ROSE GOTTENMOELLER'S REMARKS: "NUCLEAR POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS IN 21ST CENTURY"

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Nuclear Policy and Negotiations in the 21st Century
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
The Warren B. Rudman Center for Justice, Leadership & Public Policy, University of New Hampshire School of Law
Concord, New Hampshire
November 6, 2014

Good Afternoon. Thank you, John, for the kind introduction. Thank you very much for inviting me to join you at here at the Rudman Center. I was last here in May of 2013 to talk about export control reform with Senator Jeanne Shaheen. I am glad to be back to talk about arms control and nonproliferation negotiations in the 21st century.

While we are gathered here tonight in Concord, the world is facing serious challenges: the threats to Ukraine’s sovereignty and Russia’s flagrant disregard for international law, the continuing conflicts in the Middle East, a dangerous Ebola outbreak in West Africa that has travelled to our shores. It is not surprising that most people are not focused on nuclear weapons or nuclear deterrence.

When the Cold War ended, the looming threat of nuclear war seemed to drift away for the average American. When was the last time you even heard of someone doing a duck-and-cover drill or building a bomb shelter in their backyard? Unfortunately, there are still thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons in the world. The threat from these weapons is real and I would argue that it has become more serious due to the threat from nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists.

That is why this Administration, like the Administrations before it, is working so hard to reduce the nuclear threat. One of the steps in that process was the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) – a Treaty for which I led the U.S. negotiating team.

In negotiating New START, we knew that it was necessary to replace the expiring START Treaty with a new agreement reflecting progress in arms control and the changes in the world in the 20 years since START came into force.

This was no small task and it took many, many months to complete, but we were successful and in December of 2010, the Senate gave its advice and consent to its ratification. The implementation of this Treaty is now well underway and when it is completed, we will have the lowest levels of deployed strategic nuclear arms since the 1950’s.

As we now look to the future of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and treaties, it is important to recognize that we will need a host of new technical and legal experts to conduct these discussions. It is true that diplomacy is an art, not a science, but there are a number of reliable tools upon which I rely during negotiations.

One: Building Relationships

First, I cannot emphasize enough the importance of building good, professional relationships. With the New START Treaty, the two delegations launched into the negotiations committed to conducting them in an atmosphere of mutual respect with a premium on keeping the tone businesslike and productive, even when we did not agree. My counterpart on the Russian delegation, Ambassador Anatoly Antonov, always used to say, “business is business.” And what he meant was that we needed to keep the tone of the discussion businesslike even when we were butting heads – as we frequently did.

We also were very aware of the role of a human gesture. Even things as simple as acknowledging national holidays, cultural and sport events are important. The Vancouver Olympics were going on while were in Geneva for New START, and we cheered on each other’s teams. Well, maybe not each other’s hockey teams.

Also, never underestimate the power of a smile or a joke. You would be very surprised about how much a well-placed joke can help move talks along.

Two: Establishing Trust

Second, building relationships is one thing, but establishing trust is another, and it takes longer. Between negotiating teams, it is pivotal and more difficult than it sounds. In our case, we had over a year to get to know our counterparts. Further, members of both delegations brought valuable experience to the table, having worked as inspectors under START. They had inspected each other’s ICBM bases, SLBM bases, heavy bomber bases, and storage facilities multiple times. They regarded each other as professionals. That helped to establish trust.

One of the most important very important things is that our delegations agreed to disagree in private. That was good considering how easily either delegation could have broadcast negative comments that would have reached Moscow or Washington before we could pick up a phone.

Trying to work out issues and disagreements through the press is – as you can imagine – is not a great model for success.

So make sure the people you are working with know that they can trust you. Trust is the foundation of any good agreement.

Three: Creating Value for Both Sides

Third, and particularly important right now, is the fact that negotiations should not be a zero-sum game. The point is to negotiate for mutual benefit. When we finished negotiating New START, then-President Medvedev referred to it as a “win-win” situation. That should always be our goal.

This is especially important for multilateral discussions, but harder to accomplish. No one will ever get everything they want – the point is to come away with a fair deal all-around. You may not get a “win-win” situation all the time, but you can avoid a situation where parties come away from a negotiation feeling that they have lost.

Four: LISTENING

It may seem simple, but another key to negotiating is listening.

During New START, it really helped that we spoke each other’s languages. I am very proud to say that there were probably as many Russian speakers on the U.S. delegation as there were English speakers on the Russian delegation. For me, hearing things twice helped me to listen to things extra well.

It is also something you probably heard from your mothers, but you also need to make sure you are really listening to people and not just waiting for your turn to talk. You might miss something important!

Five: Negotiating Process AND Substance

In addition to negotiating skills, you also need expertise on the substance. One of the things that made the New START negotiations work smoothly was the fact that we had experienced diplomats and experienced inspectors, as well as weapon systems operators. All of them had to work together.

You can negotiate beautiful language, but if you don’t understand the ins and outs of an inspection on the ground, imprecise language in the treaty can come back to haunt you. But you also need room for flexibility. You may think you understand exactly how to inspect a re-entry vehicle on a missile, but you need to tread lightly when codifying the requirement to conduct such an inspection in a treaty. An inspector also needs room to use his or her judgment.

You always have to think about both the big picture and the little details: it’s a balancing act.

Six: Be Thorough and Be Prepared

Finally, it is important to remember that every negotiation is different. While the START negotiations from over 20 years ago informed our approach, we were in a completely new era with New START. We had to think about what worked and didn’t work for previous treaties, without letting that bind our creativity.

One of the great strengths of the New START Treaty rested on the fact that we took into account the broad perspectives of the State Department, the Department of Defense, the uniformed military, the Department of Energy, and other agencies, from the very beginning and at every step throughout the negotiations. It was a true inter-agency effort from day one until the day it entered into force and that cooperation continues, as we work to implement the Treaty.

Dealing with Difficulties

Even with the tools that I have discussed in hand, there were some days during the New START negotiations that were very rough and very long. Beyond that, I like to joke that I went through two sets of negotiations- one with the Russian Federation and one with the Senate. We had a tough, vigorous debate up on Capitol Hill, but in the process, I think we rekindled some important interest in arms control and nonproliferation issues.

In the end, the hard work paid off. New START is enhancing our national security, as well as strategic stability with Russia. The current tensions with Russia highlight the importance of mutual confidence provided by data exchanges and on-site inspections under the Treaty, and the security and predictability provided by verifiable, mutual limits on strategic weapons.

As we look to the future with respect to future nuclear reduction agreements, the United States will only pursue agreements that are in our national security interest and that of our allies. Historically, the United States and Russia have always been able to continue our work to reduce nuclear threats. That fact should not change.

The United States has made clear that we are prepared to engage Russia on the full range of issues affecting strategic stability and that there are real and meaningful steps we should be taking that can contribute to a more predictable and safer security environment.

In June 2013 in Berlin, President Obama stated U.S. willingness to negotiate a reduction of up to one-third of our deployed strategic warheads from the level established in the New START Treaty.

Progress requires a willing partner and a conducive strategic environment.

As I have said, no one here should doubt that we are in a difficult crisis period with Russia, but we need nuclear cooperation with Russia and others to address global threats – first and foremost the threat of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon or nuclear material.

The reason we can and must continue to pursue arms control and nonproliferation tools is that they are the best - and quite frankly - the only path that we can take to effectively prevent a terrorist nuclear threat and reduce nuclear dangers more broadly.

That will take new, and I am sure, difficult negotiations.

Final Thoughts

With that I would like to wrap up and take some questions, but I want to leave you with some final thoughts. With all the challenges in the world, it is sometimes easy to despair, but I assure you that through hard work, humor, patience and persistence, we can meet and solve these challenges.

One of our less-quoted presidents, Calvin Coolidge had a quote about persistence that I often think of:

“Nothing in the world can take the place of Persistence. Talent will not; nothing is more common than unsuccessful men with talent. Genius will not; unrewarded genius is almost a proverb. Education will not; the world is full of educated derelicts. Persistence and determination alone are omnipotent. The slogan 'Press On' has solved and always will solve the problems of the human race.”

That is what I think about when I think about the next set of negotiations in front of me. Whether that involves the next steps in nuclear reductions or banning the production of the fissile material used in nuclear weapons, we will be patient, but we will be persistent. Progress will not only require building on the success of New START, but new and innovative approaches to the challenges we face…and some really good negotiating. Thank you.

UNDER SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER'S SPEECH TO UN ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

69th United Nations General Assembly First Committee General Debate

Speech

Rose Gottemoeller

Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 

New York, NY

October 7, 2014

As Delivered

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations, Ambassador Courtenay Rattray, on your election as Chair of the First Committee during its 69th session. The United States pledges to support your leadership and the work of this committee. We are sure that together we can make this a session that puts us on the right path for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon).

As we begin our work, it is important to remember why we are here. We are, as I have said many times, travelling on a long and difficult road. We are facing obstacles – today more clearly than in years past – that slow the pace of progress. We press ahead, because we know that only by continuing our committed, serious work on reducing the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction can we achieve safety and security for generations to come.

That is what motivates and guides U.S. policy. That is the sentiment behind President Obama’s 2009 speech in Prague. That is what we sincerely hope guides the path of every nation represented here. While we have accomplished much over the past five years, we have no intention of diverting from our efforts to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, increase confidence and transparency, strengthen nonproliferation, and address compliance challenges.

Mr. Chairman, on this last point, let me stress that compliance with global agreements is an essential part of international peace and security. That is why the United States is once again sponsoring its triennial resolution on “Compliance with nonproliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments,” which seeks to strengthen the global consensus on this topic. We welcome maximum co-sponsorship and support, and hope that it will be adopted without a vote.

Mr. Chairman, we should view the challenges that face us today as a potent reminder that our work is more important than ever. First and foremost, we must all provide unyielding support for the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime, the NPT.

Achieving a successful RevCon in 2015 is a priority for the United States. We encourage all parties to join with the United States to advance realistic and achievable objectives. The NPT binds nations to a common interest in preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons use. The challenges to the NPT are real, but the treaty is far too important to fail or be held hostage to impractical demands or political agendas that will not command consensus.

Some question U.S. support for nuclear disarmament. This is a mistake. We remain firmly committed to Article VI of the NPT and to achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. The United States has made clear our readiness to discuss further nuclear reductions with the Russian Federation, but progress requires a willing partner and good environment.

The United States will continue to make it clear that arms control regimes and their corresponding nuclear reductions have served the world well for more than 40 years. The United States and Russia, of course, have special responsibilities to protect and preserve those regimes, as our countries still possess over 90% of the global nuclear stockpile.

A critical part of this regime is the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). The United States is deeply concerned about Russia’s violation of its obligations under this landmark treaty. We believe that the INF Treaty benefits the security of the United States, our allies, and Russia. For that reason, we urge Russia to resolve our concerns, return to compliance, and ensure the continued viability of the Treaty.

Now is the time to move forward, not back to postures reminiscent of the Cold War. Despite these challenges, the United States and Russia continue to implement the New START Treaty successfully. When we complete implementation, deployed nuclear weapons will be at their lowest levels since the 1950s. This translates to an 85% reduction to the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile from its Cold War peak. That is indisputable progress in disarmament.

As we consider future reductions, our focus must be on responsible measures that can be trusted and verified. We will learn from our past experience – successes and disappointments – and continue to move ahead with each step building on the last. Actually, perhaps we do ourselves a disservice when we think about disarmament as a metaphorical ladder – one that must be climbed in a linear fashion. Perhaps we are better off thinking in terms of how creeks and streams connect to form rivers. Over time, those mighty rivers are irreversible; they cut through massive and seemingly impenetrable stone on the way to their final destination. In those terms, one can see how the myriad of tasks in front of us will connect to each other and steadily but surely form an irreversible path towards disarmament.

There is no way to skip to the end and forgo the hard work of preparing for the technical and political disarmament challenges that lie ahead. For example, we can all acknowledge that verification will become increasingly complex at lower numbers of nuclear weapons, while requirements for effectiveness will increase. All of us – every nation here – should be devoting ample time and energy to address this challenge right now. As a start, I recommend reviewing the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s recent research on future verification mechanisms, and encourage everyone to attend our October 14 side event on the topic.

Mr. Chairman, the United States is continuing its engagement with the P5 on the issue of disarmament. Collectively, we have created a consensus NPT Reporting Framework, first demonstrated at this year’s NPT PrepCom, and we continue to work on a P5 Glossary that will increase mutual understanding. Ongoing P5 work on critical Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) inspection techniques will help enhance that Treaty’s verification regime.

The United States is pleased that the United Kingdom will host the sixth annual P5 conference early next year. I want to stress that speed is less important than results in this process. The regular interactions and cooperation that are happening now is the foundation on which future P5 multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament will stand.

Patience and persistence is needed from all parties both among and beyond the P5. That is why the United States is interested in engaging non-nuclear weapon states in order to increase transparency and engagement in the disarmament process. Such collaboration can help us ensure the nearly 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons continues forever.

As we consider the agenda for the 2015 RevCon, it is important to focus on all three pillars of the NPT. The United States will seek a balanced review that addresses each.

Ensuring NPT safeguards are upheld and nuclear energy remains in peaceful use are no less important to disarmament as future nuclear reductions. Treaty violations should never be tolerated and demand our attention. That is because NPT pillars are mutually reinforcing and implementation of each is a shared responsibility.

Mr. Chairman, as we approach the 2015 RevCon, the United States will be focusing its efforts on a number of other issues. We will be supporting legally binding assurances against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the context of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty Protocols. We were pleased to sign the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in May. We will continue to work with ASEAN toward signature of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty Protocol. Bringing into force the protocols of all five regional zones is a top priority.

Along with our P5+1 partners, the United States will continue to seek concrete, verifiable steps to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.

The United States is eager to launch negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) – an agreement recognized to be a vital and necessary step in multilateral nuclear disarmament. Nations that continue to block these negotiations should consider how their actions increase nuclear dangers and impede nuclear disarmament.

This year, through a resolution from this body, and under Canada’s leadership, a UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on FMCT was convened. It is our hope that the GGE and its final report will finally break this impasse and allow us to proceed with the negotiation of this important treaty.

The United States will continue to create the conditions that will help us ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz have both recently emphasized the need for this Treaty to finally enter into force.

While we are focused on CTBT ratification in the United States, we call on the seven other Annex 2 States to complete their ratification processes without delay. The time for action is now. The United States asks that all CTBT Signatories continue their commitment to support an effective, operational, and sustainable verification system for the Treaty. We also look forward to participating in the upcoming CTBT Integrated Field Exercise in Jordan.

Mr. Chairman, the United States is also focusing on the long-term sustainability of space. We believe irresponsible behavior in space, such as the testing or use of debris-generating ASAT systems, threatens the security, safety, economic well-being, and space science activities of all nations. We are pleased that the report from the UN GGE on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures for outer space activities was endorsed by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly. It provides a valuable roadmap for practical, near-term solutions, such as an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.

On the subject of conventional arms control and disarmament, the United States recently announced that we will not use anti-personnel landmines (APL) outside the Korean Peninsula, nor will we assist, encourage, or induce anyone outside the Korean Peninsula to engage in activity prohibited by the Ottawa Convention. We will also undertake to destroy APL stockpiles not required for the defense of the Republic of Korea. The United States will continue our diligent efforts to pursue solutions that would be compliant with and ultimately allow us to join the Ottawa Convention. At the same time, we are proud to be the world’s single largest financial supporter of humanitarian mine action.

We are also pleased that the Arms Trade Treaty will enter-into-force before the end of this year. As a signatory, we are working with Mexico and other interested States in pursuit of a successful first Conference of States Parties that will lay the groundwork for a Treaty that lives up to all of our expectations.

I would like to thank all those here who aided in the effort to remove chemical weapons from Syria. Through an unprecedented collaboration of nations and international organizations, we collected, removed, and ultimately destroyed 1,300 tons of chemical weapons and precursors from Syria. Very serious issues with Syria still must be resolved, including the reports of systematic use of chlorine gas in opposition areas. The fact remains that through cooperation, the international community was able to significantly reduce the threat posed by chemical weapons in the region. The framework we developed can serve as a guide for future WMD nonproliferation cooperation.

In sum, it is not enough to have the will to pursue nonproliferation and disarmament; we have to have a way to pursue nonproliferation and disarmament. We will require all the tools we have available: diplomacy, law, science, technology, economic cooperation, and more. We will have to eschew needless arguments, vanity, and political games. We will need the courage and the tenacity to keep chipping away at this problem, day after day, month after month, year after year.

It will not be easy. Just as there is no single solution to our global fight against violent extremism, no single initiative, no matter how noble or well-intentioned, can end the threat from weapons of mass destruction by itself. In both cases, we must commit ourselves to active and engaged cooperation, and, most importantly, we must seek the cooperation and support of people outside of these walls, and outside of our capitals. The global public must both understand the significant humanitarian impacts of weapons of mass destruction and the achievable way we can reduce and then eliminate them.

We are under no illusions – we know there is disagreement on the right path ahead. Instead of focusing on what divides us, I would again ask everyone to remember why we are here and what we are charged with doing. We can and must reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. By focusing on our mutual commitments to the NPT and other established international agreements, we can succeed.

Mr. Chairman, we must succeed and the United States is ready to do its part.

Thank you.

REMARKS BY ROSE GOTTEMOELLER AT 2013 MULTINATIONAL BMD CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION

FROM:   U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Remarks at the 2013 Multinational BMD Conference and Exhibition
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
Warsaw, Poland
October 31, 2013

As Delivered

Thank you so much for inviting me to speak here and thank you for your kind introduction, Nancy. It is always a pleasure to visit Warsaw. The United States greatly values its relationship with Poland and looks forward to further strengthening our cooperation.

As you have all heard from my colleagues, Under Secretary Miller and Admiral Syring, the global threat from ballistic missiles is very serious. Missile defense is an important part of how we combat this threat. In our increasingly-connected and fiscally-strained world, efforts and collaboration of allies and partners on missile defense are more important than ever.  The United States will continue to do its part in this regard and today, I would like to focus on the broader picture about how missile defenses fit into our larger strategy to respond to the threat, including the defense of the United States, our Allies and friends.

Comprehensive Tools

The United States has a large number of tools available to it to prevent the threat from growing. We are active participants in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which serves as the global standard for controlling the transfer of equipment, software, and technology that could make a contribution to the development of WMD-capable missile and unmanned aerial vehicle delivery systems.

We are also working through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other counter-proliferation activities to help partners improve their ability to stop shipments of missiles or missile parts. My last visit to Warsaw was for the PSI 10th anniversary in the spring. We made some real progress on that occasion in expanding the reach and depth of the PSI, and thank you again to Poland for hosting such an effective meeting.  We have worked directly with specific governments to convince them to renounce their missile programs. For example, in 2003, Libya committed to eliminate its long-range ballistic missile programs, which led to the elimination of their 800-km range SCUD missiles.  These are just some of our ongoing efforts to tackle the missile threat and prevent missile proliferation. While much of this work is performed quietly, the impact of all of these efforts is of crucial importance to international peace and security.

At the same time, we are realistic that these programs cannot completely halt missile proliferation and that other steps are needed to dissuade countries from acquiring or developing ballistic missiles. That is why missile defense is an important part of our efforts to strengthen regional security.  The missile defense systems that we deploy are critical to reassuring our allies. They signal that, in the face of threats from countries like Iran and North Korea, we will meet our defense commitments.  As you heard yesterday, missile threats exist around the globe and have been used in recent and current conflicts. In both the Libyan and Syrian conflicts, ballistic missiles were used.

As Iran and North Korea conduct more ballistic missile tests, our defense systems make it more likely that our allies will embrace our diplomatic efforts, whether it is engagement or sanctions, knowing that missile defenses are doing their part to defend against a regional threat. That assurance is critical as we seek regional cooperation to persuade some states to abandon their nuclear programs and stop the proliferation of nuclear material.

Where we can, we seek to integrate our missile defense systems into a broader system of defenses deployed by our allies and friends. We are better off where we can leverage the capabilities of our allies and combine that with a flexible, capable cost effective system.  The Obama Administration is improving these regional security architectures by deploying and improving regional missile defenses. These deployments are tailored to the unique requirements of the regional threat. We do not purchase more than what is required and we are very transparent about what we do purchase. Let me discuss some of our efforts around the world related to these efforts.

Cooperation in Europe

First, in Europe, the United States remains firmly committed to defending NATO Europe against ballistic missile threats to populations, territory and forces. We are deploying the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which will provide protection to all NATO European territory in the 2018 timeframe.  We are making great progress on EPAA, most recently with Monday’s Phase 2 site ground-breaking in Romania, in which Under Secretary Miller and Admiral Syring participated, as well as my colleague DAS Frank Rose. That site will be operational in the 2015 timeframe. We will also forward-base four BMD-capable Aegis warships to Rota, Spain in the 2015 timeframe to support the EPAA. Our commitment to deploy Phase 3 in Poland is ironclad, and preparations are currently on-time and on-budget for the establishment of the Phase 3 interceptor site at Redzikowo. It will be operational in the 2018 timeframe.

Although not related to EPAA, the Dutch, German and United States deployment of Patriot missile defense units to Turkey this year in response to a Turkish request to NATO for defense against potential Syrian ballistic missile threats is an excellent example of how missile defense can provide reassurance to Allies and deter potential adversaries.

Cooperation in the Middle East

The United States continues its robust BMD partnership with Israel. This cooperation includes the Arrow 2 interceptor, the more advanced Arrow 3, and the David’s Sling Weapon system. And the United States and Israel worked closely together to deploy an AN/TPY-2 radar to Israel in 2008. This powerful radar is linked to U.S. early warning satellites, and intended to enhance Israel’s missile detection and defense capabilities.

In the Gulf, the United States has had a continuous missile defense presence and seeks to strengthen cooperation with its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). We have begun an initiative, launched at the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in March 2012, to strengthen missile defense cooperation.

At the September 26 meeting of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, Ministers resolved to work together to continue to work towards enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), including the eventual development of a Gulf-wide coordinated missile defense architecture built around interoperable U.S. and GCC forces that would serve as an integrated system to defend the territory and assets of the GCC states against the threat of ballistic missiles.  A number of states in the region already deploy PATRIOT batteries and are exploring purchases of some missile defense capabilities under the auspices of the foreign military sales (FMS) program. To build a coordinated architecture, it is critical that our partners select systems that are fully interoperable.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) continues to be a leader in the field of ballistic missile defense. On December 25, 2011, the UAE became the first international partner to purchase the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or “THAAD,” system from the United States.  This robust area defense capability, in conjunction with the UAE’s acquisition of PAC-3 point defense systems, will provide the UAE with a layered missile defense capability, ensure interoperability with U.S. forces, and contribute to regional stability. These purchases highlight the strong ties and common strategic interests between the United States and the UAE.

As our partners acquire greater missile defense capabilities, the United States will work to promote interoperability and information sharing among the GCC states. This will allow for more efficient missile defenses and greater security cooperation in the region.

Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

In the Asia-Pacific region, we have robust missile defense cooperation with Japan and are increasing this cooperation. Japan is one of our closest allies, a leader in missile defense within the region, and one of the United States’ closest BMD partners.  The United States and Japan have made significant strides in interoperability. The United States and Japan regularly train together, and our forces have successfully executed cooperative BMD operations.

Japan has acquired a layered integrated BMD system that includes Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile 3 interceptors, Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) fire units, early warning radars, and a command and control system. We also worked cooperatively to deploy a forward-based X-band radar in Japan.  At their October 3, 2013, “2+2 meeting, U.S. and Japanese foreign and defense ministers confirmed their intention to designate the Air Self-Defense Force base at Kyogamisaki as the deployment site for a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system that will further enhance the defense of our two countries.

One of our most significant cooperative efforts is the co-development of a next-generation SM-3 interceptor, called the Block IIA. This co-development program represents not only an area of significant technical cooperation but also the basis for enhanced operational cooperation to strengthen regional security.  The Republic of Korea (ROK) is another key U.S. ally and with the increasing North Korean missile threat, the United States stands ready to work with the ROK to strengthen its BMD capabilities. We are working together to define possible future ROK BMD requirements and the United States looks forward to taking further steps to build upon this ongoing missile defense relationship.

Defense Against Regional Threats

As we work with partners abroad, the Obama Administration is enhancing our homeland missile defenses; a development which will also provide reassurance to our Allies. On March 15, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced an increase in the number of ground-based interceptors to ensure that the United States remains well hedged against a North Korean ICBM threat. This change in our missile defenses will also provide the United States with additional defenses against an Iranian ICBM capability should that threat emerge.

We also strengthened our defenses of U.S. territory through deployment of a THAAD battery to Guam during the tensions with North Korea earlier this year.  Homeland missile defenses ensure that the United States reduces the risks that come with helping to defend our Allies and allows our Allies to be confident that the United States will meet its Treaty and security commitments.

Strategic Stability

As we move forward with our programs, I want to be very clear - our missile defense deployments are not directed at Russia or China. We are committed to maintaining strategic stability with these nations.  U.S. missile defenses are not designed to intercept Russian ICBMs or SLBMs, nor are they technically capable of intercepting Russian ICBMs or SLBMs. As stated in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, our homeland missile defenses are to defend against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.

Russia and China both field advanced ICBMs and SLBMs. In addition, with just 44 ground-based interceptors scheduled to be deployed, both Russia and China’s nuclear arsenals far exceed the number of interceptors we have; thus clearly establishing that we are talking about – to use an American phrase – apples and oranges when it comes to how U.S. missile defenses impact strategic stability with those nations.  There is therefore no way that U.S. missile defenses could undermine the effectiveness of Russia’s or China’s strategic nuclear forces.

Dialogue with Russia

We remain convinced that increased predictability on missile defense between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, missile defense cooperation with Russia remains a priority for President Obama, as it has been for nearly 20 years with both Democratic and Republican Presidents.

As such, the United States has had discussions with the Russian Federation on increasing predictability on missile defense. Secretary of Defense Hagel and Russian Defense Minister Shoygu agreed in March to reconvene missile defense discussions between Under Secretary of Defense Jim Miller and Deputy Defense Minister Antonov. I also had discussions with my Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs counterpart, Sergei Ryabkov, on strategic stability issues, including missile defense. We are committed to a dialogue on missile defense, both bilaterally and in the NATO-Russia Council, and stand ready to begin practical discussions.

While we seek to develop ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, it is important to remember that in keeping with its collective security obligations, NATO alone bears responsibility for defending the Alliance from ballistic missile threats. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of Russian territory, NATO must ensure the defense of NATO territory. NATO cannot and will not outsource its Article 5 commitments.  Russia continues to request legal guarantees that could create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional ballistic missile threats such as those presented by Iran and North Korea.  We have made clear that we cannot and will not accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships.

The United States believes that through cooperation and transparency, Russia will see firsthand that this system is designed to respond to ballistic missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems will not undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Cooperation would also send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter their efforts.

Dialogue with China

We are in the beginning stages of holding dialogues with China on these issues that span both governments’ interagencies. In May, I traveled to Beijing to hold a Security Dialogue with my Chinese counterpart.  On the State Department side, there are a number of fora in which we discuss important issues, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue led by Secretaries Kerry and Lew and the Strategic Security Dialogue led by the Deputy Secretary of State. The Defense Department also has a number of important dialogues with the Chinese, including the U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks. General Dempsey and other senior defense officials have also met with their Chinese counterparts this year. These mechanisms and opportunities for deep discussion are important for strengthening our strategic stability with China.

Looking Ahead

Looking ahead, the United States knows that we have a lot more work to do on creating opportunities for missile defense cooperation and on defending against ballistic missile proliferation, but that is why forums like these are so important. The discussions, debates and ideas that develop here can help us move to a safer, more secure world.

Thank you.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL REMARKS ON THE INFORMATION AGE AND ARMS CONTROL

Photo:  Minute Man III Missile Launch.  Credit:  U.S. Navy
FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Arms Control in the Information Age: Harnessing "Sisu"
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Finnish Institute for International Affairs


Helsinki, Finland
August 29, 2012
Thank you for inviting me to speak here at the Finnish Institute for International Affairs. This is my first visit to Finland and it is an absolutely lovely place. This nation has been a strong partner for the United States in pushing for a safer, more secure world, whether through diplomacy, peacekeeping or arms control efforts.

I would like to start out by saying that this is not a policy speech; this is an ideas speech. The United States has an ambitious arms control agenda and as such, we are doing some big thinking. I know Finns are no strangers to big thinking, so I think I am in the right place to discuss arms control in the information age.

The Challenges Ahead

It has been over 3 years since President Obama made his now-famous speech in Prague, in which he stated that the United States would seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. That speech was not just a rhetorical gesture; the Prague Agenda is a step by step path to the elimination of nuclear weapons. For the first two years of my service in the Administration, I worked on one step in that path – the New START Treaty. I am happy to report that Treaty has now been in force for over 18 months and its implementation is going very well. Both the United States and Russia are benefitting from the enhanced predictability it provides, which in turn enhances security for both nations and the world.

In the context of moving the President’s overall nuclear policy agenda forward, the entry into force of New START is just the beginning. In order to reach our goals, we are going to have to think bigger and bolder. Indeed, persistence, determination and willpower will be important to the next steps in arms control. I believe the Finns have the perfect term for what it will take: "sisu."

As we look towards the next steps in reductions, it is clear that there will be new challenges facing us. We have not tried to limit non-deployed or non-strategic weapons before, which President Obama called for the day he signed New START. We are thinking about how we would verify reductions in those categories and people have different ideas about what terms like ‘non-strategic’ even mean. Even more complicated: the lower the numbers of nuclear weapons and the smaller the components, the harder it will be to effectively verify compliance.

New Concepts

With this is mind, I have been challenging myself to think about how we use the knowledge from our past together with the new tools of the information age. The seed of an idea was planted in my mind in Geneva during the New START negotiations. As we considered verification mechanisms for New START, it occurred to me that, by and large, we were still thinking about verification through the lens of the 1970’s. The advancements in technology since then have been nothing short of revolutionary, but it wasn’t quite clear how to incorporate these advancements into an effective verification regime.

It was actually a conversation with my two tech-guru sons over the dinner table that helped to further develop my thoughts on the subject. We discussed the incorporation of open source technologies – including social networking – into the verification of arms control and nonproliferation treaties.

Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. These people exchange and share ideas on a wide variety of topics: why not put this vast problem-solving entity to good use?

Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, could be broadcast globally in seconds. That means it is harder to hide things. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool, and it can help us make sure that countries are following the rules of arms control treaties and agreements.

I look out at a crowd like you and realize that I don’t need to convince you that the technologies of the 21st century are changing the world as we know it. Finland has been a leading force in innovation in the information age. Over 95% of Finns have access to the internet and broadband access is now considered a legal right. It was not too many generations ago that Finland was a primarily agrarian state and now it is an economic powerhouse, with cutting-edge research and development. I am always amazed that Nokia went from making rubber boots to revolutionizing the communications world with its inexpensive and efficient cellular phones. It is this kind of creativity and adaptability that will be needed as we think about how to verify reductions going forward.

Of course, I should caveat that this is not actually a new idea. Renowned physicist and Nobel-laureate Joseph Rotblat proposed the concept of involving everyday citizens in the verification of arms control agreements back in the 1960’s. But without the tools to "crowd-source" verification, the idea languished. In the 1990s, Joseph Rotblat revived the idea of establishing an international system for public reporting and whistle-blowing as a complement to technological verification. Rotblat termed this concept "societal verification," to reflect the idea that entire communities of non-experts could be involved. While Rotblat and others saw that the new global political conditions could be fertile ground for cultivating societal verification, there was still a need for technical tools. Today, we may finally have those tools.

New Possibilities

So now, armed with an idea and technological capacity, we can start to think about the possibilities.

Social verification can take place on a scale that moves from active participation, like public reporting and crowd-sourced mapping and analysis, or to passive participation, like ubiquitous sensing or data mining and analytics.

On this scale, the open source information technologies in use can improve arms control verification in at least two ways: either by generating new information, or by analyzing information that already is out there.

Let me give you some examples, to give you an idea what I’m talking about.

In 2009, in recognition of the 40th anniversary of the Internet, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) held a competition where 10 red weather balloons were moored at visible fixed locations around the continental United States. The first team to identify the location of all 10 balloons won a sizable cash prize--$40,000. Over 4,300 teams composed of an estimated 2 million people from 25 countries took part in the challenge. A team from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology won the challenge, identifying all of the balloon locations in an astonishing time of 8 hours and 52 minutes. Of course, to win in such a short time or complete the challenge at all, the MIT team did not "find" the balloons themselves. They tapped into social networks using a unique incentive structure that not only incentivized people to identify a balloon location, but also incentivized people to recruit others to the team. Their win showed the enormous potential of social networking, and also demonstrated how incentives can motivate large populations to work toward a common goal.

Social networking is already being incorporated into local safety systems. RAVEN911—the Regional Asset Verification & Emergency Network—is a multilayer mapping tool that supports emergency first response in Cincinnati, Ohio. RAVEN911 uses live data feeds and intelligence gathered through Twitter to provide details that cannot be given on an everyday geographic map, such as the location of downed electric power lines and flooded roads. Authorities are cooperating with communities in Southwestern Ohio, Southeastern Indiana and Northern Kentucky to develop and implement this emergency management system, in order to help fire departments assess the risks and potential dangers before arriving on the scene of an accident. This open source system gives emergency responders a common operating picture, to better execute time-critical activities, such as choosing evacuation routes out of flooded areas.

In addition to collecting useful data, the ability to identify patterns and trends in social networks could aid the arms control verification process. In the most basic sense, social media can draw attention to both routine and abnormal events. We may be able to mine Twitter data to understand where strange effluents are flowing, to recognize if a country has an illegal chemical weapons program or to recognize unexpected patterns of industrial activity at a missile production plant. In this way, we may be able to ensure better compliance with existing arms control treaties and regimes, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Now, how could approaches such as this work, specifically in the arms control context?

Let’s just imagine that a country, to establish its bona fides in a deep nuclear reduction environment, wishes to open itself to a verification challenge, recruiting its citizens and their iPhones to help prove that it is not stashing extra missiles in the woods, for example, or a fissile material production reactor in the desert. Of course, some form of international supervision would likely be required, to ensure the legitimacy of the challenge and its procedures. And we would have to consider whether such a challenge could cope with especially covert environments, such as caves or deep underground facilities.

Sound far-fetched? Just consider that even today, tablets such as your iPad have tiny accelerometers installed – that’s what tells the tablet which way is up. But the accelerometers also have the capability to detect small shakes, like an earth tremor.

Now, imagine a whole community of tablet users, all containing an "earth shake" app, dispersed randomly around the country, and connected into a centralized network node. An individual shake could be something as simple as bumping your iPad on a table. But a whole network of tablets, all shaking at virtually the same time? That tells you that something happened; knowing where all the tablets are and the exact time they started shaking can help you to geo-locate the event. It could be an earthquake, or it could be an illegal nuclear test. Of course, other sensors and analysis would have to be brought to bear to figure out the difference.

This is called "ubiquitous sensing," that is, collecting data and basic analysis through sensors on smartphones and other mobile-computing devices. These sensors would allow citizens to contribute to detecting potential treaty violations, and could build a bridge to a stronger private-public partnership in the realm of treaty verification.

The Challenges Ahead

Of course, for any of this to work, there are technical, legal and political barriers ahead that would need to be overcome—no easy feat to be sure.

On the technical front, it would be necessary to work together to make sure nations cannot spoof or manipulate the public verification challenges that they devise. We also have to bear in mind there could be limitations based on the freedoms available to the citizens of a given country.

On the legal front, there are many questions that must be confronted about active vs. passive participation. How can we prevent governments from extracting information from citizens without their knowledge, or manipulating results collected in databases? Further, in some circumstances, how can active participants be sheltered from reproach by authorities? It may be possible, through careful handling and management, to mask sources, even if locations are public.

On the political front, we cannot assume that information will always be so readily available. As nations and private entities continue to debate the line between privacy and security, it is possible to imagine that we are living in a golden age of open source information that will be harder to take advantage of in future. In the end, the goal of using open source information technology and social networks should be to add to our existing arms control monitoring and verification capabilities, not to supersede them.

Joining Forces

Even with great ideas and fool-proof planning, another issue that we have to consider is: how do we create, organize and, when necessary, fund efforts such as these? Developing partnerships among governments, civil society groups, philanthropic organizations and private businesses will be the key to moving ahead.

We are just now starting to think about how governments can actively enlist their publics to help prove that they are in compliance with their arms control and nonproliferation obligations. To this end, on Tuesday, the U.S. Department of State launched the "Innovation in Arms Control Challenge" asking, "How Can the Crowd Support Arms Control Transparency Efforts?" We want to get ideas on if and how the everyday citizen can help support arms control transparency efforts. While the contest can only be won by U.S. citizens or permanent residents, we encourage anyone who is interested in the subject to participate.

The Future

As I said at the outset, this is not about policy; this is about coming up with the bold ideas that will shape policy in the future. As governments around the world work to enhance and expand our arms control and nonproliferation efforts, we will need your help to find new ways to use the amazing information tools at our disposal. It is increasingly apparent that we are going to need every tool we have, and many we have not yet developed or perhaps even thought of, to fulfill the Prague Agenda. We will need "sisu".

Thank you again for inviting me here to speak. I would now love to take some questions.