THE U.S. NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE: CAPABILITY AND CREDIBILITY

FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
Kehler Lauds Capability, Credibility of Nuclear Enterprise
By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, July 24, 2013 - Sweeping improvements across the U.S. nuclear enterprise since a 2007 incident have increased the focus on the nuclear mission and raised the bar in terms of standards and performance, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command told reporters today.

"In general, I feel much more comfortable today with the level of attention," Air Force Gen. C. Robert Kehler said during a Defense Writers Group breakfast roundtable. "I am very confident in the capability and credibility of the forces. And I am very, very confident in our ability to continue our deterrence mission."

Kehler was deputy commander of Stratcom during the August 2007 "Bent Spear" incident in which nuclear-equipped missiles were mistakenly transported nearly 1,500 miles on the wing of a B-52 Stratofortress bomber.

Revelation of the incident -- defense officials emphasized at the time that the weapons were never unsecured and never at risk of detonating -- led to personnel dismissals, organizational changes and heightened performance requirements.

"A lot has changed in the last six to seven years," Kehler said. "A lot has changed organizationally, ... in terms of the intensity of the focus on the nuclear part of our mission, ... [and] in terms of the assessment and evaluation that we put on the units that are involved in all of this.

"And as we say, perfection is really the standard when we talk about nuclear weapons," he said.

Among the changes was the Air Force's standup of Global Strike Command, with a singular focus on the nuclear mission and the standards applied to those involved, he said. The Navy underwent its own top-to-bottom review of its nuclear operations and activities.

The increased focus on nuclear-related units and activities has paid off in better performance levels, Kehler reported.

The general recalled his own experience with these "hard looks" during his earlier years within the nuclear force. "These are not easy evaluations to pass," he said. "And they have gotten harder."

Stratcom's nuclear deterrence mission remains critical to the United States, Kehler noted, injected with a renewed focus and sense of urgency by the president's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the national defense strategy.

"We recognize the Cold War has been over for 20 years," he said, but he noted President Barack Obama's pledge to maintain a "credible deterrent force" for both the United States and its allies and partners.

That deterrent is based on the triad of ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable heavy bombers and the associated aerial tankers, and the assured warning and command-and-control system that interconnects them.

Kehler called modernization of the nuclear enterprise "essential."

"We find ourselves in the position today where most of the platforms and virtually all of the weapons are well over 20 years old, and, in some cases, substantially over 20 years old," he said.

"Life extensions are due on the weapons, [and] modernization is due on the platforms ... and the nuclear command-and control system," said Kehler, noting that some of these efforts already have been deferred for almost 10 years.

Asked about morale within the nuclear force, Kehler said it's generally good. "It is not an easy job," he added, noting the intellectual intensity of the nuclear mission.
Kehler visited the Global Strike Command headquarters at Barksdale Air Force Base, La., earlier this month, to emphasize the importance of that mission to the men and women charged with carrying it out every day.

"The skills that we have for the nuclear-deterrence mission will be needed as far into the future as I can see," he said. "As long as we have nuclear weapons, it's our job to deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure and effective force. That's what we're here for."

STRATCOM'S FUTURE CAPABILITIES NEEDS

 

U.S. Strategic Command serves as the Defense Department's global synchronizer for capabilities that affect every combatant command: space, cyberspace, missile defense and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, among them. Here, the sun sets over some of the assets that provide those capabilities at Forward Operating Base Sharana in Afghanistan's Paktika province, Nov. 5, 2012. U.S. Army photo by Spc. Raymond Schaeffer

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Stratcom Advocates for Current, Future Capabilities
By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, Neb., April 2, 2013 - Faced with shrinking budgets and an ever-growing appetite across the military for the capabilities U.S. Strategic Command provides, the Defense Department is relying on Stratcom itself to help determine what assets are needed and where to dedicate them.

U.S. Strategic Command serves as DOD's global synchronizer for capabilities that affect every combatant command: space, cyberspace, missile defense and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, among them.

The problem, explained Kenneth Callicutt, the command's director of capability and resource integration, is that there simply aren't -- and never will be -- enough of any of these to satisfy every combatant commander's requests.

"Every [combatant commander] wants more," he said. "But there are only so many Aegis ships and only so many radars that can be deployed."

More than 1,000 miles from the Capital Beltway and relatively insulated from political pressures, Stratcom leaders weigh requirements against assets to determine the best way to allocate what's available.

"We take the viewpoint of how to do this globally, taking into account everyone's requests," Callicutt said. "What we try to build is a common understanding of where we can get the best bang for the dollars we are spending to solve the common set of problems, and to synchronize those efforts across the department."

It's an effort he said involves continuous communication with combatant commands to assess what they need now and how they expect those requirements to change in the future.

"We have a full team here that walks through that analysis each year and looks at current allocations," Callicutt said. "But our advocacy role also looks to the future," influencing the Pentagon's acquisitions and investments in development programs.

Prioritization that factors in both short- and long-term requirements becomes particularly important in times of constrained resources, Callicutt said.

"In this fiscal environment, you're often left with a tradeoff between modernization and readiness," he said. "And in many cases, as you focus on training and the ability to do something now, the tendency is to sacrifice investment or buying modernization equipment."

That can have significant consequences in the future, creating capability gaps in vital areas that can't be filled quickly or easily. Callicutt noted, for example, that fielding new satellites and other space-based systems typically takes 25 years. The design, development and deployment timeline for nuclear weapons can be even longer, approaching 35 years, he said, as in the case of the replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine.

"So we maintain a very long time horizon here," Callicutt said. "The Defense Department relies on us to keep that longer-term view."

"The No. 1 concern, from our perspective, is to ensure we always have the required capabilities," said John Dodson, chief of staff for capability and resource integration. "You always want, whoever your adversary is, to have an upper edge. That's how it has always been in history and will remain the future. And a big part of that is ensuring that you are state of the art."

"So part of what we do here in our advocacy mission is to try to keep the balance" between current and future requirements, Callicutt said, and ensuring investments in modernization aren't dangerously deferred.

"I don't think we can, for the good of this nation, pay later, because our grandchildren will be the ones paying, with high risk," Callicutt said. "So we have to continue to prepare for the future while at the same time, executing today. And how to do that has to be an informed discussion." That discussion involves the combatant commands, the services and Pentagon leaders, he added.

"One of the biggest contributions Stratcom brings to this discussion is its global view," Dodson said. "It enables us to synchronize and optimize the capabilities out there. For the Defense Department, that is huge."

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE STRATCOM MISSION

A B-2 Spirit bomber is towed to a parking spot at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. The B-2 is a key element of the U.S. nuclear triad, which includes ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable heavy bombers and associated aerial tankers, and the assured warning and command-and-control system that interconnects them. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Shane A. Cuomo

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Nuclear Deterrence Remains Key Stratcom Mission, Commander Says
By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, Neb., April 5, 2013 - Twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and with the United States and Russia committed to deep cuts in their already-reduced nuclear arsenals, some might be tempted to think U.S. Strategic Command's most important mission is fading into the history books.

Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent -- and the ability to operate its nuclear capabilities effectively if directed by the president -- was a foundation of U.S. national security throughout the Cold War, said Air Force Gen. C. Robert Kehler, the Stratcom commander.

Yet Stratcom's nuclear deterrence mission remains as critical as at any time in U.S. history, Kehler said, injected with a renewed focus and sense of urgency by the president's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the new national defense strategy.

So even as the United States began withdrawing numerous weapons abroad, deactivated entire classes of weapons and reduced its nuclear stockpile by 75 percent since the height of the Cold War, it has ensured that it maintains sufficient deterrent capability.

"As long as nuclear weapons exist, U.S. Strategic Command's top priority must be to deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure and effective strategic nuclear deterrent force," Kehler told the House and Senate armed services committees earlier this month.

Kehler's job is to look across the entire nuclear enterprise to ensure it remains operationally viable, and to verify the safety and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile. That includes the triad of ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable heavy bombers and associated aerial tankers, and the assured warning and command-and-control system that interconnects them.

"I can assure you that today's nuclear weapons and triad of delivery platforms are safe, secure and effective," Kehler reported in testimony to the congressional panels.

Looking to the future, he said, the challenge will be to modernize and sustain the myriad aspects of the nuclear enterprise: from delivery systems and stockpile surveillance activities to upgrades to the nuclear command, control and communications capabilities.

"Our nuclear weapons and platforms are aging and are in need of either modernization or recapitalization, the majority occurring within the next 10 to 20 years," Navy Cmdr. Robert Thomas Jr., Stratcom's deputy division chief for global strike capabilities, resources and integration, told American Forces Press Service.

"We are talking about every platform -- the bombers, the submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles -- and also every weapon employed on those platforms," Thomas said.

So Stratcom is working with the services and its interagency partners to develop a replacement for the Ohio-class submarine and to modernize or replace the Minuteman III ICBM and the B-52 Stratofortress and B-2 Spirit bombers, as well as the weapons they deliver.

"We are not talking about developing any new capabilities or new weapons. That is not what we are doing," Thomas emphasized. "What we are doing is maintaining the capability of our nuclear deterrent."

That deterrent remains vital, he said, not only to the United States, but also to the allies and partners it has pledged to protect.

Based on this threat and the approaching end of much of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure's life-cycle, Thomas said, Stratcom's efforts aren't occurring a minute too soon.

The Ohio-class submarines that are capable of launching ballistic missiles are slated to operate through the late 2020s and early 2030s. At that point, they will have reached their maximum life expectancy, serving for 42 years -- longer than any other submarine in Navy history.

"Last year's decision to delay the Ohio-class replacement program by two years is all the risk I would recommend in this critical program," Kehler said during his congressional testimony.

Replacement submarines are being developed now, with the first of 12 on schedule for delivery in 2031, just as the Ohio-class subs they replace go into retirement.

Meanwhile, Stratcom is working with the Air Force to determine whether to replace or extend the life of the Minuteman III ICBMs that have been in service since the 1970s. The current system has undergone several modernization programs since it was fielded, Thomas said, and Congress has mandated that the current force remain viable and credible through the 2030 timeframe.

A study of alternatives to sustain the ground-based leg of the triad beyond 2030 is underway.

The Air Force also is assessing how to modernize the nuclear-capable B-52 and B-2 bombers. The B-52 has undergone several modernization programs since it was first fielded in the early 1950s, and is expected to remain in service through 2040. The B-2, introduced in the late 1990s, will require similar efforts to remain viable into the 2050 timeframe, Thomas said.

In addition, Stratcom is working with the National Nuclear Security Administration to ensure the weapons development under its purview meets the command's strategic requirements.

"We are fairly unique in our role as a combatant command in looking holistically across the entire enterprise and making sure all these activities remain synchronized and aligned so we don't have capability gaps," Thomas said.

This synchronizing mission presents challenges in terms of not only budget constraints, but also of manufacturing capability to make it all happen within the required timeframe. "Schedules are important, because it does no good to deliver a weapon at the wrong time," Thomas said. "And if a platform or weapon is aging out, we have to have its replacement ahead of time so we can be confident the system works as designed to meet the mission requirements."

Further complicating the effort is the Nuclear Posture Review's emphasis on refurbishing existing nuclear weapons capabilities rather than developing new ones. Thomas said he recognizes the rationale, with the intent of reducing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons as part of its national security strategy. "Building new weapons is not in line with that strategy or that position," he said.

Thomas compared the current approach to driving a 1965 Mustang that's been refitted with new systems and replacements for parts no longer made. Essentially, it's still a 1965 Mustang, he said, but now it relies on modern parts to keep running.

"In many respects, it would be a lot easier to go out and buy a new car, but we can't do that. We have to maintain the car we have," he said.

Another complication is the unilateral moratorium the United States has maintained on nuclear testing for the past two decades. This, Kehler told Congress, presents the challenge of certifying the effectiveness and reliability of nuclear weapons without actually testing them with nuclear explosions.

He noted advances in the computer simulations, modeling and other scientific and surveillance programs used instead for testing, and the importance of attracting the proper talent pool to the mission to sustain it into the future.

"We've got to maintain the science that underpins those weapons," Kehler told Congress. "We've got to make sure we are sustaining those weapons and surveilling those weapons as they age, as well as introducing life-extension programs as needed.

Ensuring the viability of the U.S. nuclear enterprise provides deterrence and, should that fail, gives the president options in how to deploy forces, Thomas said. But it also helps stem proliferation by assuring U.S. allies and partners, he added, so they do not feel a need to pursue their own nuclear-weapon capability.

"So it is as important now -- and perhaps even more important in a world that is more uncertain -- and into the future that we maintain a very credible nuclear force," he said. "And as long as we have these weapons, we are ensuring that they are safe, secure, credible and effective. And we are taking the appropriate steps to accomplish that."