FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Remarks to Members of the American Chamber of Commerce and Fulbright Economic Teaching Program Participant
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
American Center
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
December 14, 2013
SECRETARY KERRY: Mr. Ambassador, David, thank you very, very much. And thank you so much for your great leadership these past years. Xin chao, Vietnam. I’m very, very happy to be here and to be back. It’s an honor for me to be here with so many people who’ve really been taking part in and contributing to the great transformation and the great success that is taking place here in Vietnam.
I’ll just share a little bit of – a little bit of nostalgia with you. When I first came back here around 1990, this was a very different country. The United States and Vietnam were still very stuck. There was an embargo, and we had not resolved difficult issues that remained from the war. Many of us dreamed of a time back then when we would think of Vietnam not in terms of war, but of only a country and the normal things that countries engage in. And I am proud and pleased to say that today, certainly for me, represents that moment.
The last time I was here was in the year 2000 with President Clinton when we came right after the normalization had taken place, and the embargo had been lifted some years earlier with President Bush, George Herbert Walker Bush. And a number of us – Senator John McCain and myself – were involved in that journey from the beginning. There were very difficult issues to still resolve. We had prisoner of war/missing in action issue which was felt deeply, as it should have been and was, by people all across America. And of course, there were issues here in Vietnam about Agent Orange and the residuals of the war.
I can’t think of two countries that have worked harder, done more, and done better to try to bring themselves together and change history and change the future and provide a future for people which is now very, very different. There are still things to be achieved, things to be done. I’ll say a few words about that. But I can remember when I touched down in Hanoi back then. I could still see all the craters from bombs. There was almost no motorbikes. Everything was a bicycle; very, very few cars. Not a stoplight worked in Hanoi at that point in time, and there were just a couple of hotels. It was a place that had been frozen in time.
No one can help but marvel at the modern Vietnam. What has taken place in just a little over 20 years is extraordinary. And so this is not a transformation that just happens by coincidence, may I say. It’s a product of the commitment and the vision of a lot of people here in this room.
I want to thank David for his job as ambassador and the work that all of our embassy personnel and consular personnel, Foreign Service, Civil Service, local hires, third national country. Everybody joins together as a team and works very, very effectively to do things.
Our ties are growing stronger every day we continue to work. We have the educational exchanges that we talked about today. And I believe that, actually, David participated in not one but I think three educational exchange programs in Asia, just as an example of the background and depth that can help to contribute to these kinds of efforts.
It is, frankly, why the vision of educators and education has been so important to this transformation. And I just want to take a moment to say that I can’t think of anyone who’s done more to help make that happen than the combined team of Tom Vallely and Ben Wilkinson, who are leading Harvard’s – Harvard University’s efforts here in Vietnam, and the Fulbright Economics Teaching Program, a program I was proud to first support as a senator. And we put it in place and it was built into the largest Fulbright program in the world. Today, I think it’s the second-largest program in the world, and we’ve got to see if we can’t make it the largest again if we keep working at it. But I want to thank Tom and Ben for all that they do to contribute to this transformation.
I also want to thank the American Chamber of Commerce, and the American Chamber of Commerce Vietnam and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and industry have also made just a gigantic difference here. AmCham’s experience in Vietnam has really ushered in a new era of cooperation for the bilateral trade agreement in 2001, to the WTO session in 2007, and now we are working on the TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership. I’ll say a word about it.
But just think about this for a minute: Our bilateral trade has grown 50-fold, 50 times since 1995, to more than $25 billion a year now, and we are on track to meet our target of doubling our U.S. exports to Vietnam in five years, which was the goal that President Obama set five years ago. Vietnam has the potential to become one of the United States’ leading economic partners in the region, and we’re going to continue to work at that.
Today, we’re on the doorstep of another great transformation that could open more doors to opportunity, and it could make our partnership much more vibrant, and frankly, could make our markets a lot more energized and rewarding. What I’m talking about are the opportunities that would come from the Trans-Pacific Partnership from the high-standard trade pact that Vietnam and the United States are negotiating with 10 of our Pacific partners. The partnership’s high standards would maintain the momentum that has been created for market reforms, for modernization, for regional integration that the Government of Vietnam has actually made a priority. It will also complement Vietnam’s efforts to transform state-owned enterprises and important sectors of the economy like energy and banking, which will attract greater investment.
And today, I am happy to announce that we will provide an initial $4.2 million for USAID’s Governance for Inclusive Growth. It’s a program to help implement the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This is not aid. I want to make that clear. This is an investment, and it’s an investment in broad-based and sustainable growth.
And I think this is just one more way that the United States wants to support Vietnam as it grows its own role in the global economy. And just think about it; you’ll see it out in the streets walking around. Forty percent of the population here is younger than 25. I was thinking about it as I was driving in, watching all the motorbikes. And I said a lot of the people riding those motorbikes were eight, nine, and ten years old when I was last here, just to give you an example of growth and time passing.
To create high-paying jobs and economic opportunity, there are a number of essential things, and I want to say something about it. You need a free market. You need a free marketplace of ideas. People need to be able to express their thoughts. You need to be able to dare to fail. You need to be able to be creative. You need to be able to talk and promote new ideas about trade and development and creation of new products.
And the United States believes firmly, as we have seen from Slovenia all the way to South Korea, that building a society that is more open and more free is critical to a country’s long-term strength and success. Vietnam has proven that greater openness is a great catalyst for a stronger and more prosperous society, and today Vietnam has an historic opportunity to prove that even further. A commitment to an open internet, to a more open society, to the rights of people to be able to exchange their ideas, to high-quality education, to a business environment that supports innovative companies, and to the protection of individual people’s human rights and their ability to be able to join together, express their views – all of these things create a more vibrant and a more powerful economy as well as a society. It strengthens a country; it doesn’t weaken it. And the United States urges leaders here to embrace that possibility and to protect those rights.
American institutions of higher learning in Vietnam already provide some of the highest-quality education in the world, and I have long supported this program, the Fulbright Economics Teaching Program in Ho Chi Minh City, which has provided a huge number of Vietnamese officials in government now opportunities to study economic policy. And this exchange process is a wonderful way for people to see what the rest of the world is doing and bring back ideas to their own country, and not be afraid of change and of the possibilities of the future.
When I met with today’s foreign minister of Vietnam in New York City – actually, when I met him in Washington – he came to meet me first in Washington – the foreign minister handed me a photo. And I looked at the photo and I saw a young, black-haired, brown-haired John Kerry and a young foreign minister standing together outside of Tuft’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where I first met him on one of these exchanges 30 years ago or 20-whatever years ago.
That’s how it works, folks. And now there are foreign ministers, prime ministers, environment ministers, finance ministers, presidents of countries all over the world who have shared their educational experience in a different place. I’m very pleased that the leadership of the Fulbright Economics Teaching Program is here today, and I look forward to working with the Vietnamese Government to establish a Fulbright University of Vietnam in the near future.
We also see a lot of innovative American companies here, and I had a chance to meet with a number of you who are engaged in entrepreneurial activity. Chad Ovel here today from AA Corporation, which has helped to introduce sustainable forestry to Vietnam and he’s helped to show that we don’t have to choose between being pro-environment and pro-economic; they go hand in hand, and the future will demand that they go hand in hand. The success of Sherry Boger at Intel and Khoa Pham at Microsoft highlights how high standards for intellectual property help to make innovation and job creation possible.
And we just did a wonderful signing ceremony in there with General Electric. General Electric is another American company that is benefitting from growing economic ties but also helping Vietnam to grow at the same time. And GE signed a deal with Vietnam Airlines back in October to sell this country’s flag carrier 1.7 billion in aircraft engines for the Boeing 787 aircraft. And a few minutes ago, as some of you saw, we just signed an agreement worth approximately $94 million for the Cong Le company to provide a second tranche of turbines for a signature wind farm project in Bac Lieu province. This project, with financing that comes from the U.S. Import-Export Bank and the Vietnam Development Bank, will help meet Vietnam’s growing demand for electricity, but it does so bringing clean power generation to the Mekong Delta and can set an example for the ways in which the new energy paradigm can be defined.
So whether – here in Vietnam, whether we are talking about our commitment to economic exchange, greater educational exchange, or our support for young entrepreneurs and a cleaner environment, I’m proud that the United States is putting a full complement of our diplomatic tools to work. And it’s clear that the partnership between Vietnam and the United States is stronger than ever, and most exciting, I am convinced we’re only just beginning. This is the beginning, and there are just enormous possibilities ahead of us. With the continued commitment of all of you in this room and your partners across the country, I am absolutely convinced the bonds between the United States and Vietnam can be the pillars of much greater prosperity and of a shared prosperity for decades to come.
And I’ll tell you something. Years ago, that vision we all had that we wanted to be able to think of Vietnam – when we said the word “Vietnam,” for years and years you’d say, “Vietnam,” and wow, you just thought about a war. And a lot of us didn’t want to do that. Now you say the word “Vietnam” and you think about a country and you think about a very changed playing field where this is one of the growing, contributing, transforming nations of the world. And I think the possibilities for the future are just gigantic. So with the right focus on the openness and freedom of the society, with the right respect for people and their rights, and with the right focus on growth and education, there is no question in my mind that all of that energy and all of that effort invested in trying to set this new direction is going to pay off big-time.
So it’s my honor to be here. Thank you very much, all of you, for joining in this. And thank you particularly to the entrepreneurs who are the ones really making this difference on the ground. It’s great to be with you. Thank you. (Applause.)
Sunday, December 15, 2013
NSF LOOKS AT DIFFERENT WAYS RELATED CORAL SPECIES SURVIVE CLIMATE CHANGE
FROM: NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
Related coral species differ in how they survive climate change effects
Genetic data reveal a tale of two corals
December 12, 2013
Ocean waters warming from climate change are placing coral reefs in jeopardy, but a new discovery suggests that two similar-looking coral species differ in how they survive.
One withstands warmer ocean temperatures better than the other.
"We've found that a previously unrecognized species was hiding some corals' ability to respond to climate change," says Iliana Baums, a biologist at Penn State University.
Baums led the research team that included Jennifer Boulay of Penn State, Jorge Cortes of the University of Costa Rica and Michael Hellberg of Louisiana State University.
A paper describing the discovery is published today in the journal Proceedings of the Royal Society B.
"These scientists have identified a 'cryptic,' or hidden, species in a common group of corals," says Michael Lesser, program director in the National Science Foundation's Division of Ocean Sciences, which funded the research.
"The two corals have very different responses to their environment," says Lesser, "and different interactions with other organisms on coral reefs."
Coral reefs protect shorelines from battering by hurricanes and generate millions of dollars in recreation revenue each year. They also provide habitat for an abundance of species used by humans as seafood and serve as a discovery ground for new medicines.
The researchers sampled the lobe coral Porites lobata in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.
"The environment for reef growth isn't the best in the Eastern Tropical Pacific," says Baums, "due to seasonally cold waters, water chemistry that makes it difficult for corals to lay down their skeletons [low aragonite for calcification], and recurring warm waters from the El Niño Southern Oscillation."
The scientists found an unexpected pattern: two coral species that look deceivingly similar and sometimes live together in the same location.
The samples were not all Porites lobata, as the researchers initially thought. Instead, some belonged to the species Porites evermanni.
"That surprised us," Baums says. "The two look identical, and we thought they were the same coral species, but Porites evermanni has a very different genetic makeup.
"We knew about Porites evermanni--it's not a new species--but we didn't expect to find it in the Eastern Pacific. Usually it's in the waters off the Hawaiian Islands."
Boulay wondered if the two differed in the way they live. She found that Porites evermanni was less susceptible to bleaching than Porites lobata.
Bleaching happens when the symbiotic relationship corals have with single-celled algae inside them breaks apart as water temperatures go up.
"If water temperatures continue to rise, coral species that succumb to bleaching more easily will die," Baums says. "We're going to see a shift in the relative abundance, for example, of these two Porites species."
Boulay found other important differences: Porites evermanni had many genetically identical clones, which means that the species is reproducing asexually by breaking apart, although Porites lobata did not.
The clonally-reproducing Porites evermanni also, on average, housed many more tiny mussels that lived in its skeletons. The mussels poked through the surface of the corals and formed keyhole-shaped openings.
The researchers then wanted to determine the connection between Porites evermanni's ability to clonally reproduce and its interactions with mussels and with other members of the reef community.
Jorge Cortes remembered that several years ago a scientist had reported finding that some corals are a target of biting triggerfish.
"That was the missing piece," Baums says. "We realized that triggerfish were eating the mussels inside the coral skeletons. To get at the mussels, the fish have to bite the coral.
"They then spit out the fragments, and those fragments land on the ocean floor and grow into new coral colonies.
"No one had realized how important fish might be in helping corals reproduce. Now there's evidence that triggerfish attacks on Porites evermanni result in asexual reproduction--the coral fragments cloning themselves."
The other coral species, Porites lobata, has fewer mussels and reproduces sexually through its larvae.
It takes two to tango, Baums says, so usually you need a partner. "But in areas of the Eastern Pacific Ocean that are so harsh that only a few individuals can survive, it might be easier for the coral to clone itself."
As for the difference in bleaching, there are two possible explanations, the scientists believe.
One is that the symbiotic algae that live in the coral species are different, and one can withstand hotter temperatures. "Just like in your garden: the tomatoes like the heat more than the cauliflower does," says Baums.
Another possibility is that the difference is not in the symbiotic algae, but in the corals themselves.
"There's been a lot of attention given to how different symbiotic algae react to increases in water temperatures and whether, if a coral species could switch to hardier algae, it could survive in hotter waters," Baums says.
But what the researchers found suggests a different scenario. Although the two Porites corals have the same symbiotic algae species, bleaching still differs.
It may be the corals themselves instead of their symbiotic algae that contribute to bleaching.
A tale of two corals, and a tale, perhaps, of more than two factors.
-NSF-
Related coral species differ in how they survive climate change effects
Genetic data reveal a tale of two corals
December 12, 2013
Ocean waters warming from climate change are placing coral reefs in jeopardy, but a new discovery suggests that two similar-looking coral species differ in how they survive.
One withstands warmer ocean temperatures better than the other.
"We've found that a previously unrecognized species was hiding some corals' ability to respond to climate change," says Iliana Baums, a biologist at Penn State University.
Baums led the research team that included Jennifer Boulay of Penn State, Jorge Cortes of the University of Costa Rica and Michael Hellberg of Louisiana State University.
A paper describing the discovery is published today in the journal Proceedings of the Royal Society B.
"These scientists have identified a 'cryptic,' or hidden, species in a common group of corals," says Michael Lesser, program director in the National Science Foundation's Division of Ocean Sciences, which funded the research.
"The two corals have very different responses to their environment," says Lesser, "and different interactions with other organisms on coral reefs."
Coral reefs protect shorelines from battering by hurricanes and generate millions of dollars in recreation revenue each year. They also provide habitat for an abundance of species used by humans as seafood and serve as a discovery ground for new medicines.
The researchers sampled the lobe coral Porites lobata in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.
"The environment for reef growth isn't the best in the Eastern Tropical Pacific," says Baums, "due to seasonally cold waters, water chemistry that makes it difficult for corals to lay down their skeletons [low aragonite for calcification], and recurring warm waters from the El Niño Southern Oscillation."
The scientists found an unexpected pattern: two coral species that look deceivingly similar and sometimes live together in the same location.
The samples were not all Porites lobata, as the researchers initially thought. Instead, some belonged to the species Porites evermanni.
"That surprised us," Baums says. "The two look identical, and we thought they were the same coral species, but Porites evermanni has a very different genetic makeup.
"We knew about Porites evermanni--it's not a new species--but we didn't expect to find it in the Eastern Pacific. Usually it's in the waters off the Hawaiian Islands."
Boulay wondered if the two differed in the way they live. She found that Porites evermanni was less susceptible to bleaching than Porites lobata.
Bleaching happens when the symbiotic relationship corals have with single-celled algae inside them breaks apart as water temperatures go up.
"If water temperatures continue to rise, coral species that succumb to bleaching more easily will die," Baums says. "We're going to see a shift in the relative abundance, for example, of these two Porites species."
Boulay found other important differences: Porites evermanni had many genetically identical clones, which means that the species is reproducing asexually by breaking apart, although Porites lobata did not.
The clonally-reproducing Porites evermanni also, on average, housed many more tiny mussels that lived in its skeletons. The mussels poked through the surface of the corals and formed keyhole-shaped openings.
The researchers then wanted to determine the connection between Porites evermanni's ability to clonally reproduce and its interactions with mussels and with other members of the reef community.
Jorge Cortes remembered that several years ago a scientist had reported finding that some corals are a target of biting triggerfish.
"That was the missing piece," Baums says. "We realized that triggerfish were eating the mussels inside the coral skeletons. To get at the mussels, the fish have to bite the coral.
"They then spit out the fragments, and those fragments land on the ocean floor and grow into new coral colonies.
"No one had realized how important fish might be in helping corals reproduce. Now there's evidence that triggerfish attacks on Porites evermanni result in asexual reproduction--the coral fragments cloning themselves."
The other coral species, Porites lobata, has fewer mussels and reproduces sexually through its larvae.
It takes two to tango, Baums says, so usually you need a partner. "But in areas of the Eastern Pacific Ocean that are so harsh that only a few individuals can survive, it might be easier for the coral to clone itself."
As for the difference in bleaching, there are two possible explanations, the scientists believe.
One is that the symbiotic algae that live in the coral species are different, and one can withstand hotter temperatures. "Just like in your garden: the tomatoes like the heat more than the cauliflower does," says Baums.
Another possibility is that the difference is not in the symbiotic algae, but in the corals themselves.
"There's been a lot of attention given to how different symbiotic algae react to increases in water temperatures and whether, if a coral species could switch to hardier algae, it could survive in hotter waters," Baums says.
But what the researchers found suggests a different scenario. Although the two Porites corals have the same symbiotic algae species, bleaching still differs.
It may be the corals themselves instead of their symbiotic algae that contribute to bleaching.
A tale of two corals, and a tale, perhaps, of more than two factors.
-NSF-
Saturday, December 14, 2013
RECENT U.S. AIR FORCE PHOTOS
FROM: U.S. AIR FORCE
An F-15 Eagle assigned to Barnes Air National Guard Base, Westfield, Mass., takes off Dec. 7, 2013, from Westover Air Reserve Base at Chicopee, Mass., heading toward an annual exercise in Florida. The jets flew training missions out of Westover ARB for approximately six months while the runway at Barnes Municipal Airport was undergoing several months of repairs. The F-15 is an extremely maneuverable, all-weather tactical fighter designed to permit the Air Force gain and maintain air superiority. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Kelly Goonan)
Toy Drop: Army paratroopers float to the ground after successfully jumping from a C-130 Hercules Dec. 7, 2013, in support of Operation Toy Drop at Fort Bragg, N.C. The 16th Annual Randy Oler Operation Toy Drop, hosted by the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), is the largest combined airborne operation in the world. During the event, Fort Bragg’s paratroopers and allied jumpmasters donate toys to be distributed to children’s homes and social service agencies across the local community. (U.S. Air Force photo/Airman 1st Class Logan Brandt)
STATE DEPARTMENT FACT SHEET: GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE (GPOI)
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
Fact Sheet
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
December 13, 2013
The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a U.S. Government-funded security assistance program working to meet the growing global demand for specially trained personnel to conduct international peace operations by building the capabilities of U.S. partner countries to train and sustain peacekeepers; increasing the number of capable military troops and formed police units available for deployment; and facilitating the preparation, logistical support, and deployment of peacekeepers. GPOI promotes international peace and security, saving lives while reducing the burden on U.S. military forces, and helping set the stage for post-conflict recovery around the world.
GPOI currently partners with 69 countries and regional organizations. Through these partnerships, GPOI implementers have:
Facilitated the training of 228,658 foreign military personnel to serve on international peacekeeping missions through both direct training activities (176,047 peacekeepers) and enabling the indigenous training by GPOI partner countries (52,611 peacekeepers);
Supported 45 national and regional peace operations training centers and three regional headquarters for the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), as well as financial, technical, and staffing support to the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), an Italian-led center to facilitate the training of stability/formed police unit trainers.
Facilitated the deployment of 180,223 personnel from 38 countries to 25 operations around the world. Currently, there are over 116,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from 115 countries serving in 15 UN peacekeeping operations deployed on four continents.
GPOI is managed by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which works in close coordination with the Department of State regional bureaus, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, Regional Combatant Commands, and other DoD organizations, to develop regional program plans and implement train and equip activities with partner nations worldwide.
GPOI was launched in 2005 as the U.S. contribution to the G8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations, adopted at the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit.
The primary objective of GPOI in FY 2005-2009 was to train and equip at least 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010. GPOI implementers met and surpassed this target, training nearly 87,000 peacekeepers by September 30, 2009. More than 77,000 of this total were African troops trained through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. In GPOI’s current activities, program emphasis has shifted from the direct training of peacekeepers by U.S. personnel to building sustainable, self-sufficient, national training capabilities by partner countries, with the target of facilitating training for an additional 242,500 troops.
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
Fact Sheet
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
December 13, 2013
The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a U.S. Government-funded security assistance program working to meet the growing global demand for specially trained personnel to conduct international peace operations by building the capabilities of U.S. partner countries to train and sustain peacekeepers; increasing the number of capable military troops and formed police units available for deployment; and facilitating the preparation, logistical support, and deployment of peacekeepers. GPOI promotes international peace and security, saving lives while reducing the burden on U.S. military forces, and helping set the stage for post-conflict recovery around the world.
GPOI currently partners with 69 countries and regional organizations. Through these partnerships, GPOI implementers have:
Facilitated the training of 228,658 foreign military personnel to serve on international peacekeeping missions through both direct training activities (176,047 peacekeepers) and enabling the indigenous training by GPOI partner countries (52,611 peacekeepers);
Supported 45 national and regional peace operations training centers and three regional headquarters for the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), as well as financial, technical, and staffing support to the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), an Italian-led center to facilitate the training of stability/formed police unit trainers.
Facilitated the deployment of 180,223 personnel from 38 countries to 25 operations around the world. Currently, there are over 116,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from 115 countries serving in 15 UN peacekeeping operations deployed on four continents.
GPOI is managed by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which works in close coordination with the Department of State regional bureaus, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, Regional Combatant Commands, and other DoD organizations, to develop regional program plans and implement train and equip activities with partner nations worldwide.
GPOI was launched in 2005 as the U.S. contribution to the G8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations, adopted at the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit.
The primary objective of GPOI in FY 2005-2009 was to train and equip at least 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010. GPOI implementers met and surpassed this target, training nearly 87,000 peacekeepers by September 30, 2009. More than 77,000 of this total were African troops trained through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. In GPOI’s current activities, program emphasis has shifted from the direct training of peacekeepers by U.S. personnel to building sustainable, self-sufficient, national training capabilities by partner countries, with the target of facilitating training for an additional 242,500 troops.
EX-IM BANK BOARD ADOPTS REVISED ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
FROM: U.S. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK
Washington, DC — The board of directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) this week adopted revisions to its environmental procedures and guidelines governing high-carbon intensity projects, aligning the Bank with President Obama’s goal of reducing carbon pollution, while maintaining the Bank’s focus on continuing to help create and support American export-related jobs.
“No one has been more supportive of U.S. exports and the American jobs they produce and maintain than this Bank and this board. Since 2009, we have supported nearly 1.2 million jobs.” said Fred P. Hochberg, Ex-Im chairman and president. “We can’t do it, however, without considering the environmental costs associated with transactions.”
The revised guidelines adopted today require carbon capture and storage in most countries in order to secure Bank financing for coal-fired power plants, but would provide flexibility for the Bank with respect to the important energy needs of the poorest countries in the world.
The policy revisions were drafted by Ex-Im Bank staff and reviewed extensively by exporters, the public, leading environmental groups, the Administration and other federal agencies through an extensive and transparent vetting process.
“The Bank engages in an important balancing act — in supporting our exporters, we have to weigh the potential impacts on the environment associated with our financing,” Hochberg said. “This balancing act is a Congressional mandate, is a directive in our Charter, is part of our mission and it is something we at the Bank take seriously.”
Hochberg noted that: “Our proposed guidelines would balance the Bank’s obligations to its many different stakeholders and also its efforts to support the growth of export-related U.S. jobs.”
“Without guidelines or limits, ever-increasing numbers of new coal plants worldwide will just continue to emit more carbon pollution into the air we breathe,” said Hochberg. “But America cannot do this alone. I strongly support the Administration’s efforts to build an international consensus such that other nations follow our lead in restricting financing of new coal-fired power plants.”
Ex-Im has been a leader among the world’s export credit agencies (ECAs) in adopting measures to protect the environment while financing exports.
· In 1995 the Bank was the first ECA to adopt environmental procedures and guidelines governing its export financing.
· In 1999 the Bank began tracking and publicly reporting projected carbon emissions produced by projects it financed. Even today Ex-Im is the only ECA that tracks and reports carbon emissions.
· In 2009 the Bank approved a formal carbon policy, and in 2010 it approved supplemental guidelines for high-carbon intensity projects.
The guideline revisions approved today are not designed to impact mining projects or coal exports produced by American coal miners. Ex-Im staff have worked with other agencies to ensure that the flexibility of these guidelines would be consistent with those of other federal agencies.
In addition to approving the revisions to its environmental guidelines, the board today approved seven transactions that together will support more than 11,200 U.S. export-related jobs.
Washington, DC — The board of directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) this week adopted revisions to its environmental procedures and guidelines governing high-carbon intensity projects, aligning the Bank with President Obama’s goal of reducing carbon pollution, while maintaining the Bank’s focus on continuing to help create and support American export-related jobs.
“No one has been more supportive of U.S. exports and the American jobs they produce and maintain than this Bank and this board. Since 2009, we have supported nearly 1.2 million jobs.” said Fred P. Hochberg, Ex-Im chairman and president. “We can’t do it, however, without considering the environmental costs associated with transactions.”
The revised guidelines adopted today require carbon capture and storage in most countries in order to secure Bank financing for coal-fired power plants, but would provide flexibility for the Bank with respect to the important energy needs of the poorest countries in the world.
The policy revisions were drafted by Ex-Im Bank staff and reviewed extensively by exporters, the public, leading environmental groups, the Administration and other federal agencies through an extensive and transparent vetting process.
“The Bank engages in an important balancing act — in supporting our exporters, we have to weigh the potential impacts on the environment associated with our financing,” Hochberg said. “This balancing act is a Congressional mandate, is a directive in our Charter, is part of our mission and it is something we at the Bank take seriously.”
Hochberg noted that: “Our proposed guidelines would balance the Bank’s obligations to its many different stakeholders and also its efforts to support the growth of export-related U.S. jobs.”
“Without guidelines or limits, ever-increasing numbers of new coal plants worldwide will just continue to emit more carbon pollution into the air we breathe,” said Hochberg. “But America cannot do this alone. I strongly support the Administration’s efforts to build an international consensus such that other nations follow our lead in restricting financing of new coal-fired power plants.”
Ex-Im has been a leader among the world’s export credit agencies (ECAs) in adopting measures to protect the environment while financing exports.
· In 1995 the Bank was the first ECA to adopt environmental procedures and guidelines governing its export financing.
· In 1999 the Bank began tracking and publicly reporting projected carbon emissions produced by projects it financed. Even today Ex-Im is the only ECA that tracks and reports carbon emissions.
· In 2009 the Bank approved a formal carbon policy, and in 2010 it approved supplemental guidelines for high-carbon intensity projects.
The guideline revisions approved today are not designed to impact mining projects or coal exports produced by American coal miners. Ex-Im staff have worked with other agencies to ensure that the flexibility of these guidelines would be consistent with those of other federal agencies.
In addition to approving the revisions to its environmental guidelines, the board today approved seven transactions that together will support more than 11,200 U.S. export-related jobs.
RECENT DOD PHOTOS FROM AFGHANISTAN
FROM: U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
A U.S. soldier, along with Afghan army commandos, conduct a clearance operation of Perozi village in Panjwai district in Kandahar province, Afghanistan, Dec. 4, 2013. The soldier is assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan. U.S. Army Photo by Staff Sgt. Bertha A. Flores.
An Afghan army commando uses a metal detector to scan an area thought to contain improvised explosive devices during a clearance operation of Perozi village in Panjwai district in Kandahar province, Afghanistan, Dec. 4, 2013. The Afghan soldier, an engineer, is assigned to 2nd Company, 3rd Special Operations Kandak. U.S. Army Photo by Staff Sgt. Bertha A. Flore
STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S TESTIMONY ON P5+1 JOINT PLAN OF ACTION WITH IRAN
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Assessing the P5+1 Joint Plan of Action With Iran
Testimony
Wendy R. Sherman
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Written Statement Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Washington, DC
December 12, 2013
Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Crapo, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss the details of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) concluded with Iran and our P5+1 partners on November 24 in Geneva.
Let me begin by noting that the diplomatic opportunity before us is a direct result of the cooperation between Congress and the Administration to put in place and implement a comprehensive and unprecedented sanctions regime designed to press Iran to address international concerns with its nuclear program.
Our collaboration on sanctions is what brought Iran to the table. However, it is important to underscore that what we do from this point forward is just as critical, if not more so, in terms of testing Iran’s intentions. In that regard, I look forward to our consultations over the important weeks and months ahead.
Today, I want to give you the facts about what was agreed to in Geneva, so you can judge the merits of the JPA for yourself.
Iran Commitments
We have long recognized that the Iranian nuclear program constitutes one of the most serious threats to U.S. national security and our interests in the Middle East. Thanks to the sanctions pressure, and a firm and united position from the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, UK, U.S. and Germany, in coordination with the EU), we have reached an understanding that constitutes the most significant effort to halt the advance of Iran’s nuclear program in nearly a decade. As a consequence, the JPA agreed to in Geneva is profoundly in America’s national security interest, and makes our regional partners safer and more secure.
The JPA is sequenced, with a 6-month period designed explicitly to block near-term Iranian pathways to a nuclear weapon, while creating space for a long-term comprehensive solution. The goal of that comprehensive solution is to resolve the international community’s concerns with Iran’s nuclear program. What this initial plan does is help ensure that Iran’s nuclear program cannot advance while negotiations towards that solution proceed.
Upon implementation in the coming weeks, this initial step will immediately: halt progress of the Iranian nuclear program; roll it back in key respects; and introduce unprecedented monitoring into Iran’s nuclear activities. Taken together, these measures will prevent Iran from enhancing its ability to create a nuclear weapon and increase the confidence in our ability to detect any move towards nuclear break-out or diversion of material towards a covert program.
The details demonstrate why this is the case. First, as stated, Iran must halt the progress of its enrichment program. This means, under the express terms of the JPA, that Iran cannot increase its enrichment capacity. Iran’s stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cannot grow – it will be the same amount or less at the end of the six month period as it is as the beginning. Iran cannot build new enrichment facilities for the production of enriched uranium. Iran cannot install additional centrifuges of any type in their production facilities, operate more centrifuges, nor replace existing centrifuges with more advanced types. Moreover, Iran must limit centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines; thus Iran cannot expand its stockpile of centrifuges.
Second, during this initial phase, Iran will roll back or neutralize key aspects of its program. Iran must cease all enrichment over five percent. The piping at Fordow and Natanz that is used to more efficiently enrich uranium over five percent must be dismantled. Iran must neutralize its entire 20 percent stockpile of enriched uranium hexafluoride by diluting it to a lower level of enriched uranium hexafluoride or converting it to oxide for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.
Finally, Iran cannot advance work on the plutonium track. At Arak, Iran cannot commission the heavy water reactor under construction nor transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site. Iran cannot test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor nor install remaining components for the reactor. Iran cannot construct a facility for reprocessing spent fuel. Without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate plutonium from spent fuel and therefore cannot obtain any plutonium for use in a nuclear weapon. As such, this first step freezes the timeline for beginning operations at the Arak reactor and halts progress on any plutonium pathway to a weapon.
Significantly, the monitoring measures outlined in the JPA will provide much more timely warning of a breakout at Iran’s declared enrichment facilities and add new checks against the diversion of equipment for any potential covert enrichment program. Some have rightfully asked why we should trust Iran to live up to these commitments. As Secretary Kerry has said, the JPA is not based on trust, it is based on verification – and the verification mechanisms set forth in the JPA are unprecedented.
Under its express terms, Iran must permit daily access by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to the facilities at Natanz and Fordow and allow more frequent access to the Arak reactor. Iran must allow IAEA inspectors access to sites related to centrifuge assembly and production of centrifuge rotors (both key aspects of the program). Iran must allow IAEA inspectors access to uranium mines and mills. Iran must provide design information for the Arak heavy water reactor. These monitoring mechanisms will provide additional warning of breakout or diversion of equipment all along the nuclear fuel cycle and would not be in place without the understanding reached in Geneva.
In summary, even in its initial phase, the JPA stops any advances in each of the potential pathways to a weapon that has long concerned us and our closest allies. It eliminates Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride. It stops installation of additional centrifuges at production facilities, especially Iran’s most advanced centrifuge design, together with freezing further accumulation of 3.5 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride. And it ensures that the Arak reactor cannot be brought on line while we negotiate a comprehensive solution.
P5+1 Commitments
In return for these concrete actions by Iran and as Iran takes the required steps, the P5+1 will provide limited, temporary, and reversible relief while maintaining the core architecture of our sanctions regime – including key oil and banking sanctions. And we will vigorously enforce these and all other existing sanctions.
We estimate that this limited relief will provide approximately $6-7 billion in revenue.
First, we will hold steady Iran’s exports of crude oil at levels that are down over 60 percent since 2011. This means that Iran will continue to lose $4-5 billion per month while the JPA is in effect compared to 2011. Let me be clear, however. We will not allow Iran’s exports to increase and we will continue collaboration with our international partners to ensure that they understand that any increases in Iranian oil purchases – or any new purchases of Iranian oil – remain subject to sanctions.
Second, we are prepared to allow Iran to access $4.2 billion in its restricted assets, not in a lump sum, but in monthly allocations that keep up with verified Iranian progress on its nuclear commitments. Remember, Iran will continue to lose $4-5 billion a month due to our oil sanctions compared to 2011, so this access to funds is less than one month of those losses. And this is a fraction of Iran’s total needs for imports or its budget shortfall.
Third, the P5+1 agreed to suspend certain sanctions on gold and precious metals, Iran’s auto sector and on Iran’s petrochemical exports. The suspension of the sanctions on gold and precious metals will not allow Iran to use restricted assets to purchase gold and precious metals, rather it allows Iranians to import and export gold and precious metals. The suspension of the sanctions on the auto industry will allow Iran to obtain support and services from third countries for the assembly and manufacturing of light and heavy vehicles. The suspension of sanctions on petrochemical exports means Iran will be able to sell petrochemicals and retain the revenues from these sales. We estimate that Iran will earn approximately $1.5 billion in revenue from the temporary suspension of these sanctions.
We will also license the supply and installation of spare parts for the safety of flight for airplanes to occur in Iran. We will also license safety inspections and related services to occur in Iran. Notably, this will not apply to any airline subject to sanctions under our counter-terrorism authorities.
In addition, solely for the financing of humanitarian transactions and tuition assistance for Iranians studying abroad, we will facilitate access to Iran’s overseas accounts for these specific transactions. Even before the JPA, we never intended to deprive the Iranian people of humanitarian goods, like food and medicine. In fact, Congress has explicitly exempted these transactions from sanctions.
There have been some that have incorrectly represented the limited relief as being far more. So, let me reiterate. The total relief envisioned in the JPA amounts to between $6-7 billion – nowhere near the $20 or $40 billion that some have reported. The total relief for Iran envisioned in the JPA would be a modest fraction of the approximately $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings that are inaccessible or restricted because of our ongoing sanctions pressure. This sanctions pressure, moreover, will continue to increase over the six months of this initial phase through the continued enforcement of our sanctions.
Continued Enforcement of Sanctions
It is important to understand that the overwhelming majority of our sanctions remain in place and we will continue to vigorously enforce those sanctions to ensure that Iran receives only the limited relief that we agreed to. This will include aggressive enforcement of sanctions under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), the Iran Sanctions Act, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012. This means that sanctions will continue to apply to broad swaths of Iran’s economy including its energy, financial, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors. By rigorous monitoring we will also prevent abuse of the relief that is part of the JPA. Were we to see increased purchases of oil or sanctions evasion, we are prepared to act swiftly to sanction the offenders.
Moreover, the U.S. trade embargo remains in place and U.N. Security Council’s sanctions remain in place. All sanctions related to Iran’s military program, state sponsorship of terrorism, and human rights abuses and censorship remain in place. Our vigilance will continue.
What is also important to understand is that we remain in control. If Iran fails to live up to its commitments as agreed to in Geneva, we would be prepared to work with Congress to ramp up sanctions. In that situation, we would be well-positioned to maximize the impact of any new sanctions because we would likely have the support of the international community, which is essential for any increased pressure to work
In comparison, moving forward on new sanctions now would derail the promising and yet-to-be-tested first step outlined above, alienate us from our allies, and risk unraveling the international cohesion that has proven so essential to ensuring our sanctions have the intended effect.
The Way Ahead
In assessing this deal on the merits, we must compare where we would be without it.
Without the JPA, Iran’s program would continue to advance: Iran could spin thousands of additional centrifuges; install and spin next-generation centrifuges that reduce its breakout times; advance on the plutonium track by fueling and commissioning the Arak heavy water reactor and install remaining components ; and grow its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride. It could do all of that, moreover, without the new inspections that are part of this deal and give us new tools to help detect breakout.
With the JPA, we halt the program in its tracks, roll it back in key respects, and put time on the clock to negotiate a long-term, comprehensive solution with strict limits and verifiable assurances that Iran’s nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.
In a perfect world, we could get to such a comprehensive solution right away. But the reality is that in the absence of the JPA, we would have had an Iranian nuclear program that could double its enrichment capacity, grow its stockpile of enriched uranium, and make progress on starting up the Arak reactor.
We are now moving forward to prepare for implementation. This week, our experts are in Vienna discussing with their P5+1 counterparts, Iran, and the IAEA, the mechanisms and timeframes for beginning implementation and setting a start date. These are technical and complex discussions, and it is critical that we do them well and right -- working to protect our national security interests at every step along the way.
At the same time, the JPA and its implementation is only a first step. There are still many issues related to Iran’s nuclear program that must be addressed, and in the process, Iran must work with the IAEA to resolve all past and present issues of concern. That is why our ultimate aim is a comprehensive agreement that fully addresses all of our longstanding concerns.
Conclusion
Finally, let me be clear about one thing: Our policy with regard to Iran has not changed. The President has been clear that he will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapon. While his strong preference is for a diplomatic solution, he is prepared to use all elements of American power to prevent that outcome.
Our commitment to working with our partners, in the region and elsewhere, to hold Iran accountable for all its actions also remains firm. These negotiations will solely focus on Iran’s nuclear program. So we will continue to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. We will continue to hold Iran accountable for its support for terrorism. Iran remains listed as a State Sponsor of Terror and our sanctions for their support of terror remain in place.
Our sanctions on Iran’s human rights abusers will also continue and so will our support for the fundamental rights of all Iranians. Last week, National Security Advisor Rice reiterated our support for the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and called on Iran to allow him to visit Iran. We will continue to speak forcefully for the oppressed inside Iran, including through our support, later this month, for a resolution before the UN General Assembly condemning Iran’s human rights practices
We call on Iran to release Saeed Abedini and Amir Hekmati and support our efforts to bring Robert Levinson home. As Secretary Kerry has said, one day is too long to be in captivity, and one day for any American citizen is more than any American wants to see somebody endure. Mr. Abedini, Mr. Hekmati, and Mr. Levinson have been gone too long and we will continue to do everything we can, using quiet diplomacy.
And we will prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. That is what these negotiations are all about. We have been encouraged that nearly 70 countries have expressed support for the understandings reached in Geneva, including statements of support from our partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council, with whom we remain closely engaged. The sentiment from our partners has been clear: give this process a chance. If Iran lives up to its commitments then the world will become a safer place. If it does not, then we retain all options to ensure that Iran can never obtain a nuclear weapon. The coming months will be a test of Iranian intentions, and of the possibility for a peaceful resolution to this crisis.
Throughout, and as always, we look forward to working closely with the Congress to ensure that U.S. national security interests are protected and advanced.
Thank you.
Assessing the P5+1 Joint Plan of Action With Iran
Testimony
Wendy R. Sherman
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Written Statement Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Washington, DC
December 12, 2013
Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Crapo, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss the details of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) concluded with Iran and our P5+1 partners on November 24 in Geneva.
Let me begin by noting that the diplomatic opportunity before us is a direct result of the cooperation between Congress and the Administration to put in place and implement a comprehensive and unprecedented sanctions regime designed to press Iran to address international concerns with its nuclear program.
Our collaboration on sanctions is what brought Iran to the table. However, it is important to underscore that what we do from this point forward is just as critical, if not more so, in terms of testing Iran’s intentions. In that regard, I look forward to our consultations over the important weeks and months ahead.
Today, I want to give you the facts about what was agreed to in Geneva, so you can judge the merits of the JPA for yourself.
Iran Commitments
We have long recognized that the Iranian nuclear program constitutes one of the most serious threats to U.S. national security and our interests in the Middle East. Thanks to the sanctions pressure, and a firm and united position from the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, UK, U.S. and Germany, in coordination with the EU), we have reached an understanding that constitutes the most significant effort to halt the advance of Iran’s nuclear program in nearly a decade. As a consequence, the JPA agreed to in Geneva is profoundly in America’s national security interest, and makes our regional partners safer and more secure.
The JPA is sequenced, with a 6-month period designed explicitly to block near-term Iranian pathways to a nuclear weapon, while creating space for a long-term comprehensive solution. The goal of that comprehensive solution is to resolve the international community’s concerns with Iran’s nuclear program. What this initial plan does is help ensure that Iran’s nuclear program cannot advance while negotiations towards that solution proceed.
Upon implementation in the coming weeks, this initial step will immediately: halt progress of the Iranian nuclear program; roll it back in key respects; and introduce unprecedented monitoring into Iran’s nuclear activities. Taken together, these measures will prevent Iran from enhancing its ability to create a nuclear weapon and increase the confidence in our ability to detect any move towards nuclear break-out or diversion of material towards a covert program.
The details demonstrate why this is the case. First, as stated, Iran must halt the progress of its enrichment program. This means, under the express terms of the JPA, that Iran cannot increase its enrichment capacity. Iran’s stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cannot grow – it will be the same amount or less at the end of the six month period as it is as the beginning. Iran cannot build new enrichment facilities for the production of enriched uranium. Iran cannot install additional centrifuges of any type in their production facilities, operate more centrifuges, nor replace existing centrifuges with more advanced types. Moreover, Iran must limit centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines; thus Iran cannot expand its stockpile of centrifuges.
Second, during this initial phase, Iran will roll back or neutralize key aspects of its program. Iran must cease all enrichment over five percent. The piping at Fordow and Natanz that is used to more efficiently enrich uranium over five percent must be dismantled. Iran must neutralize its entire 20 percent stockpile of enriched uranium hexafluoride by diluting it to a lower level of enriched uranium hexafluoride or converting it to oxide for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.
Finally, Iran cannot advance work on the plutonium track. At Arak, Iran cannot commission the heavy water reactor under construction nor transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site. Iran cannot test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor nor install remaining components for the reactor. Iran cannot construct a facility for reprocessing spent fuel. Without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate plutonium from spent fuel and therefore cannot obtain any plutonium for use in a nuclear weapon. As such, this first step freezes the timeline for beginning operations at the Arak reactor and halts progress on any plutonium pathway to a weapon.
Significantly, the monitoring measures outlined in the JPA will provide much more timely warning of a breakout at Iran’s declared enrichment facilities and add new checks against the diversion of equipment for any potential covert enrichment program. Some have rightfully asked why we should trust Iran to live up to these commitments. As Secretary Kerry has said, the JPA is not based on trust, it is based on verification – and the verification mechanisms set forth in the JPA are unprecedented.
Under its express terms, Iran must permit daily access by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to the facilities at Natanz and Fordow and allow more frequent access to the Arak reactor. Iran must allow IAEA inspectors access to sites related to centrifuge assembly and production of centrifuge rotors (both key aspects of the program). Iran must allow IAEA inspectors access to uranium mines and mills. Iran must provide design information for the Arak heavy water reactor. These monitoring mechanisms will provide additional warning of breakout or diversion of equipment all along the nuclear fuel cycle and would not be in place without the understanding reached in Geneva.
In summary, even in its initial phase, the JPA stops any advances in each of the potential pathways to a weapon that has long concerned us and our closest allies. It eliminates Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride. It stops installation of additional centrifuges at production facilities, especially Iran’s most advanced centrifuge design, together with freezing further accumulation of 3.5 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride. And it ensures that the Arak reactor cannot be brought on line while we negotiate a comprehensive solution.
P5+1 Commitments
In return for these concrete actions by Iran and as Iran takes the required steps, the P5+1 will provide limited, temporary, and reversible relief while maintaining the core architecture of our sanctions regime – including key oil and banking sanctions. And we will vigorously enforce these and all other existing sanctions.
We estimate that this limited relief will provide approximately $6-7 billion in revenue.
First, we will hold steady Iran’s exports of crude oil at levels that are down over 60 percent since 2011. This means that Iran will continue to lose $4-5 billion per month while the JPA is in effect compared to 2011. Let me be clear, however. We will not allow Iran’s exports to increase and we will continue collaboration with our international partners to ensure that they understand that any increases in Iranian oil purchases – or any new purchases of Iranian oil – remain subject to sanctions.
Second, we are prepared to allow Iran to access $4.2 billion in its restricted assets, not in a lump sum, but in monthly allocations that keep up with verified Iranian progress on its nuclear commitments. Remember, Iran will continue to lose $4-5 billion a month due to our oil sanctions compared to 2011, so this access to funds is less than one month of those losses. And this is a fraction of Iran’s total needs for imports or its budget shortfall.
Third, the P5+1 agreed to suspend certain sanctions on gold and precious metals, Iran’s auto sector and on Iran’s petrochemical exports. The suspension of the sanctions on gold and precious metals will not allow Iran to use restricted assets to purchase gold and precious metals, rather it allows Iranians to import and export gold and precious metals. The suspension of the sanctions on the auto industry will allow Iran to obtain support and services from third countries for the assembly and manufacturing of light and heavy vehicles. The suspension of sanctions on petrochemical exports means Iran will be able to sell petrochemicals and retain the revenues from these sales. We estimate that Iran will earn approximately $1.5 billion in revenue from the temporary suspension of these sanctions.
We will also license the supply and installation of spare parts for the safety of flight for airplanes to occur in Iran. We will also license safety inspections and related services to occur in Iran. Notably, this will not apply to any airline subject to sanctions under our counter-terrorism authorities.
In addition, solely for the financing of humanitarian transactions and tuition assistance for Iranians studying abroad, we will facilitate access to Iran’s overseas accounts for these specific transactions. Even before the JPA, we never intended to deprive the Iranian people of humanitarian goods, like food and medicine. In fact, Congress has explicitly exempted these transactions from sanctions.
There have been some that have incorrectly represented the limited relief as being far more. So, let me reiterate. The total relief envisioned in the JPA amounts to between $6-7 billion – nowhere near the $20 or $40 billion that some have reported. The total relief for Iran envisioned in the JPA would be a modest fraction of the approximately $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings that are inaccessible or restricted because of our ongoing sanctions pressure. This sanctions pressure, moreover, will continue to increase over the six months of this initial phase through the continued enforcement of our sanctions.
Continued Enforcement of Sanctions
It is important to understand that the overwhelming majority of our sanctions remain in place and we will continue to vigorously enforce those sanctions to ensure that Iran receives only the limited relief that we agreed to. This will include aggressive enforcement of sanctions under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), the Iran Sanctions Act, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012. This means that sanctions will continue to apply to broad swaths of Iran’s economy including its energy, financial, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors. By rigorous monitoring we will also prevent abuse of the relief that is part of the JPA. Were we to see increased purchases of oil or sanctions evasion, we are prepared to act swiftly to sanction the offenders.
Moreover, the U.S. trade embargo remains in place and U.N. Security Council’s sanctions remain in place. All sanctions related to Iran’s military program, state sponsorship of terrorism, and human rights abuses and censorship remain in place. Our vigilance will continue.
What is also important to understand is that we remain in control. If Iran fails to live up to its commitments as agreed to in Geneva, we would be prepared to work with Congress to ramp up sanctions. In that situation, we would be well-positioned to maximize the impact of any new sanctions because we would likely have the support of the international community, which is essential for any increased pressure to work
In comparison, moving forward on new sanctions now would derail the promising and yet-to-be-tested first step outlined above, alienate us from our allies, and risk unraveling the international cohesion that has proven so essential to ensuring our sanctions have the intended effect.
The Way Ahead
In assessing this deal on the merits, we must compare where we would be without it.
Without the JPA, Iran’s program would continue to advance: Iran could spin thousands of additional centrifuges; install and spin next-generation centrifuges that reduce its breakout times; advance on the plutonium track by fueling and commissioning the Arak heavy water reactor and install remaining components ; and grow its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride. It could do all of that, moreover, without the new inspections that are part of this deal and give us new tools to help detect breakout.
With the JPA, we halt the program in its tracks, roll it back in key respects, and put time on the clock to negotiate a long-term, comprehensive solution with strict limits and verifiable assurances that Iran’s nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.
In a perfect world, we could get to such a comprehensive solution right away. But the reality is that in the absence of the JPA, we would have had an Iranian nuclear program that could double its enrichment capacity, grow its stockpile of enriched uranium, and make progress on starting up the Arak reactor.
We are now moving forward to prepare for implementation. This week, our experts are in Vienna discussing with their P5+1 counterparts, Iran, and the IAEA, the mechanisms and timeframes for beginning implementation and setting a start date. These are technical and complex discussions, and it is critical that we do them well and right -- working to protect our national security interests at every step along the way.
At the same time, the JPA and its implementation is only a first step. There are still many issues related to Iran’s nuclear program that must be addressed, and in the process, Iran must work with the IAEA to resolve all past and present issues of concern. That is why our ultimate aim is a comprehensive agreement that fully addresses all of our longstanding concerns.
Conclusion
Finally, let me be clear about one thing: Our policy with regard to Iran has not changed. The President has been clear that he will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapon. While his strong preference is for a diplomatic solution, he is prepared to use all elements of American power to prevent that outcome.
Our commitment to working with our partners, in the region and elsewhere, to hold Iran accountable for all its actions also remains firm. These negotiations will solely focus on Iran’s nuclear program. So we will continue to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. We will continue to hold Iran accountable for its support for terrorism. Iran remains listed as a State Sponsor of Terror and our sanctions for their support of terror remain in place.
Our sanctions on Iran’s human rights abusers will also continue and so will our support for the fundamental rights of all Iranians. Last week, National Security Advisor Rice reiterated our support for the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and called on Iran to allow him to visit Iran. We will continue to speak forcefully for the oppressed inside Iran, including through our support, later this month, for a resolution before the UN General Assembly condemning Iran’s human rights practices
We call on Iran to release Saeed Abedini and Amir Hekmati and support our efforts to bring Robert Levinson home. As Secretary Kerry has said, one day is too long to be in captivity, and one day for any American citizen is more than any American wants to see somebody endure. Mr. Abedini, Mr. Hekmati, and Mr. Levinson have been gone too long and we will continue to do everything we can, using quiet diplomacy.
And we will prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. That is what these negotiations are all about. We have been encouraged that nearly 70 countries have expressed support for the understandings reached in Geneva, including statements of support from our partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council, with whom we remain closely engaged. The sentiment from our partners has been clear: give this process a chance. If Iran lives up to its commitments then the world will become a safer place. If it does not, then we retain all options to ensure that Iran can never obtain a nuclear weapon. The coming months will be a test of Iranian intentions, and of the possibility for a peaceful resolution to this crisis.
Throughout, and as always, we look forward to working closely with the Congress to ensure that U.S. national security interests are protected and advanced.
Thank you.
CDC REPORT ON SUDDEN CARDIAC DEATHS ASSOCIATED WITH LYME CARDITIS
FROM: CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
Three Sudden Cardiac Deaths Associated with Lyme Carditis — United States, November 2012–July 2013
Lyme carditis is a known but rare cause of sudden cardiac death. Lyme carditis can cause heart palpitations, chest pain, light-headedness, fainting, and shortness of breath in addition to the commonly recognized Lyme disease symptoms of fever, rash, and body aches. If you live in an area where Lyme disease is common and have these symptoms, see a healthcare provider immediately. Between November 2012 and July 2013, three young adults who lived in high-incidence Lyme disease regions suffered from sudden cardiac death associated with undiagnosed Lyme carditis. Lyme carditis is a known, but rare cause of death in persons who have Lyme disease. The CDC and state and local health departments investigated these three deaths. Two of the three individuals who died had corneas transplanted to three separate recipients before the cause of death was notified, but there was no evidence of disease transmission. Prompt recognition and early, appropriate therapy for Lyme disease with antibiotics is essential. These deaths underscore the urgent need for better methods of primary prevention of Lyme disease and other tickborne infections.
Three Sudden Cardiac Deaths Associated with Lyme Carditis — United States, November 2012–July 2013
Lyme carditis is a known but rare cause of sudden cardiac death. Lyme carditis can cause heart palpitations, chest pain, light-headedness, fainting, and shortness of breath in addition to the commonly recognized Lyme disease symptoms of fever, rash, and body aches. If you live in an area where Lyme disease is common and have these symptoms, see a healthcare provider immediately. Between November 2012 and July 2013, three young adults who lived in high-incidence Lyme disease regions suffered from sudden cardiac death associated with undiagnosed Lyme carditis. Lyme carditis is a known, but rare cause of death in persons who have Lyme disease. The CDC and state and local health departments investigated these three deaths. Two of the three individuals who died had corneas transplanted to three separate recipients before the cause of death was notified, but there was no evidence of disease transmission. Prompt recognition and early, appropriate therapy for Lyme disease with antibiotics is essential. These deaths underscore the urgent need for better methods of primary prevention of Lyme disease and other tickborne infections.
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK REPORTS FINANCING OVER $27 BILLION IN FISCAL YEAR 2013
FROM: U.S. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK
Export-Import Bank Financing Exceeds $27 Billion in FY’13
Supports more than 200,000 U.S. Jobs
Record Number of Small Businesses Reached
Washington, DC – In Fiscal Year 2013 (FY’13) results released today, the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) unveiled its annual numbers highlighting its approval of more than $27 billion in authorizations, which supported approximately 205,000 American jobs in communities across the country.
“This year American businesses exported a record $2.3 trillion worth of goods and services, and Ex-Im Bank played a key role in that success,” said Ex-Im Bank Chairman and President Fred P. Hochberg. “Over the past five years, Ex-Im Bank has created or sustained an estimated 1.2 million American jobs – including 205,000 jobs in FY’13 alone. The Bank is a great example of government operating at the speed of business. I would like to thank the dedicated Ex-Im Bank staff who help our nation’s businesses big and small remain globally competitive.”
Ex-Im Bank worked with more than 3,400 small businesses (89 percent of all transactions) – making it the highest number of small business deals in the Bank’s history. As part of its efforts to increase this portfolio, Ex-Im Bank has hosted more than 60 Global Access for Small Business forums across the country since launching the program in January 2011.
Key highlights
Ex-Im financing created or supported an estimated 205,000 export-related U.S. jobs.
In FY’13, Ex-Im Bank authorized financing for a record high 3,842 export transactions, which totaled an estimated export value of $37.4 billion.
In FY’13, Ex-Im Bank approved 3,413 small-business authorizations – the highest number of small-business authorizations in the Bank’s history.
In the last five years (FY’09 to FY’13), Ex-Im Bank has assisted in financing more than $188 billion of U.S. exports and supported 1.2 million American jobs.
Manufacturing was the industry with the highest authorized amount at $8.4 billion, surpassing Aircraft for the first time since 1997.
Export-Import Bank Financing Exceeds $27 Billion in FY’13
Supports more than 200,000 U.S. Jobs
Record Number of Small Businesses Reached
Washington, DC – In Fiscal Year 2013 (FY’13) results released today, the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) unveiled its annual numbers highlighting its approval of more than $27 billion in authorizations, which supported approximately 205,000 American jobs in communities across the country.
“This year American businesses exported a record $2.3 trillion worth of goods and services, and Ex-Im Bank played a key role in that success,” said Ex-Im Bank Chairman and President Fred P. Hochberg. “Over the past five years, Ex-Im Bank has created or sustained an estimated 1.2 million American jobs – including 205,000 jobs in FY’13 alone. The Bank is a great example of government operating at the speed of business. I would like to thank the dedicated Ex-Im Bank staff who help our nation’s businesses big and small remain globally competitive.”
Ex-Im Bank worked with more than 3,400 small businesses (89 percent of all transactions) – making it the highest number of small business deals in the Bank’s history. As part of its efforts to increase this portfolio, Ex-Im Bank has hosted more than 60 Global Access for Small Business forums across the country since launching the program in January 2011.
Key highlights
Ex-Im financing created or supported an estimated 205,000 export-related U.S. jobs.
In FY’13, Ex-Im Bank authorized financing for a record high 3,842 export transactions, which totaled an estimated export value of $37.4 billion.
In FY’13, Ex-Im Bank approved 3,413 small-business authorizations – the highest number of small-business authorizations in the Bank’s history.
In the last five years (FY’09 to FY’13), Ex-Im Bank has assisted in financing more than $188 billion of U.S. exports and supported 1.2 million American jobs.
Manufacturing was the industry with the highest authorized amount at $8.4 billion, surpassing Aircraft for the first time since 1997.
3-D PRINTED REPLACEMENT PARTS FOR THE HUMAN BODY
FROM: NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
3-D printed implants may soon fix complex injuries
Researchers adapt technology for 3-D printing metals, ceramics and other materials to create custom medical implants designed to fix complicated injuries
December 12, 2013
In an age where 3-D printers are becoming a more and more common tool to make custom designed objects, some researchers are using the technology to manufacture replacement parts for the most customized and unique object of all--the human body.
With funding from the National Science Foundation, a husband and wife duo--materials scientist Susmita Bose and materials engineer Amit Bandyopadhyay--are leading a team of researchers at Washington State University to create implants that more closely mimic the properties of human bone, and can be custom-designed for unusual injuries or anatomy.
"In the majority of cases, results are fantastic with off-the-shelf implants," Bandyopadhyay says. "However, physicians come across many patients in which the anatomy or injury is so unique they can't take a part off the shelf. In these unique situations, the surgeon becomes a carpenter."
Using a technology called Laser Engineered Net Shaping (LENS®), these new implants integrate into the body more effectively, encouraging bone regrowth that ultimately results in a stronger, longer lasting implant.
Parts on demand
In the LENS® process, tiny particles are blown into the path of a laser and melted. The material cools and hardens as soon as it is out of the laser beam, and custom parts can be quickly built up layer by layer. The process is so precise that parts can be used straight off the printer without the polishing or finishing needed in traditional manufacturing.
Implant manufacturers using this strategy could simply start with a CT scan or MRI and use that to make a 3-D model of the injury. A consultation with a physician would determine where the problem was and how to repair it.
According to Bandyopadhyay, "the most exciting part is it doesn't take months. Within a few hours the first iteration of a design can be done. It then takes another five to six hours to manufacture it. As long as the physician is connected to the Internet, within three days he or she can have a custom, patient-specific implant in hand."
There is a real need for these sorts of solutions for people with complex injuries, such as victims of traffic accidents or natural disasters.
Making the best even better
Not every implant needs to be custom manufactured. In most cases, surgeons can choose a standard-size implant based on the anatomy of the patient.
The standard materials for weight-bearing implants--titanium or stainless steel--are well-tolerated by the human body. Nevertheless, these metals have different properties from the bone they replace. Although bone seems stiff and solid, it in fact has some "spring" and millions of microscopic pores.
Because a metal implant is much stiffer, the surrounding bone doesn't have to support as much weight as it normally would. This is a significant problem with today's implants. Bones weaken and break down when they aren't properly exercised.
LENS® can be used to make parts out of many different materials, including metals and ceramics. Unlike many traditional manufacturing processes, LENS® allows different kinds of materials to be easily combined into a single part. The heating and cooling processes are so fast that the component materials don't react with one another to create unexpected materials or properties.
"Once we built confidence that the properties of LENS®-manufactured implants were the same as standard implants, we then focused on materials that were difficult to manufacture, like tantalum. We can make a tantalum implant or coating in less than 15 minutes, even though its melting temperature is over 3000 degrees Celsius," Bandyopadhyay says.
Tantalum is non-irritating and can directly bond to hard tissue like bone. This gives researchers like Bandyopadhyay greater control over how implants interact with the body.
A metal core can be coated with a thin ceramic layer, for example, so that new bone is more likely to grow and bond with the implant. And because LENS® builds a layer at a time, implants can be manufactured with structures that are difficult to make using traditional techniques. They can have pores in the center but be solid at the edges, or have texture on the surface to help bond with bone or other biological materials.
Porous structures are particularly challenging to make using traditional manufacturing, yet they are potentially critical in making implants that more closely mimic natural bone. The LENS® process allows implants to be manufactured with microscopic holes for bone to grow into and attach. The holes have the added benefit of making the metal part less stiff and more like the bone it replaces, also helping the bone grow.
When bone grows into an implant, it forms a strong bond between the two and makes the bone less likely to degrade. The less the bone degrades, the less chance a replacement might be needed.
Wave of the future
Early in development the greatest challenge was to show that the material produced using the LENS® process showed similar mechanical and physical properties compared to standard implants. Over time, the technology has matured to a level where it is reliable enough to become commercially feasible.
Bandyopadhyay expects that by 2020 custom-designed and manufactured implants will become commonplace.
According to Bandyopadhyay, "Biomedical device companies have invested heavily in this research and are setting up 3-D printing facilities. The FDA approved its first 3-D printed device last year."
-- Katie Feldman, AAAS Science and Technology Policy Fellow and National Science Foundation, Directorate for Engineering
Investigators
Susmita Bose
Amit Bandyopadhyay
3-D printed implants may soon fix complex injuries
Researchers adapt technology for 3-D printing metals, ceramics and other materials to create custom medical implants designed to fix complicated injuries
December 12, 2013
In an age where 3-D printers are becoming a more and more common tool to make custom designed objects, some researchers are using the technology to manufacture replacement parts for the most customized and unique object of all--the human body.
With funding from the National Science Foundation, a husband and wife duo--materials scientist Susmita Bose and materials engineer Amit Bandyopadhyay--are leading a team of researchers at Washington State University to create implants that more closely mimic the properties of human bone, and can be custom-designed for unusual injuries or anatomy.
"In the majority of cases, results are fantastic with off-the-shelf implants," Bandyopadhyay says. "However, physicians come across many patients in which the anatomy or injury is so unique they can't take a part off the shelf. In these unique situations, the surgeon becomes a carpenter."
Using a technology called Laser Engineered Net Shaping (LENS®), these new implants integrate into the body more effectively, encouraging bone regrowth that ultimately results in a stronger, longer lasting implant.
Parts on demand
In the LENS® process, tiny particles are blown into the path of a laser and melted. The material cools and hardens as soon as it is out of the laser beam, and custom parts can be quickly built up layer by layer. The process is so precise that parts can be used straight off the printer without the polishing or finishing needed in traditional manufacturing.
Implant manufacturers using this strategy could simply start with a CT scan or MRI and use that to make a 3-D model of the injury. A consultation with a physician would determine where the problem was and how to repair it.
According to Bandyopadhyay, "the most exciting part is it doesn't take months. Within a few hours the first iteration of a design can be done. It then takes another five to six hours to manufacture it. As long as the physician is connected to the Internet, within three days he or she can have a custom, patient-specific implant in hand."
There is a real need for these sorts of solutions for people with complex injuries, such as victims of traffic accidents or natural disasters.
Making the best even better
Not every implant needs to be custom manufactured. In most cases, surgeons can choose a standard-size implant based on the anatomy of the patient.
The standard materials for weight-bearing implants--titanium or stainless steel--are well-tolerated by the human body. Nevertheless, these metals have different properties from the bone they replace. Although bone seems stiff and solid, it in fact has some "spring" and millions of microscopic pores.
Because a metal implant is much stiffer, the surrounding bone doesn't have to support as much weight as it normally would. This is a significant problem with today's implants. Bones weaken and break down when they aren't properly exercised.
LENS® can be used to make parts out of many different materials, including metals and ceramics. Unlike many traditional manufacturing processes, LENS® allows different kinds of materials to be easily combined into a single part. The heating and cooling processes are so fast that the component materials don't react with one another to create unexpected materials or properties.
"Once we built confidence that the properties of LENS®-manufactured implants were the same as standard implants, we then focused on materials that were difficult to manufacture, like tantalum. We can make a tantalum implant or coating in less than 15 minutes, even though its melting temperature is over 3000 degrees Celsius," Bandyopadhyay says.
Tantalum is non-irritating and can directly bond to hard tissue like bone. This gives researchers like Bandyopadhyay greater control over how implants interact with the body.
A metal core can be coated with a thin ceramic layer, for example, so that new bone is more likely to grow and bond with the implant. And because LENS® builds a layer at a time, implants can be manufactured with structures that are difficult to make using traditional techniques. They can have pores in the center but be solid at the edges, or have texture on the surface to help bond with bone or other biological materials.
Porous structures are particularly challenging to make using traditional manufacturing, yet they are potentially critical in making implants that more closely mimic natural bone. The LENS® process allows implants to be manufactured with microscopic holes for bone to grow into and attach. The holes have the added benefit of making the metal part less stiff and more like the bone it replaces, also helping the bone grow.
When bone grows into an implant, it forms a strong bond between the two and makes the bone less likely to degrade. The less the bone degrades, the less chance a replacement might be needed.
Wave of the future
Early in development the greatest challenge was to show that the material produced using the LENS® process showed similar mechanical and physical properties compared to standard implants. Over time, the technology has matured to a level where it is reliable enough to become commercially feasible.
Bandyopadhyay expects that by 2020 custom-designed and manufactured implants will become commonplace.
According to Bandyopadhyay, "Biomedical device companies have invested heavily in this research and are setting up 3-D printing facilities. The FDA approved its first 3-D printed device last year."
-- Katie Feldman, AAAS Science and Technology Policy Fellow and National Science Foundation, Directorate for Engineering
Investigators
Susmita Bose
Amit Bandyopadhyay
Friday, December 13, 2013
U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CONTRACTS FOR DECEMBER 13, 2013
FROM: U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
NAVY
Lockheed Martin Corp., Mission Systems and Training, Manassas, Va., is being awarded a $124,531,317 modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-11-C-6294) for the development and production of the acoustic rapid commercial-off-the-shelf insertion (A-RCI) and common acoustics processing for Technology Insertion 12 (TI12) through Technology Insertion 14 (TI14) for the U.S. submarine fleet. A-RCI is a sonar system that integrates and improves towed array, hull array, sphere array, and other ship sensor processing, through rapid insertion of commercial off-the-shelf based hardware and software. Work will be performed in Manassas, Va., (60 percent) and Clearwater, Fla., (40 percent) and is expected to be completed by December 2014. Fiscal 2013 and 2014 research, development, test and evaluation funds; fiscal 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 shipbuilding and conversion, Navy funds and fiscal 2014 other procurement, Navy funding in the amount of $20,573,237 will be obligated at the time of the award. Contract funds in the amount of $8,385,273 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity.
General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, Inc., Pittsfield, Mass., is being awarded a $115,049,349 cost-plus-incentive-fee, cost-plus-fixed-fee, and fixed-price-incentive contract for engineering, development, and production efforts necessary to support to United States and United Kingdom Trident II Strategic Weapons Systems, SSBN Fire Control Subsystem (FCS) and support to SSGN Attack Weapons Control Subsystem, and continued engineering and trade studies on US SSBN replacement and UK SSBN successor common missile compartment. These efforts include technical engineering and support, including performance evaluation, logistics, fleet documentation, and reliability maintenance engineering services for the deployed US and UK SSBN fleets; US SSBN replacement and UK SSBN successor FCS development, production, integration, planning, and installation; SSP alteration (SPALT) kits (hardware, software, and fleet documentation) for the US and UK; planning, management, and field engineering services for the Trident-II SWS; FCS engineered refueling overhauls; planning, management, and field engineering services for attack weapons control system major modernization periods and voyage repair periods; long-term supportability and sustainment efforts aimed at implementation of new technology within the subsystem as required to offset obsolescence and avoid cost growth; and training hardware, software, curricula, and technical engineering support including support to equipment repair and SPALTs. The maximum dollar value, including the base period and one option year, is $217,685,976. Work will be performed in Pittsfield, Mass., and work is expected to be completed March 31, 2016. Fiscal 2013 and 2014 other procurement, Navy contract funds in the amounts of $8,211,247 and $12,343,418 respectively; fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Navy contract funds in the amount of $8,942,052; fiscal 2012, 2013, and 2014 UK contract funds in the amounts of $760,000, $1,298,432, and $7,653,569 respectively; fiscal 2014 research, development, test and evaluation contract funds in the amount of $2,795,309; and fiscal 2014 weapons procurement, Navy contract funds in the amount of $1,251,739 are being obligated at time of award. Contract funds in the amount of $28,975,275 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was a sole source acquisition in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1). Strategic Systems Programs, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity. (N00030-14-C-0005)
Lockheed Martin Mission Systems & Training, Liverpool, N.Y., is being awarded a $24,462,051 fixed-price incentive, firm-fixed-price, and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the production and support of AN/BQS-25 low-cost conformal arrays (LCCA). The AN/BQS-25 LCCA is a passive planar array mounted on the aft submarine sail structure that is integrated with the Acoustic Rapid commercial-off-the-shelf insertion AN/BQQ-10 system to provide situational awareness and collision avoidance for improved tactical control in high density environments. This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $92,476,516. Work will be performed in Syracuse, N.Y. (90 percent), Akron, Ohio (7 percent), and Marion, Mass. (3 percent), and is expected to complete by March 2015. Fiscal 2013 other procurement, Navy funds in the amount of $3,846,509 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured via the Federal Business Opportunities website, with two offers received. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-14-C-6227).
Science Applications International Corp., McLean, Va., is being awarded a $14,425,908 modification to a previously awarded indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract (N00421-11-D-0030) to exercise an option for technical and engineering services in support of the Naval Air Systems Command's Air Vehicle Engineering Department and the Manned Flight Simulator/Air Combat Environment Test and Evaluation Facilities. Services to be provided support the development and utilization of advanced air vehicle technology for evaluating air vehicle flying qualities and controllability, developing simulation software, and building prototype simulations. Work will be performed in Patuxent River, Md., and is expected to be completed in December 2014. Funds will not be obligated at time of award; funds will be obligated on individual orders as they are issued. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.
Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Bethpage, N.Y., is being awarded an $11,764,551 modification to a previously awarded indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract (N68936-11-D-0028) to provide additional engineering, technical and programmatic support services for development of products within the Airborne Electronic Attack Integrated Product Team; to include, EA-6B operational flight software, EA-6B unique planning component and EA-18G operational flight software. Work will be performed in Pt. Mugu, Calif. (80 percent); and Baltimore, Md. (20 percent); and is expected to be completed by July 2014. No funds will be obligated at time of award; funds will be obligated on individual orders as they are issued. The Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Pt. Mugu, Calif., is the contracting activity.
Southeast Aerospace, Melbourne, Fla., is being awarded a $7,350,121 modification (P00004) to a previously awarded contract (N68836-13-D-0004) to exercise option one to extend the term of the contract to provide additional quantity of 23 additional parts kits, and miscellaneous components for the Avionics System Upgrade of the T-44 aircraft. With the exercise of this option, the total contract value will be $16,568.406. Work will be performed at Melbourne Fla., and is expected to be completed by Jan. 24, 2015. No funds are being obligated at the time of award and will not expire before the end of the current fiscal year. Funds will be obligated on individual task orders issued against the contract. This contract was competitively procured via Navy Electronic Commerce Online website, with five offers received in response to the solicitation. Naval Supply Systems Fleet Logistics Center, Jacksonville, Fla., is the contracting activity.
ARMY
General Atomics Aeronautical, Poway, Calif., was awarded an $110,453,269 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for continuing logistic services to the Warrior unmanned aircraft system. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Army funds in the amount of $8,000,000 were obligated at the time of the award. Estimated completion date is Dec.15, 2015. One bid was solicited with one received. Work will be performed in Afghanistan and Poway, Calif. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal (Aviation), Ala., is the contracting activity (W58RGZ-14-C-0008).
Lockheed Martin Corp., Orlando, Fla., was awarded a $92,915,233 contract modification (P00015) to contract W58RGZ-12-C-0009 to exercise option year two of the Apache attack helicopter performance based logistics program to modernize target designation sight/pilot's night vision sensor equipment. Fiscal 2014 other procurement funds in the amount of $92,915,233 were obligated at the time of the award. Estimated completion date is Dec. 31, 2014. Work will be performed in Orlando, Fla. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal (Aviation), Ala., is the contracting activity.
Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Linthicum Heights, Md., was awarded a $65,288,028 contract modification (P00037) to contract W15P7T-11-C-H267 for continued operations and sustainment of the vehicle and dismount exploitation radar (VADER) currently deployed in theater. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Army funds in the amount of $24,861,376 were obligated at the time of the award. Estimated completion date is Dec. 31, 2014. Work will be performed at Linthicum Heights, Md., Hagerstown, Md., and Afghanistan. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal (Aviation), Ala., is the contracting activity.
Encompass Digital Media Inc, Atlanta, Ga., was awarded a $10,915,918 firm-fixed-price contract for a Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS) operations hub. The hub will transmit and receive broadcast-quality high definition/standard definition video, two-way data, stories, stills, audio and data from DVIDS worldwide satellite transmitters (SATCOM). It will maintain up and downlink service to all government portable SATCOM terminals accessing the DVIDS integrated network. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Army funds in the amount of $4,200,000 were obligated at the time of the award. Estimated completion date is Dec. 15, 2016. Bids were solicited via the Internet with one received. Work will be performed in Atlanta, Ga. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal; Ill., is the contracting activity (W52P1J-14-C-0014).
AIR FORCE
Boeing Boeing Co., Seal Beach, Calif., has been awarded a $59,617,404 modification (P00024) on an existing firm-fixed-price contract (FA8807-13-C-0001) for on-orbit support, factory reach-back, maintenance, and storage. This contract provides for exercise of options for additional launch and on-orbit support for GPS IIF space vehicles. Work will be performed at El Segundo, Calif., Colorado Springs, Colo., and Cape Canaveral, Fla., and is expected to be completed by Dec. 31, 2014. Fiscal 2012, 2013 and 2014 missile procurement funds in the amount of $56,867,404 are being obligated at time of award. The Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center Contracting Directorate, Los Angeles Air Force Base, Calif., is the contracting activity.
J. Torres Company Inc., Bakersfield, Calif., has been awarded a $7,396,934, firm-fixed-price contract for integrated solid waste services at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., to include municipal solid waste, recycling, and landfill services. The location of performance is Edwards AFB, Calif. The work is expected to be complete by Dec. 31, 2018. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance in the amount of $129,501 are being obligated at time of award. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition with numerous offers solicited, and three offers received. Air Force Test Center, Aerospace Systems Support Branch, Edwards AFB, Calif., is the contracting activity (FA9301-14-D-0006).
Raytheon Co., Integrated Defense Systems, Sudbury, Mass., has been awarded a $6,896,385 modification (P0005) on an existing cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price, cost-reimbursement contract (FA8730-13-C-0003) for the Taiwan Surveillance Radar program follow-on support string upgrade engineering change proposal. The contract modification provides a continental United States sustainment string upgrade that creates a controlled site-like testing environment for build deployment and system troubleshooting at the CONUS development facility. Work will be performed at Sudbury, Mass., and is expected to be completed by Nov. 8, 2017. This contract involves foreign military sales to Taiwan. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center/HBNA, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass., is the contracting activity.
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
O.C. Lugo Co., Inc.*, New York, N.Y., has been awarded a maximum $15,300,000 modification (P00105) exercising the first one-year option period on a two-year base contract (SPM8EF-129-D-0002) with three one-year option periods for chlorate candles and igniters. This is a firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. Location of performance is New York with a March 13, 2015 performance completion date. Using military service is Navy. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2014 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pa.
Thomas Scientific Inc.*, Swedesboro, N.J., has been awarded a maximum $9,600,000 fixed-price with economic-price-adjustment, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for laboratory supplies and wares. This contract is a competitive acquisition, and four offers were received. Location of performance is New Jersey with a Jan. 1, 2015 performance completion date. This contract is a one-year base with four one-year option periods. Using services are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and federal civilian agencies. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2014 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pa., (SPM2DE-14-D-7349).
NAVY
Lockheed Martin Corp., Mission Systems and Training, Manassas, Va., is being awarded a $124,531,317 modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-11-C-6294) for the development and production of the acoustic rapid commercial-off-the-shelf insertion (A-RCI) and common acoustics processing for Technology Insertion 12 (TI12) through Technology Insertion 14 (TI14) for the U.S. submarine fleet. A-RCI is a sonar system that integrates and improves towed array, hull array, sphere array, and other ship sensor processing, through rapid insertion of commercial off-the-shelf based hardware and software. Work will be performed in Manassas, Va., (60 percent) and Clearwater, Fla., (40 percent) and is expected to be completed by December 2014. Fiscal 2013 and 2014 research, development, test and evaluation funds; fiscal 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 shipbuilding and conversion, Navy funds and fiscal 2014 other procurement, Navy funding in the amount of $20,573,237 will be obligated at the time of the award. Contract funds in the amount of $8,385,273 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity.
General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, Inc., Pittsfield, Mass., is being awarded a $115,049,349 cost-plus-incentive-fee, cost-plus-fixed-fee, and fixed-price-incentive contract for engineering, development, and production efforts necessary to support to United States and United Kingdom Trident II Strategic Weapons Systems, SSBN Fire Control Subsystem (FCS) and support to SSGN Attack Weapons Control Subsystem, and continued engineering and trade studies on US SSBN replacement and UK SSBN successor common missile compartment. These efforts include technical engineering and support, including performance evaluation, logistics, fleet documentation, and reliability maintenance engineering services for the deployed US and UK SSBN fleets; US SSBN replacement and UK SSBN successor FCS development, production, integration, planning, and installation; SSP alteration (SPALT) kits (hardware, software, and fleet documentation) for the US and UK; planning, management, and field engineering services for the Trident-II SWS; FCS engineered refueling overhauls; planning, management, and field engineering services for attack weapons control system major modernization periods and voyage repair periods; long-term supportability and sustainment efforts aimed at implementation of new technology within the subsystem as required to offset obsolescence and avoid cost growth; and training hardware, software, curricula, and technical engineering support including support to equipment repair and SPALTs. The maximum dollar value, including the base period and one option year, is $217,685,976. Work will be performed in Pittsfield, Mass., and work is expected to be completed March 31, 2016. Fiscal 2013 and 2014 other procurement, Navy contract funds in the amounts of $8,211,247 and $12,343,418 respectively; fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Navy contract funds in the amount of $8,942,052; fiscal 2012, 2013, and 2014 UK contract funds in the amounts of $760,000, $1,298,432, and $7,653,569 respectively; fiscal 2014 research, development, test and evaluation contract funds in the amount of $2,795,309; and fiscal 2014 weapons procurement, Navy contract funds in the amount of $1,251,739 are being obligated at time of award. Contract funds in the amount of $28,975,275 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was a sole source acquisition in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1). Strategic Systems Programs, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity. (N00030-14-C-0005)
Lockheed Martin Mission Systems & Training, Liverpool, N.Y., is being awarded a $24,462,051 fixed-price incentive, firm-fixed-price, and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the production and support of AN/BQS-25 low-cost conformal arrays (LCCA). The AN/BQS-25 LCCA is a passive planar array mounted on the aft submarine sail structure that is integrated with the Acoustic Rapid commercial-off-the-shelf insertion AN/BQQ-10 system to provide situational awareness and collision avoidance for improved tactical control in high density environments. This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $92,476,516. Work will be performed in Syracuse, N.Y. (90 percent), Akron, Ohio (7 percent), and Marion, Mass. (3 percent), and is expected to complete by March 2015. Fiscal 2013 other procurement, Navy funds in the amount of $3,846,509 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured via the Federal Business Opportunities website, with two offers received. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-14-C-6227).
Science Applications International Corp., McLean, Va., is being awarded a $14,425,908 modification to a previously awarded indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract (N00421-11-D-0030) to exercise an option for technical and engineering services in support of the Naval Air Systems Command's Air Vehicle Engineering Department and the Manned Flight Simulator/Air Combat Environment Test and Evaluation Facilities. Services to be provided support the development and utilization of advanced air vehicle technology for evaluating air vehicle flying qualities and controllability, developing simulation software, and building prototype simulations. Work will be performed in Patuxent River, Md., and is expected to be completed in December 2014. Funds will not be obligated at time of award; funds will be obligated on individual orders as they are issued. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.
Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Bethpage, N.Y., is being awarded an $11,764,551 modification to a previously awarded indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract (N68936-11-D-0028) to provide additional engineering, technical and programmatic support services for development of products within the Airborne Electronic Attack Integrated Product Team; to include, EA-6B operational flight software, EA-6B unique planning component and EA-18G operational flight software. Work will be performed in Pt. Mugu, Calif. (80 percent); and Baltimore, Md. (20 percent); and is expected to be completed by July 2014. No funds will be obligated at time of award; funds will be obligated on individual orders as they are issued. The Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Pt. Mugu, Calif., is the contracting activity.
Southeast Aerospace, Melbourne, Fla., is being awarded a $7,350,121 modification (P00004) to a previously awarded contract (N68836-13-D-0004) to exercise option one to extend the term of the contract to provide additional quantity of 23 additional parts kits, and miscellaneous components for the Avionics System Upgrade of the T-44 aircraft. With the exercise of this option, the total contract value will be $16,568.406. Work will be performed at Melbourne Fla., and is expected to be completed by Jan. 24, 2015. No funds are being obligated at the time of award and will not expire before the end of the current fiscal year. Funds will be obligated on individual task orders issued against the contract. This contract was competitively procured via Navy Electronic Commerce Online website, with five offers received in response to the solicitation. Naval Supply Systems Fleet Logistics Center, Jacksonville, Fla., is the contracting activity.
ARMY
General Atomics Aeronautical, Poway, Calif., was awarded an $110,453,269 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for continuing logistic services to the Warrior unmanned aircraft system. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Army funds in the amount of $8,000,000 were obligated at the time of the award. Estimated completion date is Dec.15, 2015. One bid was solicited with one received. Work will be performed in Afghanistan and Poway, Calif. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal (Aviation), Ala., is the contracting activity (W58RGZ-14-C-0008).
Lockheed Martin Corp., Orlando, Fla., was awarded a $92,915,233 contract modification (P00015) to contract W58RGZ-12-C-0009 to exercise option year two of the Apache attack helicopter performance based logistics program to modernize target designation sight/pilot's night vision sensor equipment. Fiscal 2014 other procurement funds in the amount of $92,915,233 were obligated at the time of the award. Estimated completion date is Dec. 31, 2014. Work will be performed in Orlando, Fla. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal (Aviation), Ala., is the contracting activity.
Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Linthicum Heights, Md., was awarded a $65,288,028 contract modification (P00037) to contract W15P7T-11-C-H267 for continued operations and sustainment of the vehicle and dismount exploitation radar (VADER) currently deployed in theater. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Army funds in the amount of $24,861,376 were obligated at the time of the award. Estimated completion date is Dec. 31, 2014. Work will be performed at Linthicum Heights, Md., Hagerstown, Md., and Afghanistan. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal (Aviation), Ala., is the contracting activity.
Encompass Digital Media Inc, Atlanta, Ga., was awarded a $10,915,918 firm-fixed-price contract for a Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS) operations hub. The hub will transmit and receive broadcast-quality high definition/standard definition video, two-way data, stories, stills, audio and data from DVIDS worldwide satellite transmitters (SATCOM). It will maintain up and downlink service to all government portable SATCOM terminals accessing the DVIDS integrated network. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Army funds in the amount of $4,200,000 were obligated at the time of the award. Estimated completion date is Dec. 15, 2016. Bids were solicited via the Internet with one received. Work will be performed in Atlanta, Ga. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal; Ill., is the contracting activity (W52P1J-14-C-0014).
AIR FORCE
Boeing Boeing Co., Seal Beach, Calif., has been awarded a $59,617,404 modification (P00024) on an existing firm-fixed-price contract (FA8807-13-C-0001) for on-orbit support, factory reach-back, maintenance, and storage. This contract provides for exercise of options for additional launch and on-orbit support for GPS IIF space vehicles. Work will be performed at El Segundo, Calif., Colorado Springs, Colo., and Cape Canaveral, Fla., and is expected to be completed by Dec. 31, 2014. Fiscal 2012, 2013 and 2014 missile procurement funds in the amount of $56,867,404 are being obligated at time of award. The Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center Contracting Directorate, Los Angeles Air Force Base, Calif., is the contracting activity.
J. Torres Company Inc., Bakersfield, Calif., has been awarded a $7,396,934, firm-fixed-price contract for integrated solid waste services at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., to include municipal solid waste, recycling, and landfill services. The location of performance is Edwards AFB, Calif. The work is expected to be complete by Dec. 31, 2018. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance in the amount of $129,501 are being obligated at time of award. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition with numerous offers solicited, and three offers received. Air Force Test Center, Aerospace Systems Support Branch, Edwards AFB, Calif., is the contracting activity (FA9301-14-D-0006).
Raytheon Co., Integrated Defense Systems, Sudbury, Mass., has been awarded a $6,896,385 modification (P0005) on an existing cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price, cost-reimbursement contract (FA8730-13-C-0003) for the Taiwan Surveillance Radar program follow-on support string upgrade engineering change proposal. The contract modification provides a continental United States sustainment string upgrade that creates a controlled site-like testing environment for build deployment and system troubleshooting at the CONUS development facility. Work will be performed at Sudbury, Mass., and is expected to be completed by Nov. 8, 2017. This contract involves foreign military sales to Taiwan. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center/HBNA, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass., is the contracting activity.
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
O.C. Lugo Co., Inc.*, New York, N.Y., has been awarded a maximum $15,300,000 modification (P00105) exercising the first one-year option period on a two-year base contract (SPM8EF-129-D-0002) with three one-year option periods for chlorate candles and igniters. This is a firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. Location of performance is New York with a March 13, 2015 performance completion date. Using military service is Navy. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2014 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pa.
Thomas Scientific Inc.*, Swedesboro, N.J., has been awarded a maximum $9,600,000 fixed-price with economic-price-adjustment, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for laboratory supplies and wares. This contract is a competitive acquisition, and four offers were received. Location of performance is New Jersey with a Jan. 1, 2015 performance completion date. This contract is a one-year base with four one-year option periods. Using services are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and federal civilian agencies. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2014 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pa., (SPM2DE-14-D-7349).
HHS ON HIGH SCHOOL SPORTS AND PAINKILLERS
FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
From the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, I’m Ira Dreyfuss with HHS HealthBeat.
Sports can be tough competition for high school boys, and sometimes pain from an injury is bad enough for a doctor to prescribe painkillers. But a researcher warns that opioid drugs can cause problems if they’re not watched closely.
At the University of Michigan, Philip Veliz looked at national survey data on 1,540 teens. He found boy athletes were more likely than non-athletes to report having used and misused opioids in the previous year. Veliz suspects injuries led to the prescriptions.
He says drug use needs careful supervision:
"Parents should be the ones monitoring these medications and they should be the ones who dispense the medications to their adolescents."
The study in the Journal of Adolescent Health was supported by the National Institutes of Health.
Learn more at healthfinder.gov.
HHS HealthBeat is a production of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. I’m Ira Dreyfuss.
From the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, I’m Ira Dreyfuss with HHS HealthBeat.
Sports can be tough competition for high school boys, and sometimes pain from an injury is bad enough for a doctor to prescribe painkillers. But a researcher warns that opioid drugs can cause problems if they’re not watched closely.
At the University of Michigan, Philip Veliz looked at national survey data on 1,540 teens. He found boy athletes were more likely than non-athletes to report having used and misused opioids in the previous year. Veliz suspects injuries led to the prescriptions.
He says drug use needs careful supervision:
"Parents should be the ones monitoring these medications and they should be the ones who dispense the medications to their adolescents."
The study in the Journal of Adolescent Health was supported by the National Institutes of Health.
Learn more at healthfinder.gov.
HHS HealthBeat is a production of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. I’m Ira Dreyfuss.
SECRETARY OF STATE KERRY SPEAKS AT U.S. EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV, ISRAEL'
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Secretary Kerry's Press Availability in Tel Aviv
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Secretary of State
U.S. Embassy
Tel Aviv, Israel
December 13, 2013
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, good afternoon, everybody. I want to thank Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas yet again for their great hospitality and for their joint commitment to try to continue very, very doggedly to work on these difficult issues.
We had a very interesting evening last night which unfortunately was a little bit cut short because of the road conditions and the need for us to be able to get back from Ramallah to Jerusalem. So we did not have as long a session as I had hoped. And we had, obviously, an enormous challenge in the weather, and we’re very grateful to the police officers and the road crews of both the Palestinian Authority as well as Israel for helping to facilitate travel at night in those very difficult storm conditions. We’re very grateful.
I am, as many people know, on my way to Asia, and I thought it would be valuable on the way to stop off here to continue the conversations with Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas. I appreciate the fact that both of them continue to be very serious, providing both their personnel and their own personal time to the effort to be able to carry on these discussions. And we had some in-depth focus on the issue particularly of security, and also some of the other critical issues with respect to the Palestinian Authority.
I know that the nature of these talks breeds speculation inevitably, and that’s because we really don’t want to talk about the details of any proposals or what we’re discussing. And the reasons for that are obvious. It lends to distortion, they may never be the real things that you wind up focusing on, and the proposal is merely that – a proposal.
So I want to just make clear what our goal is. Our goal remains as it always has been – for the Israelis and Palestinians to reach a final status agreement – not an interim agreement, a final status agreement. And both parties remain committed to fulfilling their obligations to stay at the table and negotiate hard during the nine-month period that we set for that. The core principles, the core framework, if you want to call it that, which we are discussing with respect to this, centers on the critical issues – borders, security, refugees, Jerusalem, mutual recognition, and an end to conflict and to all claims.
The United States is committed to remaining the principal facilitator in this process. And again, I want to thank both Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas for the serious way in which they are pursuing these discussions. Security is obviously a key issue. It is a key issue because all of the countries in the region and all of the people in the region understand the threats that exist, and particularly the threat from terrorism, the threat from – externally to the State of Israel. So we have a major interest in being able to make certain that both Palestinians and Israelis, when they reach final status, have the ability to be able to deal with their mutual security interests and their independent security interests.
The United States is committed to both. Everybody knows that we have had a long-time commitment to the security of Israel. Our willingness and readiness to defend the State of Israel is ironclad, and that is because – our commitment to security for the region is because we are convinced that the greatest security, in fact, will come from the agreement of the parties for the creation of two states with two peoples living side by side in peace. Last night, General Allen, a former Marine Corps four-star general, one of the best military minds in the American military, continued to lay out to President Abbas in Ramallah ways in which he believes the security of the West Bank and the territories can be secured, and ultimately, a Palestinian state, and how that will interact with Israel so that Israel will be confident of its security.
We are working on an approach that both guarantees Israel’s security and fully respects Palestinian sovereignty. We remain hopeful that we can achieve that final status agreement. Why? Because we are absolutely confident – President Obama, myself, I believe the leaders – that – from both sides and from the region at large – peace can bring enormous benefits. It will make Israelis more secure and Palestinians, too. It will make Palestinians more prosperous and Israelis, too. And with peace, both Israelis and Palestinians will become known globally for what they create and for their capacity to be able to contribute to the peace and stability of the region rather than for the conflicts that have been perpetuated here. And I believe in doing so that both peoples will be able to fulfill common aspirations. That’s what drives us, that’s what continues to make this a challenge worth trying to succeed at. And we will continue in the days ahead.
On that note, I’d be delighted to answer any questions.
MS. PSAKI: Matt Lee, Associated Press.
QUESTION: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I’m just wondering – you say you remain hopeful and you’re committed to the nine-month – the target that was set for the – for final status agreement. But really, it’s now past halfway through there, there hasn’t been any sign of – tangible sign of progress, at least to the outside world. I’m just wondering if it is really realistic, and if it’s not time now to start focusing more on what you talked about as the framework – not an interim agreement, but this idea of a framework agreement. Should the focus now be on that rather than on a final status agreement? And also, do you think that an extension of the nine months is going to have to be – is going to be needed?
SECRETARY KERRY: No. At this point in the talks, Matt, we are comfortable that we’re discussing a host of subjects. We’re fleshing out a lot of different issues, and we’re comfortable with the fact that everything is on the table and everything is being discussed. And I think it’s important in that process to be thinking about the framework core principles which guide you, but I think we have a pretty good sense of that. And as I said to you, I just laid out what all those core issues are that are on the table. So we’re not talking at this point about any shifts, and the next tranche of the prisoners is due to take place on the 29th of December, and it will take place then.
MS. PSAKI: Indira from Bloomberg.
QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. A two-part question – first of all, on Syria: Have you spoken with General Idris and can you comment on the earlier reports that he was run out of Syria? And does the U.S. Government still have confidence in the FSA and the Syrian opposition given the apparent divisions?
And secondly, on Iran: What concerns have caused a halt in the expert talks in Vienna on implementing the November 24th deal? And has there been any progress towards the release of Robert Levinson, whom the AP reported was working on an authorized CIA mission in Iran? And will his case be tied to the larger talks over a final deal with Iran?
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, regarding General Idris, we are in touch with General Idris. I have not personally talked to him, but we are touch in with him, and he is, I believe, in Turkey at this moment. We are talking with both him and others in the SMC staff to inventory the equipment that was in the warehouse that was raided by the Islamic front, al-Nusrah. And we are in discussions with our friends and consulting with everybody in the opposition about the next steps in support of the Syrian people. What’s happened thus far has no impact on our support for the opposition or anything to do with the material assistance that we’re going to continue to provide to the opposition. As a result of the situation, though, we have suspended deliveries of nonlethal assistance into northern Syria simply while we evaluate the situation on the ground. But we continue to have confidence in General Idris and confidence in the opposition, and we will continue to support them.
With respect to the second part of your question on Iran, this is – we’ve been hard at it in Vienna, a lot of discussions taking place. I've talked with Cathy Ashton the last days. We’re making progress, but I think we’re at a point in those talks where folks feel a need to consult, take a moment. There is every expectation that talks are going to continue in the next few days, and that we will proceed to the full implementation of that plan. This is sort of the normal part of the process in developing the implementation plan.
And finally, with respect to Mr. Levinson, I don’t have any comment whatsoever on the condition with respect to employment or any other issue except to say to you that we have raised the issue of his whereabouts on a continuous basis. I have personally raised it with the Iranians in the course of our discussions, and we will continue to try to seek his release and return to the United States.
MS. PSAKI: Thank you, everyone.
SECRETARY KERRY: Thanks, all. Appreciate it. Thank you very much.
We had a very interesting evening last night which unfortunately was a little bit cut short because of the road conditions and the need for us to be able to get back from Ramallah to Jerusalem. So we did not have as long a session as I had hoped. And we had, obviously, an enormous challenge in the weather, and we’re very grateful to the police officers and the road crews of both the Palestinian Authority as well as Israel for helping to facilitate travel at night in those very difficult storm conditions. We’re very grateful.
I am, as many people know, on my way to Asia, and I thought it would be valuable on the way to stop off here to continue the conversations with Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas. I appreciate the fact that both of them continue to be very serious, providing both their personnel and their own personal time to the effort to be able to carry on these discussions. And we had some in-depth focus on the issue particularly of security, and also some of the other critical issues with respect to the Palestinian Authority.
I know that the nature of these talks breeds speculation inevitably, and that’s because we really don’t want to talk about the details of any proposals or what we’re discussing. And the reasons for that are obvious. It lends to distortion, they may never be the real things that you wind up focusing on, and the proposal is merely that – a proposal.
So I want to just make clear what our goal is. Our goal remains as it always has been – for the Israelis and Palestinians to reach a final status agreement – not an interim agreement, a final status agreement. And both parties remain committed to fulfilling their obligations to stay at the table and negotiate hard during the nine-month period that we set for that. The core principles, the core framework, if you want to call it that, which we are discussing with respect to this, centers on the critical issues – borders, security, refugees, Jerusalem, mutual recognition, and an end to conflict and to all claims.
The United States is committed to remaining the principal facilitator in this process. And again, I want to thank both Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas for the serious way in which they are pursuing these discussions. Security is obviously a key issue. It is a key issue because all of the countries in the region and all of the people in the region understand the threats that exist, and particularly the threat from terrorism, the threat from – externally to the State of Israel. So we have a major interest in being able to make certain that both Palestinians and Israelis, when they reach final status, have the ability to be able to deal with their mutual security interests and their independent security interests.
The United States is committed to both. Everybody knows that we have had a long-time commitment to the security of Israel. Our willingness and readiness to defend the State of Israel is ironclad, and that is because – our commitment to security for the region is because we are convinced that the greatest security, in fact, will come from the agreement of the parties for the creation of two states with two peoples living side by side in peace. Last night, General Allen, a former Marine Corps four-star general, one of the best military minds in the American military, continued to lay out to President Abbas in Ramallah ways in which he believes the security of the West Bank and the territories can be secured, and ultimately, a Palestinian state, and how that will interact with Israel so that Israel will be confident of its security.
We are working on an approach that both guarantees Israel’s security and fully respects Palestinian sovereignty. We remain hopeful that we can achieve that final status agreement. Why? Because we are absolutely confident – President Obama, myself, I believe the leaders – that – from both sides and from the region at large – peace can bring enormous benefits. It will make Israelis more secure and Palestinians, too. It will make Palestinians more prosperous and Israelis, too. And with peace, both Israelis and Palestinians will become known globally for what they create and for their capacity to be able to contribute to the peace and stability of the region rather than for the conflicts that have been perpetuated here. And I believe in doing so that both peoples will be able to fulfill common aspirations. That’s what drives us, that’s what continues to make this a challenge worth trying to succeed at. And we will continue in the days ahead.
On that note, I’d be delighted to answer any questions.
MS. PSAKI: Matt Lee, Associated Press.
QUESTION: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I’m just wondering – you say you remain hopeful and you’re committed to the nine-month – the target that was set for the – for final status agreement. But really, it’s now past halfway through there, there hasn’t been any sign of – tangible sign of progress, at least to the outside world. I’m just wondering if it is really realistic, and if it’s not time now to start focusing more on what you talked about as the framework – not an interim agreement, but this idea of a framework agreement. Should the focus now be on that rather than on a final status agreement? And also, do you think that an extension of the nine months is going to have to be – is going to be needed?
SECRETARY KERRY: No. At this point in the talks, Matt, we are comfortable that we’re discussing a host of subjects. We’re fleshing out a lot of different issues, and we’re comfortable with the fact that everything is on the table and everything is being discussed. And I think it’s important in that process to be thinking about the framework core principles which guide you, but I think we have a pretty good sense of that. And as I said to you, I just laid out what all those core issues are that are on the table. So we’re not talking at this point about any shifts, and the next tranche of the prisoners is due to take place on the 29th of December, and it will take place then.
MS. PSAKI: Indira from Bloomberg.
QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. A two-part question – first of all, on Syria: Have you spoken with General Idris and can you comment on the earlier reports that he was run out of Syria? And does the U.S. Government still have confidence in the FSA and the Syrian opposition given the apparent divisions?
And secondly, on Iran: What concerns have caused a halt in the expert talks in Vienna on implementing the November 24th deal? And has there been any progress towards the release of Robert Levinson, whom the AP reported was working on an authorized CIA mission in Iran? And will his case be tied to the larger talks over a final deal with Iran?
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, regarding General Idris, we are in touch with General Idris. I have not personally talked to him, but we are touch in with him, and he is, I believe, in Turkey at this moment. We are talking with both him and others in the SMC staff to inventory the equipment that was in the warehouse that was raided by the Islamic front, al-Nusrah. And we are in discussions with our friends and consulting with everybody in the opposition about the next steps in support of the Syrian people. What’s happened thus far has no impact on our support for the opposition or anything to do with the material assistance that we’re going to continue to provide to the opposition. As a result of the situation, though, we have suspended deliveries of nonlethal assistance into northern Syria simply while we evaluate the situation on the ground. But we continue to have confidence in General Idris and confidence in the opposition, and we will continue to support them.
With respect to the second part of your question on Iran, this is – we’ve been hard at it in Vienna, a lot of discussions taking place. I've talked with Cathy Ashton the last days. We’re making progress, but I think we’re at a point in those talks where folks feel a need to consult, take a moment. There is every expectation that talks are going to continue in the next few days, and that we will proceed to the full implementation of that plan. This is sort of the normal part of the process in developing the implementation plan.
And finally, with respect to Mr. Levinson, I don’t have any comment whatsoever on the condition with respect to employment or any other issue except to say to you that we have raised the issue of his whereabouts on a continuous basis. I have personally raised it with the Iranians in the course of our discussions, and we will continue to try to seek his release and return to the United States.
MS. PSAKI: Thank you, everyone.
SECRETARY KERRY: Thanks, all. Appreciate it. Thank you very much.
JUSTICE OFFICIALS TESTIFY BEFORE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ABOUT FISA COURT
FROM: U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole, Director Keith B. Alexander and General Counsel Robert S. Litt Testify Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
Washington, D.C. ~ Wednesday, December 11, 2013
Thank you for inviting us to continue our discussions with this Committee on our efforts to enhance public confidence in the important intelligence collection programs that have been the subject of unauthorized disclosures since earlier this year: the collection of bulk telephony metadata under the business records provision found in Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, and the targeting of non-U.S. persons overseas under Section 702 of FISA. As we have emphasized in previous appearances before this and other Committees, we remain committed, as we review any modifications to these authorities, both to protecting privacy and civil liberties in the conduct of our intelligence activities, in a manner consistent with the Constitution, the law and our values, and to ensuring that we continue to have the authorities we need to collect important foreign intelligence to protect the country from terrorism and other threats to national security. We also remain committed to working closely with this Committee as any modifications to these activities are considered.
A key step in promoting greater public confidence in these intelligence activities is to provide greater transparency so that the American people, as well as ordinary citizens around the world, understand what the activities are, how they function, and how they are overseen. As you know, many of the reports appearing in the media concerning the scope of the Government’s intelligence collection efforts have been inaccurate, including with respect to the collection carried out under Sections 215 and 702. In response, the Administration has released substantial information since June to increase transparency and public understanding, while also working to ensure that these releases are consistent with national security. We welcome the opportunity to discuss ways to make more information about intelligence activities conducted under FISA available to the public in a meaningful and responsible way. At the same time, we are mindful of the need not to publicly disclose information that our adversaries could exploit to evade surveillance and harm our national security. There is no doubt that the recent unauthorized disclosures about our surveillance capabilities risk causing substantial damage to our national security, and it is essential that we not take steps that will increase that damage.
In keeping with this balance, in June the President directed the Intelligence Community to make as much information about the Section 215 and Section 702 programs available to the public as possible, consistent with the need to protect national security and sensitive sources and methods. Since then, the Director of National Intelligence has declassified and publicly released substantial information in order to facilitate informed public debate about these programs. Among other things, the Government has declassified and disclosed the primary and secondary orders from the FISA Court that describe in detail how the bulk telephony metadata collection program operates and the important restrictions on how the data collected under the program are accessed, retained, and disseminated. The Government has also released two recent FISA Court opinions, as well as an Administration white paper, that articulate in detail the legal authority and rationale for this program. We have also declassified and released to the public several other FISA Court opinions and orders concerning the two programs, including detailed discussions of compliance issues that have arisen during the programs’ history and the Government’s responses to these incidents. We have declassified and released extensive materials that were provided to the Congress in conjunction with its oversight and reauthorization of these authorities. Finally, just this week we have declassified and released additional materials, including FISA Court opinions relating to a separate program (no longer in operation) to collect certain internet metadata in bulk pursuant to court orders issued under the pen register/trap and trace provision of FISA (Section 402). Our efforts to promote greater transparency through declassification and public release of relevant documents are not yet complete. We will continue our efforts to promote greater transparency through declassification and public release of relevant documents, while carefully protecting information that we cannot responsibly release because of national security concerns. These efforts are an important means of enhancing public confidence that the Intelligence Community is using its legal authorities appropriately, which has become increasingly important in the wake of confusion, concerns, and misunderstandings caused by the recent and continuing unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
As part of our ongoing efforts to increase transparency, the Director of National Intelligence has also committed to providing annual public reports that include nationwide statistical data on the Intelligence Community’s use of certain FISA authorities. Specifically, for each of the following categories of FISA and related authorities, beginning in January 2014 and on an annual basis thereafter, the Intelligence Community will release to the public the total number of orders issued during the prior twelve-month period and the number of targets affected by these orders:
FISA orders based on probable cause (Titles I and III and Sections 703 and 704 of FISA).
Directives under Section 702 of FISA.
FISA Business Records orders (Title V of FISA).
FISA Pen Register/Trap and Trace orders (Title IV of FISA).
National Security Letters issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), 15 U.S.C.
This information will enable the public to understand how often the Intelligence Community uses these authorities nationwide, how many persons or entities are targeted by these efforts, and how these figures change over time. The Director of National Intelligence has concluded that providing this information on a nationwide basis is an acceptable course in light of the goal of public transparency, without unduly risking national security.
We also understand the concerns that specific companies have expressed as to their ability to inform their customers of how often data is provided to the Government in response to legal process. In light of those concerns, we have authorized companies to report within certain ranges the total number of federal, state, and local law enforcement and national security legal demands they receive on a nationwide basis, and the number of user accounts affected by such orders. This allows companies to illustrate that those demands affect only a tiny percentage of their users, even taking all of the demands together, and thus to refute inaccurate reports that companies cooperate with the Government in dragnet surveillance of all of their customers. At the same time, this approach avoids the disclosure of information to our adversaries regarding the extent or existence of FISA coverage of services or communications platforms provided by particular companies
The scope of the voluntary disclosures by the Executive Branch concerning sensitive intelligence collection activities carried out under FISA is unprecedented. We hope that the information we have released, and will continue to release, will allow the public to understand better how our intelligence collection authorities are used. We also hope the public will appreciate the rigorous oversight conducted by all three branches of government over our intelligence activities, a whole of government approach that is unique and exacting in comparison to the many governments that conduct similar intercept programs with substantially less stringent oversight. The extensive oversight that we conduct helps to ensure that our activities protect national security, balance important privacy considerations, and operate lawfully.
In addition to the unprecedented steps we have taken to promote transparency, we are open to working with Congress on legislation designed to increase public confidence in these intelligence activities and enhance the protection of privacy and civil liberties. Regarding Section 215, we would consider statutory restrictions on querying the data that are compatible with operational needs, including perhaps greater limits on contact chaining than what the current FISA Court orders permit. We could also consider a different approach to retention periods for the data—consistent with operational needs—and enhanced statutory oversight and transparency measures, such as annual reporting on the number of identifiers used to query the data. To be clear, we believe the manner in which the bulk telephony metadata collection program has been carried out is lawful, and existing oversight mechanisms protect both privacy and security. However, there are some changes that we believe could be made that would enhance privacy and civil liberties as well as public confidence in the program, consistent with our national security needs.
On the issue of FISA Court reform, we believe that the ex parte nature of proceedings before the FISA Court is fundamentally sound and has worked well for decades in adjudicating the Government’s applications for authority to conduct electronic surveillance or physical searches in the national security context under FISA. However, we understand the concerns that have been raised about the lack of independent views in certain cases, such as cases involving bulk collection, that affect the privacy and civil liberties interests of the American people as a whole.
Therefore, we would be open to discussing legislation authorizing the FISA Court to appoint an amicus , at its discretion, in appropriate cases, such as those that present novel and significant questions of law and that involve the acquisition and retention of information concerning a substantial number of U.S. persons. Establishing a mechanism whereby the FISA Court could solicit independent views of an amicus in cases that raise broader privacy and civil liberties questions, but without compromising classified information, may further assist the Court in making informed and balanced decisions and may also serve to enhance public confidence in the FISA Court process.
While we remain open to working with Congress to effectuate meaningful reforms along the lines just described, we do not support legislation that would have the effect of ending the Section 215 program, which the Government continues to find valuable in protecting national security. And, while we support increased transparency, we do not support legislation that would require or permit public reporting of information concerning intelligence activities under FISA that could be used by our adversaries to evade surveillance, or which otherwise raises practical and operational concerns. The bill approved by the Senate Intelligence Committee includes a number of constructive provisions that we support and that we think will enhance protections for privacy and civil liberties without harming national security.
Finally, we want to address the Committee’s interest in the legal standard for collection of records under Section 215. As the Administration explained in a white paper that it published in August, the telephony metadata program satisfies the statutory requirement that there be “reasonable grounds to believe” that the records collected are “relevant to an authorized investigation . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information . . . or to protect against international terrorist or clandestine intelligence activities.” The text of Section 215, considered in light of the well-developed understanding of “relevance” in the context of civil discovery and criminal and administrative subpoenas, as well as the broader purposes of the statute, indicates that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the records at issue here are “relevant to an authorized investigation.” Specifically, in the circumstance where the Government has reason to believe that conducting a search of a broad collection of telephony metadata records will produce counterterrorism information—and that it is necessary to collect a large volume of data in order to employ the analytic tools needed to identify that information—the standard of relevance under Section 215 is satisfied, particularly in light of the strict limitations on the use of the data collected and the extensive oversight of the program.
As noted above, two decisions of the FISA Court that have recently been declassified by the Government and released publicly by the Court explain why the collection of telephony metadata in bulk is constitutional and is authorized under the statute. These opinions reflect the independent conclusions of two federal judges serving on the FISA Court that the Government’s request for the production of call detail records under Section 215 meets the relevance standard and all other statutory requirements. Moreover, these opinions conclude that because the Government seeks only the production of telephony metadata, and not the content of communications, there are no Fourth Amendment impediments to the collection. Indeed, 15 separate judges of the FISA Court have held on 35 occasions that Section 215 authorizes the collection of telephony metadata in bulk in support of counterterrorism investigations. Last week, a district court in a criminal case in California also held that the collection of telephony metadata in bulk under Section 215 is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
We appreciate that privacy concerns persist about the telephony metadata collection program, even considering the limited data the Government receives, the stringent constraints set by the FISA Court on how it is used, and the aforementioned legal rulings that have consistently upheld its legality. But we hope you will weigh those concerns against the increased risks to national security if this capability were terminated with no equivalent program that addresses what the 9/11 Commission pointed out as a critical gap in the ability of the intelligence community to detect and “connect the dots” for foreign terror plots against our homeland. This program fills a significant gap in our ability to identify terrorist communications and, together with other authorities, can help us identify and disrupt terrorist plots, thus fulfilling the vision of the 9/11 Commission, which implored the Government to undertake mechanisms and collaboration which would prevent the recurrence of another 9/11.
We look forward to answering any questions you might have about these important intelligence collection programs and related issues. We understand that there are a variety of views in the Congress and among the American people about these activities, and we look forward to discussing these issues with this Committee as new legislation concerning these activities is considered. We hope that, with the assistance of this Committee, we can ensure that these programs are on the strongest possible footing, from the perspective of both national security and privacy, so that they will continue to enjoy Congressional support in the future. Thank you.
Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole, Director Keith B. Alexander and General Counsel Robert S. Litt Testify Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
Washington, D.C. ~ Wednesday, December 11, 2013
Thank you for inviting us to continue our discussions with this Committee on our efforts to enhance public confidence in the important intelligence collection programs that have been the subject of unauthorized disclosures since earlier this year: the collection of bulk telephony metadata under the business records provision found in Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, and the targeting of non-U.S. persons overseas under Section 702 of FISA. As we have emphasized in previous appearances before this and other Committees, we remain committed, as we review any modifications to these authorities, both to protecting privacy and civil liberties in the conduct of our intelligence activities, in a manner consistent with the Constitution, the law and our values, and to ensuring that we continue to have the authorities we need to collect important foreign intelligence to protect the country from terrorism and other threats to national security. We also remain committed to working closely with this Committee as any modifications to these activities are considered.
A key step in promoting greater public confidence in these intelligence activities is to provide greater transparency so that the American people, as well as ordinary citizens around the world, understand what the activities are, how they function, and how they are overseen. As you know, many of the reports appearing in the media concerning the scope of the Government’s intelligence collection efforts have been inaccurate, including with respect to the collection carried out under Sections 215 and 702. In response, the Administration has released substantial information since June to increase transparency and public understanding, while also working to ensure that these releases are consistent with national security. We welcome the opportunity to discuss ways to make more information about intelligence activities conducted under FISA available to the public in a meaningful and responsible way. At the same time, we are mindful of the need not to publicly disclose information that our adversaries could exploit to evade surveillance and harm our national security. There is no doubt that the recent unauthorized disclosures about our surveillance capabilities risk causing substantial damage to our national security, and it is essential that we not take steps that will increase that damage.
In keeping with this balance, in June the President directed the Intelligence Community to make as much information about the Section 215 and Section 702 programs available to the public as possible, consistent with the need to protect national security and sensitive sources and methods. Since then, the Director of National Intelligence has declassified and publicly released substantial information in order to facilitate informed public debate about these programs. Among other things, the Government has declassified and disclosed the primary and secondary orders from the FISA Court that describe in detail how the bulk telephony metadata collection program operates and the important restrictions on how the data collected under the program are accessed, retained, and disseminated. The Government has also released two recent FISA Court opinions, as well as an Administration white paper, that articulate in detail the legal authority and rationale for this program. We have also declassified and released to the public several other FISA Court opinions and orders concerning the two programs, including detailed discussions of compliance issues that have arisen during the programs’ history and the Government’s responses to these incidents. We have declassified and released extensive materials that were provided to the Congress in conjunction with its oversight and reauthorization of these authorities. Finally, just this week we have declassified and released additional materials, including FISA Court opinions relating to a separate program (no longer in operation) to collect certain internet metadata in bulk pursuant to court orders issued under the pen register/trap and trace provision of FISA (Section 402). Our efforts to promote greater transparency through declassification and public release of relevant documents are not yet complete. We will continue our efforts to promote greater transparency through declassification and public release of relevant documents, while carefully protecting information that we cannot responsibly release because of national security concerns. These efforts are an important means of enhancing public confidence that the Intelligence Community is using its legal authorities appropriately, which has become increasingly important in the wake of confusion, concerns, and misunderstandings caused by the recent and continuing unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
As part of our ongoing efforts to increase transparency, the Director of National Intelligence has also committed to providing annual public reports that include nationwide statistical data on the Intelligence Community’s use of certain FISA authorities. Specifically, for each of the following categories of FISA and related authorities, beginning in January 2014 and on an annual basis thereafter, the Intelligence Community will release to the public the total number of orders issued during the prior twelve-month period and the number of targets affected by these orders:
FISA orders based on probable cause (Titles I and III and Sections 703 and 704 of FISA).
Directives under Section 702 of FISA.
FISA Business Records orders (Title V of FISA).
FISA Pen Register/Trap and Trace orders (Title IV of FISA).
National Security Letters issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), 15 U.S.C.
This information will enable the public to understand how often the Intelligence Community uses these authorities nationwide, how many persons or entities are targeted by these efforts, and how these figures change over time. The Director of National Intelligence has concluded that providing this information on a nationwide basis is an acceptable course in light of the goal of public transparency, without unduly risking national security.
We also understand the concerns that specific companies have expressed as to their ability to inform their customers of how often data is provided to the Government in response to legal process. In light of those concerns, we have authorized companies to report within certain ranges the total number of federal, state, and local law enforcement and national security legal demands they receive on a nationwide basis, and the number of user accounts affected by such orders. This allows companies to illustrate that those demands affect only a tiny percentage of their users, even taking all of the demands together, and thus to refute inaccurate reports that companies cooperate with the Government in dragnet surveillance of all of their customers. At the same time, this approach avoids the disclosure of information to our adversaries regarding the extent or existence of FISA coverage of services or communications platforms provided by particular companies
The scope of the voluntary disclosures by the Executive Branch concerning sensitive intelligence collection activities carried out under FISA is unprecedented. We hope that the information we have released, and will continue to release, will allow the public to understand better how our intelligence collection authorities are used. We also hope the public will appreciate the rigorous oversight conducted by all three branches of government over our intelligence activities, a whole of government approach that is unique and exacting in comparison to the many governments that conduct similar intercept programs with substantially less stringent oversight. The extensive oversight that we conduct helps to ensure that our activities protect national security, balance important privacy considerations, and operate lawfully.
In addition to the unprecedented steps we have taken to promote transparency, we are open to working with Congress on legislation designed to increase public confidence in these intelligence activities and enhance the protection of privacy and civil liberties. Regarding Section 215, we would consider statutory restrictions on querying the data that are compatible with operational needs, including perhaps greater limits on contact chaining than what the current FISA Court orders permit. We could also consider a different approach to retention periods for the data—consistent with operational needs—and enhanced statutory oversight and transparency measures, such as annual reporting on the number of identifiers used to query the data. To be clear, we believe the manner in which the bulk telephony metadata collection program has been carried out is lawful, and existing oversight mechanisms protect both privacy and security. However, there are some changes that we believe could be made that would enhance privacy and civil liberties as well as public confidence in the program, consistent with our national security needs.
On the issue of FISA Court reform, we believe that the ex parte nature of proceedings before the FISA Court is fundamentally sound and has worked well for decades in adjudicating the Government’s applications for authority to conduct electronic surveillance or physical searches in the national security context under FISA. However, we understand the concerns that have been raised about the lack of independent views in certain cases, such as cases involving bulk collection, that affect the privacy and civil liberties interests of the American people as a whole.
Therefore, we would be open to discussing legislation authorizing the FISA Court to appoint an amicus , at its discretion, in appropriate cases, such as those that present novel and significant questions of law and that involve the acquisition and retention of information concerning a substantial number of U.S. persons. Establishing a mechanism whereby the FISA Court could solicit independent views of an amicus in cases that raise broader privacy and civil liberties questions, but without compromising classified information, may further assist the Court in making informed and balanced decisions and may also serve to enhance public confidence in the FISA Court process.
While we remain open to working with Congress to effectuate meaningful reforms along the lines just described, we do not support legislation that would have the effect of ending the Section 215 program, which the Government continues to find valuable in protecting national security. And, while we support increased transparency, we do not support legislation that would require or permit public reporting of information concerning intelligence activities under FISA that could be used by our adversaries to evade surveillance, or which otherwise raises practical and operational concerns. The bill approved by the Senate Intelligence Committee includes a number of constructive provisions that we support and that we think will enhance protections for privacy and civil liberties without harming national security.
Finally, we want to address the Committee’s interest in the legal standard for collection of records under Section 215. As the Administration explained in a white paper that it published in August, the telephony metadata program satisfies the statutory requirement that there be “reasonable grounds to believe” that the records collected are “relevant to an authorized investigation . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information . . . or to protect against international terrorist or clandestine intelligence activities.” The text of Section 215, considered in light of the well-developed understanding of “relevance” in the context of civil discovery and criminal and administrative subpoenas, as well as the broader purposes of the statute, indicates that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the records at issue here are “relevant to an authorized investigation.” Specifically, in the circumstance where the Government has reason to believe that conducting a search of a broad collection of telephony metadata records will produce counterterrorism information—and that it is necessary to collect a large volume of data in order to employ the analytic tools needed to identify that information—the standard of relevance under Section 215 is satisfied, particularly in light of the strict limitations on the use of the data collected and the extensive oversight of the program.
As noted above, two decisions of the FISA Court that have recently been declassified by the Government and released publicly by the Court explain why the collection of telephony metadata in bulk is constitutional and is authorized under the statute. These opinions reflect the independent conclusions of two federal judges serving on the FISA Court that the Government’s request for the production of call detail records under Section 215 meets the relevance standard and all other statutory requirements. Moreover, these opinions conclude that because the Government seeks only the production of telephony metadata, and not the content of communications, there are no Fourth Amendment impediments to the collection. Indeed, 15 separate judges of the FISA Court have held on 35 occasions that Section 215 authorizes the collection of telephony metadata in bulk in support of counterterrorism investigations. Last week, a district court in a criminal case in California also held that the collection of telephony metadata in bulk under Section 215 is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
We appreciate that privacy concerns persist about the telephony metadata collection program, even considering the limited data the Government receives, the stringent constraints set by the FISA Court on how it is used, and the aforementioned legal rulings that have consistently upheld its legality. But we hope you will weigh those concerns against the increased risks to national security if this capability were terminated with no equivalent program that addresses what the 9/11 Commission pointed out as a critical gap in the ability of the intelligence community to detect and “connect the dots” for foreign terror plots against our homeland. This program fills a significant gap in our ability to identify terrorist communications and, together with other authorities, can help us identify and disrupt terrorist plots, thus fulfilling the vision of the 9/11 Commission, which implored the Government to undertake mechanisms and collaboration which would prevent the recurrence of another 9/11.
We look forward to answering any questions you might have about these important intelligence collection programs and related issues. We understand that there are a variety of views in the Congress and among the American people about these activities, and we look forward to discussing these issues with this Committee as new legislation concerning these activities is considered. We hope that, with the assistance of this Committee, we can ensure that these programs are on the strongest possible footing, from the perspective of both national security and privacy, so that they will continue to enjoy Congressional support in the future. Thank you.
MANAGING PARTNERS OF INVESTMENT ADVISORY FIRM ALLEGEDLY ALLOWED THIRD PARTY TO INFLUENCE PORTFOLIO
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged the managing partners of a Charlotte, N.C.-based investment advisory firm for compromising their independent judgment and allowing a third party with its own interests to influence the portfolio selection process of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) being offered to investors.
The investment managers have agreed to collectively pay more than $472,000 and exit the securities industry to settle the SEC’s charges.
According to the SEC’s order instituting settled administrative proceedings, disclosures to investors indicated that NIR Capital Management LLC was solely selecting the assets for Norma CDO I Ltd. as the designated collateral manager. However, NIR’s Scott H. Shannon accepted assets chosen by hedge fund firm Magnetar Capital LLC for the Norma CDO’s portfolio, and Joseph G. Parish III allowed Magnetar to influence the selection of some other assets. Shannon himself called at least one of the residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) ultimately included in the portfolio a “real stinker.” Magnetar bought the equity in the CDO but also placed short bets on collateral in the CDO and therefore had an interest not necessarily aligned with potential long-term debt investors that relied on the CDO and its collateral to perform well.
The SEC also today announced charges against Merrill Lynch, which structured and marketed the Norma CDO.
“Shannon and Parish could not serve two masters,” said George S. Canellos, co-director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “They allowed Magnetar to influence asset selection and abdicated their duty to pick only the assets they believed were best for their client.”
According to the SEC’s order, NIR initially was unaware when Magnatar purchased $472.5 million in long exposure to RMBS for the Norma CDO in August and September 2006 based on information that NIR provided to Magnetar that was preliminary and not intended as a basis for actual collateral selection. By the time it learned about the purchases in November 2006, NIR already had purchased a substantial portion of the RMBS collateral. Nevertheless, NIR used its own internal credit metrics to analyze the collateral that Magnetar purchased, and Shannon then sought to exclude some of the RMBS collateral that Magnetar had acquired and selected. NIR, however, ultimately incorporated the collateral that Magnetar purchased in the closing portfolio. Shannon explained to an NIR credit analyst that the final portfolio included a number of trades that NIR did not execute, and “this leaves us with several names we probably would not want...”
According to the SEC’s order, Parish allowed Magnetar to exercise so-called approval rights by permitting the firm to be involved in the process of selecting CDO assets acquired for the portfolio. As a result, Parish knew that Magnetar was the short counterparty for much of the Norma CDO’s synthetic exposure to CDO securities. NIR attested in the collateral management agreement with the Norma CDO that it would act in good faith and exercise reasonable care in selecting the portfolio. However, the CDO and its debt investors knew nothing about NIR’s compromised decision-making with Magnetar involved in the collateral selection process.
Shannon and Parish consented to the SEC’s order finding that Shannon violated Sections 206(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Parish violated Section 206(2). Shannon agreed to be barred from the securities industry for at least two years and must pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $140,662 and a penalty of $116,553. Parish agreed to be suspended from the securities industry for at least 12 months and must pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $140,662 and a penalty of $75,000. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Shannon and Parish consented to cease and desist from violating respective Sections of 206 of the Advisers Act. They have agreed to dissolve the NIR business.
The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Steven Rawlings, Tony Frouge, Sharon Bryant, Kapil Agrawal, Douglas Smith, Howard Fischer, and Daniel Walfish with assistance from Gerald Gross and Joshua Pater of the New York Regional Office. They were assisted by examiners Edward Moy, Luis Casais, and Thomas Shupe in the New York office.
The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged the managing partners of a Charlotte, N.C.-based investment advisory firm for compromising their independent judgment and allowing a third party with its own interests to influence the portfolio selection process of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) being offered to investors.
The investment managers have agreed to collectively pay more than $472,000 and exit the securities industry to settle the SEC’s charges.
According to the SEC’s order instituting settled administrative proceedings, disclosures to investors indicated that NIR Capital Management LLC was solely selecting the assets for Norma CDO I Ltd. as the designated collateral manager. However, NIR’s Scott H. Shannon accepted assets chosen by hedge fund firm Magnetar Capital LLC for the Norma CDO’s portfolio, and Joseph G. Parish III allowed Magnetar to influence the selection of some other assets. Shannon himself called at least one of the residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) ultimately included in the portfolio a “real stinker.” Magnetar bought the equity in the CDO but also placed short bets on collateral in the CDO and therefore had an interest not necessarily aligned with potential long-term debt investors that relied on the CDO and its collateral to perform well.
The SEC also today announced charges against Merrill Lynch, which structured and marketed the Norma CDO.
“Shannon and Parish could not serve two masters,” said George S. Canellos, co-director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “They allowed Magnetar to influence asset selection and abdicated their duty to pick only the assets they believed were best for their client.”
According to the SEC’s order, NIR initially was unaware when Magnatar purchased $472.5 million in long exposure to RMBS for the Norma CDO in August and September 2006 based on information that NIR provided to Magnetar that was preliminary and not intended as a basis for actual collateral selection. By the time it learned about the purchases in November 2006, NIR already had purchased a substantial portion of the RMBS collateral. Nevertheless, NIR used its own internal credit metrics to analyze the collateral that Magnetar purchased, and Shannon then sought to exclude some of the RMBS collateral that Magnetar had acquired and selected. NIR, however, ultimately incorporated the collateral that Magnetar purchased in the closing portfolio. Shannon explained to an NIR credit analyst that the final portfolio included a number of trades that NIR did not execute, and “this leaves us with several names we probably would not want...”
According to the SEC’s order, Parish allowed Magnetar to exercise so-called approval rights by permitting the firm to be involved in the process of selecting CDO assets acquired for the portfolio. As a result, Parish knew that Magnetar was the short counterparty for much of the Norma CDO’s synthetic exposure to CDO securities. NIR attested in the collateral management agreement with the Norma CDO that it would act in good faith and exercise reasonable care in selecting the portfolio. However, the CDO and its debt investors knew nothing about NIR’s compromised decision-making with Magnetar involved in the collateral selection process.
Shannon and Parish consented to the SEC’s order finding that Shannon violated Sections 206(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Parish violated Section 206(2). Shannon agreed to be barred from the securities industry for at least two years and must pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $140,662 and a penalty of $116,553. Parish agreed to be suspended from the securities industry for at least 12 months and must pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $140,662 and a penalty of $75,000. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Shannon and Parish consented to cease and desist from violating respective Sections of 206 of the Advisers Act. They have agreed to dissolve the NIR business.
The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Steven Rawlings, Tony Frouge, Sharon Bryant, Kapil Agrawal, Douglas Smith, Howard Fischer, and Daniel Walfish with assistance from Gerald Gross and Joshua Pater of the New York Regional Office. They were assisted by examiners Edward Moy, Luis Casais, and Thomas Shupe in the New York office.
HACKER SENTENCED FOR ROLE IN SCHEME TO SELL ACCESS TO COMPUTER NETWORKS
FROM: U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Thursday, December 12, 2013
Pennsylvania Man Sentenced to 18 Months in Prison for Hacking into Multiple Computer Networks
A Pennsylvania man was sentenced to serve 18 months in prison for his role in a scheme to hack into computer networks and sell access to those networks.
Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and U .S. Attorney Carmen M. Ortiz of the District of Massachusetts made the announcement after sentencing by U.S. District Judge Mark Wolf in the District of Massachusetts on Dec. 11, 2013.
Andrew James Miller, 23, of Devon, Pa., pleaded guilty to conspiracy and computer fraud on Aug. 26, 2013. According to court documents, from 2008 to 2011, Miller remotely hacked into a variety of computers located in Massachusetts and elsewhere, and, in some instances, surreptitiously installed “backdoors” into those computers. These “backdoors” were designed to provide future administrator-level, or “root,” access to the compromised computers.
Miller obtained login credentials to the compromised computers. He and his co-conspirators then sold access to these backdoors, as well as other login credentials. The access sold by Miller and his co-conspirators allowed unauthorized people to access various commercial, education and government computer networks. Miller attempted to sell access for $50,000 to two supercomputers at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in Oakland, California, that were part of the National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center.
The case was investigated by the FBI and prosecuted by Senior Trial Attorney Mona Sedky of the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Adam Bookbinder of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts.
Thursday, December 12, 2013
Pennsylvania Man Sentenced to 18 Months in Prison for Hacking into Multiple Computer Networks
A Pennsylvania man was sentenced to serve 18 months in prison for his role in a scheme to hack into computer networks and sell access to those networks.
Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and U .S. Attorney Carmen M. Ortiz of the District of Massachusetts made the announcement after sentencing by U.S. District Judge Mark Wolf in the District of Massachusetts on Dec. 11, 2013.
Andrew James Miller, 23, of Devon, Pa., pleaded guilty to conspiracy and computer fraud on Aug. 26, 2013. According to court documents, from 2008 to 2011, Miller remotely hacked into a variety of computers located in Massachusetts and elsewhere, and, in some instances, surreptitiously installed “backdoors” into those computers. These “backdoors” were designed to provide future administrator-level, or “root,” access to the compromised computers.
Miller obtained login credentials to the compromised computers. He and his co-conspirators then sold access to these backdoors, as well as other login credentials. The access sold by Miller and his co-conspirators allowed unauthorized people to access various commercial, education and government computer networks. Miller attempted to sell access for $50,000 to two supercomputers at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in Oakland, California, that were part of the National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center.
The case was investigated by the FBI and prosecuted by Senior Trial Attorney Mona Sedky of the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Adam Bookbinder of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts.
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