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a binding and verifiable ban on such production is a necessary step toward a world without nuclear weapons. We welcome the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which will make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to a future Treaty, and can build momentum towards eventual negotiations in the CD.
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
15. All States Parties to the NPT have an inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in compliance with their international obligations. We reiterate our willingness to cooperate with States that meet their nuclear non-proliferation obligations and wish to develop a civil nuclear program in a manner that meets the highest standards of safety, security, non-proliferation, and respect for the environment.
16. We urge strong support for implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Safety Action Plan, including working towards establishing a global nuclear liability regime, and welcome the progress in enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. We emphasize the importance of the establishment, implementation and continuous improvement of national emergency preparedness and response measures.
17. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle contribute to nuclear energy programs. We support the IAEA’s work to establish a bank of Low Enriched Uranium in Kazakhstan and urge the conclusion of a Host State Agreement at an early date in order to allow for the beginning of operation of the bank.
IAEA Safeguards
18. We support the central role of the IAEA, and in particular its safeguards system, which remains essential for the effective implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The IAEA must continue to have the necessary resources and legal authorities to be able to carry out its mission in full, in accordance with its statutory mandate. We will continue to help promote an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol as the universally accepted international verification standard, which should be a consideration in decisions on the supply of nuclear fuel, equipment, or technology. We call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and bring into force the Additional Protocol and apply its provisions as soon as possible.
Nuclear Security
19. We welcome the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague on 24-25 March 2014 where 58 world leaders worked to further reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by securing vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material around the globe. The Hague Summit participants agreed to a Communique that reaffirms the fundamental responsibility of States, the need to further strengthen and coordinate international cooperation, and the need for a strengthened and comprehensive international security architecture. Many countries agreed to multilateral joint commitments intended to advance the goal of nuclear security. We highlight Belgian and Italian work to complete the removal of their excess supplies of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for elimination, and Japan for announcing that it will work with the United States to eliminate hundreds of kilograms of nuclear material from one of its experimental reactors. We call on others to take additional transparency measures. We also continue to encourage nations to join existing relevant international initiatives that support Summit goals.
20. We urge all States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to ratify, accept or approve the 2005 Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible. In addition to securing nuclear and radiological material at their source, we recognize the need to locate and secure material currently available on the illicit market and prosecute those involved in the trafficking of these materials.
21. We commend the work of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and other international efforts to counter nuclear smuggling and combat nuclear terrorism. The ongoing occurrence for more than 20 years of nuclear and radioactive trafficking highlights the threat that terrorists or other malicious actors can acquire these dangerous materials. The international community must be vigilant to prevent the world’s most dangerous materials from falling into the wrong hands.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group
22. We welcome the call by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on all states to exercise vigilance to ensure that the supply of nuclear related technologies and materials is for peaceful purposes and to make best efforts to ensure that none of their exports of goods and technologies contributes to the spread of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we recognize that the NSG Guidelines serve as the standard for nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. We call on NSG Participating Governments to strictly observe the Guidelines and encourage nuclear supplier states that are not NSG participating governments to act in conformity with the Guidelines on a voluntary basis. We also support the discussion of the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to enhance nuclear non-proliferation efforts. We welcome the progress that is being made by the Technical Experts Group to ensure that control lists remain current, and we welcome the Group’s outreach efforts to enhance non-proliferation. We welcome the membership of Mexico in 2012 and Serbia in 2013.
Chemical Weapons
23. We reaffirm our unconditional support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the functions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We applaud the success of the Convention and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the OPCW for its ongoing work to eliminate an entire class of WMD and toward preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. We look forward to continuing the work set out in the final document of the 2013 Review Conference and support efforts to ensure the universalisation and effective implementation of the Convention, and we call on all states not party to the Convention to adhere to it now. Destroying chemical weapons remains a key objective of the Convention together with refraining from the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, use and proliferation of chemical weapons. We welcome the progress being made by the possessor states as reported recently to the OPCW Executive Council (EC) and Conference of the States Parties. We encourage all possessor states to continue to take every necessary measure to complete their destruction processes as soon as possible in a transparent fashion, and within the framework of the existing verification regime. We reiterate the importance of an effective industry verification regime.
24. We share deep concern over the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime against its citizens. We share further concern about the more recent allegations of use of a toxic chemical as a weapon in Syria and we support the OPCW fact-finding mission. We urge the regime to cooperate fully with the mission to ensure those who are responsible for such attacks are brought to account. The continued possession of chemical weapons material by the Assad regime represents a sustained danger to Syria’s population and all of its neighbors. We support the full implementation of the OPCW Executive Council Decision of September 27, 2013 and UN Security Council Resolution (2118), which resulted from the Russia U.S. Geneva framework to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program. We welcome the efforts of the Joint OPCW-UN Mission and the assistance provided by individual States and by the international community at large to support safe elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Whilst efforts have been made, the removal process remains behind schedule. We call upon Syria to make sustained efforts in meeting its obligations under the CWC, OPCW EC decisions and UNSCR 2118. International confidence that the program has been completely eliminated requires further review of Syria’s declaration of its CW program. Syria must also take immediate steps to physically destroy the remaining 13 chemical production facilities in accordance with the CWC.
Biological Weapons
25. We welcome the work undertaken so far to implement the outcome of the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). We are committed to achieving real progress to promote national implementation, confidence-building measures, and cooperation and assistance, to reviewing developments in science and technology, and to strengthening the Convention’s Article VII on responding to use of biological or toxin weapons. We support further exploration or consideration of practical approaches to promote the exchange of best practices, enhance transparency, and build trust among states parties, such as peer review, voluntary transparency visits and briefings, and constructive approaches to raising and addressing concerns where they arise. Such approaches may play a role in strengthening implementation and enhancing assurance of compliance with BWC obligations. We reaffirm our commitment to promote universal membership of the BTWC, and we are determined to work with all the State Parties to reinforce its regime.
Addressing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
26. WMD and delivery means- related export controls by members of the international nonproliferation regimes (Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group) and the Zangger Committee has significantly reduced the availability to proliferators of support from countries with the most advanced technology. These controls, and the information-sharing, best practices, and patterns of cooperation fostered by the regimes, have made it more difficult, time-consuming, and costly for proliferators to produce or acquire WMD and their delivery systems. We plan to continue to work through the regimes to reduce the global proliferation threat and urge all countries to unilaterally adopt and apply on a national basis the guidelines and standards of the regimes.
27. We fully support the key role played by the United Nations Security Council in addressing proliferation issues. We welcome the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 1977, which renewed the mandate of the 1540 Committee for ten years and reaffirmed Resolution 1540’s obligations. We invite all States to nominate a national point of contact and to work toward full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We stand ready to provide assistance to States in this regard and we reiterate our support to the 1540 Committee in the discharge of its mandate.
28. We strongly believe that the proliferation of missiles, especially those capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a serious concern to us all and a threat to international peace and security, as reaffirmed in UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1887, and 1977. We believe that a multilateral response and international norms are the most adequate and effective way to address this issue. We strongly endorse the MTCR and the Hague Code of Conduct in that regard.
29. We affirm our commitment to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) and this commitment remains unwavering. We therefore commend the Global Partnership on its efforts to coordinate and collaborate on programs and activities in the areas of nuclear and radiological security, biological security, chemical security, scientist engagement and countering knowledge proliferation, and in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The Global Partnership has continued its valuable work on engagement with centers of excellence and the expansion of its membership. Since 2013, the Global Partnership has welcomed the Philippines, Hungary and Spain as new members. Members of the Global Partnership also welcome the ongoing participation and closer cooperation of relevant international organizations and bodies in global efforts to improve information sharing and coordination of WMD threat reduction projects. The sub-groups that focused on each of the substantive areas of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological security helped the Global Partnership improve information sharing, funding and project coordination. The Global Partnership has provided significant funding for the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria. In addition, strengthened matchmaking has begun to enable the Global Partnership to improve coordination of projects globally.
30. We continue to promote robust counter-proliferation tools. We support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The list of endorsing nations continues to grow, with Vietnam recently being the 104th endorsing nation. We commit to undertake further measures to enhance the capabilities and authorities required to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. We promote outreach for enhanced participation in the PSI and continue to focus on legal and operational issues.
Conventional
31. Conventional arms play a legitimate role in enabling governments to defend their citizens, as enshrined in the UN Charter. However, in the wrong hands they pose a threat to global, regional and national security. Improperly controlled, they can fuel terrorism and threaten peace and stability. For this reason, we welcome the adoption of UNSCR 2117 and stress the need for full and effective implementation by States at the national, regional and international levels, of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. In this context, we also reiterate our support for full implementation of UNSCR 2017 in order to stem arms proliferation from Libya. In addition, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies contributes to preventing de-stabilizing accumulations of these arms, goods and technologies. We urge those which currently sit outside the regime to make every effort to apply the Wassenaar Arrangement’s standards and control lists. Conventional arms agreements and commitments can also address specific regional security concerns. The Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty have provided useful transparency about military activities in Ukraine and western Russia in recent months, reflecting the importance of continued implementation and modernization of these agreements and commitments.
32. We welcome the rapid progress that has been made towards entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty since it was opened for signature on 3 June 2013. We call upon States who have not yet done so to join the Treaty as soon as possible. Effective implementation of the Treaty’s obligations will contribute to saving lives, reducing human suffering, protecting human rights, preventing the diversion of conventional arms to the illegal market and combating terrorism, while upholding the legitimate trade in arms, which is vital for national defense and security. We urge States in a position to do so to render assistance in capacity building to enable States Parties needing such assistance to fulfill and implement the Treaty’s obligations.
Outer Space
33. Outer space activities continue to play a significant role in the social, economic, scientific, and technological development of states, as well as in maintaining international peace and security. We acknowledge the need to take collaborative, timely, and pragmatic steps to enhance the long-term safety, security, sustainability, and stability of the space environment. In this context, the G-7 supports and encourages constructive discussion on the development and implementation of transparency and confidence building measures to enhance stability in space, taking into account the recommendations of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space. The G7 continues to support ongoing efforts to develop a non-legally-binding International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and strongly encourages completion of the Code in the near future or in the first half of 2015 at the latest. We also support the efforts to complete the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Guidelines on Long-Term Sustainability for Space Activities in 2015.
Monday, April 28, 2014
PRESIDENT OBAMA, PRESIDENT AQUINO III MAKE REMARKS IN MANILA, PHILIPPINES
April 28, 2014
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
Remarks by President Obama and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint Press Conference
Malacañang Palace
Manila, Philippines
Manila, Philippines
3:40 P.M. PHT
PRESIDENT AQUINO: The honorable President of the United States Barack Obama and his official delegation, members of the Cabinet present, members of the press, ladies and gentlemen: good afternoon.
Today, the Philippines welcomes President Obama and his delegation on his first state visit to the Philippines. The United States is a key ally, a strategic partner, and a reliable friend of the Philippines.
With this visit, we reaffirm the deep partnership between our countries, one founded on democratic values, mutual interest in our shared history and aspirations, and one that will definitely give us the momentum to propel our peoples to even greater heights.
We witnessed the most recent and tangible manifestations of this in the immediate outpouring of assistance from the government of the United States and the American people in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, or Yolanda, and your nation’s clear expression of solidarity with the typhoon survivors.
Mr. President, in your State of the Union address earlier this year, you spoke of how American volunteers and troops were greeted with gratitude in the affected areas. Today, I reiterate formally the Filipino people will never forget such kindness and compassion. On behalf of my countrymen, I thank the United States of America once more for being a true friend to our people.
The friendship and partnership between our countries, however, are evident not only in times of crisis and immediate need, but also in other aspects of our relations. Our defense alliance has been a cornerstone of peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region for more than 60 years. And our strategic partnership spans a broad range of areas of cooperation, contributing to the growth and prosperity of both our nations, and fostering closer bonds between our peoples.
As such, President Obama and I met today with the shared resolve to ensure that our deepening relations are attune to the realities and needs that have emerged in the 21st century, which affect not only our two countries, but also the entire community of nations.
I thank President Obama for the U.S.’s support for our government’s efforts in modernizing and enhancing its defense capabilities. The Philippines-U.S. Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement takes our security cooperation to a higher level of engagement, reaffirms our country’s commitment to mutual defense and security, and promotes regional peace and stability.
Both President Obama and I shared the conviction that territorial and maritime disputes in the Asia Pacific region should be settled peacefully based on international law. We affirm that arbitration is an open, friendly and peaceful approach to seeking a just and durable solution. We also underscored the importance of the full and effective implementation of the Declaration of Conduct and the expeditious conclusion of a substantive and legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea -- all towards fostering peace and stability in our part of the world.
We, likewise, welcome the active participation of the United States in regional mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit.
Typhoon Haiyan showed the entire world how vulnerable the Philippines as well as other developing countries are to natural disasters. As such, humanitarian assistance and disaster response is an essential component of our cooperation. As the United States and the American people have always been ready to support us in the aftermath of disasters, so too do we look forward to the continued cooperation of the United States and the rest of our partners in the international community as we undertake the task of building back the communities affected by Typhoon Haiyan.
This morning we made a promising start as we discussed how our partnership can be enhanced through building climate resilient communities. These kind of strong communities are important not only in withstanding disasters, but also in fostering inclusive growth across the entire country.
President Obama and I recognize the importance of strong economic engagement for the continued growth of both the Philippines and the United States.
On this note, we expressed our appreciation for the U.S.’s support for our government’s programs under the Partnership for Growth framework, which enhances the policy environment for economic growth through US $145 million total plan contribution from the USAID. U.S. support is also coursed through the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which supports the implementation of projects and road infrastructure, poverty reduction, and good governance, with $434 million grant from 2011 to 2016.
Recently, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration reinstated the Philippines to a Category 1 status. This will redound to mutual benefit for our countries from opening more routes for travel between the United States and the Philippines to creating more business opportunities to facilitate the increased tourism and business travel.
We welcome the substantive agreement between our countries on the terms and concessions for the U.S. to support the Philippines’ request for the extension of special treatment for rice imports until 2017.
We also discussed the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is a high-standard trade agreement that will shape the global and regional economic architecture in the 21st century. The Philippines is working to assert in how participation in TPP can be realized.
The signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro last March 27 brings a just and lasting peace within our reach -- a peace that will serve as a strong foundation for stability, inclusivity, and progress in Mindanao. This was born of the steadfast commitment and the hard work of our administration, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and other partners and stakeholders, the U.S. included.
We thank President Obama for the United States’ significant assistance and support for the Philippine peace process. Our meeting today was comprehensive, historic and significant, embodying our shared values and aspirations. It afforded President Obama and myself the opportunity to build on the relations between our countries, and discuss our strategic mission for the future of the Philippines-United States relationship -- a relationship that is modern, mature and forward-looking, and one that allows us to surpass challenges towards the benefit of our peoples, the entire region and the world.
Thank you.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Mabuhay. Thank you, President Aquino, for your warm welcome and your very kind words.
With the President’s indulgence, I want to begin by saying a few words about some terrible storms and tornadoes back home in the United States. Over the weekend, a series of storms claimed at least a dozen lives and damaged or destroyed homes and businesses and communities across multiple states, with the worst toll in Arkansas. So I want to offer my deepest condolences to all those who lost loved ones. I commend the heroic efforts of first responders and neighbors who rushed to help.
I want everyone affected by this tragedy to know that FEMA and the federal government is on the ground and will help our fellow Americans in need, working with state and local officials. And I want everybody to know that your country will be there to help you recover and rebuild as long as it takes.
Now, this is my first visit to the Philippines as President, and I’m proud to be here as we mark the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, when Americans and Filipinos fought together to liberate this nation during World War II. All these years later, we continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder to uphold peace and security in this region and around the world.
So, Benigno, I want to thank you and the Filipino people not only for your generous hospitality today, but for a friendship that has spanned generations. And I’d add that our friendship is deeper and the United States is stronger because of the contributions and patriotism of millions of proud Filipino-Americans.
As I’ve made clear throughout this trip, the United States is renewing our leadership in the Asia Pacific, and our engagement is rooted in our alliances. And that includes the Philippines, which is the oldest security treaty alliance that we have in Asia. As a vibrant democracy, the Philippines reflects the desire of citizens in this region to live in freedom and to have their universal rights upheld. As one of the fastest-growing economies in Asia, the Philippines represents new opportunities for the trade and investment that creates jobs in both countries.
And given its strategic location, the Philippines is a vital partner on issues such as maritime security and freedom of navigation. And let me add that the recent agreement to end the insurgency in the south gives the Philippines an historic opportunity to forge a lasting peace here at home, with greater security and prosperity for the people of that region.
I was proud to welcome President Aquino to the White House two years ago, and since then we’ve worked to deepen our cooperation and to modernize our alliances. Our partnership reflects an important Filipino concept -- bayanihan -- the idea that we have to work together to accomplish things that we couldn’t achieve on our own. That’s what we saw last year when Typhoon Yolanda devastated so many communities. Our armed forces and civilians from both our countries worked as one to rescue victims and to deliver lifesaving aid. That’s what friends do for each other. And, Mr. President, I want to say to you and the people of the Philippines: The United States will continue to stand with you as you recover and rebuild. Our commitment to the Philippines will not waver.
Today, I’m pleased that we’re beginning an important new chapter in the relationship between our countries, and it starts with our security -- with the new defense cooperation agreement that was signed today. I want to be very clear: The United States is not trying to reclaim old bases or build new bases. At the invitation of the Philippines, American servicemembers will rotate through Filipino facilities. We’ll train and exercise more together so that we’re prepared for a range of challenges, including humanitarian crises and natural disasters like Yolanda.
We’ll work together to build the Philippines’ defense capabilities and to work with other nations to promote regional stability, such as in the South China Sea. And I’m looking forward to my visit with forces from both our nations tomorrow to honor their service and to look ahead to the future we can shape together.
As we strengthen our bilateral security cooperation, we’re also working together with regional institutions like ASEAN and the East Asia Summit. When we met in the Oval Office two years ago, Benigno and I agreed to promote a common set of rules, founded in respect for international law, that will help the Asia Pacific remain open and inclusive as the region grows and develops.
Today, we have reaffirmed the importance of resolving territorial disputes in the region peacefully, without intimidation or coercion. And in that spirit, I told him that the United States supports his decision to pursue international arbitration concerning territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
Finally, we agreed to keep deepening our economic cooperation. I congratulated President Aquino on the reforms that he’s pursued to make the Philippines more competitive. Through our Partnership for Growth and our Millennium Challenge Corporation compact, we’re going to keep working together to support these efforts so that more Filipinos can share in this nation’s economic progress -- because growth has to be broad-based and it has to be inclusive.
We discussed the steps that the Philippines could take to position itself for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And I encouraged the President to seize the opportunity he’s created by opening the next phase of economic reform and growth.
Today, I’m announcing that my Commerce Secretary, Penny Pritzker, will lead a delegation of American business leaders to the Philippines this June to explore new opportunities. And I’d add that we’ve also committed to work together to address the devastating effects of climate change and to make Philippine communities less vulnerable to extreme storms like Yolanda.
So, Mr. President, let me once again thank you for everything you’ve done to strengthen our alliance and our friendship. I’m looking forward to paying tribute to the bonds between our people at the dinner tonight and to working with you as we write the next chapter in the relationship between our two countries.
Q Good afternoon, Your Excellencies. President Aquino, President Obama -- welcome to the Philippines. My questions are: How did the United States reassure the Philippines that the U.S. is genuinely committed to countering an increasingly assertive China in the region? Will the U.S. defend the Philippines in case the territorial dispute with China in the West Philippine Sea or the South China Sea becomes an armed conflict? And how do you think will China react to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement? And what are you going to do with this that is consistent with your position to have the territorial disputes resolved in arbitration? Thank you.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, I’ve been consistent throughout my travels in Asia. We welcome China’s peaceful rise. We have a constructive relationship with China. There is enormous trade, enormous business that’s done between the United States and China. There are a whole range of issues on the international stage in which cooperation between the U.S. and China are vital. So our goal is not to counter China. Our goal is not to contain China.
Our goal is to make sure that international rules and norms are respected, and that includes in the area of maritime disputes. We do not have claims in this area territorially. We’re an Asia Pacific nation and our primary interest is the peaceful resolution of conflict, the freedom of navigation that allows for continued progress and prosperity. And we don’t even take a specific position on the disputes between nations.
But as a matter of international law and international norms, we don’t think that coercion and intimidation is the way to manage these disputes. And for that reason we’re very supportive of President Benigno’s approach to go before the tribunal for the law of the sea and to seek international arbitration that can resolve this in a diplomatic fashion.
With respect to the new Defense Cooperation Agreement that’s been signed, the goal here is wide-ranging. We’ve had decades of alliance with the Philippines, but obviously in the 21st century we have to continue to update that. And the goal for this agreement is to build Philippine capacity, to engage in training, to engage in coordination -- not simply to deal with issues of maritime security, but also to enhance our capabilities so that if there’s a natural disaster that takes place, we’re able to potentially respond more quickly; if there are additional threats that may arise, that we are able to work in a cooperative fashion.
This is consistent with, for example, the agreement that we have with Australia, in Darwin. Obviously, we’ve had a longstanding alliance with Australia, but we also recognize that as circumstances change, as capacities change, we have to update that alliance to meet new needs and new challenges.
And so, I think this is going to be a terrific opportunity for us to work with the Philippines to make sure that our navies, our air force are coordinated, to make sure that there’s information-sharing to allow us to respond to new threats, and to work with other countries, ASEAN countries -- Australia, Japan. My hope is, is that at some point we’re going to be able to work cooperatively with China as well, because our goal here is simply to make sure that everybody is operating in a peaceful, responsible fashion. When that happens, that allows countries to focus on what’s most important to people day to day, and that is prosperity, growth, jobs. Those are the things that we as leaders should be focused on, need to be focused on. And if we have security arrangements that avoid conflict and dispute, then we’re able to place our attention on where we should be focused.
MR. CARNEY: The next question comes from Margaret Talev of Bloomberg.
Q Mr. President, later today we are expecting to hear about new sanctions on people close to President Putin. And I wanted to ask you, do you see this as a way to get to Mr. Putin’s personal wealth? Do you believe that he has amassed personal wealth that’s unreported? Or is it just a means of ratcheting up pressure before a move to sectoral sanctions? You mentioned yesterday specifically the defense industry as an area where it doesn’t make sense to move without Europe moving. I wanted to ask you, are we likely to see defense sanctions soon, banking and energy sanctions soon? What kind of timeframe?
And then, President Aquino, if I may, I also wanted to ask you about China and the new agreement. What I wanted to ask you is what message should China take away from the U.S. and the G7’s approach to Russia and Ukraine when it comes to territorial disputes? And do you believe that the military agreement that we’ve just been talking about will in and of itself deter China from being aggressive territorially, or should the U.S. begin developing military options that could be possible contingencies if you needed to go that course? Thanks.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: You’re right, Margaret, that later today there will be an announcement made, and I can tell you that it builds on the sanctions that were already in place. As I indicated, we saw an opportunity through the Geneva talks to move in the direction of a diplomatic resolution to the situation in Ukraine.
The G7 statement accurately points out that the government in Kyiv, the Ukrainian government, has, in fact, abided by that agreement and operated in good faith. And we have not seen comparable efforts by the Russians. And as a consequence, we are going to be moving forward with an expanded list of individuals and companies that will be affected by sanctions. They remain targeted. We will also focus on some areas of high-tech defense exports to Russia that we don’t think are appropriate to be exporting in this kind of climate.
The goal here is not to go after Mr. Putin, personally. The goal is to change his calculus with respect to how the current actions that he’s engaging in in Ukraine could have an adverse impact on the Russian economy over the long haul, and to encourage him to actually walk the walk and not just talk the talk when it comes to diplomatically resolving the crisis in Ukraine. There are specific steps that Russia can take. And if it takes those steps, then you can see an election taking place in Ukraine; you can see the rights of all people inside of Ukraine respected.
The Ukrainian government has put forward credible constitutional reforms of the sort that originally Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the south and east said were part of their grievances, the failure to have their voices heard and represented. Kyiv has responded to those.
And so there’s a path here to resolve this. But Russia has not yet chosen to move forward, and these sanctions represent the next stage in a calibrated effort to change Russia’s behavior. We don’t yet know whether it’s going to work. And that’s why the next phase if, in fact, we saw further Russian aggression towards Ukraine could be sectoral sanctions, less narrowly targeted, addressing sectors like banking or the defense industry.
So those would be more broad-based. Those aren’t what we’ll be announcing today. Today’s will be building on what we’ve already done and continue to be narrowly focused but will exact some additional costs on the Russians. But we are keeping in reserve additional steps that we could take should the situation escalate further.
PRESIDENT AQUINO: First of all, I think China shouldn’t be concerned about this agreement, especially if you look at what is being contemplated -- for instance, training for emergency disaster relief operations.
I’ll give you a perfect example. The Americans have the V-22 Osprey aircraft, which is quite a significant upgrade in capabilities in terms of reaching out to very remote areas. We don’t have a comparable aircraft. We have smaller helicopters. And we had 44 of our provinces devastated by Typhoon Haiyan. Now, the training will not just train our people on how to operate this particular aircraft, but more importantly, even help the Office of Civil Defense, for instance, manage this resource in case a storm or another natural disaster of the scale that transpired does happen.
Secondly, I think the statements that America has been making with regards to Ukraine is the same message that has been said to China, and I guess not only by America but so many other countries. China itself has said repeatedly that they will and have been conforming to international law. And the rest of the world is I think saying we are expecting you to confirm and, by actions, that which you have already been addressing by words, and not distort international law.
The Philippines has not just won through arbitration, but we did remind obviously the President and our dialogue partners that in 2002 they tried to come up with a code of conduct with regards to the South China Sea and the portion which the Philippines claims, which we call the West Philippine Sea. And in 2012, the 10th anniversary, there had still been no progress even -- in the meeting. So the Philippines felt it was timely to raise the matter up and to remind everybody that there is no code of conduct that binds us that sets the operational parameters for all to manage any potential conflict. And as a result of that, there has been preparatory meetings towards the formal meeting to try and constitute a code of conduct.
So at the end of the day, we are not a threat militarily to any country. We don’t even have -- and I have said this often enough -- we don’t even have presently a single fighter aircraft in our inventory. Now, we have I think legitimate needs. We have a 36,000 kilometer coastline. We do have an exclusive economic zone. We do have concerns about poaching on our waters and preserving the environment and even protecting endangered species. So I think no country should begrudge us our rights to be able to attend to our concerns and our needs.
Q Good afternoon, Your Excellencies. This question goes to President Obama, but I would also like to hear the thoughts of President Aquino. I understand the tough balancing act that you need to do between China and your allies in Asia. But do you believe that China’s expansionism is a threat to regional peace and stability? And will the Mutual Defense Treaty apply in the event that the territorial conflict with China escalates into an armed conflict?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, let me repeat what I said earlier. I think that it is good for the region and good for the world if China is successfully developing, if China is lifting more of its people out of poverty. There are a lot of people in China, and the more they’re able to develop and provide basic needs for their people and work cooperatively with other countries in the region, that’s only going to strengthen the region -- that’s not going to weaken it.
I do think that, as President Aquino said very persuasively, that China as a large country has already asserted that it is interested in abiding by international law. And really, our message to China consistently on a whole range of issues is we want to be a partner with you in upholding international law. In fact, larger countries have a greater responsibility in abiding by international norms and rules because when we move, it can worry smaller countries if we don’t do it in a way that’s consistent with international law.
And I think that there are going to be territorial disputes around the world. We have territorial disputes with some of our closest allies. I suspect that there are some islands and rocks in and around Canada and the United States where there are probably still some arguments dating back to the 1800s. But we don’t go around sending ships and threatening folks. What we do is we sit down and we have some people in a room -- it’s boring, it’s not exciting, but it’s usually a good way to work out these problems and work out these issues.
And I think that all the countries that I’ve spoken to in the region during the course of my trip -- Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and now the Philippines -- their message has been the same everywhere I go, which is they would like to resolve these issues peacefully and diplomatically. That’s why I think that the approach that President Aquino has been taking, putting this before international arbitration, is a sound one.
And if China I think listens to its neighbors and recognizes that there’s another approach to resolve these disputes, what China will find is they’ve got ready and willing partners throughout the Asia Pacific region that want to work with them on trade and commerce and selling goods and buying goods. And it’s inevitable that China is going to be a dominant power in this region just by sheer size. Nobody, I think, denies that. The question is just whether other countries in the region are also able to succeed and prosper on their own terms and tend to the various interests and needs that they and their people have as well. And that’s what we support.
PRESIDENT AQUINO: I think from the onset, our message to China has been I think we’re all focused on achieving greater prosperity for all our respective peoples, and prosperity and continued prosperity does not happen in a vacuum. There has to be stability. And in turn, they have responded that the disputes in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea are not the end all, be all of our relationships. And we have had good cooperation with them on so many different fronts, and perhaps one could even argue that this is the only sore point in our relationship.
Now, having said that, perhaps -- we have tried to work on that particular premise of building up our ties on different aspects where there is no conflict or very little conflict. And in this particular instance, I have to find the way and means by which we can both achieve our respective goals, which I believe are not -- or should not be mutually exclusive, but rather should be inclusive if at the end of the day, we do want to strive for the prosperity of our respective peoples.
That I think has to be the primordial concern, rather than disputes on a few rocks that are not possible to be inhabited. And I think in due time, given the fact that there’s so much commerce that traverses this particular -- both in the maritime and the air domain -- China, which has achieved its goals of improving the life of its people, will see the soundness of this proposal and perhaps will act more, shall we say, consistently and actively towards achieving that stability for all. That is our hope.
Q Thank you to both Presidents. President Aquino, as a journalist, I’d like to ask you why 26 journalists have been killed since you took office. And I understand that there have only been suspects arrested in six of those cases. What are you doing to fix that?
President Obama, as you grappled here with all these national security challenges, I have two questions. One, back home we’ve learned that 40 military veterans died while they were waiting for health care, a very tragic situation. I know you don’t run the Phoenix Office of Veterans Affairs, but as Commander-in-Chief, what specifically will you pledge to fix that?
And, secondly, more broadly -- big picture -- as you end this trip, I don’t think I have to remind you there have been a lot of unflattering portraits of your foreign policy right now. And rather than get into all the details or red lines, et cetera, I’d like to give you a chance to lay out what your vision is more than five years into office, what you think the Obama doctrine is in terms of what your guiding principle is on all of these crises and how you answer those critics who say they think the doctrine is weakness.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, Ed, I doubt that I’m going to have time to lay out my entire foreign policy doctrine. And there are actually some complimentary pieces as well about my foreign policy, but I’m not sure you ran them.
Here’s I think the general takeaway from this trip. Our alliances in the Asia Pacific have never been stronger; I can say that unequivocally. Our relationship with ASEAN countries in Southeast Asia have never been stronger. I don’t think that’s subject to dispute. As recently as a decade ago, there were great tensions between us and Malaysia, for example. And I think you just witnessed the incredible warmth and strength of the relationship between those two countries.
We’re here in the Philippines signing a defense agreement. Ten years ago, fifteen years ago there was enormous tensions around our defense relationship with the Philippines. And so it’s hard to square whatever it is that the critics are saying with facts on the ground, events on the ground here in the Asia Pacific region. Typically, criticism of our foreign policy has been directed at the failure to use military force. And the question I think I would have is, why is it that everybody is so eager to use military force after we’ve just gone through a decade of war at enormous costs to our troops and to our budget? And what is it exactly that these critics think would have been accomplished?
My job as Commander-in-Chief is to deploy military force as a last resort, and to deploy it wisely. And, frankly, most of the foreign policy commentators that have questioned our policies would go headlong into a bunch of military adventures that the American people had no interest in participating in and would not advance our core security interests.
So if you look at Syria, for example, our interest is in helping the Syrian people, but nobody suggests that us being involved in a land war in Syria would necessarily accomplish this goal. And I would note that those who criticize our foreign policy with respect to Syria, they themselves say, no, no, no, we don’t mean sending in troops. Well, what do you mean? Well, you should be assisting the opposition -- well, we’re assisting the opposition. What else do you mean? Well, perhaps you should have taken a strike in Syria to get chemical weapons out of Syria. Well, it turns out we’re getting chemical weapons out of Syria without having initiated a strike. So what else are you talking about? And at that point it kind of trails off.
In Ukraine, what we’ve done is mobilize the international community. Russia has never been more isolated. A country that used to be clearly in its orbit now is looking much more towards Europe and the West, because they’ve seen that the arrangements that have existed for the last 20 years weren’t working for them. And Russia is having to engage in activities that have been rejected uniformly around the world. And we’ve been able to mobilize the international community to not only put diplomatic pressure on Russia, but also we’ve been able to organize European countries who many were skeptical would do anything to work with us in applying sanctions to Russia. Well, what else should we be doing? Well, we shouldn’t be putting troops in, the critics will say. That’s not what we mean. Well, okay, what are you saying? Well, we should be arming the Ukrainians more. Do people actually think that somehow us sending some additional arms into Ukraine could potentially deter the Russian army? Or are we more likely to deter them by applying the sort of international pressure, diplomatic pressure and economic pressure that we’re applying?
The point is that for some reason many who were proponents of what I consider to be a disastrous decision to go into Iraq haven’t really learned the lesson of the last decade, and they keep on just playing the same note over and over again. Why? I don’t know. But my job as Commander-in-Chief is to look at what is it that is going to advance our security interests over the long term, to keep our military in reserve for where we absolutely need it. There are going to be times where there are disasters and difficulties and challenges all around the world, and not all of those are going to be immediately solvable by us.
But we can continue to speak out clearly about what we believe. Where we can make a difference using all the tools we’ve got in the toolkit, well, we should do so. And if there are occasions where targeted, clear actions can be taken that would make a difference, then we should take them. We don't do them because somebody sitting in an office in Washington or New York think it would look strong. That's not how we make foreign policy. And if you look at the results of what we've done over the last five years, it is fair to say that our alliances are stronger, our partnerships are stronger, and in the Asia Pacific region, just to take one example, we are much better positioned to work with the peoples here on a whole range of issues of mutual interest.
And that may not always be sexy. That may not always attract a lot of attention, and it doesn’t make for good argument on Sunday morning shows. But it avoids errors. You hit singles, you hit doubles; every once in a while we may be able to hit a home run. But we steadily advance the interests of the American people and our partnership with folks around the world.
Q The Veterans Affairs --
PRESIDENT OBAMA: You got me all worked up on the other one. (Laughter.)
The moment we heard about the allegations around these 40 individuals who had died in Phoenix, I immediately ordered the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, General Shinseki, to investigate. We also have an IG investigation taking place. And so we take the allegations very seriously.
That is consistent with what has been my rock-solid commitment to make sure that our veterans are cared for. I believe that if somebody has served our nation then they have to get the benefits and services that they have earned. And my budgets have consistently reflected that. That's why we’ve resourced the Veterans Affairs office more in terms of increases than any other department or agency in my government.
That doesn’t mean, though, that some folks may still not be getting the help that they need. And we're going to find out if, in fact, that's the case, and I'm interested in working with everybody, whether it's our outstanding veteran service organizations or Congress, to make sure that there is not a single veteran in the United States who needs help -- whether because they’re homeless, because they’re sick, because they’re looking for a job. I want to make sure that they are getting the help that they need.
PRESIDENT AQUINO: With regards to the killing of journalists, perhaps we should say from the outset that I don't have the figures right here before me. But we did set up an interagency committee to look on extralegal killings and forced disappearances, torture, and other grave violations of right to life, liberty and security of persons.
And in this particular body, there has been -- I have the figures for labor-related issues -- there were 62 suspected cases of extrajudicial killings referred to it, and of the 62 investigations before this committee, there have been 10 that have been determined to fulfill the criteria and the definitions of what constitutes an extrajudicial killing. Of the 10 cases that have been determined to be possible EJK cases, only one happened during our watch -- the case of Mr. Estrellado.
Now, as far as journalists are concerned, perhaps the track record speaks for itself. The Maguindanao massacre involved something like 52 journalists, and there are presently something like over 100 people who have been indicted for this crime and are undergoing trial. That doesn’t mean that we have stopped trying to look for others potentially involved in this particular killing. And may we just state for the record that even when it comes to journalists, it is not a policy of this state to silence critics. All you have to do would be to turn on the TV, the radio, or look at any newspaper to find an abundance of criticisms.
Now, having said that, investigations have been done. Anybody who has been killed obviously is a victim, and investigations have been ongoing. If at times we do not reveal the discoveries by our intelligence agencies and security services, perhaps we are very sensitive to personal relationships by the people who are deceased who were killed not because of professional activities, but, shall we say, other issues. But having said that, they were killed. That is against the law. And the people will have to be found, prosecuted and sent to jail.
The fourth plank of my promise when I ran for election was judicial reform, and this is still a work in progress. We want to protect all the rights of every individual but also ensure that the speedy portion of the promise also happens. Unfortunately, speed is not a hallmark of our current judicial system and there are various steps -- laws, amendments, particular laws -- even a rethink of the whole process to try and ensure the speedy disposition of justice.
Thank you.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Thank you very much, everybody.
END
4:22 P.M. PHT
4:22 P.M. PHT
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