REMARKS AT COUNTERING NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL SMUGGLING WORKSHOP

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Welcome and Introductory Remarks at the Countering Nuclear and Radiological Smuggling Workshop

Remarks
Simon Limage
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Programs, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
Institute for Transuranium Elements
Karlsruhe, Germany
February 11, 2014

(As Prepared)

Good morning. Thank you, Dr. Fanghänel, for your kind introduction. I would also like to thank the European Union, the European Commission, and specifically the Joint Research Centre’s Institute for Transuranium Elements, for opening these impressive facilities to host this workshop — which marks a significant step toward strengthened capacities to counter transnational nuclear and radiological smuggling. I would also like to recognize all of the workshop participants — representing more than 35 Nuclear Security Summit countries and international organizations — who have traveled from around the world to contribute to this week’s activities. I believe the work we do together this week will represent a significant step toward preventing terrorists, criminals and all other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear or radioactive materials that could be used in nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices. Achieving this objective remains one of the most important security challenges that we all face in the years to come, and I am proud to be a part of this important work.

Through our collective efforts in support of the Nuclear Security Summit process, our governments have together made great strides in creating and promoting global awareness of, and cooperation on nuclear security. Steps taken by the international community since the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington four years ago have been extensive. Within the United States, we have taken steps to further strengthen our domestic nuclear security framework. Internationally, important work done by programs such as the Department of Energy’s Material Protection, Control and Accounting program and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program have resulted in nuclear facilities that are more secure today than ever before.

At the first Nuclear Security Summit, Leaders from participating governments endorsed a Work Plan that included promoting national capacities in the areas of nuclear forensics, and exploring ways to enhance cooperation among local, national and international customs and law enforcement bodies to prevent illicit trafficking and acts of nuclear terrorism.

At the Seoul Summit in 2012, our leaders outlined specific steps that we have taken and intend to take — both collectively and individually — to meet these goals. Some of these steps are reflected in the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, and in the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit “Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling.” Over the past several years, our governments have pursued many counter nuclear smuggling activities at the national and international levels that reinforce Summit objectives. Our activities here this week will further complement the commitments and steps our Leaders pledged at the Summits.

Now as we prepare for the third Nuclear Security Summit next month in The Hague, we must not only consider the progress we have made, but also acknowledge the work that remains to be done to prevent nuclear or radiological terrorism. Current and past inabilities to secure nuclear and radioactive materials continue to mean that materials are vulnerable to theft, or are now already outside regulatory control, and vulnerable to terrorists or other malicious actors. Despite our many nuclear security successes, the threat that highly enriched uranium or plutonium could be obtained by terrorists or other criminals intent to cause harm continues to represent one of the most pressing threats to global security.

As President Barack Obama stated in 2012, “There are still too many bad actors in search of these dangerous materials, and these dangerous materials are still vulnerable in too many places. It would not take much -- just a handful or so of these materials -- to kill hundreds of thousands of innocent people.”

Seizures of weapon-grade nuclear material in Georgia in 2010 and Moldova in 2011 suggest that such materials remain in illegal circulation on the black market, and we must work together to locate and secure materials currently outside regulatory control. To do this, we must take action to investigate smuggling networks, remove trafficked material from the black market and arrest the individuals involved—which is the focus of our work this week.

One of the most successful methods for recovering nuclear or radioactive material outside regulatory control focuses on establishing national mechanisms to bring together law enforcement, intelligence and technical experts to investigate nuclear smuggling networks. This national-level effort might utilize, for example, information collectors to gather data on nuclear smuggling networks; intelligence analysts to review this information and look for connections between cases and individuals involved; law enforcement officers to conduct investigations and arrest smugglers; and technical experts to conduct nuclear forensics analyses of materials that are seized.

In addition to national-level competencies in all of these areas, international information-sharing mechanisms are integral to ensuring information on seized materials and the criminals who traffic them is made available to the relevant law enforcement and technical experts working to prevent these activities in the future. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) is recognized as the most well-established information-exchange mechanism for incidents involving nuclear and radioactive materials that have fallen outside regulatory control. Within the global law enforcement community, INTERPOL’s Operation Fail Safe provides a mechanism for sharing information on known nuclear smugglers with police officers around the world. I would encourage all of you to consider participating in this newly created program that fills a unique information-sharing gap in addressing the nuclear and radiological smuggling threat. We are honored to have representatives from each of these agencies deliver the keynote address for us this morning, and participate in the week’s events by sharing their expertise in this important area of international security.

This week, all of you will work together to explore new and emerging techniques for investigating nuclear smuggling networks, detecting nuclear and radioactive materials outside regulatory control, and analyzing seized material to trace its illicit movement.

The hands-on demonstrations, exercises, and scenario-based activities that you will participate in this week represent a collective next step toward advancing key capabilities to counter nuclear and radioactive materials smuggling and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. Together, we can—and will—make the world a safer place. Thank you.

STATEMENT: U.S.-RUSSIA BILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION JOINT REPORT

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE 
Statement by NSC Spokesperson Caitlin Hayden on the U.S.–Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission Joint Report

The United States of America and the Russian Federation launched the U.S.–Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) four years ago to reaffirm our commitment to cooperation and collaboration based on shared interests.  Since its creation, the Commission has embraced a whole-of-government approach to advance this goal, finding common ground on arms control and international security; fostering closer defense ties; increasing bilateral trade and investment opportunities; countering terrorism and narcotics trafficking; promoting advances in science, technology, and energy; and enhancing people-to-people and cultural ties between our societies.

Today we received from Secretary of State John Kerry the submission of the 2013 BPC Joint Report, which comprehensively highlights the Commission’s accomplishments since Spring 2012.

President Obama encourages the Commission’s working groups to deepen and expand their engagement with Russia in order to remove barriers to trade and investment, increase security, and ensure that advances in science and innovation continue.  By partnering with American and Russian civil society and private enterprise, the Commission’s working groups can have an enduring impact that yields a brighter future for Russians, Americans, and people around the world.

U.S. OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION IN CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Sixty-Eighth UNGA First Committee Thematic Discussion on Other Disarmament Measures and International Security
Remarks
Michele G. Markoff, Delegation of the United States
Washington, DC
October 30, 2013

Mr. Chairman,

My remarks today will address United States views relating to developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.

This June, the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on “Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security” achieved an historic consensus. In the GGE’s report, the United States sees reflected a growing global consensus on core ideas, namely that the international community seeks a path towards a peaceful and stable environment that allows all states to take advantage of the positive benefits of cyberspace. Further, the international community seeks to create incentives for cooperation on shared threats and to avoid conflict, and to create disincentives for states to disrupt one another’s networks or infrastructure. The United States has long been a leader and strong proponent of this effort. We believe, and the GGE report affirmed, that to be successful, this effort must be based on a foundation of international law and practical confidence building measures (CBMs) that, taken together, give us the essential tools with which to build peaceful intergovernmental relations in cyberspace.

Mr. Chairman,

As a participant in the GGE, the United States sought to enhance common understanding on cyber issues of critical national and international significance, particularly: that there is a need to promote international stability, transparency, and confidence in cyberspace; that existing international law should guide state behavior with regard to the use of cyberspace; that practical CBMs are needed to build transparency and confidence; that cooperation with the private sector and civil society is essential; and that the international community should help build the cybersecurity capacity of less-developed states to help them participate in this process. We believe that the Experts made a substantial contribution on all of these issues.

From the United States perspective, the most significant achievement in this consensus was the Group’s affirmation that international law is applicable and essential to maintaining peace and stability in cyberspace. That affirmation was coupled with consensus that states must meet their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them; states must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts; and states should seek to ensure that their territories are not used by non-state actors for unlawful use of information and communication technologies (ICTs). The experts also affirmed that state efforts to address the security of ICTs must go hand-in-hand with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments.

Together with the application of these rules, the United States believes that practical cooperative CBMs are needed to enhance predictability and reduce the prospect that misattribution or misperception might lead mistakenly to conflict. In order to develop a stable international framework for a technology which cannot be seen or counted, and where state capabilities cannot be easily assessed, states need to develop some confidence that behavior by states is predictable and understandable. The GGE agreed that practical transparency and CBMs, such as high-level communication and timely information sharing, can enhance trust and assurance among states and help reduce the risk of conflict by increasing predictability and reducing misperception. The Group agreed on the vital importance of capacity-building to enhance global cooperation in securing cyberspace. The Group reaffirmed the importance of an open and accessible cyberspace, as it enables economic and social development. And, the Group agreed that the combination of all these efforts support a more secure cyberspace.

These measures will help make conflict in cyberspace less likely. They can also play important roles should conflict occur. The application of international law to actions in cyberspace includes rules governing the use of force by states and the law of armed conflict. These rules regulate the use of ICTs in armed conflicts of all kinds, whether or not the conflicts began in cyberspace. The application of these rules in cyberspace is fully consistent with the desire of all states for peace and stability in cyberspace. Just as we are all parties to the UN Charter which seeks to prevent war of all kinds, we also all subscribe to the Geneva Conventions, and recognize the central role they play in minimizing civilian suffering when armed conflict occurs.

The United States was pleased to join consensus to affirm the applicability of international law to cyberspace. With that clear affirmation, this consensus sends a strong signal: States must act in cyberspace under the established international rules and principles that have guided their actions for decades – in peacetime and during conflict.

Mr. Chairman,

The United States looks forward to future dialogue on these issues with the international community. It is our expectation that future GGEs on the subject will use the results of this report as the foundation for discussion on how international law applies in cyberspace, how the international community can work with developing states to improve their own capacity, and what specific practical measures can be undertaken to achieve these goals.

States must unite in the common goal of preserving and enhancing the benefits of information technologies by assuring their security and integrity, while also maintaining an environment that promotes efficiency, innovation, economic prosperity, free trade, and respect for human rights.

To this end, let me reiterate the United States unwavering commitment to an Internet governance model that is people-centered, bottom-up, multi-stakeholder, and transparent. To build global knowledge societies, we must work to promote the free exchange of information and ideas among people. At the same time, we must resist efforts to erect new barriers and restrict the dynamic potential of the free flow of information.

The United States favors international engagement to develop a consensus on appropriate state behavior in cyberspace, based on existing principles of international law, and we cannot support other approaches that would only serve to legitimize repressive state practices.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize that our delegation looks forward to collaborating successfully with other delegations on these important issues, as well as on the remaining work of this session.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER'S REMARKS AT 68TH FIRST COMMITTEE GENERAL DEBATE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Statement by Rose E. Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
68th UNGA First Committee General Debate
New York, NY
October 9, 2013

As Delivered

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations, Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi, on your election as Chair of the First Committee during its 68th session. We pledge to support your leadership and the work of this committee. We look forward to a productive session.

This is the fourth year in a row that I have spoken to the UNGA First Committee on behalf of the United States. I look back to 2009 and I am proud of all we have accomplished. That said, we have a long path in front of us.

The conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons do not yet exist, but together we are completely capable of creating these conditions. I am sure of this, because of the examples of our predecessors.

As you all may know, tomorrow is the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). This groundbreaking Treaty went from a seemingly unattainable goal on the horizon to an international law on the books within a year of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Perhaps it was those dark days that helped solidify U.S. President Kennedy’s view that it was possible – in fact, imperative – that we work to address nuclear dangers through multilateral diplomacy.

“Peace need not be impracticable,” he said, “and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly -- by making it seem more manageable and less remote -- we can help all people to see it, to draw hope from it and to move irresistibly towards it.”

Mr. Chairman, that idea should be our touchstone as we move forward with the Committee’s work. If our predecessors could accomplish a Treaty like the LTBT in the midst of the Cold War, surely we can find ways to work on further arms reductions, increased transparency, banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and more.

Over the last fifty years, we have had many unprecedented successes. We have gone from the brink of nuclear war to successful strategic reduction treaties – the latest of which will bring us by 2018 to the lowest number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons since the 1950s.

We have continued to limit nuclear explosive testing over the years through treaties, including the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) that prohibited the United States and the Soviet Union from conducting a nuclear explosive test in excess of 150 kilotons. Before the TTBT entered into force, some voiced concerns that the parties had different ways to measure explosive yields. To deal with this problem, the United States and the Soviet Union undertook an unprecedented step in transparency and confidence-building. They invited each other to their respective nuclear test sites to observe a nuclear test and use their preferred methods for measuring explosive yields as they applied to the TTBT. That event, known as the Joint Verification Experiment, happened 25 years ago and it paved the way for subsequent negotiations of new verification protocols for both the TTBT and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). Our joint work would ultimately help the international community negotiate a total ban on nuclear explosive testing, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

This year also marks a significant nonproliferation accomplishment: the 1993 United States-Russian Federation Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement will reach a major milestone with the final delivery of low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from downblending 500 metric tons of Russian weapons origin HEU. The LEU that results from this downblending process is delivered to the United States, fabricated into nuclear fuel, and used by nearly all U.S. nuclear power plants to generate approximately half of the nuclear energy in the United States. Approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads have been eliminated under this unique government-industry partnership. Over the past 15 years, nuclear fuel from this source has accounted for approximately 10% of all electricity produced in the United States.

We expect to meet with our Russian partners this November to observe the loading in St. Petersburg of the final containers of LEU downblended under the Agreement, and we will meet again in the United States when that ship delivers this important cargo in December. We look forward to jointly celebrating this historic achievement.

Another success that flies under the radar is the Open Skies Treaty. It just marked its 1000th completed mission in August. It is a great example of a Euro-Atlantic transparency and confidence building measure, and it has proven itself as a valuable arms control monitoring tool, for both strategic and conventional purposes.

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the Obama Administration, working with international partners, has made many of its own significant achievements in nonproliferation and disarmament: entry into force of the New START Treaty, the launching of the Nuclear Security Summit process, an agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to each verifiably dispose of 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium, and more recently, signature of an agreement between the United States and Russia on threat reduction that reinforces our longstanding partnership on nonproliferation.

But it is not enough: the United States and Russian Federation still possess over ninety percent of the nuclear weapons in the world, and it is time we move beyond Cold War postures.

That is why in June, the President announced in Berlin that we would pursue further reductions of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. This decision flowed from the Administration’s extensive analysis of the current strategic environment and deterrence requirements. That analysis confirmed that the United States can ensure its security and that of our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third below the level established by the New START Treaty. The President said on that occasion, “I intend to seek negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War postures.” Toward that end, we will pursue a treaty with the Russian Federation.

We are also making sure our lines of communication on strategic issues are solid. On Monday in Bali, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov signed a new agreement to strengthen the connection between our Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs). Today’s NRRC-to-NRRC relationship and communications link continue to provide vital transparency in strategic and conventional forces, facilitate verification of arms control treaties and agreements, and support strategic stability. Actually, we just passed a significant milestone -- the two Centers have now exchanged over five thousand New START Treaty notifications since its entry into force, which provide us day-to-day updates on the status of each others' nuclear forces. These are joined by the 97 on-site inspections that we have now conducted under New START, which give us even more insights into each others' nuclear forces, thus enhancing predictability for both countries.

We are also working with the other Nuclear Weapons States (P5) on disarmament-related issues to support implementation of the NPT and the 2010 NPT Action Plan. The P5 have now had four official conferences, with China hosting the fifth meeting next year. But we are not just meeting; through dialogue at the political level and concrete work at the expert level, our engagement has moved from concepts to concrete actions.

For example, P5 experts are meeting to address issues related to the CTBT, especially those relating to the On-Site Inspection (OSI) element of the CTBT’s verification regime and to the OSI Integrated Field Exercise to be conducted in Jordan in 2014. The objective of this effort is to define and engage in technical collaborative work based on our unique expertise with past nuclear explosive tests.

In the broader multilateral context, the United States continues to hold to its long-standing position calling for the immediate commencement of long delayed negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). This treaty is the obvious next step in multilateral disarmament and it is time to get to the table. We hope that the upcoming UN Group of Governmental Experts on FMCT will provide useful impetus. Another priority for the United States is to continue to build support for the ratification of the CTBT, as affirmed by President Obama this past June. We encourage all Annex 2 nations to join us in this pursuit.

Mr. Chairman, we will have a lot of things to discuss and debate this session, from cyber and space security to conventional arms control, from humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. It is critical that we continue our work together. Two weeks ago, the international community reached a landmark with UN Security Council Resolution 2118 and the Executive Council decision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Together, they enable a strong international partnership to eliminate chemical weapons from Syria and end this threat to the Syrian people.

And elsewhere, we should be cautious, but cognizant of potentially historic opportunities. We must continue our push to bring Iran back into line with its international nuclear obligations. We will also continue to make clear to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that should it meet its own denuclearization commitments, it too can have an opportunity to reintegrate into the international community. The United States is ready to talk, we are ready to listen, we are ready to work hard, and we hope that every country in this room is ready to join us.

It is no secret there are issues on which we disagree. This does not mean that we stop trying to move ahead in a step-by-step fashion. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union found it in our mutual interest to work together on reducing the nuclear threat. Of course, today, this is not just the responsibility of the United States and Russia. All states can and must contribute to the conditions for disarmament, as well as nonproliferation; they are two sides of the same coin.

Mr. Chairman, the road toward the next steps might not be familiar and it will require difficult negotiations and complicated diplomacy. Nevertheless, armed with patience and persistence, we can keep our compasses pointed at the one reason we are here: to pursue disarmament in ways that promote mutual security, because it is in our mutual interest.

The United States asks that we all commit ourselves to the hard work ahead.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER ON GEOPOLITICS AND NUCLEAR ENERGY

Rose Gottemoeller

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Geopolitics and Nuclear Energy: The View from the State Department
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Nuclear Energy Institute
Washington, DC
May 15, 2013

Thank you for that introduction and thank you for having me here today. It is a pleasure to talk to the principal nuclear industry organization in the United States. Your involvement in all parts of the nuclear energy sector, as well as your work with universities, research laboratories, and labor unions is so important to our energy future. Congratulations on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Atomic Industrial Forum, your predecessor organization. It is sometimes hard to believe that nuclear energy is over a half century old.

I am sure that most of you are familiar with the Obama Administration’s "all of the above" energy strategy – and that it unequivocally includes nuclear energy – but it bears repeating. President Obama has stated clearly that "we must harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to combat climate change and advance peace and opportunity for all people."

Since taking office in 2009, the President has worked continuously to improve our nation’s energy security, efficiency, and sustainability. With his recently proposed FY2014 budget, the President has made it clear that he will not back down from energy issues and has proposed significant targets – and budgetary resources – to dramatically improve our economy’s energy productivity, lessen our oil imports, and deploy clean power generation technologies.

Energy and Geopolitics

There are three fundamental reasons that energy issues matter to American foreign policy.

First, energy rests at the core of geopolitics – an issue of both wealth and power, which means it can be both a source of conflict and a basis for international cooperation. It is in the interest of the United States to resolve disputes over energy peacefully. We must keep energy supplies and markets stable during global crises and ensure that countries don’t use their energy resources to force others to bend to their will or forgive their bad behavior.

Second, energy is essential to how we will power our economy and manage our environment in the 21st century. We will work to promote new technologies and sources of energy to reduce pollution, to diversify the global energy supply, to create jobs, and to address the threat of climate change. Nuclear energy can play a role in each of these efforts.

Third, energy is the key to development and political stability. There are 1.3 billion people worldwide who don’t have access to energy. That is unacceptable in economic terms and security terms.

Our nuclear exports are a key strategic asset- a mature energy technology that does not emit greenhouse gases, while also providing a source of base-load electric power. Nuclear energy has an important role to play in pursuing our foreign policy objectives. Our top priority, though, is to make sure that U.S. access to energy is secure, reliable, affordable, and sustainable.

The Administration is working hard to make sure that countries are using nuclear energy safely. In comparison to other energy sources, nuclear power presents a unique set of challenges, most notably those related to safety, security, and nonproliferation.

Of course, when another country buys a U.S. reactor, both of us be confident that the design is safe because it has been certified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). U.S. nuclear exports also increase the transparency of the importing country’s nuclear programs, thus indirectly supporting our nonproliferation policies. When we export U.S. technology, we are also exporting our safety and security cultures.

Looking Ahead

The future of nuclear exports cannot be discussed without considering the future of nuclear energy, in general. It is well known that, following the incident at Fukushima, Japan in 2011, some major economies decided to decrease, and eventually eliminate, their reliance on nuclear power. Despite these shifts, there is still a considerable market for nuclear energy.

The International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Technology Review (NTR) for 2012 concluded that, "globally the [Fukushima] accident is expected to slow or delay the growth of nuclear power, but not to reverse it." In fact, the NTR projects significant growth in the use of nuclear energy worldwide, between 35% and 100% by 2030.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) has reached similar conclusions. In its World Energy Outlook for 2012, the IEA concluded that while nuclear power would expand more slowly due to Fukushima and lower prices for fossil fuels, by 2035 nuclear generating capacity could increase to 580 gigawatts of electricity, compared to 371 gigawatts in 2010.

The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates the international marketplace for civil nuclear technology at $500 to $740 billion over the next ten years, with the potential to generate more than $100 billion in U.S. exports and thousands of new jobs.

This growth is welcome, as electricity demand is growing rapidly, particularly in emerging economies. By 2035, as much as 80 percent of this growth will take place in China, India and other non-OECD countries. These are the markets of the future. We see nuclear energy playing a critical role in meeting this increasing demand in a way that helps to provide efficient, low-cost power that also mitigates CO2 emissions.

Support for Industry

As we approach these new markets, we know that American nuclear exporters continue to face obstacles in the international market. That said, the U.S. nuclear industry has a number of assets that allow it to remain competitive, and I never bet against American ingenuity.

Our edge in technology is our greatest asset. American reactor designs on the market today are among the most advanced in the world, and some of them include passive safety features that would have been helpful at Fukushima.

The United States has unmatched experience with civil nuclear energy, operating the largest number of nuclear reactors in the world and generating the most nuclear power with the largest installed capacity worldwide.

The United States has top-performing companies all along the nuclear value chain. According to the World Nuclear Association, 12 of the world’s 25 highest-performing reactors are in the United States.

Further, while the NRC is careful not to engage in the promotion of nuclear power or exports, its very existence gives U.S. exporters an advantage. The NRC is widely regarded as the most effective and independent nuclear regulator in the world. By setting the bar for such safety standards we are also working to raise standards for nuclear safety around the world.

Some of the challenges of financing a nuclear power plant can be eased by the Export-Import Bank, the official U.S. export credit agency. While the Bank cannot engage in equity investing, it does offer direct loans and loan guarantees to support U.S. exports, including nuclear exports. This past fall, for the first time in decades, the Ex-Im Bank approved a two billion dollar loan to support a nuclear-related export.

It may not be the first impulse of export firm executives to think of the U.S. Government as a business asset, but there is much that we can do to help. We are developing what we call a "Team USA" approach to civil nuclear engagement abroad. In January 2012, the White House created a new position - Director of Nuclear Energy Policy – to lead this effort. Going forward, this will help us present a unified U.S. message on these issues and increase our presence in the civil nuclear commercial spaces.

Another service that the government can provide is advocacy. Once a potential nuclear project is approved for advocacy by the Department of Commerce’s Advocacy Center, the State Department and other U.S. government agencies can, through active diplomacy with the host country, put U.S. Government support behind the American bidder. Even when more than one American firm is bidding on a nuclear power plant, we may be able to engage in generic advocacy, expressing to the host government our support for a U.S. firm winning the contract.

We also try to ensure that a foreign government’s decisions are being made in a transparent manner on a "level playing field." Our diplomatic posts are sensitive to any evidence that undue influence is affecting a host government’s decision, and those posts are prepared to protest unwarranted discrimination against U.S sellers.

There are a number of other steps that the Administration has taken to ensure that our nuclear exports receive the attention they deserve. The Department of Commerce has established a Civil Nuclear Trade Initiative, the goal of which is to identify the U.S. nuclear industry’s trade policy challenges and commercial opportunities and coordinate public-private sector responses to support the growth of the U.S. civil nuclear industry.

There are important initiatives we are undertaking to significantly reduce the proliferation side-effects of the spread of nuclear energy. For example, in the field of radiopharmaceuticals, the United States plays an active role on several fronts. The Department of Energy is engaged in four cooperative agreements to support the development of domestic production of medical isotopes (in particular molybdenum-99) without the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU).

Last June, the White House established a policy that includes steps to further minimize the export of HEU where possible and preferentially procure non-HEU-based isotopes. The "American Medical Isotopes Production Act," passed in January, further supports these efforts by providing for a complete phase-out of HEU exports for such isotopes by 2020.

Let me close by reaffirming the Administration’s support for American nuclear exports. You all face stiff competition on the international market, but you also have strong resources to draw upon. I want to avoid the cliché, but we are here to help, and I hope we continue to work closely together in the future.

Thank you. I am happy to take a few questions and also eager to hear some thoughts and suggestions from you.

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND LISTS FOUR BASIC PRIORITIES

FROM:  AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE 
Ensuring ready forces is U.S. European Command's highest priority. Here, paratroopers from Special Operations Command Europe descend after jumping from an MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft over Malmsheim Drop Zone, Germany, Dec. 9, 2009. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Isaac A. Graham

Priorities Chart Way Forward for Eucom
By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service
STUTTGART, Germany, May 4, 2012 - Using the new defense strategic guidance as its roadmap, officials at U.S. European Command say they've fixed their compasses on four basic priorities: maintaining ready forces, completing a successful transition in Afghanistan, sustaining strategic partnerships and countering transnational threats.
Keeping a steely-eyed focus on these priorities is particularly important at a time of limited resources, Navy Vice Adm. Charles Martoglio, Eucom's deputy commander, told American Forces Press Service.

"Our highest priority is readiness to execute the contingency plans that we are responsible for," he said. "That goes directly back to the Constitution that says the military's mission is to fight and win the nation's wars."

That, explained Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, the command's deputy commander for plans, policy and strategy, means being ready to act if called upon to deal with issues in a 51-country area of responsibility that stretches across the Baltics, the Balkans, the Caucasuses and the Levant.

Eucom's next priority is to complete a successful security transition in Afghanistan from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force to Afghan national security forces, the admirals said. This, Montgomery explained, requires evolving from an operational role to a training role to ensure Afghan forces are prepared to accept increasing security responsibility.

"Many people don't realize that most of the non-U.S. forces in ISAF are from Europe," Martoglio said, noting that about 32,000 of the 35,000 partner forces in the coalition deploy from European soil. Eucom has been active over the past decade helping to organize, train and equip forces from countries not financially or logistically capable of doing so themselves.

"Some would say we should expect more from our European partners," Martoglio acknowledged, noting the 90,000 U.S. troop  contribution to ISAF. "But I would say that if it weren't for those 32,000 European partners there, we would require 32,000 more Americans."

As the coalition draws down forces in Afghanistan, Eucom's next priority, he said, will be to preserve the strategic partnerships solidified there.

"We have been alongside NATO, or NATO has been alongside us, for 10 years in Afghanistan and Iraq," Martoglio said. "We have a combat edge that has been honed by 10 years of working together in very challenging circumstances.

"So as we come out of Iraq and Afghanistan, how do we sustain that combat edge over time, particularly when everybody's budgets are being significantly constrained?" he asked. "Our job here is to sustain the strategic partnership, the NATO alliance – that most successful coalition in history – across these difficult financial times."

NATO never has been at a higher level of readiness to conduct contingency operations, Montgomery said. He cited the immediacy of a mission that's brought interoperability within ISAF to its highest level ever, but could begin deteriorating over time without a concerted effort to preserve it.
"The question," he said, echoing Martolgio, "is how do we preserve all the investment that's been made over the last eight to 10 years – an investment of not just money, but blood and sweat, working together in both Iraq and Afghanistan?"

Martoglio emphasized the importance of continued engagement and training, both to take new strategic partnerships forged with Eastern European nations to the next level, and to maintain other ISAF contributors' high-end capabilities.

"We have to look toward ensuring interoperability of those forces and routinely training together so that if we have to conduct high-end operations, we have the ability to work together from a technical perspective, and the skills to work together from a training perspective," he said.

Looking forward, Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis, the Eucom commander, identified four specific countries for increased engagement: Israel, Russia, Turkey and Poland.

Israel is one of the United States' closest allies, Martoglio said, noting the U.S. commitment to help in deterring its adversaries. Russia has a major impact on security in Europe and the world, and forging a more positive bilateral relationship is essential, he said.

Turkey, a rising regional power and NATO partner, is able to influence events in parts of the world the United States simply can't. And Poland, an increasingly influential leader in Northeastern Europe, is on a trajectory toward extending its economic and democratic impact beyond the immediate region.

These partnerships will be vital in confronting new and emerging threats in a rapidly-changing security environment, Martoglio said, particularly transnational threats that no one country can tackle alone. These include violent extremist organizations, cyber attacks, ballistic missiles and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

NATO addressed these concerns at its 2010 summit in Lisbon, Portugal, tasking member countries to contribute to various capabilities as part of its new 10-year strategic concept. The United States took on a significant ballistic missile defense tasking, Montgomery noted, and is working within NATO and U.S. structures to address other challenges.

Stavridis, testifying before Congress in March, said these evolving threats demand the steady commitment that the trans-Atlantic alliance has demonstrated since its inception more than six decades ago.

"Working together with our historic partners on these critical security challenges of the 21st century to wisely leverage the significant investments that America has made for over half a century will be more important than ever in light of the fiscal constraints that we all face," he told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Stavridis credited the men and women of Eucom who work alongside allies and partners across the dynamic European theater every day pursuing common security interests and as a result, forward defense of the United States.

 "With every action, they are shaping the rapidly changing world we live in today, in order to provide the ensuring capabilities, security structures and trust we need for a stronger world tomorrow," he said.

U.S. UNDER SECRETARY ROSE GOTTEMOELLER REMARKS ON ARMS CONTROL IN THE INFORMATION AGE

The following excerpt is from a U.S. State Department e-mail:

“Arms Control in the Information Age
Remarks Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Mykolas Romeris University
Vilnius, Lithuania
March 2, 2012
Thank you for the kind introduction. It is so wonderful to be back in Vilnius. I was here just over a year ago, shortly after the New START Treaty entered into force. I am happy to report that implementation of that Treaty is now well underway.

New START was just the beginning. President Obama made it clear in his now-famous Prague Speech that the United States is committed to the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. In order to pursue this goal, we know that we are going to have to think bigger and bolder. With this is mind, I have been challenging myself and my colleagues to think about how we use the knowledge of our past together with the new tools of the information age. I look out at a crowd like you and realize that I don’t need to convince you that the technologies of the 21st century are changing the world as we know it. While I may still be figuring out how to use my Ipad, I know it too. That is why I have been talking about arms control in the information age at universities around in the United States.

Today, I will talk to you about our diplomatic toolbox, the changing nature of diplomacy, and the new technologies that can help us on the road to nuclear zero. You all are the first international university to hear this, so I would like to start out saying the same thing I tell students back in the United States—this is not a policy speech, this is an ideas speech.

Tools in the Toolbox
When it comes to pursuing the next steps in nuclear reductions, we have a lot on our plate, and getting to zero is going to take time and heavy effort. There can be no shortcuts. The United States and Russia still have a lot of work to do, as together we still control over 90% of the world’s nuclear stockpile. Proliferation and nuclear terrorism continue to be a serious security threat. And when we come to agreement on disarmament and nonproliferation measures, it will take hard, persistent work to implement those agreements. Even more complicated: the lower the numbers or the smaller the parts, the harder it will be to monitor compliance.

It is clear that we are going to need every tool we have, and many we have not yet developed or even thought of, to fulfill the Prague Agenda. That means the first thing we need to do is take stock of the tools we have in our diplomatic toolbox.

First up in the toolbox is the formal, legally-binding negotiation process, like the one we used for the New START Treaty. This process is responsible for the important Treaties and agreements that undergird our arms control and nonproliferation regime.

In the United States, we also have international agreements that do not require Senate advice and consent; they are called “executive agreements.” They too are legally binding. While these types of agreements are not used for reductions, they could be useful in securing agreements on confidence-building, verification or other actions that may be as important as future treaties.

Another way to makes changes in nuclear posture that was used in the past was through reciprocal actions that two countries take at the same time. The pros of such an approach include speed and flexibility. A con is that such arrangements may not be verifiable and can be reversed as a result of a change in policy.

Progress on reductions is sometimes difficult due to a lack of trust between parties. A solution for this is mutual confidence building measures, or CBMs. These measures help establish lasting stability, while at the same time taking into account each nation’s security interests. CBMs may include exchanging information about the size of the defense budget, giving notification of planned military activities, or even things as simple as issuing invitations for national holidays, cultural and sport events.

An important way to build mutual confidence is to work together on tough problems. One of the great unsung success stories of the early post-Cold War years is how U.S. and Russian scientists, sometimes with other scientists from the then Newly Independent States, worked together to ensure the continued safety and security of fissile material and warheads.

We can also use “alphabet soup” cooperative efforts, like Cooperative Threat Reduction or CTR. Introduced in 1991 by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, the CTR legislation helped destroy a large amount of former Soviet weaponry, including hundreds of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers. The CTR programs continue today and have expanded to tackle the threat posed by terrorist organizations or states seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD) expertise, materials and equipment.
All these efforts will be key parts to moving forward, but it is not just what we have in our toolbox that is important, it is how we use those tools.

21st Century Diplomacy
Diplomacy today is very different than it was at the dawn of the nuclear age. More often diplomacy is happening in the open, and at quicker speeds. The world has changed and we diplomats have to work under new circumstances.

In my own experience, diplomacy has been changing before my eyes. I was a junior member of the U.S. START delegation in 1990-91, an experience that served me well when negotiating the New START Treaty. I remember how things were done back then: masses of paper had to be shuttled among delegation members—we were constantly burning up Xerox machines, and faxes flowed from Geneva to Washington and back. Remember the fax machines? It has disappeared like the dinosaur. In Geneva in 1990, if you had secret and urgent business with Washington, you had to sandwich yourself into a steaming hot secure phone booth and shout to make yourself understood at the other end.

When the New START negotiations began in April 2009, the world had changed. The U.S. and Russian delegations launched into the negotiations committed to keeping them respectful and businesslike, even when we did not agree. And we agreed to disagree in private. That was good considering how easily either delegation could have broadcast negative comments that would have reached Moscow or Washington before we could pick up a phone.

For me, the biggest change in how we did business was email. Instead of making hard copies and waiting days or weeks for the mail, we could get information around the delegation and to our leaders in Washington within hours, even minutes. Both classified and unclassified materials could be sent, decreasing necessary trips back to Washington.

After some discussion, we also agreed to exchange negotiating documents with the Russian team electronically, although on disks and not via email. Still, even CDs made a big difference to after-hours communication. There was a famous story about how in the 1990s, during the START talks, a member of the U.S. delegation had to hurl a satchel of negotiating documents over the fence of the Soviet mission to his counterpart, because no guard was there to open the gates late at night. Obviously, a CD could be handed more easily between the bars of the fence--which we did from time to time.

In my view, these new approaches to a formal negotiating process, especially our new digital toolbox, were a big factor in the fast pace of our negotiations--exactly one year from our first meeting to our last one. No longer bogged down by paper processes, things moved quickly. Nowadays, I don’t have to wait until the next time I travel to Geneva or Moscow to advance business with my counterparts; I can email or call from my home or office, and hopefully soon, I can walk across the hall and have a video-chat in our conference room.

New Technologies and Arms Control
These astonishing advancements in communication technologies over the past decades may not just be useful in diplomacy, they might also be able to aid in the verification of arms control treaties and agreements.

Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. They exchange and share ideas on a wide variety of topics, why not put this vast problem solving entity to good use? Or put another way, how can we use new media technologies by combining them with 222 years of U.S. diplomatic negotiating expertise?

Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, could be broadcast globally in seconds. That means it is harder to hide things. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool and it could help us make sure that countries were following the rules of arms control treaties and agreements.

Open source information technologies improve arms control verification in at least two ways: either as a way of generating new information or as analysis of information that already is out there.

The DARPA Red Balloon Challenge, which you can google, is an example of the first. It demonstrated the enormous potential of social networking to solve problems and also showed how incentives can motivate large populations to work toward a common goal. Applying such ideas to arms control, a country could, for example, show it is complying with a treaty by opening itself to a verification challenge.

A technique like this—I call it a “public verification challenge”—might be especially valuable as we move to lower and lower numbers of nuclear weapons. Governments, in that case, will have an interest in proving that they are meeting their reduction obligations and may want to engage their publics in helping them to make the case.
It will then be necessary to work together to make sure nations cannot spoof or manipulate the verification challenges that they devise—that’s a big problem, but one I am sure you can tackle.

This kind of citizen-run verification and monitoring project could add to the standard international safeguards or verification of a country’s nuclear declaration. Once again, we have to bear in mind that there could be limitations based on the freedoms available to the citizens of said country—an issue to tackle in thinking through this problem.
The Information Age is also creating a greater talent pool of individuals. People can reach a broader, diverse market for their products and services. These private citizens can develop web base applications for e-book readers, cell phones and any touch pad communication devices. This “crowd sourcing” lets everyday people solve problems by getting innovative ideas out of their heads and onto the shelves.

Open source technology could be useful in the hands of inspectors. Smart Phone and tablet apps could be created for the express purpose of aiding in the verification and monitoring process. For example, by having all safeguards and verification sensors in an inspected facility wirelessly connected to the inspector’s iPad, he or she could note anomalies and flag specific items for closer inspections, as well as compare readings in real time and interpret them in context. Some of this is already happening. Another new application idea would take sensor readings and feed them into a 3-D virtual model of a facility, so an inspector could tailor an inspection in real time before he or she even steps inside.

As we think through new ways to use these tools, we should be aware that there may be trouble ahead. We cannot assume that information will always be so readily available. As nations and private entities continue to debate the line between privacy and security, it is possible to imagine that we are living in a golden age of open source information that will be harder to take advantage of in future.

In the end, the goal of using open source information technology and social networks should be to add to our existing arms control verification capabilities, and we will need your help to think about how it can be done.

So, as you have heard, we are thinking about a lot of new concepts. As I said at the outset, this is not about policy; this is about coming up with the bold ideas that will shape policy in the future. As the first set of university students outside the United States that has heard this, you have a head start on helping us find new ways to use the amazing information tools at our disposal to move the world closer to eliminating nuclear weapons.
Thank you again for inviting me here to speak. I would now love to take some questions.”