AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO STATEMENT ON THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Testimony for Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs
“Countering the Lord’s Resistance Army”
Ambassador Donald Yamamoto,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to update the committee about
our ongoing efforts to help end the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA).  Over the last several years, the governments of the region have made
progress dispersing the LRA and reducing its numbers.  However, despite this
progress, the LRA continues to abduct, terrorize, and uproot communities across
three countries – the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), and South Sudan.  The LRA is a weakened force, but its
humanitarian impact remains disproportionate.  The UN Office of Coordination for
Humanitarian Affairs estimated that more than 465,000 people were displaced or
living as refugees during 2011 as a result of the LRA threat.
Mr. Chairman, we believe that the LRA’s actions are an affront to human
dignity and a threat to regional stability.  Joseph Kony and the LRA’s top leaders
should be brought to justice.

We appreciate Congress’ strong interest and longstanding concern about the
LRA, especially the attention given by this Committee over the years.  We view
Congress as a critical partner in our ongoing efforts.  The United States has worked
for many years to help address the suffering caused by the LRA.  Consistent with
the legislation passed in 2010, we continue to pursue a multi-faceted strategy to
help the governments and people of this region in their efforts to end the threat
posed by the LRA and address the human consequences of the LRA’s atrocities.  
Let me stress that the governments of Uganda, CAR, DRC, and South Sudan
are in the lead.  Their troops are making the most important sacrifices, and their
people are confronting the LRA’s terror.  These governments are the ones that are
ultimately responsible for ending this threat and protecting local communities.  The
United States is trying to help them fulfill that responsibility.  We have a strong
interest in enhancing the capacity and cooperation of our partners in Africa to
address threats to peace and security, such as the LRA, and to better protect their
citizens.

Continued leadership and cooperation by these governments is essential to
keep the pressure on the LRA.  As we have seen in the past, the LRA can exploit
any reduction in military or diplomatic pressure to regroup and rebuild its forces.
Over recent years, the State Department has provided support to enable counterLRA operations by our regional partners.  Since 2008, we have obligated
approximately $50 million in logistical support to help the Ugandan military
sustain its operations and increase its mobility.  We continue to provide this
support.

In the DRC, the State Department funded training and equipment for a light
infantry battalion of the Congolese army that is now operating in LRA-affected
areas of the DRC.  This battalion is engaged in targeted military operations against
the LRA in coordination with the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the
DRC (MONUSCO).  The State Department continues to fund two mentors who are
working with this battalion.  We are also engaging with the militaries of CAR and
South Sudan as they increase their efforts to counter the LRA and protect their
populations.

Mr. Chairman, we continue to look at ways that we can improve our security
assistance and enhance the capacity of these militaries to succeed in their mission.
Last October, President Obama authorized the deployment of a small number of
U.S. military forces to serve as advisors to the national military forces pursuing the
LRA and seeking to protect local populations.  The President announced yesterday
that the United States will continue the deployment.  My colleague from the
Department of Defense will go into more detail on the work of these advisors.  We
believe they are helping the partner forces to enhance their cooperation,
intelligence-sharing and fusion, and operational planning.
The U.S. military advisors are coordinating closely with the UN
peacekeeping missions in the region, especially to promote civilian protection.

MONUSCO, in particular, has stepped up its efforts to address the LRA in the
DRC.  MONUSCO conducts targeted military operations unilaterally as well as
jointly with the Congolese military to help protect civilians.  We have encouraged
the UN to scale up its efforts, when possible, to help address the LRA threat in
CAR and South Sudan.  The new UN Regional Office for Central Africa is
overseeing the developing of a regional UN strategy for addressing the LRA,
which will be presented to the UN Security Council next month.  We have been
working with the UN to develop this strategy and look forward to helping the UN
implement it.

We are also working closely with the African Union as it increases its efforts
to address the LRA.  Last month, the AU officially launched its Regional 3
Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA.  Although many operational
details are still being worked out, we believe the AU’s involvement can strengthen
coordination, information-sharing, and trust among the four militaries pursuing the
LRA.  We also believe the AU can help the governments in the region to develop a
common approach to encouraging LRA defections and ensuring effective
repatriation and reintegration of those who defect.  Our military advisors in the
field are coordinating with the AU staff as they stand up this initiative on the
ground, and our embassies are working closely with the AU’s Special Envoy on
the LRA issue, Francisco Madeira.

These new initiatives, united together, offer real promise.  However, as
Chairman Kerry wrote in The Huffington Post earlier this month, we have to level
with the American public that ending the LRA threat is not an easy mission.  The
LRA operates in very small groups across vast territory roughly the size of
California, much of it densely-forested.  Regional forces have had success in
tracking down LRA groups, but the LRA’s leaders are savvy.  They exploit
communal conflicts and attack remote communities, which lack basic road,
telecommunications and governance infrastructure.  Moreover, the governments in
this region have limited capabilities and numerous security challenges.
Mr. Chairman, effectively ending the LRA threat requires simultaneously
removing the top leadership from the battlefield and addressing the conditions that
leave communities so vulnerable to predatory groups such as the LRA.  This is
precisely why the United States is seeking to pursue a multi-faceted strategy to
enhance both military and civilian capacity in the region.   In partnership with
USAID, the State Department is supporting projects to increase civilian protection,
enhance early warning capabilities, deliver humanitarian relief, and strengthen the
overall resiliency of communities.  We also continue to encourage other
international donors to increase their efforts in these areas.  As we have seen in
northern Uganda and parts of South Sudan, development can play a critical role in
pushing out the LRA and keeping it from returning.

We also believe that targeted efforts, in coordination with increased military
pressure, to encourage LRA fighters to peacefully surrender can have a great effect
on reducing the LRA’s numbers.  Since 2000, more than 12,000 fighters and
abductees have left the group and been reintegrated and reunited with their families
through Uganda’s Amnesty Commission.  The successful rehabilitation and
reintegration of those who leave the LRA creates a positive feedback cycle that
encourages others to defect.

MONUSCO is undertaking critical efforts in the DRC to encourage LRA
defections, including by setting up assembly points where LRA fighters and
associated persons can safely surrender.  The Mission is publicizing the locations
of these assembly points through targeted radio broadcasts and leaflets.  We
strongly support these efforts and have encouraged the UN to initiate similar,
coordinated activities in CAR and South Sudan.  We are also looking at ways that
we can augment these activities through our programs and presence on the ground.
The State Department has deployed a civilian officer to the region who is working
with our military advisors and embassies to identify critical gaps and opportunities
for further U.S. support.  We plan to deploy a second officer soon.

Mr. Chairman, we believe there is an opportunity for further U.S. support to
the counter-LRA effort using the State Department’s War Crimes Rewards
Program.  This program allows the Secretary of State to publicize and pay rewards
for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of targeted war criminals.
This program has been very effective in bringing fugitives to justice, but the
present statutory authority is limited to fugitives indicted by the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Special Court
for Sierra Leone.

We welcome legislation that would expand the authority for the War Crimes
Reward Program so it could be used to target foreign nationals accused of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide by any international criminal
tribunal, including hybrid or mixed courts.  This would shift the program from
being court-specific to crime-specific.  Fugitives would only be added to the
program after careful review and approval by an interagency committee, and
ultimately the Secretary of State.

Under this expanded authority, we could use the program to target Joseph
Kony and other top LRA commanders.  We could publicize rewards for
information about LRA leaders using leaflets, radio broadcasts, and other
communications mechanisms.  We believe, and our colleagues at the Defense
Department agree, that this would provide an important tool to generate
information about the whereabouts of top LRA leaders, especially to encourage
non-indicted LRA fighters to defect and provide such information.
In closing, let me reiterate that it is our partners in the region – governments and
civil society organizations – who are in the lead in countering the LRA threat and
its impacts.  But the United States can provide critical capabilities and support to help them succeed in their efforts.  We believe doing so puts us on the right side of
history, on the right side of our values, and on the right side of our strategic
interests.   We appreciate Congress’ strong commitment to countering the LRA,
and we look forward to working with you in the months ahead.

STATE DEPARTMENT FACT SHEET ON "THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY" (LRA)

The following excerpt is from the U.S. State Department website:
The Lord's Resistance Army
Fact Sheet Office of the Spokesperson Washington, DC
March 23, 2012
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been active since 1986, making it one of Africa’s oldest, most violent, and persistent armed groups. The LRA was formed in northern Uganda to fight against the Government of Uganda, and operated there from 1986 to 2006. At the height of the conflict, nearly two million people in northern Uganda were displaced.

Lacking public support, the LRA resorted to forcible recruitment to fill its ranks. A 2006 study funded by UNICEF estimated that at least 66,000 children and youth had been abducted by the LRA between 1986 and 2005. According to that study, most of these children were only held for a brief period of time and then released or escaped, but others were forced to become child soldiers or sex slaves and commit unspeakable acts.

Under increasing pressure, LRA’s leader Joseph Kony ordered the LRA to withdraw completely from Uganda in 2005 and 2006 and move west into the border region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), and what would become the Republic of South Sudan. The LRA has continued to operate in this border region to date.

With the LRA’s departure, northern Uganda has undergone a significant positive transformation. More than 95% of the people who once lived in displacement camps have left to rebuild their lives. The United States has played a leading role, among donors, in supporting this Uganda-led recovery process.

Since 2000, more than 12,000 former LRA fighters and abductees have left the group and been reintegrated through Uganda’s Amnesty Commission. Many more have escaped and returned to their communities without going through reception centers.

From 2006 to 2008, representatives of the Government of Uganda and the LRA participated in negotiations in Juba, South Sudan, mediated by Southern Sudan officials. The U.S. State Department sent a senior official to support the talks. The negotiators finalized a peace agreement, but Joseph Kony refused on multiple occasions to sign. During 2008, the LRA increased attacks and abductions in the DRC and CAR. In late 2008, regional leaders agreed to undertake new military operations against the LRA. Since then, the Ugandan military has continued to pursue LRA groups across the region, in coordination with the other militaries.

As a result of military pressure and defections, the LRA’s core fighters have been reduced to an estimated 150-200, in addition to an unknown number of accompanying abductees, women and children. However, the LRA retains the capacity to cast a wide shadow across the region because of its brutality and the fear it arouses in local populations. According to the UN, there were 278 reported attacks attributed to the LRA in 2011. The UN estimates that more than 465,000 people in CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan were displaced or living as refugees during 2011 as a result of the LRA threat.

In 2005, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for the LRA’s top leader Joseph Kony and four other top commanders – Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and Raska Lukwiya – for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Otti and Lukwiya are now believed to be dead, but the others remain at large.

The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly condemned ongoing attacks carried out by the LRA and commended the important efforts undertaken by militaries in the region to address the threat posed by the LRA. The UN has peacekeeping operations in South Sudan and the DRC whose mandates include helping to address the LRA.

On November 22, 2011, the African Union formally designated the LRA as a terrorist group and authorized an initiative to enhance regional cooperation toward the elimination of the LRA. The U.S. State Department has included the LRA on its “Terrorist Exclusion List” since 2001. In 2008, Joseph Kony was designated by the State Department as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” under Executive Order 13324.

Over the past decade (FY 2002-FY 2011), the United States has provided more than $560 million in humanitarian assistance specifically benefiting LRA-affected populations in Uganda, CAR, the DRC and Sudan, in addition to countrywide assistance in the affected countries that could benefit individuals affected by LRA violence.