Right: ATHENAmodel.jpg: The ATHENA organ project combines heart, liver, kidney and lung features in a desktop toxicity testing platform. Artists conception courtesy Los Alamos National Laboratory.
FROM: LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY
ATHENA Desktop Human “Body” Could Reduce Need for Animal Drug Tests
Surrogate Organ System Developed for Toxicity Testing
LOS ALAMOS, N.M., March 26, 2014—Creating surrogate human organs, coupled with insights from highly sensitive mass spectrometry technologies, a new project is on the brink of revolutionizing the way we screen new drugs and toxic agents.
ATHENA, the Advanced Tissue-engineered Human Ectypal Network Analyzer project team, is developing four human organ constructs – liver, heart, lung and kidney – that are based on a significantly miniaturized platform. Each organ component will be about the size of a smartphone screen, and the whole ATHENA “body” of interconnected organs would fit neatly on a desk.
“By developing this ‘homo minutus,’ we are stepping beyond the need for animal or Petri dish testing: There are huge benefits in developing drug and toxicity analysis systems that can mimic the response of actual human organs,” said Rashi Iyer, a senior scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory, the lead laboratory on the five-year, $19 million multi-institutional effort. The project is supported by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).
“By creating a holistic dynamic system that more realistically mimics the human physiological environment than static human cells in a dish, we can understand chemical effects on human organs as never before,” she said. “The ultimate goal is to build a lung that breathes, a heart that pumps, a liver that metabolizes and a kidney that excretes -– all connected by a tubing infrastructure much akin to the way blood vessels connect our organs. While some skeptics might believe that this is a utopian dream,” she said, “the team is confident that this is indeed achievable.”
Some 40 percent of pharmaceuticals fail their clinical trials, Iyer noted, and there are thousands of chemicals whose effects on humans are simply unknown. Providing a realistic, cost-effective and rapid screening system such as ATHENA with high-throughput capabilities could provide major benefits to the medical field, screening more accurately and offering a greater chance of clinical trial success.
Results from the project’s Vanderbilt University effort on the ATHENA perfusion system will be presented at the Society of Toxicology meeting this week in Phoenix by co-principal investigator John Wikswo. Successful development and analysis of a human liver organ construct -- that responds to exposure to a toxic chemical much like a real liver – is described in a presentation reported by the Gordon A. Cain University Professor and Director of the Vanderbilt Institute for Integrative Biosystems Research and Education (VIIBRE) at Vanderbilt University.
“We spent a bit of time analyzing the challenges in building miniature human organ constructs, and we believe we’ve figured out how to capture the key features we need,” said Wikswo. “There are a lot of trade-offs, and we’re not trying to build an exact replica of a human liver, but an in vitro model that allows us to measure human liver responses to drugs and toxins that cannot be replicated by a layer of cells growing on plastic.”
The ATHENA project brings together top capabilities and researchers in this pioneering field of research. The project components are divided as follows:
In addition to leading and coordinating the project, Iyer is directing work on the lung and kidney organ as well as step-wise integration and validation of all of the organs in the ATHENA perfusion platform – all of which will be executed at LANL.
Wikswo and his VIIBRE group are building the hardware platform that ‘runs’ and monitors the health of the entire system, while the first organ, the liver construct, which was recently tested in the ATHENA platform at VIIBRE, is being developed by Katrin Zeilinger, head of the Bioreactor Group, Experimental Surgery, and colleagues at Charité Universitätsmedizin, Berlin, Germany.
Kevin Kit Parker, Tarr Family Professor of Bioengineering and Applied Physics at Harvard University, is leading the heart effort.
Shuvo Roy, Director of the Biomedical Microdevices Laboratory at the University of California San Francisco (UCSF), and Associate Professor of Medicine William Fissell of Vanderbilt are developing the kidney constructs.
Andrzej Przekwas, CTO and Senior Vice President for Research of CFD Research Corporation (CFDRC), a technology company in Huntsville, AL, is building a mathematical model of ATHENA to facilitate system design and physiologically-based pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic (PB-PK/PD) models to guide drug exposure studies and data extrapolation. “This component is unique and critical when building an integrated ex vivo system mimicking the human body,” said the DTRA program manager.
LANL and Vanderbilt in collaboration with CFDRC will develop a blood mimic to sustain the four devices.
And as Iyer puts it “a system is only as good as its analytical strength. . . the ion mobility mass spectrometry capability being developed by VU’s John McLean with a parallel capability at Los Alamos, lead by Srinivas Iyer, ensures an unprecedented ability to interrogate the system and obtain valuable data.”
Successful integration of the Charité-developed liver organ construct into the VIIBRE built ATHENA perfusion system was demonstrated to DTRA recently. The team expects to connect the liver and the heart constructs this winter followed by the lung and finally the kidney.
The research is funded by Defense Threat Reduction Agency agreement # CBMXCEL-XL1-2-0001.
A PUBLICATION OF RANDOM U.S.GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASES AND ARTICLES
Thursday, March 27, 2014
U.S.-CANADA ANTITRUST AGENCIES ISSUE BEST PRACTICES FOR COORDINATING REVIEWS OF MERGERS
FROM: U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
U.S. AND CANADA ANTITRUST AGENCIES ISSUE BEST PRACTICES FOR COORDINATING MERGER REVIEWS
Builds Upon 1995 Cooperation Agreement Between the Two Countries
WASHINGTON — The Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Competition Bureau Canada today issued a set of “best practices” to make more transparent how they coordinate merger reviews that affect the United States and Canada.
Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division Bill Baer, FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez and Canadian Commissioner of Competition John Pecman praised the long record of successful cooperation between the two jurisdictions, and noted that cross-border coordination and cooperation in merger matters have steadily increased over the last decades.
The best practices set forth how effective day-to-day cooperation works between the two U.S. agencies and the Competition Bureau, including how the agencies communicate with each other, benefit from the similarity of their respective merger review timetables, cooperate in the analysis of evidence, use waivers of confidentiality provided by the parties and address remedies and settlements. The best practices also seek to promote cooperation and coordination between the U.S. and Canadian agencies in order to enhance the likelihood of consistent outcomes when the same merger is reviewed in both countries. In addition, the best practices acknowledge the contribution that merging parties can make in facilitating cooperation, and provide guidance to firms about how to work with the agencies to coordinate and facilitate the reviews of their proposed transactions.
“The strong relationship between the U.S. and Canadian competition agencies has allowed us to cooperate closely and effectively on many merger investigations,” said Assistant Attorney General Baer. “The best practices we are issuing today are a testimony to our agencies’ long-standing and productive working relationship and the importance all of our agencies place on transparency.”
“We have developed a very close working relationship with our Canadian colleagues based on our shared approach to the implementation of our competition laws and policies,” said FTC Chairwoman Ramirez. “These best practices exemplify our commitment to cooperation and convergence, benefiting our agencies, merging parties, and ultimately consumers.”
The best practices, which do not modify existing law, build upon the framework of the 1995 antitrust cooperation agreement between the United States and Canada and the experience gained under that framework.
U.S. AND CANADA ANTITRUST AGENCIES ISSUE BEST PRACTICES FOR COORDINATING MERGER REVIEWS
Builds Upon 1995 Cooperation Agreement Between the Two Countries
WASHINGTON — The Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Competition Bureau Canada today issued a set of “best practices” to make more transparent how they coordinate merger reviews that affect the United States and Canada.
Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division Bill Baer, FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez and Canadian Commissioner of Competition John Pecman praised the long record of successful cooperation between the two jurisdictions, and noted that cross-border coordination and cooperation in merger matters have steadily increased over the last decades.
The best practices set forth how effective day-to-day cooperation works between the two U.S. agencies and the Competition Bureau, including how the agencies communicate with each other, benefit from the similarity of their respective merger review timetables, cooperate in the analysis of evidence, use waivers of confidentiality provided by the parties and address remedies and settlements. The best practices also seek to promote cooperation and coordination between the U.S. and Canadian agencies in order to enhance the likelihood of consistent outcomes when the same merger is reviewed in both countries. In addition, the best practices acknowledge the contribution that merging parties can make in facilitating cooperation, and provide guidance to firms about how to work with the agencies to coordinate and facilitate the reviews of their proposed transactions.
“The strong relationship between the U.S. and Canadian competition agencies has allowed us to cooperate closely and effectively on many merger investigations,” said Assistant Attorney General Baer. “The best practices we are issuing today are a testimony to our agencies’ long-standing and productive working relationship and the importance all of our agencies place on transparency.”
“We have developed a very close working relationship with our Canadian colleagues based on our shared approach to the implementation of our competition laws and policies,” said FTC Chairwoman Ramirez. “These best practices exemplify our commitment to cooperation and convergence, benefiting our agencies, merging parties, and ultimately consumers.”
The best practices, which do not modify existing law, build upon the framework of the 1995 antitrust cooperation agreement between the United States and Canada and the experience gained under that framework.
RESEARCHER BELIEVES YELLOWSTONE SUPERVOLCANO WILL NOT ERUPT FOR A LONG TIME
FROM: NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
Will the Yellowstone supervolcano erupt in our lifetime?
Researcher studies the past to predict the future
As with many things in nature, it helps to understand the past when trying to predict the future.
Ilya Bindeman, an associate professor of geological sciences at the University of Oregon, believes this is true of the Yellowstone supervolcano and the likelihood that it will produce an apocalyptic eruption as it has three times over the last the last 2 million years.
"Yellowstone is one of the biggest supervolcanos in the world," he says. "Sometimes it erupts quietly with lava flow, but once or twice every million years, it erupts very violently, forming large calderas," which are very large craters measuring tens of kilometers in diameter.
If it happens again, and he says most scientists think that it will, he predicts such an eruption will obliterate the surroundings within a radius of hundreds of kilometers, and cover the rest of the United States and Canada with multiple inches of ash. This, effectively, would shut down agriculture and cause global climate cooling for as long as a decade, or more, he says. A volcanic event of such magnitude "hasn't happened in modern civilization," he says.
However, the National Science Foundation (NSF)-funded scientist doesn't think it's going to happen anytime soon--at least not for another 1 million to 2 million years.
"Our research of the pattern of such volcanism in two older, 'complete' caldera clusters in the wake of Yellowstone allows a prognosis that Yellowstone is on a dying cycle, rather than on a ramping up cycle," he says.
By this, he is referring to an ongoing cycle that occurs within the so-called Yellowstone "hot spot," an upwelling plume of hot mantle beneath the Earth's surface, when magma chambers, which are large underground pools of liquid rock, reuse rocks, eject lava, melt again and prompt large eruptions many thousands of years later.
It is a complicated process that also involves the position of the North American plate, which is moving at the rate of two to four centimeters a year, and its relationship to the hot spot, as well as the continuing interaction of the Earth's crust with basalt, a common volcanic rock derived from the mantle.
"Yellowstone is like a conveyer belt of caldera clusters," he says. "By investigating the patterns of behavior in two previously completed caldera cycles, we can suggest that the current activity of Yellowstone is on the dying cycle."
Calderas first form due to the hot spot's interaction with the North American plate, forming new magma after about a two-million-year delay.
"It takes a long time to build magma bodies in the crust," he says. "We discovered a consistent pattern: subsequent volcanism is a combination of new magma production and the recycling of already erupted material, which includes lava and tuff," a rock composed of consolidated volcanic ash.
By comparing Yellowstone to previous completed caldera cycles, "we can detect that the Yellowstone hot spot is re-using the already erupted and buried material, rather than producing just new magma, " he says. "Either the crust under Yellowstone is turning into hard-to-melt basalt, or because the movement of North American plate has changed the magma pluming system away from Yellowstone, or both of these reasons."
The Yellowstone hot spot has produced multiple clusters of nested volcanic craters, known as calderas, during the last 16 million years. "Caldera cycles go on for maybe several million years, and then it is done," he adds. "The current magmatic activity in Yellowstone is in the middle of the cycle, or at the end, as three caldera forming eruptions have already happened."
The three most recent eruptions, which occurred 2 million, 1.3 million, and 640,000 years ago, resulted in a series of nested calderas forming what we know as Yellowstone National Park and its immediate vicinity.
Eventually, the cycle comes to an end for unknown reasons.
"By performing micro-analytical isotopic investigation of tiny minerals in rocks, we are trying to understand when it's done," he says. "We know the behavior of the past and we know at what comparative stage Yellowstone is right now. We think Yellowstone is currently on a third cycle, and it's a dying cycle. We've observed a lot of material that represent recycled volcanic rocks, which were once buried inside of calderas and are now getting recycled. Yellowstone has erupted enough of this material already to suggest that the future melting potential of the crust is getting exhausted."
To be sure, however, he also points out that "everything is possible in geology, and not very precise."
Bindeman is conducting his research under an NSF Faculty Early Career Development (CAREER) award, which he received in 2009. The award supports junior faculty who exemplify the role of teacher-scholars through outstanding research, excellent education, and the integration of education and research within the context of the mission of their organization. NSF is funding his work with $533,606 over five years.
As part of the grant's education component, Bindeman is training graduate and undergraduate students using lab-based learning, summer research programs for undergraduates and community college students, and through new courses.
He also has developed exchanges and collaboration among graduate and undergraduate students and scientists in the United States, Switzerland, Russia, France and Iceland.
"International exchange will involve collaborative lab visits, joint fieldwork, excursions for foreign students, and international student and postdoc hiring," he says. He recently led a two-week Yellowstone field school for graduate students and professors visiting from Switzerland.
Bindeman's research involves using radioactive dating to determine the age of volcanic materials, such as tuff and lava, "with the goal of understanding its history," he says. "Knowing the age is important as a context for understanding everything else."
They analyze oxygen isotope ratios in quartz and zircon, and water- and heat-resistant minerals, from volcanic rocks. Despite re-melting, the zircon crystals have retained their isotope signatures, enabling the scientists to date their cores and rims, and look into the history of the magma assembly.
"We found patterns indicating that material was recycled as older volcanic rocks forming the roofs of magma chambers collapsed and re-melted during eruptions, only to be re-ejected in the next volcanic outburst," he says.
Specifically he and his team studied the two most recently completed cycles, that is, the cycle that produced the eruption of 2 million years ago, known as Heise, and the one that followed, producing the eruption of 1.3 million years ago, known as Picabo.
The results of those studies enabled them to determine the current state of the supervolcano, and predict that a new catastrophic caldera-forming eruption likely will happen only in 1 million to 2 million years, probably in Montana.
An eruption of power has not occurred in the world for at least 74,000 years. "The last one was in Toba, Indonesia," he says.
Bindeman also is investigating the potential effects of the next massive eruption on the atmosphere. "Sulfur dioxide gas will be released in large quantities, resulting in global cooling and ozone destruction, but nobody knows yet how cold it's going to get and what will be the effects of temporary ozone layer destruction," he says.
To convey the power of the last Yellowstone eruption, and quite possibly the next one, Bindeman cites two recent examples for comparison purposes: The 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens in Washington State, which killed 57 people and caused widespread destruction, spewed one cubic kilometer of material into the air, he says. The 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines, which killed hundreds of people and for several years decreased global temperatures, released ten cubic kilometers, he says.
"The last Yellowstone eruption 640,000 years ago was 1,000 kilometers of material," he says.
-- Marlene Cimons, National Science Foundation
Investigators
Ilya Bindeman
Related Institutions/Organizations
University of Oregon Eugene
Will the Yellowstone supervolcano erupt in our lifetime?
Researcher studies the past to predict the future
As with many things in nature, it helps to understand the past when trying to predict the future.
Ilya Bindeman, an associate professor of geological sciences at the University of Oregon, believes this is true of the Yellowstone supervolcano and the likelihood that it will produce an apocalyptic eruption as it has three times over the last the last 2 million years.
"Yellowstone is one of the biggest supervolcanos in the world," he says. "Sometimes it erupts quietly with lava flow, but once or twice every million years, it erupts very violently, forming large calderas," which are very large craters measuring tens of kilometers in diameter.
If it happens again, and he says most scientists think that it will, he predicts such an eruption will obliterate the surroundings within a radius of hundreds of kilometers, and cover the rest of the United States and Canada with multiple inches of ash. This, effectively, would shut down agriculture and cause global climate cooling for as long as a decade, or more, he says. A volcanic event of such magnitude "hasn't happened in modern civilization," he says.
However, the National Science Foundation (NSF)-funded scientist doesn't think it's going to happen anytime soon--at least not for another 1 million to 2 million years.
"Our research of the pattern of such volcanism in two older, 'complete' caldera clusters in the wake of Yellowstone allows a prognosis that Yellowstone is on a dying cycle, rather than on a ramping up cycle," he says.
By this, he is referring to an ongoing cycle that occurs within the so-called Yellowstone "hot spot," an upwelling plume of hot mantle beneath the Earth's surface, when magma chambers, which are large underground pools of liquid rock, reuse rocks, eject lava, melt again and prompt large eruptions many thousands of years later.
It is a complicated process that also involves the position of the North American plate, which is moving at the rate of two to four centimeters a year, and its relationship to the hot spot, as well as the continuing interaction of the Earth's crust with basalt, a common volcanic rock derived from the mantle.
"Yellowstone is like a conveyer belt of caldera clusters," he says. "By investigating the patterns of behavior in two previously completed caldera cycles, we can suggest that the current activity of Yellowstone is on the dying cycle."
Calderas first form due to the hot spot's interaction with the North American plate, forming new magma after about a two-million-year delay.
"It takes a long time to build magma bodies in the crust," he says. "We discovered a consistent pattern: subsequent volcanism is a combination of new magma production and the recycling of already erupted material, which includes lava and tuff," a rock composed of consolidated volcanic ash.
By comparing Yellowstone to previous completed caldera cycles, "we can detect that the Yellowstone hot spot is re-using the already erupted and buried material, rather than producing just new magma, " he says. "Either the crust under Yellowstone is turning into hard-to-melt basalt, or because the movement of North American plate has changed the magma pluming system away from Yellowstone, or both of these reasons."
The Yellowstone hot spot has produced multiple clusters of nested volcanic craters, known as calderas, during the last 16 million years. "Caldera cycles go on for maybe several million years, and then it is done," he adds. "The current magmatic activity in Yellowstone is in the middle of the cycle, or at the end, as three caldera forming eruptions have already happened."
The three most recent eruptions, which occurred 2 million, 1.3 million, and 640,000 years ago, resulted in a series of nested calderas forming what we know as Yellowstone National Park and its immediate vicinity.
Eventually, the cycle comes to an end for unknown reasons.
"By performing micro-analytical isotopic investigation of tiny minerals in rocks, we are trying to understand when it's done," he says. "We know the behavior of the past and we know at what comparative stage Yellowstone is right now. We think Yellowstone is currently on a third cycle, and it's a dying cycle. We've observed a lot of material that represent recycled volcanic rocks, which were once buried inside of calderas and are now getting recycled. Yellowstone has erupted enough of this material already to suggest that the future melting potential of the crust is getting exhausted."
To be sure, however, he also points out that "everything is possible in geology, and not very precise."
Bindeman is conducting his research under an NSF Faculty Early Career Development (CAREER) award, which he received in 2009. The award supports junior faculty who exemplify the role of teacher-scholars through outstanding research, excellent education, and the integration of education and research within the context of the mission of their organization. NSF is funding his work with $533,606 over five years.
As part of the grant's education component, Bindeman is training graduate and undergraduate students using lab-based learning, summer research programs for undergraduates and community college students, and through new courses.
He also has developed exchanges and collaboration among graduate and undergraduate students and scientists in the United States, Switzerland, Russia, France and Iceland.
"International exchange will involve collaborative lab visits, joint fieldwork, excursions for foreign students, and international student and postdoc hiring," he says. He recently led a two-week Yellowstone field school for graduate students and professors visiting from Switzerland.
Bindeman's research involves using radioactive dating to determine the age of volcanic materials, such as tuff and lava, "with the goal of understanding its history," he says. "Knowing the age is important as a context for understanding everything else."
They analyze oxygen isotope ratios in quartz and zircon, and water- and heat-resistant minerals, from volcanic rocks. Despite re-melting, the zircon crystals have retained their isotope signatures, enabling the scientists to date their cores and rims, and look into the history of the magma assembly.
"We found patterns indicating that material was recycled as older volcanic rocks forming the roofs of magma chambers collapsed and re-melted during eruptions, only to be re-ejected in the next volcanic outburst," he says.
Specifically he and his team studied the two most recently completed cycles, that is, the cycle that produced the eruption of 2 million years ago, known as Heise, and the one that followed, producing the eruption of 1.3 million years ago, known as Picabo.
The results of those studies enabled them to determine the current state of the supervolcano, and predict that a new catastrophic caldera-forming eruption likely will happen only in 1 million to 2 million years, probably in Montana.
An eruption of power has not occurred in the world for at least 74,000 years. "The last one was in Toba, Indonesia," he says.
Bindeman also is investigating the potential effects of the next massive eruption on the atmosphere. "Sulfur dioxide gas will be released in large quantities, resulting in global cooling and ozone destruction, but nobody knows yet how cold it's going to get and what will be the effects of temporary ozone layer destruction," he says.
To convey the power of the last Yellowstone eruption, and quite possibly the next one, Bindeman cites two recent examples for comparison purposes: The 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens in Washington State, which killed 57 people and caused widespread destruction, spewed one cubic kilometer of material into the air, he says. The 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines, which killed hundreds of people and for several years decreased global temperatures, released ten cubic kilometers, he says.
"The last Yellowstone eruption 640,000 years ago was 1,000 kilometers of material," he says.
-- Marlene Cimons, National Science Foundation
Investigators
Ilya Bindeman
Related Institutions/Organizations
University of Oregon Eugene
Wednesday, March 26, 2014
BRITISH, U.S. DEFENSE LEADERS MEET OVER CRIMEA-UKRAINE SITUATION
FROM: U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
U.S., British Defense Leaders Discuss Ukraine, NATO
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 26, 2014 – U.S. and United Kingdom defense leaders today reiterated that there must be consequences for Russia following President Vladimir Putin’s forced annexation of Crimea from Ukraine.
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel hosted British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond at the Pentagon. The two discussed a range of subjects, but the main focus was Ukraine, Hagel said at a news conference with Hammond after their meeting.
“I thanked Secretary Hammond for the U.K.'s steadfast support of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and for the U.K.’s important contributions to NATO,” Hagel said. “We reaffirmed the strong commitment of both our countries to NATO's collective defenses, as President Obama has emphasized throughout his trip to Europe.”
Economic and diplomatic sanctions that have been imposed against Russia by the European Union and the United States will further isolate Russia, Hagel noted. “As the leaders of both our countries and the other G-7 nations affirmed this week in the Netherlands, we will continue to coordinate closely on future actions and sanctions we may take against Russia,” he added.
Hammond said Russia’s action was completely unacceptable, and he called the Russian occupation of Crimea “illegal annexation of a sovereign territory.”
The United Kingdom stands with the United States and the rest of NATO in opposing the Russian action and supports “wide-ranging economic and diplomatic sanctions to force President Putin to stop his bullying behavior,” Hammond said.
“The Russian government should be in no doubt that should there be further acts of aggression, there will be further consequences for Russia,” he added.
Hammond confirmed that in addition to the offer of Royal Air Force Typhoon combat jets to bolster the Baltic air policing mission, the United Kingdom is working with its allies and partners to scope options for additional measures of reassurance to Eastern European and Baltic allies.
Hammond stated that evidence suggests that the Russian agenda is being run by Putin personally. “Other Russian players, including [Defense] Minister [Sergei] Shoigu, may express views, but it's a moot point, and we cannot know, we do not know, to what extent all of those people are really inside the inner circle in which President Putin is planning this exercise,” the British leader said.
The situation in Ukraine demonstrates the continued need for NATO, Hagel said. “The essential character and commitment of this alliance, of its 28 members to one another, remains unchanged, but we will look for new ways to collaborate and improve the alliance’s capabilities and readiness,” the secretary said. “That means we will make continued necessary investments in defense.”
The two men and their staffs also discussed the progress of the campaign in Afghanistan.
Both countries are grappling with budget constraints, and both leaders look on this as an opportunity to explore new areas of cooperation. Hammond said the United States and United Kingdom could work together in nuclear deterrence, special operations forces, intelligence, unmanned aerial vehicles, surveillance aircraft and carrier strike regeneration.
U.S., British Defense Leaders Discuss Ukraine, NATO
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 26, 2014 – U.S. and United Kingdom defense leaders today reiterated that there must be consequences for Russia following President Vladimir Putin’s forced annexation of Crimea from Ukraine.
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel hosted British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond at the Pentagon. The two discussed a range of subjects, but the main focus was Ukraine, Hagel said at a news conference with Hammond after their meeting.
“I thanked Secretary Hammond for the U.K.'s steadfast support of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and for the U.K.’s important contributions to NATO,” Hagel said. “We reaffirmed the strong commitment of both our countries to NATO's collective defenses, as President Obama has emphasized throughout his trip to Europe.”
Economic and diplomatic sanctions that have been imposed against Russia by the European Union and the United States will further isolate Russia, Hagel noted. “As the leaders of both our countries and the other G-7 nations affirmed this week in the Netherlands, we will continue to coordinate closely on future actions and sanctions we may take against Russia,” he added.
Hammond said Russia’s action was completely unacceptable, and he called the Russian occupation of Crimea “illegal annexation of a sovereign territory.”
The United Kingdom stands with the United States and the rest of NATO in opposing the Russian action and supports “wide-ranging economic and diplomatic sanctions to force President Putin to stop his bullying behavior,” Hammond said.
“The Russian government should be in no doubt that should there be further acts of aggression, there will be further consequences for Russia,” he added.
Hammond confirmed that in addition to the offer of Royal Air Force Typhoon combat jets to bolster the Baltic air policing mission, the United Kingdom is working with its allies and partners to scope options for additional measures of reassurance to Eastern European and Baltic allies.
Hammond stated that evidence suggests that the Russian agenda is being run by Putin personally. “Other Russian players, including [Defense] Minister [Sergei] Shoigu, may express views, but it's a moot point, and we cannot know, we do not know, to what extent all of those people are really inside the inner circle in which President Putin is planning this exercise,” the British leader said.
The situation in Ukraine demonstrates the continued need for NATO, Hagel said. “The essential character and commitment of this alliance, of its 28 members to one another, remains unchanged, but we will look for new ways to collaborate and improve the alliance’s capabilities and readiness,” the secretary said. “That means we will make continued necessary investments in defense.”
The two men and their staffs also discussed the progress of the campaign in Afghanistan.
Both countries are grappling with budget constraints, and both leaders look on this as an opportunity to explore new areas of cooperation. Hammond said the United States and United Kingdom could work together in nuclear deterrence, special operations forces, intelligence, unmanned aerial vehicles, surveillance aircraft and carrier strike regeneration.
U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CONTRACTS FOR MARCH 26, 2014
FROM: U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DEFENSE
CONTRACTS
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
Siemens Medical Solutions Inc., Malvern, Pa., has been awarded a maximum $1,789,537,539 modification (P00101) exercising the fifth option period on a one-year base contract (SPM2D1-09-D-8314) with seven one-year option periods for radiology systems, subsystems, accessories, service, and repair and parts. This is a fixed-price with economic-price-adjustment, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. Location of performance is Pennsylvania with a March 30, 2015 performance completion date. Using military services are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and federal civilian agencies. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2014 through fiscal 2015 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pa.
Hitachi Medical Systems America Inc., Twinsburg, Ohio, has been awarded a maximum $90,254,284 modification (P00017) exercising the fifth option period on a one-year base contract (SPM2D1-09-D-8331) with seven one-year option periods for radiology systems, components, upgrades, accessories, and installation. This is a fixed-price with economic-price adjustment contract. Location of performance is Ohio with a March 29, 2015 performance completion date. Using military services are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and federal civilian agencies. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2014 through fiscal 2015 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pa.
AIR FORCE
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., Savannah, Ga., has been awarded a maximum $102,062,349 modification (P00002) exercising option period one on firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract (FA8106-13-D-0002) for contractor logistics support services to the C-20 and C-37 fleet for Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. Work will be performed worldwide, and is expected to be completed by Jan. 31, 2015. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard funds in the amount of $60,841,191 are being obligated at time of award. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center/WLKLB, Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., is the contracting activity.
The Raytheon Co., El Segundo, Calif., has been awarded a maximum $33,680,614 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the hypertemporal imaging space experiment payload. The primary objective of the hypertemporal imaging space experiment payload effort is to design, fabricate, test, and deliver a space-flight ready instrument capable of conducting hypertemporal imaging from a geosynchronous earth orbit. Work will be performed in El Segundo, Calif., and is expected to be completed in January 2017. Fiscal 2013 and 2014 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $6,387,630 are being obligated at award. This award is the result of a broad agency announcement, and two proposals were received. Detachment 8, Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M., is the contracting activity (FA9453-14-C-0211).
Beechcraft Corp., Wichita, Kan., has been awarded a $24,500,000 firm-fixed-price and cost- reimbursable, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for King Air 350 aircraft maintenance training. Contractor provided training shall be based on standard commercial-off-the shelf configured King Air 350 proline 21 avionics. Work will be performed at New Al-Muthana Airbase, Iraq and Wichita, Kan., and is expected to be completed by Dec. 31, 2015. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition. This is 100 percent foreign military sales for Iraq. 338 Specialized Contracting Squadron, Joint Base San Antonio, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, is the contracting activity (FA3002-14-D-0003).
Newbegin Enterprise Inc.*, Johnson City, Tenn., has been awarded a $15,000,000 modification (P00005) on indefinite-quantity/indefinite-delivery contract (FA4803-11-D-0001) to exercise option year three for U.S. Air Forces Central (USAFCENT) Internet-Based Contractor Operated Part Store. The contract modification provides for the contractor to provide automotive and related vehicle parts, automotive chemicals, corrosion control materials, upholstery material, and accessories for USAFCENT vehicles/equipment located in USAFCENT area of responsibility. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance funding for this modification will be issued against individual delivery orders. Work will be performed at Johnson City, Tenn., and is expected to be completed March 31, 2015. 20th Contracting Squadron, Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., is the contracting activity.
NAVY
L-3 Communications Vertex Aerospace LLC, Madison, Miss., is being awarded a $58,488,748 indefinite-delivery, requirements contract to provide logistics services and materials for organizational, intermediate, and depot level maintenance required to support T45TS aircraft based at Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian, Miss.; NAS Kingsville, Texas; and NAS Pensacola, Fla. This requirement also includes the support and maintenance of the T-45 aircraft at all operational sites, numerous outlying fields, and various detachment sites. Work will be performed in Kingsville, Texas (58 percent); Meridian, Miss. (36 percent); and Pensacola, Fla. (6 percent), and is expected to be completed in July 2014. Contract funds will not be obligated at time of award. Funds will be obligated on individual delivery orders as they are issued. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity (N00019-14-D-0019).
Rolls-Royce Corp., Indianapolis, Ind., is being awarded a $39,599,668 modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-10-C-0020) for the procurement of 26,495 V-22 flight hours and 26 low power MV-22 repairs under the Mission Care™ contract. Work will be performed in Oakland, Calif. (70 percent) and Indianapolis, Ind. (30 percent), and is expected to be completed in February 2015. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Navy and U.S. Special Operations funds in the amount of $39,599,668 are being obligated on this award, all of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.
CasePro Inc., San Antonio, Texas (N62645-14-D-5003); Catalyst Professional Services Inc.*, Colorado Springs, Colo. (N62645-14-D-5004); Cherokee Medical Services LLC*, Stillwell, Okla. (N62645-14-D-5005); Chesapeake Educational Services LLC*, Vienna, Va. (N62645-14-D-5006); OMV Medical Inc., Takoma Park, Md. (N62645-14-D-5007); Professional Performance Development Group Inc., San Antonio, Texas (N62645-14-D-5008); Saratoga Medical Center Inc.*, Fairfax, Va. (N62645-14-D-5009); TCMP Staffing Services LLC, Springfield, Va. (N62645-14-D-5010) are each being awarded a nine-month, firm-fixed-priced, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity, multiple-award task order bridge contract to continue extending physician, allied health, nursing, technologist, technician and assistant services currently being provided in support of the Naval Hospital Jacksonville, Fla.; Naval Health Clinic Pensacola, Fla.; Naval Health Clinic Corpus Christi, Texas, and their affiliated clinics within Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and Texas. The aggregate not-to-exceed amount for these multiple award contracts combined is $28,000,000. Work will be performed in Jacksonville, Fla. (46 percent); Pensacola, Fla. (44 percent); Corpus Christi, Texas (10 percent) and affiliated clinics within Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and Texas, and work is expected to be completed January 31, 2015. Fiscal 2014 Defense Health Program contract funding in the amount of $21,391,455 will be obligated at the time of award. Contract funds in the amount of $5,000,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Other funding initiatives such as psychological health/traumatic brain injury, overseas contingency operations and wounded, ill, and injured may be used. These contracts were issued as sole source requirements in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1)-only one responsible source or only a limited number of responsible sources. The Naval Medical Logistics Command, Fort Detrick, Md., is the contracting activity.
General Dynamics-Advanced Information Systems, Pittsfield, Mass., is being awarded a $10,485,397 cost-plus-incentive-fee modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-09-C-6206) for fiscal 2014 and 2015 multi-purpose processor (MPP) cabinet and the Total Ship Monitoring System (TSMS). The contract provides funding for the development and production of the MPPs and TSMS (TI-14) for the U.S. submarine fleet. Work will be performed in Pittsfield, Mass. (70 percent), and Fairfax, Va. (30 percent), and is expected to be completed by December 2015. Fiscal 2014 shipbuilding and conversion, Navy; fiscal 2014 other procurement, Navy; fiscal 2014 research, development, test and evaluation; and fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Navy contract funds in the amount $5,736,478 will be obligated at the time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity.
United Technologies Corp., Pratt & Whitney Military Engines, East Hartford, Conn., is being awarded a $10,242,104 modification to a previously awarded advance acquisition contract (N00019-13-C-0016) for long-lead components, parts and materials associated with the low rate initial production Lot VIII of eight F135 conventional take off and landing propulsion systems for the governments of Japan (6) and Israel (2). Work will be performed in East Hartford, Conn. (67 percent); Bristol, United Kingdom (16.5 percent); and Indianapolis, Ind. (16.5 percent), and is expected to be completed in September 2016. Foreign military sales funds in the amount of $10,242,104 are being obligated on this award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract combines purchases for the governments of Japan; ($7,681,578; 75 percent); and Israel ($2,560,526; 25 percent) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.
Detyens Shipyards Inc.*, North Charleston, S.C., is being awarded an $8,529,497 firm-fixed-price contract for a 55-calendar day regular overhaul and dry-docking of USNS Laramie (T-AO 203). Work will include clean and gas free tanks, voids, and cofferdams; deck non-skid resurfacing; ballast tank preservation, cylinder head and liner overhaul, main engine turbo overhaul, cargo system wire replacement; cargo console mechanical support; auxiliary boiler maintenance and inspection; annual lifeboat certification; house ventilation system cleaning; docking and undocking; propeller system maintenance and hub replacement; overhauling sea valves; and underwater hull cleaning and painting. Laramie’s primary mission is to provide fuel to U.S. Navy ships at sea and jet fuel to aircraft assigned to aircraft carriers. The contract includes options, which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $9,520,492. Work will be performed in Charleston, S.C., and is expected to be completed by June 2014. Fiscal 2014 Navy working capital funds in the amount of $8,529,497 are obligated and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured as a small business set-aside, with proposals solicited via the Federal Business Opportunities website, with two proposals received. The U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N32205-14-C-1001).
ARMY
Olin Corp.-Winchester Division, East Alton, Ill., was awarded a $28,748,479 modification (P00036) to contract W52P1J-11-C-0038 to exercise option period three to procure .50 caliber and 5.56mm ammunition. Fiscal 2013 other procurement funds in the amount of $2,132,226 and fiscal 2014 other procurement funds in the amount of $21,124,202 were obligated at the time of the award. Estimated completion date is Sept 30, 2016. Work will be performed at East Alton, Ill. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Ill., is the contracting activity.
Holland and Holland, Hinesville, Ga., was awarded a $9,035,374 modification (P00004) to indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract W9124M-12-D-0005 for paving at Fort Stewart, Ga. Funding and performance locations will be determined with each order. Estimated completion date is March 31, 2015. Army Contracting Command, Fort Stewart, Ga., is the contracting activity.
*Small Business
CONTRACTS
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
Siemens Medical Solutions Inc., Malvern, Pa., has been awarded a maximum $1,789,537,539 modification (P00101) exercising the fifth option period on a one-year base contract (SPM2D1-09-D-8314) with seven one-year option periods for radiology systems, subsystems, accessories, service, and repair and parts. This is a fixed-price with economic-price-adjustment, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. Location of performance is Pennsylvania with a March 30, 2015 performance completion date. Using military services are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and federal civilian agencies. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2014 through fiscal 2015 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pa.
Hitachi Medical Systems America Inc., Twinsburg, Ohio, has been awarded a maximum $90,254,284 modification (P00017) exercising the fifth option period on a one-year base contract (SPM2D1-09-D-8331) with seven one-year option periods for radiology systems, components, upgrades, accessories, and installation. This is a fixed-price with economic-price adjustment contract. Location of performance is Ohio with a March 29, 2015 performance completion date. Using military services are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and federal civilian agencies. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2014 through fiscal 2015 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pa.
AIR FORCE
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., Savannah, Ga., has been awarded a maximum $102,062,349 modification (P00002) exercising option period one on firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract (FA8106-13-D-0002) for contractor logistics support services to the C-20 and C-37 fleet for Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. Work will be performed worldwide, and is expected to be completed by Jan. 31, 2015. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard funds in the amount of $60,841,191 are being obligated at time of award. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center/WLKLB, Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., is the contracting activity.
The Raytheon Co., El Segundo, Calif., has been awarded a maximum $33,680,614 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the hypertemporal imaging space experiment payload. The primary objective of the hypertemporal imaging space experiment payload effort is to design, fabricate, test, and deliver a space-flight ready instrument capable of conducting hypertemporal imaging from a geosynchronous earth orbit. Work will be performed in El Segundo, Calif., and is expected to be completed in January 2017. Fiscal 2013 and 2014 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $6,387,630 are being obligated at award. This award is the result of a broad agency announcement, and two proposals were received. Detachment 8, Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M., is the contracting activity (FA9453-14-C-0211).
Beechcraft Corp., Wichita, Kan., has been awarded a $24,500,000 firm-fixed-price and cost- reimbursable, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for King Air 350 aircraft maintenance training. Contractor provided training shall be based on standard commercial-off-the shelf configured King Air 350 proline 21 avionics. Work will be performed at New Al-Muthana Airbase, Iraq and Wichita, Kan., and is expected to be completed by Dec. 31, 2015. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition. This is 100 percent foreign military sales for Iraq. 338 Specialized Contracting Squadron, Joint Base San Antonio, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, is the contracting activity (FA3002-14-D-0003).
Newbegin Enterprise Inc.*, Johnson City, Tenn., has been awarded a $15,000,000 modification (P00005) on indefinite-quantity/indefinite-delivery contract (FA4803-11-D-0001) to exercise option year three for U.S. Air Forces Central (USAFCENT) Internet-Based Contractor Operated Part Store. The contract modification provides for the contractor to provide automotive and related vehicle parts, automotive chemicals, corrosion control materials, upholstery material, and accessories for USAFCENT vehicles/equipment located in USAFCENT area of responsibility. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance funding for this modification will be issued against individual delivery orders. Work will be performed at Johnson City, Tenn., and is expected to be completed March 31, 2015. 20th Contracting Squadron, Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., is the contracting activity.
NAVY
L-3 Communications Vertex Aerospace LLC, Madison, Miss., is being awarded a $58,488,748 indefinite-delivery, requirements contract to provide logistics services and materials for organizational, intermediate, and depot level maintenance required to support T45TS aircraft based at Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian, Miss.; NAS Kingsville, Texas; and NAS Pensacola, Fla. This requirement also includes the support and maintenance of the T-45 aircraft at all operational sites, numerous outlying fields, and various detachment sites. Work will be performed in Kingsville, Texas (58 percent); Meridian, Miss. (36 percent); and Pensacola, Fla. (6 percent), and is expected to be completed in July 2014. Contract funds will not be obligated at time of award. Funds will be obligated on individual delivery orders as they are issued. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity (N00019-14-D-0019).
Rolls-Royce Corp., Indianapolis, Ind., is being awarded a $39,599,668 modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-10-C-0020) for the procurement of 26,495 V-22 flight hours and 26 low power MV-22 repairs under the Mission Care™ contract. Work will be performed in Oakland, Calif. (70 percent) and Indianapolis, Ind. (30 percent), and is expected to be completed in February 2015. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Navy and U.S. Special Operations funds in the amount of $39,599,668 are being obligated on this award, all of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.
CasePro Inc., San Antonio, Texas (N62645-14-D-5003); Catalyst Professional Services Inc.*, Colorado Springs, Colo. (N62645-14-D-5004); Cherokee Medical Services LLC*, Stillwell, Okla. (N62645-14-D-5005); Chesapeake Educational Services LLC*, Vienna, Va. (N62645-14-D-5006); OMV Medical Inc., Takoma Park, Md. (N62645-14-D-5007); Professional Performance Development Group Inc., San Antonio, Texas (N62645-14-D-5008); Saratoga Medical Center Inc.*, Fairfax, Va. (N62645-14-D-5009); TCMP Staffing Services LLC, Springfield, Va. (N62645-14-D-5010) are each being awarded a nine-month, firm-fixed-priced, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity, multiple-award task order bridge contract to continue extending physician, allied health, nursing, technologist, technician and assistant services currently being provided in support of the Naval Hospital Jacksonville, Fla.; Naval Health Clinic Pensacola, Fla.; Naval Health Clinic Corpus Christi, Texas, and their affiliated clinics within Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and Texas. The aggregate not-to-exceed amount for these multiple award contracts combined is $28,000,000. Work will be performed in Jacksonville, Fla. (46 percent); Pensacola, Fla. (44 percent); Corpus Christi, Texas (10 percent) and affiliated clinics within Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and Texas, and work is expected to be completed January 31, 2015. Fiscal 2014 Defense Health Program contract funding in the amount of $21,391,455 will be obligated at the time of award. Contract funds in the amount of $5,000,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Other funding initiatives such as psychological health/traumatic brain injury, overseas contingency operations and wounded, ill, and injured may be used. These contracts were issued as sole source requirements in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1)-only one responsible source or only a limited number of responsible sources. The Naval Medical Logistics Command, Fort Detrick, Md., is the contracting activity.
General Dynamics-Advanced Information Systems, Pittsfield, Mass., is being awarded a $10,485,397 cost-plus-incentive-fee modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-09-C-6206) for fiscal 2014 and 2015 multi-purpose processor (MPP) cabinet and the Total Ship Monitoring System (TSMS). The contract provides funding for the development and production of the MPPs and TSMS (TI-14) for the U.S. submarine fleet. Work will be performed in Pittsfield, Mass. (70 percent), and Fairfax, Va. (30 percent), and is expected to be completed by December 2015. Fiscal 2014 shipbuilding and conversion, Navy; fiscal 2014 other procurement, Navy; fiscal 2014 research, development, test and evaluation; and fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance, Navy contract funds in the amount $5,736,478 will be obligated at the time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity.
United Technologies Corp., Pratt & Whitney Military Engines, East Hartford, Conn., is being awarded a $10,242,104 modification to a previously awarded advance acquisition contract (N00019-13-C-0016) for long-lead components, parts and materials associated with the low rate initial production Lot VIII of eight F135 conventional take off and landing propulsion systems for the governments of Japan (6) and Israel (2). Work will be performed in East Hartford, Conn. (67 percent); Bristol, United Kingdom (16.5 percent); and Indianapolis, Ind. (16.5 percent), and is expected to be completed in September 2016. Foreign military sales funds in the amount of $10,242,104 are being obligated on this award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract combines purchases for the governments of Japan; ($7,681,578; 75 percent); and Israel ($2,560,526; 25 percent) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.
Detyens Shipyards Inc.*, North Charleston, S.C., is being awarded an $8,529,497 firm-fixed-price contract for a 55-calendar day regular overhaul and dry-docking of USNS Laramie (T-AO 203). Work will include clean and gas free tanks, voids, and cofferdams; deck non-skid resurfacing; ballast tank preservation, cylinder head and liner overhaul, main engine turbo overhaul, cargo system wire replacement; cargo console mechanical support; auxiliary boiler maintenance and inspection; annual lifeboat certification; house ventilation system cleaning; docking and undocking; propeller system maintenance and hub replacement; overhauling sea valves; and underwater hull cleaning and painting. Laramie’s primary mission is to provide fuel to U.S. Navy ships at sea and jet fuel to aircraft assigned to aircraft carriers. The contract includes options, which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $9,520,492. Work will be performed in Charleston, S.C., and is expected to be completed by June 2014. Fiscal 2014 Navy working capital funds in the amount of $8,529,497 are obligated and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured as a small business set-aside, with proposals solicited via the Federal Business Opportunities website, with two proposals received. The U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N32205-14-C-1001).
ARMY
Olin Corp.-Winchester Division, East Alton, Ill., was awarded a $28,748,479 modification (P00036) to contract W52P1J-11-C-0038 to exercise option period three to procure .50 caliber and 5.56mm ammunition. Fiscal 2013 other procurement funds in the amount of $2,132,226 and fiscal 2014 other procurement funds in the amount of $21,124,202 were obligated at the time of the award. Estimated completion date is Sept 30, 2016. Work will be performed at East Alton, Ill. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Ill., is the contracting activity.
Holland and Holland, Hinesville, Ga., was awarded a $9,035,374 modification (P00004) to indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract W9124M-12-D-0005 for paving at Fort Stewart, Ga. Funding and performance locations will be determined with each order. Estimated completion date is March 31, 2015. Army Contracting Command, Fort Stewart, Ga., is the contracting activity.
*Small Business
REMARKS BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN ON EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Efforts of the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to Accomplish the Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons
Thomas M. Countryman
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
March 26, 2014
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and Members of the Committee; thank you for the opportunity to testify today about international efforts to support the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the complete and verifiable elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons program. While we have made important progress in the past months toward the elimination of Syria’s chemicals weapons program, considerable work remains to be done to ensure the Asad regime can never again use these terrible weapons against its own people, or threaten our regional and international partners with them.
Just last year, the regime did not even publicly acknowledge that it possessed chemical weapons, despite having used them on multiple occasions, including in attacks that killed over 1,400 people. Today, OPCW inspectors on the ground in Syria, with UN support, have conducted full inspections of Syria’s declared chemical weapons-related sites, and have verified the functional destruction of the chemical weapons production, mixing, and filling equipment at those sites. In addition, as of today, more than 49 percent of Syria’s declared chemical weapons materials slated for destruction outside of Syria have been removed, including all of Syria’s declared sulfur mustard agent, and the OPCW has verified the destruction in Syria of 93 percent of Syria’s declared isopropanol, a binary component of the nerve agent sarin. But that’s not good enough. Syria has yet to remove 65 percent of its most dangerous (Priority 1) declared chemicals. We must continue to work with the international community to maintain pressure on the Asad regime to remove all of these chemicals as urgently as possible.
The international community has established a firm legal framework, through UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2118 and decisions of the OPCW Executive Council, to ensure that this immense undertaking is completed in a transparent, expeditious, and verifiable manner, with a target for destroying all of Syria’s declared chemicals by June 30 of this year.
The progress made in the past months has been achieved by diplomacy backed by a willingness to use military force. It remains critically important, as this process continues, that members of the international community continue to monitor closely the Syrian regime’s compliance with its Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)-related obligations. Syria’s obligations are clear, and we will continue to underscore the importance of the Asad regime’s continued cooperation. The Security Council decided in UNSCR 2118 to impose Chapter VII measures in the event of non-compliance with the resolution.
While we have made progress, the task before us remains considerable. After months of Syrian foot dragging, we have made clear to the Asad regime that the internationally agreed upon schedule for chemical weapons destruction is simply not up for negotiation; the regime has all the equipment that it needs and has run out of excuses. We remain focused on underscoring the need for Syria to move forward rapidly with transporting chemical weapons materials to the port of Latakia for removal, consistent with its responsibilities under the CWC and UNSCR 2118. The next few weeks are critical in the removal effort, and we and the rest of the world are watching. We have, of course, also been in contact with Syrian opposition leaders, updating them throughout this process, and confirming their commitment that they will not interfere with the activities of the international elimination effort.
With the continuing support of the international community, and the dedicated commitment of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission, we believe the Syrians are capable of completing the removal effort by late April. The international community continues to work toward the June 30 target date for the complete elimination of the program. While Syrian delays have placed that timeline in some danger, we continue to believe they remain achievable.
The path ahead is not an easy one. Syria has missed several intermediate target dates, including most recently the target date for the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities. The regime must meet all chemical weapons destruction obligations, including for the physical destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, consistent with the CWC. The OPCW is currently advising Syria on an appropriate facilities destruction plan. It is essential that Syria accept its recommendations, and submit a revised facilities destruction plan for consideration by the OPCW Executive Council at its next scheduled meeting.
The United States and the international community have provided extensive assistance to the international effort to eliminate the Syrian chemical weapons program. There are no more excuses on the part of the Asad regime for not meeting the agreed timeline. We continue to encourage all countries to make whatever contribution they can to this important undertaking – whether that contribution is financial, technical, or in-kind – to enable the OPCW and UN to complete their missions. The United States has led by example in providing tens of millions of dollars in assistance to the OPCW-UN Joint Mission, including the provision of containers, trucks, forklifts and other materials necessary for the safe transportation of chemical weapons materials in Syria. The State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund has provided eight million dollars in financial and in-kind assistance to the OPCW inspection team, including armored vehicles, training, protective equipment, and medical countermeasures. Most significantly, the United States is also contributing unique capabilities to the elimination effort through the Department of Defense’s provision of a U.S. vessel, the Motor Vessel (M/V) Cape Ray, equipped with deployable hydrolysis technology to neutralize at sea Syria’s highest priority chemical weapons materials (sulfur mustard agent and the sarin precursor chemical, DF).
While U.S. contributions to the elimination efforts are significant, this is ultimately a mission that reflects a remarkable international division of labor. Many of our international partners are participating and providing financial and in-kind assistance that is critical to the effort’s success: Danish and Norwegian ships (with Finnish and British support) are removing chemical weapons materials from the Syrian port of Latakia. Russia and China are assisting with security in Syrian territorial waters for the port loading operations. Italy has agreed to provide a port to allow transloading operations from the Danish cargo ship to the Cape Ray. The United Kingdom has agreed to destroy nerve agent precursor chemicals through commercial incineration. Germany has agreed to destroy the by-product resulting from neutralization of the sulfur mustard agent aboard the M/V Cape Ray as an in-kind contribution. Countries like Japan, Canada, the European Union and many other states have made generous financial contributions. Companies in the United States and Finland have been awarded contracts from the OPCW for the destruction of the remaining materials.
As the removal and elimination process continues, we will also continue to fully support the OPCW’s verification and inspection efforts, to ensure the accuracy and completeness of Syria’s declaration. We have never taken the Asad regime at its word, and will continue to press for a robust verification regime to ensure the absence of undeclared materials and facilities. We approach this process with our eyes wide open, and will insist on international verification.
The path ahead will not be smooth, given the unprecedented scope and timeline for the mission. But we remain resolute in addressing these challenges, given the high stakes for the Syrian people, the region, and the world. Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this important issue with you. I look forward to your questions and to consulting with you closely as we continue our efforts to verifiably eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program.
Just last year, the regime did not even publicly acknowledge that it possessed chemical weapons, despite having used them on multiple occasions, including in attacks that killed over 1,400 people. Today, OPCW inspectors on the ground in Syria, with UN support, have conducted full inspections of Syria’s declared chemical weapons-related sites, and have verified the functional destruction of the chemical weapons production, mixing, and filling equipment at those sites. In addition, as of today, more than 49 percent of Syria’s declared chemical weapons materials slated for destruction outside of Syria have been removed, including all of Syria’s declared sulfur mustard agent, and the OPCW has verified the destruction in Syria of 93 percent of Syria’s declared isopropanol, a binary component of the nerve agent sarin. But that’s not good enough. Syria has yet to remove 65 percent of its most dangerous (Priority 1) declared chemicals. We must continue to work with the international community to maintain pressure on the Asad regime to remove all of these chemicals as urgently as possible.
The international community has established a firm legal framework, through UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2118 and decisions of the OPCW Executive Council, to ensure that this immense undertaking is completed in a transparent, expeditious, and verifiable manner, with a target for destroying all of Syria’s declared chemicals by June 30 of this year.
The progress made in the past months has been achieved by diplomacy backed by a willingness to use military force. It remains critically important, as this process continues, that members of the international community continue to monitor closely the Syrian regime’s compliance with its Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)-related obligations. Syria’s obligations are clear, and we will continue to underscore the importance of the Asad regime’s continued cooperation. The Security Council decided in UNSCR 2118 to impose Chapter VII measures in the event of non-compliance with the resolution.
While we have made progress, the task before us remains considerable. After months of Syrian foot dragging, we have made clear to the Asad regime that the internationally agreed upon schedule for chemical weapons destruction is simply not up for negotiation; the regime has all the equipment that it needs and has run out of excuses. We remain focused on underscoring the need for Syria to move forward rapidly with transporting chemical weapons materials to the port of Latakia for removal, consistent with its responsibilities under the CWC and UNSCR 2118. The next few weeks are critical in the removal effort, and we and the rest of the world are watching. We have, of course, also been in contact with Syrian opposition leaders, updating them throughout this process, and confirming their commitment that they will not interfere with the activities of the international elimination effort.
With the continuing support of the international community, and the dedicated commitment of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission, we believe the Syrians are capable of completing the removal effort by late April. The international community continues to work toward the June 30 target date for the complete elimination of the program. While Syrian delays have placed that timeline in some danger, we continue to believe they remain achievable.
The path ahead is not an easy one. Syria has missed several intermediate target dates, including most recently the target date for the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities. The regime must meet all chemical weapons destruction obligations, including for the physical destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, consistent with the CWC. The OPCW is currently advising Syria on an appropriate facilities destruction plan. It is essential that Syria accept its recommendations, and submit a revised facilities destruction plan for consideration by the OPCW Executive Council at its next scheduled meeting.
The United States and the international community have provided extensive assistance to the international effort to eliminate the Syrian chemical weapons program. There are no more excuses on the part of the Asad regime for not meeting the agreed timeline. We continue to encourage all countries to make whatever contribution they can to this important undertaking – whether that contribution is financial, technical, or in-kind – to enable the OPCW and UN to complete their missions. The United States has led by example in providing tens of millions of dollars in assistance to the OPCW-UN Joint Mission, including the provision of containers, trucks, forklifts and other materials necessary for the safe transportation of chemical weapons materials in Syria. The State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund has provided eight million dollars in financial and in-kind assistance to the OPCW inspection team, including armored vehicles, training, protective equipment, and medical countermeasures. Most significantly, the United States is also contributing unique capabilities to the elimination effort through the Department of Defense’s provision of a U.S. vessel, the Motor Vessel (M/V) Cape Ray, equipped with deployable hydrolysis technology to neutralize at sea Syria’s highest priority chemical weapons materials (sulfur mustard agent and the sarin precursor chemical, DF).
While U.S. contributions to the elimination efforts are significant, this is ultimately a mission that reflects a remarkable international division of labor. Many of our international partners are participating and providing financial and in-kind assistance that is critical to the effort’s success: Danish and Norwegian ships (with Finnish and British support) are removing chemical weapons materials from the Syrian port of Latakia. Russia and China are assisting with security in Syrian territorial waters for the port loading operations. Italy has agreed to provide a port to allow transloading operations from the Danish cargo ship to the Cape Ray. The United Kingdom has agreed to destroy nerve agent precursor chemicals through commercial incineration. Germany has agreed to destroy the by-product resulting from neutralization of the sulfur mustard agent aboard the M/V Cape Ray as an in-kind contribution. Countries like Japan, Canada, the European Union and many other states have made generous financial contributions. Companies in the United States and Finland have been awarded contracts from the OPCW for the destruction of the remaining materials.
As the removal and elimination process continues, we will also continue to fully support the OPCW’s verification and inspection efforts, to ensure the accuracy and completeness of Syria’s declaration. We have never taken the Asad regime at its word, and will continue to press for a robust verification regime to ensure the absence of undeclared materials and facilities. We approach this process with our eyes wide open, and will insist on international verification.
The path ahead will not be smooth, given the unprecedented scope and timeline for the mission. But we remain resolute in addressing these challenges, given the high stakes for the Syrian people, the region, and the world. Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this important issue with you. I look forward to your questions and to consulting with you closely as we continue our efforts to verifiably eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program.
REMARKS ON ELIMINATION OF SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY PATTERSON
Statement for the Record - Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons
Anne W. Patterson
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
March 26, 2014
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker and Members of the Committee, for inviting me today to discuss the crisis in Syria. I am well aware that many members of this Committee are not satisfied with our progress to date. Neither are we. Let me say that the Administration appreciates your concern and the support this committee has shown for efforts to address this challenge.
The Committee heard from Deputy Secretary Burns three weeks ago on the challenge of sectarian and extremist violence related to the conflict. Today I will supplement Deputy Secretary Burns’ remarks by describing the coordinated strategy that we are developing. I am pleased to be accompanied today by my colleague, Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Tom Countryman, who will address the international community’s progress in the removal and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons.
The Crisis
The popular demands for economic and political reform sweeping the Middle East began three years ago in Syria as peaceful protests. Syria’s large youthful population sought an end to oppression and new opportunities. The Asad regime’s response to these demands has torn the nation apart, fueling extremism and inflaming regional tensions.
More than 146,000 people have been killed since the unrest and violence began. The number of conflict-affected civilians seeking refuge in neighboring countries has increased to more than 2.5 million people while, inside Syria, an additional 6.5 million people are displaced and at least 9.3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. The U.N. Security Council has condemned the denial of humanitarian access to civilians in need and has urged immediate steps to facilitate relief operations throughout the country, yet the regime has continued to obstruct humanitarian access. Again last week, the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Syria reported on the continuing human rights violations being committed by the regime, as well as human rights abuses by the al-Qaeda linked groups and their offshoots that have taken root in the ungoverned spaces that Asad’s actions and atrocities have created.
Opposition to the Asad regime in Syria is broad and deep. Most Syrians who side with the opposition are moderates. In large areas of the country they have thrown off regime control, yet the situation on the ground is constantly in flux. In some areas, regime forces – with Hizballah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard support – have regained control of territory they had lost earlier in the conflict. Syrian troops are well armed with Iranian and Russian weapons, and also resort to barrel bombs or starvation to terrorize civilians. But peace will not come to Syria from a military victory. The only sustainable solution to the Syria crisis is a negotiated political settlement.
The United States is a leader of the ‘London 11’ contact group that has worked to move forward the Syrian transition, end the violence, and achieve a political solution. Although the U.N.-sponsored Geneva II negotiations have stalled due to regime intransigence aided by the tacit support of Russia, the process served to unify components of the Syrian opposition and to enable it to articulate its vision for a transitional government.
The continuing civil war has proved a magnet for foreign violent extremists – some with substantial combat experience – who are drawn to the ungoverned regions left by the deterioration of the Asad regime. Our colleagues at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence have estimated that there are nearly 23,000 violent extremist fighters in Syria, including more than 7,000 foreign fighters. They represent a minority of the total rebel ranks inside Syria, which are estimated to be between 75,000 – 110,000 fighters. The violent extremist fighters belong to several groups but most notably al-Qaeda’s official affiliate in Syria, Nusra Front, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), formerly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq, whose new name indicates its growing ambitions. ISIL is responsible for most of the violence that has been taking place in Iraq’s Anbar province aimed at destabilizing Iraq. These groups offer weapons and money to Syrian men who oppose the regime, yet who might not otherwise be drawn to violent extremist causes but for the money and avenue for action against the regime they provide.
Bashar al-Asad bears responsibility for this metastasizing problem. His regime has released terrorists from its jails, allowed violent extremist bases to emerge, and invited other foreign terrorist organizations including Lebanese Hizballah, as well as Iranian-trained militia fighters from Iraq and Pakistan, to join the fight on its side.
Mr. Chairman, we are reviewing our policy and identifying priorities for coordinated action.
Countering Violent Extremist Activity
In Pakistan, we clearly saw the dangers that arise when terrorists are able to set up safe havens – and how difficult and costly in lives and money it becomes to dislodge or destroy them. For that reason, a top priority in the Syria crisis is preventing the establishment of a permanent terrorist safe-haven. In coordination with allies and partners, we are now better organizing ourselves to address the growing challenge of violent extremist fighters in Syria and the flow of these fighters into and out of the country. With our partners, we will apply tools, tactics, and best practices to mitigate potential threats and build upon existing lines of cooperation.
We are working with members of the opposition, Syria’s neighbors and other regional states to cut off their sources of funding and recruits. Saudi Arabia has criminalized participation in foreign conflicts by its citizens and is prosecuting individuals who have done so. Our allies in the Gulf increasingly, and correctly, see the flood of violent extremists from their countries as a threat to themselves. We have new initiatives to work with our allies to identify violent extremists who have travelled to the region.
We are also working to strengthen the moderate Syrian opposition, both inside and outside of Syria, because they are now facing a two-front war against both the Asad regime and the violent extremists.
Preventing Collapse and Nonlethal Support
In parts of Syria where the regime has been ousted, we want to prevent the wholesale collapse of Syria’s institutions and public services and keep regime hardliners and violent extremists from asserting control. As the fighting has continued, the regime has increasingly targeted civilian populations by denying basic services and cutting them off from food, fuel and medical care. But some provincial and local councils and civil society organizations continue struggling, against great odds, to maintain local government and continue critical services. We need to help them.
Mr. Chairman, members of this committee have been rightly concerned about the pace and effectiveness of support for the civilian opposition. Without a direct U.S. government presence inside the country – as well as control of many border entry points by al-Qaeda-linked groups or their offshoots – it has been difficult to increase our assistance to the Syrian opposition. Our strategy had been to use $260 million in non-lethal assistance to link the Syrian Coalition (SOC) to councils and NGOs inside the country, helping to unify and strengthen the opposition.
However, based on our experience on the ground over the past year, we have been refocusing our activity. Over the past few months the State Department and USAID have stepped up efforts to channel resources directly to local and provincial governments and civil society groups, as well as the SOC.
Our focus is increasingly on ways to help communities maintain basic security, keep the lights on, provide water, food and basic medical care – staving off the advances of extremist groups who seek to exploit peoples’ desperation. It allows these localities to maintain the basic public institutions that will be so critical in rebuilding a post-Asad Syria.
In towns and cities under opposition control, we are beginning to provide cash grants to pay local law enforcement and teachers. We continue to train local councils and civil society organizations in administration and local governance. And we are providing equipment and supplies to help them, including heavy equipment such as generators, cranes, trucks, and ambulances. In one major city, for example, we have helped reopen 17 schools serving 9,300 students. In another major city, we funded the refurbishment of 60 police stations and are providing non-lethal equipment and basic stipends to 1,300 policemen, who are struggling to maintain order. Paying stipends not only helps keep these people on the job, but it also helps deprive the extremist groups of the chance to fill the vacuum themselves.
Make no mistake: this is extremely difficult work and nobody is saying that this assistance will turn the tide against what remains an extremely serious and deteriorating situation. As we learned in Iraq – even with 160,000 American troops, ten years of effort, tens of thousands of schools refurbished, and hundreds of millions of dollars spent – it takes generations to restore stability in societies wrecked by decades of dictatorship and civil wars. We are determined, however, to stand with those struggling to rebuild and stabilize their local communities even in the most horrific circumstances imaginable. These brave individuals will be the future leaders of Syria; they deserve our support, and they will continue to receive it through the types of assistance I just described.
As part of this $260 million in non-lethal overall assistance, moreover, we are providing $80 million in support to the Supreme Military Command (SMC). Providing this support to groups engaged in a highly fluid battle zone has been challenging. In December, an SMC warehouse in Syria containing U.S. supplies was overrun by a faction of extremist fighters. We suspended SMC assistance until they could reestablish secure supply routes and storage facilities. By February, when the SMC regained control of its facility and accounted for its contents, we began sending supplies again – this time directly to trusted commanders.
In providing non-lethal assistance to the SMC, needs are identified by commanders and have included food rations, medical kits, and vehicles – as well as communications and other personal gear. These supplies not only fill gaps identified by opposition troops fighting both the regime and violent extremists, but they are tangible evidence of our support for the moderate opposition.
Although a leadership debate has opened up within the SMC – as the Syrian opposition discusses how to fight the regime more effectively – the dispute has not affected our ability to deliver non-lethal assistance to the moderate armed opposition through trusted commanders.
None of the non-lethal assistance we are providing will be determinative in defeating regime forces, nor will it, on its own, force Asad to change his calculus about trying to hold on to power. However, our assistance does provide needed equipment while sending a signal both to those inside and outside Syria of our strong support for the moderate opposition; help maintain basic administrative institutions; help prevent the formation of vacuums in services and security that extremists aggressively exploit; and create relationships with moderates who can, when this conflict is over, form the basis of a transitional government.
Eliminating the Threat of Chemical Weapons
The Asad regime used chemical weapons against its citizens, and its continued possession of chemical weapons material represents a sustained danger to Syria’s population and all of its neighbors, including Israel. Last year, the international community, led by the United States and Russia, united to defend a long-standing international norm against the use of chemical weapons. Under a Joint Mission organized by the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international community is supporting the safe elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. U.S. assistance includes outfitting a vessel to neutralize Syria’s highest priority chemical precursors and agents.
We are making progress, but there is tough work ahead. To date, the Joint Mission has verified the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons-production equipment, the machines that mix the components, and the removal of nearly half of Syria’s declared stockpile. All of the sulfur mustard agent and some of the precursors for sarin, the highest priority declared chemicals, have now been removed. It is our goal to complete the removal of declared chemicals as soon as possible in April and the verified destruction of these chemical weapons and materials by June 30.
Protecting our Friends and Allies
We are committed to helping contain the conflict by bolstering the security and stability of Syria’s neighbors. Violence from the ongoing conflict has already spilled into Lebanon and Turkey, our NATO ally. Recently, Israel retaliated against Syrian army targets for an attack on an Israeli patrol on the Golan Heights. On Sunday, the Turkish Air Force shot down a Syrian plane that had encroached along the border. ISIL has used its position in Syria to pour extremist fighters and weapons into Iraq. Lebanon and Jordan are bearing an enormous burden as they work to secure their borders and meet the needs of more than 1.6 million refugees from Syria. We appreciate the support we have received from Congress as we work directly and with our international partners to support Syria’s neighbors:
We are coordinating closely with the international community to alleviate the suffering caused by this crisis. The Government of Kuwait co-hosted a donor conference with the U.N. Secretary-General in January, which resulted in $2.6 billion in new pledges. The United States is the largest single donor to the Syria humanitarian response, providing more than $1.7 billion in humanitarian assistance. Our assistance supports U.N. and other international organizations as well as numerous NGOs assisting conflict-affected civilians inside the country and throughout the region. We are specifically directing some of our funds to alleviate the growing strain on host communities, infrastructure and public services in neighboring countries. Inside Syria, our assistance provides food, basic healthcare, water and sanitation services and desperately needed relief supplies.
The Asad regime continues to deliberately block humanitarian access in Syria, citing the uncertain security situation. Last week, the first U.N. convoy reached the residents of Qamishli in northern Syria via the Turkish border crossing at Nusaybin. Although some supplies will finally reach these people in desperate need, one day of U.N. aid convoys crossing one border point is not enough. These convoys prove that the Syrian army can allow humanitarian access when it chooses to do so. The Asad regime must approve all U.N. requests for access to areas in need immediately as called for by the U.N. Security Council.
Negotiations Transitioning to a Representative Government
Transitioning to a representative government that is responsive to the needs of the Syrian people is the only way to reduce the violence and alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. While the international community, including Russia, maintains that the conflict must end via a negotiated political agreement in line with the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, the regime has squandered every opportunity for a peaceful settlement. At the Geneva II talks, the regime’s negotiator insulted the opposition, U.N. Joint Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi and the international community while contributing nothing of substance to the discussion.
The United States and Russia share a common interest in a successful negotiation that fully implements the Geneva Communiqué and prevents the spread of instability and violent extremism beyond Syria’s borders. To date, this common interest has motivated Russia to continue its support to the OPCW mission. However, Russia has done nothing to move its Syrian allies forward in the Geneva II negotiations. Moreover, we have seen an increase in both the quantity and the quality of weapons Russia has provided to the Syrian regime in recent months. The stability that Russia seeks in Syria will not be achieved by providing planes, tanks, bombs, and guns for use against the Syrian people. We continue to review all options for changing President Putin's calculus away from Russia's support for the Asad regime. Ambassador Brahimi told the Security Council on March 13, that he recommends against a third round of talks unless the regime commits to discuss substantively all elements of the Geneva Communiqué. In the meantime, the United States and its partners will continue to expand our support to the Syrian opposition and ratchet up pressure on the regime.
On another matter, I know that the safety of Syria’s minority communities is a key concern for members of this committee, as it is for us. We are troubled by the plight of all civilians in Syria, including Christians and other religious minorities. Protecting the security and religious rights of these communities, as well as the rights of women, is an important element of our policy and will be essential to any future political settlement. We have sought and received assurances from the Syrian opposition leadership and moderate rebel leaders that they will protect the rights of women and minorities, and engage them in plans for building Syria’s future.
Next Steps
Mr. Chairman, we are actively engaged in trying to bring the Syria crisis to an end.
March 14 letter – and will continue to work together with the Congress as we move forward.
The Syrian people reject violent extremism. They want to return home and rebuild their country – and we will help them. Thank you.
The Committee heard from Deputy Secretary Burns three weeks ago on the challenge of sectarian and extremist violence related to the conflict. Today I will supplement Deputy Secretary Burns’ remarks by describing the coordinated strategy that we are developing. I am pleased to be accompanied today by my colleague, Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Tom Countryman, who will address the international community’s progress in the removal and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons.
The Crisis
The popular demands for economic and political reform sweeping the Middle East began three years ago in Syria as peaceful protests. Syria’s large youthful population sought an end to oppression and new opportunities. The Asad regime’s response to these demands has torn the nation apart, fueling extremism and inflaming regional tensions.
More than 146,000 people have been killed since the unrest and violence began. The number of conflict-affected civilians seeking refuge in neighboring countries has increased to more than 2.5 million people while, inside Syria, an additional 6.5 million people are displaced and at least 9.3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. The U.N. Security Council has condemned the denial of humanitarian access to civilians in need and has urged immediate steps to facilitate relief operations throughout the country, yet the regime has continued to obstruct humanitarian access. Again last week, the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Syria reported on the continuing human rights violations being committed by the regime, as well as human rights abuses by the al-Qaeda linked groups and their offshoots that have taken root in the ungoverned spaces that Asad’s actions and atrocities have created.
Opposition to the Asad regime in Syria is broad and deep. Most Syrians who side with the opposition are moderates. In large areas of the country they have thrown off regime control, yet the situation on the ground is constantly in flux. In some areas, regime forces – with Hizballah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard support – have regained control of territory they had lost earlier in the conflict. Syrian troops are well armed with Iranian and Russian weapons, and also resort to barrel bombs or starvation to terrorize civilians. But peace will not come to Syria from a military victory. The only sustainable solution to the Syria crisis is a negotiated political settlement.
The United States is a leader of the ‘London 11’ contact group that has worked to move forward the Syrian transition, end the violence, and achieve a political solution. Although the U.N.-sponsored Geneva II negotiations have stalled due to regime intransigence aided by the tacit support of Russia, the process served to unify components of the Syrian opposition and to enable it to articulate its vision for a transitional government.
The continuing civil war has proved a magnet for foreign violent extremists – some with substantial combat experience – who are drawn to the ungoverned regions left by the deterioration of the Asad regime. Our colleagues at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence have estimated that there are nearly 23,000 violent extremist fighters in Syria, including more than 7,000 foreign fighters. They represent a minority of the total rebel ranks inside Syria, which are estimated to be between 75,000 – 110,000 fighters. The violent extremist fighters belong to several groups but most notably al-Qaeda’s official affiliate in Syria, Nusra Front, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), formerly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq, whose new name indicates its growing ambitions. ISIL is responsible for most of the violence that has been taking place in Iraq’s Anbar province aimed at destabilizing Iraq. These groups offer weapons and money to Syrian men who oppose the regime, yet who might not otherwise be drawn to violent extremist causes but for the money and avenue for action against the regime they provide.
Bashar al-Asad bears responsibility for this metastasizing problem. His regime has released terrorists from its jails, allowed violent extremist bases to emerge, and invited other foreign terrorist organizations including Lebanese Hizballah, as well as Iranian-trained militia fighters from Iraq and Pakistan, to join the fight on its side.
Mr. Chairman, we are reviewing our policy and identifying priorities for coordinated action.
Countering Violent Extremist Activity
In Pakistan, we clearly saw the dangers that arise when terrorists are able to set up safe havens – and how difficult and costly in lives and money it becomes to dislodge or destroy them. For that reason, a top priority in the Syria crisis is preventing the establishment of a permanent terrorist safe-haven. In coordination with allies and partners, we are now better organizing ourselves to address the growing challenge of violent extremist fighters in Syria and the flow of these fighters into and out of the country. With our partners, we will apply tools, tactics, and best practices to mitigate potential threats and build upon existing lines of cooperation.
We are working with members of the opposition, Syria’s neighbors and other regional states to cut off their sources of funding and recruits. Saudi Arabia has criminalized participation in foreign conflicts by its citizens and is prosecuting individuals who have done so. Our allies in the Gulf increasingly, and correctly, see the flood of violent extremists from their countries as a threat to themselves. We have new initiatives to work with our allies to identify violent extremists who have travelled to the region.
We are also working to strengthen the moderate Syrian opposition, both inside and outside of Syria, because they are now facing a two-front war against both the Asad regime and the violent extremists.
Preventing Collapse and Nonlethal Support
In parts of Syria where the regime has been ousted, we want to prevent the wholesale collapse of Syria’s institutions and public services and keep regime hardliners and violent extremists from asserting control. As the fighting has continued, the regime has increasingly targeted civilian populations by denying basic services and cutting them off from food, fuel and medical care. But some provincial and local councils and civil society organizations continue struggling, against great odds, to maintain local government and continue critical services. We need to help them.
Mr. Chairman, members of this committee have been rightly concerned about the pace and effectiveness of support for the civilian opposition. Without a direct U.S. government presence inside the country – as well as control of many border entry points by al-Qaeda-linked groups or their offshoots – it has been difficult to increase our assistance to the Syrian opposition. Our strategy had been to use $260 million in non-lethal assistance to link the Syrian Coalition (SOC) to councils and NGOs inside the country, helping to unify and strengthen the opposition.
However, based on our experience on the ground over the past year, we have been refocusing our activity. Over the past few months the State Department and USAID have stepped up efforts to channel resources directly to local and provincial governments and civil society groups, as well as the SOC.
Our focus is increasingly on ways to help communities maintain basic security, keep the lights on, provide water, food and basic medical care – staving off the advances of extremist groups who seek to exploit peoples’ desperation. It allows these localities to maintain the basic public institutions that will be so critical in rebuilding a post-Asad Syria.
In towns and cities under opposition control, we are beginning to provide cash grants to pay local law enforcement and teachers. We continue to train local councils and civil society organizations in administration and local governance. And we are providing equipment and supplies to help them, including heavy equipment such as generators, cranes, trucks, and ambulances. In one major city, for example, we have helped reopen 17 schools serving 9,300 students. In another major city, we funded the refurbishment of 60 police stations and are providing non-lethal equipment and basic stipends to 1,300 policemen, who are struggling to maintain order. Paying stipends not only helps keep these people on the job, but it also helps deprive the extremist groups of the chance to fill the vacuum themselves.
Make no mistake: this is extremely difficult work and nobody is saying that this assistance will turn the tide against what remains an extremely serious and deteriorating situation. As we learned in Iraq – even with 160,000 American troops, ten years of effort, tens of thousands of schools refurbished, and hundreds of millions of dollars spent – it takes generations to restore stability in societies wrecked by decades of dictatorship and civil wars. We are determined, however, to stand with those struggling to rebuild and stabilize their local communities even in the most horrific circumstances imaginable. These brave individuals will be the future leaders of Syria; they deserve our support, and they will continue to receive it through the types of assistance I just described.
As part of this $260 million in non-lethal overall assistance, moreover, we are providing $80 million in support to the Supreme Military Command (SMC). Providing this support to groups engaged in a highly fluid battle zone has been challenging. In December, an SMC warehouse in Syria containing U.S. supplies was overrun by a faction of extremist fighters. We suspended SMC assistance until they could reestablish secure supply routes and storage facilities. By February, when the SMC regained control of its facility and accounted for its contents, we began sending supplies again – this time directly to trusted commanders.
In providing non-lethal assistance to the SMC, needs are identified by commanders and have included food rations, medical kits, and vehicles – as well as communications and other personal gear. These supplies not only fill gaps identified by opposition troops fighting both the regime and violent extremists, but they are tangible evidence of our support for the moderate opposition.
Although a leadership debate has opened up within the SMC – as the Syrian opposition discusses how to fight the regime more effectively – the dispute has not affected our ability to deliver non-lethal assistance to the moderate armed opposition through trusted commanders.
None of the non-lethal assistance we are providing will be determinative in defeating regime forces, nor will it, on its own, force Asad to change his calculus about trying to hold on to power. However, our assistance does provide needed equipment while sending a signal both to those inside and outside Syria of our strong support for the moderate opposition; help maintain basic administrative institutions; help prevent the formation of vacuums in services and security that extremists aggressively exploit; and create relationships with moderates who can, when this conflict is over, form the basis of a transitional government.
Eliminating the Threat of Chemical Weapons
The Asad regime used chemical weapons against its citizens, and its continued possession of chemical weapons material represents a sustained danger to Syria’s population and all of its neighbors, including Israel. Last year, the international community, led by the United States and Russia, united to defend a long-standing international norm against the use of chemical weapons. Under a Joint Mission organized by the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international community is supporting the safe elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. U.S. assistance includes outfitting a vessel to neutralize Syria’s highest priority chemical precursors and agents.
We are making progress, but there is tough work ahead. To date, the Joint Mission has verified the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons-production equipment, the machines that mix the components, and the removal of nearly half of Syria’s declared stockpile. All of the sulfur mustard agent and some of the precursors for sarin, the highest priority declared chemicals, have now been removed. It is our goal to complete the removal of declared chemicals as soon as possible in April and the verified destruction of these chemical weapons and materials by June 30.
Protecting our Friends and Allies
We are committed to helping contain the conflict by bolstering the security and stability of Syria’s neighbors. Violence from the ongoing conflict has already spilled into Lebanon and Turkey, our NATO ally. Recently, Israel retaliated against Syrian army targets for an attack on an Israeli patrol on the Golan Heights. On Sunday, the Turkish Air Force shot down a Syrian plane that had encroached along the border. ISIL has used its position in Syria to pour extremist fighters and weapons into Iraq. Lebanon and Jordan are bearing an enormous burden as they work to secure their borders and meet the needs of more than 1.6 million refugees from Syria. We appreciate the support we have received from Congress as we work directly and with our international partners to support Syria’s neighbors:
- We back the Lebanese government’s efforts to contain the Syrian conflict and strongly condemn Hizballah’s intervention on behalf of the Asad regime. The U.S. has provided additional support to the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces to help them secure Lebanon’s borders and address internal security threats. We are helping the Lebanese government care for nearly one million refugees from Syria and strengthen the communities that are hosting them. We have provided more than $340 million in humanitarian assistance to support the needs of these refugees and to reduce the burden on Lebanese communities. In addition, our ongoing bilateral assistance is helping to address deteriorating economic conditions and gaps in the delivery of important services, particularly in communities impacted by the crisis.
- Many of you met with Jordan’s King Abdullah when he was here recently and can appreciate the contributions that Jordan is making to address this crisis. The United States is already working closely with the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) to address threats emanating from Syria, including providing enhanced border security and counterterrorism capabilities. DOD funds also help to assist the JAF with providing humanitarian assistance to newly arriving Syrian refugees. Longstanding development programs help relieve the strains on water infrastructure, schools, and health facilities in Jordanian communities that support large numbers of Syrian refugees. We have provided $300 million in additional budget support over the last two years and will support a $1 billion loan guarantee for Jordan as well as the renewal of our bilateral assistance Memorandum of Understanding for an additional five years, as announced by the President last month.
- In regards to Turkey, we are most importantly working with Ankara on a variety of counter-terrorism issues to address the growing threat that Syria-based terrorists pose to Turkey and the challenge posed by foreign fighters. Additionally, Turkey hosts far more than the 641,000 officially registered refugees from Syria, in addition to significant parts of the Syrian opposition leadership. We are working to mitigate the Syrian conflict’s spillover on Turkey’s security and sovereignty, including through the deployment of two U.S. Patriot batteries in southern Turkey, which join four batteries from other NATO allies. U.S. contributions to the international humanitarian response help provide critical support to refugees hosted in Turkish camps and communities. In support of the U.N., Turkey is playing an important role in facilitating cross-border humanitarian assistance in northern Syria.
- Iraq hosts more than 225,000 refugees from Syria, mostly in the Iraqi Kurdistan region. Since 2012, the United States has provided more than $90 million in humanitarian aid to international organizations and NGOs for Syrian refugees in Iraq. We are also working with the U.N. and the Iraqi government to ensure that the estimated 350,000 Iraqis displaced by the Anbar conflict are getting needed assistance and will be able to vote in Iraq’s upcoming elections, which ISIL seeks to disrupt. At the same time, we are in close contact with Iraq’s political leaders and security commanders to develop and execute a holistic campaign to isolate ISIL from the population, including through intensified information sharing and security assistance.
- In Egypt, which hosts over 135,000 Syrian refugees, political instability and polarization has contributed to a difficult environment and increasing humanitarian needs for refugees. Recognizing the burden that refugee communities can pose on host countries, we are continuing to support humanitarian partners in Egypt and to engage the government to ensure that refugees receive needed support.
- Israel has not been spared the effects of the conflict. Our governments coordinate closely to monitor violent extremist threats in Syria, and we support Israel’s right to defend itself from spillover violence. We applaud Israeli efforts to provide medical care to wounded Syrians seeking help. We are also concerned that Syria’s instability will continue to threaten the Golan.
We are coordinating closely with the international community to alleviate the suffering caused by this crisis. The Government of Kuwait co-hosted a donor conference with the U.N. Secretary-General in January, which resulted in $2.6 billion in new pledges. The United States is the largest single donor to the Syria humanitarian response, providing more than $1.7 billion in humanitarian assistance. Our assistance supports U.N. and other international organizations as well as numerous NGOs assisting conflict-affected civilians inside the country and throughout the region. We are specifically directing some of our funds to alleviate the growing strain on host communities, infrastructure and public services in neighboring countries. Inside Syria, our assistance provides food, basic healthcare, water and sanitation services and desperately needed relief supplies.
The Asad regime continues to deliberately block humanitarian access in Syria, citing the uncertain security situation. Last week, the first U.N. convoy reached the residents of Qamishli in northern Syria via the Turkish border crossing at Nusaybin. Although some supplies will finally reach these people in desperate need, one day of U.N. aid convoys crossing one border point is not enough. These convoys prove that the Syrian army can allow humanitarian access when it chooses to do so. The Asad regime must approve all U.N. requests for access to areas in need immediately as called for by the U.N. Security Council.
Negotiations Transitioning to a Representative Government
Transitioning to a representative government that is responsive to the needs of the Syrian people is the only way to reduce the violence and alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. While the international community, including Russia, maintains that the conflict must end via a negotiated political agreement in line with the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, the regime has squandered every opportunity for a peaceful settlement. At the Geneva II talks, the regime’s negotiator insulted the opposition, U.N. Joint Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi and the international community while contributing nothing of substance to the discussion.
The United States and Russia share a common interest in a successful negotiation that fully implements the Geneva Communiqué and prevents the spread of instability and violent extremism beyond Syria’s borders. To date, this common interest has motivated Russia to continue its support to the OPCW mission. However, Russia has done nothing to move its Syrian allies forward in the Geneva II negotiations. Moreover, we have seen an increase in both the quantity and the quality of weapons Russia has provided to the Syrian regime in recent months. The stability that Russia seeks in Syria will not be achieved by providing planes, tanks, bombs, and guns for use against the Syrian people. We continue to review all options for changing President Putin's calculus away from Russia's support for the Asad regime. Ambassador Brahimi told the Security Council on March 13, that he recommends against a third round of talks unless the regime commits to discuss substantively all elements of the Geneva Communiqué. In the meantime, the United States and its partners will continue to expand our support to the Syrian opposition and ratchet up pressure on the regime.
On another matter, I know that the safety of Syria’s minority communities is a key concern for members of this committee, as it is for us. We are troubled by the plight of all civilians in Syria, including Christians and other religious minorities. Protecting the security and religious rights of these communities, as well as the rights of women, is an important element of our policy and will be essential to any future political settlement. We have sought and received assurances from the Syrian opposition leadership and moderate rebel leaders that they will protect the rights of women and minorities, and engage them in plans for building Syria’s future.
Next Steps
Mr. Chairman, we are actively engaged in trying to bring the Syria crisis to an end.
- We are working with allies and partners to combat the growing threat of violent extremists;
- We are working to prevent a catastrophic collapse of Syrian cities in opposition controlled areas;
- We are providing nonlethal support to the armed opposition;
- We are working with the international community to end the threat of Syria’s chemical weapons;
- We are taking steps to protect and support our regional friends and allies;
- We are contributing generously to the humanitarian response both inside Syria and among its neighbors; and
- We are providing support to the Syrian opposition both directly and through the London 11.
March 14 letter – and will continue to work together with the Congress as we move forward.
The Syrian people reject violent extremism. They want to return home and rebuild their country – and we will help them. Thank you.
SECRETARY KERRY SAYS HE IS "DEEPLY TROUBLED" OVER THE MASS DEATH SENTENCES IN EGYPT
Mass Trials and Sentencing in Egypt
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Secretary of State
Washington, DC
March 26, 2014
I am deeply, deeply troubled by the sudden and unprecedented decision by an Egyptian court to issue preliminary death sentences for 529 citizens after a quick mass trial. It simply defies logic. There are many avenues of legitimate review for this judgment and I urge the appropriate Egyptian authorities to remedy the situation. This news simply does not reflect the values and goals to which the interim government has aspired publicly and privately.
The need for due process assumed greater urgency with the start of a new trial for nearly 700 more people in the same courtroom where the earlier judgment was rendered after a two-day summary proceeding in which the defendants were tried as a group rather than on the merits of individual cases. Many of those defendants were not even in the courtroom. It is impossible to believe that such a proceeding satisfied even the most basic standards of justice.
The interim government must understand the negative message that this decision, if upheld, would send to the world about Egypt's commitment to international law and inclusivity.
For three years, Egyptians have demanded responsive leadership that protects human rights and promotes economic opportunity. Many lost their lives in that struggle. Adhering to the new constitution and maintaining a criminal justice system free of intimidation and political retribution are essential functions of a legitimate government. I urge the interim Egyptian government to reverse the court ruling and ensure due process for the accused. Anything less would dishonor the bravery of all who sacrificed their lives for democratic values.
The need for due process assumed greater urgency with the start of a new trial for nearly 700 more people in the same courtroom where the earlier judgment was rendered after a two-day summary proceeding in which the defendants were tried as a group rather than on the merits of individual cases. Many of those defendants were not even in the courtroom. It is impossible to believe that such a proceeding satisfied even the most basic standards of justice.
The interim government must understand the negative message that this decision, if upheld, would send to the world about Egypt's commitment to international law and inclusivity.
For three years, Egyptians have demanded responsive leadership that protects human rights and promotes economic opportunity. Many lost their lives in that struggle. Adhering to the new constitution and maintaining a criminal justice system free of intimidation and political retribution are essential functions of a legitimate government. I urge the interim Egyptian government to reverse the court ruling and ensure due process for the accused. Anything less would dishonor the bravery of all who sacrificed their lives for democratic values.
SEC COMMISSIONER AGUILAR SPEAKS ON GROWING CYBER-THREAT
FROM: SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
The Commission’s Role in Addressing the Growing Cyber-Threat
Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar
March 26, 2014
*I would like to start by welcoming each of the participants, audience members, and those joining us by webcast.
In recent months, cybersecurity has become a top concern to American companies, regulators, and law enforcement agencies.[1] This is in part because of the mounting evidence that the constant threat of cyber-attack is real, lasting, and cannot be ignored.
One of the most prominent examples of the wide-ranging and potentially devastating effects that can result from cyber-attacks is the December 2013 data breach of Target Corporation.[2] In addition, several large banks have repeatedly been the subject of denial-of-service attacks in which their public websites have been knocked offline for hours at a time,[3] and numerous government agencies have also experienced a series of cyber-attacks.[4] Moreover, cyber-attacks on financial institutions have become both more frequent and more sophisticated.[5] This is also true of cyber-attacks on the infrastructure underlying the capital markets. For example, according to a 2012 global survey of securities exchanges, 89% identified cyber-crime as a potential systemic risk and 53% reported experiencing a cyber-attack in the previous year.[6]
As an SEC Commissioner, I have become particularly concerned about the risks that cyber-attacks pose to public companies, and to the capital markets and its critical participants, including the exchanges, clearing agencies, transfer agents, broker-dealers, and investment advisers. Cyber-attacks aimed at these market participants can have devastating effects on our economy, on individual consumers, and on the markets and investors that the SEC was created to safeguard.
There is no doubt that the SEC must play a role in this area. What is less clear is what that role should be. As many of you know, in 2011 the staff issued guidance to public companies about their disclosure obligations with respect to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents.[7] I hope that these disclosures have helped investors and public companies to focus and assess cybersecurity issues. However, the increased pervasiveness and seriousness of the cybersecurity threat raises questions about whether more should be done to ensure the proper functioning of the capital markets and the protection of investors.
As I explored this issue, it became readily apparent to me that the Commission has much to learn about the specific risks that our regulated entities and public companies are facing. After conducting research into this area, I recommended that the Commission convene a roundtable so that we can begin to develop a better understanding of this growing problem. I am pleased that Chair White agreed with my recommendation and asked the staff to make this roundtable a reality.
The issues that will be discussed by today’s four panels can roughly be broken down into two categories – issues potentially impacting public companies and issues impacting the capital market infrastructure and SEC-regulated entities. With regard to the public company discussion, I am particularly interested in hearing whether the current disclosure regime under the 2011 guidance is working or how it could be improved.
The risks facing the capital market infrastructure and regulated entities are of particular concern to the SEC. For instance, a cyber-attack on an exchange or other critical market participant can have broad consequences that impact a large number of public companies and their investors. Indeed, given the extent to which the capital markets have become increasingly dependent upon sophisticated and interconnected technological systems, there is a substantial risk that a cyber-attack could cause significant and wide-ranging market disruptions and investor harm.
I am hopeful that today’s Roundtable will engender significant discussion about the ways in which regulators and industry can work together to address these risks. One of the most important things that can develop from this Roundtable is for the Commission to hear what we can do to help you fight, and respond to, the growing cyber-threat that is confronting our markets and our public companies. My expectation is for the Commission to analyze all of the information we will receive as a result of this Roundtable and, with appropriate haste, consider what additional steps the Commission should take to address cyber-threats.
It will be important to keep the dialogue and momentum from today’s event going. One immediate step the Commission should take is to establish a Cybersecurity Task Force. This Task Force should be composed of representatives from each division that will regularly meet and communicate with one another to discuss these issues, and, importantly, advise the Commission as appropriate.
In conclusion, I would like to thank all of our panelists for taking the time to be here today, and I want to thank the staff for organizing the Roundtable. I look forward to a well-informed discussion about cyber-attacks, as well as the ways to prevent, respond to, and mitigate the risks of such attacks. As a reminder, there will be a public comment file associated with today’s Roundtable, and I look forward to receiving additional comments and input on this issue.
Thank you.
[*] The views I express today are my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or “Commission”), my fellow Commissioners, or members of the staff.
[1] For example, on February 26, 2014, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) published guidance outlining the data security practices it expects from firms it oversees and the third parties they contract with. See CFTC Staff Advisory No. 14-21, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Security Safeguards (Feb. 26, 2014), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/14-21.pdf. In addition, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), James Comey, said last November that “resources devoted to cyber-based threats will equal or even eclipse the resources devoted to non-cyber based terrorist threats.” See Testimony of James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Nov. 14, 2013), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/homeland-threats-and-the-fbis-response. Also, on December 9, 2013, the Financial Stability Oversight Council held a meeting to discuss cybersecurity threats to the financial system; see also, U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to Meet December 9 (Dec. 2, 2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2228.aspx; Jaclyn Jaeger, “Boards Look to Boost IT, Data Security Oversight,” Compliance Week (Mar. 11, 2014) (noting that company boards have become much more sensitive to cybersecurity risks and the harm they could cause to a company’s reputation and business). The importance of this issue is also reflected in the recent notices that the staffs from the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations and from FINRA will have cybersecurity as a focus of their 2014 examinations. See SEC’s National Examination Priorities for 2014 (Jan. 9, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2014.pdf; FINRA’s 2014 Regulatory and Examination Priorities Letter (Jan. 2, 2014), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/p419710.pdf. In addition, it was recently announced that SEC examiners will review whether asset managers have policies to prevent and detect cyber-attacks and are properly safeguarding against security risks that could arise from vendors having access to their systems. See Sarah N. Lynch, “SEC examiners to review how asset managers fend off cyber attacks,” Reuters (Jan. 30, 2014), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/30/us-sec-cyber-assetmanagers-idUSBREA0T1PJ20140130.
[2] On December 19, 2013, Target Corporation announced a data breach resulting from a cyber-attack on its systems. The breach affected two types of data: payment card data, which affected approximately 40 million Target customers, and certain personal data, which affected up to 70 million Target customers. See Testimony of John Mulligan, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Target, before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/02-04-14MulliganTestimony.pdf; Target Press Release, Target Confirms Unauthorized Access to Payment Card Data in U.S. Stores (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://pressroom.target.com/news/target-confirms-unauthorized-access-to-payment-card-data-in-u-s-stores..
[3] See, e.g., Joseph Menn, “Cyber attacks against banks more severe than most realize,” Reuters (May 18, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/18/us-cyber-summit-banks-idUSBRE94G0ZP20130518; Bob Sullivan, “Bank Website Attacks Reach New Highs,” CNBC (Apr. 3, 2013), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/100613270.
[4] See, e.g., Jim Finkle and Joseph Menn, “FBI warns of U.S. government breaches by Anonymous hackers,” Reuters (Nov. 15, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/15/us-usa-security-anonymous-fbi-idUSBRE9AE17C20131115 (activist hackers secretly accessed U.S. government computers in multiple agencies, resulting in stolen data on at least 104,000 employees, contractors, and others associated with the Department of Energy, along with information on almost 2,000 bank accounts); “HealthCare.gov targeted ‘about 16 times’ by cyberattacks, DHS official says,” NBCNews.com (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/healthcare-gov-targeted-about-16-times-cyberattacks-dhs-official-says-v21440068.
[5] For example, on December 9, 2013, the Financial Stability Oversight Council held a meeting to discuss cybersecurity threats to the financial system. See U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to Meet December 9 (Dec. 2, 2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2228.aspx. During that meeting, Assistant Treasury Secretary Cyrus-Amir-Mokri said that “[o]ur experience over the last couple of years shows that cyber-threats to financial institutions and markets are growing in both frequency and sophistication.” See U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, Remarks of Assistant Secretary Cyrus Amir-Mokri on Cybersecurity at a Meeting of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Dec. 9, 2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2234.aspx. In addition, in testimony before the House Financial Services Committee in 2011, the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Cyber Division stated that the number and sophistication of malicious incidents involving financial institutions has increased dramatically over the past several years and offered numerous examples of such attacks, which included fraudulent monetary transfers, unauthorized financial transactions from compromised bank and brokerage accounts, denial of service attacks on U.S. stock exchanges, and hacking incidents in which confidential information was misappropriated. See Testimony of Gordon M. Snow, Assistant Director, Cyber Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit (Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/cybersecurity-threats-to-the-financial-sector.
[6] See Rohini Tendulkar, “Cyber-crime, securities markets and systemic risk,” Joint Staff Working Paper of the IOSCO Research Department and World Federation of Exchanges (July 16, 2013), available at http://www.iosco.org/research/pdf/swp/Cyber-Crime-Securities-Markets-and-Systemic-Risk.pdf. Forty-six securities exchanges responded to the survey.
[7] On October 13, 2011, staff in the Commission’s Division of Corporation Finance (Corp Fin) issued guidance on issuers’ disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents. See SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2—Cybersecurity (“SEC Guidance”) (Oct. 31, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm. Among other things, this guidance notes that securities laws are designed to elicit disclosure of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information about risks and events that a reasonable investor would consider important to an investment decision, and cybersecurity risks and events are not exempt from these requirements. The guidance identifies six areas where cybersecurity disclosures may be necessary under Regulation S-K: (1) Risk Factors; (2) Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operation (MD&A); (3) Description of Business; (4) Legal Proceedings; (5) Financial Statement Disclosures; and (6) Disclosure Controls and Procedures. The SEC Guidance further recommends that material cybersecurity risks should be disclosed and adequately described as Risk Factors. Where cybersecurity risks and incidents that represent a material event, trend or uncertainty reasonably likely to have a material impact on the organization's operations, liquidity, or financial condition—it should be addressed in the MD&A. If cybersecurity risks materially affect the organization’s products, services, relationships with customers or suppliers, or competitive conditions, the organization should disclose such risks in its description of business. Data breaches or other incidents can result in regulatory investigations or private actions that are material and should be discussed in the Legal Proceedings section. Cybersecurity risks and incidents that represent substantial costs in prevention or response should be included in Financial Statement Disclosures where the financial impact is material. Finally, where a cybersecurity risk or incident impairs the organization's ability to record or report information that must be disclosed, Disclosure Controls and Procedures that fail to address cybersecurity concerns may be ineffective and subject to disclosure. Some have suggested that such disclosures fail to fully inform investors about the true costs and benefits of companies’ cyber security practices, and argue that the Commission (and not the staff) should issue further guidance regarding issuers’ disclosure obligations. See Letter from U.S. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV to Chair White (Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=49ac989b-bd16-4bbd-8d64-8c15ba0e4e51.
The Commission’s Role in Addressing the Growing Cyber-Threat
Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar
March 26, 2014
*I would like to start by welcoming each of the participants, audience members, and those joining us by webcast.
In recent months, cybersecurity has become a top concern to American companies, regulators, and law enforcement agencies.[1] This is in part because of the mounting evidence that the constant threat of cyber-attack is real, lasting, and cannot be ignored.
One of the most prominent examples of the wide-ranging and potentially devastating effects that can result from cyber-attacks is the December 2013 data breach of Target Corporation.[2] In addition, several large banks have repeatedly been the subject of denial-of-service attacks in which their public websites have been knocked offline for hours at a time,[3] and numerous government agencies have also experienced a series of cyber-attacks.[4] Moreover, cyber-attacks on financial institutions have become both more frequent and more sophisticated.[5] This is also true of cyber-attacks on the infrastructure underlying the capital markets. For example, according to a 2012 global survey of securities exchanges, 89% identified cyber-crime as a potential systemic risk and 53% reported experiencing a cyber-attack in the previous year.[6]
As an SEC Commissioner, I have become particularly concerned about the risks that cyber-attacks pose to public companies, and to the capital markets and its critical participants, including the exchanges, clearing agencies, transfer agents, broker-dealers, and investment advisers. Cyber-attacks aimed at these market participants can have devastating effects on our economy, on individual consumers, and on the markets and investors that the SEC was created to safeguard.
There is no doubt that the SEC must play a role in this area. What is less clear is what that role should be. As many of you know, in 2011 the staff issued guidance to public companies about their disclosure obligations with respect to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents.[7] I hope that these disclosures have helped investors and public companies to focus and assess cybersecurity issues. However, the increased pervasiveness and seriousness of the cybersecurity threat raises questions about whether more should be done to ensure the proper functioning of the capital markets and the protection of investors.
As I explored this issue, it became readily apparent to me that the Commission has much to learn about the specific risks that our regulated entities and public companies are facing. After conducting research into this area, I recommended that the Commission convene a roundtable so that we can begin to develop a better understanding of this growing problem. I am pleased that Chair White agreed with my recommendation and asked the staff to make this roundtable a reality.
The issues that will be discussed by today’s four panels can roughly be broken down into two categories – issues potentially impacting public companies and issues impacting the capital market infrastructure and SEC-regulated entities. With regard to the public company discussion, I am particularly interested in hearing whether the current disclosure regime under the 2011 guidance is working or how it could be improved.
The risks facing the capital market infrastructure and regulated entities are of particular concern to the SEC. For instance, a cyber-attack on an exchange or other critical market participant can have broad consequences that impact a large number of public companies and their investors. Indeed, given the extent to which the capital markets have become increasingly dependent upon sophisticated and interconnected technological systems, there is a substantial risk that a cyber-attack could cause significant and wide-ranging market disruptions and investor harm.
I am hopeful that today’s Roundtable will engender significant discussion about the ways in which regulators and industry can work together to address these risks. One of the most important things that can develop from this Roundtable is for the Commission to hear what we can do to help you fight, and respond to, the growing cyber-threat that is confronting our markets and our public companies. My expectation is for the Commission to analyze all of the information we will receive as a result of this Roundtable and, with appropriate haste, consider what additional steps the Commission should take to address cyber-threats.
It will be important to keep the dialogue and momentum from today’s event going. One immediate step the Commission should take is to establish a Cybersecurity Task Force. This Task Force should be composed of representatives from each division that will regularly meet and communicate with one another to discuss these issues, and, importantly, advise the Commission as appropriate.
In conclusion, I would like to thank all of our panelists for taking the time to be here today, and I want to thank the staff for organizing the Roundtable. I look forward to a well-informed discussion about cyber-attacks, as well as the ways to prevent, respond to, and mitigate the risks of such attacks. As a reminder, there will be a public comment file associated with today’s Roundtable, and I look forward to receiving additional comments and input on this issue.
Thank you.
[*] The views I express today are my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or “Commission”), my fellow Commissioners, or members of the staff.
[1] For example, on February 26, 2014, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) published guidance outlining the data security practices it expects from firms it oversees and the third parties they contract with. See CFTC Staff Advisory No. 14-21, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Security Safeguards (Feb. 26, 2014), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/14-21.pdf. In addition, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), James Comey, said last November that “resources devoted to cyber-based threats will equal or even eclipse the resources devoted to non-cyber based terrorist threats.” See Testimony of James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Nov. 14, 2013), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/homeland-threats-and-the-fbis-response. Also, on December 9, 2013, the Financial Stability Oversight Council held a meeting to discuss cybersecurity threats to the financial system; see also, U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to Meet December 9 (Dec. 2, 2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2228.aspx; Jaclyn Jaeger, “Boards Look to Boost IT, Data Security Oversight,” Compliance Week (Mar. 11, 2014) (noting that company boards have become much more sensitive to cybersecurity risks and the harm they could cause to a company’s reputation and business). The importance of this issue is also reflected in the recent notices that the staffs from the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations and from FINRA will have cybersecurity as a focus of their 2014 examinations. See SEC’s National Examination Priorities for 2014 (Jan. 9, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2014.pdf; FINRA’s 2014 Regulatory and Examination Priorities Letter (Jan. 2, 2014), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/p419710.pdf. In addition, it was recently announced that SEC examiners will review whether asset managers have policies to prevent and detect cyber-attacks and are properly safeguarding against security risks that could arise from vendors having access to their systems. See Sarah N. Lynch, “SEC examiners to review how asset managers fend off cyber attacks,” Reuters (Jan. 30, 2014), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/30/us-sec-cyber-assetmanagers-idUSBREA0T1PJ20140130.
[2] On December 19, 2013, Target Corporation announced a data breach resulting from a cyber-attack on its systems. The breach affected two types of data: payment card data, which affected approximately 40 million Target customers, and certain personal data, which affected up to 70 million Target customers. See Testimony of John Mulligan, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Target, before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/02-04-14MulliganTestimony.pdf; Target Press Release, Target Confirms Unauthorized Access to Payment Card Data in U.S. Stores (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://pressroom.target.com/news/target-confirms-unauthorized-access-to-payment-card-data-in-u-s-stores..
[3] See, e.g., Joseph Menn, “Cyber attacks against banks more severe than most realize,” Reuters (May 18, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/18/us-cyber-summit-banks-idUSBRE94G0ZP20130518; Bob Sullivan, “Bank Website Attacks Reach New Highs,” CNBC (Apr. 3, 2013), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/100613270.
[4] See, e.g., Jim Finkle and Joseph Menn, “FBI warns of U.S. government breaches by Anonymous hackers,” Reuters (Nov. 15, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/15/us-usa-security-anonymous-fbi-idUSBRE9AE17C20131115 (activist hackers secretly accessed U.S. government computers in multiple agencies, resulting in stolen data on at least 104,000 employees, contractors, and others associated with the Department of Energy, along with information on almost 2,000 bank accounts); “HealthCare.gov targeted ‘about 16 times’ by cyberattacks, DHS official says,” NBCNews.com (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/healthcare-gov-targeted-about-16-times-cyberattacks-dhs-official-says-v21440068.
[5] For example, on December 9, 2013, the Financial Stability Oversight Council held a meeting to discuss cybersecurity threats to the financial system. See U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to Meet December 9 (Dec. 2, 2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2228.aspx. During that meeting, Assistant Treasury Secretary Cyrus-Amir-Mokri said that “[o]ur experience over the last couple of years shows that cyber-threats to financial institutions and markets are growing in both frequency and sophistication.” See U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, Remarks of Assistant Secretary Cyrus Amir-Mokri on Cybersecurity at a Meeting of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Dec. 9, 2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2234.aspx. In addition, in testimony before the House Financial Services Committee in 2011, the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Cyber Division stated that the number and sophistication of malicious incidents involving financial institutions has increased dramatically over the past several years and offered numerous examples of such attacks, which included fraudulent monetary transfers, unauthorized financial transactions from compromised bank and brokerage accounts, denial of service attacks on U.S. stock exchanges, and hacking incidents in which confidential information was misappropriated. See Testimony of Gordon M. Snow, Assistant Director, Cyber Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit (Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/cybersecurity-threats-to-the-financial-sector.
[6] See Rohini Tendulkar, “Cyber-crime, securities markets and systemic risk,” Joint Staff Working Paper of the IOSCO Research Department and World Federation of Exchanges (July 16, 2013), available at http://www.iosco.org/research/pdf/swp/Cyber-Crime-Securities-Markets-and-Systemic-Risk.pdf. Forty-six securities exchanges responded to the survey.
[7] On October 13, 2011, staff in the Commission’s Division of Corporation Finance (Corp Fin) issued guidance on issuers’ disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents. See SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2—Cybersecurity (“SEC Guidance”) (Oct. 31, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm. Among other things, this guidance notes that securities laws are designed to elicit disclosure of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information about risks and events that a reasonable investor would consider important to an investment decision, and cybersecurity risks and events are not exempt from these requirements. The guidance identifies six areas where cybersecurity disclosures may be necessary under Regulation S-K: (1) Risk Factors; (2) Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operation (MD&A); (3) Description of Business; (4) Legal Proceedings; (5) Financial Statement Disclosures; and (6) Disclosure Controls and Procedures. The SEC Guidance further recommends that material cybersecurity risks should be disclosed and adequately described as Risk Factors. Where cybersecurity risks and incidents that represent a material event, trend or uncertainty reasonably likely to have a material impact on the organization's operations, liquidity, or financial condition—it should be addressed in the MD&A. If cybersecurity risks materially affect the organization’s products, services, relationships with customers or suppliers, or competitive conditions, the organization should disclose such risks in its description of business. Data breaches or other incidents can result in regulatory investigations or private actions that are material and should be discussed in the Legal Proceedings section. Cybersecurity risks and incidents that represent substantial costs in prevention or response should be included in Financial Statement Disclosures where the financial impact is material. Finally, where a cybersecurity risk or incident impairs the organization's ability to record or report information that must be disclosed, Disclosure Controls and Procedures that fail to address cybersecurity concerns may be ineffective and subject to disclosure. Some have suggested that such disclosures fail to fully inform investors about the true costs and benefits of companies’ cyber security practices, and argue that the Commission (and not the staff) should issue further guidance regarding issuers’ disclosure obligations. See Letter from U.S. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV to Chair White (Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=49ac989b-bd16-4bbd-8d64-8c15ba0e4e51.
PRESS GAGGLE WITH BEN RHODES
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
Press Gaggle by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes
Aboard Air Force One
En Route Brussels, Belgium
March 25, 2014
9:19 P.M. CET
Q And comments on the denial of a Saudi visa to the Jerusalem Post Washington’s bureau chief?
MR. RHODES: I'll say basically what we said, which is that we were very disappointed by the Saudi decision. We expressly reached out to the Saudi government through multiple channels when we became aware of this issue. We made it clear how important it was to us that this journalist, like any other journalist, have access to cover the President’s trip. And we'll continue to raise our concerns with the Saudis about why this journalist was denied a visa and about our very strong objections to their decision.
Q What was the reason?
MR. RHODES: They did not give a reason. Again, any journalist should be able to cover the President’s trip if they have the appropriate credentials to do so, and it certainly should not be the case that the affiliation of a journalist should in any way count against their ability to do their job just because they work for the Jerusalem Post.
Q That didn’t cause you guys to reconsider going to Saudi Arabia or anything like that?
MR. RHODES: No. Look, we have disagreements with Saudi Arabia on a number of issues. We obviously have had disagreements in the past as it relates to some issues associated with Israel, some issues associated with human rights. But we also share a significant set of interests with Saudi Arabia. They’re a very important partner of ours in the Gulf, and we believe it's better to have the type of relationship where we can cooperate but also be clear and honest with one another where we have differences.
Q Thanks, Ben.
END
9:21 P.M. CET
Press Gaggle by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes
Aboard Air Force One
En Route Brussels, Belgium
March 25, 2014
9:19 P.M. CET
Q And comments on the denial of a Saudi visa to the Jerusalem Post Washington’s bureau chief?
MR. RHODES: I'll say basically what we said, which is that we were very disappointed by the Saudi decision. We expressly reached out to the Saudi government through multiple channels when we became aware of this issue. We made it clear how important it was to us that this journalist, like any other journalist, have access to cover the President’s trip. And we'll continue to raise our concerns with the Saudis about why this journalist was denied a visa and about our very strong objections to their decision.
Q What was the reason?
MR. RHODES: They did not give a reason. Again, any journalist should be able to cover the President’s trip if they have the appropriate credentials to do so, and it certainly should not be the case that the affiliation of a journalist should in any way count against their ability to do their job just because they work for the Jerusalem Post.
Q That didn’t cause you guys to reconsider going to Saudi Arabia or anything like that?
MR. RHODES: No. Look, we have disagreements with Saudi Arabia on a number of issues. We obviously have had disagreements in the past as it relates to some issues associated with Israel, some issues associated with human rights. But we also share a significant set of interests with Saudi Arabia. They’re a very important partner of ours in the Gulf, and we believe it's better to have the type of relationship where we can cooperate but also be clear and honest with one another where we have differences.
Q Thanks, Ben.
END
9:21 P.M. CET
WHITE HOUSE ISSUES U.S.-EU COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION FACT SHEET
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
FACT SHEET: U.S.-EU Counterterrorism Cooperation
The United States and the European Union are committed to working together to protect our citizens against terrorist attacks. We work in close cooperation, bilaterally and multilaterally, to safeguard the security of our citizens in keeping with our shared values and to offer assistance to other countries to build their own capacity.
Collaboration in the Global Counterterrorism Forum Framework
The United States and the EU are among the most active members of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), a multilateral counterterrorism body with 30 worldwide members, designed to address counterterrorism threats and build international capacity. The United States and the EU jointly support work in all areas of the two working groups focused on Africa:
- Horn of Africa Region Capacity-Building Working Group: focuses on law enforcement, criminal justice and the rule of law, border management, countering violent extremism, and countering terrorist financing.
- Sahel Region Capacity-Building Working Group: focuses on police cooperation, building legal and judicial cooperation, border security, community engagement to counter extremism, and countering terrorism financing.
The United States and the EU also continue to collaborate on three GCTF-inspired institutions, and will serve on the governing boards of and provide financial support to all three institutions:
- Hedayah: Hedayah is the first and only international center of excellence on countering violent extremism (CVE). We will jointly support Hedayah’s efforts, and the United States is funding curriculum development and CVE training.
- Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund: This fund, a public-private global venture, will support grassroots efforts to counter violent extremism. The United States and EU have committed to supporting this fund’s development and operations.
- International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law: Headquartered in Malta, this institute will train criminal justice officials in North, West, and East Africa, with a particular focus on countries in transition, to counter terrorism and handle transnational security challenges while respecting human rights. The United States and the EU have agreed to provide resources and technical support.
Cooperation on Countering Violent Extremism and Foreign Fighters
We share a common understanding of how terrorists exploit underlying conditions to recruit others to their cause. The United States and EU have increased transatlantic cooperation on both stemming the flow of foreign fighters and reintegrating them when they return. We aim to counter violent extremism by providing positive alternatives to communities most at risk of recruitment and radicalization to violence; counter terrorist narratives; and build the capacity of government and civil society to counter violent extremism.
- Balkans: The United States and the EU are committed to building the capacity of Balkan governments and civil society to counter violent extremism – from counter-messaging/counter-recruitment to the reintegration of returning fighters.
- Dutch-Moroccan-led Foreign Fighter Project: We jointly support a year-long GCTF initiative, launched February 19, led jointly by Morocco and the Netherlands, to address the phenomenon of foreign fighters.
- U.S. Regional Strategic Initiative Foreign Fighter Project: The United States, with EU support, will complement the Dutch-Moroccan initiative by focusing on implementation of the Rabat Good Practices to address the criminal justice aspects of prevention, disruption, and prosecution of foreign fighters, mainly focused on the Balkans, Maghreb, and Sahel countries.
Coordination on Combating Terrorist Organizations
We are committed to preventing and countering efforts by terrorists and their networks to travel freely in our territories and finance their illicit activities. We are continuing this work with the European Union and will rely on a number of critical agreements to accomplish this.
SUNNY DAY AT THE SOYUZ LAUNCH PAD
FROM: NASA
The sun rises behind the Soyuz launch pad shortly before the Soyuz TMA-12M spacecraft is rolled out by train to the launch pad at the Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan, Sunday, March, 23, 2014. Launch of the Soyuz rocket is scheduled for March 26 (5:17 p.m. U.S. EDT on March 25) and will send Expedition 39 Soyuz Commander Alexander Skvortsov of the Russian Federal Space Agency, Roscosmos, Flight Engineer Steven Swanson of NASA, and Flight Engineer Oleg Artemyev of Roscosmos on a six-month mission aboard the International Space Station. Credit-NASA-Bill Ingalls
The sun rises behind the Soyuz launch pad shortly before the Soyuz TMA-12M spacecraft is rolled out by train to the launch pad at the Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan, Sunday, March, 23, 2014. Launch of the Soyuz rocket is scheduled for March 26 (5:17 p.m. U.S. EDT on March 25) and will send Expedition 39 Soyuz Commander Alexander Skvortsov of the Russian Federal Space Agency, Roscosmos, Flight Engineer Steven Swanson of NASA, and Flight Engineer Oleg Artemyev of Roscosmos on a six-month mission aboard the International Space Station. Credit-NASA-Bill Ingalls
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