Thursday, June 21, 2012

SYRIA: BACKGROUND FROM U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT


Map Credit:  U.S. State Department Website.
PROFILE
Geography
Area: 185,170 sq. km. (71,504 sq. mi.), including 1,295 sq. km. of Israeli-occupied territory; about the size of North Dakota.
Cities: Capital--Damascus (1.7 million). Other cities--Metropolitan Damascus (excluding city) (2.7 million), Aleppo (4.6 million), Homs (1.7 million), Hama (1.5 million), Idleb (1.4 million), al-Hasakeh (1.4 million), Dayr al-Zur (1.1 million), Latakia (1 million), Dar'a (1 million), al-Raqqa (900,000), and Tartus (800,000).
Terrain: Narrow coastal plain with a double mountain belt in the west; large, semiarid and desert plateau to the east.
Climate: Mostly desert; hot, dry, sunny summers (June to August) and mild, rainy winters (December to February) along coast.

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Syrian(s).
Population (2010 est.)*: 22.5 million.
Population growth rate (2009 est.): 2.37%.
Major ethnic groups: Arabs (90%), Kurds (9%), Armenians, Circassians, Turkmans.
Religions: Sunni Muslims (74%), Alawis (12%), Christians (10%), Druze (3%), and small numbers of other Muslim sects, Jews, and Yazidis.
Languages: Arabic (official), Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, Circassian understood within communities, French, English somewhat understood, principally in major cities.
Education (2009 est.): Years compulsory--primary, 6 years. Attendance--97.9%. Literacy--86%, illiteracy--14%.
Health (2009 est.): Infant mortality rate--17/1,000. Life expectancy--69.8 years male, 72.68 years female.
Work force (5.5 million, 2008 est.): By occupation--services (including government) 26%, agriculture 19%, industry 14%, commerce 16%, construction 15%, transportation 7%, and finance 3%.
Unemployment (2008 est.): 9.8%.

Government
Type: Republic, under authoritarian military-dominated Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party regimes since March 1963.
Independence: April 17, 1946.
Constitution: March 13, 1973. From 1963 until April 2011, Syria was under a legal State of Emergency, which effectively suspended most constitutional protections. Although the State of Emergency was lifted in response to growing opposition, no constitutional protections were implemented and arbitrary detentions and punishments escalated.

Branches: Executive--president, two vice presidents, prime minister, Council of Ministers (cabinet). Legislative--unicameral People's Council. Judicial--Supreme Judicial Council, Supreme Constitutional Court, Court of Cassation, Appeals Courts, Economic Security Courts, Supreme State Security Court, Personal Status and local levels courts. Administrative subdivisions: 14 provinces

Political parties: The National Progressive Front, an umbrella organization for several parties permitted by the government including the Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) Party; Socialist Unionist Democratic Party; Syrian Arab Socialist Union or ASU, Syrian Communist Party (two branches); Syrian Social Nationalist Party; Unionist Socialist Party; and other quasi-tolerated parties, generally considered opposition-oriented but enfeebled and reluctant to challenge the government. There are also several illegal Kurdish parties. Recent decrees allowing for registration of parties have had minimal response. Active domestic and external opposition groups have no legal status.
Suffrage: Universal at 18.

Economy (2010)
GDP*: $59.4 billion.
Real growth rate (2010)*: 3.0%.
Per capita GDP (2010)*: $2,893.
Natural resources: petroleum, phosphates, iron, chrome and manganese ores, asphalt, rock salt, marble, gypsum, hydropower.

Agriculture: Products--wheat, barley, cotton, lentils, chickpeas, olives, sugar beets, and other fruits and vegetables; beef, mutton, eggs, poultry, and other dairy products. Arable land--33%.
Industry: Types--petroleum, textiles, pharmaceuticals, food processing, beverages, tobacco, phosphate rock mining, cement, oil seed extraction, and car assembly.

Trade: Exports (2010 est.)--$12.84 billion: crude oil, minerals, petroleum products, fruits and vegetables, cotton fiber, textiles, clothing, meat and live animals, wheat. Major markets(2007)--Italy 22%, France 11%, Saudi Arabia 10%, Iraq 5%, Egypt 4%, Jordan 4%. Imports(2008 est.)--$17.2 billion f.o.b.: machinery and transport equipment, electric power machinery, food and livestock, metal and metal products, chemicals and chemical products, plastics, yarn, and paper. Major suppliers (2007)--Russia 10%, China 8%, Saudi Arabia 6%, Ukraine 6%, South Korea 5%, Turkey 4%. In 2010 the European Union (EU) was Syria's biggest trading partner, accounting for 22.5% of Syrian trade, followed by Iraq (13.3%), Saudi Arabia (9%) and China (6.9%.) Turkey was in fifth place with 6.6% and Russia was ninth with 3%.

*according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics

PEOPLE
Ethnic Syrians are of Semitic stock. Syria's population is 90% Muslim--74% Sunni, and 16% other Muslim groups, including the Alawi, Shi'a, and Druze--and 10% Christian. There also is a tiny Syrian Jewish community.

Arabic is the official, and most widely spoken, language. Arabs, including some 500,000 Palestinian and fewer than 1 million Iraqi refugees, make up 90% of the population. Many educated Syrians also speak English or French, but English is the more widely understood. The Kurds, many of whom speak the Kurdish language, make up 9% of the population and live mostly in the northeast corner of Syria, though sizable Arabic-speaking Kurdish communities live in most major Syrian cities as well. Armenian and Turkic languages are spoken among the small Armenian and Turkman populations.

Most people live in the Euphrates River valley, along the coastal plain, and in a fertile strip between the coastal mountains and the desert. Education is free and compulsory from ages 6 to 12. Schooling consists of 6 years of primary education followed by a 3-year preparatory or vocational training period and a 3-year secondary or vocational program. The second 3-year period of secondary schooling is required for university admission. Total enrollment at post-secondary schools is over 150,000. The illiteracy rate of Syrians aged 15 and older is 9.3% for males and 17.8% for females.

Ancient Syria's cultural and artistic achievements and contributions are many. Archaeologists have discovered extensive writings and evidence of a brilliant culture rivaling those of Mesopotamia and Egypt in and around the ancient city of Ebla. Later Syrian scholars and artists contributed to Hellenistic and Roman thought and culture. Zeno of Sidon founded the Epicurean school; Cicero was a pupil of Antiochus of Ascalon at Athens; and the writings of Posidonius of Apamea influenced Livy and Plutarch. Syrians have contributed to Arabic literature and music and have a proud tradition of oral and written poetry. Although declining, the world-famous handicraft industry still employs thousands.

HISTORY
Archaeologists have demonstrated that Syria was the center of one of the most ancient civilizations on earth. Around the excavated city of Ebla in northern Syria, discovered in 1975, a great Semitic empire spread from the Red Sea north to Turkey and east to Mesopotamia from 2500 to 2400 B.C. The city of Ebla alone during that time had a population estimated at 260,000. Scholars believe the language of Ebla to be the oldest Semitic language. In the east, the ancient site of Mari contains archeological remains of multiple cultures and religions living concurrently in the city.

Syria was occupied successively by Canaanites, Phoenicians, Hebrews, Arameans, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Nabataeans, Byzantines, and, in part, Crusaders before finally coming under the control of the Ottoman Turks. Syria is significant in the history of Christianity; Paul was converted on the road to Damascus and established the first organized Christian Church at Antioch in ancient Syria, from which he left on many of his missionary journeys.

Damascus, settled about 2500 B.C., is one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world. It came under Muslim rule in A.D. 636. Immediately thereafter, the city's power and prestige reached its peak, and it became the capital of the Omayyad Empire, which extended from Spain to India from A.D. 661 to A.D. 750, when the Abbasid caliphate was established at Baghdad, Iraq.

Damascus became a provincial capital of the Mamluk Empire around 1260. It was largely destroyed in 1400 by Tamerlane, the Mongol conqueror, who removed many of its craftsmen to Samarkand. Rebuilt, it continued to serve as a capital until 1516. In 1517, it fell under Ottoman rule. The Ottomans remained for the next 400 years, except for a brief occupation by Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt from 1832 to 1840.

French Occupation
In 1920, an independent Arab Kingdom of Syria was established under King Faysal of the Hashemite family, who later became King of Iraq. However, his rule over Syria ended after only a few months, following the clash between his Syrian Arab forces and regular French forces at the battle of Maysalun. French troops occupied Syria later that year after the League of Nations put Syria under French mandate. With the fall of France in 1940, Syria came under the control of the Vichy Government until the British and Free French occupied the country in July 1941. Continuing pressure from Syrian nationalist groups forced the French to evacuate their troops in April 1946, leaving the country in the hands of a republican government that had been formed during the mandate.

Independence to 1970
Although rapid economic development followed the declaration of independence of April 17, 1946, Syrian politics from independence through the late 1960s were marked by upheaval. A series of military coups beginning in 1949 undermined civilian rule and led to army colonel Adib Shishakli's seizure of power in 1951. After the overthrow of President Shishakli in a 1954 coup, continued political maneuvering supported by competing factions in the military eventually brought Arab nationalist and socialist movements to power.

Syria's political instability during the years after the 1954 coup, the apparent parallelism of Syrian and Egyptian policies, and the appeal of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's leadership in the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis created support in Syria for union with Egypt. On February 1, 1958, the two countries merged to create the United Arab Republic, and all Syrian political parties ceased overt activities. Cairo directed economic policies in Syria, generating resentment among many Syrians.

The union was not a success, and, following a military coup on September 28, 1961, Syria seceded, reestablishing itself as the Syrian Arab Republic. Instability characterized the next 18 months, with various coups culminating on March 8, 1963, in the installation by leftist Syrian Army officers of the National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC), a group of military and civilian officials who assumed control of all executive and legislative authority. The takeover was engineered by members of the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (Ba'ath Party), which had been active in Syria and other Arab countries since the late 1940s. The new cabinet was dominated by Ba'ath members.

The Ba'ath takeover in Syria followed a Ba'ath coup in Iraq the previous month. The new Syrian Government explored the possibility of federation with Egypt and Ba'ath-controlled Iraq. An agreement was concluded in Cairo on April 17, 1963, for a referendum on unity to be held in September 1963. However, serious disagreements among the parties soon developed, and the tripartite federation failed to materialize. Thereafter, the Ba'ath regimes in Syria and Iraq began to work for bilateral unity. These plans foundered in November 1963, when the Ba'ath regime in Iraq was overthrown. In May 1964, President Amin Hafiz of the NCRC promulgated a provisional constitution providing for an appointed legislature called the National Council of the Revolution (NCR) composed of representatives of mass organizations--labor, peasant, and professional unions; a presidential council, in which executive power was vested; and a cabinet. On February 23, 1966, a group of army officers carried out a successful, intra-party coup, imprisoned President Hafiz, dissolved the cabinet and the NCR, abrogated the provisional constitution, and designated a regionalist, civilian Ba'ath government. The coup leaders described it as a "rectification" of Ba'ath Party principles. The defeat of the Syrians and Egyptians in the June 1967 war with Israel weakened the radical socialist regime established by the 1966 coup. Conflict developed between a moderate military wing and a more extremist civilian wing of the Ba'ath Party. The 1970 retreat of Syrian forces sent to aid the PLO during the "Black September" hostilities with Jordan reflected this political disagreement within the ruling Ba'ath leadership. On November 13, 1970, Minister of Defense Hafiz al-Asad effected a bloodless military coup, ousting the civilian party leadership and assuming the role of prime minister.

1970 to 2000
Upon assuming power, Hafiz al-Asad moved quickly to create an organizational infrastructure for his government and to consolidate control. The Provisional Regional Command of Asad's Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party nominated a 173-member legislature, the People's Council, in which the Ba'ath Party took 87 seats. The remaining seats were divided among "popular organizations" and other minor parties. In March 1971, the party held its regional congress (covering Syria, rather than the pan-Arab countries) and elected a new 21-member Regional Command headed by Asad. In the same month, a national referendum was held to confirm Asad as President for a 7-year term. In March 1972, to broaden the base of his government, Asad formed the National Progressive Front, a coalition of parties led by the Ba'ath Party, and elections were held to establish local councils in each of Syria's 14 governorates. In March 1973, a new Syrian constitution went into effect, followed shortly thereafter by parliamentary elections for the People's Council, the first such elections since 1962.

The authoritarian regime was not without its critics, though it dealt quickly with most. A serious challenge arose in the late 1970s, however, from fundamentalist Sunni Muslims, who rejected the basic values of the secular Ba'ath program and objected to rule by the minority Alawis, whom some considered heretical. From 1976 until its suppression in 1982, the Islamist Syrian Muslim Brotherhood led an armed insurgency against the regime. In response to an attempted uprising by the Brotherhood in February 1982, the government crushed the fundamentalist opposition centered in the city of Hama, leveling parts of the city with artillery fire and causing many thousands of dead and wounded. From 1982 until March 2011, public manifestations of anti-regime activity were very limited.

Syria's 1990 participation in the U.S.-led multinational coalition aligned against Iraq's Saddam Hussein marked a dramatic shift in Syria's policies toward other Arab states and the West. Syria participated in the multilateral Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991. During the 1990s, Syria engaged in direct, face-to-face negotiations with Israel, although these negotiations failed.

Hafiz al-Asad died on June 10, 2000, after 30 years in power. Immediately following Asad's death, the parliament amended the constitution to reduce the mandatory minimum age of the president from 40 to 34 years old. This allowed his son, Bashar al-Asad, legally to be eligible for nomination by the ruling Ba'ath Party. On July 10, 2000, Bashar al-Asad was elected President by referendum in which he ran unopposed, garnering 97.29% of the vote, according to Syrian Government statistics. He was inaugurated into office on July 17, 2000 for a 7-year term.

2000 to 2011 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Syrian Government began limited cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts on the basis of shared opposition to al-Qaeda’s goals. Syria opposed the Iraq war in March 2003, and bilateral relations with the United States swiftly deteriorated. In December 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, which provided for the imposition of a series of sanctions against Syria if Syria did not end its support for Palestinian terrorist groups, curtail its military and security interference in Lebanon, cease its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and meet its obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. In May 2004, the President determined that Syria had not met these conditions and implemented sanctions that prohibit the export to Syria of U.S. products except for food and medicine, and the taking off from or landing in the United States of Syrian Government-owned aircraft. At the same time, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced its intention to order U.S. financial institutions to sever correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria based on money-laundering concerns, pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Acting under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the President also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to freeze assets belonging to certain Syrian individuals and entities.

Tensions between Syria and the United States intensified from mid-2004 to early 2009, primarily over issues relating to Iraq and Lebanon. The U.S. Government recalled its ambassador to Syria in February 2005 following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Prior to the assassination, France and the United States in 2004 had co-authored UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559 calling for “all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon.” Under pressure from the international community following the Hariri assassination, Syrian units stationed in Lebanon since 1976 were withdrawn by April 2005. Sensing its international isolation, the Syrians strengthened their relations with Iran and radical Palestinians groups based in Damascus, and cracked down on any signs of internal dissent. During the July-August 2006 conflict in Lebanon between Israel and Hizballah, Syria placed its military forces on alert but did not intervene directly on behalf of its Hizballah ally.

On May 27, 2007, President al-Asad was reaffirmed by referendum for a second 7-year term, with 97.6% of the vote. During 2008, though Syria’s relations with the United States remained strained, Syria’s international isolation was slowly being overcome as indirect talks between Israel and Syria, mediated by Turkey, were announced and a Qatar-brokered deal in Lebanon was reached. Shortly thereafter, French president Nicolas Sarkozy invited President Asad to participate in the Euro-Mediterranean summit in Paris, spurring a growing stream of diplomatic visits to Damascus. Since January 2009, President Barack Obama’s administration has continued to review Syria policy in light of dynamic changes in Syria and the region, and a succession of congressional and U.S. administration officials visited Syria while in the region.

Despite high hopes when President al-Asad first took power in 2000, there was little movement on political reform, with more focus on limited economic liberalizations. The Syrian Government provided some initial cooperation to the UN Independent International Investigation Commission, which investigated the killing of Hariri until superseded by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Since the 34-day conflict between Lebanon and Israel in July and August 2006, evidence of Syrian compliance with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 not to rearm the Lebanese group Hizballah is unpersuasive. On April 17, 2007, the United Nations Security Council welcomed the Secretary General's intention to evaluate the situation along the entire Syria-Lebanon border and invited the Secretary General to dispatch an independent mission to assess the monitoring of the border and to report back on its findings and recommendations. As of January 2012, the border had yet to be demarcated, and Syrian military attacks on Syrian oppositionists have occurred in areas claimed by both countries.

After 2009, the United States attempted to engage with Syria to find areas of mutual interest, reduce regional tensions, and promote Middle East peace. These efforts included congressional and executive meetings with senior Syrian officials, including President Asad, and the return of a U.S. Ambassador to Damascus. The Syrian Government’s violent response to public protests since March 2011, however, has isolated Syria politically not only from the United States but also from Europe, the Arab world, and other parts of the international community. Before operations were suspended in February 2012, the U.S. embassy’s role in Syria strongly supported the movement toward political reform and greater openness.

GOVERNMENT
The Syrian constitution vests the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party with leadership functions in the state and society and provides broad powers to the president. The president, approved by referendum for a 7-year term, is also Secretary General of the Ba'ath Party and leader of the National Progressive Front, which is a coalition of 10 political parties authorized by the regime. The president has the right to appoint ministers, to declare war and states of emergency, to issue laws (which, except in the case of emergency, require ratification by the People's Council), to declare amnesty, to amend the constitution, and to appoint civil servants and military personnel. The Emergency Law, which effectively suspends most constitutional protections for Syrians, was formally in effect through a declared State of Emergency from 1963 until 2011 and remains the de facto standard for security operations.

The National Progressive Front also acts as a forum in which economic policies are debated and the country's political orientation is determined. However, because of Ba'ath Party dominance, the National Progressive Front has traditionally exercised little independent power, and most decisions come from the Ba’ath Party Regional Command.

The Syrian constitution of 1973 requires that the president be Muslim but does not make Islam the state religion. Islamic jurisprudence, however, is a main source of legislation. The judicial system in Syria is an amalgam of Ottoman, French, and Islamic laws, with three levels of courts: courts of first instance, courts of appeals, and the constitutional court, the highest tribunal. In addition, Muslim and Christian religious courts handle questions of personal and family law for their respective communities.

The Ba'ath Party emphasizes socialism and secular Arabism. Although Ba'ath Party doctrine seeks to build pan-Arab identity, ethnic, religious, and regional allegiances remain important in Syria. Syria’s religious minorities have valued the actively secular character of the Ba'ath state.

Members of President Asad's own minority sect, the Alawis, hold most of the key military and security positions, while Sunnis have held many positions in the powerful Ba'ath Party Regional Command. In recent years there has been a gradual decline in the party's preeminence, with more power held directly by regime-linked individuals and groups. The regime’s security services and the military, which consume a disproportionate share of Syria's economic resources, play a large political role.

Syria is divided administratively into 14 provinces, one of which is the city of Damascus. A governor for each province is appointed by the president. The governor is assisted by an elected provincial council.

Principal Government Officials
President--Bashar al-Asad
Vice President--Faruq al-Sharaa
Vice President--Najah al-Attar
Prime Minister--Adel Safar
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Walid al-Mouallem
Ambassador to the United States--Charge d’Affaires Zuhair Jabbour
Ambassador to the United Nations--Bashar al-Ja'fari

Syria maintains an embassy in the United States at 2215 Wyoming Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202-232-6313; fax 202-234-9548). Consular section hours are 9:15 a.m.-3:15 p.m., Monday-Friday. Syria also has three honorary consuls: 1022 Wirt Rd., Suite 300, Houston, TX 77055 (tel. 713-622-8860; fax 713-622-8872); 3 San Joaquin Plaza, #190, Newport Beach, CA 92660 (tel. 949-640-9888; fax 949-640-9292); and P.O. Box 2392, Birmingham, MI 48012-2392 (tel. 248-519-2496; fax 248-519-2399).

POLITICAL CONDITIONS
Officially, Syria is a republic. In reality, however, it is an authoritarian regime under the guise of a democratic system. Although citizens vote for the president and members of parliament, they have little choice and electoral results are often adjusted. Syrians have not had the right to change the role of the Ba’ath Party. The late President Hafiz al-Asad was confirmed by unopposed referenda five times. His son, Bashar al-Asad, also was confirmed by unopposed referenda in July 2000 and May 2007. The President and his senior aides, both those with official roles and those with informal links, ultimately make most basic decisions in political and economic life with a very limited degree of public accountability. The military and security services carry a great deal of power, expressed in even more violent terms since the outbreak of protest demonstrations in March 2011. Political opposition to the President is not tolerated, and allegiance to the person of the President has become the criterion for loyalty to the state. Syria declared an official state of emergency in 1963, which was changed in April 2011 to a de facto authorization of extraordinary measures by the security forces. Syrian governments have justified martial law by the state of war that continues to exist with Israel and by continuing threats posed by terrorist groups.

The Asad regime has held power longer than any other Syrian government since independence; its survival is due partly to a strong desire for stability and secularism in a region that has seen many conflicts. The expansion of the government bureaucracy has also created a large class dependent on the regime. The President's strength through early 2011 was partly due to his personal popularity among Syrians who believed he sought to bring change and reform. Following the onset of Syria’s protests against the dictatorship, however, his strength is due more to the army leadership's continued loyalty and the effectiveness of Syria's large internal security apparatus. The leadership of both is comprised largely of members of Asad's own Alawi sect. The several main branches of the security services operate independently of each other and outside of the legal system. The primarily Alawi irregulars known as “Shabiha” have demonstrated great violence against protesters and those opposing the regime. Each continues to be responsible for human rights violations of greatly escalating levels.

All three branches of government are guided by the views of the Ba'ath Party, whose de jure primacy in state institutions is assured by the constitution. In practice, the decisions of those close to the Asad clan carry most weight. The Ba'ath platform is proclaimed succinctly in the party's slogan: "Unity, freedom, and socialism." The party was traditionally considered both socialist, advocating state ownership of the means of industrial production and the redistribution of agricultural land, and revolutionary, dedicated to carrying a socialist revolution to every part of the Arab world. Founded by Michel 'Aflaq, a Syrian Christian, and Salah al-Din Al-Bitar, a Syrian Sunni, the Ba'ath Party embraces secularism and has attracted supporters of all faiths in many Arab countries, especially Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. Over the past 20 years, economic modernization has changed the face of Syrian socialism, and Bashar al-Asad’s economic liberalization gave the private sector a dominant role. The regime called for a gradual reform of the Syrian economy, but this was not accompanied by political or security reforms.

Nine smaller political parties are permitted to exist and, along with the Ba'ath Party, make up the National Progressive Front (NPF), a grouping of parties that represents the sole framework of legal political party participation for citizens. Created to give the appearance of a multi-party system, the NPF is dominated by the Ba'ath Party and does not change the essentially one-party character of the political system. Non-Ba'ath parties included in the NPF represent small political groupings of a few hundred members each and conform strictly to Ba'ath Party and government policies. There were reports in 2005, in the wake of the June Ba'ath Party Congress, that the government would permit formation of new political parties and legalization of parties previously banned. These changes did not take place, and promises in response to Syria’s Arab Spring of greater openness to political participation have not borne fruit. Some 15 small independent parties outside the NPF have operated without government approval, and the new political movements arising from the opposition movement are not considered legitimate by the Syrian regime. The Syrian National Council, Local Coordination Committees, and other opposition groups are considered treasonous by the Syrian Government.

The Ba'ath Party dominates the parliament, which is known as the People's Council. Members are elected every 4 years, but the Council has no independent authority. The executive branch retains ultimate control over the legislative process, although parliamentarians may criticize policies and modify draft laws; according to the constitution and its bylaws, a group of 10 parliamentarians can propose legislation. During 2001, two independent members of parliament, Ma'mun al-Humsy and Riad Seif, who had advocated political reforms, were stripped of their parliamentary immunity and tried and convicted of charges of "attempting to illegally change the constitution." Criticism of economic policies became common in 2010 and 2011, but suggestions by the few independents that the security forces be controlled or greater voice be given to unofficial sources were met with threats, and the Council has taken no action to constrain the regime’s repression.

Although Internet access is increasing and non-political private media are slowly being introduced, the government continues to ban numerous newspaper and news journal publications from circulating in the country, including Saudi-owned Al-Hayat and Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. It has recently allowed sporadic access to previously blocked websites, including YouTube.com, Amazon.com, and Facebook.com but maintains close monitoring of usage in order to identify oppositionists. The nominally-private television station Ad-Dounia carries, in additional to entertainment programming, pro-regime coverage and incitement against U.S. interests.

There was a surge of interest in political reform after Bashar al-Asad assumed power in 2000. Human rights activists and other civil society advocates, as well as some parliamentarians, became more outspoken during a period referred to as "Damascus Spring" (July 2000-February 2001). Asad also made a series of appointments of reform-minded advisors to formal and less formal positions, and included a number of similarly-oriented individuals in his cabinet. The continuing arrests and detention of reformists, regime critics, and oppositionists indicate that political reform in Syria is unlikely to be a smooth process. Crackdowns on civil society in 2005, in the wake of Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, and again in the late winter and spring of 2006 set the stage for the March 2011 mobilization of official and informal security forces to crack down violently on protests and demonstrations and to carry out wholesale arrest campaigns.

Although Asad continues to promise steps toward political reform, even as regime forces violently repress alternative political voices, none of his proposed reforms have been implemented as yet and public anger is increasing. The October 2008 arrest of 12 members of the Damascus Declaration National Council, drafters of a civil society reform document written in 2005 and signed by a confederation of opposition parties and individual activists who sought to work with the government to ensure greater civil liberties and democratic political reform, indicated the regime’s willingness to suppress advocates for human, legal, or minority rights even in normal times. As street protests swelled after March 2011, international concern and condemnation have grown. The Arab League, of which Syria has been a core member, decried the regime’s actions against the Syrian people. The League successively suspended Syria’s membership, called for political and security reforms and negotiations with the opposition, and carried out a monitoring mission to assess the regime’s response. In late January 2012, the Arab League took the issue to the United Nations Security Council for action.

ECONOMY
Syria is a middle-income, developing country with an economy based on agriculture, oil, industry, and tourism. However, Syria's economy began to face serious challenges and impediments to growth even prior to March 2011, including: a large and poorly performing public sector; declining rates of oil production; widening non-oil deficit; widescale corruption; weak financial and capital markets; and high rates of unemployment tied to a high population growth rate. In addition, Syria has been subject to U.S. economic sanctions since 2004 under the Syria Accountability Act, which prohibits or restricts the export and re-export of most U.S. products to Syria. In response to regime brutality against peaceful protesters beginning in 2011, the U.S. Government imposed additional sanctions beginning in April 2011, designating those complicit in human rights abuses or supporting the Asad regime. Sanctions in August 2008 prohibited the export of U.S. services to Syrian and banned U.S. persons from involvement in the Syrian petroleum sector, including a prohibition on importing Syrian petroleum products. The European Union, Japan, Canada, and other countries have also implemented a range of bilateral sanctions on the Syrian government.

As a result of an inefficient and corrupt centrally planned economy, Syria has both low rates of investment and low levels of industrial and agricultural productivity. Consumer unwillingness to spend money in turbulent times, a devastated tourism sector, customs spats with Turkey, pressure on the Syrian pound, and increasing unemployment and factory closings led the IMF to reduce estimates of economic growth in 2011 and to project negative real GDP growth in 2012. The two main pillars of the Syrian economy have been agriculture and oil. Severe drought badly affected the agricultural sector, reducing its share in the economy to about 17% of GDP, down from 20.4% in 2007 and 25% in the 1990s. On the other hand, higher crude oil prices countered declining oil production and led to higher budgetary and export receipts before international sanctions on Syrian oil cut revenue to the Syrian Government by $2 billion, according to the Syrian Minister of Petroleum in January 2012.

Water and energy availability are among the most pervasive issues facing the agriculture sector. The agricultural sector has also suffered from the government’s vacillation on subsidies for key inputs such as fertilizers, fuel, electricity, and water. Drought has continued for several years and thousands of small farmers and herders have been displaced to the outskirts of cities to the west, including Damascus. Wheat and barley production is heavily dependent on rainfall, and in dry years irrigation places high demands on water pumps run on electricity or diesel. The UN has implemented an emergency program, but food distribution has been stopped by security conditions. Syria has moved from being a net exporter of wheat to a net importer, and subsidies for bread and sugar have placed an additional strain on the budget as world prices have risen.

Damascus implemented modest economic reforms between 2001 and 2010, especially under the guidance of Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdullah Dardari, including cutting lending interest rates; opening private banks; consolidating all of the multiple exchange rates; raising prices on some subsidized items, most notably diesel, other oil derivatives, and fertilizers; and establishing the Damascus Stock Exchange, which began operations in 2009. Damascus has alternately raised and lowered the price of subsidized diesel in response to political conditions, and as of January 2012 the government announced a policy to reduce subsidies and allow prices to rise. In addition, President Asad signed legislative decrees to encourage corporate ownership reform and allowed the Central Bank to issue Treasury bills and bonds for government debt, although no debt instruments were available until December 2010. Despite these reforms, the economy remains highly controlled by the government, and rapid fluctuations in the regulatory environment impede healthy growth. Long-run economic constraints include increasing pressure on water supplies caused by heavy subsidized use in agriculture, increasing demand for electricity, rapid population growth, declining oil production due to limits on exports, high unemployment, exchange rate uncertainty, and rising budget deficits.

The government hoped to attract new investment in the tourism, natural gas, and service sectors to diversify its economy and reduce its dependence on oil and agriculture. Reform was slow and ad hoc as factions in the government struggled to agree on economic theory. The social market economy proposed by the regime generated argument over the balance between private sector growth and social protection. For ideological reasons, privatization of government enterprises is still not widespread, but it is in its initial stage for port operations, power generation, and air transport. Most sectors are now open for private investment, but neither domestic nor foreign investors are willing to commit funds in Syria at this time.

The Bashar al-Asad government started its reform efforts by changing the regulatory environment in the financial sector. Private sector banks were legalized in 2001, and after the initial openings in 2004 more than a dozen conventional and Islamic financial entities have established a presence in Syria and on the Damascus Stock Exchange. Syria has taken gradual but wavering steps to loosen controls over foreign exchange. In 2003, the government decriminalized private sector use of foreign currencies, and in 2005 it allowed licensed private banks to sell foreign currency to Syrian citizens under certain circumstances and to the private sector to finance imports. In October 2009, Syrians traveling abroad were permitted to withdraw the equivalent of up to $10,000 from their Syrian pound accounts. Following the outbreak of protests in March 2011, regulations on bank and personal access to foreign currencies have swung widely between initial decrees permitting any Syrian to withdraw $5,000 monthly for any use and other decrees prohibiting the use of U.S. dollars entirely. In late January 2012, the regime decided to make foreign currencies available again at a floating rate, in an effort to stem the rapidly falling Syrian pound exchange rate against the U.S. dollar and the Euro.

To attract investment and to ease access to credit, the government allowed investors in 2007 to receive loans and other credit instruments from foreign banks, and to repay the loans and any accrued interest through local banks using project proceeds. In February 2008, the government permitted investors to receive loans in foreign currencies from local private banks to finance capital investment. The government passed a law in 2006 which permits the operation of private money exchange companies, which have been subject to an unpredictable regulatory context. A small black market for foreign currency is active but practitioners have been subject to arrest.

Syrian policies from the 1960s through the late 1980s included nationalization of companies and some private assets. Despite steps toward economic modernization beginning in the late 1990s, Syria failed to join an increasingly interconnected global economy. Economic conservatives who resisted modernization pointed to Syria’s financial independence as its salvation during the international financial crisis, but consequent drops in consumer demand from Syria’s trading partners hit the national economy in 2009 and 2010. Syria withdrew from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1951 because of Israel's accession. It is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), although it submitted a request to begin the accession process in 2001 and again in 2004. Syria had developed regional free trade agreements, which have been largely suspended as trading partners seek to express disapproval of the Syrian regime’s violence against protesters. The Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA) came into effect in January 2005, and customs duties were eliminated between Syria and all other members of GAFTA. Syria's free trade agreement with Turkey came into force in January 2007 but has been compromised by retaliatory steps by both parties, given Turkey’s reaction to the Asad regime’s violent response to the demonstrations. Syria is a signatory to free trade agreements with Jordan, India, Belarus, and Slovakia. In 2004 Syria and the European Union initialed an Association Agreement; the ratification process had not been finalized as of March 2011, and the EU withdrew its offer following the regime’s crackdown on opposition and imposition of EU sanctions. Syria claimed a boom in non-oil exports prior to mid-2011, but its trade numbers are notoriously inaccurate and out-of-date. Syria's main exports include crude oil, refined products, rock phosphate, raw cotton, clothing, fruits and vegetables, and spices. The bulk of Syrian imports are raw materials essential for industry, petroleum products, vehicles, agricultural equipment, and heavy machinery. Earnings from oil exports as well as remittances from Syrian workers are the government's most important sources of foreign exchange. The Syrian Minister of Petroleum estimated in January 2012 a loss of $2 billion from sanctions on oil exports.

Syria has produced heavy-grade oil from fields located in the northeast since the late 1960s. In the early 1980s, light-grade, low-sulphur oil was discovered near Dayr al-Zur in eastern Syria. Syria's rate of oil production was decreasing steadily, from a peak close to 610,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1995 down to approximately 379,000 bpd in 2008. In parallel, Syria’s oil reserves are being gradually depleted and reached 2.5 billion barrels in January 2009. Recent developments have helped revitalize the energy sector, including new discoveries, enhanced recovery techniques, and the successful development of its hydrocarbon reserves. Syria’s oil exports contributed only 7% to GDP, although total domestic and export oil sector activity contributed 25% to GDP. Oil exports for hard currency were, however, over 30% of total export income in 2010 and nearly 35% of Syrian Government income, down from 50% of government income in 2005. Syria became a net importer of petroleum products in 2009, and oil sanctions will temporarily increase the ratio of imports to exports. Syria also produces about 22 million cubic meters of gas per day, with estimated reserves around 240 billion cubic meters or 8.5 trillion cubic feet. While the government had begun to work with international energy companies in the hopes of eventually becoming a significant gas exporter, most gas currently produced is consumed domestically and a number of international oil companies withdrew foreign staff in 2011 and 2012 and restricted their Syria operations in response to the unrest. Demand for electricity is growing at a rate of about 10% per year and is barely met by current generation capacity, and ongoing and planned projects are not expected to be sufficient to meet future demand.

Some basic commodities, such as bread, continue to be heavily subsidized, and social services are provided for nominal charges. Subsidies are becoming harder to sustain as demand rises and pressure on government financial reserves increases. Syria has a population of approximately 22.5 million people, and Syrian Government figures place the population growth rate at 2.37%, with 65% of the population under the age of 35 and more than 40% under the age of 15. Approximately 200,000 people enter the labor market every year. Unemployment, already high due to distortions in the economy and drought, has increased dramatically as economic activity has virtually shut down due to unrest, and estimates place it between 30% and 45%. Government and public sector employees constitute about 30% of the total labor force and receive low salaries and wages, often balanced by the opportunity for rampant graft. Government officials acknowledged that the economy was not growing at a pace sufficient to create enough new jobs annually to match population growth even prior to the protests. IMF estimates of negative growth in 2011 will place even more pressure on the labor market. Syrian Government prioritizing of supplies and funds to the security services has increased the percentage of Syrians experiencing poverty and shortages of fuel and food.

Syria made progress in easing its foreign debt burden through bilateral rescheduling deals with its key creditors in Europe, most importantly Russia, Germany, and France. Syria also settled its debt with Iran and the World Bank. In December 2004, Syria and Poland reached an agreement by which Syria would pay $27 million out of the total $261.7 million debt. In January 2005, Russia forgave 73% of Syria's $14.5 billion long-outstanding debt and in June 2008, Russia’s parliament ratified the agreement. In 2007, Syria and Romania reached an agreement for Syria to pay 35% of the $118.1 million debt. In May 2008, Syria settled all the debt it owed to the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

NATIONAL SECURITY
President Bashar al-Asad is commander in chief of the Syrian armed forces, comprising some 400,000 troops upon mobilization. The military is a conscripted force; males serve 18 months in the military upon reaching the age of 18. Although exemptions existed for education or upon payment of $5,000, the government ended all exemptions in late 2011, bringing even more young men under direct security control. Military leadership is heavily dominated by Alawi officers, but the vast majority of troops in uniform are Sunni.

Syria's military remains one of the largest in the region, although the breakup of the Soviet Union--long the principal source of training, material, and credit for the Syrian forces--slowed Syria's ability to acquire modern military equipment. Syria received significant financial aid from Gulf Arab states in the 1990s as a result of its participation in the first Gulf War, with a sizable portion of these funds earmarked for military spending. Funds, equipment, and training have gone disproportionately to elite units. Besides sustaining its conventional forces, Syria seeks to develop its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability, including chemical munitions and delivery systems.

In September 2007 Israeli warplanes attacked a purported nuclear facility in Syria. Investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered particles of enriched uranium at the site, with a low probability they were introduced by the missiles used to attack the facility. As of March 2011, the IAEA continued to investigate the issue with limited cooperation from the Syrian Government.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Ensuring regime survival, maintaining influence among its Arab neighbors, and achieving a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement, which includes the return of the Golan Heights, are the primary goals of President Asad's foreign policy. Vocal Turkish and Arab League criticism of the Asad regime’s repression of protests has drastically limited Syrian influence in the region.

Relations with Other Arab Countries
Syria reestablished full diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1989. In the 1990-91 Gulf War, Syria joined other Arab states in the U.S.-led multinational coalition against Iraq. In 1998, Syria began a slow rapprochement with Iraq, driven primarily by economic needs. Syria continued to play an active pan-Arab role after emerging from its relative isolation following the Hariri assassination, attempting to assert its influence regionally and expand diplomatic relations with Europe, Latin America, and China. In mid-2011, Syrian relations with Europe worsened following regime violence against the opposition movement, and EU and other development projects were shut down. Some countries in Latin America, especially Venezuela, have maintained good relations but contribute little to Syrian trade or development.

Though it voted in favor of UNSCR 1441 in 2002, Syria was against coalition military action in Iraq in 2003. However, the Syrian Government accepted UNSCR 1483 (after being absent for the actual vote), which lifted sanctions on Iraq and established a framework to assist the Iraqi people in determining their political future and rebuilding their economy. Syria also voted for UNSCR 1511, which called for greater international involvement in Iraq and addressed the transfer of sovereignty from the U.S.-led coalition. Since the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq on June 28, 2004, Syria extended qualified support to the Iraqi Government and pledged to cooperate in the areas of border security, repatriation of Iraqi assets, and eventual restoration of formal diplomatic relations. Formal diplomatic relations were established in December 2006, but the bilateral relationship has experienced ups and downs. Iraq has refused to adhere to the Arab League’s November 2011 decision to impose sanctions on Syria, possibly to avoid conflict with its eastern neighbor Iran, which continues to strongly support the Asad regime.

Up to an estimated 1 million Iraqi refugees lived in Syria after the 2003 U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, of whom more than 224,000 have officially registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, but some thousands have returned to Iraq as the security situation in Syria worsened. The United States remains the largest single contributor to UN and non-governmental organization (NGO) efforts to assist Iraqi refugees in the region. Total U.S. support region-wide in 2011 approached $630 million--up from $400 million in 2008. Since fiscal year 2007 the United States has admitted over 62,000 Iraqi refugees for resettlement. Of that number, over 9,300 arrived in the United States in fiscal year 2011. Most of the Iraqi refugees who have arrived in the United States--over 45,000--have come from Syria, Jordan, and Turkey, the three countries in the region hosting the most Iraqi refugees. Smaller groups have arrived directly from Iraq, as well as from Lebanon and Egypt. The United States remains committed to assisting Iraqi refugees and plans to continue to help meet the needs of Iraq’s displaced population. Additionally, in fiscal year 2012, the United States will continue to admit as many of the most vulnerable Iraqi refugees as possible for resettlement in the United States through the United States Refugee Admissions Program.

Involvement in Lebanon
Syria has played an important role in Lebanon by virtue of its history, size, power, and economy. Lebanon was part of post-Ottoman Syria until 1926. The presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon dated to 1976, when President Hafiz al-Asad intervened in the Lebanese civil war on behalf of Maronite Christians. Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Syrian and Israeli forces clashed in eastern Lebanon. However, Syrian resistance blocked implementation of the May 17, 1983 Lebanese-Israeli accord on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.

In 1989, Syria endorsed the Charter of National Reconciliation, or "Taif Accord," a comprehensive plan for ending the Lebanese conflict negotiated under the auspices of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco. In May 1991, Lebanon and Syria signed the treaty of brotherhood, cooperation, and coordination called for in the Taif Accord.

According to the U.S. interpretation of the Taif Accord, Syria and Lebanon were to have decided on the redeployment of Syrian forces from Beirut and other coastal areas of Lebanon by September 1992. Israeli occupation of Lebanon until May 2000, the breakdown of peace negotiations between Syria and Israel that same year, and intensifying Arab/Israeli tensions since the start of the second Palestinian uprising in September 2000 delayed full implementation of the Taif Accord. The United Nations declared that Israel's May 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon fulfilled the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 425.

Syria and Lebanon, however, claimed that UNSCR 425 had not been fully implemented because Israel did not withdraw from the Sheba Farms area occupied by Israel in 1967, which Syria claimed was part of Lebanon but the United Nations places in Syria. Hizballah has used this occupation to justify attacks against Israeli forces in that region, leading to Hizballah's abduction of two Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006, which sparked a 34-day conflict in between Israel and Lebanon. After the conflict, UNSCR 1701 authorized the enhancement of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), raising its presence in southern Lebanon from 2,000 troops to 15,000. UNIFIL is tasked with ensuring peace and security along the frontier and overseeing the return of effective Lebanese government and military authority throughout the border region.

Until its withdrawal in April 2005, Syria maintained approximately 17,000 troops in Lebanon. A September 2004 vote by Lebanon's Chamber of Deputies to amend the constitution to extend Lebanese President Lahoud's term in office by 3 years amplified the question of Lebanese sovereignty and the continuing Syrian presence. The vote was clearly taken under Syrian pressure, exercised in part through Syria's military intelligence service, whose chief in Lebanon had acted as a virtual proconsul for many years. The UN Security Council expressed its concern over the situation by passing Resolution 1559, which called for the withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces from Lebanon, disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in accordance with the Taif Accord, the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces throughout the country, and a free and fair electoral process in the presidential election.

Former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 19 others were assassinated in Beirut by a car bomb on February 14, 2005. The assassination spurred massive protests in Beirut and international pressure that led to the withdrawal of the remaining Syrian military troops from Lebanon on April 26, 2005. Rafiq Hariri's assassination was one of a number of attacks targeting high-profile Lebanese critics of Syria. The UN International Independent Investigative Commission (UNIIIC) probed Hariri's assassination until the UN Security Council established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). The STL began operating in March 2009, continuing UNIIIC’s work with an aim toward prosecuting the individuals behind the attacks.

Syrian-Lebanese relations have improved since 2008 when, in response to French and Saudi engagement with Syria, Damascus recognized Lebanon’s sovereignty and the two countries agreed to open full embassies in each country and exchange ambassadors. Syria sent Ali Abdul Karim Ali to Beirut as its ambassador to Lebanon in March 2009, and Lebanon sent Michel Khoury as ambassador to Syria in April 2009. Following his election in November 2009, Prime Minister Saad Hariri, son of the slain leader, traveled to Damascus for discussions with President Asad. During the visit, the two countries agreed to demarcate their border for the first time. As of January 2012, the border had yet to be demarcated.

Syrian relations with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri became strained due to his support for the STL and Syria’s continued support of Hizballah. Hizballah and its parliamentary allies engineered the fall of the Hariri government on January 12, 2011 when they resigned from the cabinet en masse, triggering a constitutional crisis. Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati has strong connections to the Syrian regime. Tensions within Syria are increasing strains among various groups in Lebanon. The Syrian regime claims that weapons for the Syrian opposition are crossing the border from Lebanon, and the opposition claims that Hizballah is providing support to the Syrian Government.

The United States supports a sovereign, independent Lebanon, free of all foreign forces, and believes that the best interests of both Lebanon and Syria are served by a positive and constructive relationship based upon principles of mutual respect and non-intervention between two neighboring sovereign and independent states. The United States calls for Syrian non-interference in Lebanon, consistent with UNSCR 1559 and 1701.

Arab-Israeli Relations
Syria was an active belligerent in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, during which Israel occupied the Golan Heights and the city of Quneitra. Following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, during which Israel occupied additional Syrian territory, Syria accepted UN Security Council Resolution 338, which signaled an implicit acceptance of Resolution 242. Resolution 242, which became the basis for the peace process negotiations begun in Madrid in 1981, calls for a just and lasting Middle East peace to include withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967; termination of the state of belligerency; and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all regional states and of their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

As a result of the mediation efforts of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Syria and Israel concluded a disengagement agreement in May 1974, enabling Syria to recover territory lost in the October war and part of the Golan Heights occupied by Israel since 1967, including Quneitra. The two sides have effectively implemented the agreement, which is monitored by UN forces.

In December 1981, the Israeli Knesset voted to extend Israeli law to the part of the Golan Heights over which Israel retained control. The UN Security Council subsequently passed a resolution calling on Israel to rescind this measure. Syria participated in the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991, and negotiations that were conducted intermittently through the 1990s came very close to succeeding. However, the parties were unable to come to an agreement over Syria's nonnegotiable demand that Israel withdraw from occupied territory in Golan to the positions it held on June 4, 1967. The peace process collapsed following the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in September 2000, though Syria continues to call for a comprehensive settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the land-for-peace formula adopted at the 1991 Madrid conference.

Tensions between Israel and Syria increased as the second Intifada dragged on, primarily as a result of Syria's unwillingness to stop giving sanctuary to Palestinian terrorist groups conducting operations against Israel. In October 2003, following a suicide bombing carried out by a member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Haifa that killed 20 Israeli citizens, Israeli Defense Forces attacked a suspected Palestinian terrorist training camp 15 kilometers north of Damascus. This was the first such Israeli attack deep inside Syrian territory since the 1973 war. During the summer of 2006 tensions again heightened due to Israeli fighter jets buzzing President Asad's summer palace in response to Syria's support for the Palestinian group Hamas, Syria's support of Hizballah during the July-August 2006 conflict in Lebanon, and the rearming of Hizballah in violation of UN Resolution 1701. Rumors of negotiations between the Israeli and Syrian Governments were initially discounted by both Israel and Syria, with spokespersons for both countries indicating that any such talks were not officially sanctioned. However, the rumors were confirmed in early 2008 when it was announced that indirect talks facilitated by Turkey were taking place. The talks continued until December 2008 when Syria withdrew in response to Israel's shelling of the Gaza Strip. Turkey’s relationship with Israel cooled following the Israeli attack on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara, part of the "Gaza Flotilla" in 2010, which resulted in the deaths of Turkish civilians including a participant with dual American and Turkish citizenship. Turkey also has criticized the Syrian Government strongly over its violent repression of opposition protesters, and indirect peace talks are not considered possible through this channel.

Membership in International Organizations 
Syria is a member of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab Common Market, Arab League, Arab Monetary Fund, Council of Arab Economic Unity, Customs Cooperation Council, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Food and Agricultural Organization, Group of 24, Group of 77, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Chamber of Commerce, International Development Association, Islamic Development Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development, International Finance Corporation, International Labor Organization, International Monetary Fund, International Maritime Organization, INTERPOL, International Olympic Committee, International Organization for Standardization, International Telecommunication Union, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, United Nations, UN Conference on Trade and Development, UN Industrial Development Organization, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Universal Postal Union, World Federation of Trade Unions, World Health Organization, World Meteorological Organization, and World Tourism Organization. However, Syrian membership in some of these organizations, including the Arab League, has been suspended due to Syrian Government violence against its citizens.

U.S.-SYRIA RELATIONS
Relations between the United States and Syria, severed in 1967, were resumed in June 1974, following the achievement of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement. In 1990-91, Syria cooperated with the United States as a member of the multinational coalition of forces in the Gulf War. The United States and Syria also consulted closely on the Taif Accord ending the civil war in Lebanon. In 1991, President Asad made a historic decision to accept President George H.W. Bush's invitation to attend a Middle East peace conference and to engage in subsequent bilateral negotiations with Israel. Syria's efforts to secure the release of Western hostages held in Lebanon and its lifting of restrictions on travel by Syrian Jews helped to further improve relations between Syria and the United States. There were several presidential summits; the last one occurred when President Bill Clinton met the late President Hafiz al-Asad in Geneva in March 2000. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Syrian Government began limited cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

Syria has been on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism since the list's inception in 1979. Because of its continuing support and safe haven for terrorist organizations, Syria is subject to legislatively mandated penalties, including export sanctions under the Syrian Accountability Act and ineligibility to receive most forms of U.S. aid or to purchase U.S. military equipment. In 1986, the United States withdrew its ambassador and imposed additional administrative sanctions on Syria in response to evidence of direct Syrian involvement in an attempt to blow up an Israeli airplane. A U.S. ambassador returned to Damascus in 1987, partially in response to positive Syrian actions against terrorism such as expelling the Abu Nidal Organization from Syria and helping free an American hostage earlier that year.

Relations cooled as a consequence of U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003, declined following the imposition of U.S. economic sanctions in May 2004, and worsened further in February 2005 after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. Issues of U.S. concern included the Syrian Government's failure to prevent Syria from becoming a major transit point for foreign fighters entering Iraq, its refusal to deport from Syria former Saddam Hussein regime elements supporting the insurgency in Iraq, its ongoing interference in Lebanese affairs, its protection of the leadership of Palestinian rejectionist groups in Damascus, its deplorable human rights record, and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. In May 2004, the U.S. Government, pursuant to the provisions of the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, imposed sanctions on Syria which banned nearly all exports to Syria except food and medicine. In February 2005, in the wake of the Hariri assassination, the United States recalled its ambassador to Washington.

On September 12, 2006 the U.S. Embassy was attacked by four armed assailants with guns, grenades, and a car bomb (which failed to detonate). Syrian security forces successfully countered the attack, killing all four attackers. Two other Syrians killed during the attack were a government security guard and a passerby. The Syrian Government publicly stated that terrorists had carried out the attack. The U.S. Government did not receive an official Syrian Government assessment of the motives or organization behind the attack, but security was upgraded at U.S. facilities. Both the Syrian ambassador to the U.S., Imad Mustapha (withdrawn in December 2011), and President Bashar al-Asad, however, blamed U.S. foreign policy in the region for contributing to the incident. After a military action occurred at the Iraq-Syria border in October 2008, in which purportedly there were several Syrian casualties, the Syrian Government ordered the closure of the Damascus Community School, the American Language Center (ALC), and the American Cultural Center (ACC). The school and the language center were allowed to reopen in fall 2010, but both minimized activities at the beginning of 2012 due to security concerns.

After 2009, the United States attempted to engage with Syria to find areas of mutual interest, reduce regional tensions, and promote Middle East peace. These efforts included congressional and executive meetings with senior Syrian officials, including President Asad, and the return of a U.S. Ambassador to Damascus. In March 2011, a group of Syrian students were arrested in the southern city of Dara’a for writing political graffiti on walls, and the government’s mishandling of its security response gave rise to ever-increasing demonstrations around the country. The key commercial cities of Aleppo and Damascus remained relatively quiet until December 2011, when larger demonstrations and explosions occurred, challenging the government’s claim that the opposition was small groups funded by other countries. The United Nations states that 5,000 have been killed in the uprising’s 10-month history, and a monitoring mission from the Arab League could not verify that the Syrian Government was implementing Arab League-mandated plans to end repression. The Arab League’s proposal that Bashar al-Asad step down and hand power to Vice President Faruq al-Sharaa heading a joint interim government was immediately rejected by the Syrian regime, and most countries participating in the Arab League monitoring effort consequently withdrew from a planned 1-month extension. Rising bilateral tensions since March 2011 due to the regime’s vicious repression have halted efforts to find common ground, and the U.S. Government has repeatedly called for President Bashar al-Asad to step aside and allow a representative government to be formed. Strong sanctions, implemented in coordination with countries in Europe, Asia, and the Arab world, have put pressure on the regime’s ability to continue its crackdown on opponents. In late January 2012, the Arab League called on the United Nations Security Council to condemn Syria’s actions and to demand a rapid transition to an interim government.

Following an attack on the U.S. Embassy and Ambassador’s residence on July 11, 2011, the embassy reduced non-U.S. citizen services and instituted more stringent security procedures. As incitement and harassment of embassy personnel increased, U.S. officers were gradually evacuated. On February 6, 2012, the United States temporarily suspended embassy operations and removed all U.S. direct hire personnel from Syria.


Wednesday, June 20, 2012

U.S.-SOLOMON ISLANDS RELATIONS


Map Credit:  U.S. State Department.
FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
U.S. Relations With the Solomon Islands
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Fact Sheet
During World War II, U.S. and Japanese forces fought each other in Solomon Islands, then a British protectorate. By the end of 1943, the Allies were in command of the entire Solomon chain. The large-scale U.S. presence toward the end of the war dwarfed anything seen before in the islands. In recognition of the close ties forged between the United States and the people of Solomon Islands during World War II, the U.S. Congress financed the construction of the Solomon Islands Parliament building.

The two countries established diplomatic relations following Solomon Islands' independence in 1978 from the United Kingdom. The U.S. Ambassador to Papua New Guinea is also accredited to Solomon Islands. U.S. diplomatic representation is handled by the U.S. Embassy in Papua New Guinea. The United States maintains a Consular Agency in Honiara, Solomon Islands to provide consular services. The United States and Solomon Islands are committed to working together and improving regional stability, promoting democracy and human rights, responding to climate change, increasing trade, and promoting sustainable economic development.

U.S. Assistance to Solomon Islands
The U.S. Coast Guard provides training to Solomon Islands border protection officers, and the U.S. military also provides appropriate military education and training courses to national security officials. The USG also implements a program on unexploded ordinance on Guadalcanal. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) contributes to the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) focused on preserving coral reefs, fisheries, and food security. Solomon Islands is one of six CTI countries. With the opening of the USAID Pacific Islands Regional Office in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea in October 2011, USAID is now providing development assistance related to climate change in the Solomon Islands. A new five-year, $5 million project will collaborate with GIZ in a ridge-to-reef approach to environmental management on Choiseul Island. In addition, Solomon Islands will be one of the focus countries for the upcoming $25 million Climate Change Adaptation Program for the Pacific, which will assist communities in adapting infrastructure, health systems, agricultural practices, and economic livelihoods to the realities of climate change.

Bilateral Economic Relations
Under the multilateral U.S.-Pacific Islands tuna fisheries treaty, the U.S. grants $18 million per year to Pacific island parties, including Solomon Islands, for access by licensed U.S. fishing vessels. U.S. trade with Solomon Islands is very limited.

Solomon Islands' Membership in International Organizations
Solomon Islands and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, Pacific Community, and Pacific Regional Environment Program.

Bilateral Representation
The U.S. Ambassador to Solomon Islands is Teddy B. Taylor, resident in Papua New Guinea; other principal embassy officials are listed in the Department's Key Officers List.
Solomon Islands has no embassy in Washington, DC, but has a permanent representative to the United Nations in New York who also is accredited as ambassador to the United States.

ATTORNEY GENERAL HOLDER SAYS CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE VOTE IS “ELECTION-YEAR TACTIC”



FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Wednesday, June 20, 2012
Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Vote
Attorney General Eric Holder issued the following statement today: 
“In recent months, the Justice Department has made unprecedented accommodations to respond to information requests by Chairman Issa about misguided law enforcement tactics that began in the previous administration and allowed illegal guns to be taken into Mexico.  Department professionals have spent countless hours compiling and providing thousands of documents -- nearly 8,000 -- to Chairman Issa and his committee.   My staff has had numerous meetings with congressional staff to try and accommodate these requests and yesterday, I met with Chairman Issa to offer additional internal Department documents and information that would satisfy what he identified as the Committee’s single outstanding question.

“Unfortunately, Chairman Issa has rejected all of these efforts to reach a reasonable accommodation.  Instead, he has chosen to use his authority to take an extraordinary, unprecedented and entirely unnecessary action, intended to provoke an avoidable conflict between Congress and the Executive Branch.  This divisive action does not help us fix the problems that led to this operation or previous ones and it does nothing to make any of our law enforcement agents safer.  It's an election-year tactic intended to distract attention -- and, as a result -- has deflected critical resources from fulfilling what remains my top priority at the Department of Justice:  Protecting the American people.

“Simply put, any claims that the Justice Department has been unresponsive to requests for information are untrue.  From the beginning, Chairman Issa and certain members of the Committee have made unsubstantiated allegations first, then scrambled for facts to try to justify them later. That might make for good political theater, but it does little to uncover the truth or address the problems associated with this operation and prior ones dating back to the previous Administration.

“I have spent most of my career in law enforcement and worked closely with brave agents who put their lives on the line every day.  I know the sacrifices they make, so as soon as allegations of gunwalking came to my attention – and well before Chairman Issa expressed any interest in this issue -- I ordered the practice stopped.  I made necessary personnel changes in the Department's leadership and instituted policy changes to ensure better oversight of significant investigations.  And, I directed the Department's Inspector General to open a comprehensive investigation.  That investigation is ongoing, and the American people and Congress can count on it to produce a tough, independent review of the facts.

“When Chairman Issa later began his own investigation, I made it clear that the Department would cooperate with all appropriate oversight requests, while still adhering to our legal obligations to protect information involving ongoing law enforcement investigations, legally-protected grand jury material and other sensitive information whose disclosure would endanger the American people or our agents investigating open cases.

“The American people deserve better.  That is why, I will remain focused on, and committed to, the Justice Department’s mission to protect the rights, safety, and best interests of my fellow citizens and to stand by my brave colleagues in law enforcement.”

U.S. AFRICA COMMANDER GE. HAM SAYS THERE ARE THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN AFRICA


Photo:  Army Gen. Carter F. Ham.  Credit:  U.S. Department of Defense.
FROM:  AMEICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE
Army Gen. Carter F. Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command during a March 9, 2011, address near Stuttgart, Germany. DOD photo by Stuart Java
Ham: Africa Presents Opportunity, Challenges
By Donna Miles

STUTTGART, Germany, June 19, 2012 - For decades, Africa was arguably the most overlooked continent on the globe, with U.S. military involvement there shared among three combatant commands and engagement activities episodic at best.
But five years since the standup of U.S. Africa Command, its commander called Africa a land of great opportunity, but he also said the continent presents threats not only to the immediate region, but to the United States and its interests as well.

"There are a lot of reasons why Africa matters to the United States," Army Gen. Carter F. Ham said during a recent interview with American Forces Press Service at his headquarters here.

Opportunity abounds on the continent, with some of the world's fastest-growing economies and a young, vibrant and growing population that's already topped a billion people, he noted. Meanwhile, Africa is experiencing growing democratization, with Africans increasingly choosing their own governments in a way that contributes to both regional and continental stability.

But amid these positive developments, Ham cited some negative trends he said have the potential to impact the security of America and its partners and allies.

Topping the list of why Africa matters to the United States, he said, is the presence of violent extremist organizations "that have very clearly articulated an intent to attack the United States, its allies, its citizens and its interests both within Africa and also more broadly, in Europe."

Africom's headquarters became fully operational in 2008, a decade after the near-simultaneous Aug. 7, 1998, terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. The years since then have witnessed additional terrorist activity, particularly in the Horn of Africa and Pan-Sahel regions.

Wide, ungoverned and under-governed spaces have proven to be fertile ground for violent extremism, Ham said. To the east, the al-Shabab terrorist organization announced in February that it had officially joined forces with al-Qaida's senior leaders. Meanwhile, an al-Qaida affiliate known as al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb is working to undermine the rule of law and governments in North and West Africa, particularly the trans-Sahara region, with a goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate there.
More recently, a violent group known as Boko Haram has begun extending its influence in Northern Nigeria as it challenges the Nigerian central government.

"While each of those three organizations is of concern, the greatest concern to me is the apparent intent of those organizations to find ways where they can collaborate, cooperate and synchronize their efforts," Ham said.

It's a concern he shared with Congress in February. "If they are able to coordinate their efforts, share funding, training, weapons exchange and what have you, I think that presents a real challenge for us," he told the House Armed Services Committee.

Preventing a merger of these like-minded organizations is a major focus of Africom as it works hand-in-hand with African partners every day through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities and other operations aimed at promoting a stable, secure Africa, the general said.

"To counter the threat posed by these three organizations, we do work by, with and through ... the host-nation forces to increase their capability," Ham told the House panel. "There are some times where it may be appropriate for U.S. forces to act," he said, citing U.S. and NATO actions in Libya as an example. "But more generally, we're better off when it is Africans leading with a bit of training and support [and] equipping from us."

Ham underscored U.S. Africa Command's most fundamental mission: "to advance the security interests of the United States, in our case, particularly in Africa."

"Our primary role is to protect America, Americans and American interests from the threats that might emanate from the continent of Africa," he said.

Doing so, Ham said, involves strengthening the capabilities of individual African states and regional organizations so they ultimately can provide their own security.

President Barack Obama, on visiting Ghana in 2009, recognized what's been one of Africom's guiding principles: that Africans themselves are best able to address African security challenges.

"The shorthand for that is, 'African solutions to African problems," Ham said. "We recognize that. And we try to abide by that in all that we do. So our efforts are taken largely by, with, and through our African partners," with Africom and its service components almost always playing a supporting or "enabling" role.
"We train, we advise, we assist. Sometimes we provide equipment, but all in an effort to try to enable the Africans to address problems on their own," he continued. "It is their region, it is their continent and while it is certainly in our interest for that continent to be stable, it is better if the Africans decide when and how to do that."
Since taking command in March 2010, Ham said he's been struck by the sense of optimism among the African partners he meets.

"They recognize the challenge they face, and they are realistic about that," he said. "But they also have this sense that they are going to overcome those challenges and move forward."

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT FACT SHEET: U.S. RELATIONS WITH LITHUANIA


FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Map Credit: U.S. State Department
U.S. Relations With Lithuania
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Fact Sheet
June 6, 2012
U.S.-LITHUANIA RELATIONS
The U.S. and Lithuania share a history as valued allies and strong partners. The United States established diplomatic relations with Lithuania in 1922, following its declaration of independence during World War I. Lithuania was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 during World War II. In 1990, Lithuania proclaimed its renewed independence, and international recognition followed. The United States had never recognized the forcible incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union, and it views the present Government of Lithuania as the legal continuation of the interwar republic.

Since Lithuania regained its independence, the United States has worked closely with the country to help it rebuild its democratic institutions and a market economy. The U.S. welcomed Lithuania's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in 2004. As a NATO ally and EU member, Lithuania has become a strong, effective partner committed to democratic principles and values. The country is a strong supporter of U.S. objectives in the area of democracy promotion and has helped the people of other young European nations develop and strengthen civil institutions.

U.S. Assistance to Lithuania
The United States provides no significant foreign assistance to Lithuania.

Bilateral Economic Relations
Lithuania is a relatively small but potentially attractive market for U.S. goods and services. Steps undertaken during the country's accession to the EU and NATO helped improve its legal, tax, and customs systems, which aided economic and commercial sector development. The United States and Lithuania have signed an agreement on bilateral trade and intellectual property protection and a bilateral investment treaty. Lithuania participates in the visa waiver program, which allows nationals of participating countries to travel to the United States for certain business or tourism purposes for stays of 90 days or less without obtaining a visa.

Lithuania's Membership in International Organizations
Lithuania’s foreign policy is largely informed by what it perceives as an expansionist Russia. Lithuania and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BRIEFING FROM AFGHANISTAN BY GEN. RICHARD CRIPWELL


Map Credit:  U.S. State Department.
FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Presenter: Director of Strategic Transition Group, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Brig. Gen. Richard Cripwell 
DOD News Briefing with Brig. Gen. Cripwell via Teleconference from Afghanistan


            CAPT JANE CAMPBELL, DIRECTOR, PRESS OPERATIONS:  Good morning here in the briefing room, and good evening in Afghanistan. I'd like to welcome the ISAF Strategic Transition Group Brigadier General Richard Cripwell, British army, to the Pentagon Briefing Room.

            Brigadier Cripwell assumed duties at ISAF headquarters in April of this year. Since 1982 he has served in junior regiment appointments with the Royal Engineers and the Queen's Gurkha Engineers and in field and amphibious regiments. He commanded 34 Field Squadron (Air Support) and 26 Engineer Regiment, supporting a number of Royal Air Force and mechanized brigade deployments.

            Brigadier Cripwell has also served in command and staff positions in Kosovo, Mozambique and Iraq. He has also served operations in Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, and various parts of the Middle East and the Balkans.

            This is Brigadier Cripwell's first time with us in the Pentagon Briefing Room. He will provide brief opening remarks on progress towards transition in Afghanistan and then take your questions.

            And with that, sir, I'll turn it over to you.

            BRIGADIER RICHARD CRIPWELL:  Thank you.

            Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. As was said, my name is Brigadier General Richard Cripwell, and I am the director of the Strategic Transition and Assessments Group here at ISAF headquarters.

            Thank you all for being here. I'm pleased to have this opportunity to talk to you about the transition of security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghanistan National Security Forces, a process that is placing the lead for security in Afghanistan with the police and the armed forces.

            It is a process that was initiated by the Lisbon conference in late 2010, a process that is defined by the Inteqal agreement or the transition agreement and which is regulated by the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board, which is responsible for making recommendations to the president of Afghanistan about transition.

            There are plans to be five tranches to transition. And as you will be aware, on the 13th of May, President Karzai announced the details of tranche three. As a result of that, every capital in all 34 provinces in Afghanistan has now entered transition. This tranche will see three-quarters of Afghanistan's population living in areas where the ANSF is in the lead for security.

            The importance of this process cannot be overstressed. President Karzai stated in Chicago that it remains his highest joint strategic priority. And we are on track, with our Afghan colleagues, to complete the process of entering transition by the middle of 2013, with completion of the process by the end of 2014. After 2014, we will maintain an equally strong partnership with Afghanistan, as the Strategic Partnership Agreement and many bilateral agreements make clear.

            I would conclude these brief opening remarks by saying a few words about how the Afghan National Security Forces are going to assume the lead for security within the country. I am fortunate enough to work with the army and the police every day and to see them all over the country. The responsibility for leading security is not one they take lightly, but it is one that they relish.

            They are growing in capability all the time, and their confidence in themselves is growing exponentially. During recent high-profile incidents across Afghanistan, the ANSF have taken leading roles and responded aggressively, with little or no coalition support. In simple terms, they know what they have to do, and that they are proving that they can do it every day.

            Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes my opening remarks. Again, thank you for attending, and I look forward to hearing your questions.

            Q:  Hi, General. This is Courtney Kube from NBC News.

            I realize that current ops aren't really in your daily purview, but there was a suicide attack in Khost earlier today, and we've been having a hard time getting the ground truth on what happened. Can you give us an idea? It seems -- our understanding is there were both Afghans and Americans killed. Can you give us your understanding of what happened?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  All I can tell you, and this is -- I've been, in fact, out of the capital for most of the day -- I'm aware that there was a suicide bomb attack in Khost, that there have been ISAF casualties, and I understand there have been a great deal of Afghan civilian casualties as well. But I have no more details than that, and I think it would be inappropriate for me to speculate. The ISAF spokesman will have more details in due course.

            Q:  General, Otto Kreisher with SEAPOWER Magazine and others.

            We've had another incident recently of green-on-blue. That's a continuing problem that kind of erodes the confidence our troops have in working with their allies. How do you appraise that situation? And what's being done, you know, to avoid those?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  Well, firstly, I'm not aware that there have been any recent green-on-blue attacks, although I'm aware there's been some accusations of them. But to approach your question more broadly, of course any death out here is an absolute tragedy, and it is more so when it is caused by Afghan forces.

            But I should be clear, firstly, that it's a tragedy as much for the Afghans themselves.

            Every single day there are tens of thousands and more ongoing relationships between ISAF forces and the Afghans. We work extremely closely. We work extremely well together. These attacks are absolutely not representative of the huge, huge majority of the Afghan forces, and they are dismayed by them as we are.

            In answer to your question of what's being done, I -- the Afghans are doing an enormous amount to ensure the loyalty of every single member of the police and the army. The deputy commander here has spoken about this in the past, but it includes biometric testing, it includes the deployment of a national directorate of security officials into units. And as I say, they are turning every stone they can to ensure the loyalty of their own forces.

            Q:  Yes, thanks for speaking with us. This is Kristina Wong from The Washington Times.

            Last summer there was a highly critical ISAF report called "The Crisis of Compatibility," on the relationship between ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces. I'm wondering, what recommendations from that report have been implemented? And has that relationship between ISAF and ANSF forces improved?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  I can't speak to the detail of the report, but I can tell you -- and as I said in my introductory remarks -- I am out almost every day with Afghan army officials and Afghan police officials, and that we work extremely closely together. And we see that in my area in transition all of the time.

            The whole point of transition is to put the ANSF in the lead and for ISAF to be in support of them. And those relationships, day in, day out, across the country are working extremely well.

            Q:  What metrics are used to gauge the ANSF other than performance in those high-profile attacks?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  I'm sorry, could I ask you to repeat the question? It got lost in transmission.

            Q:  What metrics are used to gauge the progress of the -- and competence of the ANSF other than performance during those high- profile attacks? And why are they -- why are they deemed better than expected?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  I think that -- actually I think it's not just that they're doing better than expected; I think they're also surprising themselves with their ability and their capability. It's not simply an ability to deal with high-profile attacks. The fact remains is the Afghans are out dealing with incidents of all sorts every day. Their ability to plan and conduct operations is improving all of the time. And they are now routinely, for example, planning and conducting brigade operations around the country. This is very serious soldiering, and it's a significant achievement on their part to have -- to have come this far in the time that they have.

            Q:  Dan De Luce from Agence France-Presse.

            What would cause you, if anything -- what would cause ISAF to reconsider the pace of this transition? Is there anything that could somehow slow down this scheduled transition?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  I've certainly seen nothing to date at all that questions the pace of transition.

            As I'm sure you are aware, transition is simply about the security forces being able to be in the lead. It doesn't necessarily mean that all of the challenges that lie within a district or province have been solved. But to date, in tranches one and two there has been no regression in terms of security or governance or development in those areas.

            And whilst clearly there are challenges ahead in tranche three, I've seen no indication at all that either the Afghan national forces would not be able to deal with those problems or that they would put the rough timetable for transition into question.

            Q:  And then in that context, how concerned are you about the ethnic composition of the Afghan force and the relative shortage of southern Pashtuns in the force?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  Well, the details of the makeup of the ANSF are, you know, beyond the issues that I look at. But all I can say is that whatever the ethnic diversity of the security forces, I've seen absolutely no impression of that in the areas that I visited and in the reports that I read of their performance around the country.

            Q:  Hi, my name is Ben Iannotta. I'm editor of an intelligence magazine called the C4ISR Journal.

            The decision not to plug the ANSF into the Afghanistan Mission Network, is that driven by strategy or cost, or is it a sign of a lack of trust between ISAF and ANSF?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  I don't know is the simple answer to that question. I think I'd have to refer you to the spokesman or to a particular expert on that.

            But there is no -- to be clear, there is no lack of trust in the ANSF. We are going on operations with them every day. They are leading, certainly in transitioned areas, nearly 50 percent of operations. You absolutely have to trust your comrades and colleagues when you're operating in that kind of environment. So there is absolutely no lack of trust between us and our Afghan colleagues.

            Q:  Hi, General. John Harper with the Asahi Shimbun.

            How many ISAF troops do you think will need to remain in Afghanistan in 2013 to ensure the transition moves along smoothly?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  You'll be surprised to hear that I'm not going to indulge in speculation over troop levels in Afghanistan. But I am absolutely confident that the ANSF, first and foremost, will be absolutely in a position to assume the lead for security across the country, supported by ISAF forces, by roughly the middle of 2013.

            Q:  Thank you, General. This is Lalit Jha from Pajhwok Afghan News.

            As we are post-2014, what do you think the key challenge is which ANSF are facing now and that needs to be addressed on a priority basis before 2014?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  Well, I think the -- again, you'd be better off asking those who are responsible for equipping and training the ANSF that question.

            I've certainly seen on my travels nothing that is stopping the ANSF conducting operations as they choose to and stopping them from reacting to incidents in a manner that they choose to. ISAF support is there, but increasingly, the Afghans are more than capable and more than content to deal with operations entirely dependent on their own capabilities.

            Q:  Otto Kreisher again.

            Let me follow up on that. There's been, you know, substantial reports about their lack of air cover -- indigenous air cover, their logistics problems, their intelligence and communications. You don't see those as a problem?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  All I'm saying, as I -- as I said to the -- to the last question, I think the details of those issues -- these are issues that are not affecting transition, and that that clearly is the bit that I am most focused on. I have not seen issues about enablers impacting on the ability of the Afghan security forces, be it army or police, to maintain the lead in transitioning areas.

            Q:  Good morning. Larry Shaughnessy from CNN.

            The talks to try to reopen the Pakistan border to ISAF convoys fell apart not long ago. I know the Northern Distribution Network is working, but at a tremendous cost. Is there something besides money that is a problem created by the lack of a southern distribution network, for lack of a better term, through Pakistan? Or is it just a matter of it costs more to do everything?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  I haven't been privy to the negotiations that have been going on over the opening of the Pakistan GLOC. Now, clearly I'm aware that there have been some very detailed negotiations in the past, and I'm sure there will in the future.
            I'm not aware of the detail, other than to say -- as, again, the deputy commander said not so long ago -- that ISAF is managing perfectly well at the moment in its conduct of operations. But the detail of the discussions over the GLOC, I'm afraid I haven't got any information on that.

            Q:  If I could follow up. But beyond the discussions, in practical, day-to-day operations, is the lack of a GLOC with Pakistan causing you any operational, day-to-day problems? I know he's saying it's working right now, but do you anticipate a problem that cannot be easily solved using the Northern Distribution Network?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  I'm not aware of one, no.

            Q:  Chris Carroll, Stars and Stripes.

            Is progress being made throughout the entire ANSF? We continually hear anecdotes about, you know, a large number of Afghan forces who are not well-trained and who are not easy to operate with. Is it the case that there's a small group or, you know, a minority of well-trained professional soldiers and a larger group that are not progressing at the same rate?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  You know, I must say, I've never heard that.
            Again, at the risk of repeating myself, you can't -- you cannot mount -- wherever you may be in this country, you cannot mount, as the Afghans are doing, brigade-level operations and hope that a thin veneer of professionalism is in some way hiding a basic incompetence below that. You know, a brigade operation requires a properly trained and, indeed, resourced force. They're doing that around the country.

            So I certainly haven't heard the apocryphal stories that you mention, and I don't believe the evidence on the ground would support them either.

            Q:  Just a follow-up question. What kind of capabilities are the ANSF developing -- for example, explosive, ordnance disposal, logistics, special forces, you know -- that we might not hear about every day?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  Well, it's kind of you to think that I would know, but I'm afraid that is -- that is well beyond my brief on transition, and you would be far better up close, not least because you would be speaking to someone who knows, to speak to somebody else on this.

            Q:  General, it's Luis Martinez of ABC News.

            Every region in Afghanistan brings its own security challenges. How do you tailor ANSF forces to each region? I imagine they bring their own unique characteristics that require specific training to -- and so it's going to vary from region to region. How can you -- how do you do that?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  Well, you're absolutely right, of course, that the, you know, various parts of Afghanistan bring challenges of their own. And the Afghans deal with this as any other army in the world would deal with it, that there is -- there is always a level of basic training that is provided to every member of security forces, which is then honed when you get down to a unit in a particular area.

            It is the responsibility of the Afghan corps and the Afghan brigades to make sure that that -- the special training, if you like, sensitive to the environment, is conducted. And of course ISAF is absolutely part of that training process and mechanism in various parts of the country. But the Afghans would treat this in -- no differently to any other army in the world.

            CAPT. CAMPBELL:  One more.

            Q:  If I could follow up, sir. With the push into the eastern portions of -- eastern regions of Afghanistan this year, does that mean that you see more of a kinetic force among the ANSF that go in there? Or do you try -- find a mix, given that you're going to have to turn that over towards the security transition in the future?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  If I understand your question correctly, again, I don't think that -- the nature of basic training doesn't change. Wherever a unit may go to thereafter, whether it be -- wherever it may be deployed in the country, there will always be special training that will be conducted before it goes into a certain area.

            I don't think, wherever you may go in this country, that you should assume that operations will be more or less kinetic. The important thing is that the forces will get the appropriate training, the appropriate assistance wherever they may get deployed.

            Q:  Another question. Can you describe from what you've seen, you know, personally, the relationship between ISAF and Afghan forces? How close do they interact when they're not training? Are they eating together?

            Are they -- can you -- are they friends? Are they -- you know, how do they interact with one another, besides from during training, that you've seen?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  Yeah. I mean, working together means all of those things. Going out on a patrol or an operation is just part of working together.

            Our troops and Afghan troops absolutely in the field eat together. It's clearly difficult to socialize together, but they are -- they are together. And I think, as much as people who may well be speaking different languages can be, there are unquestionably some very close relationships all over the country between ISAF forces of all nationalities and the Afghans.

            So this isn't simply coming together as you prepare to go out the gate on a patrol. These are -- you know, as I say, the patrol is, if you like, just the pointy end of some very strong relationships across the country.

            Q:  Excuse me. General, Chris Carroll from Stars and Stripes again.

            Is there any update on the numbers from the recent 1230 report on the percentages of Afghan units able to operate, you know, with advisers or with partners, et cetera?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  In simple terms, no, there isn't. As you know, the 1230 comes out every six months or so. The next one will be due in the late fall. And yeah, that will be the appropriate time, not least because, obviously, the data is being collected. So in simple terms, the answer is no to your question.

            CAPT. CAMPBELL:  General, we'll wrap it up with one last question here and then turn it back over to you.

            So one more question on our end, sir.

            Q:  Matt Schofield, McClatchey Newspapers.

            You know, going forward, the future of -- the future success of the ANSF, we've heard there is some backsliding on the success against poppy production. This is a primary source of funding.

            What's the -- what's -- going forward, how do you see that moving? I mean, is there -- does there need to be a renewed effort to go back after poppy, to decrease the funding of Taliban, et cetera? Or do you -- are you happy with the way things are going, or is that -- is that not an operational thing -- is that not a transitional issue?

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  It's not a transitional issue. But what I will say is that the governor-led eradication schemes this year have been more successful than they ever have been. And you know, as an example of the Afghans taking responsibility for their own future, I think it's an excellent example. But it doesn't impact on transition. No, it doesn't.

            CAPT. CAMPBELL:  General, we're grateful for your time that you've devoted to speak with us this evening your time, this morning our time. And I'd like to just turn it back over to you for a few closing remarks on your end, sir. And again, thank you from the Briefing Room.

            BRIG. CRIPWELL:  Thanks very much indeed. And thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your questions.

            I would just reiterate what I said at the start, that transition is a strategically important process for this country. It is one not simply that is being imposed on the Afghans; it is one that they are absolutely part of.

            And the success of the Afghan National Security Forces to date in assuming the responsibility for 75 percent of the population of their country, and the success that I have no doubt that they are going to enjoy in the future, is absolutely critical to them assuming responsibility and ensuring the sovereignty and peace in this country in the future.
            Thank you very much, indeed, for your time.

            CAPT. CAMPBELL:  General, thank you.

VA ANNOUNCES ALMOST ALL AGENT ORANGE CLAIMS HAVE BEEN PROCESSED




Photo:  Huey-Helicopter Spraying Agent Orange in Vietnam.   Credit:  U.S. Department of Defense.


FROM:  U.S. VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
VA Nearly Done With Agent Orange Claims
June 19, 2012 by Alex Horton
About two years ago, Secretary Shinseki made the decision to award presumptions of service connection to certain diseases that may have been caused by exposure to Agent Orange during the Vietnam War. That decision added nearly a quarter of a million claims to an already stressed backlog, but it was a long overdue victory for Vietnam Vets and their families who waited too long for action.

Today, VA announced that nearly all of the 230,000 claims for Agent Orange presumption for diseases including ischemic heart disease, hairy cell and other chronic B-cell leukemias, and Parkinson’s disease have been processed, which has put $3.6 billion into the hands of Vietnam Vets and their survivors. The most experienced raters, about 36 percent of all employees who handle claims, were put on these claims to get the claims finished as soon as possible.

Now that nearly all Agent Orange presumption claims have been completed, the 1,200 claims workers diverted to this unprecedented action will return to normal duties. This will surely help tackle the backlog, which significantly grown as Veterans return from Iraq and Afghanistan and file more complex claims at a higher rate than ever before (45 percent of new Veterans submit claims after service). VA completed one million claims in each of the last two years, an unprecedented number, but the amount of claims submitted outpaced those numbers.

VA has put together a transformation plan that emphasizes technology and new processes to finish claims faster and more accurately. The Veterans Benefits Management System is on its way to 16 regional offices this year, and will be found at 56 regional offices by the end of next year.

Veterans who may qualify for Agent Orange presumption include those who were exposed based on duty or visitation in Vietnam or on its inland waterways between January 9, 1962, and May 7, 1975; exposed along the demilitarized zone in Korea between April 1, 1968, and August 31, 1971; or exposed due to herbicide tests and storage at military bases within and outside of the United States. Check out the Agent Orange Fast Track web site if you think you may be affected by the diseases listed above as a result of Agent Orange exposure.


NORTHFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. ORDERED TO PAY $800,000 AFTER TERMINATION OF INJURED WORKER


FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. ordered by US Labor Department's OSHA to pay more than $800,000 after terminating injured workers
Investigation found violations of Federal Railroad Safety Act whistleblower provisions
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration has found that Norfolk Southern Railway Co. violated the whistleblower protection provisions of the Federal Railroad Safety Act and consequently has ordered the company to pay three whistleblowers $802,168.70 in damages, including $525,000 in punitive damages and attorneys' fees. Additionally, the company has been ordered to expunge the disciplinary records of the whistleblowers, post workplace notices regarding railroad employees' whistleblower protection rights and provide training to its employees about these rights.

Three concurrent investigations were completed by OSHA's offices in Columbia, S.C.; Nashville, Tenn.; and Harrisburg, Pa. The investigations revealed reasonable cause to believe that the employees' reporting of their workplace injuries led to internal investigations and, ultimately, to dismissals from the company.

A laborer based in Greenville, S.C., was terminated on Aug. 14, 2009, after reporting an injury as a result of being hit by the company's gang truck. The railroad charged the employee, a laborer, with improper performance of duties. OSHA found that the employee was treated disparately in comparison to four other employees involved in the incident. The laborer was the only employee injured and, thus, the only employee who reported an injury. He also was the only employee terminated. OSHA has ordered the railroad to pay punitive damages of $200,000 as well as compensatory damages of $110,852 and attorney's fees of $14,325.

In Louisville, Ky., an engineer at a Norfolk Southern facility was terminated on March 31, 2010, after reporting an injury as a result of tripping and falling in a locomotive restroom. The railroad, after an investigative hearing, charged the employee with falsifying his injury. OSHA found that the investigative hearing was flawed and orchestrated to intentionally support the decision to terminate the employee. OSHA has ordered the railroad to pay the employee $150,000 in punitive damages, $50,000 in compensatory damages and $7,375 in attorney's fees.

On July 22, 2010, a railroad conductor based in Harrisburg, Pa., was terminated after reporting a head injury sustained when he blacked out and fell down steps while returning from the locomotive lavatory. The company, after an investigative hearing presided over by management officials, found the employee guilty of falsifying a report of a work-related injury, failing to promptly report the injury, and making false and conflicting statements. The day before the injury, the employee had been lauded for excellent performance, highlighted by no lost work time due to injuries in his 35-year career. OSHA found that the investigative hearing was flawed, and there was no evidence the employee intended to misrepresent his injury. OSHA is ordering the railroad to pay the employee $175,000 in punitive damages, $76,623.27 in back wages plus interest and $17,993.43 in compensatory damages, as well as all fringe benefits.

"Firing workers for reporting an injury is not only illegal, it also endangers all workers. When workers are discouraged from reporting injuries, no investigation into the cause of an injury can occur," said Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health Dr. David Michaels. "To prevent more injuries, railroad workers must be able to report an injury without fear of retaliation. The Labor Department will continue to protect all employees, including those in the railroad industry, from retaliation for exercising these basic worker rights. Employers found in violation will be held accountable."

These actions follow several other orders issued by OSHA against Norfolk Southern Railway Co. in the past year. OSHA's investigations have found that the company continues to retaliate against employees for reporting work-related injuries and has effectively created a chilling effect in the railroad industry.

Any party to this case can file an appeal with the Labor Department's Office of Administrative Law Judges.

Norfolk Southern Railway Co. is a major transporter/hauler of coal and other commodities, serving every major container port in the eastern United States with connections to western carriers. Its headquarters are in Norfolk, Va., and it employs more than 30,000 union workers worldwide.

OSHA enforces the whistleblower provisions of the FRSA and 20 other statutes protecting employees who report violations of various securities laws, trucking, airline, nuclear power, pipeline, environmental, rail, maritime, health care, workplace safety and health regulations, and consumer product safety laws.

Under the various whistleblower provisions enacted by Congress, employers are prohibited from retaliating against employees who raise various protected concerns or provide protected information to the employer or to the government. Employees who believe that they have been retaliated against for engaging in protected conduct may file a complaint with the secretary of labor for an investigation by OSHA's Whistleblower Protection Program.

USS FORT MCHENRY RMEMBERS THE WAR OF 1812


FROM:  U.S. NAVY
120615-N-CN263-054 BALTIMORE (June 15, 2012) Lance Cpl. Zachary Franks, a military policeman assigned to Combat Logistics Battalion 26, discusses the .50-caliber M2 machine gun mount on his Humvee with a tour group aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43). Fort McHenry welcomed more than 1,000 visitors aboard throughout the day to celebrate the Star Spangled Sailabration, which coincides with Baltimore Navy Week 2012 and commemorates the War of 1812 and the writing of the "Star Spangled Banner" by Francis Scott Key. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Wesley Dannelley/Released) 

Sailors, Marines Show Off USS Fort McHenry
Story Number: NNS120617-05Release Date: 6/17/2012 9:48:00
By Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Wesley Dannelley, Navy Operational Support Center Baltimore
BALTIMORE (NNS) -- USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) welcomed more than 1,000 guests aboard for the Star-Spangled Sailabration, June 15, commemorating the 200th anniversary of the War of 1812 and the nation's flag.

Crew members conducted guided tours around the deckplates and visitors observed the day-to-day activities Sailors and Marines perform aboard the ship, as well as some of the tasks Marines perform while ashore or forward deployed.

Marines of Combat Logistics Battalion 26 (CLB 26), embarked for the War of 1812 celebrations, displayed equipment and vehicles for public view, and offered demonstrations on various tools of the trade.

Marine Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) members attached to CLB 26 donned the heavy Kevlar EOD suit used to protect Marines when they handle and dispose of various explosive devices. Guests were also introduced to the "EOD Bot," the remote-controlled robot that allows EOD teams to gather information and/or handle explosives while keeping personnel out of harm's way.

Lance Cpl. Easten Fry, a field artillery cannoneer with Bravo Battery 1/10, also attached to CLB 26, was the subject matter expert for the Marine Corps' M777A2 Howitzer, answering questions and giving demonstrations of the weapon's capabilities.

"Having people take time out of their day to walk a quarter of a mile down a pier in the heat to hear about my job makes me feel appreciated," Fry said.

United States Naval Sea Cadet Corps Seaman Apprentice Phillip Plunkard expressed his excitement about being onboard a warship. "Getting to learn all about the Navy, and seeing all the helicopters was so cool!"

While aboard, Plunkard met Cmdr. Ray Hartman, commanding officer of Fort McHenry, who shared words of wisdom and encouragement.

Fort McHenry is homeported at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek/Fort Story, and is currently preparing for its upcoming deployment.

RECENT PHOTOS RELEASED BY THE U.S. NAVY




120614-N-WO496-200 GULF OF OMAN (June 14, 2012) The MK-45 5-inch/.54-caliber lightweight gun fires a round aboard the guided-missile destroyer USS Porter (DDG 78) during a live-fire exercise. Porter is deployed as part of Enterprise Carrier Strike Group to support maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Alex Forster/Released)




Capt. Brandon Cordill, left wingman of the U.S. Navy flight demonstration squadron, the Blue Angels, flies an F/A-18 Hornet over Baltimore during the Star Spangled Sailabration, which coincides with Baltimore Fleet Week 2012 and commemorates the War of 1812 and the writing of the "Star Spangled Banner." U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Andrew Johnson (Released) 120615-N-BA418-135




120617-N-HM950-114 BERAUS, Malaysia (June 17, 2012) U.S. Marines and Malaysian soldiers from the 10 Paratrooper Brigade conduct an ambush exercise during Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Malaysia 2012. CARAT is a series of bilateral military exercises between the U.S. Navy and the armed forces of Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Timor Leste joins the exercise for the first time in 2012. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Aaron Glover/Released)



ESA Portal - Czech Republic - Hladké pohyby: jak kosmické aktivity pomáhají s filmovými animacemi

ESA Portal - Czech Republic - Hladké pohyby: jak kosmické aktivity pomáhají s filmovými animacemi

PENTAGON SAYS AFGHAN TRANSITION ROCEEDS

Photo:  U.S. Pentagon Under Construction.  Credit:  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

FROM:  AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE 



Afghan Transition Remains On Track, Officials Say

By Army Sgt. 1st Class Tyrone C. Marshall Jr.
WASHINGTON, June 19, 2012 - Despite the threat of insider attacks in Afghanistan, coalition forces continue to apply pressure against insurgents in the country, Defense Department spokesmen said today.


During a Pentagon press conference, Navy Capt. John Kirby acknowledged multiple attacks by those in Afghan uniform in Kandahar, which left nearly 10 International Security Assistance Force troops wounded.


"[It was] clearly a tough day in Kandahar, or [the] last couple of days. There's no question about that," Kirby said. "We still believe, and it still appears to be, what we consider a green-on-blue, an insider threat attack ... three attackers that were dressed in Afghan national security force uniforms."


Kirby said it was unclear if the attackers wore Afghan police or army uniforms, but all three are still at large. Two other attacks were also reported in the area.


"In one of them, we do believe that it was at least facilitated -- potentially facilitated by an individual dressed in an Afghan National Police uniform," the Navy captain said. "But again, details are very sketchy right now. ISAF is certainly looking into this."


Kirby also provided details about a recent attack on Forward Operating Base Frontenac, in Kandahar's Arghandab Valley.


"It does appear that some insurgents dressed in [Afghan security force] uniforms were able to breach the perimeter of the operating base and were engaged very quickly by friendly forces inside," he said.


"There was a quick response force from a nearby combat outpost that responded almost immediately, and of course, all the casualties were evacuated to Kandahar Airfield," Kirby said.

Although there were no U.S. forces reported killed, Kirby said several were wounded in the course of killing at least seven insurgents.



Kirby noted it's too early to say with certainty whether these attacks are connected beyond the fact that all occurred in or around Kandahar.


"It's not uncommon that in the warm months of the year, violence will increase," he said. "Part of that is because of the weather. Part of it is because ISAF and coalition forces are being more aggressive."


"They're out and about much more, particularly in the south," Kirby said. "So they have occasion to be in more contact with or more of a problem for the enemy, and therefore, eliciting some of these attacks."


Even so, the withdrawal of 23,000 surge forces remains on track and will be complete by the end of September, Kirby said.


Pentagon Press Secretary George Little stated ISAF will continue to overcome threats from al-Qaida terrorists in Afghanistan, even during the transition phase from ISAF to Afghan security forces.


"As we transition to a new phase in our relationship with Afghanistan, we believe that the Afghans themselves, working with ISAF countries that could maintain a presence beyond 2014, are going to be able to effectively suppress this threat," Little said.


"Al-Qaida should take no comfort in 2014 as an end date for the Lisbon transition," he said. "[This] will be a continuing priority and focus of the United States and our allies, to include Afghanistan. They will continue to see pressure brought to bear against them ... pressure [that] is happening now, and it will continue in the future."




THE THREE LITTLE EXOPLANETS AND THE RED DWARF STAR



FROM:  NASA
Image Credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech
Compact Planetary System
This artist's concept depicts a planetary system so compact that it's more like Jupiter and its moons than a star and its planets. Astronomers using data from NASA's Kepler mission and ground-based telescopes recently confirmed that the system, called KOI-961, hosts the three smallest exoplanets currently known to orbit a star other than our sun. An exoplanet is a planet that resides outside of our solar system.

The star, which is located about 130 light-years away in the Cygnus constellation, is a red dwarf that is one-sixth the size of the sun, or just 70 percent bigger than Jupiter. The star is also cooler than our sun, and gives off more red light than yellow.

The smallest of the three planets, called KOI-961.03, is actually located the farthest from the star, and is pictured in the foreground. This planet is about the size of Mars, with a radius of 0.57 times that of Earth. The next planet to the upper right is KOI-961.01, which is 0.78 times the radius of Earth. The planet closest to the star is KOI-961.02, with a radius 0.73 times the Earth's.

All three planets whip around the star in less than two days, with the closest planet taking less than half a day. Their close proximity to the star also means they are scorching hot, with temperatures ranging from 350 to 836 degrees Fahrenheit (176 to 447 degrees Celsius). The star's habitable zone, or the region where liquid water could exist, is located far beyond the planets.

The ground-based observations contributing to these discoveries were made with the Palomar Observatory, near San Diego, Calif., and the W.M. Keck Observatory atop Mauna Kea in Hawaii.




U.S.-RUSSIA AND ENERGY COOPERATION


Photo Credit:  U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

U.S.-Russia Energy and Energy Efficiency Cooperation

Fact Sheet
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
June 18, 2012

The United States and Russia have an extensive dialogue on issues of energy and energy efficiency aimed at spurring innovation and stimulating the scientific development needed to address the global energy challenges of the 21st century. The U.S.-Russia Energy Working Group, one of several initiatives under the Bilateral Presidential Commission, supports this dialogue and the deployment of clean energy technologies and services. This cooperation is also implemented through a range of activities including public-private partnerships, city-to-city pairings, trade missions, and university links. These efforts endeavor to promote growth in the Russian and U.S. economies and assist in reducing national levels of carbon emissions by implementing advanced technologies, mobilizing financial resources, and facilitating creative energy management solutions.


Smart Grid
Under the Smart Grid pilot project, the cities of San Diego and Belgorod are sharing best practices and technical information to improve efficiency in electric power systems and reduce emissions. In May 2011, San Diego, Belgorod, and their respective utilities signed a protocol of intent outlining priority areas of cooperation including power distribution automation, and exchanging best practices in business processes and critical infrastructure security. The U.S. Agency for International Development is working with the Russian Energy Agency to fund a joint U.S.-Russian Study on Legal/Regulatory, Market, Consumer and Technical Impediments to Smart Grid Technology Deployment.
  • The United States and Russia have held technical workshops to lay the groundwork for a second Smart Grid pairing between Kaliningrad and a U.S. city.
Smart Cities
Building on the Smart Grid partnerships, the United States and Russia plan to establish a “Smart Cities” partnership to integrate principles of energy efficiency and environmental sustainability into urban planning. Under this partnership, benchmarks will be defined to achieve sustainable urban growth. Innovative municipalities would share best practices on meeting these benchmarks for energy efficiency and “smart” planning to lower energy costs, enhance public services, and reduce harmful greenhouse gas emissions, thus stimulating local job growth and economic development.


Energy Efficiency in Public Buildings
Russia’s new energy efficiency law calls for a 15 percent reduction of energy consumption in public buildings by 2014. The United States and Russia are working together to share lessons learned in utilizing energy performance contracts to improve efficiency in municipal public buildings, including a pilot project with Honeywell and the City of St. Petersburg. Under the project, Honeywell is scheduled to begin the first phase of an energy efficiency audit of Hospital No. 2 in St. Petersburg. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation has indicated an interest in financing the project.


Methane Mitigation
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Russia’s Gazprom are collaborating to implement cost-effective methane mitigation technologies to reduce pipelines leakages, energy waste and harmful carbon emissions.


Energy Efficiency Trade Missions
The U.S. Commercial Service and the Department of Energy organized an Energy Efficiency Trade Mission of 12 U.S. companies to Moscow and St. Petersburg led by Under Secretary for International Trade Sanchez from June 4-7, 2012. The mission included individualized business appointments and meetings with Russian national and regional government officials for United States companies specializing in implementing energy efficiency solutions.


Promoting Clean Energy in Russia’s Far East
 In April 2012, USAID and the Russian Energy Agency signed a Memorandum of Understanding to promote clean energy development in Russia’s Far East. This collabortion aims to identify, evaluate, and implement a demonstration project for environmentally sensitive and efficient use of heat and electricity. The collaboration aims to enable investments related to energy production, delivery, and consumption using advanced clean energy technologies and services. The United States and Russia are also jointly conducting scientific research on black carbon to identify, inventory, and find solutions to harmful black carbon emissions.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ISSUES GUIDANCE ON "WORK SHARING" COMPENSATION


Picture:  Labor Day Celebration In New York City in 1882.  Credit:  Wikimedia.
FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
US Labor Department announces guidance to state Unemployment Insurance agencies on implementing short-time compensation or ‘work sharing’

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Department of Labor today announced guidance to state agencies responsible for Unemployment Insurance regarding short-time compensation, commonly referred to as "work sharing." Today's announcement is the latest in a series of innovative reforms to the UI program made possible by the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 signed by President Obama in February.

"Work sharing is a win-win for workers and employers," said Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis. "This program will provide more flexibility to workers and employers so they may more efficiently and effectively weather the ups and downs of the economy."

Work sharing allows employees to keep their jobs and helps employers to avoid laying off their trained workforces during economic downturns by reducing the hours of work for an entire group of affected workers. Workers affected by reduced hours can have their wages compensated with a portion of their weekly unemployment compensation payments.

The guidance issued today provides detailed information about a new federal definition of short-time compensation — which includes more worker protections such as maintenance of health insurance and retirement benefits — as well as how states currently operating short-time compensation programs can transition to the new definition. The guidance also provides information to states that already have permanent short-time compensation programs on how to begin receiving 100 percent federal reimbursement of payments made by state programs.

The Labor Department will issue additional guidance to address other aspects of short-time compensation found in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, including a two-year federal initiative to enable states to quickly implement and try out short-time compensation programs; and the provision of approximately $100 million in grants to states for the implementation or improved administration of, or for promotion of and enrollment in, a short-time compensation program. The department also is developing model legislative language, to be provided in the near future, that will assist states in amending their laws so they can adopt short-time compensation programs.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE NEWS FOR JUNE 19, 2012


Photo:  Poppy Field In Afghanistan.  Credit:  Wikimedia.


FROM:  AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE


Combined Force Captures Taliban Leader

Compiled from International Security Assistance Force Joint Command News Releases
WASHINGTON, June 19, 2012 - An Afghan and coalition security force detained a Taliban leader in the Nad 'Ali district of Helmand province today, military officials reported.
The insurgent leader was responsible for sniper and improvised explosive device attacks against Afghan and coalition forces in the region, officials said. He also provided support to insurgents in the province and delivered small-arms and vehicles for use in attacks.
The security force also detained multiple suspected insurgents.

In other Afghanistan operations today:

-- An Afghan-led, coalition-supported force detained multiple suspects while searching for a Taliban leader in the Nahr-e Saraj district of Helmand province. The Taliban leader is responsible for directing and participating in IED and direct-fire attacks against coalition forces in Kandahar and Helmand provinces.

-- A combined force detained a Taliban leader as well as one other insurgent, and seized IED-making components and an AK-47 rifle in the Gardez district of Paktiya province. The Taliban leader was responsible for building and using IED's in attacks against Afghan and coalition forces. He also coordinated the purchase and shipment of weapons and explosives for insurgents.

-- A combined force detained several suspects during a search for a Haqqani leader in the Nadir Shah Kot district of Khost province.



In June 18 operations:
-- In the Shahr-e-Buzurg district of Badakhshan province, a combined force called in an airstrike that killed an Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader. No civilian property was damaged and no civilians were harmed during the operation.


-- A combined force detained several suspects and seized multiple small-arms and ammunition in the Yaftal-e Sufla district of Badakhshan province.


-- A combined force killed four insurgents during a search for a Haqqani explosives expert in the Mota Khan district of Paktika province. The force also detained one suspect and seized multiple assault rifles, grenades and a suicide vest.


In June 17 operations:
-- A combined force called in an airstrike that killed several Taliban leaders during an operation in Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan.
In June 16 operations:


-- A combined force detained several suspects and seized 3,300 pounds of opium and 5,500 pounds of ammonium chloride, a chemical used to refine opium into heroin, in the Northern Musa Qal'ah district of Helmand province. The opium, chemicals and drug-processing equipment were destroyed.

RUSSIA REPORTEDLY RESUPPLYING BASE IN SYRIA


Map Credit:  U.S. State Department Website:

FROM:  AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE


Russia Resupplying Base in Syria, DOD Spokesman Says

By Karen Parrish
WASHINGTON, June 19, 2012 - A Russian cargo ship reportedly carrying attack helicopters to Syria turned back today when its British insurer canceled coverage, but a Defense Department spokesman said three other Russian vessels will carry supplies and possibly troops to the Russian naval base at Tartus.


Russian military officials have said the supplies are intended for their own resupply and force protection, Pentagon spokesman Navy Capt. John Kirby told reporters today.


Kirby said defense officials support Russia's decision to stop the cargo ship's voyage. "We ... don't want to see the Assad regime get arms and ammunition or any lethal support that they could use," he said.

In January 2011, Syrians began protesting against the government of Bashar Assad. The protests spread into a more general uprising, which United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said in May had claimed some 10,000 lives. Russia, a Syrian ally, has threatened to veto any U.N. Security Council sanctions against Syria.



President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a joint statement yesterday calling for "moving forward on [a] political transition to a democratic, pluralistic political system" in Syria.


Kirby said political transition is "the right way forward."


"I think we can all agree that that's the right answer for Syria and for the Syrian people," he added.


International diplomatic and economic pressure "needs to continue to be applied to the Assad regime so that they will step down and do what's right for their own people," the spokesman added.


Kirby noted U.S. defense officials have repeatedly said providing lethal military aid to Assad's forces is "intolerable and unacceptable."


"We've been very clear with the entire international community, not just the Russians, about what our concerns are with respect to lethal aid and assistance going to the Assad regime," he added.


Pentagon Press Secretary George Little, who also spoke during today's briefing, said any disagreement over Syria between Russia and the United States hasn't affected the northern distribution network. The network, which Russia supports, has been the only means of ground transport for NATO supplies headed into Afghanistan since Pakistan closed ground cargo routes to NATO forces in November.


"It's an extremely complicated but essential network for our supplies in and out of Afghanistan," Little said. "I have heard no indication that the Russians are going to change their participation in that network and would reiterate our thanks to the government of Russia for supporting it."

"At the same time," Kirby said, "we've been very clear with them about our concerns about lethal support to the Syrian regime. It's not like we haven't been honest about what concerns us with these arms sales to Assad. We have been."



Kirby noted U.S. officials are working with the international community "as much and as aggressively as we can to make sure that Assad doesn't have at his disposal the means to kill his own people, or at least limit that ability as much as we can."



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