FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
04/16/2015 02:55 PM EDT
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced fraud charges against a New York City-based financial advisor accused of stealing at least $20 million from customers to fund his own brokerage accounts and then squandering the bulk of the money in highly unprofitable options trading.
The SEC alleges that Michael J. Oppenheim abused his position as a private client advisor at a global bank and persuaded some customers to withdraw millions of dollars out of their accounts by promising he would purchase safe and secure municipal bonds on their behalf. Instead, Oppenheim bought himself cashier’s checks and deposited them into his own brokerage account or his wife’s account that he controlled. Almost immediately after each theft and deposit, Oppenheim allegedly embarked on sizeable trading of stocks and options including Tesla, Apple, Google, and Netflix. Oppenheim typically lost the entire amount of each deposit, and his brokerage accounts currently show minimal cash balances. On occasions when his accounts did have positive cash balances, he allegedly wired money to bank accounts in his or his wife’s name. At least one outgoing wire was used to pay off a portion of his mortgage.
“We allege that Oppenheim promised his customers that he would invest their money in safe and secure investments, but he seized their funds and aggressively played the stock market in his own accounts,” said Amelia A. Cottrell, Associate Director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office.
In a parallel action, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York today announced criminal charges against Oppenheim.
According to the SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in Manhattan, Oppenheim took illicit steps to conceal his fraud. For instance, Oppenheim created false account statements when a customer asked for a statement reflecting his municipal bond holdings. Oppenheim simply pasted the customer’s name onto an account statement reflecting the holdings of another customer, and provided the fabricated statement to convince the customer that he had purchased the municipal bonds for his account as promised. In another instance, Oppenheim transferred money from one customer to another to replenish the amounts he had stolen earlier.
The SEC’s complaint charges Oppenheim, who lives in Livingston, N.J., with violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 as well as Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The SEC’s complaint seeks disgorgement of ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest and financial penalties as well as permanent injunctions barring future violations. The SEC’s complaint against Oppenheim names his wife Alexandra Oppenheim as a relief defendant for the purpose of recovering any customer funds transferred to her.
The SEC’s investigation, which is continuing, is being conducted by William Martin, Nancy Brown, Neil Hendelman, and Charles Riely of the New York Regional Office. The case is being supervised by Amelia A. Cottrell, and the SEC’s litigation will be led by Nancy Brown and William Martin. The New York Regional Office’s broker-dealer examination team of Michael Kress, Jennifer Fournier, and Ronald Sukhu assisted the investigation. The SEC appreciates the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.
A PUBLICATION OF RANDOM U.S.GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASES AND ARTICLES
Showing posts with label NEW YORK CITY. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NEW YORK CITY. Show all posts
Friday, April 17, 2015
Tuesday, January 27, 2015
AG HOLDER ANNOUNCES CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST MEMBERS OF SPY RING IN NEW YORK CITY
FROM: U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Monday, January 26, 2015
Attorney General Holder Announces Charges Against Russian Spy Ring in New York City
Spy Ring Attempted to Collect Economic Intelligence and Recruit New York City Residents as Intelligence Sources
Evgeny Buryakov, aka “Zhenya,” Worked Under “Non-Official Cover” as a Bank Employee in Manhattan
Attorney General Eric Holder, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara for the Southern District of New York and Assistant Director Randall C. Coleman of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division announced charges today against Evgeny Buryakov, aka “Zhenya,” Igor Sporyshev and Victor Podobnyy in connection with Buryakov’s service as a covert intelligence agent on behalf of the Russian Federation (Russia) in New York City, without notifying the U.S. Attorney General of Buryakov’s status as an agent of Russia, as required by federal law. Buryakov was placed under arrest earlier today in Bronx, New York, and is scheduled to appear before U.S. Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn in federal court in Manhattan later today. Sporyshev and Podobnyy no longer reside in the United States and have not been arrested. By virtue of their prior positions in the United States on behalf of Russia, both of them were protected by diplomatic immunity from arrest and prosecution while in the United States.
“These charges demonstrate our firm commitment to combating attempts by covert agents to illegally gather intelligence and recruit spies within the United States,” said Attorney General Holder. “We will use every tool at our disposal to identify and hold accountable foreign agents operating inside this country – no matter how deep their cover. I want to thank the dedicated men and women of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division and New York Field Office, the National Security Division’s Counterespionage Section and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York for their skilled handling of this complex and highly sensitive matter.”
“The attempt by foreign nations to illegally gather economic and other intelligence information in the United States through covert agents is a direct threat to the national security of the United States, and it exemplifies why counterespionage is a top priority of the National Security Division,” said Assistant Attorney General Carlin. “I want to thank the FBI’s New York Field Office and Counterintelligence Division as well as the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York for their continued effort to conduct these highly complex and sensitive counterespionage investigations and prosecutions, and for their continued close partnership with the National Security Division and the Counterespionage Section.”
“Following our previous prosecution with the FBI of Russian spies, who were expelled from the United States in 2010 when their plan to infiltrate upper levels of U.S. business and government was revealed, the arrest of Evgeny Buryakov and the charges against him and his co-defendants make clear that – more than two decades after the presumptive end of the Cold War – Russian spies continue to seek to operate in our midst under cover of secrecy,” said U.S. Attorney Bharara. “Indeed, the presence of a Russian banker in New York would in itself hardly draw attention today, which is why these alleged spies may have thought Buryakov would blend in. What they could not do without drawing the attention of the FBI was engage in espionage. New York City may be more hospitable to Russian businessmen than during the Cold War, but my office and the FBI remain vigilant to the illegal intelligence-gathering activities of other nations.”
“This investigation is one of many that highlight the determined and prolific efforts by foreign governments to target Americans for the purposes of collecting intelligence and stealing secrets,” Assistant Director Coleman. “This case is especially egregious as it demonstrates the actions of a foreign intelligence service to integrate a covert intelligence agent into American society under the cover of an employee in the financial sector. Espionage is as pervasive today as it has even been, and FBI counterintelligence teams will continue to aggressively investigate and expose hostile foreign intelligence activities conducted on U.S. soil.”
According to the complaint unsealed in Manhattan federal court today:
Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of Russia’s foreign intelligence agency, known as the SVR. Buryakov operated under “non-official cover,” meaning he entered and remained in the United States as a private citizen, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. SVR agents operating under such non-official cover – sometimes referred to as NOCs – typically are subject to less scrutiny by the host government, and, in many cases, are never identified as intelligence agents by the host government. As a result, a NOC is an extremely valuable intelligence asset for the SVR.
Federal law prohibits individuals from acting as agents of foreign governments within the United States without prior notification to the U.S. Attorney General. Department of Justice records indicate that Buryakov has never notified the U.S. Attorney General that he is, in fact, an agent of Russia.
Sporyshev and Podobnyy are also SVR agents who worked in the United States to gather intelligence on behalf of Russia by posing as official representatives of Russia. From Nov. 22, 2010, to Nov. 21, 2014, Sporyshev served as a trade representative of the Russian Federation in New York. From Dec. 13, 2012, to Sept. 12, 2013, Podobnyy served as an attaché to the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. Based on their official government postings on behalf of Russia, Sporyshev and Podobnyy are exempt from notifying the U.S. Attorney General of the true nature of their work. However, that exemption does not permit them to conspire with, or aid and abet, Buryakov in his work as an unregistered agent of Russia operating within the United States.
The intelligence-gathering efforts of Sporyshev and Podobnyy included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York City residents as intelligence sources for Russia; tasking Buryakov to gather intelligence; and transmitting intelligence reports prepared by Buryakov back to SVR headquarters in Moscow. Specifically, during the course of the charged offenses, Sporyshev was responsible for relaying assignments from the SVR to Buryakov, and Sporyshev and Podobnyy were responsible for analyzing and reporting back to the SVR about the fruits of Buryakov’s intelligence-gathering efforts.
The directives from the SVR to Buryakov, Sporyshev and Podobnyy, as well as to other covert SVR agents acting within the United States, included requests to gather intelligence on, among other subjects, potential U.S. sanctions against Russian banks and the United States’ efforts to develop alternative energy resources.
Clandestine Meetings and Communications
During the course of their work as covert SVR agents in the United States, Buryakov, Sporyshev and Podobnyy regularly met and communicated using clandestine methods and coded messages, in order to exchange intelligence-related information while shielding their associations with one another as SVR agents. These efforts were designed, among other things, to preserve their respective covers as an employee of a bank in Manhattan (Buryakov), a trade representative of the Russian Federation in New York (Sporyshev) and an attaché to the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations (Podobnyy). In particular, the defendants worked to safeguard Buryakov’s work as a NOC.
Sporyshev and Podobnyy acted as covert intermediaries for Buryakov to communicate with the SVR on intelligence-related matters. As an agent posing as someone without any official ties to the Russian government or the SVR, Buryakov was unable to access the SVR New York Office – which is located within an office maintained by Russia in New York City – without potentially alerting others to his association with the SVR. As such, Buryakov required the assistance of other SVR agents, like Sporyshev and Podobnyy, to exchange communications and information with the SVR through the communications systems located in the SVR New York Office.
From as early as March 2012 through as recently as mid-September 2014, the FBI has conducted physical or electronic surveillance of Buryakov and Sporyshev engaging in over 48 brief meetings, several of which involved Buryakov passing a bag, magazine or slip of paper to Sporyshev. These meetings typically took place outdoors, where the risk of effective surveillance was reduced relative to an indoor location.
These meetings were nearly always preceded by a short telephone call between Buryakov and Sporyshev, during which one of the men typically told the other that he had an item to give to him. Typically, during these telephone calls, which were intercepted by the FBI, the item in question was referred to as some non-specific ticket, book, list or other ordinary item (e.g., umbrella or hat).
Subsequently, at each meeting surveilled by the FBI, Buryakov and Sporyshev met and sometimes exchanged documents or other small items. Notably, despite discussing on approximately 12 occasions the need to meet to transfer “tickets,” Buryakov and Sporyshev, were – other than one occasion where they discussed going to a movie – never observed attending, or discussing in any detail, events that would typically require tickets, such as a sporting event or concert. In fact, Buryakov and Sporyshev used this coded language to signal that they needed to meet, and then met to exchange intelligence information.
Attempts by Sporyshev and Podobnyy to Recruit Intelligence Sources in New York City
In numerous recorded communications, Sporyshev and Podobnyy discussed their attempts to recruit U.S. residents, including several individuals employed by major companies, and several young women with ties to a major university located in New York City (University-1), as intelligence sources for the SVR. On these recordings, the defendants discussed the potential value of these sources and identified particular sources by use of a “source name,” which appears to be a coded name. In addition, during these recordings, Sporyshev and Podobnyy discussed the efforts of other SVR agents to recruit a number of other Russian-origin individuals associated with University-1 as intelligence sources.
For example, Sporyshev and Podobnyy discussed Podobnyy’s efforts to recruit a male working as a consultant in New York City as an intelligence source. During this conversation, Podobnyy explained his source recruitment method, which included cheating, promising favors and then discarding the intelligence source once the relevant information was obtained by the SVR: “This is intelligence method to cheat. . . . You promise a favor for a favor. You get the documents from him and tell him to go [expletive] himself.”
In other recorded conversations, Sporyshev and Podobnyy made clear that they worked for the SVR. For example, on Jan. 31, 2013, Sporyshev and another SVR agent not charged in the complaint (CC-1) had a discussion inside the SVR New York Office about their contracts with the SVR. Sporyshev stated that, “Everyone has a five-year contract,” and explained, in response to CC-1’s question about reimbursement for the travel of SVR agents’ family members, that “travel for military personnel and their families on authorized home leave is paid, and in our, in our SVR, this, the payment for getting to and from the duty station.” In addition, on April 25, 2013, Sporyshev and Podobnyy discussed the use of nontraditional cover for Russian intelligence officers and, in particular, the Illegals program that ended with the arrest of 10 “deep cover” SVR agents in July 2010.
Buryakov’s Intelligence Taskings
Sporyshev was responsible for relaying intelligence assignments from the SVR to Buryakov. The FBI obtained electronic recordings of several conversations relating to such intelligence directives being communicated to and carried out by Buryakov in his position as an SVR agent acting under non-official cover. For example, on May 21, 2013, Sporyshev called Buryakov to ask for Buryakov’s help in formulating questions to be used for intelligence gathering purposes by others associated with a leading Russian state-owned news organization (the News Organization). Buryakov responded by supplying Sporyshev with a particular line of questioning about the New York Stock Exchange for use by the News Organization.
Buryakov’s Receipt of Purported Official U.S. Government Documents
In the summer of 2014, Buryakov met numerous times with a confidential source working for the FBI (CS-1). CS-1 posed as the representative of a wealthy investor looking to develop casinos in Russia. During the course of these meetings, and consistent with his interests as a Russian intelligence agent, Buryakov demonstrated his strong desire to obtain information about subjects far outside the scope of his work as a bank employee. During these meetings, Buryakov also accepted documents that CS-1 claimed he had obtained from a U.S. government agency and which purportedly contained information potentially useful to Russia, including information about U.S. sanctions against Russia.
* * *
Buryakov, 39, Sporyshev, 40, and Podobnyy, 27, are charged on two counts. The first count charges the defendants with participating in a conspiracy for Buryakov to act in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without first notifying the Attorney General, and carries a statutory maximum penalty of five years in prison. The second count charges Buryakov with acting in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without first notifying the Attorney General, and charges Sporyshev and Podobnyy with aiding and abetting that offense. The second count carries a statutory maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendants will be determined by a judge.
The Attorney General is grateful for the investigative work of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division.
The prosecution is being handled by Senior Trial Attorney Heather Schmidt of the National Security Division’s Counterespionage Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Adam Fee, Ian McGinley and Anna M. Skotko for the Southern District of New York’s Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit.
The charges in the Complaint are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
Monday, January 26, 2015
Attorney General Holder Announces Charges Against Russian Spy Ring in New York City
Spy Ring Attempted to Collect Economic Intelligence and Recruit New York City Residents as Intelligence Sources
Evgeny Buryakov, aka “Zhenya,” Worked Under “Non-Official Cover” as a Bank Employee in Manhattan
Attorney General Eric Holder, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara for the Southern District of New York and Assistant Director Randall C. Coleman of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division announced charges today against Evgeny Buryakov, aka “Zhenya,” Igor Sporyshev and Victor Podobnyy in connection with Buryakov’s service as a covert intelligence agent on behalf of the Russian Federation (Russia) in New York City, without notifying the U.S. Attorney General of Buryakov’s status as an agent of Russia, as required by federal law. Buryakov was placed under arrest earlier today in Bronx, New York, and is scheduled to appear before U.S. Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn in federal court in Manhattan later today. Sporyshev and Podobnyy no longer reside in the United States and have not been arrested. By virtue of their prior positions in the United States on behalf of Russia, both of them were protected by diplomatic immunity from arrest and prosecution while in the United States.
“These charges demonstrate our firm commitment to combating attempts by covert agents to illegally gather intelligence and recruit spies within the United States,” said Attorney General Holder. “We will use every tool at our disposal to identify and hold accountable foreign agents operating inside this country – no matter how deep their cover. I want to thank the dedicated men and women of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division and New York Field Office, the National Security Division’s Counterespionage Section and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York for their skilled handling of this complex and highly sensitive matter.”
“The attempt by foreign nations to illegally gather economic and other intelligence information in the United States through covert agents is a direct threat to the national security of the United States, and it exemplifies why counterespionage is a top priority of the National Security Division,” said Assistant Attorney General Carlin. “I want to thank the FBI’s New York Field Office and Counterintelligence Division as well as the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York for their continued effort to conduct these highly complex and sensitive counterespionage investigations and prosecutions, and for their continued close partnership with the National Security Division and the Counterespionage Section.”
“Following our previous prosecution with the FBI of Russian spies, who were expelled from the United States in 2010 when their plan to infiltrate upper levels of U.S. business and government was revealed, the arrest of Evgeny Buryakov and the charges against him and his co-defendants make clear that – more than two decades after the presumptive end of the Cold War – Russian spies continue to seek to operate in our midst under cover of secrecy,” said U.S. Attorney Bharara. “Indeed, the presence of a Russian banker in New York would in itself hardly draw attention today, which is why these alleged spies may have thought Buryakov would blend in. What they could not do without drawing the attention of the FBI was engage in espionage. New York City may be more hospitable to Russian businessmen than during the Cold War, but my office and the FBI remain vigilant to the illegal intelligence-gathering activities of other nations.”
“This investigation is one of many that highlight the determined and prolific efforts by foreign governments to target Americans for the purposes of collecting intelligence and stealing secrets,” Assistant Director Coleman. “This case is especially egregious as it demonstrates the actions of a foreign intelligence service to integrate a covert intelligence agent into American society under the cover of an employee in the financial sector. Espionage is as pervasive today as it has even been, and FBI counterintelligence teams will continue to aggressively investigate and expose hostile foreign intelligence activities conducted on U.S. soil.”
According to the complaint unsealed in Manhattan federal court today:
Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of Russia’s foreign intelligence agency, known as the SVR. Buryakov operated under “non-official cover,” meaning he entered and remained in the United States as a private citizen, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. SVR agents operating under such non-official cover – sometimes referred to as NOCs – typically are subject to less scrutiny by the host government, and, in many cases, are never identified as intelligence agents by the host government. As a result, a NOC is an extremely valuable intelligence asset for the SVR.
Federal law prohibits individuals from acting as agents of foreign governments within the United States without prior notification to the U.S. Attorney General. Department of Justice records indicate that Buryakov has never notified the U.S. Attorney General that he is, in fact, an agent of Russia.
Sporyshev and Podobnyy are also SVR agents who worked in the United States to gather intelligence on behalf of Russia by posing as official representatives of Russia. From Nov. 22, 2010, to Nov. 21, 2014, Sporyshev served as a trade representative of the Russian Federation in New York. From Dec. 13, 2012, to Sept. 12, 2013, Podobnyy served as an attaché to the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. Based on their official government postings on behalf of Russia, Sporyshev and Podobnyy are exempt from notifying the U.S. Attorney General of the true nature of their work. However, that exemption does not permit them to conspire with, or aid and abet, Buryakov in his work as an unregistered agent of Russia operating within the United States.
The intelligence-gathering efforts of Sporyshev and Podobnyy included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York City residents as intelligence sources for Russia; tasking Buryakov to gather intelligence; and transmitting intelligence reports prepared by Buryakov back to SVR headquarters in Moscow. Specifically, during the course of the charged offenses, Sporyshev was responsible for relaying assignments from the SVR to Buryakov, and Sporyshev and Podobnyy were responsible for analyzing and reporting back to the SVR about the fruits of Buryakov’s intelligence-gathering efforts.
The directives from the SVR to Buryakov, Sporyshev and Podobnyy, as well as to other covert SVR agents acting within the United States, included requests to gather intelligence on, among other subjects, potential U.S. sanctions against Russian banks and the United States’ efforts to develop alternative energy resources.
Clandestine Meetings and Communications
During the course of their work as covert SVR agents in the United States, Buryakov, Sporyshev and Podobnyy regularly met and communicated using clandestine methods and coded messages, in order to exchange intelligence-related information while shielding their associations with one another as SVR agents. These efforts were designed, among other things, to preserve their respective covers as an employee of a bank in Manhattan (Buryakov), a trade representative of the Russian Federation in New York (Sporyshev) and an attaché to the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations (Podobnyy). In particular, the defendants worked to safeguard Buryakov’s work as a NOC.
Sporyshev and Podobnyy acted as covert intermediaries for Buryakov to communicate with the SVR on intelligence-related matters. As an agent posing as someone without any official ties to the Russian government or the SVR, Buryakov was unable to access the SVR New York Office – which is located within an office maintained by Russia in New York City – without potentially alerting others to his association with the SVR. As such, Buryakov required the assistance of other SVR agents, like Sporyshev and Podobnyy, to exchange communications and information with the SVR through the communications systems located in the SVR New York Office.
From as early as March 2012 through as recently as mid-September 2014, the FBI has conducted physical or electronic surveillance of Buryakov and Sporyshev engaging in over 48 brief meetings, several of which involved Buryakov passing a bag, magazine or slip of paper to Sporyshev. These meetings typically took place outdoors, where the risk of effective surveillance was reduced relative to an indoor location.
These meetings were nearly always preceded by a short telephone call between Buryakov and Sporyshev, during which one of the men typically told the other that he had an item to give to him. Typically, during these telephone calls, which were intercepted by the FBI, the item in question was referred to as some non-specific ticket, book, list or other ordinary item (e.g., umbrella or hat).
Subsequently, at each meeting surveilled by the FBI, Buryakov and Sporyshev met and sometimes exchanged documents or other small items. Notably, despite discussing on approximately 12 occasions the need to meet to transfer “tickets,” Buryakov and Sporyshev, were – other than one occasion where they discussed going to a movie – never observed attending, or discussing in any detail, events that would typically require tickets, such as a sporting event or concert. In fact, Buryakov and Sporyshev used this coded language to signal that they needed to meet, and then met to exchange intelligence information.
Attempts by Sporyshev and Podobnyy to Recruit Intelligence Sources in New York City
In numerous recorded communications, Sporyshev and Podobnyy discussed their attempts to recruit U.S. residents, including several individuals employed by major companies, and several young women with ties to a major university located in New York City (University-1), as intelligence sources for the SVR. On these recordings, the defendants discussed the potential value of these sources and identified particular sources by use of a “source name,” which appears to be a coded name. In addition, during these recordings, Sporyshev and Podobnyy discussed the efforts of other SVR agents to recruit a number of other Russian-origin individuals associated with University-1 as intelligence sources.
For example, Sporyshev and Podobnyy discussed Podobnyy’s efforts to recruit a male working as a consultant in New York City as an intelligence source. During this conversation, Podobnyy explained his source recruitment method, which included cheating, promising favors and then discarding the intelligence source once the relevant information was obtained by the SVR: “This is intelligence method to cheat. . . . You promise a favor for a favor. You get the documents from him and tell him to go [expletive] himself.”
In other recorded conversations, Sporyshev and Podobnyy made clear that they worked for the SVR. For example, on Jan. 31, 2013, Sporyshev and another SVR agent not charged in the complaint (CC-1) had a discussion inside the SVR New York Office about their contracts with the SVR. Sporyshev stated that, “Everyone has a five-year contract,” and explained, in response to CC-1’s question about reimbursement for the travel of SVR agents’ family members, that “travel for military personnel and their families on authorized home leave is paid, and in our, in our SVR, this, the payment for getting to and from the duty station.” In addition, on April 25, 2013, Sporyshev and Podobnyy discussed the use of nontraditional cover for Russian intelligence officers and, in particular, the Illegals program that ended with the arrest of 10 “deep cover” SVR agents in July 2010.
Buryakov’s Intelligence Taskings
Sporyshev was responsible for relaying intelligence assignments from the SVR to Buryakov. The FBI obtained electronic recordings of several conversations relating to such intelligence directives being communicated to and carried out by Buryakov in his position as an SVR agent acting under non-official cover. For example, on May 21, 2013, Sporyshev called Buryakov to ask for Buryakov’s help in formulating questions to be used for intelligence gathering purposes by others associated with a leading Russian state-owned news organization (the News Organization). Buryakov responded by supplying Sporyshev with a particular line of questioning about the New York Stock Exchange for use by the News Organization.
Buryakov’s Receipt of Purported Official U.S. Government Documents
In the summer of 2014, Buryakov met numerous times with a confidential source working for the FBI (CS-1). CS-1 posed as the representative of a wealthy investor looking to develop casinos in Russia. During the course of these meetings, and consistent with his interests as a Russian intelligence agent, Buryakov demonstrated his strong desire to obtain information about subjects far outside the scope of his work as a bank employee. During these meetings, Buryakov also accepted documents that CS-1 claimed he had obtained from a U.S. government agency and which purportedly contained information potentially useful to Russia, including information about U.S. sanctions against Russia.
* * *
Buryakov, 39, Sporyshev, 40, and Podobnyy, 27, are charged on two counts. The first count charges the defendants with participating in a conspiracy for Buryakov to act in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without first notifying the Attorney General, and carries a statutory maximum penalty of five years in prison. The second count charges Buryakov with acting in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without first notifying the Attorney General, and charges Sporyshev and Podobnyy with aiding and abetting that offense. The second count carries a statutory maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendants will be determined by a judge.
The Attorney General is grateful for the investigative work of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division.
The prosecution is being handled by Senior Trial Attorney Heather Schmidt of the National Security Division’s Counterespionage Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Adam Fee, Ian McGinley and Anna M. Skotko for the Southern District of New York’s Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit.
The charges in the Complaint are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
Tuesday, January 20, 2015
MAN ARRESTED FOR TRYING TO ACQUIRE RICIN THROUGH THE "DARK WEB"
FROM: U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Tuesday, January 20, 2015
New York Man Indicted For Attempting to Acquire Deadly Toxin, Ricin
Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara for the Southern District of New York and Assistant Director-in-Charge George Venizelos of the FBI’s New York Office, announced today that a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Cheng Le for attempting to acquire and distribute ricin and committing postal fraud. Le was arrested on Dec. 23, 2014, by the FBI in Manhattan. He was presented on a Complaint before the U.S. Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV on Dec. 24, 2014, and has been detained since his arrest. He is expected to be arraigned on Friday, January 23, 2015, before the United States District Judge Alison J. Nathan.
“As alleged, Cheng Le attempted to acquire ricin, a potentially lethal toxin, through the Dark Web so that it could be used for deadly purposes,” said U.S. Attorney Bharara. “Thankfully, with the help of our law enforcement partners he was intercepted and must now answer for his alleged crimes.”
“In the shadows of the Dark Web, criminals hide behind a veil of anonymity, sniffing out hidden opportunities to buy and sell illegal and potentially dangerous merchandise,” said Assistant Director-in-Charge Venizelos. “As alleged, in this case, activity carried out in the marketplace served as a conduit for Le to obtain ricin. In his desire to acquire this potentially deadly toxin, he picked his own poison and now faces the consequences of the justice system.”
According to the Complaint, which was unsealed today in Manhattan federal court, and the indictment:
Ricin is a highly potent and potentially fatal toxin with no known antidote. In December 2014, an individual (the Ricin Buyer) contacted an FBI online covert employee (the OCE) on an online forum. During Dec. 2014, the Ricin Buyer exchanged a series of messages with the OCE, during which the Ricin Buyer explored the possibility of the OCE supplying the Ricin Buyer with ricin, for the Ricin Buyer to resell to at least one secondary buyer.
On or about Dec. 18, 2014, the Ricin Buyer directed the OCE to send a quantity of ricin to a particular postal box in Manhattan (the Postal Box). The FBI later determined that the Postal Box belonged to Cheng Le. Later that same day, FBI agents observed Le wear latex gloves while retrieving a package from the Postal Box (the Package) and mailing it at a nearby post office (the Post Office). Law enforcement officers examined the Package, confirmed that it did not contain any hazardous materials, and determined that Le had listed a fake name as the Package’s return address. A postal employee (the Postal Employee) informed the FBI that the Postal Employee had seen Le at the Post Office on multiple prior occasions and that Le has worn blue latex gloves on at least some of those occasions.
The FBI prepared a package (the Sham Shipment) that was consistent with the Ricin Buyer’s request to the OCE, which was then delivered to the Postal Box. On Dec. 23, 2014, Le, wearing latex gloves, retrieved the Sham Shipment, opened it, and took the contents to his apartment, whereupon he was arrested by FBI agents.
* * *
The indictment charges Le, 21, in two counts. Count One charges Le with attempting to possess a biological toxin for use as a weapon, and carries a maximum sentence of life in prison. Count Two charges Le with using a fictitious name in furtherance of unlawful business involving the mail, and carries a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.
Assistant Attorney General Carlin is grateful for the outstanding investigative efforts of the FBI, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS). Le’s arrest is the result of the close cooperative efforts of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force—which consists of law enforcement officers of the FBI, NYPD, USPIS and other agencies.
The case is being prosecuted by the office’s Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Ilan Graff and Andrew D. Beaty are in charge of the prosecution, with assistance provided by Trial Attorney Joseph Kaster of the Justice Department’s Counterterrorism Section.
The charges contained in the indictment are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
Tuesday, January 20, 2015
New York Man Indicted For Attempting to Acquire Deadly Toxin, Ricin
Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara for the Southern District of New York and Assistant Director-in-Charge George Venizelos of the FBI’s New York Office, announced today that a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Cheng Le for attempting to acquire and distribute ricin and committing postal fraud. Le was arrested on Dec. 23, 2014, by the FBI in Manhattan. He was presented on a Complaint before the U.S. Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV on Dec. 24, 2014, and has been detained since his arrest. He is expected to be arraigned on Friday, January 23, 2015, before the United States District Judge Alison J. Nathan.
“As alleged, Cheng Le attempted to acquire ricin, a potentially lethal toxin, through the Dark Web so that it could be used for deadly purposes,” said U.S. Attorney Bharara. “Thankfully, with the help of our law enforcement partners he was intercepted and must now answer for his alleged crimes.”
“In the shadows of the Dark Web, criminals hide behind a veil of anonymity, sniffing out hidden opportunities to buy and sell illegal and potentially dangerous merchandise,” said Assistant Director-in-Charge Venizelos. “As alleged, in this case, activity carried out in the marketplace served as a conduit for Le to obtain ricin. In his desire to acquire this potentially deadly toxin, he picked his own poison and now faces the consequences of the justice system.”
According to the Complaint, which was unsealed today in Manhattan federal court, and the indictment:
Ricin is a highly potent and potentially fatal toxin with no known antidote. In December 2014, an individual (the Ricin Buyer) contacted an FBI online covert employee (the OCE) on an online forum. During Dec. 2014, the Ricin Buyer exchanged a series of messages with the OCE, during which the Ricin Buyer explored the possibility of the OCE supplying the Ricin Buyer with ricin, for the Ricin Buyer to resell to at least one secondary buyer.
On or about Dec. 18, 2014, the Ricin Buyer directed the OCE to send a quantity of ricin to a particular postal box in Manhattan (the Postal Box). The FBI later determined that the Postal Box belonged to Cheng Le. Later that same day, FBI agents observed Le wear latex gloves while retrieving a package from the Postal Box (the Package) and mailing it at a nearby post office (the Post Office). Law enforcement officers examined the Package, confirmed that it did not contain any hazardous materials, and determined that Le had listed a fake name as the Package’s return address. A postal employee (the Postal Employee) informed the FBI that the Postal Employee had seen Le at the Post Office on multiple prior occasions and that Le has worn blue latex gloves on at least some of those occasions.
The FBI prepared a package (the Sham Shipment) that was consistent with the Ricin Buyer’s request to the OCE, which was then delivered to the Postal Box. On Dec. 23, 2014, Le, wearing latex gloves, retrieved the Sham Shipment, opened it, and took the contents to his apartment, whereupon he was arrested by FBI agents.
* * *
The indictment charges Le, 21, in two counts. Count One charges Le with attempting to possess a biological toxin for use as a weapon, and carries a maximum sentence of life in prison. Count Two charges Le with using a fictitious name in furtherance of unlawful business involving the mail, and carries a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.
Assistant Attorney General Carlin is grateful for the outstanding investigative efforts of the FBI, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS). Le’s arrest is the result of the close cooperative efforts of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force—which consists of law enforcement officers of the FBI, NYPD, USPIS and other agencies.
The case is being prosecuted by the office’s Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Ilan Graff and Andrew D. Beaty are in charge of the prosecution, with assistance provided by Trial Attorney Joseph Kaster of the Justice Department’s Counterterrorism Section.
The charges contained in the indictment are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
Thursday, December 18, 2014
REMARKS: ACTING AG GUPTA ON UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT FOR YOUTH ON RIKERS ISLAND
FROM: U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Remarks by Acting Assistant Attorney General Vanita Gupta at the Press Conference to Announce the Department's Intervention to Remedy Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement for Youth on Rikers Island
New York City, NYUnited States ~ Thursday, December 18, 2014
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery
Thank you, Preet. It is an honor to join you to announce the filing of this important piece of litigation. The enforcement of the nation’s civil rights laws is a partnership between the Civil Rights Division and United States Attorneys across this country. Your office has been a leader in this effort and you and your team have undertaken many important civil rights initiatives, including your critical work on Rikers Island.
As Preet mentioned, we are here today to announce our intervention in a class action suit against New York City over a pattern and practice of excessive force and violence in New York City jails on Rikers Island that violate the constitutional rights of adolescent inmates.
The authority to deprive individuals of their liberty and place them in a prison or a jail is one of the most profound powers of government. With the exercise of that power comes the responsibility to ensure that at least minimum standards of care and protection are observed. Our constitution recognizes that individuals who are incarcerated have the right to reasonable protection from violence, and to be provided basic necessities of life. These are not only essential constitutional principles, but good public policy and fundamental to public safety and the safety of correctional staff. When governments fail to meet these basic responsibilities, the Department of Justice stands ready to appeal to the Courts to ensure that basic rights are respected. Today, we are doing just that -- taking legal action to ensure that critically important reforms are put in place to address conduct reflecting the culture of violence at Rikers Island that has violated the constitutional rights of New York City’s youngest inmates.
The mandate to ensure safe and humane jail conditions is never more important than when we incarcerate young people. The findings of the investigation of the United States Attorney’s Office can only be described as deeply disturbing. Young people are subject to unnecessary and excessive violence by staff, and to the overuse of punitive segregation. They are not protected from other inmates. This suit is essential to bring urgent and necessary, sustainable change to the conditions at Rikers Island through a court enforceable agreement.
The Civil Rights Division works to address unconstitutional conditions in prisons, jails and juvenile facilities across this nation. For example, from Cook County, Illinois to New Orleans, Louisiana to Muscogee, Oklahoma, we have reached cooperative agreements that ensure that people in prison are treated humanely and consistent with the constitution. From that work we have learned that, sadly, Rikers is not alone. In far too many places, youth held in adult jails are subject to abhorrent and abusive conditions.
We have also learned that mistreatment, violence and neglect are not inevitable. The problems we see on Rikers Island can be fixed. Reform works and the changes we seek will not only ensure that the rights of youthful inmates are protected, but will make a safer work place for corrections staff and promote public safety.
Most prisoners return to their communities following incarceration. If our compassion does not motivate us to ensure that youthful prisoners are treated with a minimum of decency, our self-interest demands it. The conditions in which they are confined, the services that they are provided and the opportunities that they are given are critical to their ability to succeed when they come home. We can make kids better or worse by the way we treat them while they are locked up.
Moreover, the adverse and dangerous conditions that prevail on Rikers Island place the lives and safety of staff at risk. It is clear from our investigation that corrections officers do not have adequate programmatic options to deal with an admittedly complex and difficult population. The risk is compounded by the failure to give staff sufficient policy guidance, necessary training, support through supervision and important accountability systems. These systems failures create a toxic mix that harms prisoners and staff alike.
We recognize that the city has taken initial steps to start reform. We applaud the Mayor for his public commitment to fixing the problems. We are committed to working with the city to get at core issues. Through this litigation, we seek a court enforceable agreement to ensure that:
excess force will be prohibited, that staff will be trained to deescalate and maintain control without excessive force and that when force is used inappropriately it will be identified and addressed;
That necessary steps will be taken to protect youth from violence; and
That other necessary measures are taken to ensure that the rights of adolescent inmates are protected.
It is our sincere hope that we can resolve these issues with the city through a court enforceable agreement with a monitor in order to implement sustainable systemic reforms. We also hope that this matter can be resolved quickly so that all available resources can be directed at fixing the problems and not in litigation. Thank you.
Remarks by Acting Assistant Attorney General Vanita Gupta at the Press Conference to Announce the Department's Intervention to Remedy Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement for Youth on Rikers Island
New York City, NYUnited States ~ Thursday, December 18, 2014
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery
Thank you, Preet. It is an honor to join you to announce the filing of this important piece of litigation. The enforcement of the nation’s civil rights laws is a partnership between the Civil Rights Division and United States Attorneys across this country. Your office has been a leader in this effort and you and your team have undertaken many important civil rights initiatives, including your critical work on Rikers Island.
As Preet mentioned, we are here today to announce our intervention in a class action suit against New York City over a pattern and practice of excessive force and violence in New York City jails on Rikers Island that violate the constitutional rights of adolescent inmates.
The authority to deprive individuals of their liberty and place them in a prison or a jail is one of the most profound powers of government. With the exercise of that power comes the responsibility to ensure that at least minimum standards of care and protection are observed. Our constitution recognizes that individuals who are incarcerated have the right to reasonable protection from violence, and to be provided basic necessities of life. These are not only essential constitutional principles, but good public policy and fundamental to public safety and the safety of correctional staff. When governments fail to meet these basic responsibilities, the Department of Justice stands ready to appeal to the Courts to ensure that basic rights are respected. Today, we are doing just that -- taking legal action to ensure that critically important reforms are put in place to address conduct reflecting the culture of violence at Rikers Island that has violated the constitutional rights of New York City’s youngest inmates.
The mandate to ensure safe and humane jail conditions is never more important than when we incarcerate young people. The findings of the investigation of the United States Attorney’s Office can only be described as deeply disturbing. Young people are subject to unnecessary and excessive violence by staff, and to the overuse of punitive segregation. They are not protected from other inmates. This suit is essential to bring urgent and necessary, sustainable change to the conditions at Rikers Island through a court enforceable agreement.
The Civil Rights Division works to address unconstitutional conditions in prisons, jails and juvenile facilities across this nation. For example, from Cook County, Illinois to New Orleans, Louisiana to Muscogee, Oklahoma, we have reached cooperative agreements that ensure that people in prison are treated humanely and consistent with the constitution. From that work we have learned that, sadly, Rikers is not alone. In far too many places, youth held in adult jails are subject to abhorrent and abusive conditions.
We have also learned that mistreatment, violence and neglect are not inevitable. The problems we see on Rikers Island can be fixed. Reform works and the changes we seek will not only ensure that the rights of youthful inmates are protected, but will make a safer work place for corrections staff and promote public safety.
Most prisoners return to their communities following incarceration. If our compassion does not motivate us to ensure that youthful prisoners are treated with a minimum of decency, our self-interest demands it. The conditions in which they are confined, the services that they are provided and the opportunities that they are given are critical to their ability to succeed when they come home. We can make kids better or worse by the way we treat them while they are locked up.
Moreover, the adverse and dangerous conditions that prevail on Rikers Island place the lives and safety of staff at risk. It is clear from our investigation that corrections officers do not have adequate programmatic options to deal with an admittedly complex and difficult population. The risk is compounded by the failure to give staff sufficient policy guidance, necessary training, support through supervision and important accountability systems. These systems failures create a toxic mix that harms prisoners and staff alike.
We recognize that the city has taken initial steps to start reform. We applaud the Mayor for his public commitment to fixing the problems. We are committed to working with the city to get at core issues. Through this litigation, we seek a court enforceable agreement to ensure that:
excess force will be prohibited, that staff will be trained to deescalate and maintain control without excessive force and that when force is used inappropriately it will be identified and addressed;
That necessary steps will be taken to protect youth from violence; and
That other necessary measures are taken to ensure that the rights of adolescent inmates are protected.
It is our sincere hope that we can resolve these issues with the city through a court enforceable agreement with a monitor in order to implement sustainable systemic reforms. We also hope that this matter can be resolved quickly so that all available resources can be directed at fixing the problems and not in litigation. Thank you.
Wednesday, October 15, 2014
WHITE HOUSE READOUT: HOMELAND SECURITY ASSISTANT MEETS WITH NEW YOUR CITY OFFICIALS
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
October 14, 2014
Readout of Lisa Monaco’s Meeting with New York City Officials
The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Lisa Monaco, met at the White House this afternoon with New York City Mayor Bill De Blasio and New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton to discuss strengthening federal, state, and local coordination on counterterrorism issues as well as the U.S. government’s response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa. On counterterrorism, they reviewed threat streams overseas associated with al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and the Khorasan Group, and discussed measures to take to better protect the U.S. homeland from potential threats posed by these groups as well as homegrown violent extremists. They specifically noted the threat from foreign fighters, including Western passport-holders, and the comprehensive, whole-of-government strategy to counter it. On Ebola, they reviewed the status of additional airport screening measures that were implemented at New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport on Saturday and that will be rolled out later this week at Newark and other domestic airports. They also reviewed ongoing efforts to prepare hospitals and healthcare workers nationwide, including in New York City, to identify and treat Ebola patients safely and effectively.
Wednesday, April 3, 2013
NEW YORK CITY FROM SPACE
FROM: NASA
One of the Expedition 35 crew members aboard the Earth-orbiting International Space Station exposed this 400 millimeter night image of the greater New York City metropolitan area on March 23, 2103.For orientation purposes, note that Manhattan runs horizontal through the frame from left to the midpoint. Central Park is just a little to the left of frame center.Image Credit: NASA
Saturday, February 2, 2013
FEMA CLAIMS 95% DONE WITH HURRICANE SANDY DEBRIS REMOVAL FROM NEW YORK
Hurricane Sandy Cleanup. Credit: FEMA |
Sandy Debris Removal Passes 95 percent in 95 days February 1, 2013
NEW YORK – Debris removal efforts after Hurricane Sandy in New York are nearing completion. More than 95 percent of the debris has been removed within 95 days of the storm hitting New York.
That includes everything from fallen trees to vehicles, boats, drywall and furniture, washers, dryers and insulation. It all amounts to 5.25 million cubic yards of debris caused by the strong winds and heavy rains created by Hurricane Sandy, beginning Oct. 27, 2012. That’s enough debris to fill the 102-story Empire State Building a little more than 3.5 times.
Collecting and hauling debris to the curbs has involved homeowners, neighbors and volunteers working with city, state and federal agencies. Neighbors and volunteers combined their skill and chainsaws to remove broken trees from yards and streets along with cleaning up disaster debris from public streets.
The demolition of destroyed structures is ongoing and about 20 percent complete.
Early in the cleanup, barges were used to haul debris to landfills in upstate New York.
The debris is also being trucked to landfills in other states.
Vegetation, such as wood, tree branches, leaves and other organic matter, is incinerated or chipped. Chips will be recycled for beneficial reuse.
FEMA’s Public Assistance program reimburses state and local governments and certain private nonprofit organizations 75 percent of eligible debris removal costs. In order to qualify, damage must be a direct result of Hurricane Sandy.
Saturday, December 29, 2012
RECENT PHOTOS FROM FEMA
FROM: FEMA, HURRICANE SANDY
Far Rockaway, N.Y., Dec. 19, 2012 -- The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is continuing coordination of sand screening, sifting and remediation at Jacob Riis Park, in the New York City borough of Queens. FEMA is providing public assistance funds to aid in the cleanup and restoration of the Rockaways and Breezy Point, Queens, NY. Andre R. Aragon/FEMA
Tuesday, November 13, 2012
RECENT U.S. NAVY PHOTOS
FROM: U.S. NAVY
Wounded Warriors participate in wheel chair basketball practice as part of the first ever Wounded Warrior Pacific Trials at the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam Gym. Nearly 50 seriously wounded, ill and injured Sailors and Coast Guardsmen from across the country are competing for a place on the 2013 Warrior Games Navy-Coast Guard team. The U.S. Navy has a 237-year heritage of defending freedom and projecting and protecting U.S. interests around the globe. Join the conversation on social media using #warfighting. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Daniel Barker (Released) 121112-N-RI884-118
Electronics Technician 2nd Class Shawn Cutter, assigned to the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1), removes debris from a street in Staten Island, New York, that was leveled during Hurricane Sandy. More than 130 Sailors and Marines volunteered to help remove debris from sections from the hard hit Breezy Point neighborhoods, roads, and alleys. Wasp, USS San Antonio (LPD 17), and USS Carter Hill (LSD 50) are positioned in New York City's harbor to provide relief support to areas affected by Hurricane Sandy. The U.S. Navy has a 237-year heritage of defending freedom and projecting and protecting U.S. interests around the globe. Join the conversation on social media using #warfighting. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Gretchen Albrecht (Released) 121109-N-NR998-161
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