DEPUTY AG YATES TESTIFIES BEFORE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REGARDING PRIVACY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC SAFETY

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates Delivers Oral Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee
Washington, DC United States ~ Wednesday, July 8, 2015
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery

Good morning, Chairman [Chuck] Grassley, Ranking Member [Patrick] Leahy and members of the Judiciary Committee.  Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the information and evidence-collection problem we commonly describe as “going dark.”

Twenty-five years ago, I started my Justice Department career as a line prosecutor in Atlanta.  I worked every kind of case you can imagine—from guns and drugs to financial fraud and terrorism.

During that time, the world has changed in remarkable ways.  Technological innovations have revolutionized the ways we communicate with colleagues and loved ones.  And increasingly sophisticated means of encryption have helped to ensure that these communications remain private.  For many reasons, these have been good developments—and ones that the Department of Justice embraces.

But it’s important that we do not let these technological innovations undermine our ability to protect the community from significant national security and public safety challenges.  The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and our criminal justice system provides a well-developed framework for a careful balance between privacy rights and public safety by adhering to the basic principle of judicial authorization established by probable cause and determined by a neutral judge.  that framework governs searches of all our communications, regardless of whether they are by private letters or smartphone [messages], and regardless of whether we are wiretapping a landline or intercepting instant messages sent over the latest applications.  This framework has protected the interests that we all have in safety and privacy for many years.

But recent technological innovations threaten that careful balance.  Although we still have the statutory authorities that congress provided to protect the community, like the Wiretap Act and FISA (the Foreign Intelligence Service Act of 1978)—increasingly, we’re finding that even when we have the authority to search certain types of digital communications, we can’t get the information we need because the encryption has been designed so that the information is only available to the user and the providers are unable to comply with the court order or warrant.  The need and justification for the evidence has been established—and yet that evidence cannot be accessed.  Crucial information becomes, in effect, “warrant proof.”

Because of this, we are creating safe zones where dangerous criminals and terrorists can operate and avoid detection.  And it impacts us in two ways: we can’t get access to information that is stored on someone’s smartphone, like a child pornographer’s photographs or a gang member’s saved text messages, known as data at rest.  And we also can no longer effectuate wiretap orders to intercept certain communications as they happen, like ISIL members plotting to carry out an attack in the U.S., or a kidnapper communicating with a coconspirator.  This is known as data in motion.  These technological changes come with real national security and public safety costs.

In the six short months that I’ve served as Deputy Attorney General, I’ve seen the threat picture from ISIL change.  ISIL currently communicates on Twitter, sending communications to thousands of would-be followers right here in our country.  When someone responds and the conversations begin, they are then directed to encrypted platforms for further communication.  And even with a court order, we can’t see those communications.  This is a serious threat and our inability to access these communications, with valid court orders, is a real national security and public safety problem.

The current public debate about how to strike the careful balance between privacy rights and public safety has at times been a challenging and highly charged discussion.  I believe that we have to protect the privacy of our citizens and the safety of the Internet.  But those interests are not absolute.  And they have to be balanced against the risks we face from creating warrant-proof zones of communication.

There are no easy answers to this dilemma, and reasonable people can disagree on where that balance should be struck.  I don’t think that we advance the analysis to vilify those who prioritize privacy for their customers.  But from where I sit, as the Deputy Attorney General, I believe that the balance must be struck in such a way that allows us to continue to enforce court orders to obtain the critical information we need to combat crime and national security threats.  But regardless of how one believes the balance should be struck, we can all agree that we will need ongoing honest and informed public debate about how best to protect both our liberty and our security.

Thank you again for giving us an opportunity to highlight this growing threat to public safety.  We must find a solution to this pressing problem and soon.  The government’s ability to protect our nation from our most pressing threats—both foreign and domestic—depends on it.

I look forward to answering your questions.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTOR HIGHLIGHTS FUTURE TRENDS

FROM:  U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 
Intelligence Agency Director Discusses Roadmap for Future
By Cheryl Pellerin
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Sept. 16, 2013 - In a global environment where crises such as the one occurring in Syria become sudden priorities and where fiscal, cyber and geopolitical disasters simmer on the world's back burners, intelligence is a critical guarantor of U.S. national security, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency said here last week.

Army Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn spoke to those attending a panel on intelligence community challenges and priorities at the Intelligence and National Security Alliance Summit. INSA is a nonprofit public-private organization whose members include current and former high-ranking intelligence, military and government agency leaders, analysts and experts.

"In light of future trends ... and in light of the absolutely critical role of intelligence for our national security, we must do the following," Flynn said. "We must adjust our operating model to refocus on our mission and our unique strengths. We must continually emphasize burden sharing, partnerships and integration. And we must instill flexibility and agility to respond to crises. That is our new normal."

Flynn said these undertakings must be woven into the fabric and culture of DIA and everything it does.

"At DIA," he said, "we have already laid the groundwork for that future."

The agency recently reorganized into a centers-based model that networks and integrates talent from across the agency -- analysts, collectors, collections managers, technicians, technical experts, targeteers -- and brings them together as one team to solve critical problems, Flynn said, describing the model as a "critical personal lesson that I learned from the past decade of war."

At the core of the centers are the following three qualities, the general explained.

-- A fusion of analysis and collection, which, based on experience from Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, is the most successful model for intelligence production and support;

-- Flexibility, so team members no longer have to contend with organizational boundaries; and

-- Integration, as each center has interagency embeds from across the intelligence community and tight relationships with combatant commands and service intelligence centers.

"That's not the model that we had coming into the last decade of war," he said.

Today, Flynn said, DIA's Middle East-Africa Regional Center, in close coordination with U.S. Central Command, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the White House, is handling the DIA assessments of the Syria crisis.

"And I have the utmost faith that they have the right talent, the right tools and the right resources to get the job done," he said.

The agency also has pushed more of its intelligence professionals -- collectors and analysts -- into the field to "thicken the edges," the general said, ensuring that they and the agency have an appreciation and working understanding of developments across the globe.

"My constant drumbeat is to make the edge the center," Flynn said. "The unique perspective of these officers in the field often made the crucial difference in our support to policymakers during the [al-Qaida] threats in Yemen, operations in Mali, instability in Egypt and certainly growing unrest in Syria."

Recently, he added, feedback from an intelligence officer in a particular country went directly to the secretary of defense in advance of his talks to allies about instability in the Middle East.

As the United States finds itself with new national security crossroads to navigate, the general observed, DIA is focused on being in the right place at the right time.

Flynn said DIA's role in the U.S. government's response to the crisis in Syria has been intense and continuous from the beginning.

"In our agency we have over 6,000 civilians who have served in a combat environment in the last decade," he said. "That's pretty extraordinary. Those that served in Iraq and focused on ... al-Qaida, ... but certainly on the Middle East militaries and the kinds of capabilities they have. They're worth their weight in gold right now."

The Defense Intelligence Agency is deeply involved as a member of the community, the general added. DIA, he said, is part of "an integrated team supporting Central Command, European Command, Africa Command, certainly Cyber Command. And we also support the military planning that's going on at every level up to and including the Joint Staff."

DIA also is involved on the policy side, he said.

"We have provided what I would call the nation's experts on chemical warfare to the State Department. They are today helping Secretary [John F.] Kerry negotiate that issue. They were called on a dime, and the individual I'm thinking about in this case absolutely jumped right into it," Flynn said.

The crisis in Syria shows how rapidly a challenge from the list of global threats can bubble up to the surface and completely change the nation's course and commitment of resources, the general said.

Another such issue on the horizon, he noted, could be the tactical use of cyberattacks for strategic purposes.

"We are all aware of the cyber threat," Flynn said.

Summit attendees spent a significant part of the afternoon talking about a range of cybersecurity topics, he said, from rogue hackers to insider threats to state-sponsored actors.

In May, the general added, appropriately at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said in no uncertain terms that the destructive potential of cyberattacks has become the national security challenge of the age.

"While we grow ever more worried about threats to infrastructure in our increasingly wired society, DIA is increasingly focused on threats that can degrade our military capabilities," Flynn said.

Militarized cyber weapons are a new world for DIA, he added, one in which the agency needs to understand the doctrine and intent of cyber foes to best manage the risk such enemies pose to the nation.

"DIA has been the all-source leader on enemy doctrine and discipline, order-of-battle research and offensive capabilities for more than 50 years," Flynn said.

The agency is working hard with its intelligence community partners, he added, "to understand the security challenges that we face in our era."

STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE DAVIES TESTIFIES ON NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TESTING

Bridge of No Return.  Korean Border.  Credit:  CIA World Factbook.

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
U.S. Policy Toward North Korea
Testimony
Glyn Davies
Special Representative for North Korea Policy
Testimony Before the Senate Committee On Foreign Relations
Washington, DC
March 7, 2013

Chairman Menendez, Senator Corker, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on U.S. policy toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Nearly sixty years have passed since the conclusion of the armistice that ended the hostilities of the Korean War, yet North Korea still persists as one of the thorniest challenges confronting the United States and the international community. Pyongyang’s February announcement of a third nuclear test—conducted in brazen defiance of the demands of the United Nations Security Council—and its subsequent threats to conduct even more follow-on "measures" are only the latest in a long line of reminders that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities pose serious threats to U.S. national security, to regional security in the Asia-Pacific, and to the global nonproliferation regime.

Pyongyang continues to violate its international obligations and commitments, including to denuclearize. Its human rights record remains deplorable. Its economy is stagnant. Its people are impoverished. It pours significant sums into nuclear and ballistic missile programs that are forbidden by the United Nations. The leadership’s choices are isolating North Korea from the international community. International outrage against North Korea and its provocative and threatening actions, meanwhile, continues to grow.

The DPRK has consistently failed to take advantage of the alternatives available. The United States offered—and has continued to offer—Pyongyang an improved relationship with the United States and integration into the international community, provided North Korea demonstrated a willingness to fulfill its denuclearization commitments and address other concerns. The DPRK rebuffed these offers and instead responded with a series of provocations that drew widespread international condemnation.

Pyongyang appeared prepared to enter a period of serious diplomatic engagement in mid-2011, and the United States responded with a proactive, nearly-year-long diplomatic effort to push forward on denuclearization in a way that would lay the groundwork for improved bilateral relations. Starting in July 2011 and continuing over the next ten months, the United States and the DPRK held three rounds of bilateral denuclearization talks on three continents. In our meetings, we worked to forge the conditions necessary for resuming the Six-Party Talks, which had been stalled since 2008. Shortly after Kim Jong Un’s assumption of power, we reached a modest but potentially important bilateral understanding announced on February 29, 2012.

Pyongyang announced its commitment to, among other things, a moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and all nuclear activity, including uranium enrichment activity, at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. North Korea also committed to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to return to Yongbyon to monitor the cessation of uranium enrichment and confirm the disablement of plutonium-related facilities there.

But just 16 days later, North Korea reneged on these commitments by announcing its intent to launch a satellite into orbit. Such launches use ballistic missile technology proscribed by multiple UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs), and we had made it abundantly clear during our negotiations that such a launch, even if characterized as a satellite launch, would be a deal-breaker. Pyongyang nevertheless conducted such a launch on April 13 and was greeted by deep international opprobrium. All five Six-Party partners—China, Russia, the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan—joined a long list of states publicly condemning Pyongyang’s provocation. The UN Security Council unanimously issued a Presidential Statement condemning the act as a "serious violation" of UNSCRs 1718 and 1874, tightened existing sanctions, and made clear its commitment to "take action accordingly" in the event of another launch.

North Korea again brazenly defied the international community on December 12, 2012, with another long-range missile launch, again characterized by the DPRK as a satellite launch, in flagrant violation of UN Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874 and in the face of united public and private calls by the international community to desist. Over 60 countries and international organizations issued statements criticizing the launch. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 2087, which condemned the launch, further expanded the scope of sanctions on the DPRK, and promised "significant action" in the event of a future DPRK missile launch or nuclear test.


The announcement of a nuclear test which Pyongyang proclaimed was targeted against the United States, represents an even bolder threat to U.S. national security, the stability of the region, and the global nonproliferation regime. The international response has been unprecedented. Over 80 countries and international organizations from all corners of the world have decried the test. Many are speaking out against DPRK provocations for the first time. As the list continues to grow, it is increasingly clear that an international consensus is coalescing in opposition to North Korea’s destabilizing activities.

We are working with the international community to make clear that North Korea’s nuclear test has costly consequences. In adopting Resolution 2087 in January after the December launch, the UN Security Council pledged to take "significant action" in the event of a nuclear test; we are working hard at the UN Security Council to make good on that pledge. We are intensively engaged with our Six-Party partners, members of the UN Security Council, and other UN member states on a strong and credible response by the international community.

China’s support for firm action remains key, and we are deeply engaged with the Chinese in shaping an appropriate response. We are strengthening our close coordination with our Six-Party partners and regional allies. And—through a whole-of-government approach, working closely with our partners in the Department of Defense and other agencies—we will take the steps necessary to defend ourselves and our allies, particularly the ROK and Japan. We have reassured both Seoul and Tokyo, at the highest levels, of our commitment to extended deterrence through the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional capabilities, and missile defense.

North Korea’s WMD, ballistic missile, conventional arms, and proliferation activities constitute a serious and unacceptable threat to U.S. national security, to say nothing of the integrity of the global nonproliferation regime, which many around the world have labored—over generations—to devise, nurture, and enforce. Effective, targeted multilateral and national sanctions will consequently remain a vital component of our efforts to impede the DPRK’s efforts to advance its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities. UNSCR 2087 was an important step forward in this regard. Combined with the measures in resolutions 1718 and 1874, UNSCR 2087 further constricts North Korea’s efforts to procure weapons components, send agents abroad, smuggle dual-use items, and make headway on its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

Full and transparent implementation of these resolutions by all UN member states, including China, is critical. We are actively engaged with the international community to underscore the importance of full enforcement of these measures.

We also continue to exercise national authorities to sanction North Korean entities, individuals, and those that support them in facilitating programs that threaten the American people. Most recently, on January 24, the Departments of State and the Treasury designated a number of North Korean individuals and entities under Executive Order 13382, which targets actors involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters. The Department of State designated the Korean Committee for Space Technology—North Korea’s space agency—and several officials directly involved in North Korea’s April 2012 and December 2012 launches, which contributed to the DPRK’s long-range ballistic missile development efforts. The Department of the Treasury designated several Beijing-based North Korean officials linked to the DPRK’s Tanchon Commercial Bank, which has been designated by the UN and the United States for its role in facilitating the sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and related items. The Treasury Department also targeted Leader (Hong Kong) International Trading Limited, a Hong Kong-based firm, for its links to the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, the DPRK’s premier arms dealer and exporter of missile- and weapon-related goods.

We will continue to take national measures as appropriate. We are also working closely with the UN Security Council’s DPRK sanctions committee and its Panel of Experts, the EU and like-minded partners, and others around the globe to harmonize our sanctions programs and to ensure the full and transparent implementation of UNSCRs 1718, 1874, and 2087, which remain the heart of the multilateral sanctions regime.

Sanctions are not a punitive measure, but rather a tool to impede the development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and proliferation-related exports, as well as to make clear the costs of North Korea’s defiance of its international obligations. Working toward our endgame—the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner—will require an openness to meaningful dialogue with the DPRK. But the real choice is up to Pyongyang.

We remain committed to authentic and credible negotiations to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and to bring North Korea into compliance with its international obligations through irreversible steps leading to denuclearization. The President made this clear last November when he said, "…let go of your nuclear weapons and choose the path of peace and progress. If you do, you will find an extended hand from the United States of America." But let me state the obvious: North Korea’s reckless provocations have certainly raised the bar for a return to dialogue.

The United States will not engage in talks for the sake of talks. Rather, what we want are negotiations that address the real issue of North Korea’s nuclear program. Authentic and credible negotiations therefore require a serious, meaningful change in North Korea’s priorities demonstrating that Pyongyang is prepared to meet its commitments and obligations to achieve the core goal of the September 2005 Joint Statement: the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

This leads to some other important principles. First and foremost, the United States will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. We will not reward the DPRK for the absence of bad behavior. We will not compensate the DPRK merely for returning to dialogue. We have also made clear that U.S.-DPRK relations cannot fundamentally improve without sustained improvement in inter-Korean relations and human rights. Nor will we tolerate North Korea provoking its neighbors. These positions will not change.

In the meantime, active U.S. diplomacy on North Korea—on a wide range of issues—continues. Close coordination with our valued treaty allies, the ROK and Japan, remains central to our approach.

ROK President Park Geun-hye and President Obama agree on the need for continued close U.S.-ROK coordination on a range of security issues, including North Korea. We are confident of President Park’s commitment to the U.S.-ROK alliance and anticipate close consultation with her administration on its North Korea strategy. Close consultation will also continue with Japan. During his visit to Washington in late February, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Obama agreed to continue working together closely in responding to the threat posed by North Korea, including through coordination on sanctions measures.

We have also expanded our engagement by developing new dialogues on North Korea with key global actors who have joined the rising chorus of regional and global voices calling on North Korea to fulfill its commitments, comply with its international obligations, and refrain from provocative acts that undermine regional security and the global nonproliferation regime.

China, however, remains central to altering North Korea’s cost calculus. Both geography and history have endowed the People’s Republic of China with a unique—if increasingly challenging—diplomatic, economic, and military relationship with the DPRK. Close U.S.-China consultations on North Korea will remain a key locus of our diplomatic efforts in the weeks and months ahead as we seek to bring further pressure to bear on North Korea and, over the longer term, seek genuine diplomatic openings to push forward on denuclearization.

While denuclearization remains an essential focus of U.S. policy, so, too, does the welfare of North Korea’s nearly 25 million people, the vast majority of whom bear the brunt of their government’s decision to perpetuate an unsustainable, self-impoverishing military-first policy. While the DPRK devotes limited resources to developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and devising ways to avoid sanctions, one in three North Korean children is chronically malnourished, according to a 2009 UNICEF estimate. An elaborate network of political prison camps in the country is reportedly estimated to contain 100,000-200,000 inmates, who are subjected to forced labor, torture, and starvation. It has been reported that whole families have been condemned—in most cases without trial—when one member commits an alleged crime. The courageous and charismatic Shin Dong-hyuk, whose life story is chronicled in Blaine Harden’s excellent book, Escape from Camp 14, was born in one of the most infamous political prison camps and spent the first 23 years of his life there. He was not only tortured and subjected to forced labor, but was also cruelly made to witness—at the age of 14—the execution of his mother and his brother.

Even outside this prison-camp system, the North Korean government dictates nearly all aspects of people’s lives through a highly structured social classification system called songbun, which it uses to divide North Korea’s population into categories. This system, in turn, determines access to education and health care, employment opportunities, place of residence, and marriage prospects. Improving human rights conditions is an integral part of our North Korea policy, and how the DPRK addresses human rights will have a significant impact on prospects for improved U.S.-DPRK ties.

The world is increasingly taking note of the grave, widespread, and systematic human rights violations in the DPRK and demanding action. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay has called for an in-depth international inquiry to document abuses. We support this call, and next week, my colleague Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Robert King will travel to Geneva to attend the UN Human Rights Council’s 22nd session, where he will call attention to North Korea’s human rights record and urge the adoption of an enhanced mechanism of inquiry into the regime’s abuses against the North Korean people.

We continue, meanwhile, to engage countries across the globe to raise awareness about North Korea and enlist their help in pushing for action. We are also working with international and non-governmental organizations to improve the situation on the ground for the North Korean people, including by supporting the flow of independent information into the DPRK. Working with the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and independent broadcasters in the ROK, we aim to provide information to the North Korean people and—over the longer term—plant the seeds for the development of civil society.

The Obama Administration’s dual-track policy of engagement and pressure toward the DPRK reflects a bipartisan recognition that only a policy of openness to dialogue when possible, combined with sustained, robust pressure through sanctions when necessary, can maximize prospects for progress in denuclearizing North Korea.

Progress on this decades-old problem will not be achieved easily or quickly. We cannot and should not dignify or, worse, feed the North Korean narrative that U.S. actions determine DPRK behavior. North Korea makes its own choices, selects its own timing, and is alone responsible for its actions. Similarly, we need to bear in mind that this is certainly not now—if it ever truly was—solely or even primarily a bilateral U.S.-DPRK issue. It is, rather, increasingly a global issue that requires an entrepreneurial approach, multilateral diplomacy and—yes—continuing, robust American leadership.

But above all else, genuine progress requires a fundamental shift in North Korea’s strategic calculus. The DPRK leadership must choose between provocation or peace, isolation or integration. North Korea will not achieve security, economic prosperity, and integration into the international community while it pursues nuclear weapons, threatens its neighbors, tramples on international norms, abuses its own people, and refuses to fulfill its longstanding obligations and commitments.

The international community has been increasingly clear about this, and so have we. The DPRK leadership in Pyongyang faces sharp choices. And we are working to further sharpen those choices. If the North Korean regime is at all wise, it will re-embark on the path to denuclearization for the benefit of the North Korean people, the Northeast Asia region, and the world.

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.