JAMES DOBBINS HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN IN NEW DELHI

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Press Conference in New Delhi
Press Conference
Ambassador James Dobbins, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
New Delhi, India
June 27, 2013

Ambassador Dobbins: Thank you. It’s a pleasure to be here in New Delhi. I’ve been in the job I currently hold for a month now. I’ve been touring the region for the last week. I went to Doha with Secretary Kerry for discussions there, and then met with President Karzai in Kabul on Monday and with Prime Minister Nawaz and other Pakistani officials on Tuesday. I arrived here yesterday and met with the Foreign Secretary and others from the Foreign Ministry yesterday evening. I’ll meet with the Indian Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Ambassador [Lamba] who is an old friend from a decade ago after this meeting.

I think the last time I was in New Delhi was in a similar capacity. I was the American Special Envoy for Afghanistan also in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and represented the U.S. in the early diplomacy after 9/11 which led to the Bonn Conference and the establishment of an interim government in Afghanistan which ultimately led to the current constitution and current government in Afghanistan.

So I’ve come back at an interesting and pivotal time, a time when NATO and the United States are transitioning from a combat to an advisory and assistance role in Afghanistan, and maybe more importantly a time when Afghanistan will be going through its first peaceful democratic transition in its national history.

I’ve come to Delhi and hope to be able to come back regularly because India has an important stake in Afghanistan and it has important influence in Afghanistan, and it’s important that we understand Indian views and obviously that India understands our views and that we collaborate as closely as possible which I certainly did 10 years ago or 11 years ago when the Indian representative and I, Ambassador [Lamba] collaborated very closely, very effectively, in bringing about the emergence of an interim government in Afghanistan, and I anticipate that we’ll be able to continue to collaborate on a similar basis. So I’ll be glad to answer questions.

Press: What talks with the Indian [inaudible] the Special Envoy. What [were] talks?

Ambassador Dobbins: The talks pretty much covered all aspects of our relations with Afghanistan and also to some degree with Pakistan where I had just been, but the focus was on Afghanistan.

The issue that’s probably most topical because it’s been in the news lately is the efforts to begin a peace process and I would say that was probably the single, the topic that occupied the most time. But we also talked about other issues including the upcoming Afghan elections and the political transition. And I think while a lot of us concentrate on our attention on both the possible peace process on the one hand and the military situation and the reduction in NATO and American forces, those are not the most important things that are going on. The most important things that are going on, the thing that will shape Afghanistan’s future more than anything else is the political transition that will take place next year.

Press: What topics?

Ambassador Dobbins: I think we talked about the election process, about the international [inaudible], that it’s a free and fair process, and how we can encourage the Afghan political elites to coalesce around candidates who have broad non-sectarian or cross-sectarian appeal. Candidates who don’t just represent one sectarian community but bring together coalitions that will result in an administration that has support and appeal in Pashtun, Hazara, Tajik, Uzbek communities.

On the reconciliation there were a lot of questions about where we stand in terms of the possibilities of opening a Taliban office in Doha for the purpose of negotiating and I explained where that process stood.

Press: Could you summarize what the Indian view was to your [Doha] peace process and how you responded to what has widely been considered [inaudible] of great [inaudible]?

Ambassador Dobbins: They questioned me closely about what the prospects were, what the exact status was, and I hope that they were somewhat reassured as a result. They weren’t telling me they were opposed, they weren’t telling me that this was something we should stay away from, but they clearly had anxieties, anxieties that we all have. Nobody knows how this is going to progress and it’s certainly not a sure thing that it will result in a diminished violence and a successful evolution toward peace. But I didn’t get a sense that they thought it wasn’t worth trying.

I don’t really want to speak for the Indian side, however. I think they’re perfectly capable of doing that for themselves. For our standpoint we’re going into this process with open eyes and without naïve or excessive expectations of rapid progress or even a certainty that there will be any progress at all. Indeed, there’s no certainty that the process will even start since we’re still waiting for responses from the Taliban as to whether they’re prepared to operate under the conditions that the government of Qatar has set, whether they’re prepared to meet with us, and whether they’re prepared to meet with representatives of the Afghan High Peace Council. We haven’t yet received definitive responses on those questions.

Press: After the change of government in Islamabad, what is your assessment for improvement of India-Pakistan ties, and how important do you see that in terms of [Afghanistan’s situation] post 2014?

Ambassador Dobbins: I think that any improvement in India-Pakistan ties will almost automatically improve Afghanistan’s situation. I’ve met twice now in little more than two weeks with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The first time shortly before he became Prime Minister and then again the day before yesterday. My sense is that an improvement in relations with India is fairly high on his list of priorities. He’s got an overwhelming set of problems facing him, most immediately economic pressures, also significant domestic violence that he need to cope with.

But on the external front, and I think he understands that internal and external affairs are related, my sense is that improving relations with India seems to be his top priority.

Press: [What is the] concern [in] India? [Inaudible] talks with Taliban? Without [inaudible] of terrorists, do you believe that an improvement in Indo relations with Pakistan [or] Taliban [will pass]?

Ambassador Dobbins: We certainly agree that there’s no prospect for improvement in relations with the Taliban or any agreement with the Taliban unless the issue of terrorism is directly addressed. We set as a precondition for beginning talks with the Taliban that they make a statement that at least began to distance themselves from international terrorism and they did so. They made a statement a week ago Tuesday in which they said they opposed the use of Afghan territory for attacks on anybody else. But that’s I think from our standpoint sufficient to begin talking to them, but it’s not going to be sufficient as the basis for any agreement.

We’ve made clear, Secretary Kerry made clear when he was here that any agreement would need to include a cessation of hostilities, a respect for the Afghan constitution, and a severing of all ties with al-Qaida and similar terrorist organizations.

I would stress that the negotiations toward this objective will principally be negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Not between the United States and the Taliban. But we hope that our dialogue with them, if it begins, can contribute to that and we’ll be focused particularly on the topic that you raised which is severing their ties with al-Qaida. It will be one of the first issues we will raise is how do they intend to do that. Not just what they intend to say about it but how they actually intend to go about severing those ties.

Press: What exactly is the U.S. doing to get President Karzai on board with the peace process with the Taliban? [Inaudible] and I understand that President Karzai isn’t very happy about that. I was wondering [inaudible].

Ambassador Dobbins: Well, President Karzai wasn’t happy about it, quite aside from that we weren’t happy about it either. There’s I think an impression that we intervened with the Qataris only because President Karzai complained. We intervened with the Qataris well before President Karzai complained because the self-presentation of that office was inconsistent with the assurance that the Qataris had given us and that we had given President Karzai.

The government of Qatar responded very quickly. They took down the sign that said Islamic Emirates. They took down the flag. And they issued a public statement that this was not the Office of the Islamic Emirate, this was the political office of the Taliban.

So in terms of the specific things that Karzai was concerned about, I think those issues have been resolved. When I talked to President Karzai on Monday, he was perfectly content to move forward with this if the Taliban are prepared to do so on the basis that we had previously agreed

Press: Are you going back to Qatar?

Ambassador Dobbins: No. We’re still waiting to hear from the Taliban whether they’re willing to meet. I think they’re still debating among themselves as the result of the events of last Tuesday whether they want to go forward or not. I don’t know.

From here I’m going back to Washington via Europe.

Press: On the Taliban. You mentioned a statement by them a week ago saying the use of Afghan territory [inaudible]. And yet we saw a couple of days ago an attack on central Kabul targeting the Presidential Palace. How do you manage the process if you see in the coming months the attacks continuing in Afghanistan? What would your [inaudible] to do with that?

Ambassador Dobbins: You don’t hold peace talks after the war, you hold peace talks during wars. The Taliban haven’t asked us to stop fighting and we don’t expect them to stop fighting just because they’re talking. The objective of the talks obviously is a diminution of violence and ultimately an enduring peace, but we’re not naïve enough to think that’s going to come quickly and it’s certainly not a precondition for just talking.

Frankly, I anticipate that the Taliban will continue to try to negotiate from a position of strength. They’ll continue to mount attacks as will we and as will the Afghan government. The attacks that the Taliban have mounted over the past several months have been fairly severe and they’ve almost all failed. The Afghan armed forces are now taking the lead in combat operations. We’re no longer leading in combat. They are increasingly reliant on their own resources. And they’re performing well.

But I don’t think that’s going to lead to an immediate diminution in violence. I think the Taliban probably want to continue to put pressure on. They want to continue to make it look like the United States is retreating as a result of that pressure rather than as a result of its success in building a viable Afghan capacity for self-defense. And NATO, the United States, and in particular the Afghan Security Forces are going to continue not just to defend themselves, but to mount offensive operations against the Taliban, and not only seek to hold territory but to reclaim territory.

So I don’t anticipate that the beginning of negotiations will end the war. I do hope that negotiations will ultimately contribute to an end to the war. But that’s by no means certain. It’s simply something that’s worth trying.

U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY BURNS INTERVIEWS WITH INDIAN MEDIA

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Interview With Indian Media

Press Conference
William J. Burns
Deputy Secretary
New Delhi,, India
October 19, 2012
I am very happy to be back in New Delhi at the end of a trip that has also taken me to Japan, South Korea, China and Burma. I am also proud to have been able to contribute in a small way over the past five years, through two administrations, first as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and now as Deputy Secretary of State, to the development of an historic partnership between India and the United States. That period has spanned the completion of the civilian nuclear agreement in 2008 as well as the landmark visits of Prime Minister Singh to Washington in 2009 and President Obama to New Delhi and Mumbai in 2010. And today, I am very proud to reemphasize that our strategic partnership with India is of abiding importance to the United States and one in which both our governments continue to make broad and enduring investments.

Since Secretary Clinton hosted Minister Krishna in Washington in June for the third U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue, the interaction between our two governments has continued to deepen and expand. Strong support across the political spectrum in the United States, as well as in India, gives us reason for continued optimism about the bilateral relationship in the years ahead.

Bilateral trade, as you know, is flourishing, and is expected to surpass $100 billion this year. We have done a considerable amount to remove impediments to further expansion of our trade relationship, including in high technology and defense trade, but there is more that we can do. Concluding a Bilateral Investment Treaty should be a top priority for both our countries, and would send a positive signal to our business communities.

I look forward to exchanging views today on how we can continue to advance our civil nuclear cooperation, to which we remain committed, and to deepening our defense and counterterrorism cooperation.

We are encouraged by the Indian government’s recent bold steps toward economic reforms. As Treasury Secretary Geithner said, these reforms will foster economic growth, with increased investment, and greater prosperity. Once implemented, we are confident that U.S. investors will respond positively to these measures with concrete, job-creating projects and proposals.

I also look forward to exchanging views today on regional economic cooperation, including with Afghanistan and Pakistan. We welcome the progress the Indian government has made with Pakistan on building trade and investment ties and appreciate the leading role India has played in spurring private sector investment in Afghanistan.

India has an important voice in the Asia-Pacific region, and it is fitting that I conclude a trip to a number of leading Asia-Pacific powers with a stop in Delhi. I look forward to discussing our mutual goals for the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Summit, along with our shared interested in promoting maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region and connectivity between India and Southeast Asia.

We appreciate India’s efforts to urge Iran’s compliance with its international obligations and to resume P5+1 talks on its nuclear program. In our judgment, tough sanctions are necessary to bring Iran back to the negotiating table and to abandon its nuclear weapons program.

I look forward to thanking my Indian colleagues for India’s immediate and strong statement of support following the attack on our diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya and for steps the government has taken to ensure the safety and security of our personnel throughout India.

India is a model of democratic governance, tolerance and rule of law, and can play a critical role throughout the Middle East and North Africa, as well as East Asia, to support the strengthening of democratic institutions, civil society, education, and many other fields. We look forward to partnering with India on these important challenges in the months and years to come.

DIALOGUE ON THE INDIA-U.S. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Varanasi, located on the west bank of the River Ganges in the state of Uttar Pradesh, is one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world and is often referred to as the religious capital of India. Pilgrims journey to Varanasi to cleanse their spirits in the river. Photo Credit: U.S. CIA World Factbook.

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Remarks at the Brookings-FICCI Dialogue on the India-U.S. Strategic Partnership

Remarks
Geoffrey Pyatt
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs

New Delhi, India
October 10, 2012
I’d like to say first of all, what an enormous pleasure and honor it is for me to be here speaking, and especially before such a distinguished audience of very senior Indian retired and current officials.

I want to offer two particular acknowledgements. First of all, to our host R. V. Kanoria, and to note in particular the indispensable role that he has played over the past decade in building the architecture for the new U.S.-India relationship. Initiatives like the Indo-U.S. Parliamentary Forum which began here in this building and played an absolutely critical role in establishing the channels of communication that are so important to the strategic partnership that we’re seeking to build.

The second acknowledgement is to someone who’s not here but whose passing I wanted to note and that’s Brajesh Mishra, somebody to whom I think all of us who have worked on the U.S.-India relationship over the past decade have to look and in many ways everything that we’re doing today together stands on his shoulders and the strategic vision that he first enunciated.

The one big idea I’d like to highlight for everybody this morning is simply to underline the degree to which for the United States our engagement with India, going back to the period that Strobe Talbott documents in his "Engaging India" manuscript, is the result of a deliberate, considerate strategy founded on the judgment that the rise of India, the emergence of India as a more consequential and powerful actor in the international system is good for U.S. interests and good for the international system, good for the global economy. That’s a line of approach which began in President Clinton’s administration, was sustained by President Bush, and very much informs the approach that President Obama has brought to the task before us.

In the Obama administration there has been a considered presidential review of our approach to India policy and it is a review that has reaffirmed the conclusion that this is a strategic relationship of abiding importance to the United States in which our governments have prepared to make a broad and enduring investment.

One of the advantages of the U.S.-India relationship in the transformative phase that Ambassador Mishra was involved with was the fact that it focused on a single big issue -- the U.S.-India nuclear deal -- which captured everybody’s attention and made clear that we were changing the rules of engagement. I think one of the tasks which those of us who are now engaged in the relationship have to work on is the fact that rather than one big thing, we have a multiplicity of activities in which we are working together, trying to forge an international partnership.

I would just highlight six specific areas that reflect the strategic bet that the United States has made on the future of our partnership with India [in the expectation my co-panelists will cover those I’ve overlooked].

1) ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP: First and foremost, I would highlight the economic relationship which will be of enduring importance. And it’s worth remembering that about a decade after Ambassador Blackwell’s famous "flat as a Chapati" speech, we have managed to grow the U.S.-India trade account by a factor of four. Investment has grown by a factor of ten. Government can take relatively little credit for that accomplishment. Most of the growth has resulted from decisions made by investors and business people here in India and in the United States. But certainly it has been our task to remove the obstacles. We have been engaged on the task of dealing with high technology trade, working through the High Technology Group and other mechanisms to remove regulatory and other barriers to the high end partnership that characterizes and distinguishes this economic relationship.

The U.S.-India economic relationship is really set apart from others that we enjoy by the fact that this is an engagement that takes place at the high end of both of our economies in areas like services, advanced technologies, bio technology. These are the technologies and the knowledge-based industries of the future.

Yes, there are issues that remain to be resolved across this economic spectrum, but I would argue that in the context of the expanded volume of trade, and expanded volume of interaction, it is quite natural that there are issues that have to be addressed as we grow this bilateral economic engagement. But I think what stands apart for me is the level of comfort certainly on the Washington side, with India as an economic partner. This is not a relationship revival; this is a relationship of complementary and comparative advantage.

2) STRATEGIC DIALOGUE: The second major basket I would flag is the spectrum of strategic consultation that has emerged between our two governments on a broad array of diplomatic tasks that confront us. The vehicle for this in the Obama administration has been the Strategic Dialogue, which Secretary Clinton has chaired, but it really has become part of the day-to-day practice of American diplomacy in particular in the region that I’m responsible for: South and Central Asia. It reflects the convergence of our interests. It also reflects the commitment to candor and engagement on both sides of the discussion.

The foremost example I would cite is Afghanistan. I would simply highlight the trilateral meeting in New York about ten days ago as the encapsulation of the commitment on the part of the United States to working intensively with India as we manage the transitions that are underway in Afghanistan, and also as we look to our enduring engagement there, an engagement in which we expect India to be a foremost partner of the United States.

But I would go further than that. First of all, in Afghanistan, I would note the appreciation both in Washington and elsewhere for the role that India has played. It was quite striking to me in July at the Tokyo Conference to look around the room at all the foreign ministers assembled there and to realize that the largest delegation in the room after the United States was India. I think it’s a reflection of the commitment that this government has made to the success of the democratic transition in Afghanistan and the fact that the Indian presence there was not just the foreign minister, not just your distinguished Ambassador in Kabul, Gautam Mukhopadhyay, but was also representative of the Indian private sector which is going to be so important to Afghanistan’s long term future and prosperity.

I would flag another few examples, particularly in this region where Indian advice and Indian approaches have significantly informed American policy and have helped to shape our approach. For instance, to the transition in the Maldives, to the crisis that occurred there in February and the question of how to preserve Maldivian democracy; to the political transitions in Nepal, in Sri Lanka. Looking further abroad to Central Asia where India has been an enthusiastic supporter of the New Silk Road Vision for regional integration that Secretary Clinton has enunciated. But India is also, and I say this from my own consultations with Central Asian governments, India is a preferred partner for the Central Asians as they look at how to manage their uniquely complicated geopolitical situation and look at how to access international markets for the Central Asians and through projects like the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Pipeline (TAPI), India is a highly attractive marketplace, but it’s also a model of what can be achieved in terms of engagement with the global economy and development thereunder.

Multilaterally, as I learned through three years of working very closely with my Indian counterparts in Vienna, in the IAEA, in the other UN institutions, we’ve developed a habit of routine consultation and collaboration. It’s been very visible, again, in Vienna on the Iran File where India’s voice has been absolutely critical to maintaining pressure on Iran to come into compliance with its Security Council and IAEA obligations. But critically, India, because it’s part of groups with which the United States is not a part, for instance the non-aligned movement, India has an ability to shape the larger narrative in a way that helps to drive towards the multilateral goals that we both hold.

The nomenclature on the Middle East or West Asia illustrates that there are still differences that need to be bridged, but certainly my experience has been that by and large, more often than not, American and Indian perspectives will converge, and we’ve developed the habit of working with each other in order to achieve common objectives.

Four other quick areas that I would highlight:

3) PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE TIES: An absolutely critical one from the American perspective is our people-to-people ties. Don Lu, our Charge, is here and I know how hard the embassy is working to manage the expansion of our people-to-people relations both in terms of educational partnerships in terms of visa services, in terms of travel back and forth. But I would also flag from the U.S. side the critical role that the Indian Diaspora is playing in shaping the narrative around India in the United States. That’s a story that’s just begun, but it’s worth paying attention to as you see more and more Indian Americans succeeding in our political system, the rise of governors like Nikki Hailey, Bobby Jindal in Louisiana. We have multiple Indian-Americans running for our Congress this year. These are part of the sinews of people-to-people ties that really distinguish the bilateral relationship and will certainly provide stability and ballast over the long term.

4) DEFENSE: Defense has been referred to previously. I would just highlight that the critical importance of our defense partnership looking forward, not just in terms of the sort of strategic consultation that I described earlier, but also in terms of defense sales, interoperability. I would highlight the initiative that Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, launched during the course of his visit to India earlier this year. It’s the only place in the world where the United States is undertaking the kind of initiative that Dr. Carter is leading in our system to identify the avenues of expanding our defense cooperative relationship, our defense sales relationship, looking at issues like co-production, co-development, placing India on par with our closest allies and partners in terms of the technologies and the systems which we share with India. And then looking at how to leverage the commercial relationships, the business relationships that are emerging as India’s own private sector moves into areas like aerospace and defense technology, offering an attractive partnership to the top U.S. companies that are already deeply committed here. I think as a defense partner one of the things that sets the United States apart is the presence in India that companies like Boeing and Lockheed Martin and Honeywell and Raytheon have all established. They’re all in Hyderabad and Bangalore and across the country, and they’ve put down roots here. They see India as a long-term place to do business, not just as a partner, but as a source of technology, a source of expertise, and as part of their global supply chains.

The last two issues:

5) ENERGY: First of all energy. I was deeply, deeply impressed by the energy dialogue that took place in Washington last week, the role that Energy Secretary Dr. Steven Chu has played in mobilizing our laboratories, our experts to work with Indian counterparts to develop the emerging technologies will be critical in areas as diverse as solar, gas, clean coal, also the strategic energy dialogue that bleeds into the issues that we discussed earlier.

6) COUNTER-TERRORISM: Finally, counter-terrorism cooperation. The Obama administration of course took office just a few weeks after the tragedy in Mumbai and the administration has made a strong commitment to an intensive, largely unspoken dialogue aimed at both ensuring that justice for those who were involved in the Mumbai attacks, but also working as hard as we possibly can almost every single day to prevent a recurrence of that kind of catastrophic terrorist attack.

CONCLUSION
I would conclude with two thoughts. One, I think from where I sit the greatest risk to the U.S.-India strategic relationship looking forward is complacency. I think on both sides we have complicated democratic systems and certainly those of us who have been in the trenches of building this bilateral relationship have relied on the vision and political commitment of our leaderships on both sides. I think that’s something which will continue to be necessary.

Then I would flag, the importance of India’s continued process of economic reform and economic modernization. We understand that the issues that are now in play in the Delhi papers-- the questions of retail market opening and the other reforms --these are issues that have to be worked through India’s own democratic process. We are no more than interested observers, but we have an enormous interest in the success of this experiment. And as we look to the future, an India, which, by 2025, will be the third largest economy in the world, we expect to be a preferred partner. We expect that our companies and our economic fates will continue to become deeply intertwined with each other. So from that perspective it’s entirely appropriate that we’re having this broad strategic conversation here at FICCI House with business people on both sides that I think are going to play an important role in shaping the kind of relationship that we have looking to the future.

Thank you.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PANETTA'S REMARKS IN NEW DELHI, INDIA

FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, India

            SECRETARY LEON PANETTA:  Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, Dr. Gupta.  Thank you for inviting me to the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, and thank you for your leadership of this distinguished organization.  It's a special honor for me to have this opportunity on my first visit to India as secretary of defense to be able to address the issues in the defense arena that involve both the United States and India.

            This trip has taken me from the Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore to Cam Ranh Bay and Hanoi in Vietnam.  It's appropriate that as I've had the opportunity to define our new defense strategy for the 21st century that I am now here with a very key partner in India, particularly in this important region.

            Over the past two days I have held some very excellent meetings with Prime Minister Singh, with Defense Minister Antony, with National Security Adviser Menon.  And I want to thank them all for welcoming me back to this country.  I've had the opportunity to visit here a number of times in my prior capacity as director of the CIA and now have the opportunity to visit as secretary of defense.

            I also want to take this moment to thank Ambassador Chandra for his role in helping to convene and moderate today's discussion.  And I also want to thank him for his contributions.  He's made a number of very important contributions in helping to advance United States-India relationship during his career in public service.  And I had the opportunity to see that personally during the time I was in the White House.

            His first year in Washington as India's ambassador overlapped with the end of my tenure as President Clinton's chief of staff in the 1990s.  It was a time when the legacy of the Cold War and the suspicions that developed during that period still loomed large.  And though the United States and India shared many values and many common interests, our bilateral relationship suffered from many of those suspicions.

            My former boss, President Bill Clinton, I think got it right at the time twelve years ago here in New Delhi when he said, and I quote, "India and America are natural allies, two nations conceived in liberty, each finding strength in its diversity, each seeing in the other a reflection of its own aspiration for a more humane and a more just world," unquote.  Thanks to the efforts of past presidents, both Republican and Democrat, our two nations, I believe, have finally and irreversibly started a new chapter of our history.

            When I returned to government in 2009 to serve as director of the CIA, I found a transformed United States-India relationship.  We had acted together to get past our differences and re-establish better cooperation.  It required that we get beyond our outdated notions about one another.  And today, thanks to President Obama and Prime Minister Singh, along with Indian leaders from across the country's political spectrum, our two nations now engage actively and effectively as partners on a whole host of bilateral, regional and global issues.

            President Obama has said that the United States and India will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century, and I believe that to be true.  Today we have growing economic, social, diplomatic ties that benefit both of our nations.  But for this relationship to truly provide security for this region and for the world, we need to deepen our defense and our security cooperation, and this is why I have come to India.

            America is at a turning point.  After a decade of war, we are developing a new defense strategy for the 21st century, a central feature of that strategy is rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region.  In particular, we will expand our military partnerships and our presence in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia.  Defense cooperation, defense cooperation with India is a linchpin in this strategy.

            India is one of the largest and most dynamic countries in the region and, for that matter, in the world, with one of the most capable militaries.  India also shares with the United States a strong commitment to a set of principles that help maintain international security and prosperity.  We share a commitment to open and free commerce.  We share a commitment to open access by all to our shared domains of sea, air, space and cyberspace.  We share a commitment to resolving disputes without coercion or the use of force and in accordance with international law.  We share a commitment to abide by international standards and international norms -- rules of the road, if you will -- which promote international stability and peace for the world.  One of the ways we will advance these principles is to help develop the capabilities of countries who share these values, and India certainly is one of those countries.

            Our two nations face many of the same security challenges: from violent extremism and terrorism to piracy on the high seas, and from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to regional instability.  Handling these challenges requires a forward-looking vision for our defense partnership and a plan for advancing it month by month and year by year.  We have built a strong foundation, and we will enhance this partnership over time in the spirit of equality, common interest and mutual respect.

            In particular, I believe our relationship is, can and should become more strategic, more practical and more collaborative.  Our defense cooperation is strategic, in that we consult and share views on all major regional and international security developments.  Our defense policy exchanges are now regular, candid and invaluable.  Our partnership is practical because we take concrete steps, through military exercises and exchanges, to improve our ability to operate together and with other nations to meet a range of challenges.  And our defense relationship is growing ever more collaborative as we seek to do more -- more advanced research, more advanced development, share new technologies and enter into the joint production of defense articles.

            Let me share my view on the progress we have made in each of these areas and outline additional steps that I believe we can take in the coming months and years.  First of all, with regards to strategic cooperation, we've built a strong strategic relationship.  That is the nature of the relationship between the United States and India.  In my own experience, including during my visits here as director of the CIA, my Indian counterparts always offer clear strategic analysis and recommendations.  We are transparent.  We are honest in our discussions, something that has come to define the strength of our relationship.

            During my two days here we discussed the new defense strategy that is guiding the United States' military rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.  We also talked about the value of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) regional architecture in promoting international norms and in guaranteeing freedom of navigation.  We discussed Afghanistan, where we have embarked on a transition to Afghan responsibility for security, for governance and for economic affairs.

            India has supported this process through its own significant investments in Afghan reconstruction and has signed a long-term partnership agreement with Afghanistan.  We are making significant progress towards a successful transition.  The United States now has an enduring partnership agreement with Afghanistan, and we are committed to the long term in assuring that Afghanistan is a stable nation in this region of the world.

            I urge India's leaders to continue with additional support to Afghanistan through trade and investment, reconstruction and help for Afghan security forces.  We both realize how important it is to ultimately have a stable Afghanistan if we are to have peace and prosperity in this region.

            We also discussed India's immediate neighborhood.  In particular, I welcomed the initial steps that India and Pakistan have taken to normalize trade relations.  This is a process that we believe is key to resolving their differences and to helping Pakistan turn around its economy and counter extremism within its borders.  Pakistan is a complicated relationship, complicated for both of our countries, but it is one that we must continue to work to improve.

            And finally, we exchanged views about other key issues, like piracy and terrorism, tensions in the South China Sea, our concerns about Iran, about North Korea's destabilizing activities, and new challenges like cyber-intrusions and cyberwarfare.

            Second, what is -- what is it we can do to improve a practical defense partnership?  At a very practical level, our defense partnership is coming of age.  Expanded military exercises, defense sales, intelligence sharing are key examples of the relationship's maturation.  Last year alone we held more than 50 cooperative defense events.  Some of the most significant include our military exercises, which enhance our ability to prepare for real-world challenges.

            The annual MALABAR naval exercise has grown from a passing exercise for our ships into a full-scale engagement across all functional areas of naval warfare.  In March U.S. Army soldiers joined their counterparts in India to rehearse scenarios involving United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief in a post-conflict setting.  U.S. soldiers even had the chance to participate in a Holi celebration, in which, I gather, all experienced a colorful -- a colorful occasion.  One month later the
SHATRUJEET exercise took place at Camp Pendleton in California, my home state, with amphibious operations and other exercises between U.S. Marines and Indian soldiers.

            These engagements, these exercises provide opportunities for our militaries to learn from each other.  This will sharpen our skills the next time we are called upon to interdict a weapons of mass destruction shipment or break up a terrorist plot or respond to a future tsunami.

            We've also increased our defense sales relationship from virtually nothing early in the last decade to sales worth well over $8 billion today.  Our sales are rapidly growing.

            For example, India and the U.S. have agreed to sales of maritime surveillance and transport aircraft.  India will soon have the largest -- the second-largest fleet of C-17s in the world, expanding the reach and strength of India's forces and their ability to rapidly deploy.  Your C-130J transport aircraft and P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft purchases are also historic.  In fact, India and the United States will be the only countries operating the P-8I aircraft.

            In providing such world-class capabilities to the Indian armed forces, we also enabled new training and exchange opportunities between our militaries.  For example, our sales of transport aircraft included U.S. Air Force training of Indian pilots, loadmasters and maintenance staff.

            The third area is defense collaboration.

            Finally, in terms of building collaboration, we have some early successes and are poised to embark on technology sharing, co-production and other initiatives that will be a great value to each of our nations.  Lockheed Martin, Sikorsky, India's Tata Group are already jointly manufacturing spare parts for transport aircraft in Hyderabad.  This project benefits each of our nations by creating jobs in India and America and strengthening our defense industries.  Our shared goal should be to solidify progress and deepen defense engagement and cooperation in all of these areas.

            So now let me turn to the future.  At a strategic level, we have worked together to counter piracy, to counter terrorism, and now we should join forces to tackle new and even more complex threats.

            We can do more to drive the creation of a rules-based order that protects our common interests in new areas like cybersecurity and space.  We need to develop rules of the road in these domains to help confront dangerous activities by states and non-state actors alike.

 In terms of regional security, our vision is a peaceful Indian Ocean region supported by growing Indian capabilities.  America will do its part through doing things like rotating the presence of Marines in Australia.  We will have littoral combat ships rotating through Singapore.  And we will have other deployments in the region.  But the fundamental challenge here is to develop India's capabilities so that it can respond to security challenges in this region.

            The United States supports Southeast Asia multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus, or ADMM-Plus.  These mechanisms will prevent and manage regional tensions.  As I told my Indian colleagues over the past two days, India's voice and involvement in these international forums will be critical.

            As the United States and India deepen our defense partnership with each other, both of us will also seek to strengthen our relations with China.  We recognize that China has a critical role to play advancing security and prosperity in this region.  The United States welcomes the rise of a strong and prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in global affairs and respects and enforces the international norms and international rules that have governed this region for six decades.

            And again, with regard to Pakistan, India and the United States will need to continue to engage Pakistan, overcoming our respective and often deep differences with Pakistan, to make all of South Asia peaceful and prosperous.

            And to improve our practical cooperation, I do believe that the United States' and India's participation in military exercises, which are already strong, should continue to be more regular and complex.  And we must move beyond a focus on individual arms sales to regular cooperation that increases the quantity and the quality of our defense trade.

            I want to stress that the United States is firmly committed to providing the best defense technology possible to India.  We are both leaders in technology development, and we can do incredible work together.  Indeed, I think a close partnership with America will be key to meeting India's own stated names -- aims -- of a modern and effective defense force.

            The Obama administration is hard at work on export control reforms, in cooperation with our Congress, in order to improve our ability to deliver the best technologies even more quickly.  Meanwhile, we look to India to modernize its own regulations in areas like defense procurement and nuclear liability legislation.

            But to realize the full potential of defense trade relations, we need to cut through the bureaucratic red tape on both sides.  For that reason, I've asked my deputy secretary, Ash Carter, to lead an effort at the Pentagon to engage with Indian leaders on a new initiative to streamline our bureaucratic processes and make our defense trade more simple, more responsive and more effective.

            Believe me, I know this is not going to be easy.  This is hard.  But that's the nature of the democratic systems that we share.  Your leaders understand the challenges I face, and we understand the obstacles you face.  But we both need to persevere to support our defense needs and our strategic interests.  Over the long term, I am certain that we will transition our defense trade beyond the buyer-seller relationship to a substantial co-production and eventually high-technology joint research and development.

            During my visit to Asia this week, I have sought to bring closure to some of the past chapters of the United States involvement in this region.  The government of Vietnam opened three new areas to search for our missing in action from the Vietnam War.

            And here in India, I'm pleased to announce that the Indian government will allow a team to return to India to continue the search for U.S. service members that were lost during World War II.  This is a humanitarian gesture by a government with whom we share so many values.  The ability to return these heroes and the remains of these heroes to their loved ones is something that America deeply, deeply appreciates.

            America's involvement in Asia has an important past, but it has an even more important future.  India is at the crossroads of Asia.  It is at the crossroads of a new global economy, and it is at the crossroads of regional security.  We, the United States, will stand with India at those crossroads.

            I began my trip across the Asia-Pacific region eight days ago.  Along the way, I have laid out how the United States military plans to rebalance towards this region.  As I come to the end of my trip, I'm struck by the opportunities for closer cooperation, the strong support throughout this region for the rebalance, and the hope that this cooperation can help forge an even brighter future for this region and for the world.

            The United States and India have built a strong foundation for defense cooperation in this new century.  My country is committed to an even greater role in the Asia-Pacific, extending all the way to the Indian Ocean, and our attention and resources will advance partnerships throughout the region, including in particular a partnership with India.

            Our two nations -- our two nations may not agree on the solution to every challenge that faces us.  And we both face the challenge of political gridlock at home that sometimes prohibits advancing our broader strategic objectives.  But I am sure that we will continue to draw closer -- closer together because we do share the same values, because the same challenges and threats confront both of our countries, and we share the same vision of a just and stable and peaceful regional order.

            Our people, our businesses, our militaries and our governments will all be partners in this effort to serve the dream that guides both of our great democracies, the dream of building a better and more prosperous future for our children.  Together as partners, we will help one another realize this great dream of the 21st century.  Thank you.  (Applause.)

            MODERATOR:  Thank you, Secretary Panetta, for a very lucid statement.  You have very comprehensively covered almost every area and subject of great interest to us -- (inaudible).  I think -- I think I have not heard such a clear enunciation of policy and -- (inaudible) -- in a long time.

            I wanted to ask you if you would be willing to take a few questions, and in the interest of proper management of time, which is going to be very difficult, I would request, friends, to be to the point, and I know most of you, but it would help if you would please identify yourselves before you ask the questions.  And pointed questions will be most welcome.  Comments, if any, might be of interest also.

            So may I request the gentlemen -- (inaudible) to go first.

            Q:  Mr. Secretary, I congratulate you for a most illuminating -- (inaudible).  The first point I have, 60 percent of your warships are being moved into the Pacific.  Is that enough?  Warships can't operate on their own.  I presume that you are moving ground forces, amphibious forces; we have not heard about that.  But warships can't be all alone; they need ground backing.

            Secondly is command and control.  With the center of gravity moving to the Western Pacific, would Hawaii be a suitable place for command and control?  In World War II, you remember MacArthur operated from Australia.  So as the center of gravity is shifting to the western seaboard of the Pacific, I hope you are taking that into control -- into consideration.  The -- otherwise you need amphibious forces.  No word on that.  I see a Marine Corps general here.  Presumably the Marines will do that.

             (Off mic.)  (Laughter.)

            Q:  I worked with them in World War II.  They're great guys.  I -- the other thing is, better interaction is now required between the U.S.A. and India.  There has not been enough of it.  We should work closely together.  We have common interests.  I'm not really going into details; other people want to speak.  But I will just finish with a quotation from George Canning.  Do you remember George Canning?  The Monroe Doctrine?  (Laughter.)  He said:  I called a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old.  Surely that is what is required now.  Thank you.

            SEC. PANETTA:  Thank you.  Thank you very much for your questions and for that last statement, which I think is very appropriate to the moment.

            Q:  Monroe doctrine was really George Canning.

            SEC. PANETTA:  I know.

            With regards to the rebalancing issue, to the Pacific, we will -- as we transition, as I stated the other day, we will move to a 60/40 balance in the Pacific, and I listed the ships that would be involved in that transition.  At the same time, we will not only maintain a significant ground force in the Pacific -- we have a large number of forces in the Pacific at the present time, most of them located in Korea.  We have a presence elsewhere.  And our hope is to expand what we have termed a rotational presence throughout the Pacific.  The Marines are locating in a rotational process in Australia.  We've already located some there.  They'll -- that will continue to expand.  We're exploring the rotational -- a rotational presence in the Philippines as well as elsewhere.  In Okinawa, where we just arrived, in an agreement with the Japanese, we will continue to maintain a presence there, but we are moving those troops as well, these are Marines, to Guam.  And we will establish a larger presence in Guam.

            So part and parcel of our focus on the Pacific will involve obviously the kind of forces that you identify, to ensure that we have ground forces in place to be able to enhance that capability.

            With regards to command and control, our view is that the present PACOM, which operates out of Hawaii, provides the kind of joint force capability that is going to be very important for the Pacific.  Admiral Sam Locklear -- who incidentally commanded the effort in Libya which required a very significant coordination capability.  A number of nations were involved in that effort, and he was remarkable at the way that coordinated effort became successful in returning Libya to the Libyan people.  He brings that same capability to the Pacific.

            We have -- we believe in joint forces.  We will have a significant Air Force as well as Army and Marine Corps and Navy presence in this region.  But more importantly, he also believes very strongly in working with other countries to improve their capabilities, and that's one of the things that I want to point out to all of you that we are not -- we are not in the process of doing what we did in the Cold War of establishing permanent bases from which we can project our power.  Our approach here is to work with the countries in the region to develop their capabilities so that they can play a larger role in helping to secure and defend their countries in this region.  We think that is a better way to promote peace and prosperity and security in the region.

            So I think the headquarters at PACOM is very efficient and effective at being able to take charge of this rebalancing effort.  And again, with regards to amphibious forces, we do have a significant number of Marines in the region, and we will continue to maintain those.

            MODERATOR:  Going back to World War II and earlier makes me recall that today, the sixth day of June, that as we discuss this, I think the light forces that were in the process establishing a foothold on the beaches of Normandy -- so that's about the quality of sacrifice (inaudible) at this moment.

            MR.            :  (Inaudible.)

            Q:  Secretary Panetta and Maresh -- (inaudible) -- I cover strategic affairs for Business Times (inaudible) It's one of our -- (inaudible) -- news -- (inaudible).  And you would be aware that not everyone in India will -- (inaudible) -- support the India and U.S. developing relationship, and their hands get strengthened every time there's some apparent friction between the two sides.

            Now given that the United States has made an arms and defense cooperation one of the tenets and one of the pillars of the relationship, it appears to be a bit surprising that on this ongoing -- on the ongoing FMS sale of Javelin missiles, the United States has cut down India's request to just half.  I don't want to get into individual arms deals, but this seems to be a contradiction of the United States' statement that it wants to work with India.  Could you tell us something about why this was done, especially given that the Javelin is essentially a defensive -- (inaudible)?

            SEC. PANETTA:  Yeah, no, I'm -- I'd be pleased to address that issue because it's just not true.  We have not cut the sale in half; I don't know where the hell that story came from, but we get used to those stories appearing every now and then in the press.  But I want to assure you that we're committed to a full sale of the Javelin to India.  And we are -- we are working very closely with India not only on that sale, but on other sales as well to try to improve their capabilities.  So I want you to know that, you know, I recognize, as I said in my statement, that as we provide these new technologies that oftentimes we run into the barriers of various laws that have been passed either by our Congress or your congress and that sometimes provide bureaucratic barriers to trying to complete these sales.

            What my goal is -- in appointing my deputy's -- my deputy secretary to oversee this effort is to try and develop a broader strategy if we can:  What is it that India needs?  What is it that we can be helpful on and therefore be more effective in trying to reduce the barriers and improve the efficiency in those sales?  So that -- that's the approach that I'm hoping to take, and I think it will benefit not only your country but our country as well.

            MODERATOR:  (Inaudible.)

            Q:  (Inaudible) -- Secretary Panetta, I am a graduate of Fort Leavenworth of the bicentennial era and thank you for those very kind words and for words that encourage strengthening of India-U.S. defense relationship.  You've spoken extensively about Asia-Pacific, and during your presentation, you mentioned about your conversations with our leadership on Afghanistan.

            I want to ask you a question about Afghanistan.  Firstly, what is the U.S title -- the new -- (inaudible) -- about Afghanistan good enough as a policy?  Because we are not clear what that means.

            Secondly, I do believe that the United States as part of this defense cooperation, they seek more intensive Indian efforts inside Afghanistan on what India can do on security cooperation with the Afghan national security forces or in other areas.  Did you, in your conversations with the ministry of defense or other -- the defense minister or the national security adviser, make any specific requests other than what is in the ambit of the India-Afghanistan strategic partnership that you would like Indians to do in Afghanistan for a post-2014 scenario?

            Thank you, Secretary.

            SEC. PANETTA:  Thank you very much for the question.  My goal -- the United States' goal in Afghanistan is to complete the mission.  This isn't about good enough; this is about completing the mission.  And what the mission is, is to have an Afghanistan that can secure and govern itself.  That's what our mission is about, so that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorism and for those that would attack not only our country, but other countries as well.

            So the fundamental mission that we are embarked on is the mission of establishing an Afghanistan that can secure and govern itself, obviously be sovereign, be independent, but more importantly, be stable in its ability to be able to proceed and join the family of nations in this region.

            That's our goal.  We think we are on the way to accomplishing that mission.  General Allen has laid out a plan for transition.  I believe 2011 was a turning point in the Afghan war.  We weakened the Taliban significantly.  The levels of violence went down.  They continue to be down.  Even though we are seeing efforts at trying to increase their attacks, the level of violence still remains down.  We have seen an improvement in the operations of the Afghan army and police.  There are roughly about 346,000 in the Afghan army.  Our goal is to achieve a number of 352,000 and to be able to use the Afghan army in the transition process.

  We are also proceeding with the transition of key areas in Afghanistan to their control and to their governance.  As we speak, 50 percent of the Afghan population has been transitioned into Afghan security and control.  We announced -- President Karzai announced -- a third tranche of areas, to be completed, hopefully, by the end of the summer.  When we do that, 75 percent of the Afghan population will be under their security and control.

            So we are proceeding on a very effective plan that General Allen has laid out and has now been endorsed by the 50 nations of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force).  Both NATO and our partners in Chicago are committed to that transition towards -- and drawdown -- towards the end of 2014.

            In addition, we are -- we have signed a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan that will have us maintaining an enduring presence in Afghanistan.  We will continue beyond 2014.  We will continue working on counterterrorism, we'll continue to provide training and assistance to their forces, and we will continue to provide support.  That's a commitment that the president has made and that we have made clear we will maintain in Afghanistan.

            What I asked of the leaders here is that they continue to provide the training that they are providing now.  My understanding is that the training takes place here in India for the -- those that are brought here.  What I urged is that they continue to do that, if possible expand that training in order to improve the efficiency of the Afghan army.  There was nothing said about doing anything in terms of additional military efforts in Afghanistan itself.

            MODERATOR:  (Inaudible.)

            Q:  (Inaudible.)  And my question also pertains to Afghanistan and what you have said -- (inaudible).  Number one, you have many of us sitting here in this room today who do not share your feelings about NATO and ISAF forces for the ability of the Afghan national security forces to take over independent charge of security in Afghanistan after the departure of NATO and ISAF in 2014 so as to prevent the Taliban from taking over the country once again.  Is there a plan B in place already?  And what are your views on the regional peacekeeping and stabilization force but as under the U.S. plan?  Thank you.

            SEC. PANETTA:  No, as always when these things -- when these efforts begin, there are -- there were questions raised about the capability of the Afghans to be able to develop an effective armed forces and an effective police force to maintain security.

            I should say the same questions were raised in Iraq, and a large question's about whether or not they would be able to develop their capabilities.  They did.  The reason that we were able to withdraw from Iraq is because Iraq was able to secure and defend itself and govern itself.

            Is there -- are there -- are there going to be bumps in the road?  I - as a democracy, you bet.  But that's the nature of democracy.  India goes through bumps in the road.  The United States goes through bumps in the road.  And the fact is that we have established a democracy, a governing system there in which they can defend and secure themselves.  That's our mission.  That's true in Afghanistan as well.

            And what I saw happening in 2011 was that the Afghan army has indeed developed the capability to engage with our forces in operations and to maintain stability in those areas that they're involved with in terms of securing.  When the bombing attacks took place in Kabul, the army and the police were very effective at securing Kabul as a result -- (inaudible).  We've seen that happen now in the southern part of Afghanistan.  We've seen it happen in the other areas that we've transitioned.  The Afghan army is taking control, and they are taking the battle to the enemy.  That's the important point.

            So, we don't have a plan B because we don't think we need a plan B.  This is about plan A, which is to give the Afghans the capability to govern and secure themselves.  And so our goal will be to continue to train and support and assist the Afghan army so that they will be a permanent force that can protect that country in the future.  And the fact that we will be there past 2014 is additional insurance to assure that they continue to train and develop as they must in order to maintain a stable Afghanistan.  I honestly believe that they are developing the capabilities they need in order to do the job.

            MODERATOR:  (Inaudible.)

            Q:  Sir, two questions.  Every time you have a drone attack in Pakistan, or when you kill Osama, the Pakistanis come to you charging that violating their sovereignty.  How do you counter that?  It's one of their terrorist (inaudible) sanctuaries.

            Second on the aircraft carriers.  You've been quoted as saying that you will be stationing about six aircraft carriers, six or about seven in Asia Pacific region, which actually  means that your entire carrier force will be committed to India, oh sorry, the Asia Pacific region because -- (inaudible) -- to go back for replenishment and the other -- (inaudible).  You have always been wanting some foothold in the Indian Ocean.  (Inaudible)  I remember in 1980 I'd gone to Sri Lanka and I heard that you were looking for a justification -- (inaudible).  I reported that and of course Mrs. Gandhi opposed it very strongly.  (Inaudible) -- in the region would still oppose that, and also probably in the same circumstances might.

            It is reported here on one of the TV stations here that Bangladesh -- (inaudible).  Can you just kindly elaborate how would you deploy, how long?  Thank you.

            SEC. PANETTA:  Sure.

            Q:  I would also mention that you deployed three aircraft carriers off Pakistan during operation Osama -- (inaudible) – did Pakistanis in some way not interfere with your operation at that time?

            SEC. PANETTA:  They didn't know about our operation.  (Laughter.)  That was the whole idea.  (Laughter.)

            With regards to the aircraft carriers first, we have 11 aircraft carriers in our fleet.  And we will maintain 11 aircraft carriers.  The carriers -- when we say that 60 percent will move to the region, that means that some of them are going to be based on the Pacific.  So they'll be ported.  They're not all going to be floating around the Pacific.  They're going to be in ports on the Pacific side, probably along the West Coast as well as, obviously, Hawaii, and the other bases in Japan that we currently use.  So we're not looking for additional bases.

            Q: Also Diego Garcia?

            SEC. PANETTA:  Pardon me?

            Q:  Also Diego Garcia?

            SEC. PANETTA:  That's correct.  I mean, those -- the ones we use now are going to supply for the force that we need to maintain here, but we are moving them into the Pacific and porting them on the Pacific side so that if we need to deploy them, they'll be there for that purpose.

            With regards to the drones, again without getting into operational details on that, look, this is about our sovereignty as well, because there were a group of individuals who attacked the United States on 9/11 and killed 3,000 of our citizens.  And we went to war against those who attacked the United States of America.

            The leadership of those that were involved in planning this attack are located in Pakistan, in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas).  And we have made clear to the Pakistanis that the United States of America is going to defend ourselves against those that would attack us.  And we have done just that.  We have gone after their leadership, and we have done it effectively, targeting at -- targeting al-Qaida leadership and terrorists.  And very frankly, the terrorists who threaten the United States threaten Pakistan, as well.  This is not just about protecting the United States; it's also about protecting Pakistan.  And we have made very clear that we are going to continue to defend ourselves.

            Q:  (Inaudible.)  You spoke about the American planes that went out during World War II -- (inaudible).  You brought this up with prime minister.  Can you tell us exactly what you told the prime minister, what the reaction was?

            As far as another issue is concerned, you said that you will stand by India -- (inaudible).  What happens to these three agreements that you are looking at -- (inaudible)?  Did they come up during the discussions, and what was the Indian reaction?  Also, did you mention the evaluation to Mr. Antony today when you met?

            SEC. PANETTA:  First of all, on the 400 pilots, the prime minister was very moving and -- in the discussion, because I think he understands how important it is to be able to do what we can to return the remains of those that we are able to find, for their families.

            We always -- we have a pledge in the military that we leave nobody behind.  And for that reason, we do try to seek the remains of those that were lost in combat.  And I must say that India has been very cooperative in that effort.  We deeply appreciate their cooperation as we try to determine whether or not those -- we can find those remains.

            With regards to -- no, we did not -- we did not discuss the agreements.  I know that my predecessor had raised the issue of the -- with the agreements.  Frankly, my view is that, look, we can continue discussions in those areas.

            But I believe we have a strong relationship.  We have good cooperation.  I think we can continue to move towards the goals that I outlined in my speech; that even though we might -- you know, we might not always agree with regards to the specific agreements that we're discussing, I don't -- I don't see those as barriers to improving our relationship with India.

            A last point -- I'm sorry.  What was the last point?

            Q:  Haqqani.

            SEC. PANETTA:  On the Haqqanis.  Yes, I did discuss this with the -- with the Indian leadership.  Look, Afghanistan -- the effort to succeed in Afghanistan in many ways is dependent on our ability to eliminate the safe haven in Pakistan.  We can't have a stable Afghanistan if we don't have a stable Pakistan that is dealing with the threats that come across the border.

            And the principal threat that we're confronting right now are the Haqqanis.  The Haqqanis were involved in some recent attacks on our forces.  And that raises great concern that -- we cannot allow those who simply come across the border, attack our -- attack and kill people on our side of the border, to attack our troops, and then escape back into a safe haven -- and so we have urged and we will continue to urge Pakistan to take steps to deal with that safe haven in order to prevent that from happening.

            This -- the ability to achieve the kind of Afghanistan that we want -- one that can secure and govern itself for the future -- it is going to be in large measure dependent on a Pakistan that is able to confront terrorism within their own borders.  That's an important issue that has to be confronted by Pakistan.

            MODERATOR:  (Off mic.)

            Q:  (Inaudible) Just two quick questions.  One is about the -- (inaudible) -- relations between the U.S. and India, how are they going to impact on China -- (inaudible) -- amazing relationship that -- (inaudible)?  Do you think that that -- (inaudible) – have adverse reaction?

            And secondly, on Pakistan and U.S. relations -- (inaudible) -- seem to have sort of dipped quite a bit over the last few weeks and months and years.  So is that going to impact on your pullout from Afghanistan and your fight against terrorism in the region?

            SEC. PANETTA:  On the first point, I believe, in the discussions that I've had here, that I think both India and certainly the United States recognize that it is in our interest to develop a cooperative relationship with China.

            I'm in the process of trying to strengthen our military-to-military relationship with China.  I met with Vice President Xi in Washington and then met with General Liang and discussed ways to try to improve our military-to-military relationship.

            I believe that it is important that we have strong lines of communication and that we improve the transparency between our countries with regards to what we're seeking to achieve.  I mean, I believe that it is in China's interest -- in China's interest to be able to have a region that is secure and prosperous and peaceful.

            Now China faces the same threats that we all face in this region.  They face the threat of terrorism.  They face the threat of piracy.  They face the threat of humanitarian and disaster needs that have to be met.  They face the threat that if we don't have free trade in this region, it could impact on everyone's economies.  The ability to use our sea-lanes, the ability to protect maritime rights on our oceans are something that is extremely important to all nations in this region.  And we also face the threat of, frankly, nuclear proliferation from an unstable North Korea -- that's something that is as much a threat to China as it is to others in this region -- and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

            All of these things are common threats.  They're not -- they're not just threats to the United States.  They're not just threats to India.  They're not just threats to other countries -- Philippines, Indonesia.  They're threats to all of the countries in this region.  And it's for that reason that we all have to work together in developing a cooperative relationship and developing the capabilities of these countries so that we can all confront these issues -- so that we can all confront these issues.

            So my goal is to do what I can to improve our mil-to-mil relationship with China.  I think India's goal is to try to improve that relationship as well with China.  I think that's the healthy way to try to approach a better relationship between the powers in the Pacific.
            You asked one other thing.

            Q:  (Inaudible) U.S., Pakistan.

            SEC. PANETTA:  Yes.  No, it -- just as India views the relationship with Pakistan as complicated, so do we.  (Laughter.)  And it is.  It's a -- it's a complicated relationship, oftentimes frustrating, oftentimes difficult.  But at the same time, it is a necessary relationship.

            India shares a border with Pakistan.  It's important that you continue to try to make what progress you can in dealing with Pakistan in trying to resolve your differences.  The same thing is true for the United States.  We are fighting a war in the FATA.  We are fighting a war against terrorism.  We have -- I think what I try to stress with the Pakistanis is that terrorism is just as much a threat to their country as it is for ours.  They have lost many lives in their country as a result of terrorist attacks.

            They also happen to be a nuclear power, and it's extremely important that we maintain the relationship with them.

            They had been cooperative oftentimes in the efforts that we've engaged with as far as what we've done in going after those that threaten our country.  They, they have provided some cooperation.  There are other times when, frankly, that cooperation is not there.

            The United States cannot just walk away from that relationship.  We have to continue to try to do what we can, to try to improve what -- you know, areas where we can find some mutual cooperation.  We are now engaged in negotiations to try to see if we can open up the transit centers; it's an important area for us.  We're engaging in negotiations with them to try to see if we can arrive at an agreement that would reopen those areas.

            We've been going through the north right now.  We have the northern transit center.  It, you know, obviously meets our needs.  It's a little more expensive because we do have to go farther in terms of the routes that we're involved with.  We would prefer -- we don't prefer, we would -- we would like to have the additional transit centers through Pakistan as well.

            So we'll continue to negotiate on that.  We'll continue to discuss with them the drone operations.  We'll continue to discuss with them other forms of assistance.  Our goal is to try to do what we can to try to improve the relationship with them.  That is not easy, but it is necessary that we continue that effort.

            MODERATOR:  (Inaudible) --

            Q:  Thank you --

            MODERATOR:  -- with the confusion, and I would like, I mean, to -- have patience and understanding if your turn doesn't come before -- (inaudible).
            Is there some --

            Q:  Thank you, sir.  Sir, I want to request your views on the timings which you have chosen to announce the change in your strategies, with more -- (inaudible) -- and force being deployed in the Asia-Pacific.  Normally -- (inaudible) -- I'm sure it has been done because you realized after 10, 15 years a change in the strategic environment in the region while you have -- (inaudible) -- philosophy that you are developing stronger relationship with China and you hope to succeed.  Actually, it doesn't appear to be so.  Otherwise, why would you change the -- (inaudible) -- of your forces from the one side to the other?

            And secondly, do you visualize or foresee in the coming years a greater cooperation between Russia and China, becoming again one superpower, or of several of the world organizations -- (inaudible) – America so that you are able to take action -- (inaudible) -- or is it because any other reason?  Thank you, sir.

            SEC. PANETTA:  Thank you for that question.

            Look, as I indicated, we are at a turning point after 10 years of war in the United States.  It's been the longest continuous period that we've been at war.

            And what we now see is that, you know, we have brought the mission in Iraq to a conclusion.  We were in the process of hopefully being able to transition in Afghanistan.  We certainly have impacted on terrorism.  We have significantly impacted the leadership of al-Qaida.  We had a strike yesterday that hit another deputy leader in al-Qaida.  And as you know, we were successful at going after bin Laden.  And we have impacted their ability to have command and control so that they can -- they cannot effectively put together a 9/11-type attack, because of our efforts.  We were successful in the NATO effort in Libya.  So we are in a period where after 10 years of war, you know, hopefully we are -- we are able to turn a corner here.

            At the same time we are facing budget constrictions in the United States.  We are running a high deficit and a high debt in the United States.  And the Congress, in what was called the Budget Control Act, passed a number in defense savings of roughly $487 billion over 10 years that I was asked to reduce the defense budget by.

            So faced – faced with a turning point, faced with the need to find additional savings, but also facing a world in which there are continuing threats -- we continue to face the threat of terrorism, not just in Pakistan but in Yemen and Somalia and North Africa.  We continue to face the instability of North Korea and the potential for some kind of conflict with that country.  We face the same thing with Iran.  We face turmoil in the Middle East.  We're facing cyberattacks now, which has become a whole new arena, a whole new battlefield for the future.

            So you put all of that together, we are continuing to face some major threats in the world.  And so my view was, faced with that, it was important for the United States to sit back and develop a strategy for what our defense strategy ought to be not just now, but into 2020 and beyond.  And so that led us -- myself, the service leaders at the Pentagon, the undersecretaries, the president of the United States -- to sit down and develop the strategies that we felt were important in order to deal with the challenges we face in the future.
            It's made up of five elements.  The rebalancing is one of those, but there are five elements.  Let me just summarize them.  One, we know we are going to be a smaller force.  We'll be a leaner force.  But we have to be agile, we have to be deployable, we have to be flexible and we have to be on the cutting edge of technology.  That's one.
            Two, we felt it was important to focus on the two areas that represent the biggest problems that we are going to confront in the future.  One is the Pacific -- Pacific region -- because of the threat from North Korea, because of other challenges that we think are going to be extremely important to our future prosperity and security; and secondly, the Middle East.  The Middle East is a -- continues to be an area that we have to maintain a focus on.  So those two major refocuses.

            Three, we have to maintain a presence in the rest of the world as well.  We can't just walk away from that.  And so what we've developed is this innovative and, I think, very creative, approach to rotational  presence, where we can send our forces in, do exercises, develop new partnerships, develop new alliances, work with the capabilities in those countries to develop their capabilities as well.  We'll do that in Latin America; we'll do that in Africa; we'll do that in countries in this region; we'll do that in Europe.

            In addition to that, we felt it was very important to have enough power so that we could confront more than one enemy at a time.  For example, if we have a war in Korea and we face a threat in the Straits of Hormuz, we have to have the ability to address both of those and to win.  And we think we have projected a sufficient force to do that.

            And lastly, we thought it was important to invest, not just to cut back, but to invest in areas for the future.  We need to invest in cyber.  We need to invest in space.  We need to invest in unmanned systems.  We need to invest in special forces.  And we need to invest in the capability to mobilize if we have to, if we are facing a crisis.

            All of those elements I just described are part of the strategy that we've developed for the 21st century.

            MODERATOR:  I'm told we have completely run out of time, so I regret -- (inaudible) -- those who were very anxious -- (inaudible).  But I want to thank you -- (inaudible).