COMMENTS AT THE RUSSI MISSILE DEFENSE CONVERENCE

Photo:  Missile Tracking System.  From:  U.S. Air Force.
FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Missile Defense Conference
Remarks Ellen Tauscher
Special Envoy for Strategic Stability and Missile Defense 2012 RUSI Missile Defense Conference
London, United Kingdom
May 30, 2012
Thank you, Michael, for that kind introduction.
I am honored to be back here, at RUSI, speaking about my favorite topic, missile defense. I particularly appreciate this year’s program where I get to speak first.
Last year, as many of you may recall, I was the last speaker, which is tough when you follow so many renowned experts in the field. Going first is much easier, so thank you.
Let me acknowledge some of my colleagues that are in attendance today. Without their support and cooperation, much of the progress we have made on these issues would not have been possible.

I want to acknowledge Bogdan Aurescu, who will speak to this group a little later. It was a tremendous honor to work with him so closely in Romania.
I also want to mention Ambassador Daalder and Madelyn Creedon.
Madelyn and I did a similar routine at the Moscow missile defense conference earlier this month.

This conference is particularly well timed, coming just one week after the NATO Summit in Chicago. Instead of just giving my typical Monday, Wednesday, Friday missile defense speech, I would like to discuss some of the areas where we still need to make progress on missile defense.

Let me start with the recent announcement at Chicago of an “interim missile defense capability.”

The progress on missile defense is remarkable given that NATO only made its decision to develop a territorial ballistic missile defense capability 18 months ago. In that year-and-a-half period, the United States and our NATO Allies have achieved an operationally significant peacetime ballistic missile defense capability.

That means that NATO now has its first missile defense radar, its first interceptors, a single commander, and a NATO command and control system for ballistic missile defense.

This progress was only possible because our NATO Allies embraced President Obama’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which is focused on protecting our European allies and deployed U.S. forces against the existing ballistic missile threats.

It has been a great privilege for me to have worked so closely with all of our Allies over the last couple of years to reach this point, especially my colleagues in Poland, Romania, Spain, and Turkey.

Because of their support and leadership, for which we are incredibly grateful, we were able to reach agreement on the basing of our missile defense assets in Europe.
As you know, last September, we made three big announcements.
First, Turkey agreed to host the Phase 1 ANTPY-2 radar.

Second, we signed the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement with Romania to host the Phase 2 land-based SM-3 site.

Third, the U.S.-Poland agreement for the Phase 3 land-based site entered into force as well.
And then a few weeks later in early October, Spain agreed to serve as a home port for four Aegis destroyers.

As we like to say in the United States, that’s not bad for government work.
We also appreciate the other contributions by our NATO Allies to this effort. Our NATO Allies will contribute more than $1 billion dollars in NATO Common Funding to the ALTBMD command and control system. The Netherlands has indicated that it will spend close to 250 million Euros to modify the radars on its frigates to detect and track ballistic missiles at long ranges and contribute its Patriot missiles to NATO missile defense.
Germany is also exploring developing an airborne infrared sensor. France has proposed a concept for a shared early warning satellite. There is much that our allies can contribute to NATO’s developing missile defense system.

Of course, the announcement in Chicago is just an initial but important step in implementing NATO’s territorial ballistic missile defense capability.
The Obama Administration is committed to working with NATO on these efforts and deploying all four phases of the EPAA as our voluntary national contribution.
For our part, much work remains to be done on the systems that the United States will deploy as potential contributions to NATO missile defense, but considerable work has already begun.

Just look at the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2013.
Even in a constrained budget environment, the United States has protected the funding for the European Phased Adaptive Approach.

These actions are a clear demonstration of the United Sates’ continued commitment to European security and our Article 5 obligations. At the same time as we are working with our NATO Allies, there is a tremendous opportunity to develop a meaningful strategic partnership with Russia in the area of missile defense cooperation.

Missile defense cooperation can achieve two very important objectives. First, it would allow Russia to see with its own eyes what we are doing on missile defense and it will give us time to demonstrate how our systems operate.

It will allow Russia to see that the European Phased Adaptive Approach is not directed against Russia, but limited regional threats from outside of Europe… not Russia.
Second, it could give the United States, NATO, and Russia the opportunity to forge a true strategic partnership that enhances security for all.

I realize it takes time to build confidence. But, we have that time. Russia has expressed concerns about our plans for Phases 3 and 4 of the EPAA.

There are six years before we deploy Phase 3 in the 2018 timeframe. We should use that time positively on cooperation and not confrontation.

Russia should come inside the missile defense cooperation tent and see what we are doing.
During that time, we will be testing an Aegis BMD site in Hawaii. We will be developing and testing the SM-3 Block IIA and IIB interceptors.

Russia has also observed our intercept tests in the past and the invitation to observe a future test still stands.

We will also be working with our NATO Allies to ensure how to best protect NATO European populations and territory.
At the same time, the U.S., NATO and Russia can work together on a broad range of cooperation: Sharing sensor data, working on developing common pre-planned responses, conducting a joint analysis of missile defense systems, and working together on missile defense exercises.

The United States and NATO have been transparent about our missile defense programs.
We have provided Russia with a number of ideas and approaches for transparency and we are also committed to discussing other approaches to building confidence between our two countries.

At Chicago, NATO Allies made a very clear statement of our intent. NATO declared in the Chicago Summit Declaration “…the NATO missile defense in Europe will not undermine strategic stability. NATO missile defense is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities.”

And, as I have told my Russian colleagues, if Russia doesn’t like what it has learned throughout this period of cooperation, then it can terminate cooperation at any point.
But that means getting Russia inside the missile defense tent now, working alongside the U.S. and NATO, while we are in the initial phases of deploying this capability. It will take time and effort to build the trust that is currently lacking on this issue.

But let me be clear. While we can work cooperatively together, we cannot agree to the pre-conditions outlined by the Russian Government.

We are committed to deploying effective missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland and our Allies and partners around the world from the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
We will not agree to limitations on the capabilities and numbers of our missile defense systems.

We cannot agree to any “military-technical criteria,” that would, in effect, limit our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems that will protect us against regional threats such as Iran and North Korea.

If we can work together on European missile defense, and make this a subject for cooperation rather than competition, that would be a game-changer for our security relationship.

We understand that there are risks involved, and it takes courage to move away from familiar ways and long-held positions. We believe those risks are manageable.
The alternative is competition, something none of us can afford or want.
So we will keep working to see if we can come up with a plan for cooperation.
We will continue to press in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Joint Staff channels. We will keep moving forward in the run up to the June G-20 meeting between Presidents Obama and Putin, and we will keep going long after June.

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak here at this impressive gathering of experts. I look forward to answering any questions you might have.

STABILITY AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Photo:  Missile Interceptor Test.  Credit:  U.S. Navy
FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Reinforcing Stability through Missile Defense
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
National Defense University Congressional Breakfast Seminar
Washington, DC
May 11, 2012
Thank you so much for inviting me to speak today. I attended a number of these breakfasts as a Congressional Hill staffer myself, so I’m very pleased to be on the opposite side of the podium today.

At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense policy issues, including missile defense. In that capacity, it was my responsibility to negotiate the details of the BMD agreements with Poland, Romania, and Turkey that will enable the United States to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach. I will touch more on this later in my presentation, but suffice to say that I have been focused over the last couple of years on ensuring that we are able to meet the vision the President laid out in his 2009 announcement regarding the European Phased Adaptive Approach.

Missile Defense Policy
Today, the threat from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to our deployed forces, allies, and partners is growing. This regional threat is likely to increase in both quantitative and qualitative terms in the coming years, as some states are increasing their inventories, and making their ballistic missiles more accurate, reliable, mobile, and survivable.

Recognizing the seriousness of the ballistic missile threat, the United States seeks to create an environment, based on strong cooperation with allies and partners, which will eliminate an adversary’s confidence in the effectiveness of ballistic missile attacks. This will devalue and provide a disincentive for the development, acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles. To that end, President Obama has made international cooperation on missile defense a key priority, and we are pursuing a region-by-region approach based on the following three principles:

1) First, the United States will deter adversaries through strong regional deterrence architectures built upon solid cooperative relationships with an eye toward efficiently incorporating assets and structures that our partners already have today or are seeking.

2) Second, the United States will pursue Phased Adaptive Approaches (PAAs) within key regions that are tailored to their unique deterrence requirements and threats, including the scale, scope, and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. We will phase in and implement the best available technology to meet existing and evolving threats, and adapt to situations that evolve in an unforeseen manner.

3) Third, recognizing that our supply of missile defense assets cannot meet the global demand we face, the United States is developing mobile capabilities that can be relocated to adapt to a changing threat and provide surge defense capabilities where they are most needed.

Missile defense plays an important role in the broader U.S. international security strategy, supporting both deterrence and diplomacy. Missile defense assures our allies and partners that the United States has the will and the means to deter and, if necessary, defeat a limited ballistic missile attack against the U.S. homeland and regional ballistic missile attacks against our forward deployed troops, allies, and partners.

NATO and European Missile Defense
I’d like to focus today on our work in Europe, which continues to receive a great deal of attention. In order to augment the defense of the United States and a future long-range threat and provide more comprehensive and more rapid protection to our deployed forces and European Allies against the current threat, the President outlined a four-phase approach for European missile defense called the European Phased Adaptive Approach or EPAA. Through the EPAA, the United States will deploy increasingly capable BMD assets to defend Europe against a ballistic missile threat from the Middle East that is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The EPAA will protect our deployed forces and our allies and partners in Europe, as well as augment the defense of the U.S. homeland against a potential by ICBMs from the Middle East in several ways. As part of Phase 1, we have deployed to Turkey missile defense radar, referred to as the AN/TPY-2 radar, which will provide data earlier in the engagement of an incoming ballistic missile from the Middle East. This radar enhances the homeland missile defense coverage of the United States provided by our Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) capabilities in Alaska and California.

A year ago last week, we concluded negotiations with Romania to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 BMD interceptor site, designed to provide protection against medium-range ballistic missiles. The land-based SM-3 system to be deployed to Romania is anticipated to become operational in the 2015 timeframe. We also reached an agreement with Poland to place a similar U.S. BMD interceptor site there in the 2018 timeframe.

Defense of the homeland will be further augmented by the basing in Poland of the SM-3 IIB interceptor, which is a future evolution of the SM-3 series of interceptors. The SM-3 IIB interceptor will provide us an opportunity for an early-intercept against potential long-range missile launched from the Middle East. It is important for everyone to know that we are already protected from limited ICBM attacks by the GBIs we have deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg, California.

The EPAA will eventually provide us with additional protection, ensuring that we can take multiple shots at a long-range missile heading to the United States. The EPAA – in all of its phases – also provides protection to for the thousands of U.S. military personnel based in Europe.

The Obama Administration is implementing the EPAA within the NATO context. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government approved a new Strategic Concept and decided to develop the capability to defend NATO European populations and territory against the growing threat from ballistic missile proliferation. The Allies also welcomed the EPAA as a U.S. national contribution to the new NATO territorial missile defense capability, in support of our commitment to the collective defense of the Alliance under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. At the Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government also decided to expand the scope of the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program to serve as the command, control, and communications network to support this new capability. NATO allies have committed to investing over $1 billion for command, control, and communications infrastructure to support NATO missile defense.

These decisions have created a framework for Allies to contribute and optimize their own BMD assets for our collective defense. Our Allies possess land- and sea-based sensors that could be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems that can be integrated and used to provide point defense. For example, Germany and the Netherlands each have Patriot PAC-3s while Spain and Greece have Patriot PAC-2s. Turkey is also considering Patriot PAC-3s to address its air defense and BMD requirements. On the sea-based side, the Dutch announced in September 2011, their intention to upgrade the SMART-L air search radars on their De Zeven Provinciën-class frigates with an extended long-range (ELR) mode. In December 2006, the Dutch frigate Tromp participated in an Aegis BMD test during which it demonstrated the capability of a modified radar to track ballistic missiles.

Germany also has the SMART-L and Active Phased Array Radars (APARs) on its F-124 frigates and may decide to pursue a BMD capability in the future, while Spain has frigates equipped with a version of the SPY-1 radar used on our Aegis BMD ships. In June 2007, the Spanish frigate Méndez Núñez, participated in a BMD test off of Kaui, Hawaii, during which it was able to detect and track a ballistic missile with a minor modification to its Aegis Weapon System. Italy and Germany are also working with the United States to develop a Proof of Concept for MEADS, which will allow all three nations to harvest the advanced technologies of MEADS for follow-on systems.

Later this month on May 20-21, the NATO Heads of State and Government will meet in Chicago for the NATO Summit. Our goal is to declare an interim NATO MD capability at the Summit. What this means is that the United States could transfer select missile defense assets to NATO operational control should conditions warrant which results in a limited NATO missile defense capability. Over time, through additional contributions by the United States and other Allies, NATO missile defense will become even more capable.
Separate from the EPAA, it is important to note that our European allies are contributing directly to the defense of the United States today. The United Kingdom and Denmark each host an Upgraded Early Warning Radar at Fylingdales and Thule, Greenland, respectively. These radars are critical to the defense of the United States against a potential long-range missile threat from the Middle East. I would also note that U.S. EPAA capabilities will provide protection for these important assets. Therefore, I think it’s fair to say that the defense of the U.S. homeland is linked to the defense of Europe.


Russia
An update on missile defense cooperation with Europe should also include a discussion of our efforts to pursue cooperation with Russia. Missile defense cooperation with Russia is a Presidential priority, as it has been for several Administrations going back to President George H.W. Bush in the early 1990s.

When President Obama announced his new vision for missile defense in Europe in September 2009, he stated that “we welcome Russia’s cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests.” Missile defense cooperation with Russia will not only strengthen our bilateral and NATO-Russia relationships, but also could enhance NATO’s missile defense capabilities. Successful missile defense cooperation would provide concrete benefits to Russia, our NATO Allies, and the United States and will strengthen – not weaken – strategic stability over the long term.
This means it is important to get Russia inside the missile defense tent now, working alongside the United States and NATO, while we are in the early stages of our efforts. Close cooperation between Russia and the United States and NATO is the best and most enduring way for Russia to gain the assurance that European missile defenses cannot and do not undermine its strategic deterrent.

Through this cooperation, Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed for the ballistic missile threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems will not threaten Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities. Cooperation will also allow Russia to see that the EPAA is designed to be flexible. Should the ballistic missile threat from nations like Iran change, our missile defense system can be adapted accordingly. Working together on missile defense would also send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working to counter their efforts.

That said, Russia has raised the issue of a legal guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria” that could, in effect, create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional ballistic missile threats such as those presented by Iran and North Korea. We have also made it clear to Russia that we cannot and will not accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of purposes around the world, not just for missile defense.

The United States cannot accept any Russian proposal that limits the operational areas of U.S. or allied ships. Such limits are contrary to international law on navigational rights and freedom of the sea. We also will not accept limitations on the capabilities and numbers of our missile defense systems. Let me be clear, our missile defense capabilities are critical to our ability to counter a growing threat to our deployed forces, allies, and partners; therefore, no nation or group of nations will have veto power over U.S. missile defense efforts.

And while we seek to develop ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, it is important to remember that under the terms of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO alone will bear responsibility for defending the Alliance from the ballistic missile threat. This is why the United States and NATO cannot agree to Russia’s proposal for “sectoral” missile defense. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of Russian territory, NATO must ensure the defense of NATO territory.

We would, however, be willing to agree to a political framework including a statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. Any such statement would be politically binding and would publicly proclaim our intent to work together and chart the direction for cooperation, not limitations. Our bottom line is that missile defense cooperation with Russia will not come at the expense of our plans to defend against regional ballistic missile threats or our plans for the defense of the U.S. homeland.

Conclusion
Today’s ballistic missile threats continue to increase in number and sophistication. This increasing threat reinforces the importance of our collaborative missile defense efforts with partners around the world, which not only strengthen regional stability, but also provide protection for our forces serving abroad and augment the defense of the United States.
Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to your questions.

U.S. SAYS MISSILE THREAT NEEDS ROBUST DEFENSES

The following excerpt is from an American Forces Press Service e-mail: 

Growing Missile Threat Needs Robust Defenses, Official Says

By Lisa Daniel
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, March 27, 2012 - The United States is well protected against the current threat from limited intercontinental ballistic missile attacks, but the threat is growing, underscoring the need for a robust and flexible defense system, a senior Pentagon official said here yesterday.

Development and deployment of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System protects the United States against the current threats posed by nations such as North Korea and Iran, Madelyn R. Creedon, assistant secretary of defense for global strategic affairs, said at the 10th Annual U.S. Missile Defense Conference.

With 30 ground-based interceptors in place, the United States is well protected against the current threat, she said at the conference, sponsored by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

"Maintaining this advantageous position is essential," she added. "As the threat matures -- and it will -- we will continued to improve the GMD system, including enhanced performance by the [interceptors] and the deployment of new sensors."

Creedon outlined the Defense Department's ballistic missile defense plans and priorities as part of the military strategic guidance President Barack Obama issued in January. She detailed U.S. progress in sustaining a strong homeland defense, strengthening regional missile defense, and fostering increased international cooperation.

Obama's fiscal 2013 budget request to Congress includes $9.7 billion -- part of $47.4 billion over five years -- for missile defense. Though the request is down slightly from the current year, Creedon said, it adequately supports the U.S. commitment to both homeland security and regional defense.

The improved ground-based system requires a satellite tracking system, as well as the Standard Missile 3 Block IIA and IIB interceptors. "These efforts will help to ensure that the United States possesses a superior capability to counter projected threats for the foreseeable future," Creedon said.

The United States also is developing a "hedge strategy," Creedon added, to address possible delays in the development of the system or emerging threats. "The United States must be well hedged against the rapid emergence of a threat that undermines the advantage we have today," she said.

Creedon said development of the four-phase system includes:

-- Development of the two-stage ground-based interceptor and completion of 14 silos at Fort Greely, Alaska;

-- Inclusion of funding in the fiscal 2013 budget request to improve the ground-based system with early warning radars, advanced sensors, and improved command and control software, all designed to make the system increasingly more efficient;

-- Deployment of the SM-3 IIB in Europe early in the next decade, providing early interception capabilities from a possible Iranian attack and other emerging threats; and

-- The purchase of five more ground-based interceptors to improve rapid response and allow for testing and spares, as well as "to keep the GBI production line warm."

After a decade of progress in fielding capabilities against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, "the United States is now capable of significantly strengthening the protection of its forces abroad and assisting its allies and partners in providing for their own defense," Creedon said.

The short and medium ballistic missile threat is rapidly expanding in areas where the U.S. military is deployed, and Defense Department officials are reviewing the best ways to address the threat with systems that are mobile, flexible and region-specific, Creedon said. Such regional architectures will augment homeland defense, she added.

The commitment to missile defense is growing among NATO nations, Creedon said, and the United States deployed the first phase of its European-based system with the guided missile cruiser USS Monterey, carrying SM-3 interceptors, in the Mediterranean Sea.

In August, Turkish officials announced they would host a forward-based radar system, and it was deployed in December, Creedon said. And the U.S. Air Operations Center's command and control capabilities at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, now are operational, she said.

In Phase 2, a land-based SM-3 site will be developed in Romania, with Block II interceptors deployed on land and sea, and is expected to be operational in 2015, Creedon said. Spain has agreed to host four U.S. Aegis destroyers in Rota, with the first two ships scheduled to arrive in 2014, she said.

In Phase 3, a second land-based SM-3 site will be deployed to Poland, with SM-3 Block IIA interceptors deployed on land and sea, extending coverage to all NATO European countries.

In Phase 4, the SM-3 IIB will be deployed around 2020, which Creedon called "an important enhancement."

"Iran continues to develop ballistic missiles that are capable of threatening all of NATO [in] Europe," she said. "The capability will eventually enhance the protection of the United States by providing an early shot against an Iranian long-range ICBM headed to the U.S. homeland."

The administration's February 2010 missile defense review outlined these priorities:

-- Defending the homeland against the threat of a limited ballistic missile attack;

-- Defending against regional missile threats to U.S. forces while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to protect themselves;

-- Testing new technologies under operationally realistic conditions before deploying them;

-- Keeping new capabilities fiscally sustainable over the long term;

-- Ensuring capabilities are flexible enough to adapt as threats change; and

-- Seeking to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense.