FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Next Steps in U.S. Arms Control Policy
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Stockholm, Sweden
January 17, 2014
Thank you for that kind introduction.
Today, I would like to provide an update on our work on implementing the agenda laid out nearly four years ago by President Obama in Prague, when he committed the United States to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a goal that he reaffirmed in his speech in Berlin this past June.
As President Obama noted in Prague and repeated in Berlin, this will not be easy. It will require persistence and patience, and may not happen in his lifetime. Still, over the last four years we have succeeded in moving closer to this goal.
In 2010, the Administration concluded a Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, which outlines the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers, as well as advancing the broader security interests of the United States and its allies. As the NPR states, the international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War: the threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. The traditional concept of nuclear deterrence — the idea that a country would not initiate a nuclear war for fear of nuclear retaliation — does not apply to terrorists. While our nuclear arsenal has little relevance in deterring this threat, concerted action by all states to uphold their NPT obligations – including those related to disarmament – is important for building a sense of common purpose that helps maintain support from partners around the world to uphold and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Securing sensitive nuclear materials worldwide will also make it harder for terrorists to acquire those materials.
Russia has been a key partner in our efforts to secure or eliminate these materials. For instance, the downblending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) by Russia under the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement has now been completed. The final delivery of the resultant LEU to the United States took place in December. Under this agreement, 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian weapons has been converted into LEU and delivered to the United States to fuel U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The HEU that was converted by downblending was enough to produce approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads.
In the United States, an additional 374 metric tons of U.S. HEU has been declared excess to nuclear weapons needs; most of which will be downblended or used as fuel in naval or research reactors. In 2011, the United States and Russia brought into force the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 2010 protocols, which require each side to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium – enough in total for about 17,000 nuclear weapons – and thus permanently remove this material from military programs. Russia has also been an essential partner in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts to convert research reactors worldwide from HEU to LEU and repatriate those reactors’ HEU to the country of origin. These efforts have now converted or verified the shutdown of over 88 research and test reactors and isotope production facilities, and removed over 5,017 kg of HEU for secure storage, downblending and disposition.
In addition to working on the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, we have taken steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. We are not developing new nuclear weapons or pursuing new nuclear missions; we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations; and we have clearly stated that it is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the 68-year record of nonuse of nuclear weapons be extended forever.
In June of 2013, in conjunction with his Berlin speech, President Obama issued new guidance that aligns U.S. nuclear policies to the 21st century security environment. This was the latest concrete step the President has taken to advance his Prague agenda and the long-term goal of achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. After a comprehensive review, the President determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty.
Let me now address what we believe our next steps should be.
The United States and Russia still possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world, and we have a shared responsibility to continue the process of reducing our nuclear arms. With that in mind, we have a great example in the New START Treaty. The implementation of New START, now in its third year, is going well. When New START is fully implemented, the United States and the Russian Federation will each have no more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads – the lowest levels since the 1950s. Our overall nuclear stockpile is 85% below Cold War levels.
Going forward, the United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to further reduce nuclear arsenals.
To this end, we are engaged in a bilateral dialogue with Russia to promote strategic stability and increase transparency on a reciprocal basis. We are hopeful our dialogue will lead to greater reciprocal transparency and negotiation of even further nuclear weapons reductions.
The President also said in Berlin, that we will work with our NATO Allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe. The NPR underscores the U.S. position that decisions on NATO’s nuclear posture should be made by consensus among Allies. As you may know, NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of, and reliance on, nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. Allies made clear in the 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review that NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area. Allies have also affirmed their desire to work with Russia on reciprocal transparency steps. While seeking to create the conditions for further nuclear reductions, NATO will continue to ensure that the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective, as NATO is committed to remaining a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist.
There are still further initiatives that are part of this Administration’s nuclear agenda. In Berlin, President Obama called on all nations to begin negotiations on a treaty that ends the production of fissile materials for use nuclear weapons. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or FMCT would codify an end to the production of weapons-grade fissile material needed to create nuclear weapons, cap stockpiles worldwide, and provide the basis for further, deeper, reductions in nuclear arsenals.
Beginning multilateral negotiations on the FMCT is a priority objective for the United States and for the vast majority of states, and we have been working to initiate such negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. An overwhelming majority of nations support the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations. The United States is consulting with China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, as well as others, including India and Pakistan, to find a way to commence negotiations of an FMCT. And we will, of course, participate in the upcoming Group of Government Experts, which will begin its work this Spring.
In 2009, the five nuclear-weapon states, or “P5,” began to meet regularly for discussions on issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, these discussions have expanded to address P5 implementation of our commitments under the NPT and the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. Russia hosted the most recent P5 conference in Geneva, Switzerland in April 2013, where the P5 reviewed progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and continued discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. We are looking forward to continued discussions at a fifth P5 conference in 2014 in Beijing.
In addition to providing a senior level policy forum for discussion and coordination among the P5, this process has spawned a series of discussions among policymakers and government experts on a variety of issues. China is leading a P5 working group on nuclear definitions and terminology. The P5 are discussing approaches to a common format for NPT reporting, and we are also beginning to engage at expert levels on some important verification and transparency issues. As we proceed, we would like the P5 conferences and intersessional meetings to develop further practical transparency measures that build confidence and predictability.
I should add at this point that when discussing areas to broaden and deepen our cooperation and to advance our common interests, it’s necessary to address the question of missile defense. Over the past twenty years, both Democratic and Republican administrations have concluded it is in our national interest to cooperate with Russia on missile defense.
While the United States and Russia continue to have our differences on this issue, the United States remains convinced that missile defense cooperation and transparency between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, the United States remains open to missile defense cooperation with Russia. To be clear, U.S. missile defense efforts are focused on defending our homeland as well as our European, Middle Eastern, and Asian allies against ballistic missile threats coming from regional actors. These are threats that are growing, and must be met.
In meeting those threats, it is important to note that U.S. missile defenses are not designed for, or capable of, undermining the Russian or Chinese strategic deterrents. For its part, Russia has been insistent on receiving legally binding guarantees that our missile defenses will not threaten its strategic deterrent. The United States has been clear that we cannot agree to limit our missile defenses, but we believe that cooperation and transparency can provide Russia the visibility and predictability it seeks to confirm that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent. In addition to making all of us safer, cooperation on missile defense would send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter proliferation. With regard to China, the United States welcomes the opportunity to engage in a more robust dialogue about strategic stability, including missile defense.
As our work together with Russia over the past four years has shown, we can produce significant results that benefit both countries. Our ongoing cooperation in implementing the New START Treaty is a great example of this.
None of this will be easy, but the policies the Administration is pursuing are suited for our security needs and tailored for the global security threats of the 21st century. By maintaining and supporting a safe, secure and effective stockpile — sufficient to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies — at the same time that we pursue responsible verifiable reductions through arms control, we will make this world a safer place.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Showing posts with label NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Show all posts
Wednesday, January 29, 2014
Sunday, November 24, 2013
SECRETARY OF STATE KERRY MAKES REMARKS AFTER P5+1 TALKS
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Press Availability After P5+1 Talks
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Geneva, Switzerland
November 24, 2013
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, good very early morning to all of you. It’s been a long day and a long night, and I’m delighted to be here to share some thoughts with you about the recent negotiations. I particularly want to thank the Swiss Government. I want to thank the United Nations. It’s been a (inaudible) and we’re honored to be here, even at this very early hour of the morning. I particularly want to thank my colleagues from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, China, and especially Lady Cathy Ashton, who is not only a good friend but a persistent and dogged negotiator and somebody who’s been staying at this for a long period of time. And we’re very grateful for her stewardship of these negotiations.
And if I can take a moment, I really want to thank the team from the United States. There have been a great many people involved in this effort for a long period of time now, both here in Switzerland with us now, but also back in the United States, and they know who they are. But I will single out our Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, who has been a dogged, unbelievably patient hand and a skillful hand, and she has helped through long and arduous months – years of stewardship of our part of this within the P5+1, and I’m very grateful to her for those long efforts and all of her team.
At the United Nations General Assembly in September, President Obama asked me and our team to work with our partners in order to pursue a negotiated settlement or solution with respect to the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. Last month, the P5+1 entered into a more accelerated negotiation after a number of years of meetings in various parts of the world and efforts to engage Iran in serious negotiations. The purpose of this is very simple: to require Iran to prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and to ensure that it cannot acquire a nuclear weapon. And the reason for this is very clear. The United Nations Security Council found that they were not in compliance with the NPT or other IAEA and other standards. And obviously, activities such as a secret, multi-centrifuge mountain hideaway, which was being used for enrichment, raised many people’s questions, which is why ultimately sanctions were put in place.
Today, we are taking a serious step toward answering all of those important questions that have been raised through the United Nations Security Council, through the IAEA, and by individual countries. And we are taking those steps with an agreement that impedes the progress in a very dramatic way of Iran’s principal enrichment facilities and parts of its program, and ensures they cannot advance in a way that will threaten our friends in the region, threaten other countries, threaten the world. The fact is that if this step – first step – leads to what is our ultimate goal, which is a comprehensive agreement that will make the world safer. This first step, I want to emphasize, actually rolls back the program from where it is today, enlarges the breakout time, which would not have occurred unless this agreement existed. It will make our partners in the region safer. It will make our ally Israel safer. This has been a difficult and a prolonged process. It’s been difficult for us, and it’s been difficult for our allies, and it’s obviously been difficult for the Government of Iran. The next phase, let me be clear, will be even more difficult, and we need to be honest about it. But it will also be even more consequential.
And while we obviously have profound differences with Iran yet to be resolved, the fact is that this agreement could not have been reached without the decision of the Iranian Government to come to the table and negotiate. And I want to say tonight that Foreign Minister Zarif worked hard, deliberated hard, and we are obviously, we believe, better that the decision was made to come here than not to, and to work hard to reach an agreement. And we thank the Foreign Minister for those efforts.
Together now, we need to set about the critical task of proving to the world what Iran has said many times – that its program is in fact peaceful. Now, with this first step, we have created the time and the space in order to be able to pursue a comprehensive agreement that would finish the work that President Obama began on the very first day in office, and that is to ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon. President Obama worked intensively and his Administration worked intensively before I even came in; when I was in the Congress and voted for sanctions, the President worked in order to put in place a significant sanctions regime, an unprecedented regime. And he worked with countries around the world in order to ensure broad participation and support for these sanctions. That has been essential to the success of these sanctions. And we believe that it is the sanctions that have brought us to this negotiation and ultimately to the more significant negotiation to follow for a comprehensive agreement.
Make no mistakes, and I ask you, don’t interpret that the sanctions were an end unto themselves. They weren’t. The goal of the sanctions was always to have a negotiation. And that is precisely what is now taking place, and that negotiation’s goal is to secure a strong and verifiable agreement that guarantees the peacefulness of Iran’s nuclear program. For more than 40 years, the international community has been united in its willingness to negotiate in good faith. And we have been particularly crystal clear that we will do whatever is necessary in order to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon. We have also said that we prefer a peaceful solution, a peaceful path for Iran to respond to the international community’s concerns. And as a result of those efforts, we took the first step today to move down that path.
The measures that we have committed to will remain in place for six months, and they will address the most urgent concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. Since there have been many premature and even misleading reports, I want to clearly outline what this first step entails. First, it locks the most critical components of a nuclear program into place and impedes progress in those critical components in a way that actually rolls back the stockpile of enriched uranium and widens the length of time possible for breakout. That makes people safer. With daily access – we will gain daily access to key facilities. And that will enable us to determine more quickly and with greater certainty than ever before that Iran is complying. Here’s how we do that: Iran has agreed to suspend all enrichment of uranium above 5 percent. Iran has agreed to dilute or convert its entire stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium.
So let me make clear what that means. That means that whereas Iran today has about 200 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium, they could readily be enriched towards a nuclear weapon. In six months, Iran will have zero – zero. Iran will not increase its stockpile of 3.5 percent lower-enriched uranium over the next six months, and it will not construct additional enrichment facilities. Iran will not manufacture centrifuges beyond those that are broken and must be replaced. Very importantly, Iran will not commission or fuel the Arak reactor – Arak, A-r-a-k, reactor – an unfinished facility, that if it became operational would provide Iran with an alternative plutonium path to a nuclear weapon.
And to ensure that these commitments are met, Iran has agreed to submit its program to unprecedented monitoring. For the international community, this first step will provide the most far-reaching insight and view of Iran’s nuclear program that the international community has ever had. This first step – let me be clear. This first step does not say that Iran has a right to enrichment. No matter what interpretive comments are made, it is not in this document. There is no right to enrich within the four corners of the NPT. And this document does not do that. Rather, the scope and role of Iran’s enrichment, as is set forth in the language within this document, says that Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is subject to a negotiation and to mutual agreement. And it can only be by mutual agreement that enrichment might or might not be able to be decided on in the course of negotiations.
So what is on the other side of the ledger here? Again, there have been a number of premature reports and reactions, so I want to be clear about what this step provides, this first step, and what it doesn’t provide. In return for the significant steps that Iran will take that I just listed – and there are more, incidentally, than I just listed; those are the principal – the international community will provide Iran with relief that is limited and, perhaps most importantly, reversible. The main elements of this relief would hold Iran’s oil sales steady and permit it to repatriate $4.2 billion from those sales. And that would otherwise be destined for an overseas account restricted by our sanctions. In addition, we will suspend certain sanctions on imports of gold and precious metals, Iran’s auto sector, and Iran’s petrochemical exports, potentially – potentially – providing Iran with about $1.5 billion in additional export revenues.
For the benefit of the Iranian people, we will also facilitate humanitarian transactions that are already allowed by U.S. law. No U.S. law will be changed. Nothing will have to be different. In fact, the sanctions laws specifically exempt humanitarian assistance. So this channel will not provide Iran any new source of funds, but we will help them in order to try to provide the people of Iran with additional assistance. It simply improves access to goods that were never intended to be denied to the Iranian people.
Now, I want to emphasize the core sanctions architecture that President Obama, together with allies and friends around the world, have put together, that core architecture remains firmly in place through these six months, including with respect to oil and financial services. To put this number in perspective, during this six-month phase, the oil sanctions that will remain in place will continue to cause over 25 billion in lost revenues to Iran, or over $4 billion a month. That is compared to what Iran earned before this took effect – the sanctions. And while Iran will get access to the 4.2 billion that I talked about of the restricted oil revenues, 14 to 16 billion of its sales during this period will be locked up and out of reach.
Together with our partners, we are committed to maintaining our commitment to vigorously enforcing the vast majority of the sanctions that are currently in place. Again, let me repeat: This is only the first step. But it is a first step that guarantees while you take the second step and move towards a comprehensive agreement, Iran’s fundamentals of its program are not able to progress – Fordow, Natanz, Arak, and other centrifuge and other things that matter. So that is a critical first step.
And I will say to all of you that as we conclude this first round of negotiation, with the beginning of the possibility of a much broader accomplishment down the road, it is our responsibility to be as firmly committed to diplomacy and as relentless in our resolve over the years as we have been to bring the concerted pressure that brought us to this moment. For the Iranian Government, it’s their responsibility to recognize that this first phase is a very simple test. Many times, Iran, I think you heard the Foreign Minister here tonight reiterate, that they have a peaceful program and that’s their only intention. Folks, it is not hard to prove peaceful intent if that’s what you want to do. We are anxious to try to make certain that this deal ultimately will do exactly that – prove it.
And I will just say finally, I know that there are those who will assert that this deal is imperfect. Well, they too bear a responsibility, and that is to tell people what the better alternative is. Some might say we should simply continue to increase pressure – just turn up the screws, continue to put sanctions on, and somehow that’s going to push Iran towards capitulation or collapse. Not by any interpretation that we have from all the experts and all of the input that we have, and from all of the countries – the P5+1 – that took place in this today, none of them believe that would be the outcome.
Instead, we believe that while we are engaged in that effort, Iran’s program would actually march forward. It would gain. And while it gains, it would become more dangerous in the region and countries like Israel and the Emirates, other people in the region who are threatened, would in fact be more threatened.
So we believe that you would wind up with an Iran with bigger stockpiles, with more advanced centrifuges and more progress at pursuing a plutonium track. And President Obama believes that doesn’t benefit anybody.
In 1973 – 19 – excuse me, in 2003, when the Iranians made an offer to the former Administration with respect to their nuclear program, there were 164 centrifuges. That offer was not taken. Subsequently, sanctions came in, and today there are 19,000 centrifuges and growing. So people have a responsibility to make a judgment about this choice. And I am comfortable, as is President Obama, that we have made the right choice for how you proceed to get a complete agreement.
Moreover, making sanctions the sum total of our policy will not strengthen the international coalition that we have built in order to bring Iran to the negotiating table. Instead, it would actually weaken that coalition, and many people believe that to merely continue at a time where Iran says, “We’re prepared to negotiate,” would in fact break up the current sanctions regime. Others argue for military action as a first resort. Well, President Obama and I do not share a belief that war is a permanent solution, and it should never be the first option. Instead, that particular option involves enormous risks in many different ways, and as President Obama has often said, while that option remains available to us – and the President will not take it off the table – he believes that that can only be entertained after we have made every effort to resolve the dispute through diplomacy, barring some immediate emergency that requires a different response.
So I close by saying to all of you that the singular objective that brought us to Geneva remains our singular objective as we leave Geneva, and that is to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. In that singular object, we are resolute. Foreign Minister Zarif emphasized that they don’t intent to do this, and the Supreme Leader has indicated there is a fatwa, which forbids them to do this. We want to see the process put in place by which all of that is proven, not through words but with actions. And we are prepared to work in good faith, with mutual respect, to work in a way as we did in the last days – cordially, with an atmosphere that was respectful, even as it was tough, as we move towards the process of making certain that this threat will be eliminated. In that singular object, we are absolutely resolute, and in that mission, we are absolutely committed, and in that endeavor, we will do everything in our power to be able to succeed.
On that note, I’m happy to answer a couple of questions.
MODERATOR: The first question will be from Anne Gearan of The Washington Post.
SECRETARY KERRY: Anne, hi.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you started with your – about (inaudible) who want this on Iran, and you’re opposed for what it will do on a sort of a technical level. I would hope that you might just take a moment and reflect on what this agreement may mean or signify longer term or in a larger sense. And this is – you just came through several months that represent the first time that a diplomatic level from the United States and one from Iran sat together and talked about anything, much less something of this moment. What is your view and what is your hope for the next steps as far as the U.S. relationship with Iran will be?
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, I – the – obviously it is not insignificant, nor does it just fly be me, nor the President, who took great risks in committing on this and making certain that we would proceed forward with this endeavor. It’s no small thing, I think, that since 1979, for about 34 years, Iran and the United States have not been able to talk to each other. And there’s been enormous buildup of suspicion and an enormous buildup of animosity, and there have been moments here and there where there might have been some kind of minor assistance one way or the other. For instance, when we went into Afghanistan in 2001, there actually was some assistance back home (inaudible) from Iran. So there have been these moments.
But I think by and large, it is fair to say that Iran’s choices have created a very significant barrier, and huge security concerns for our friends in the region, for Israel, for Gulf states and others, and obviously they have made certain choices that are deeply, profoundly unsettling in terms of stability in the region and the possibility of anything except our focus on (inaudible). It’s too early for us to talk about other things. It’s just not right. Obviously, one would hope that Iran will make choices that it will rejoin the community of nations in full. The first step is to resolve the nuclear issue, and it shouldn’t be hard if you are in fact absolutely determined to make good on the promise that this is a peaceful program.
So our hope is that the (inaudible) engagement and the resolution of its differences with respect to the UN and the international community can indeed lead to what the Foreign Minister and President Rouhani have talked about, which is a new relationship with the West and with its neighbors. But nobody that I know of is going to accept the words at face value. It is going to be proven by the choices Iran makes, by the actions that it takes. We are open. President Obama has made clear that he is prepared to put in motion the steps that can improve those attributes, to put these words to the test. And that’s exactly what we’re doing now with this first step. And we look forward to, hopefully in a short span of time, being able to put together a comprehensive agreement that will provide the guarantees necessary to our friends in the region.
Let me be crystal clear to Israel, to our other friends in the region, to any neighbor who feels threatened, that the next step requires proof certain of a failsafe set of steps which eliminate the current prospect of a breakout and the creation of a nuclear weapon. That will require dismantling certain things. It will require stopping certain kinds of activities. It will require some fundamental choices, and we’re prepared to work with Iran in order to put in place a protocol that achieves those ends.
So I think this is potentially a significant moment, but I’m not going to stand here in some triumphal moment and suggest to you that this is an end unto itself. It is not. It is a step towards the much more significant goal and the much harder to achieve goal of having a program that is absolutely failsafe provable to be only possible to be peaceful. And that’s what we have to work for now.
MODERATOR: The last question will be from Nicole Gaouette of Bloomberg News.
QUESTION: Hi, Mr. Secretary. Congratulations to you and your team. I’m wondering (inaudible) and how you answer the criticism from Israel that by easing sanctions, you have less leverage over Iran, say, than you did yesterday. They’re (inaudible) reach that settlement. I also just wondered if you have a brief comment about more sanctions being in place. That’s been true for a long time, and for a long time (inaudible) Congress.
SECRETARY KERRY: (Inaudible.)
QUESTION: (Inaudible) by the Congress and designed to give new sanctions. And in my email feed, there are already statements from Republican senators saying it’s not good enough. The – my understanding is that this deal --
SECRETARY KERRY: Gee, you mean members of the other party (inaudible). (Laughter.)
QUESTION: (Inaudible.) My understanding is that you – the P5+1 are pledging not to increase nuclear-review sanctions for the next six months if Iran complies? How can you assure that you can get the majority in the Congress (inaudible)?
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, those are two very good questions. Let me answer both of them very directly. First of all, with respect to Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu, Prime Minister Netanyahu is a friend of mine, a man I have great respect for and I’ve worked with very closely, particularly right now, on the Middle East peace process. I talk to him several times a week. I’ve talked to him as recently as the last days about this very issue, on several occasions. And the fact that we might disagree about a tactic does not mean there is a sliver of daylight between us with respect to our strategy. The tactic is whether or not you increase sanctions or take advantage of this moment to pull the progress and guarantee you have insight into their program while you keep the pressure on. And it’s a difference of judgment. It would be nice, but there is no difference whatsoever between the United States and Israel and what the end goal must be here. We cannot have an Iran that is going to threaten its neighbors, and that has a nuclear weapon. From the day President Obama came into office, he made it clear that a centerpiece of his policy is that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon.
Now, Iran says it doesn’t want a nuclear weapon, it is going after a nuclear weapon. Therefore, it ought to be really easy to do the things that other nations do who enrich, and prove that their program is peaceful. So that’s what we’re looking for. We’re looking for it in absolute sync with our friends in Israel. And I have said frequently, no deal is better than a bad deal. We are not going to strike, ultimately, a bad deal. And you have to be able to prove that this program is peaceful. That means you’re going to have to look at putting on the grave uranium and what happens to it. You’re going to have to have limitations on certain components. You’re going to have to have limitations on the type of facilities. Arak, a heavy-water plutonium facilities, has no business within the framework of a peaceful program. We’ve been very clear about that.
So there are many things. I’m not going to go through them all right now, but it is crystal clear that Israel and the United States have the same goal, the same strategic interest, and we will stand with Israel with respect to this policy and the other allies in the region who are equally concerned about what Iran might or might not choose to do.
Now, with respect to the second part of your question, the Congress, look, I have great confidence in my colleagues in the Congress. I think they are going to look at this very carefully, and they should. And I look forward to going up on the Hill. I look forward to engaging with my former colleagues, explaining what we’ve done, why we can keep the – and working together with Congress in order to achieve the goal that Congress embraced when they put these sanctions in place in the first place. Congress sought to have negotiations.
Now ultimately, if somehow we wind up (inaudible) and Congress – midterm election obviously – the President obviously has a possibility of a veto. There have been. But I don’t think it should come to that. We don’t want it to come to that. I don’t if it will come to that. I believe Congress will see the wisdom of pursuing this for the very specific purposes that I’ve articulated with very straight delineation of exactly how we’re going to achieve our goals. And it was really a cooperative effort. And we will brief Congress readily. We will work for Congress in a very cooperative way. And I think Congress will be a very important partner in helping us put this to the test over the course of the next six months.
MODERATOR: That’s it, everyone.
SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you all very much. Appreciate it.
Press Availability After P5+1 Talks
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Geneva, Switzerland
November 24, 2013
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, good very early morning to all of you. It’s been a long day and a long night, and I’m delighted to be here to share some thoughts with you about the recent negotiations. I particularly want to thank the Swiss Government. I want to thank the United Nations. It’s been a (inaudible) and we’re honored to be here, even at this very early hour of the morning. I particularly want to thank my colleagues from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, China, and especially Lady Cathy Ashton, who is not only a good friend but a persistent and dogged negotiator and somebody who’s been staying at this for a long period of time. And we’re very grateful for her stewardship of these negotiations.
And if I can take a moment, I really want to thank the team from the United States. There have been a great many people involved in this effort for a long period of time now, both here in Switzerland with us now, but also back in the United States, and they know who they are. But I will single out our Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, who has been a dogged, unbelievably patient hand and a skillful hand, and she has helped through long and arduous months – years of stewardship of our part of this within the P5+1, and I’m very grateful to her for those long efforts and all of her team.
At the United Nations General Assembly in September, President Obama asked me and our team to work with our partners in order to pursue a negotiated settlement or solution with respect to the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. Last month, the P5+1 entered into a more accelerated negotiation after a number of years of meetings in various parts of the world and efforts to engage Iran in serious negotiations. The purpose of this is very simple: to require Iran to prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and to ensure that it cannot acquire a nuclear weapon. And the reason for this is very clear. The United Nations Security Council found that they were not in compliance with the NPT or other IAEA and other standards. And obviously, activities such as a secret, multi-centrifuge mountain hideaway, which was being used for enrichment, raised many people’s questions, which is why ultimately sanctions were put in place.
Today, we are taking a serious step toward answering all of those important questions that have been raised through the United Nations Security Council, through the IAEA, and by individual countries. And we are taking those steps with an agreement that impedes the progress in a very dramatic way of Iran’s principal enrichment facilities and parts of its program, and ensures they cannot advance in a way that will threaten our friends in the region, threaten other countries, threaten the world. The fact is that if this step – first step – leads to what is our ultimate goal, which is a comprehensive agreement that will make the world safer. This first step, I want to emphasize, actually rolls back the program from where it is today, enlarges the breakout time, which would not have occurred unless this agreement existed. It will make our partners in the region safer. It will make our ally Israel safer. This has been a difficult and a prolonged process. It’s been difficult for us, and it’s been difficult for our allies, and it’s obviously been difficult for the Government of Iran. The next phase, let me be clear, will be even more difficult, and we need to be honest about it. But it will also be even more consequential.
And while we obviously have profound differences with Iran yet to be resolved, the fact is that this agreement could not have been reached without the decision of the Iranian Government to come to the table and negotiate. And I want to say tonight that Foreign Minister Zarif worked hard, deliberated hard, and we are obviously, we believe, better that the decision was made to come here than not to, and to work hard to reach an agreement. And we thank the Foreign Minister for those efforts.
Together now, we need to set about the critical task of proving to the world what Iran has said many times – that its program is in fact peaceful. Now, with this first step, we have created the time and the space in order to be able to pursue a comprehensive agreement that would finish the work that President Obama began on the very first day in office, and that is to ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon. President Obama worked intensively and his Administration worked intensively before I even came in; when I was in the Congress and voted for sanctions, the President worked in order to put in place a significant sanctions regime, an unprecedented regime. And he worked with countries around the world in order to ensure broad participation and support for these sanctions. That has been essential to the success of these sanctions. And we believe that it is the sanctions that have brought us to this negotiation and ultimately to the more significant negotiation to follow for a comprehensive agreement.
Make no mistakes, and I ask you, don’t interpret that the sanctions were an end unto themselves. They weren’t. The goal of the sanctions was always to have a negotiation. And that is precisely what is now taking place, and that negotiation’s goal is to secure a strong and verifiable agreement that guarantees the peacefulness of Iran’s nuclear program. For more than 40 years, the international community has been united in its willingness to negotiate in good faith. And we have been particularly crystal clear that we will do whatever is necessary in order to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon. We have also said that we prefer a peaceful solution, a peaceful path for Iran to respond to the international community’s concerns. And as a result of those efforts, we took the first step today to move down that path.
The measures that we have committed to will remain in place for six months, and they will address the most urgent concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. Since there have been many premature and even misleading reports, I want to clearly outline what this first step entails. First, it locks the most critical components of a nuclear program into place and impedes progress in those critical components in a way that actually rolls back the stockpile of enriched uranium and widens the length of time possible for breakout. That makes people safer. With daily access – we will gain daily access to key facilities. And that will enable us to determine more quickly and with greater certainty than ever before that Iran is complying. Here’s how we do that: Iran has agreed to suspend all enrichment of uranium above 5 percent. Iran has agreed to dilute or convert its entire stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium.
So let me make clear what that means. That means that whereas Iran today has about 200 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium, they could readily be enriched towards a nuclear weapon. In six months, Iran will have zero – zero. Iran will not increase its stockpile of 3.5 percent lower-enriched uranium over the next six months, and it will not construct additional enrichment facilities. Iran will not manufacture centrifuges beyond those that are broken and must be replaced. Very importantly, Iran will not commission or fuel the Arak reactor – Arak, A-r-a-k, reactor – an unfinished facility, that if it became operational would provide Iran with an alternative plutonium path to a nuclear weapon.
And to ensure that these commitments are met, Iran has agreed to submit its program to unprecedented monitoring. For the international community, this first step will provide the most far-reaching insight and view of Iran’s nuclear program that the international community has ever had. This first step – let me be clear. This first step does not say that Iran has a right to enrichment. No matter what interpretive comments are made, it is not in this document. There is no right to enrich within the four corners of the NPT. And this document does not do that. Rather, the scope and role of Iran’s enrichment, as is set forth in the language within this document, says that Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is subject to a negotiation and to mutual agreement. And it can only be by mutual agreement that enrichment might or might not be able to be decided on in the course of negotiations.
So what is on the other side of the ledger here? Again, there have been a number of premature reports and reactions, so I want to be clear about what this step provides, this first step, and what it doesn’t provide. In return for the significant steps that Iran will take that I just listed – and there are more, incidentally, than I just listed; those are the principal – the international community will provide Iran with relief that is limited and, perhaps most importantly, reversible. The main elements of this relief would hold Iran’s oil sales steady and permit it to repatriate $4.2 billion from those sales. And that would otherwise be destined for an overseas account restricted by our sanctions. In addition, we will suspend certain sanctions on imports of gold and precious metals, Iran’s auto sector, and Iran’s petrochemical exports, potentially – potentially – providing Iran with about $1.5 billion in additional export revenues.
For the benefit of the Iranian people, we will also facilitate humanitarian transactions that are already allowed by U.S. law. No U.S. law will be changed. Nothing will have to be different. In fact, the sanctions laws specifically exempt humanitarian assistance. So this channel will not provide Iran any new source of funds, but we will help them in order to try to provide the people of Iran with additional assistance. It simply improves access to goods that were never intended to be denied to the Iranian people.
Now, I want to emphasize the core sanctions architecture that President Obama, together with allies and friends around the world, have put together, that core architecture remains firmly in place through these six months, including with respect to oil and financial services. To put this number in perspective, during this six-month phase, the oil sanctions that will remain in place will continue to cause over 25 billion in lost revenues to Iran, or over $4 billion a month. That is compared to what Iran earned before this took effect – the sanctions. And while Iran will get access to the 4.2 billion that I talked about of the restricted oil revenues, 14 to 16 billion of its sales during this period will be locked up and out of reach.
Together with our partners, we are committed to maintaining our commitment to vigorously enforcing the vast majority of the sanctions that are currently in place. Again, let me repeat: This is only the first step. But it is a first step that guarantees while you take the second step and move towards a comprehensive agreement, Iran’s fundamentals of its program are not able to progress – Fordow, Natanz, Arak, and other centrifuge and other things that matter. So that is a critical first step.
And I will say to all of you that as we conclude this first round of negotiation, with the beginning of the possibility of a much broader accomplishment down the road, it is our responsibility to be as firmly committed to diplomacy and as relentless in our resolve over the years as we have been to bring the concerted pressure that brought us to this moment. For the Iranian Government, it’s their responsibility to recognize that this first phase is a very simple test. Many times, Iran, I think you heard the Foreign Minister here tonight reiterate, that they have a peaceful program and that’s their only intention. Folks, it is not hard to prove peaceful intent if that’s what you want to do. We are anxious to try to make certain that this deal ultimately will do exactly that – prove it.
And I will just say finally, I know that there are those who will assert that this deal is imperfect. Well, they too bear a responsibility, and that is to tell people what the better alternative is. Some might say we should simply continue to increase pressure – just turn up the screws, continue to put sanctions on, and somehow that’s going to push Iran towards capitulation or collapse. Not by any interpretation that we have from all the experts and all of the input that we have, and from all of the countries – the P5+1 – that took place in this today, none of them believe that would be the outcome.
Instead, we believe that while we are engaged in that effort, Iran’s program would actually march forward. It would gain. And while it gains, it would become more dangerous in the region and countries like Israel and the Emirates, other people in the region who are threatened, would in fact be more threatened.
So we believe that you would wind up with an Iran with bigger stockpiles, with more advanced centrifuges and more progress at pursuing a plutonium track. And President Obama believes that doesn’t benefit anybody.
In 1973 – 19 – excuse me, in 2003, when the Iranians made an offer to the former Administration with respect to their nuclear program, there were 164 centrifuges. That offer was not taken. Subsequently, sanctions came in, and today there are 19,000 centrifuges and growing. So people have a responsibility to make a judgment about this choice. And I am comfortable, as is President Obama, that we have made the right choice for how you proceed to get a complete agreement.
Moreover, making sanctions the sum total of our policy will not strengthen the international coalition that we have built in order to bring Iran to the negotiating table. Instead, it would actually weaken that coalition, and many people believe that to merely continue at a time where Iran says, “We’re prepared to negotiate,” would in fact break up the current sanctions regime. Others argue for military action as a first resort. Well, President Obama and I do not share a belief that war is a permanent solution, and it should never be the first option. Instead, that particular option involves enormous risks in many different ways, and as President Obama has often said, while that option remains available to us – and the President will not take it off the table – he believes that that can only be entertained after we have made every effort to resolve the dispute through diplomacy, barring some immediate emergency that requires a different response.
So I close by saying to all of you that the singular objective that brought us to Geneva remains our singular objective as we leave Geneva, and that is to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. In that singular object, we are resolute. Foreign Minister Zarif emphasized that they don’t intent to do this, and the Supreme Leader has indicated there is a fatwa, which forbids them to do this. We want to see the process put in place by which all of that is proven, not through words but with actions. And we are prepared to work in good faith, with mutual respect, to work in a way as we did in the last days – cordially, with an atmosphere that was respectful, even as it was tough, as we move towards the process of making certain that this threat will be eliminated. In that singular object, we are absolutely resolute, and in that mission, we are absolutely committed, and in that endeavor, we will do everything in our power to be able to succeed.
On that note, I’m happy to answer a couple of questions.
MODERATOR: The first question will be from Anne Gearan of The Washington Post.
SECRETARY KERRY: Anne, hi.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you started with your – about (inaudible) who want this on Iran, and you’re opposed for what it will do on a sort of a technical level. I would hope that you might just take a moment and reflect on what this agreement may mean or signify longer term or in a larger sense. And this is – you just came through several months that represent the first time that a diplomatic level from the United States and one from Iran sat together and talked about anything, much less something of this moment. What is your view and what is your hope for the next steps as far as the U.S. relationship with Iran will be?
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, I – the – obviously it is not insignificant, nor does it just fly be me, nor the President, who took great risks in committing on this and making certain that we would proceed forward with this endeavor. It’s no small thing, I think, that since 1979, for about 34 years, Iran and the United States have not been able to talk to each other. And there’s been enormous buildup of suspicion and an enormous buildup of animosity, and there have been moments here and there where there might have been some kind of minor assistance one way or the other. For instance, when we went into Afghanistan in 2001, there actually was some assistance back home (inaudible) from Iran. So there have been these moments.
But I think by and large, it is fair to say that Iran’s choices have created a very significant barrier, and huge security concerns for our friends in the region, for Israel, for Gulf states and others, and obviously they have made certain choices that are deeply, profoundly unsettling in terms of stability in the region and the possibility of anything except our focus on (inaudible). It’s too early for us to talk about other things. It’s just not right. Obviously, one would hope that Iran will make choices that it will rejoin the community of nations in full. The first step is to resolve the nuclear issue, and it shouldn’t be hard if you are in fact absolutely determined to make good on the promise that this is a peaceful program.
So our hope is that the (inaudible) engagement and the resolution of its differences with respect to the UN and the international community can indeed lead to what the Foreign Minister and President Rouhani have talked about, which is a new relationship with the West and with its neighbors. But nobody that I know of is going to accept the words at face value. It is going to be proven by the choices Iran makes, by the actions that it takes. We are open. President Obama has made clear that he is prepared to put in motion the steps that can improve those attributes, to put these words to the test. And that’s exactly what we’re doing now with this first step. And we look forward to, hopefully in a short span of time, being able to put together a comprehensive agreement that will provide the guarantees necessary to our friends in the region.
Let me be crystal clear to Israel, to our other friends in the region, to any neighbor who feels threatened, that the next step requires proof certain of a failsafe set of steps which eliminate the current prospect of a breakout and the creation of a nuclear weapon. That will require dismantling certain things. It will require stopping certain kinds of activities. It will require some fundamental choices, and we’re prepared to work with Iran in order to put in place a protocol that achieves those ends.
So I think this is potentially a significant moment, but I’m not going to stand here in some triumphal moment and suggest to you that this is an end unto itself. It is not. It is a step towards the much more significant goal and the much harder to achieve goal of having a program that is absolutely failsafe provable to be only possible to be peaceful. And that’s what we have to work for now.
MODERATOR: The last question will be from Nicole Gaouette of Bloomberg News.
QUESTION: Hi, Mr. Secretary. Congratulations to you and your team. I’m wondering (inaudible) and how you answer the criticism from Israel that by easing sanctions, you have less leverage over Iran, say, than you did yesterday. They’re (inaudible) reach that settlement. I also just wondered if you have a brief comment about more sanctions being in place. That’s been true for a long time, and for a long time (inaudible) Congress.
SECRETARY KERRY: (Inaudible.)
QUESTION: (Inaudible) by the Congress and designed to give new sanctions. And in my email feed, there are already statements from Republican senators saying it’s not good enough. The – my understanding is that this deal --
SECRETARY KERRY: Gee, you mean members of the other party (inaudible). (Laughter.)
QUESTION: (Inaudible.) My understanding is that you – the P5+1 are pledging not to increase nuclear-review sanctions for the next six months if Iran complies? How can you assure that you can get the majority in the Congress (inaudible)?
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, those are two very good questions. Let me answer both of them very directly. First of all, with respect to Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu, Prime Minister Netanyahu is a friend of mine, a man I have great respect for and I’ve worked with very closely, particularly right now, on the Middle East peace process. I talk to him several times a week. I’ve talked to him as recently as the last days about this very issue, on several occasions. And the fact that we might disagree about a tactic does not mean there is a sliver of daylight between us with respect to our strategy. The tactic is whether or not you increase sanctions or take advantage of this moment to pull the progress and guarantee you have insight into their program while you keep the pressure on. And it’s a difference of judgment. It would be nice, but there is no difference whatsoever between the United States and Israel and what the end goal must be here. We cannot have an Iran that is going to threaten its neighbors, and that has a nuclear weapon. From the day President Obama came into office, he made it clear that a centerpiece of his policy is that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon.
Now, Iran says it doesn’t want a nuclear weapon, it is going after a nuclear weapon. Therefore, it ought to be really easy to do the things that other nations do who enrich, and prove that their program is peaceful. So that’s what we’re looking for. We’re looking for it in absolute sync with our friends in Israel. And I have said frequently, no deal is better than a bad deal. We are not going to strike, ultimately, a bad deal. And you have to be able to prove that this program is peaceful. That means you’re going to have to look at putting on the grave uranium and what happens to it. You’re going to have to have limitations on certain components. You’re going to have to have limitations on the type of facilities. Arak, a heavy-water plutonium facilities, has no business within the framework of a peaceful program. We’ve been very clear about that.
So there are many things. I’m not going to go through them all right now, but it is crystal clear that Israel and the United States have the same goal, the same strategic interest, and we will stand with Israel with respect to this policy and the other allies in the region who are equally concerned about what Iran might or might not choose to do.
Now, with respect to the second part of your question, the Congress, look, I have great confidence in my colleagues in the Congress. I think they are going to look at this very carefully, and they should. And I look forward to going up on the Hill. I look forward to engaging with my former colleagues, explaining what we’ve done, why we can keep the – and working together with Congress in order to achieve the goal that Congress embraced when they put these sanctions in place in the first place. Congress sought to have negotiations.
Now ultimately, if somehow we wind up (inaudible) and Congress – midterm election obviously – the President obviously has a possibility of a veto. There have been. But I don’t think it should come to that. We don’t want it to come to that. I don’t if it will come to that. I believe Congress will see the wisdom of pursuing this for the very specific purposes that I’ve articulated with very straight delineation of exactly how we’re going to achieve our goals. And it was really a cooperative effort. And we will brief Congress readily. We will work for Congress in a very cooperative way. And I think Congress will be a very important partner in helping us put this to the test over the course of the next six months.
MODERATOR: That’s it, everyone.
SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you all very much. Appreciate it.
Sunday, November 10, 2013
SECRETARY OF STATE KERRY'S REMARKS IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Press Availability
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Geneva, Switzerland
November 10, 2013
SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you for hanging in here with all of us in what has obviously been a long and interesting process, but a very productive one if I can say so. I want to thank my colleagues from the United Kingdom, Turkey, France, Russia and China. And I particularly want to thank Lady Catherine Ashton for her leadership and for the European Union’s convening all of us here in order to perform this very important business of trying to deal with the question of a country’s potential move towards nuclear weapons. And obviously, the commitment by the President, by all of the member states of the P5+1 and others in the world makes certain that that doesn’t happen, that Iran does not get a nuclear weapon.
I want to say that the negotiations were conducted with mutual respect. They were very serious. But they were conducted in a very civil and appropriate way for a subject matter as serious as this one. And we came to Geneva determined. As President Obama has said, his goal is, since day one as President, to make certain that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. That remains our goal because we remain committed to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and we remain committed to protecting our allies, particularly our allies in that region where security is so critical. We also are committed to protecting our interests in the world from the consequences of the spread of these weapons.
We came to Geneva to narrow the differences. And I can tell you without any exaggeration we not only narrowed differences and clarified those that remain, but we made significant progress in working through the approaches to this question of how one brings in a program that guarantees this peaceful nature. There’s no question in my mind that we are closer now, as we leave Geneva, than we were when we came, and that with good work and good faith over the course of the next weeks, we can in fact secure our goal.
And over the last two days, a significant amount of progress was made. I am impressed and grateful for the way in which the P5[1] countries joined together and worked effectively together, the teams worked effectively together. And I think that tonight there was a unity in our position and a unity in the purpose as we leave here. We are committed to have our political directors – and I think Lady Catherine Ashton probably shared this with you – meet in the next days, and we are also committed to returning as necessary somewhere over the next weeks, hopefully, with the goal of either building on what was done today or completing the task.
Let me just say that for those who are wondering about this kind of process, it takes time to build confidence between countries that have really been at odds with each other for a long time now – in the case of Iran, since 1979. And so we are working hard to try to overcome mistrust, to try to build confidence, to try to find the ways that both the P5+1 and the united – and Iran have the ability to be able to achieve this goal of ascertaining for certain, without a doubt, that a program is a peaceful nuclear program.
Diplomacy takes time, and all the parties here need time to fully consider the issues – very complicated, technical, difficult issues that we discussed here in the last days. And I particularly am anxious to return to brief the President and to share with Congress and others what we’ve learned and what we are thinking as we look forward. We also understand there are very strong feelings about the consequences of the choices we face for our allies, and we respect that. Some of them are absolutely directly, immediately involved and we have enormous respect, needless to say, for those concerns.
I want to caution everyone from jumping to conclusions or believing premature reports or prejudging outcomes or, particularly, believing either rumors or other little parcels of information that somebody portends to know or that leak out. The fact is that the negotiations are actually taking place enormously privately, and that is a sign of the seriousness of what is taking place. We have been working on this for a long time. The P5+1 has been at this for something like four years or more. I know that I’ve been watching and engaged in this effort as a Senator and now as Secretary of State for some period of time, and so I am aware of the complicated nature of this particular challenge.
But we came to Geneva with the clear purpose of trying to advance the goal of preventing Iran from securing a nuclear weapon, and I believe we leave this round of talks not only committed, recommitted to that goal, but clearly further down the road in understanding what the remaining challenges are and clarifying the ways that we can actually do certain things together to reach that goal.
I would emphasize also that the window for diplomacy does not stay open indefinitely, and we will continue working to find a peaceful solution because we believe that forceful diplomacy is a powerful enough weapon to be able to actually defuse the world’s most threatening weapons of mass destruction. And that’s why we’ll continue to do this.
So with that, I’m happy to answer a couple of questions here, see where we are.
MS. PSAKI: The first question is going to be from Kim Ghattas of BBC.
QUESTION: Good evening, Mr. Secretary.
SECRETARY KERRY: Good evening – good morning.
QUESTION: Good morning.
SECRETARY KERRY: It’s all right.
QUESTION: I can only imagine how tired you are.
SECRETARY KERRY: (Inaudible.)
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two questions. How much coordination takes place between the members of the P5+1 ahead of a meeting like this? Were you blindsided by the French and their objections to the agreement? And a second question is, you don’t have a deal yet; you’re hoping to get one in the coming weeks with further negotiations. But that does give detractors of a deal with Iran time to derail your work. I’m thinking of Israel. I’m thinking of Saudi Arabia, but also of Congress in the U.S. Are you worried that Congress is going to push once again for further sanctions against Iran?
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, let me answer the second part of your question first, and just tell you point blank that this is an issue of such consequence that it really needs to rise or fall on the merits, not on politics. People need to stop and think about what happens each day now that you don’t have an agreement. Each day that you don’t have an agreement, Iran will continue to enrich, and Iran will continue to put centrifuges in, and Iran will continue its program. What we were looking to do here – and will do, I believe – is freeze that program in place so that it is not in a position to continue while the real negotiation goes on to figure out what the future final agreement would look like. And that takes time.
Now, it seems to me that the members of Congress and others in the world understand that you need to give diplomacy the chance to exhaust all the remedies available to it if you are ultimately going to exercise your ultimate option, which is the potential use of force. The world wants to know that it was a last resort, not a first resort. So I believe it is essential for Congress, essential for all of our countries – and I think we all share this – the P5+1 is absolutely united in the notion that we must pursue diplomacy as a means of trying to prevent Iran from acquiring a weapon. We know the clock is ticking. That is part of what makes this urgent. But I am convinced that over these next days, the reasonableness of what we were doing and the reality of what we achieve will be taken into account by those who need to know what that is, and that will be shared as appropriate as we get back.
With respect to the negotiation itself, we work very closely with the French. We agreed with the French that there were certain issues that we needed to work through. We came here with bracketed language. That’s the nature of a negotiation. And we knew that we were going to have to negotiate going forward, and we did. And I think we were unified in feeling we needed certain language here that clarified certain things. I certainly came in here intending to do that, and that’s what the President wanted me to do.
The President has repeatedly said we will not rush to an agreement. The President has made clear that no deal is better than a bad deal. And I think it’s good we’re going to take the time we’re taking to make certain that we are dotting the i’s and crossing the t’s and doing what is necessary to have an agreement – that we are assured we can look our allies and our friends in the face and say, “This gets the job done.” That’s the purpose of it.
So we thank the – we’re grateful to the French for the work that we did together, and we worked also – every member there made contributions in one way or another. That’s the nature of the P5[2]. These are sovereign nations. No one country is going to come rolling in here, one point of view or another. We have to work it together, and that is the nature of the process.
And this is something that I think over the next weeks, as the political directors work together, they’ll build on what was achieved here in the last hours, and I feel very confident that this can be done. Not going to tell you it will be, but I can tell you it absolutely can be with good effort over these next days ahead.
MODERATOR: The next question will be from Michael Gordon of The New York Times.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the other day when you were in Israel, you said that the U.S. was asking Iran to agree, as you put it, to a complete freeze over where they are today. How important is it to impose constraints on the plutonium side of the Iranian program as part of a first-step agreement, say, precluding Iran from operating or putting fuel in the heavy water reactor that is being built in Iraq? Is that an important step to take as part of the complete freeze that you were talking about? And lastly, the next meeting, as you just pointed out, sir, is at the political director level, not at the foreign minister level. Doesn’t that suggest that there are significant differences that need to be narrowed before it makes sense to bring the foreign ministers back into the picture here in Geneva?
SECRETARY KERRY: No, it really is a reflection of wanting to get language issues that came up absolutely resolved, so the ministers, when they come, have a sense that everybody is in agreement with respect to the particular language. And the schedules of the ministers – it is not possible for all the ministers. And I think everybody felt they wanted to go back to their capitals, work through a few of these issues that are technical, complicated, and see if we can find the ways to deal with that with the political directors and the appropriate people to work that language at that level. That’s what got us here. And we’ve made a lot of progress. Now we go to the next step and hopefully, when the ministers come back – two weeks or so, something like that – we’ll be in the position to move forward.
But with respect to the plutonium, absolutely. It’s a very central issue and it’s one we spent a significant amount of time on, and one we are absolutely adamant must be addressed in the context of any kind of agreement – among others, and there are a number of others.
MS. PSAKI: Thanks, everyone.
SECRETARY KERRY: Is that it?
MS. PSAKI: We have to finish, unfortunately.
SECRETARY KERRY: I apologize. Thanks.
Press Availability
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Geneva, Switzerland
November 10, 2013
SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you for hanging in here with all of us in what has obviously been a long and interesting process, but a very productive one if I can say so. I want to thank my colleagues from the United Kingdom, Turkey, France, Russia and China. And I particularly want to thank Lady Catherine Ashton for her leadership and for the European Union’s convening all of us here in order to perform this very important business of trying to deal with the question of a country’s potential move towards nuclear weapons. And obviously, the commitment by the President, by all of the member states of the P5+1 and others in the world makes certain that that doesn’t happen, that Iran does not get a nuclear weapon.
I want to say that the negotiations were conducted with mutual respect. They were very serious. But they were conducted in a very civil and appropriate way for a subject matter as serious as this one. And we came to Geneva determined. As President Obama has said, his goal is, since day one as President, to make certain that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. That remains our goal because we remain committed to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and we remain committed to protecting our allies, particularly our allies in that region where security is so critical. We also are committed to protecting our interests in the world from the consequences of the spread of these weapons.
We came to Geneva to narrow the differences. And I can tell you without any exaggeration we not only narrowed differences and clarified those that remain, but we made significant progress in working through the approaches to this question of how one brings in a program that guarantees this peaceful nature. There’s no question in my mind that we are closer now, as we leave Geneva, than we were when we came, and that with good work and good faith over the course of the next weeks, we can in fact secure our goal.
And over the last two days, a significant amount of progress was made. I am impressed and grateful for the way in which the P5[1] countries joined together and worked effectively together, the teams worked effectively together. And I think that tonight there was a unity in our position and a unity in the purpose as we leave here. We are committed to have our political directors – and I think Lady Catherine Ashton probably shared this with you – meet in the next days, and we are also committed to returning as necessary somewhere over the next weeks, hopefully, with the goal of either building on what was done today or completing the task.
Let me just say that for those who are wondering about this kind of process, it takes time to build confidence between countries that have really been at odds with each other for a long time now – in the case of Iran, since 1979. And so we are working hard to try to overcome mistrust, to try to build confidence, to try to find the ways that both the P5+1 and the united – and Iran have the ability to be able to achieve this goal of ascertaining for certain, without a doubt, that a program is a peaceful nuclear program.
Diplomacy takes time, and all the parties here need time to fully consider the issues – very complicated, technical, difficult issues that we discussed here in the last days. And I particularly am anxious to return to brief the President and to share with Congress and others what we’ve learned and what we are thinking as we look forward. We also understand there are very strong feelings about the consequences of the choices we face for our allies, and we respect that. Some of them are absolutely directly, immediately involved and we have enormous respect, needless to say, for those concerns.
I want to caution everyone from jumping to conclusions or believing premature reports or prejudging outcomes or, particularly, believing either rumors or other little parcels of information that somebody portends to know or that leak out. The fact is that the negotiations are actually taking place enormously privately, and that is a sign of the seriousness of what is taking place. We have been working on this for a long time. The P5+1 has been at this for something like four years or more. I know that I’ve been watching and engaged in this effort as a Senator and now as Secretary of State for some period of time, and so I am aware of the complicated nature of this particular challenge.
But we came to Geneva with the clear purpose of trying to advance the goal of preventing Iran from securing a nuclear weapon, and I believe we leave this round of talks not only committed, recommitted to that goal, but clearly further down the road in understanding what the remaining challenges are and clarifying the ways that we can actually do certain things together to reach that goal.
I would emphasize also that the window for diplomacy does not stay open indefinitely, and we will continue working to find a peaceful solution because we believe that forceful diplomacy is a powerful enough weapon to be able to actually defuse the world’s most threatening weapons of mass destruction. And that’s why we’ll continue to do this.
So with that, I’m happy to answer a couple of questions here, see where we are.
MS. PSAKI: The first question is going to be from Kim Ghattas of BBC.
QUESTION: Good evening, Mr. Secretary.
SECRETARY KERRY: Good evening – good morning.
QUESTION: Good morning.
SECRETARY KERRY: It’s all right.
QUESTION: I can only imagine how tired you are.
SECRETARY KERRY: (Inaudible.)
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two questions. How much coordination takes place between the members of the P5+1 ahead of a meeting like this? Were you blindsided by the French and their objections to the agreement? And a second question is, you don’t have a deal yet; you’re hoping to get one in the coming weeks with further negotiations. But that does give detractors of a deal with Iran time to derail your work. I’m thinking of Israel. I’m thinking of Saudi Arabia, but also of Congress in the U.S. Are you worried that Congress is going to push once again for further sanctions against Iran?
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, let me answer the second part of your question first, and just tell you point blank that this is an issue of such consequence that it really needs to rise or fall on the merits, not on politics. People need to stop and think about what happens each day now that you don’t have an agreement. Each day that you don’t have an agreement, Iran will continue to enrich, and Iran will continue to put centrifuges in, and Iran will continue its program. What we were looking to do here – and will do, I believe – is freeze that program in place so that it is not in a position to continue while the real negotiation goes on to figure out what the future final agreement would look like. And that takes time.
Now, it seems to me that the members of Congress and others in the world understand that you need to give diplomacy the chance to exhaust all the remedies available to it if you are ultimately going to exercise your ultimate option, which is the potential use of force. The world wants to know that it was a last resort, not a first resort. So I believe it is essential for Congress, essential for all of our countries – and I think we all share this – the P5+1 is absolutely united in the notion that we must pursue diplomacy as a means of trying to prevent Iran from acquiring a weapon. We know the clock is ticking. That is part of what makes this urgent. But I am convinced that over these next days, the reasonableness of what we were doing and the reality of what we achieve will be taken into account by those who need to know what that is, and that will be shared as appropriate as we get back.
With respect to the negotiation itself, we work very closely with the French. We agreed with the French that there were certain issues that we needed to work through. We came here with bracketed language. That’s the nature of a negotiation. And we knew that we were going to have to negotiate going forward, and we did. And I think we were unified in feeling we needed certain language here that clarified certain things. I certainly came in here intending to do that, and that’s what the President wanted me to do.
The President has repeatedly said we will not rush to an agreement. The President has made clear that no deal is better than a bad deal. And I think it’s good we’re going to take the time we’re taking to make certain that we are dotting the i’s and crossing the t’s and doing what is necessary to have an agreement – that we are assured we can look our allies and our friends in the face and say, “This gets the job done.” That’s the purpose of it.
So we thank the – we’re grateful to the French for the work that we did together, and we worked also – every member there made contributions in one way or another. That’s the nature of the P5[2]. These are sovereign nations. No one country is going to come rolling in here, one point of view or another. We have to work it together, and that is the nature of the process.
And this is something that I think over the next weeks, as the political directors work together, they’ll build on what was achieved here in the last hours, and I feel very confident that this can be done. Not going to tell you it will be, but I can tell you it absolutely can be with good effort over these next days ahead.
MODERATOR: The next question will be from Michael Gordon of The New York Times.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the other day when you were in Israel, you said that the U.S. was asking Iran to agree, as you put it, to a complete freeze over where they are today. How important is it to impose constraints on the plutonium side of the Iranian program as part of a first-step agreement, say, precluding Iran from operating or putting fuel in the heavy water reactor that is being built in Iraq? Is that an important step to take as part of the complete freeze that you were talking about? And lastly, the next meeting, as you just pointed out, sir, is at the political director level, not at the foreign minister level. Doesn’t that suggest that there are significant differences that need to be narrowed before it makes sense to bring the foreign ministers back into the picture here in Geneva?
SECRETARY KERRY: No, it really is a reflection of wanting to get language issues that came up absolutely resolved, so the ministers, when they come, have a sense that everybody is in agreement with respect to the particular language. And the schedules of the ministers – it is not possible for all the ministers. And I think everybody felt they wanted to go back to their capitals, work through a few of these issues that are technical, complicated, and see if we can find the ways to deal with that with the political directors and the appropriate people to work that language at that level. That’s what got us here. And we’ve made a lot of progress. Now we go to the next step and hopefully, when the ministers come back – two weeks or so, something like that – we’ll be in the position to move forward.
But with respect to the plutonium, absolutely. It’s a very central issue and it’s one we spent a significant amount of time on, and one we are absolutely adamant must be addressed in the context of any kind of agreement – among others, and there are a number of others.
MS. PSAKI: Thanks, everyone.
SECRETARY KERRY: Is that it?
MS. PSAKI: We have to finish, unfortunately.
SECRETARY KERRY: I apologize. Thanks.
Friday, October 18, 2013
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER'S REMARKS AT 68TH FIRST COMMITTEE GENERAL DEBATE
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Statement by Rose E. Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
68th UNGA First Committee General Debate
New York, NY
October 9, 2013
As Delivered
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations, Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi, on your election as Chair of the First Committee during its 68th session. We pledge to support your leadership and the work of this committee. We look forward to a productive session.
This is the fourth year in a row that I have spoken to the UNGA First Committee on behalf of the United States. I look back to 2009 and I am proud of all we have accomplished. That said, we have a long path in front of us.
The conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons do not yet exist, but together we are completely capable of creating these conditions. I am sure of this, because of the examples of our predecessors.
As you all may know, tomorrow is the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). This groundbreaking Treaty went from a seemingly unattainable goal on the horizon to an international law on the books within a year of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Perhaps it was those dark days that helped solidify U.S. President Kennedy’s view that it was possible – in fact, imperative – that we work to address nuclear dangers through multilateral diplomacy.
“Peace need not be impracticable,” he said, “and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly -- by making it seem more manageable and less remote -- we can help all people to see it, to draw hope from it and to move irresistibly towards it.”
Mr. Chairman, that idea should be our touchstone as we move forward with the Committee’s work. If our predecessors could accomplish a Treaty like the LTBT in the midst of the Cold War, surely we can find ways to work on further arms reductions, increased transparency, banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and more.
Over the last fifty years, we have had many unprecedented successes. We have gone from the brink of nuclear war to successful strategic reduction treaties – the latest of which will bring us by 2018 to the lowest number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons since the 1950s.
We have continued to limit nuclear explosive testing over the years through treaties, including the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) that prohibited the United States and the Soviet Union from conducting a nuclear explosive test in excess of 150 kilotons. Before the TTBT entered into force, some voiced concerns that the parties had different ways to measure explosive yields. To deal with this problem, the United States and the Soviet Union undertook an unprecedented step in transparency and confidence-building. They invited each other to their respective nuclear test sites to observe a nuclear test and use their preferred methods for measuring explosive yields as they applied to the TTBT. That event, known as the Joint Verification Experiment, happened 25 years ago and it paved the way for subsequent negotiations of new verification protocols for both the TTBT and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). Our joint work would ultimately help the international community negotiate a total ban on nuclear explosive testing, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
This year also marks a significant nonproliferation accomplishment: the 1993 United States-Russian Federation Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement will reach a major milestone with the final delivery of low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from downblending 500 metric tons of Russian weapons origin HEU. The LEU that results from this downblending process is delivered to the United States, fabricated into nuclear fuel, and used by nearly all U.S. nuclear power plants to generate approximately half of the nuclear energy in the United States. Approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads have been eliminated under this unique government-industry partnership. Over the past 15 years, nuclear fuel from this source has accounted for approximately 10% of all electricity produced in the United States.
We expect to meet with our Russian partners this November to observe the loading in St. Petersburg of the final containers of LEU downblended under the Agreement, and we will meet again in the United States when that ship delivers this important cargo in December. We look forward to jointly celebrating this historic achievement.
Another success that flies under the radar is the Open Skies Treaty. It just marked its 1000th completed mission in August. It is a great example of a Euro-Atlantic transparency and confidence building measure, and it has proven itself as a valuable arms control monitoring tool, for both strategic and conventional purposes.
As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the Obama Administration, working with international partners, has made many of its own significant achievements in nonproliferation and disarmament: entry into force of the New START Treaty, the launching of the Nuclear Security Summit process, an agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to each verifiably dispose of 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium, and more recently, signature of an agreement between the United States and Russia on threat reduction that reinforces our longstanding partnership on nonproliferation.
But it is not enough: the United States and Russian Federation still possess over ninety percent of the nuclear weapons in the world, and it is time we move beyond Cold War postures.
That is why in June, the President announced in Berlin that we would pursue further reductions of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. This decision flowed from the Administration’s extensive analysis of the current strategic environment and deterrence requirements. That analysis confirmed that the United States can ensure its security and that of our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third below the level established by the New START Treaty. The President said on that occasion, “I intend to seek negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War postures.” Toward that end, we will pursue a treaty with the Russian Federation.
We are also making sure our lines of communication on strategic issues are solid. On Monday in Bali, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov signed a new agreement to strengthen the connection between our Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs). Today’s NRRC-to-NRRC relationship and communications link continue to provide vital transparency in strategic and conventional forces, facilitate verification of arms control treaties and agreements, and support strategic stability. Actually, we just passed a significant milestone -- the two Centers have now exchanged over five thousand New START Treaty notifications since its entry into force, which provide us day-to-day updates on the status of each others' nuclear forces. These are joined by the 97 on-site inspections that we have now conducted under New START, which give us even more insights into each others' nuclear forces, thus enhancing predictability for both countries.
We are also working with the other Nuclear Weapons States (P5) on disarmament-related issues to support implementation of the NPT and the 2010 NPT Action Plan. The P5 have now had four official conferences, with China hosting the fifth meeting next year. But we are not just meeting; through dialogue at the political level and concrete work at the expert level, our engagement has moved from concepts to concrete actions.
For example, P5 experts are meeting to address issues related to the CTBT, especially those relating to the On-Site Inspection (OSI) element of the CTBT’s verification regime and to the OSI Integrated Field Exercise to be conducted in Jordan in 2014. The objective of this effort is to define and engage in technical collaborative work based on our unique expertise with past nuclear explosive tests.
In the broader multilateral context, the United States continues to hold to its long-standing position calling for the immediate commencement of long delayed negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). This treaty is the obvious next step in multilateral disarmament and it is time to get to the table. We hope that the upcoming UN Group of Governmental Experts on FMCT will provide useful impetus. Another priority for the United States is to continue to build support for the ratification of the CTBT, as affirmed by President Obama this past June. We encourage all Annex 2 nations to join us in this pursuit.
Mr. Chairman, we will have a lot of things to discuss and debate this session, from cyber and space security to conventional arms control, from humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. It is critical that we continue our work together. Two weeks ago, the international community reached a landmark with UN Security Council Resolution 2118 and the Executive Council decision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Together, they enable a strong international partnership to eliminate chemical weapons from Syria and end this threat to the Syrian people.
And elsewhere, we should be cautious, but cognizant of potentially historic opportunities. We must continue our push to bring Iran back into line with its international nuclear obligations. We will also continue to make clear to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that should it meet its own denuclearization commitments, it too can have an opportunity to reintegrate into the international community. The United States is ready to talk, we are ready to listen, we are ready to work hard, and we hope that every country in this room is ready to join us.
It is no secret there are issues on which we disagree. This does not mean that we stop trying to move ahead in a step-by-step fashion. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union found it in our mutual interest to work together on reducing the nuclear threat. Of course, today, this is not just the responsibility of the United States and Russia. All states can and must contribute to the conditions for disarmament, as well as nonproliferation; they are two sides of the same coin.
Mr. Chairman, the road toward the next steps might not be familiar and it will require difficult negotiations and complicated diplomacy. Nevertheless, armed with patience and persistence, we can keep our compasses pointed at the one reason we are here: to pursue disarmament in ways that promote mutual security, because it is in our mutual interest.
The United States asks that we all commit ourselves to the hard work ahead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Statement by Rose E. Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
68th UNGA First Committee General Debate
New York, NY
October 9, 2013
As Delivered
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations, Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi, on your election as Chair of the First Committee during its 68th session. We pledge to support your leadership and the work of this committee. We look forward to a productive session.
This is the fourth year in a row that I have spoken to the UNGA First Committee on behalf of the United States. I look back to 2009 and I am proud of all we have accomplished. That said, we have a long path in front of us.
The conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons do not yet exist, but together we are completely capable of creating these conditions. I am sure of this, because of the examples of our predecessors.
As you all may know, tomorrow is the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). This groundbreaking Treaty went from a seemingly unattainable goal on the horizon to an international law on the books within a year of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Perhaps it was those dark days that helped solidify U.S. President Kennedy’s view that it was possible – in fact, imperative – that we work to address nuclear dangers through multilateral diplomacy.
“Peace need not be impracticable,” he said, “and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly -- by making it seem more manageable and less remote -- we can help all people to see it, to draw hope from it and to move irresistibly towards it.”
Mr. Chairman, that idea should be our touchstone as we move forward with the Committee’s work. If our predecessors could accomplish a Treaty like the LTBT in the midst of the Cold War, surely we can find ways to work on further arms reductions, increased transparency, banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and more.
Over the last fifty years, we have had many unprecedented successes. We have gone from the brink of nuclear war to successful strategic reduction treaties – the latest of which will bring us by 2018 to the lowest number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons since the 1950s.
We have continued to limit nuclear explosive testing over the years through treaties, including the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) that prohibited the United States and the Soviet Union from conducting a nuclear explosive test in excess of 150 kilotons. Before the TTBT entered into force, some voiced concerns that the parties had different ways to measure explosive yields. To deal with this problem, the United States and the Soviet Union undertook an unprecedented step in transparency and confidence-building. They invited each other to their respective nuclear test sites to observe a nuclear test and use their preferred methods for measuring explosive yields as they applied to the TTBT. That event, known as the Joint Verification Experiment, happened 25 years ago and it paved the way for subsequent negotiations of new verification protocols for both the TTBT and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). Our joint work would ultimately help the international community negotiate a total ban on nuclear explosive testing, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
This year also marks a significant nonproliferation accomplishment: the 1993 United States-Russian Federation Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement will reach a major milestone with the final delivery of low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from downblending 500 metric tons of Russian weapons origin HEU. The LEU that results from this downblending process is delivered to the United States, fabricated into nuclear fuel, and used by nearly all U.S. nuclear power plants to generate approximately half of the nuclear energy in the United States. Approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads have been eliminated under this unique government-industry partnership. Over the past 15 years, nuclear fuel from this source has accounted for approximately 10% of all electricity produced in the United States.
We expect to meet with our Russian partners this November to observe the loading in St. Petersburg of the final containers of LEU downblended under the Agreement, and we will meet again in the United States when that ship delivers this important cargo in December. We look forward to jointly celebrating this historic achievement.
Another success that flies under the radar is the Open Skies Treaty. It just marked its 1000th completed mission in August. It is a great example of a Euro-Atlantic transparency and confidence building measure, and it has proven itself as a valuable arms control monitoring tool, for both strategic and conventional purposes.
As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the Obama Administration, working with international partners, has made many of its own significant achievements in nonproliferation and disarmament: entry into force of the New START Treaty, the launching of the Nuclear Security Summit process, an agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to each verifiably dispose of 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium, and more recently, signature of an agreement between the United States and Russia on threat reduction that reinforces our longstanding partnership on nonproliferation.
But it is not enough: the United States and Russian Federation still possess over ninety percent of the nuclear weapons in the world, and it is time we move beyond Cold War postures.
That is why in June, the President announced in Berlin that we would pursue further reductions of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. This decision flowed from the Administration’s extensive analysis of the current strategic environment and deterrence requirements. That analysis confirmed that the United States can ensure its security and that of our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third below the level established by the New START Treaty. The President said on that occasion, “I intend to seek negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War postures.” Toward that end, we will pursue a treaty with the Russian Federation.
We are also making sure our lines of communication on strategic issues are solid. On Monday in Bali, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov signed a new agreement to strengthen the connection between our Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs). Today’s NRRC-to-NRRC relationship and communications link continue to provide vital transparency in strategic and conventional forces, facilitate verification of arms control treaties and agreements, and support strategic stability. Actually, we just passed a significant milestone -- the two Centers have now exchanged over five thousand New START Treaty notifications since its entry into force, which provide us day-to-day updates on the status of each others' nuclear forces. These are joined by the 97 on-site inspections that we have now conducted under New START, which give us even more insights into each others' nuclear forces, thus enhancing predictability for both countries.
We are also working with the other Nuclear Weapons States (P5) on disarmament-related issues to support implementation of the NPT and the 2010 NPT Action Plan. The P5 have now had four official conferences, with China hosting the fifth meeting next year. But we are not just meeting; through dialogue at the political level and concrete work at the expert level, our engagement has moved from concepts to concrete actions.
For example, P5 experts are meeting to address issues related to the CTBT, especially those relating to the On-Site Inspection (OSI) element of the CTBT’s verification regime and to the OSI Integrated Field Exercise to be conducted in Jordan in 2014. The objective of this effort is to define and engage in technical collaborative work based on our unique expertise with past nuclear explosive tests.
In the broader multilateral context, the United States continues to hold to its long-standing position calling for the immediate commencement of long delayed negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). This treaty is the obvious next step in multilateral disarmament and it is time to get to the table. We hope that the upcoming UN Group of Governmental Experts on FMCT will provide useful impetus. Another priority for the United States is to continue to build support for the ratification of the CTBT, as affirmed by President Obama this past June. We encourage all Annex 2 nations to join us in this pursuit.
Mr. Chairman, we will have a lot of things to discuss and debate this session, from cyber and space security to conventional arms control, from humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. It is critical that we continue our work together. Two weeks ago, the international community reached a landmark with UN Security Council Resolution 2118 and the Executive Council decision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Together, they enable a strong international partnership to eliminate chemical weapons from Syria and end this threat to the Syrian people.
And elsewhere, we should be cautious, but cognizant of potentially historic opportunities. We must continue our push to bring Iran back into line with its international nuclear obligations. We will also continue to make clear to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that should it meet its own denuclearization commitments, it too can have an opportunity to reintegrate into the international community. The United States is ready to talk, we are ready to listen, we are ready to work hard, and we hope that every country in this room is ready to join us.
It is no secret there are issues on which we disagree. This does not mean that we stop trying to move ahead in a step-by-step fashion. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union found it in our mutual interest to work together on reducing the nuclear threat. Of course, today, this is not just the responsibility of the United States and Russia. All states can and must contribute to the conditions for disarmament, as well as nonproliferation; they are two sides of the same coin.
Mr. Chairman, the road toward the next steps might not be familiar and it will require difficult negotiations and complicated diplomacy. Nevertheless, armed with patience and persistence, we can keep our compasses pointed at the one reason we are here: to pursue disarmament in ways that promote mutual security, because it is in our mutual interest.
The United States asks that we all commit ourselves to the hard work ahead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Wednesday, October 9, 2013
READOUT: SECRETARY OF DEFENCE HAGEL'S MEETING WITH ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER MOSHE YA'ALON
FROM: U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Readout of Secretary Hagel's Meeting with Minister of Defense Moshe Ya'alon
Secretary Hagel met with Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Ya'alon earlier today at the Pentagon for their third face to face meeting in the past six months. Both leaders expressed appreciation for the opportunity to frequently share views on the range of regional security challenges the United States and Israel are facing together.
On Iran, Secretary Hagel noted that while the United States intends to test the prospect for a diplomatic solution with Iran we remain clear eyed about the challenges ahead and will not waver from our firm policy to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
Secretary Hagel applauded the announcement by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria has started. While much works remains to be done, this recent progress is a step in the right direction to eliminating this threat.
The leaders also discussed progress on the United States effort to increase Israel's qualitative military edge with advanced capabilities that Secretary Hagel announced on his visit to Israel earlier this year.
Both Secretary Hagel and Minister Ya'alon thanked one another for continued unprecedented levels of security cooperation between the United States and Israel and pledged to remain in close touch.
Readout of Secretary Hagel's Meeting with Minister of Defense Moshe Ya'alon
Secretary Hagel met with Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Ya'alon earlier today at the Pentagon for their third face to face meeting in the past six months. Both leaders expressed appreciation for the opportunity to frequently share views on the range of regional security challenges the United States and Israel are facing together.
On Iran, Secretary Hagel noted that while the United States intends to test the prospect for a diplomatic solution with Iran we remain clear eyed about the challenges ahead and will not waver from our firm policy to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
Secretary Hagel applauded the announcement by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria has started. While much works remains to be done, this recent progress is a step in the right direction to eliminating this threat.
The leaders also discussed progress on the United States effort to increase Israel's qualitative military edge with advanced capabilities that Secretary Hagel announced on his visit to Israel earlier this year.
Both Secretary Hagel and Minister Ya'alon thanked one another for continued unprecedented levels of security cooperation between the United States and Israel and pledged to remain in close touch.
Tuesday, October 8, 2013
SECRETARY OF STATE KERRY AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MAKE REMARKS AFTER MEETING
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Joint Press Availability With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov After Their Meeting
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Bali, Indonesia
October 6, 2013
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, good morning, everybody. I want to thank Foreign Minister Lavrov for joining me here today to sign this important agreement. Amending the NRRC agreement is another important step towards reducing risks associated with nuclear weapons, and I think both of us are cognizant of the fact that 26 years ago our predecessors from the United States and the former Soviet Union, Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze signed the original NRRC agreement which established centers in Moscow and in Washington through which our nations were able to communicate with each other the details of our compliance with arms control treaties.
The Cold War is now long over, but thousands of nuclear weapons remain, and we both recognize a responsibility to do everything possible to keep each other appraised of important developments in order to avoid misunderstandings and potentially catastrophic consequences. I might remark that, for instance, after 2001, September 11th, we were quickly in touch with each other through this center as we took our armed forces to the highest level of alert in order to communicate immediately and directly so there could be no misunderstanding about what was taking place. In addition, on at least 13 different conventional and other kinds of treaties between us since then, this center has now become a critical component in helping us to apply the rules, live by the rules, and understand what we’re both doing.
This amended agreement better enables us to do those things. By upgrading the centers, it provides vital support for our strategic and our conventional arms treaties and agreements, like the New START Treaty, which I was privileged to help take through ratification in the Senate just a couple of years ago.
Regarding our meeting today, I would characterize the meeting as really one of the most productive that we have had since our meetings in Geneva, which were obviously productive. And I think Sergey and I talked at great length about Syria. Since the binding resolution was passed in New York, which will eliminate the weapons – the chemical weapons in Syria, we have continued to take very important steps. And I want to thank Sergey for the cooperation Russia has provided in this. It’s been very important. I think it’s an important part of our relationship. And it’s not insignificant that within days of the passing of this resolution in New York inspectors are in Syria, they are on the ground, and now they are already proceeding to the destruction of chemical weapons. That actually began yesterday. There are missile warheads and other instruments that were destroyed yesterday, so the process has become – begun in record time, and we are appreciative for the Russian cooperation, as well as obviously for the Syrian compliance to this date.
We also strongly supported the recent United Nations Security Council statement urging unhindered access to enable humanitarian aid providers to immediately reach parts of the country where the need is most urgent. We talked about that a little bit, and our Russian friends are engaged in almost daily interventions in an effort to move the Syrian regime to comply. And obviously we want to get that aid to the places where the need is much urgent and we want to get there are rapidly as possible. As the world’s largest provider of humanitarian assistance of aid to Syria, the United States applauds the Council for rapidly taking this up and for shining a light on this appalling situation.
Finally, Foreign Minister Lavrov and I discussed our mutual goal, which we are extraordinarily focused on, of ending the war in Syria through a political transition to a more broadly acceptable democratic government, under the terms of the Geneva communique. We agreed, again, that there is no military solution here. We share an interest in not having radical extremists on either side of any kind assuming a greater status or position in Syria. And that is why we recommitted today with very specific efforts to move the Geneva process as rapidly as possible. We are going to both engage with Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and lay the groundwork for a round of talks. It is our mutual hope that that can happen in November. And we are both intent and determined in consultation with our friends in these efforts to try to make certain that this can happen in November. A final date and the terms of participation will have to be determined by the United Nations, but we had a very constructive discussion about the path to getting there and we are both committed to leave here with a determination to begin that process, because we both believe – both countries believe, our leaders believe, President Putin and President Obama – that nothing is served by the prolongation of the violence in Syria. The humanitarian catastrophe is overwhelming the region, and we have a significant responsibility to try to address it. Thank you.
Sergey.
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: Thank you, John. And gentlemen for the benefit of the Russian journalists I will speak in Russian, with your permission.
(Via interpreter) Dear ladies and gentlemen, since John Kerry entered into office as Secretary of State this February, we met 11 times. And our meetings in Geneva and New York are counting, but we have met quite a lot of time also.
Today, we have signed an agreement about the National Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. These centers are functioning since 1987, but it’s high time to adapt them to new realities with our joint effort. And, of course, these centers are very important to ensure all directions of our joint work to ensure the confidence and such agreements as START agreements, the Vienna agreements, as well as the agreements on Open Skies. And I would like also to say that three weeks ago, there was signs and another important agreement about a scientific cooperation in nuclear energy field.
So this agreement was prepared specially for the Russian-American summit in Moscow that was planned for the 4th of September and which unfortunately didn’t take place. But anyway, this intense cooperation of signing agreements shows that there is no pause in our bilateral relations and there can’t be any one.
In the landlines of our attention was Syria today. Ten days ago, by our joint efforts and with the help of the Security Council of the United Nations, we could work out important decisions. There was also a resolution adopted on the document of – in the framework of the OPCW about the liquidation and elimination of chemical weapons. This is already taking place. The decisions are being fulfilled, and the elimination has started. And during all these weeks up to joining – after Syria joined the document on the elimination of chemical weapons, Damascus is working jointly with – to work on these decisions. And we hope that it will take effect soon. I hope that it will be happening in the future as that. And of course, this bears all the attention and all the necessary responsibility on – not only for this responsibility on the Syrian Government, but also on the opposition and all the states in this sphere should, of course, not let these weapons to fall into the hands of non-state subjects.
And looking into – while the concerns of chemical weapons, we haven’t forgotten other important goals. Of course, the humanitarian situation is very important for us, as well as the situation with the refugees in this country. And of course, we welcomed the Security Council announcement about the goals before the international community to help with the humanitarian situation in this country. Of course, this situation is quite complicated also because the opposition is – of course, important for the opposition to take a part in this process. And I’m convinced that with due cooperation with the United Nations, with the Red Cross, there will be a possibility to get to the places, the necessary places, the humanitarian help such needed in this country.
Of course, we looked into the political settlement, which is much needed in Syria. We also would like to say that we are very concerned and we would like it to take place, the conference on political settlement, in mid-November, as well as the Syrian Government said about its readiness for that. And we also agreed that the government would come with – completely prepared to fulfill all the commitments taken to join this international conference. And I would like to reiterate the government and the opposition to be ready for such a conference. And, of course, the composition which is completely for such an event with the participation of the Special Envoy Brahimi for such an event is very important also. And of course, the main important – the most important thing is for the long-term settlement is for the Syrians themselves to agree on it and all the other participants to fully help in such result.
We also have exchanged opinion on the settlement of the Iranian nuclear program. And we consider that such a positive situation, such a positive signal with the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, which also have met on the General – on the sidelines of General Assembly will materialize in concrete affairs for the course of these actions.
We have also expressed our – of course, our help, our support for achieving for Israelis and the Palestinians to settle their affairs. And of course, thanks to the efforts of John Kerry and the international mediators help, we consider that that could bear fruit.
We have also agreed on many issues of bilateral agenda, and we consider with – that with due efforts we could eliminate all the irritators that are in the bilateral – in the general of our bilateral relations. And I’m sure that if we are guided by the principles of equality, of non-interference in our internal affairs, and consideration of interests of each others, our countries would progress in the field of cooperation for the benefit of Russia and the United States and the whole world.
SECRETARY KERRY: We’re happy to take a few questions.
MS. PSAKI: The first question will be from Lesley Wroughton of Reuters.
QUESTION: Thank you very much. You’ve spoken today of a positive meeting on Syria. Do you believe that the elimination of the chemical weapons is going well? Do you expect it to be completed within a certain time? And how close to you – are you on actually setting a date for the peace talks for Geneva 2? Is there ever – is that ever going to happen? We’ve heard about this a long time?
And to the Minister, what have you done to convince Assad to come to the peace talks? Have you actually convinced him to do that – and the – of moving into a transitional government?
And for Secretary Kerry, there has been a complaint from Libya regarding the operation by U.S. military forces, which has provoked a complaint that Mr. al-Libi was kidnapped. Did you give them advance notice of what – of the operation? And number two, what perception do you think this leaves the world when people are snatched off the street of foreign countries by the U.S. military?
SECRETARY KERRY: So let me be crystal clear. The – we’re very pleased with the pace of what has happened with respect to chemical weapons. In a record amount of time, the United Nations Security Council has embraced a unique approach in a joint effort with the OPCW, the Office for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons. That’s never happened before. They agreed within a record period of time to follow the framework that Minister Lavrov and I negotiated in Geneva, and they put it into place both in The Hague as well as at the United Nations. I think that was a terrific example of global cooperation, of multilateral efforts, to accomplish an accepted goal.
And they have moved with equal speed to get on the ground in Syria and begin the operations. I think it is extremely significant that yesterday, Sunday, within a week of the resolution being passed, some chemical weapons were already being destroyed. I think it’s also credit to the Assad regime for complying rapidly, as they are supposed to. Now, we hope that will continue. I’m not going to vouch today for what happens months down the road, but it’s a good beginning, and we should welcome a good beginning.
I don't know if you’re planning to do the translation? Are we? All right. Please.
And in a world that needs to see government working effectively and that needs to see multilateral institutions serving their purposes, I think this a very important beginning.
With respect to setting a date, neither Minister Lavrov nor I are supposed to set a date. That date has to be set by the United Nations and by Special Envoy Brahimi and the Secretary General. We both agreed that we have some homework to do in preparation, but we are also agreed that we will meet with Lakhdar Brahimi, and we will urge that a specific date be set within the framework that the Envoy has already set, which is somewhere in the second week of November or so. And we will urge a date to be set as soon as possible.
With respect to Abu Anas al-Libi, he is a key al-Qaida figure and he is a legal and an appropriate target for the U.S. military under the Authorization of the Use of Military Force passed in September of 2001. And of course, we regularly consult with our friends in the region; we consult regularly with the Libyan Government on a range of security and counterterrorism issues. But we don’t get into the specifics of our communications with a foreign government or in any kind of operation of this kind.
Finally, I’d just say that with respect to the perception, I hope the perception is in the world that people who commit acts of terror and who have been appropriately indicted by courts of law, by the legal process, will know that the United States of America is going to do everything in its power that is legal and appropriate in order to enforce the law and protect our security. Abu Anas al-Libi was indicted in the southern district of New York in connection with his role in al-Qaida’s conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals, to conduct attacks against interests worldwide, which included al-Qaida plots to attack forces in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, as well as attacking the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.
So an indictment is an accusation. In our legal system, a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. But he will now have an opportunity to defend himself and to be appropriately brought to justice in a court of law. And I think it’s important for people in the world not to sympathize with alleged terrorists but to underscore the importance of rule of law. And that is the perception that we believe is the important one for people to understand.
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: (Via interpreter) Concerning our stance about the process of chemical weapons eliminations, we’re satisfied with such a process. We have no grounds to consider that the cooperation that is doing the Syrian Government to fulfill, perfectly, this – that these concerns is – will change anyhow. And the Russian part will do everything so that Damascus will follow the cooperation without any changes.
But there is another thing that concerns us, and we have grounds to suspect that the extremist groups are trying to undermine such a process. And we hope that the resolution of the Security Council, which was adopted 10 days ago, will be fulfilled by all the parties, as well as the countries which are neighbors of Syria, and so to fulfill the requirements of the Security Council not to fall the chemical weapons and the chemical elements into the hands of non-state subjects, as well as the territories for the work of – the territories of this country for the work of terrorists.
And in general, we would like to reiterate – and today we’ve talked about – that we are going to do everything so to completely find the terrorists and extremists element in this country. And it’s our own task and the task of everybody who want this country to be multiconfessional, secular, and to be in peace.
About the terms and the dates of the conference, John already said that we are not to establish this date. And we know the position of Damascus, and from the point of view of the government of Damascus that conference could already be established many months ago.
And we shouldn’t do anything so the delegation from Syrian Government would go there. They already said about their efforts and about their intentions to go there. Already although some of them, they went in Geneva, were adopted of the joint – the joint resolutions of American and Russians.
And we shouldn’t do anything, and we’d like – we have to do everything so that the opposition will also come and agree to come without any preliminary conditions. The important steps that they should do is to fulfill the Geneva communique, which was adopted on the 30 of May last year.
And we also talked about it with John Kerry. We would like to support all the efforts to form the delegation of the oppositions, will be a representative in all its sense. And we also would like so the National Coalition would speak with one voice, because some days ago the leaders said that – they announced that they are ready to go there, but then their partners say that they are really not ready.
And I would like to reiterate that we have a common understanding with our American colleagues that there should be synchronized and coordinated efforts to convene a conference, which would be represented by all parties with the help of important international players.
MODERATOR: (In Russian.)
QUESTION: (Via interpreter) Oleg Velano from Interfax Agency. The last question – that recently the Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran said that the decisions of the Group of Six is already on the table. How could you comment that in – take into account the planned new round of the Group of Six meeting?
And another question is to John Kerry, that there – Iran and the United States are getting quite close each time. And there are some – will there be any changes in relation to the missile defense in Europe? Because the threat of Iran – of a nuclear threat from Iran was the main reason of the deployment of that missile defense.
SECRETARY KERRY: Was the question on the Group of Six to Sergey or to me?
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: If I understood the question right, the question was about yesterday’s statement of Minister Zarif that Iran expects new proposals from the 3+3, not that the old proposal is on the table. And my understanding of this statement of Minister Zarif is that we discussed in New York – six ministers of the 3+3 group, plus Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Mr. Zarif – and we discussed the need to have a roadmap which would, at the end of the day, satisfy the international community that the Iranian nuclear program is entirely peaceful and that this program is pulled under total and strict control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. And when this is achieved, Iran wants all sanctions to be lifted.
I don’t think that this is contradictory to what the 3+3 has been doing all these years. Iran probably wants more clarity, more specific steps to be spelled out on the road to the result which we all want to achieve. And I think this would be discussed next week in Geneva, a meeting to which Iran agreed, and to which Iran and 3+3 are getting ready in a very constructive mood, as our contacts in New York showed.
SECRETARY KERRY: No translation?
INTERPRETER: No translation, Mr. Kerry.
SECRETARY KERRY: Another (inaudible) please. Does she understand English?
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: Yeah, she does.
SECRETARY KERRY: Okay. Gotcha.
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: And French. (Laughter.)
SECRETARY KERRY: What else can you tell us, Sergey? (Laughter.)
On Iran, the Group of Six put a proposal on the table in Almaty, and I don’t believe that, as of yet, Iran has fully responded to that particular proposal. So I think we’re waiting for the fullness of the Iranian difference in their approach now. But we’re encouraged by the statements that were made in New York, and we’re encouraged by the outreach.
But as the President – as President Obama has said, and I think other the members of the P-5+1 agree, it’s not words that will make the difference. It’s actions that will make the difference. So what we need are a set of proposals from Iran that fully disclose how they will show the world that their program is peaceful. And we have made it clear that if there are those indicators, the United States and our allies are absolutely prepared to move in appropriate ways to meet their actions. So we still have to wait and see where that comes out.
With respect to the part of your question about Iran and the U.S. getting close, I would just say to you that the talk of these first days and the exchanges of a couple of meetings and a phone call do not indicate a closeness. They indicate an opportunity. They indicate the opening of a door or a window to some discussion. We’re very anxious to have that discussion, but it’s way too premature to make any determinations about where we would wind up with respect to the deployment of the missile defense, which you’re right, was predicated on that threat. But as long as that threat is there, we still have to deal with that issue.
Now, that said, the Foreign Minister and I did discuss Iran and we discussed also the discussion that is underway between the United States and Russia on the subject of missile defense. And I think we’re in a place now where the next step in that discussion can take place, regardless of what happens with respect to Iran. And we look forward to having a good, continued discussion with Russia regarding mutual defense. We obviously would like to see something – we’d like to reach an understanding with Russia, and I think the Russians would like to reach an understanding with us. So that discussion will continue in the appropriate channels where it is currently located.
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: And I would just like to add that, indeed, we have this appropriate channels activated, they never actually were frozen, and missile defense is one of the important items on our agenda. We should like to resolve in the way which would not create any suspicions regarding the strategic stability sustainability. And indeed, I (inaudible) of what John said now, that as long as the Iranian threat quote/unquote exists, the American plans remain. So I assume that if we manage to make sure that everyone agrees that the threat is not any longer there, then those plans might be reconsidered.
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, that’s not exactly what I said, Sergey, but obviously we will respond to threats. And I think you know that we’re trying to work out a way for the missile defense system to meet your needs and our needs, and no matter what happens, we’ll pursue that discussion, and I think that’s a very important discussion.
Now obviously if the overall situation in the entire region changes, we’re open to a much more significant discussion.
MS. PSAKI: Thank you. Thanks, everyone.
SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you all.
Joint Press Availability With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov After Their Meeting
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Bali, Indonesia
October 6, 2013
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, good morning, everybody. I want to thank Foreign Minister Lavrov for joining me here today to sign this important agreement. Amending the NRRC agreement is another important step towards reducing risks associated with nuclear weapons, and I think both of us are cognizant of the fact that 26 years ago our predecessors from the United States and the former Soviet Union, Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze signed the original NRRC agreement which established centers in Moscow and in Washington through which our nations were able to communicate with each other the details of our compliance with arms control treaties.
The Cold War is now long over, but thousands of nuclear weapons remain, and we both recognize a responsibility to do everything possible to keep each other appraised of important developments in order to avoid misunderstandings and potentially catastrophic consequences. I might remark that, for instance, after 2001, September 11th, we were quickly in touch with each other through this center as we took our armed forces to the highest level of alert in order to communicate immediately and directly so there could be no misunderstanding about what was taking place. In addition, on at least 13 different conventional and other kinds of treaties between us since then, this center has now become a critical component in helping us to apply the rules, live by the rules, and understand what we’re both doing.
This amended agreement better enables us to do those things. By upgrading the centers, it provides vital support for our strategic and our conventional arms treaties and agreements, like the New START Treaty, which I was privileged to help take through ratification in the Senate just a couple of years ago.
Regarding our meeting today, I would characterize the meeting as really one of the most productive that we have had since our meetings in Geneva, which were obviously productive. And I think Sergey and I talked at great length about Syria. Since the binding resolution was passed in New York, which will eliminate the weapons – the chemical weapons in Syria, we have continued to take very important steps. And I want to thank Sergey for the cooperation Russia has provided in this. It’s been very important. I think it’s an important part of our relationship. And it’s not insignificant that within days of the passing of this resolution in New York inspectors are in Syria, they are on the ground, and now they are already proceeding to the destruction of chemical weapons. That actually began yesterday. There are missile warheads and other instruments that were destroyed yesterday, so the process has become – begun in record time, and we are appreciative for the Russian cooperation, as well as obviously for the Syrian compliance to this date.
We also strongly supported the recent United Nations Security Council statement urging unhindered access to enable humanitarian aid providers to immediately reach parts of the country where the need is most urgent. We talked about that a little bit, and our Russian friends are engaged in almost daily interventions in an effort to move the Syrian regime to comply. And obviously we want to get that aid to the places where the need is much urgent and we want to get there are rapidly as possible. As the world’s largest provider of humanitarian assistance of aid to Syria, the United States applauds the Council for rapidly taking this up and for shining a light on this appalling situation.
Finally, Foreign Minister Lavrov and I discussed our mutual goal, which we are extraordinarily focused on, of ending the war in Syria through a political transition to a more broadly acceptable democratic government, under the terms of the Geneva communique. We agreed, again, that there is no military solution here. We share an interest in not having radical extremists on either side of any kind assuming a greater status or position in Syria. And that is why we recommitted today with very specific efforts to move the Geneva process as rapidly as possible. We are going to both engage with Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and lay the groundwork for a round of talks. It is our mutual hope that that can happen in November. And we are both intent and determined in consultation with our friends in these efforts to try to make certain that this can happen in November. A final date and the terms of participation will have to be determined by the United Nations, but we had a very constructive discussion about the path to getting there and we are both committed to leave here with a determination to begin that process, because we both believe – both countries believe, our leaders believe, President Putin and President Obama – that nothing is served by the prolongation of the violence in Syria. The humanitarian catastrophe is overwhelming the region, and we have a significant responsibility to try to address it. Thank you.
Sergey.
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: Thank you, John. And gentlemen for the benefit of the Russian journalists I will speak in Russian, with your permission.
(Via interpreter) Dear ladies and gentlemen, since John Kerry entered into office as Secretary of State this February, we met 11 times. And our meetings in Geneva and New York are counting, but we have met quite a lot of time also.
Today, we have signed an agreement about the National Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. These centers are functioning since 1987, but it’s high time to adapt them to new realities with our joint effort. And, of course, these centers are very important to ensure all directions of our joint work to ensure the confidence and such agreements as START agreements, the Vienna agreements, as well as the agreements on Open Skies. And I would like also to say that three weeks ago, there was signs and another important agreement about a scientific cooperation in nuclear energy field.
So this agreement was prepared specially for the Russian-American summit in Moscow that was planned for the 4th of September and which unfortunately didn’t take place. But anyway, this intense cooperation of signing agreements shows that there is no pause in our bilateral relations and there can’t be any one.
In the landlines of our attention was Syria today. Ten days ago, by our joint efforts and with the help of the Security Council of the United Nations, we could work out important decisions. There was also a resolution adopted on the document of – in the framework of the OPCW about the liquidation and elimination of chemical weapons. This is already taking place. The decisions are being fulfilled, and the elimination has started. And during all these weeks up to joining – after Syria joined the document on the elimination of chemical weapons, Damascus is working jointly with – to work on these decisions. And we hope that it will take effect soon. I hope that it will be happening in the future as that. And of course, this bears all the attention and all the necessary responsibility on – not only for this responsibility on the Syrian Government, but also on the opposition and all the states in this sphere should, of course, not let these weapons to fall into the hands of non-state subjects.
And looking into – while the concerns of chemical weapons, we haven’t forgotten other important goals. Of course, the humanitarian situation is very important for us, as well as the situation with the refugees in this country. And of course, we welcomed the Security Council announcement about the goals before the international community to help with the humanitarian situation in this country. Of course, this situation is quite complicated also because the opposition is – of course, important for the opposition to take a part in this process. And I’m convinced that with due cooperation with the United Nations, with the Red Cross, there will be a possibility to get to the places, the necessary places, the humanitarian help such needed in this country.
Of course, we looked into the political settlement, which is much needed in Syria. We also would like to say that we are very concerned and we would like it to take place, the conference on political settlement, in mid-November, as well as the Syrian Government said about its readiness for that. And we also agreed that the government would come with – completely prepared to fulfill all the commitments taken to join this international conference. And I would like to reiterate the government and the opposition to be ready for such a conference. And, of course, the composition which is completely for such an event with the participation of the Special Envoy Brahimi for such an event is very important also. And of course, the main important – the most important thing is for the long-term settlement is for the Syrians themselves to agree on it and all the other participants to fully help in such result.
We also have exchanged opinion on the settlement of the Iranian nuclear program. And we consider that such a positive situation, such a positive signal with the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, which also have met on the General – on the sidelines of General Assembly will materialize in concrete affairs for the course of these actions.
We have also expressed our – of course, our help, our support for achieving for Israelis and the Palestinians to settle their affairs. And of course, thanks to the efforts of John Kerry and the international mediators help, we consider that that could bear fruit.
We have also agreed on many issues of bilateral agenda, and we consider with – that with due efforts we could eliminate all the irritators that are in the bilateral – in the general of our bilateral relations. And I’m sure that if we are guided by the principles of equality, of non-interference in our internal affairs, and consideration of interests of each others, our countries would progress in the field of cooperation for the benefit of Russia and the United States and the whole world.
SECRETARY KERRY: We’re happy to take a few questions.
MS. PSAKI: The first question will be from Lesley Wroughton of Reuters.
QUESTION: Thank you very much. You’ve spoken today of a positive meeting on Syria. Do you believe that the elimination of the chemical weapons is going well? Do you expect it to be completed within a certain time? And how close to you – are you on actually setting a date for the peace talks for Geneva 2? Is there ever – is that ever going to happen? We’ve heard about this a long time?
And to the Minister, what have you done to convince Assad to come to the peace talks? Have you actually convinced him to do that – and the – of moving into a transitional government?
And for Secretary Kerry, there has been a complaint from Libya regarding the operation by U.S. military forces, which has provoked a complaint that Mr. al-Libi was kidnapped. Did you give them advance notice of what – of the operation? And number two, what perception do you think this leaves the world when people are snatched off the street of foreign countries by the U.S. military?
SECRETARY KERRY: So let me be crystal clear. The – we’re very pleased with the pace of what has happened with respect to chemical weapons. In a record amount of time, the United Nations Security Council has embraced a unique approach in a joint effort with the OPCW, the Office for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons. That’s never happened before. They agreed within a record period of time to follow the framework that Minister Lavrov and I negotiated in Geneva, and they put it into place both in The Hague as well as at the United Nations. I think that was a terrific example of global cooperation, of multilateral efforts, to accomplish an accepted goal.
And they have moved with equal speed to get on the ground in Syria and begin the operations. I think it is extremely significant that yesterday, Sunday, within a week of the resolution being passed, some chemical weapons were already being destroyed. I think it’s also credit to the Assad regime for complying rapidly, as they are supposed to. Now, we hope that will continue. I’m not going to vouch today for what happens months down the road, but it’s a good beginning, and we should welcome a good beginning.
I don't know if you’re planning to do the translation? Are we? All right. Please.
And in a world that needs to see government working effectively and that needs to see multilateral institutions serving their purposes, I think this a very important beginning.
With respect to setting a date, neither Minister Lavrov nor I are supposed to set a date. That date has to be set by the United Nations and by Special Envoy Brahimi and the Secretary General. We both agreed that we have some homework to do in preparation, but we are also agreed that we will meet with Lakhdar Brahimi, and we will urge that a specific date be set within the framework that the Envoy has already set, which is somewhere in the second week of November or so. And we will urge a date to be set as soon as possible.
With respect to Abu Anas al-Libi, he is a key al-Qaida figure and he is a legal and an appropriate target for the U.S. military under the Authorization of the Use of Military Force passed in September of 2001. And of course, we regularly consult with our friends in the region; we consult regularly with the Libyan Government on a range of security and counterterrorism issues. But we don’t get into the specifics of our communications with a foreign government or in any kind of operation of this kind.
Finally, I’d just say that with respect to the perception, I hope the perception is in the world that people who commit acts of terror and who have been appropriately indicted by courts of law, by the legal process, will know that the United States of America is going to do everything in its power that is legal and appropriate in order to enforce the law and protect our security. Abu Anas al-Libi was indicted in the southern district of New York in connection with his role in al-Qaida’s conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals, to conduct attacks against interests worldwide, which included al-Qaida plots to attack forces in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, as well as attacking the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.
So an indictment is an accusation. In our legal system, a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. But he will now have an opportunity to defend himself and to be appropriately brought to justice in a court of law. And I think it’s important for people in the world not to sympathize with alleged terrorists but to underscore the importance of rule of law. And that is the perception that we believe is the important one for people to understand.
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: (Via interpreter) Concerning our stance about the process of chemical weapons eliminations, we’re satisfied with such a process. We have no grounds to consider that the cooperation that is doing the Syrian Government to fulfill, perfectly, this – that these concerns is – will change anyhow. And the Russian part will do everything so that Damascus will follow the cooperation without any changes.
But there is another thing that concerns us, and we have grounds to suspect that the extremist groups are trying to undermine such a process. And we hope that the resolution of the Security Council, which was adopted 10 days ago, will be fulfilled by all the parties, as well as the countries which are neighbors of Syria, and so to fulfill the requirements of the Security Council not to fall the chemical weapons and the chemical elements into the hands of non-state subjects, as well as the territories for the work of – the territories of this country for the work of terrorists.
And in general, we would like to reiterate – and today we’ve talked about – that we are going to do everything so to completely find the terrorists and extremists element in this country. And it’s our own task and the task of everybody who want this country to be multiconfessional, secular, and to be in peace.
About the terms and the dates of the conference, John already said that we are not to establish this date. And we know the position of Damascus, and from the point of view of the government of Damascus that conference could already be established many months ago.
And we shouldn’t do anything so the delegation from Syrian Government would go there. They already said about their efforts and about their intentions to go there. Already although some of them, they went in Geneva, were adopted of the joint – the joint resolutions of American and Russians.
And we shouldn’t do anything, and we’d like – we have to do everything so that the opposition will also come and agree to come without any preliminary conditions. The important steps that they should do is to fulfill the Geneva communique, which was adopted on the 30 of May last year.
And we also talked about it with John Kerry. We would like to support all the efforts to form the delegation of the oppositions, will be a representative in all its sense. And we also would like so the National Coalition would speak with one voice, because some days ago the leaders said that – they announced that they are ready to go there, but then their partners say that they are really not ready.
And I would like to reiterate that we have a common understanding with our American colleagues that there should be synchronized and coordinated efforts to convene a conference, which would be represented by all parties with the help of important international players.
MODERATOR: (In Russian.)
QUESTION: (Via interpreter) Oleg Velano from Interfax Agency. The last question – that recently the Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran said that the decisions of the Group of Six is already on the table. How could you comment that in – take into account the planned new round of the Group of Six meeting?
And another question is to John Kerry, that there – Iran and the United States are getting quite close each time. And there are some – will there be any changes in relation to the missile defense in Europe? Because the threat of Iran – of a nuclear threat from Iran was the main reason of the deployment of that missile defense.
SECRETARY KERRY: Was the question on the Group of Six to Sergey or to me?
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: If I understood the question right, the question was about yesterday’s statement of Minister Zarif that Iran expects new proposals from the 3+3, not that the old proposal is on the table. And my understanding of this statement of Minister Zarif is that we discussed in New York – six ministers of the 3+3 group, plus Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Mr. Zarif – and we discussed the need to have a roadmap which would, at the end of the day, satisfy the international community that the Iranian nuclear program is entirely peaceful and that this program is pulled under total and strict control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. And when this is achieved, Iran wants all sanctions to be lifted.
I don’t think that this is contradictory to what the 3+3 has been doing all these years. Iran probably wants more clarity, more specific steps to be spelled out on the road to the result which we all want to achieve. And I think this would be discussed next week in Geneva, a meeting to which Iran agreed, and to which Iran and 3+3 are getting ready in a very constructive mood, as our contacts in New York showed.
SECRETARY KERRY: No translation?
INTERPRETER: No translation, Mr. Kerry.
SECRETARY KERRY: Another (inaudible) please. Does she understand English?
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: Yeah, she does.
SECRETARY KERRY: Okay. Gotcha.
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: And French. (Laughter.)
SECRETARY KERRY: What else can you tell us, Sergey? (Laughter.)
On Iran, the Group of Six put a proposal on the table in Almaty, and I don’t believe that, as of yet, Iran has fully responded to that particular proposal. So I think we’re waiting for the fullness of the Iranian difference in their approach now. But we’re encouraged by the statements that were made in New York, and we’re encouraged by the outreach.
But as the President – as President Obama has said, and I think other the members of the P-5+1 agree, it’s not words that will make the difference. It’s actions that will make the difference. So what we need are a set of proposals from Iran that fully disclose how they will show the world that their program is peaceful. And we have made it clear that if there are those indicators, the United States and our allies are absolutely prepared to move in appropriate ways to meet their actions. So we still have to wait and see where that comes out.
With respect to the part of your question about Iran and the U.S. getting close, I would just say to you that the talk of these first days and the exchanges of a couple of meetings and a phone call do not indicate a closeness. They indicate an opportunity. They indicate the opening of a door or a window to some discussion. We’re very anxious to have that discussion, but it’s way too premature to make any determinations about where we would wind up with respect to the deployment of the missile defense, which you’re right, was predicated on that threat. But as long as that threat is there, we still have to deal with that issue.
Now, that said, the Foreign Minister and I did discuss Iran and we discussed also the discussion that is underway between the United States and Russia on the subject of missile defense. And I think we’re in a place now where the next step in that discussion can take place, regardless of what happens with respect to Iran. And we look forward to having a good, continued discussion with Russia regarding mutual defense. We obviously would like to see something – we’d like to reach an understanding with Russia, and I think the Russians would like to reach an understanding with us. So that discussion will continue in the appropriate channels where it is currently located.
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: And I would just like to add that, indeed, we have this appropriate channels activated, they never actually were frozen, and missile defense is one of the important items on our agenda. We should like to resolve in the way which would not create any suspicions regarding the strategic stability sustainability. And indeed, I (inaudible) of what John said now, that as long as the Iranian threat quote/unquote exists, the American plans remain. So I assume that if we manage to make sure that everyone agrees that the threat is not any longer there, then those plans might be reconsidered.
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, that’s not exactly what I said, Sergey, but obviously we will respond to threats. And I think you know that we’re trying to work out a way for the missile defense system to meet your needs and our needs, and no matter what happens, we’ll pursue that discussion, and I think that’s a very important discussion.
Now obviously if the overall situation in the entire region changes, we’re open to a much more significant discussion.
MS. PSAKI: Thank you. Thanks, everyone.
SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you all.
Wednesday, October 2, 2013
U.S.-SOUTH KOREA WILL ESTABLISH "BILATERAL STRATEGY FOR TAILORED DETERRENCE"
FROM: U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAGEL
U.S., South Korea Announce 'Tailored Deterrence' Strategy
By Karen Parrish
American Forces Press Service
American Forces Press Service
SEOUL, South Korea, Oct. 2, 2013 - The United States and South Korea today agreed to establish "a bilateral strategy for tailored deterrence against ... North Korean nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction," Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said during a press conference here today.
Hagel and his counterpart, South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin, spoke to reporters after the 45th Security Consultative Meeting in the South Korean Ministry of Defense building this morning. The annual meeting brings together military and foreign affairs officials from the two nations to discuss alliance, peninsular, regional and global issues.
The tailored deterrence agreement will create a strategic, policy-level framework within the alliance for deterring specific threats, Hagel said, "and help us work together more seamlessly to maximize the effects of our deterrence."
Kim noted both sides have agreed on the need for a "more future-oriented and comprehensive strategic alliance."
In a joint communiqué issued after the meeting, Hagel and Kim condemned North Korea's December 2012 long-range missile launch and its February 2013 nuclear test, and "urged North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to cease ... its nuclear programs immediately, including its nuclear activities at Yongbyon, uranium enrichment and construction of a light water reactor."
In his remarks, Hagel also emphasized North Korea's stockpiles of chemical weapons. "There should be no doubt that any North Korean use of chemical weapons would be completely unacceptable," he said.
The communiqué reaffirmed U.S. commitment to provide and strengthen deterrence for South Korea "using the full range of military capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities."
It also provides for a "comprehensive counter-missile strategy" to, Kim said, "detect, defend, deter and destroy" threats from the North Korean arsenal.
The agreement states South Korea will "continue to build reliable interoperable response capabilities and to develop the Korean Air and Missile Defense system" and that both sides will further interoperability of the alliance's command and control system.
Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also attended today's discussions. Other senior U.S. military leaders in the region were present as well, including Navy Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III, who leads U.S. Pacific Command, and the outgoing and incoming commanders of U.S. Forces Korea, United Nations Command and Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, Army Gen. James D. Thurman and Army Gen. Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti. Their South Korean counterparts also attended.
Scaparrotti assumed the three-flagged South Korea-based command later in the day from Thurman, who is retiring.
Locklear and Thurman shared their views on regional issues yesterday with reporters traveling with Hagel before the change-of-command ceremony. Locklear noted that units from within his command train and conduct exercises regularly with South Korean forces, which he termed "highly capable and very professional."
Thurman, who has commanded the roughly 28,500 U.S. service members in South Korea for two and a half years, noted that during his tenure readiness across the joint and combined force has been his highest priority.
During his command, he said, South Korean military forces have continued to "demonstrate their expertise in the air, on the ground and in the maritime domains."
Thurman said he remains confident the allies can defend the peninsula, which has been in a state of suspended war since North and South Korea signed an armistice in July 60 years ago. The United States fought side-by-side with South Korean forces during that war, he noted, and the two countries signed a mutual defense treaty in 1953, 60 years ago yesterday.
Thurman said the alliance is based on shared values, combined hard work, and a collective commitment to stability involving the U.N. sending states, South Korea and the United States.
"Since the Korean War, the Republic of Korea has been one of the greatest success stories of our time," he said. "They went from a country that was torn apart by war ... [to] a very vibrant democracy, a global economic power, a vital security partner and a world leader."
That success, Thurman added, "is an important example of what a great alliance can accomplish together, and it is worth defending together."
Friday, March 8, 2013
U.S. SANCTIONS INDIVIDUALS FOR AIDING N. KOREAN WMD PROGRAMS
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
United States Sanctions Individuals Linked To North Korean Weapons Of Mass Destruction Programs
Fact Sheet
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
March 8, 2013
The United States welcomes the unanimous passage today of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2094. North Korea's nuclear and missile proliferation activities violate the UN Security Council sanctions regime comprised of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), destabilize the region, and undermine the global nonproliferation regime. The international community has condemned North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation activity and its continued efforts to advance its nuclear and missile programs, including its announced February 12 nuclear test and its April and December 2012 launches using ballistic missile technology. These provocative acts continue to threaten international peace and security and will only result in North Korea becoming further isolated from the international community.
On Thursday, March 7, 2013 the U.S. Department of the Treasury implemented the asset freeze provisions of UNSCR 2094 (2013) by designating Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l, a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) representative who served in Beijing, China; and Yo’n Cho’ng-Nam and Ko Ch’o’l-Chae, both based in Dalian, China, and representatives of Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID), pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of WMD and their supporters. The Second Academy of Natural Sciences and Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation, listed in UNSCR 2094 today, were previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in August 2010 and October 2005 respectively.
"These individuals are important actors within North Korea’s proliferation network who have been working to gain access to international markets," said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. "We will continue to work with our partners around the world to expose these operations and hold North Korea accountable for its provocative and destabilizing acts."
TCB was identified in the annex of E.O. 13382 in June 2005 because it acts as the financial arm of KOMID, Pyongyang’s premier arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. KOMID was also listed in the annex to E.O. 13382 in June 2005 for its role in North Korea’s proliferation of WMD.
KOMID has offices in multiple countries around the world and facilitates weapons sales for the North Korean government. TCB plays a role in financing KOMID’s sales of ballistic missiles and has also been involved in ballistic missile transactions from KOMID to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), the U.S. and UN-sanctioned Iranian organization responsible for developing liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. In addition to their listings under E.O. 13382, both TCB and KOMID were designated by the UNSCR 1718 Committee in April 2009.
Today’s designations under E.O. 13382 generally result in the prohibition of transactions between these individuals and any U.S. person, and the freezing of any assets they may have under U.S. jurisdiction.
Identifying information:
Name: Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l
Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.)
Location: C/O Tanchon Commercial Bank, Saemaeul 1-Dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, North Korea
Title: Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative
Name: Yo’n Cho’ng-Nam
Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.)
Location: Dalian, China
Title: Chief Representative, KOMID
Name: Ko Ch’o’l-Chae
Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.)
Location: Dalian, China
Title: Deputy Representative, KOMID
United States Sanctions Individuals Linked To North Korean Weapons Of Mass Destruction Programs
Fact Sheet
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
March 8, 2013
The United States welcomes the unanimous passage today of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2094. North Korea's nuclear and missile proliferation activities violate the UN Security Council sanctions regime comprised of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), destabilize the region, and undermine the global nonproliferation regime. The international community has condemned North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation activity and its continued efforts to advance its nuclear and missile programs, including its announced February 12 nuclear test and its April and December 2012 launches using ballistic missile technology. These provocative acts continue to threaten international peace and security and will only result in North Korea becoming further isolated from the international community.
On Thursday, March 7, 2013 the U.S. Department of the Treasury implemented the asset freeze provisions of UNSCR 2094 (2013) by designating Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l, a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) representative who served in Beijing, China; and Yo’n Cho’ng-Nam and Ko Ch’o’l-Chae, both based in Dalian, China, and representatives of Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID), pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of WMD and their supporters. The Second Academy of Natural Sciences and Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation, listed in UNSCR 2094 today, were previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in August 2010 and October 2005 respectively.
"These individuals are important actors within North Korea’s proliferation network who have been working to gain access to international markets," said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. "We will continue to work with our partners around the world to expose these operations and hold North Korea accountable for its provocative and destabilizing acts."
TCB was identified in the annex of E.O. 13382 in June 2005 because it acts as the financial arm of KOMID, Pyongyang’s premier arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. KOMID was also listed in the annex to E.O. 13382 in June 2005 for its role in North Korea’s proliferation of WMD.
KOMID has offices in multiple countries around the world and facilitates weapons sales for the North Korean government. TCB plays a role in financing KOMID’s sales of ballistic missiles and has also been involved in ballistic missile transactions from KOMID to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), the U.S. and UN-sanctioned Iranian organization responsible for developing liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. In addition to their listings under E.O. 13382, both TCB and KOMID were designated by the UNSCR 1718 Committee in April 2009.
Today’s designations under E.O. 13382 generally result in the prohibition of transactions between these individuals and any U.S. person, and the freezing of any assets they may have under U.S. jurisdiction.
Identifying information:
Name: Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l
Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.)
Location: C/O Tanchon Commercial Bank, Saemaeul 1-Dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, North Korea
Title: Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative
Name: Yo’n Cho’ng-Nam
Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.)
Location: Dalian, China
Title: Chief Representative, KOMID
Name: Ko Ch’o’l-Chae
Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.)
Location: Dalian, China
Title: Deputy Representative, KOMID
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