STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL MAKES REMARKS IN JAPAN ON NORTH KOREAN POLICY

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Remarks at Narita Airport
Remarks
Glyn Davies
Special Representative for North Korea Policy
Tokyo, Japan
May 18, 2013

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Thanks for coming. Let me say a few things at the beginning, then I’m happy to take a few questions from you. What I would like to do is to report to you on my visit to Tokyo. It was a quick visit, but very productive. I had yesterday seven meetings with various officials. At the Abductions Ministry you know I met with Secretary General Mitani, Chairman Nukaga. I met Chairman Kawai at the Diet, and at the Kantei I had some useful meetings with Special Advisor Isozaki and Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Kanehara. At the Foreign Ministry, Deputy Minister Saiki made time to see me in his busy schedule, which I very much appreciate. And of course the centerpiece of my visit was my meeting with Director General Sugiyama, to follow up my late Thursday meeting that I had with him at the Foreign Ministry. I thank him very much for his hospitality. I thank all of the officials in Tokyo for their insights and their assurances. I found these meetings to be both useful and timely.

Now, in terms of the context of my visit and of these discussions, let me say this: We in the United States, and indeed I believe many who follow North Korea, expected sooner or later that North Korea would shift from the threats and belligerency of recent months, in some respects an almost unprecedented succession of unacceptable, dangerous acts and pronouncements with which you are all familiar. The December missile test, the February nuclear test, all of the threats not just to the United States, but also to the Republic of Korea, Japan, and China - you know as well as I the long list of recent provocations. We knew that North Korea would eventually shift their strategy to that of seeking engagement, in an effort to split us and to exploit any difference in our respective national positions.

What I would like to report to you about my meetings here is that they helped increase my confidence that the Government of Japan is fully aware of the challenges and pitfalls of engaging North Korea. I received assurances about the centrality of denuclearization to our collective efforts to engage North Korea on the right terms, in other words, to convince North Korea that it has no choice but to live up to its long-standing commitments and obligations to take steps to abandon nuclear weapons and indeed, to abandon its pursuit of missile technologies.

And let me say a word as I always do about the issue of abductions. The United States stands squarely with the families of the abductees and the people of Japan on this issue. It must be addressed by North Korea. We will continue to raise [this issue] at every opportunity with senior North Koreans. There can be no comprehensive resolution to all of the issues relating to North Korea unless the abductions are satisfactorily addressed. And we will indeed, as I have said many times before, never forget the suffering of the families. Let me again extend my thanks to counterparts in the Government of Japan for receiving me so well, and for such useful and timely meetings. And with that I’m happy to take a couple of questions.

QUESTION: Ambassador, are you saying that this visit by Mr. Iijima to Pyongyang is an effort by the North Koreans to split up your coalition, and what assurances did you get from the Japanese government that this won’t be the case?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, what I don’t want to do is get into commenting directly on this issue of the Iijima visit. And that is because, like the rest of you, I am suffering from a deficit of information. I simply don’t know much at all about the visit, I’ve seen the reporting from North Korea but my understanding is that Mr. Iijima has only just come back from Pyongyang and from Beijing and is now reporting to Japanese authorities. So we look forward to getting a report on what it was he discussed, and I think what we’ll do is we’ll take it from there.

QUESTION: I think you learned more about Mr. Iijima’s visit to North Korea, also in yesterday’s meetings with several Japanese officials. Now how do you understand the reason why Japan has sent Iijima to North Korea, and did you express some concerns to Japanese officials about Iijima’s trip, because it might have a negative impact on your effort to apply pressure on North Korea.

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: I understand the question, and it’s a very legitimate question. But I would suggest that at this stage, this is not so much a question for me. I think that’s a question that you may put to your own authorities. What I do not want to do is get into the business of betraying the confidences that were extended to me by these gentlemen that I met with yesterday. If I were to betray those confidences, then I would be acting like North Korea, and I don’t want to do that.

QUESTION: What kind of consultations will you be having with the Japanese moving forward?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: I think we’ll continue to have consultations with the Japanese, both through their Embassy in Washington and through our Embassy here, and also at the level of senior officials between capitals. One of the undertakings that I received from my meetings with Japanese officials is that of course they would convey to us in detail information about the Iijima trip. So we expect that it will happen, and I very much look forward to that. How about one more quick question?

QUESTION: What conditions do you think are necessary for the Japanese Government in trying to move this abduction issue forward? Do you expect to see some action from the North Koreans?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: It would be quite improper for me as an American diplomat to try and interpose myself into this issue from the standpoint of the Japanese Government. The Japanese government, we respect them, we have excellent relations with Japan, a close ally and friend, so we’ll see going forward what might have developed from this visit. But I am not going to suggest strategies and tactics other than simply to say what I have already said, that we in the United States believe that this issue of denuclearization, because it is the foundation issue, the corner issue of the Six-Party Process, is one that we must all continue to work on. Which does not mean that all of the other issues are not also exceedingly important.

There can’t be a comprehensive solution to the North Korea issue, all of these issues, until we find a way collectively to convince North Korea that it has no choice but to live up to its obligations and commitments. You’ve all heard me speak to that many, many times. I want to thank you very much for coming to the airport, I’m sorry it’s such a long trip for you to come out here. I’ve enjoyed my visit to Tokyo, the weather’s been beautiful, and I look forward very much to coming back some point in the near future. Thank you very much.

REMARKS BY U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE DAVIES IN SOUTH KOREA

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Remarks to Press at Incheon International Airport
Remarks
Glyn Davies
Special Representative for North Korea Policy
Incheon, South Korea
May 13, 2013

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Hello, everybody. It is great to be here in Seoul. This is, I think, my fifth or sixth trip since starting this job at the end of 2011. I am looking forward very much to meetings with the new government -- in particular a session with my good friend Ambassador Lim Sung Nam -- but I will also go to the Ministry of Unification and to the Blue House to meet with colleagues there. And of course I will have a chance to talk to my very good friend and colleague Ambassador Sung Kim, and we will go to USFK and talk to General Thurman. So, it is great to be here. Any questions from anybody?

QUESTION: Mr. Davies, North Korea seems to find a way to ease the tension on the Korean Peninsula these days. How do you evaluate the current situation on North Korea?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, sometimes North Korea creates the impression that they are easing tension because they cease doing provocative and dangerous and destabilizing things. But I do not think that is the same as easing tension. I think easing tension and making diplomatic progress will come when North Korea begins to live up to its obligations and to meet its expectations and gets back on the path of diplomacy and denuclearization. And that is really why I am here in South Korea, to talk to the ROK government about how best to send the right signals to North Korea so that it understands that it should get away from this kind of endless cycle of provocations, followed by periods of silence, followed by more provocations. What we need to do is to get back on a positive path toward diplomacy and toward real progress, and that starts with North Korea taking steps to demonstrate that it is serious about living up to its obligations.

QUESTION: Mr. Davies, the Bank of China publicly announced last week that it closed the account of North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank. With regard to China’s decision, how do you assess China’s movement?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, I think that is a very interesting and potentially important development that the steps are being taken by a number of Chinese banks. You know, this is my first stop. I go on from here in a couple of days to Beijing. And then after several days there, I will go to Tokyo, so I am spending the whole week in North Asia.

But I plan when I am in Beijing to talk to Chinese officials about the steps they have taken and see if there are not more ways that we can send very strong, united signals to North Korea that it is time to really return to the path of denuclearization and begin to take steps to demonstrate that they are serious about their intent to get back to diplomacy. So I find it a very interesting and very hopeful sign. And when I get to Beijing we will find out more from the Chinese about what it is it all means.

QUESTION: So do you believe it is a sign of a shift in China’s policy stance on North Korea?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, I think the Chinese attitude toward North Korea – I mean, I cannot speak for Beijing, I am not a Chinese diplomat – but from the American perspective it looks as if their thinking continues to evolve in Beijing. It is a new government in China, and they, of course, have their own set of interests in North Korea. They have a unique relationship with North Korea as its largest trading partner and political ties. So we will see what it means and we will see whether this signifies any kind of a real shift in how the Chinese are operating. But I find it quite interesting, it is hopeful, and I cannot wait to learn more from Wu Dawei and colleagues in Beijing.

QUESTION: When President Obama and President Park met last week, there seems to be a little difference between the ROK and the U.S. in terms of attitude toward Japan. So are you going to attempt to narrow the gap here in Korea?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well the point is North Korea is such an important issue. We have this shared interest, a similar, strong interest in all of us in the five-party process, the five-party partners, in trying to find a way to clarify for North Korea the choices that it faces.

So, I think North Korea is too important an issue really to get drawn into some of these other ongoing questions that are out there. That particular issue is not one that I work on, this issue of regional relationships so much. But again, from the North Korea perspective, we think it is very important that we continue to find ways to work together. The five parties, certainly the three allies, should find ways to work together on it because we all have the same interest in seeing progress made and seeing progress in particular on denuclearization.

I have to get into Seoul now and have some meetings, if that is OK with you, so thank you very much.

STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE DAVIES TESTIFIES ON NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TESTING

Bridge of No Return.  Korean Border.  Credit:  CIA World Factbook.

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
U.S. Policy Toward North Korea
Testimony
Glyn Davies
Special Representative for North Korea Policy
Testimony Before the Senate Committee On Foreign Relations
Washington, DC
March 7, 2013

Chairman Menendez, Senator Corker, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on U.S. policy toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Nearly sixty years have passed since the conclusion of the armistice that ended the hostilities of the Korean War, yet North Korea still persists as one of the thorniest challenges confronting the United States and the international community. Pyongyang’s February announcement of a third nuclear test—conducted in brazen defiance of the demands of the United Nations Security Council—and its subsequent threats to conduct even more follow-on "measures" are only the latest in a long line of reminders that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities pose serious threats to U.S. national security, to regional security in the Asia-Pacific, and to the global nonproliferation regime.

Pyongyang continues to violate its international obligations and commitments, including to denuclearize. Its human rights record remains deplorable. Its economy is stagnant. Its people are impoverished. It pours significant sums into nuclear and ballistic missile programs that are forbidden by the United Nations. The leadership’s choices are isolating North Korea from the international community. International outrage against North Korea and its provocative and threatening actions, meanwhile, continues to grow.

The DPRK has consistently failed to take advantage of the alternatives available. The United States offered—and has continued to offer—Pyongyang an improved relationship with the United States and integration into the international community, provided North Korea demonstrated a willingness to fulfill its denuclearization commitments and address other concerns. The DPRK rebuffed these offers and instead responded with a series of provocations that drew widespread international condemnation.

Pyongyang appeared prepared to enter a period of serious diplomatic engagement in mid-2011, and the United States responded with a proactive, nearly-year-long diplomatic effort to push forward on denuclearization in a way that would lay the groundwork for improved bilateral relations. Starting in July 2011 and continuing over the next ten months, the United States and the DPRK held three rounds of bilateral denuclearization talks on three continents. In our meetings, we worked to forge the conditions necessary for resuming the Six-Party Talks, which had been stalled since 2008. Shortly after Kim Jong Un’s assumption of power, we reached a modest but potentially important bilateral understanding announced on February 29, 2012.

Pyongyang announced its commitment to, among other things, a moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and all nuclear activity, including uranium enrichment activity, at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. North Korea also committed to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to return to Yongbyon to monitor the cessation of uranium enrichment and confirm the disablement of plutonium-related facilities there.

But just 16 days later, North Korea reneged on these commitments by announcing its intent to launch a satellite into orbit. Such launches use ballistic missile technology proscribed by multiple UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs), and we had made it abundantly clear during our negotiations that such a launch, even if characterized as a satellite launch, would be a deal-breaker. Pyongyang nevertheless conducted such a launch on April 13 and was greeted by deep international opprobrium. All five Six-Party partners—China, Russia, the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan—joined a long list of states publicly condemning Pyongyang’s provocation. The UN Security Council unanimously issued a Presidential Statement condemning the act as a "serious violation" of UNSCRs 1718 and 1874, tightened existing sanctions, and made clear its commitment to "take action accordingly" in the event of another launch.

North Korea again brazenly defied the international community on December 12, 2012, with another long-range missile launch, again characterized by the DPRK as a satellite launch, in flagrant violation of UN Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874 and in the face of united public and private calls by the international community to desist. Over 60 countries and international organizations issued statements criticizing the launch. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 2087, which condemned the launch, further expanded the scope of sanctions on the DPRK, and promised "significant action" in the event of a future DPRK missile launch or nuclear test.


The announcement of a nuclear test which Pyongyang proclaimed was targeted against the United States, represents an even bolder threat to U.S. national security, the stability of the region, and the global nonproliferation regime. The international response has been unprecedented. Over 80 countries and international organizations from all corners of the world have decried the test. Many are speaking out against DPRK provocations for the first time. As the list continues to grow, it is increasingly clear that an international consensus is coalescing in opposition to North Korea’s destabilizing activities.

We are working with the international community to make clear that North Korea’s nuclear test has costly consequences. In adopting Resolution 2087 in January after the December launch, the UN Security Council pledged to take "significant action" in the event of a nuclear test; we are working hard at the UN Security Council to make good on that pledge. We are intensively engaged with our Six-Party partners, members of the UN Security Council, and other UN member states on a strong and credible response by the international community.

China’s support for firm action remains key, and we are deeply engaged with the Chinese in shaping an appropriate response. We are strengthening our close coordination with our Six-Party partners and regional allies. And—through a whole-of-government approach, working closely with our partners in the Department of Defense and other agencies—we will take the steps necessary to defend ourselves and our allies, particularly the ROK and Japan. We have reassured both Seoul and Tokyo, at the highest levels, of our commitment to extended deterrence through the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional capabilities, and missile defense.

North Korea’s WMD, ballistic missile, conventional arms, and proliferation activities constitute a serious and unacceptable threat to U.S. national security, to say nothing of the integrity of the global nonproliferation regime, which many around the world have labored—over generations—to devise, nurture, and enforce. Effective, targeted multilateral and national sanctions will consequently remain a vital component of our efforts to impede the DPRK’s efforts to advance its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities. UNSCR 2087 was an important step forward in this regard. Combined with the measures in resolutions 1718 and 1874, UNSCR 2087 further constricts North Korea’s efforts to procure weapons components, send agents abroad, smuggle dual-use items, and make headway on its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

Full and transparent implementation of these resolutions by all UN member states, including China, is critical. We are actively engaged with the international community to underscore the importance of full enforcement of these measures.

We also continue to exercise national authorities to sanction North Korean entities, individuals, and those that support them in facilitating programs that threaten the American people. Most recently, on January 24, the Departments of State and the Treasury designated a number of North Korean individuals and entities under Executive Order 13382, which targets actors involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters. The Department of State designated the Korean Committee for Space Technology—North Korea’s space agency—and several officials directly involved in North Korea’s April 2012 and December 2012 launches, which contributed to the DPRK’s long-range ballistic missile development efforts. The Department of the Treasury designated several Beijing-based North Korean officials linked to the DPRK’s Tanchon Commercial Bank, which has been designated by the UN and the United States for its role in facilitating the sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and related items. The Treasury Department also targeted Leader (Hong Kong) International Trading Limited, a Hong Kong-based firm, for its links to the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, the DPRK’s premier arms dealer and exporter of missile- and weapon-related goods.

We will continue to take national measures as appropriate. We are also working closely with the UN Security Council’s DPRK sanctions committee and its Panel of Experts, the EU and like-minded partners, and others around the globe to harmonize our sanctions programs and to ensure the full and transparent implementation of UNSCRs 1718, 1874, and 2087, which remain the heart of the multilateral sanctions regime.

Sanctions are not a punitive measure, but rather a tool to impede the development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and proliferation-related exports, as well as to make clear the costs of North Korea’s defiance of its international obligations. Working toward our endgame—the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner—will require an openness to meaningful dialogue with the DPRK. But the real choice is up to Pyongyang.

We remain committed to authentic and credible negotiations to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and to bring North Korea into compliance with its international obligations through irreversible steps leading to denuclearization. The President made this clear last November when he said, "…let go of your nuclear weapons and choose the path of peace and progress. If you do, you will find an extended hand from the United States of America." But let me state the obvious: North Korea’s reckless provocations have certainly raised the bar for a return to dialogue.

The United States will not engage in talks for the sake of talks. Rather, what we want are negotiations that address the real issue of North Korea’s nuclear program. Authentic and credible negotiations therefore require a serious, meaningful change in North Korea’s priorities demonstrating that Pyongyang is prepared to meet its commitments and obligations to achieve the core goal of the September 2005 Joint Statement: the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

This leads to some other important principles. First and foremost, the United States will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. We will not reward the DPRK for the absence of bad behavior. We will not compensate the DPRK merely for returning to dialogue. We have also made clear that U.S.-DPRK relations cannot fundamentally improve without sustained improvement in inter-Korean relations and human rights. Nor will we tolerate North Korea provoking its neighbors. These positions will not change.

In the meantime, active U.S. diplomacy on North Korea—on a wide range of issues—continues. Close coordination with our valued treaty allies, the ROK and Japan, remains central to our approach.

ROK President Park Geun-hye and President Obama agree on the need for continued close U.S.-ROK coordination on a range of security issues, including North Korea. We are confident of President Park’s commitment to the U.S.-ROK alliance and anticipate close consultation with her administration on its North Korea strategy. Close consultation will also continue with Japan. During his visit to Washington in late February, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Obama agreed to continue working together closely in responding to the threat posed by North Korea, including through coordination on sanctions measures.

We have also expanded our engagement by developing new dialogues on North Korea with key global actors who have joined the rising chorus of regional and global voices calling on North Korea to fulfill its commitments, comply with its international obligations, and refrain from provocative acts that undermine regional security and the global nonproliferation regime.

China, however, remains central to altering North Korea’s cost calculus. Both geography and history have endowed the People’s Republic of China with a unique—if increasingly challenging—diplomatic, economic, and military relationship with the DPRK. Close U.S.-China consultations on North Korea will remain a key locus of our diplomatic efforts in the weeks and months ahead as we seek to bring further pressure to bear on North Korea and, over the longer term, seek genuine diplomatic openings to push forward on denuclearization.

While denuclearization remains an essential focus of U.S. policy, so, too, does the welfare of North Korea’s nearly 25 million people, the vast majority of whom bear the brunt of their government’s decision to perpetuate an unsustainable, self-impoverishing military-first policy. While the DPRK devotes limited resources to developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and devising ways to avoid sanctions, one in three North Korean children is chronically malnourished, according to a 2009 UNICEF estimate. An elaborate network of political prison camps in the country is reportedly estimated to contain 100,000-200,000 inmates, who are subjected to forced labor, torture, and starvation. It has been reported that whole families have been condemned—in most cases without trial—when one member commits an alleged crime. The courageous and charismatic Shin Dong-hyuk, whose life story is chronicled in Blaine Harden’s excellent book, Escape from Camp 14, was born in one of the most infamous political prison camps and spent the first 23 years of his life there. He was not only tortured and subjected to forced labor, but was also cruelly made to witness—at the age of 14—the execution of his mother and his brother.

Even outside this prison-camp system, the North Korean government dictates nearly all aspects of people’s lives through a highly structured social classification system called songbun, which it uses to divide North Korea’s population into categories. This system, in turn, determines access to education and health care, employment opportunities, place of residence, and marriage prospects. Improving human rights conditions is an integral part of our North Korea policy, and how the DPRK addresses human rights will have a significant impact on prospects for improved U.S.-DPRK ties.

The world is increasingly taking note of the grave, widespread, and systematic human rights violations in the DPRK and demanding action. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay has called for an in-depth international inquiry to document abuses. We support this call, and next week, my colleague Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Robert King will travel to Geneva to attend the UN Human Rights Council’s 22nd session, where he will call attention to North Korea’s human rights record and urge the adoption of an enhanced mechanism of inquiry into the regime’s abuses against the North Korean people.

We continue, meanwhile, to engage countries across the globe to raise awareness about North Korea and enlist their help in pushing for action. We are also working with international and non-governmental organizations to improve the situation on the ground for the North Korean people, including by supporting the flow of independent information into the DPRK. Working with the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and independent broadcasters in the ROK, we aim to provide information to the North Korean people and—over the longer term—plant the seeds for the development of civil society.

The Obama Administration’s dual-track policy of engagement and pressure toward the DPRK reflects a bipartisan recognition that only a policy of openness to dialogue when possible, combined with sustained, robust pressure through sanctions when necessary, can maximize prospects for progress in denuclearizing North Korea.

Progress on this decades-old problem will not be achieved easily or quickly. We cannot and should not dignify or, worse, feed the North Korean narrative that U.S. actions determine DPRK behavior. North Korea makes its own choices, selects its own timing, and is alone responsible for its actions. Similarly, we need to bear in mind that this is certainly not now—if it ever truly was—solely or even primarily a bilateral U.S.-DPRK issue. It is, rather, increasingly a global issue that requires an entrepreneurial approach, multilateral diplomacy and—yes—continuing, robust American leadership.

But above all else, genuine progress requires a fundamental shift in North Korea’s strategic calculus. The DPRK leadership must choose between provocation or peace, isolation or integration. North Korea will not achieve security, economic prosperity, and integration into the international community while it pursues nuclear weapons, threatens its neighbors, tramples on international norms, abuses its own people, and refuses to fulfill its longstanding obligations and commitments.

The international community has been increasingly clear about this, and so have we. The DPRK leadership in Pyongyang faces sharp choices. And we are working to further sharpen those choices. If the North Korean regime is at all wise, it will re-embark on the path to denuclearization for the benefit of the North Korean people, the Northeast Asia region, and the world.

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

U.S. AMBASSADOR DAVIES REMARKS ON U.S.-CHINA AND THE NORTH KOREAN PROBLEM

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Remarks to Reporters at Four Seasons Hotel
Remarks
Glyn Davies
Special Representative for North Korea Policy
Beijing, China
January 25, 2013

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Hello everybody, my name is Glyn Davies, it’s very good to see you. Thanks for coming out. I’m sorry that it is so late in the evening but I promise that I won’t take up too much of your time. What I wanted to do was simply report to you a bit on our activities today. You know that we arrived this morning from Seoul, South Korea. I’m here with Sydney Seiler from the National Security Staff at the White House, Ambassador Clifford Hart, who is the Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, as well as colleagues from the State Department. We’ve had a series of meetings with Chinese officials today. We began at the Central Committee International Department, met with Vice Minister Liu Jieyi, then went on to the Foreign Ministry where we met with Vice Minister Fu Ying, and then I had a meeting and a dinner with my counterpart, Ambassador Wu Dawei.

Now, we come here in the wake of some dramatic steps that have been reported on and I know many of you have read the reaction of the White House to the announcements made by North Korea. The White House Spokesman, of course, described the North Korean statements as needlessly provocative, a significant violation of UN Security Council resolutions and warned that this would only increase the isolation of North Korea and divert resources from the North Korean people were they to go ahead with a nuclear test. With Chinese counterparts today, we had very wide-ranging discussions, talked about all aspects of the North Korean challenge, the North Korea issue. We achieved, I think, with our Chinese colleagues a very strong degree of consensus on the issue. We agreed that Resolution 2087 is an appropriate response, and an important and strong response, to the North Koreans’ launch, on December 12, of a multi-stage rocket. We reached a strong degree of consensus that a nuclear test would be deeply troubling and would set back efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. And, of course, you all know that denuclearization is a necessary precondition to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

So, in addition to that, of course, from the North Koreans came further troubling statements of their intent to renounce their commitment to denuclearization, to walk away from the Six-Party Talks, and from their commitments that were made and contained in the September 2005 Joint Statement. So we are very pleased with the discussions we’ve had today here in Beijing. Tomorrow morning, very early, too early for any of you to worry about getting up, I think, we will get on a plane and go off to Tokyo for consultations with counterparts and colleagues of the Japanese government. So with that, let me take whatever questions you might have. Over to you.

QUESTION: Hi, from Reuters. Is North Korea’s threat to start war with South Korea if there are further economic sanctions, is that a credible threat?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, I don’t know that it’s for me to comment on the credibility or incredibility of North Korean statements. The fundamental point about North Korea is that we will judge North Korea by its actions, not its words. These types of inflammatory statements by North Korea do nothing to contribute to peace and stability on the peninsula. Now is a moment I think, when all parties in the Six-Party process, and in particular, North Korea should turn their attention to how to peacefully and diplomatically address challenges that concern them so we find this rhetoric troubling and counterproductive.

QUESTION: Ambassador, CNN here. So, China and North Korea are very close allies, so did the Chinese during your meetings give you any clarification or confirmation about how credible the North Korean threats have been, and did you ask for any of their clarification or confirmation and secondly, having joined in to approve that new, latest resolution at the UN, did the Chinese tell you they would follow up with more concrete steps now that North Koreans have unilaterally had these provocative statements.

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: No, I understand those questions, but what I don’t want to do is get into too specifically characterizing the Chinese position. What I said earlier about the degree of consensus we achieved today is about as far as I want to go today. I would direct you to the Chinese authorities for questions about their views about the credibility of threats, or what China’s next steps are. We talked about the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution, and the Chinese told us, assured us, that they would, of course, follow through and implement that Resolution, and we take them at their word.

QUESTION: What other measures will the U.S. take besides sanctions to solve the issue?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, I think the Security Council result is a powerful statement in and of itself and, of course, the first steps we take will be to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolution and you will have already seen today some announcements made out of government departments in Washington to conform to our law, our procedure, to those resolutions. So, that’s what we’re focusing on in the immediate future, we’ll see what events come about in the near-term. And I think it’s very important for all members of the international community to work hard to implement the provisions of not just Resolution 2087, but all of the prior resolutions that pertain to North Korea.

QUESTION: Is your position with the Chinese government this week has been to try to restart the Six-Party Talks despite its failure, I was wondering if in your talks with your Chinese counterparts have you considered any other option?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, we talked about possible diplomatic ways forward, but I think that the immediate challenge we face is dealing with the very provocative language from North Korea and what North Korea has done through its actions, in particular through the launch on December 12 of the rocket in contravention of Security Council resolutions, is they have made it that much more difficult to contemplate getting back to a diplomatic process.

Our policy, articulated by officials from President Obama on down — he gave a speech in Burma just at the end of last year that made this clear — is of course, to be prepared to respond to concrete steps taken by North Korea in order to engage in the diplomatic process going forward. If they reach out their hand, we’re quite prepared to reciprocate. So that’s where we are right now. This is a difficult moment that North Korea has put all of us in. It will require a lot of hard work, not just on the part of the partners in the Six-Party process, but all members of the international community, to make clear to North Korea that it faces a choice, and the choice is between further isolation, and indeed impoverishment of its people, or fulfilling its commitments, living up to the expectations that it set when it signed up to the September 2005 Joint Statement, and that’s really the state of play.

So we’re concentrating our efforts right on dealing with those issues. And we’ll see whether there will be room for diplomacy in the future. That’s up to North Korea. They’re the ones who have the choice and can take the steps to make that happen.

QUESTION: Brian Spegele from the Wall Street Journal. You mentioned a moment ago you need to differentiate North Korea’s actions from its words, take the two separately. In this case, can you explain a little more what you mean by that is specifically related to what’s been going on over the last few days and weeks, do we have any reason in this case to, and why we need to do that specifically here?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: What I don’t want to do, because I don’t think it would be helpful at this stage, is get into any kind of proscriptive laying out of steps that North Korea needs to take. We’ve been engaged in discussions with North Korea bilaterally, multilaterally, over a period of many years. There are a number of documents that one can look at that encapsulate the undertakings that North Korea have made, so I think it’s well understood what North Korea must do if it is to come back into compliance with Security Council resolutions and come back to fulfilling the commitments that it itself has made. So at this juncture, I’m not going to get into, I’m certainly not going to try to negotiate with North Korea through the press.

Are there any other questions?

QUESTION: Is there a sense that China is becoming exasperated with North Korea?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: That’s a question that you really ought to put to the Chinese. What I’d like to put the focus on right now is the fact that with the Chinese, over a period of time in New York, we were able to achieve a resolution that I think helps clarify for North Korea the choice they face and it’s an expression of the views of the international community, that can help all members of the international system understand better how they can play a role in conveying to North Korea the importance of North Korea living up to its expectations and meeting its commitments.

It’s very late. I don’t want to keep you here tonight. I want to thank you very much. At some point I’ll be back in Beijing and I hope I have a chance to talk with you again and answer your questions.

Thanks very much, talk to you again, bye-bye.

　

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT REP. DAVIES ANSWERS QUESTIONS ON NORTH KOREA

Map: North Korea. Credit: CIA World Factbook

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

Remarks at Narita AirportRemarks

Glyn Davies
Special Representative for North Korea Policy
Tokyo, Japan
October 16, 2012

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: It's wonderful to be back in Tokyo. I'm here for meetings with Japanese counterparts and then also a trilateral meeting tomorrow morning with Korean counterparts and Japanese counterparts. My host for this visit is Director General Sugiyama, and I want to thank him very much in advance for his hospitality.

I look forward to having good conversations with Japanese Government officials, and this is the first stop on a week-long trip to North Asia. I go on from here to Korea and then from there to China, for talks with those governments. And with that, I'm happy to try to answer your questions.

QUESTION: What are your expectations for the trilateral talks tomorrow?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: This trilateral meeting, this is not the first time we've done this. We do this every few months, this is very much a follow-up to the trilateral ministerial meeting that occurred in New York between the Foreign Ministers of Japan, Korea, and the United States just a few weeks ago at the United Nations General Assembly.

They discussed North Korea, among other issues, and we will follow up on those conversations. So the purpose of it is really to deepen our understanding of the issues, exchange views, and coordinate. This is particularly important given the fact that we are all coming up on political transitions, so we're very much looking forward to having these conversations.

QUESTION: I understand that you're not directly in charge of the territorial disputes, but with the current situation, do you have any concerns about the territorial disputes, that they might have a negative impact in terms of the unity of the trilateral meeting?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, I've found that on the North Korea issue, actually our coordination has been quite strong, and quite good, bilaterally obviously but then trilaterally with Korea as well. So I don't expect there to be any impact on our discussions. You know our basic position in the United States, which is that we hope very much and look to Japan, and China, and Korea to work these issues out between them. Thank you.

QUESTION: Just one more question. What is your current assessment of the North Korean situation in terms of nuclear development, missile development?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Well, we're in a somewhat troubling moment, because the North Koreans have been saying things that make it appear as if they are considering moving away from their long-standing obligation to denuclearize, which is spelled out best in the September 2005 Joint Statement.

This would be, we think, a big mistake for North Korea to make. Denuclearization is essential, from the standpoint of maintaining the Six Party Talks, it is the core reason why have Six Party Talks, is to work to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

And I think the other important thing is that North Korea will never have strong and full diplomatic, political, and economic relations with the outside world as long as it remains a nuclear outlaw. So it's very important that they take seriously their commitment to denuclearize and they follow up on it. That's one of the things we'll be talking about here today. Anyways, the flight was a little bit late, I've got to get to the hotel and then go to my meetings. So thank you very much.