ADAM SCHEINMAN'S REMARKS, NPT CLUSTER 2

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

NPT Cluster 2: Nonproliferation and Safeguards - U.S. Statement

Remarks

Adam Scheinman, Senior Advisor, International Security and Nonproliferation

Third Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

New York City

May 1, 2014

(As Prepared)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The United States emphasizes the importance of a balanced approach to implementation of the NPT. The three NPT pillars are mutually reinforcing. The nonproliferation pillar plays a central role by strengthening the other two. Together, nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses are complementary not competing goals. We pursue each with equal vigor and in all aspects.

A strong nonproliferation regime contributes to the security conditions that make disarmament easier to achieve, and progress on disarmament helps create political conditions to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. All parties share in the mutual security that derives from a strong nonproliferation regime.

Safeguards, export controls, and other important nonproliferation measures build the mutual confidence that enables the fullest possible cooperation among parties. This in turn helps to realize the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for all parties. The robust nuclear cooperation that results demonstrates the value of a strong nonproliferation regime.

The United States remains fully committed to the Action Plan that was adopted by consensus in 2010, including those actions related to nonproliferation. A complete listing of U.S. implementation of this pillar can be found in our national report to the PrepCom.

U.S. Support for IAEA Safeguards and the Additional Protocol

Mr. Chairman, the Action Plan emphasizes the importance of compliance with IAEA safeguards, which are the established international verification mechanism under the NPT. These safeguards are essential to help ensure that nuclear activities remain in peaceful uses and that material and technology is not diverted to produce nuclear weapons. These safeguards are essential to help ensure that states are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons. Only twelve NPT parties have yet to bring the required safeguards agreement into force. We should aim to reduce that number to zero by next year’s Review Conference, and we encourage states that have not yet done so to update any small quantities protocols.

A comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an Additional Protocol is now recognized as the strengthened safeguards standard. We have learned time and again that the IAEA needs the essential tools provided by the Additional Protocol in order to respond to possible undeclared nuclear activities and provide assurances of their absence. We should redouble efforts to make the Additional Protocol universal. Between now and the Review Conference, states that have signed the Additional Protocol should bring it into force. Those states yet to sign should start the work now to take this forward.

Some states may need assistance in implementing – or preparing to implement – those safeguards measures. The United States devotes considerable resources to this effort, and we encourage those who are in a position to help to offer their support to other states and to the IAEA. We should make sure that all interested states are aware and take advantage of such assistance.

The IAEA should seek to continuously improve the way it implements safeguards by using new technology and taking advantage of all safeguards-relevant information. In doing so the Agency must maintain its objectivity, impartiality, and the technical foundation of its work. This deserves our full financial, technical, and political support. In this regard, we note the IAEA’s development of the state-level concept (SLC), which is the next logical phase in the evolution of IAEA safeguards. We support the Agency’s efforts to transition to the SLC in order that IAEA safeguards remain both effective and efficient.

Thirty-seven years ago, the United States was the first state to establish a Member State Support Program to provide technical and financial assistance to the IAEA for safeguards. Last year alone, we provided $40 million to the IAEA to support its safeguards mission. This figure does not include significant efforts to revitalize our own technology base and work with other international partners to support IAEA safeguards. We also take great encouragement from the contributions of 20 other active Support Programs for IAEA safeguards, a concrete affirmation of the importance those states place in IAEA safeguards.

The United States remains ready to accept the same safeguards on our civil nuclear facilities and activities that non-nuclear-weapon states Parties are required to accept, both under comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols to those agreements, subject only to a national security exclusion. We have made roughly 300 civil nuclear facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards under our “voluntary offer” safeguards agreement. We have welcomed IAEA verification of the downblending of excess U.S. highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium for use in power reactors. Each of our annual reports under the U.S. Additional Protocol since 2010 has included over 300 entries.

Nuclear Security

Mr. Chairman, in addition to the risk of nuclear proliferation by states, we need to address the risks from non-state actors, including the risks of unauthorized removal or sabotage of dangerous nuclear and radiological materials. We welcome the outcome of the Nuclear Security Summit last month in The Hague and take note of the accomplishments made through commitments made at earlier summits by a diverse group of world leaders representing 53 states and four international organizations. This concerted international action, some of which predates the Summits, has enabled 26 states plus Taiwan to rid themselves entirely of an aggregate of over five metric tons of highly enriched uranium.

But more remains to be done not only to secure and eliminate the most dangerous materials, but to promote best practices in securing nuclear and radiological material. We are pleased that two thirds of the countries participating in this year’s Summit, on the initiative of the hosts of all three Summits, pledged to implement robust measures to strengthen their nuclear security practices. As we approach the 2016 Summit, we look forward to further progress as states work to meet the additional commitments undertaken at The Hague, as well as to further progress on nuclear security actions in the three communiqués and the 2010 Action Plan.

Proliferation Challenges

Mr. Chairman, since the early 1990s, we have seen several instances of NPT Parties that failed to comply with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. Some of these cases have been resolved successfully. But other cases remain unresolved and those states stand in violation of their obligations today because they have not taken sufficient action to resolve the underlying compliance concerns. Unresolved cases of noncompliance erode confidence in the NPT as a foundation for international security and for efforts to reduce global nuclear dangers. NPT parties should continue to give utmost attention to these challenges in order to maintain and reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Non-compliant states or non-state actors will not hesitate to take advantage of weaknesses in the nonproliferation system. They will import critical nuclear-related equipment on the black market or traffic in dangerous materials. None of us is immune to these risks. Illicit commerce has taken advantage even of states with the strongest nonproliferation commitments, and its results affect all of us.

This underscores the need for concerted action to shore up our existing controls. We therefore encourage states in position to do so to join us in offering assistance, in export control, border security, safeguards, nuclear and radiological security; we encourage those who need assistance to avail themselves of these offers.

Strengthening the Treaty

Mr. Chairman, universality of the NPT remains our long-term objective, even as we recognize the challenges we face in pursuing that goal. This goal will not be achieved quickly, but it remains an essential element in achieving the broader vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

We welcome the heightened attention to the issue of withdrawal from the NPT. While we do not challenge the right of NPT parties to withdraw in accordance with Article X of the Treaty, nor do we seek to amend that provision in any way, we share the concerns many countries have regarding the potential for states to abuse this right.

Mr. Chairman, the United States encourages all NPT parties to do all they can to strengthen the nonproliferation pillar of the Treaty. This is urgent if we are to preserve the security benefits that derive from our shared commitment to nonproliferation and to all pillars of the NPT regime.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PRESIDENT OBAMA'S REMARKS AT CLOSING OF NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE 

Remarks by President Obama at Closing Session of the Nuclear Security Summit

The World Forum
The Hague, The Netherlands

3:15 P.M. CET

PRESIDENT OBAMA:  Well, thank you very much, Mark.  Let me begin just by saying that -- to Prime Minister Rutte and all the people here in the Netherlands who were involved in organizing this summit, you did an extraordinary job.  And I think we would all agree that this was as well-designed and well-executed as any international summit that we’ve attended.  And so we’re very grateful, and you’ve set a high bar for the work that needs to be done in Chicago.

Two things I want to do is, number one, just remind everybody what has been accomplished.  In previous summits, as a consequence to the work that’s been done collectively, 12 countries and two dozen nuclear facilities around the world have rid themselves entirely of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium.  Dozens of nations have boosted security at their nuclear storage sites; built their own counter-smuggling teams; or created new centers to improve nuclear security and training.  The IAEA is stronger.  More countries have ratified the treaties and international partnerships at the heart of our efforts.

And at this particular summit, we’ve seen such steps as Belgium and Italy completing the removal of their excess supplies of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium so that those supplied s can be eliminated.  In a major commitment, Japan announced that it will work with the United States to eliminate hundreds of kilograms of weapons-usable nuclear material from one of their experimental reactors, which would be enough for a dozen nuclear weapons.  Dozens of other nations have agreed to take specific steps towards improving nuclear security in their own countries and to support global efforts.

So what’s been valuable about this summit is that it has not just been talk, it’s been action.  And that is because of the leadership that has been shown by heads of state and government -- and heads of government that have participated in this effort, as well as the extraordinary work of foreign ministers and sherpas and others who have helped to move this process forward.

I’m looking forward to hosting all of you in the United States, in 2016.  We had a good discussion this afternoon about how we should conceive of this summit two years from now.  The consensus, based on what I heard, was that we should recognize this next summit will be a transition summit in which heads of state and government are still participating, but that we are shifting towards a more sustainable model that utilizes our ministers, our technical people, and we are building some sort of architecture that can effectively focus and implement on these issues and supplement the good work that is being done by the IAEA and others.

So I see two tasks before us over the next two years.  Number one is we have to set very clearly what are the actionable items that we’ve already identified that we know can get done if we have the political will to do them, and let’s go ahead and get them done so that in 2016 we can report out that we have made extraordinary progress and achieved many of the benchmarks and targets that we had set at the very first Nuclear Security Summit.  In other words, I think it is important for us not to relax, but rather accelerate our efforts over the next two years, sustain momentum so that we finish strong in 2016.  And my team will be contacting all of you to find out specific ways in which you think we can move the ball forward over the next two years.

The second thing we’ll be doing is soliciting ideas from each of you about the ultimate architecture that should be constructed to ensure that beyond 2016 we are able to keep this process alive and effective, and that we are able to sync up the efforts of the Nuclear Security Summit with existing institutions like the IAEA, Interpol, the United Nations, some of the treaties that are already in force.

All of you have important views on that, and we’re going to want to make sure that you provide them so that by the time we get to 2016 we have a well thought-out process that can be ratified at that meeting.

So I cannot thank you enough for the extraordinary efforts that all of you have already made.  I cannot guarantee that the videos will be as good at the Washington conference as they’ve been here.  We may not be as creative and imaginative as Mark and his team have been.  But I promise you that we will continue to stay focused on this very important issue, and we look forward to your contributions in 2016 in the United States.

Thank you very much, Mark.  (Applause.)

BELGIUM-U.S. JOINT STATEMENT ON 2014 NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE 
Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Elio Di Rupo of Belgium on the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit

Belgium and the United States of America are pleased to announce that they have jointly completed the removal of a significant amount of excess highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium from Belgium.

At the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, Belgium and the United States pledged to work together to remove this material prior to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.  This removal entailed extremely complex operations that required the joint team to develop a new glovebox facility for plutonium packaging, to train and certify personnel in specialized packaging operations, to validate certificates for a U.S.-designed nuclear material package in Belgium, and to address materials in unique and unusual forms.  Despite the significant technical challenges, the team successfully completed the operation on schedule.

The material was safely packaged in transport containers certified by regulators in both the United States and Belgium.  The United States, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) worked seamlessly together and in accordance with all relevant regulations and internationally-recognized recommendations to securely transport this material to its final destination.

Belgium and the United States plan to continue their cooperation to eliminate additional stocks of excess special nuclear material, consistent with their commitment to prevent nuclear terrorism.  They also pledge to work with others in the international community to assist them with the elimination of such materials.

Joint statement by the United States and the Netherlands on Climate Change and Financing the Transition to Low-Carbon Investments Abroad

The Netherlands and the United States share a common interest in urgent action to address global climate change.  We affirm the importance of reaching a global climate change agreement in 2015 that can attract broad and ambitious participation.  The agreement should reflect the continuous evolution of capabilities of countries in tackling this global challenge.  It should also take account of the important role played by the private sector, sub-national actors, and civil society in finding solutions to addressing carbon pollution while improving the resilience of nations to the impacts of climate change.  Our two countries pledge to continue our cooperation towards adopting such an agreement at the United Nations climate conference in Paris in 2015.

We reaffirm our support of internationally agreed commitments to scale up the mobilization of climate finance and recognize that different forms of financing are needed to support countries making the transition to a low-emission, climate resilient economy.  We strive to deploy public resources to catalyze private climate finance in and to developing countries.

We emphasize that our work to scale up climate friendly investments in developing countries is most effective when combined with reducing public incentives for high-carbon infrastructure.  To this end, the Netherlands is joining the United States, the United Kingdom, and others in agreeing to end support for public financing of new coal-fired power plants abroad except in rare circumstances.  This includes our bilateral development finance institutions and projects financed through the multilateral development banks, where it should be noted that the Netherlands is a member of mixed constituencies.  Complementing action already taken by the United States, our two countries are working together to promote a technology-neutral standard in the OECD Export Credit Group that limits support for high carbon intensity power plants by export credit agencies.

JAPAN-U.S. JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING GLOBAL MINIMIZATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE  
Joint Statement by the Leaders of Japan and the United States on Contributions to Global Minimization of Nuclear Material

Recalling the history of Japan-U.S. bilateral collaboration on advanced nuclear activities as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) conclusion that all nuclear materials in Japan stay in peaceful activities;

Recalling Japan-U.S. cooperation including through the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) which strengthened nuclear security worldwide by reducing sensitive nuclear material in Japan and other countries and securely transporting the material to the United States; and,

Recalling President Obama’s remarks at Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic on April 5, 2009;

Japan and the United States reaffirm our determination to strengthen nuclear security and to further cooperate, through activities such as our bilateral Nuclear Security Working Group and the GTRI, toward our mutual goal of preventing nuclear terrorism.

Today in The Hague, the Netherlands, on the occasion of the third Nuclear Security Summit, Prime Minister Abe and President Obama pledged to remove and dispose all highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium from the Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) in Japan.  This effort involves the elimination of hundreds of kilograms of nuclear material, furthering our mutual goal of minimizing stocks of HEU and separated plutonium worldwide, which will help prevent unauthorized actors, criminals, or terrorists from acquiring such materials.  This material, once securely transported to the United States, will be sent to a secure facility and fully converted into less sensitive forms.  The plutonium will be prepared for final disposition.  The HEU will be downblended to low enriched uranium (LEU) and utilized for civilian purposes.

By committing to remove and dispose all HEU and separated plutonium from the FCA, Japan and the United States reaffirm our belief that the most cutting edge sciences do not necessarily require the use of the most proliferation sensitive materials.  In this context, our two countries plan to work together to design new enhancements to the FCA, expanding the facility’s scope to include important research on the transmutation and disposition of nuclear waste.  Additionally, to ensure that Japan can safely and securely further its important work on nuclear research and medical isotope production, the United States will continue to accept research reactor spent fuel from several Japanese facilities that utilize LEU.

This pledge complements the significant role that both Japan and the United States are playing in finding new ways to continue improving global nuclear security.  Many of the remaining gains that the international community can make in this area will require difficult decisions, and Japan has demonstrated its leadership by resolving to remove all special nuclear material from the FCA, consistent with all Summit Communiqués’ spirit to minimize stocks of nuclear material.  Our two countries encourage others to consider what they can do to further HEU and plutonium minimization.

TECHNICAL UNDERSTANDINGS SUMMARY ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE

Summary of Technical Understandings Related to the Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program

On January 12, 2014, the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, and China, coordinated by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton) and Iran arrived at technical understandings for the Joint Plan of Action, which will be implemented beginning on January 20, 2014.

The Joint Plan of Action marks the first time in nearly a decade that the Islamic Republic of Iran has agreed to specific actions that stop the advance of its nuclear program, roll back key aspects of the program, and include unprecedented access for international inspectors.  The technical understandings set forth how the provisions of the Joint Plan of Action will be implemented and verified, and the timing of implementation of its provisions.  Specifically, the technical understandings specify the actions that Iran will take to limit its enrichment capacity at Natanz and Fordow, as well as the limits on safeguarded research and development (R&D); the actions Iran will take to implement its commitments not to fuel the Arak reactor or install remaining components at the reactor; and the actions Iran will take to facilitate International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification and confirmation that Iran is fully implementing these commitments.  The understandings also clarify the reciprocal actions that the P5+1 and the EU will take.

Between now and January 20th, Iran, the IAEA, the United States, and our international partners, will take the remaining required steps to begin implementing the Joint Plan of Action on that date.

What Iran Has Committed To Do

On January 20th, the IAEA will report on the current status of Iran’s nuclear program, and particularly on its uranium enrichment program and the Arak reactor.  The IAEA will also report on several specific steps that Iran has committed to take by or on the first day of implementation, including:

Halting production of near-20% enriched uranium and disabling the configuration of the centrifuge cascades Iran has been using to produce it.
Starting to dilute half of the near-20% enriched uranium stockpile that is in hexafluoride form, and continuing to convert the rest to oxide form not suitable for further enrichment.
In addition, over the course of the Joint Plan of Action, the IAEA will verify that Iran is:

Not enriching uranium in roughly half of installed centrifuges at Natanz and three-quarters of installed centrifuges at Fordow, including all next generation centrifuges.
Limiting its centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines, so Iran cannot use the six-month period to stockpile centrifuges.
Not constructing additional enrichment facilities.
Not going beyond its current enrichment R&D practices.
Not commissioning or fueling the Arak reactor.
Halting the production and additional testing of fuel for the Arak reactor.
Not installing any additional reactor components at Arak.
Not transferring fuel and heavy water to the Arak reactor site.
Not constructing a facility capable of reprocessing.  Without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate plutonium from spent fuel.
Iran has also committed to a schedule for taking certain actions during the six-month period.  This includes:

Completion of dilution of half of its stockpile of near-20% uranium hexafluoride in three months, and completion of conversion of the rest of that material to oxide in six months.
A cap on the permitted size of Iran’s up to 5% enriched uranium stockpile at the end of the six-month period.
Verification Mechanisms

To ensure Iran is fulfilling its commitments, the IAEA will be solely responsible for verifying and confirming all nuclear-related measures, consistent with its ongoing inspection role in Iran.  In addition, the EU, P5+1 and Iran will establish a Joint Commission to work with the IAEA to monitor implementation of the Joint Plan of Action.  The Joint Commission will also work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present concerns with respect to Iran’s nuclear program.

The Joint Commission will be composed of experts of the EU, P5+1 and Iran, and it will convene at least monthly to consider the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action and any issues that may arise.  Any decisions that are required on the basis of these discussions will be referred to the Political Directors of the EU, the P5+1, and Iran.

Transparency and Monitoring

Iran committed in the Joint Plan of Action to provide increased and unprecedented transparency into its nuclear program, including through more frequent and intrusive inspections as well as expanded provision of information to the IAEA.

The Iranian enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow will now be subject to daily IAEA inspector access as set out in the Joint Plan of Action (as opposed to every few weeks).  The IAEA and Iran are working to update procedures, which will permit IAEA inspectors to review surveillance information on a daily basis to shorten detection time for any Iranian non-compliance.  In addition, these facilities will continue to be subjected to a variety of other physical inspections, including scheduled and unannounced inspections.

The Arak reactor and associated facilities will be subject to at least monthly IAEA inspections – an increase from the current inspection schedule permitting IAEA access approximately once every three months or longer.

Iran has also agreed to provide for the first time:

Long-sought design information on the Arak reactor;
Figures to verify that centrifuge production will be dedicated to the replacement of damaged machines; and
Information to enable managed access at centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities, and uranium mines and mills.
These enhanced monitoring measures will enable the IAEA to provide monthly updates to the Joint Commission on the status of Iran’s implementation of its commitments and enable the international community to more quickly detect breakout or the diversion of materials to a secret program.

What the P5+1 and EU Have Committed To Do

As part of this initial step, the P5+1 and EU will provide limited, temporary, and targeted relief to Iran.  The total value of the relief is between $6 and $7 billion – a small fraction of the $100 billion in Iranian foreign exchange holdings that will continue to be blocked or restricted.  Some relief will be provided from the first day; most will be provided in installments over the span of the entire six-month period.  The relief is structured so that the overwhelming majority of the sanctions regime, including the key oil, banking, and financial sanctions architecture, remains in place – and sanctions will continue to be vigorously implemented throughout the six-month period.

Once the IAEA has confirmed Iran is implementing its commitments, in return the P5+1 and EU have committed to do the following on the first day of implementation:

Suspend the implementation of sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical exports and Iran’s imports of goods and services for its automotive manufacturing sector.
Suspend sanctions on Iran’s import and export of gold and other precious metals, with significant limitations that prevent Iran from using its restricted assets overseas to pay for these purchases.
License expeditiously the supply of spare parts and services, including inspection services, for the safety of flight of Iran’s civil aviation sector.
Pause efforts to further reduce purchases of crude oil from Iran by the six economies still purchasing oil from Iran.
Facilitate the establishment of a financial channel intended to support humanitarian trade that is already permitted with Iran and facilitate payments for UN obligations and tuition payments for students studying abroad.
Modify the thresholds for EU internal procedures for the authorization of financial transactions.
The P5+1 and EU have also committed to take certain actions to facilitate Iran’s access to $4.2 billion in restricted Iranian funds on a set schedule at regular intervals throughout the six months.  Access to a small portion of these funds will be linked to Iran’s progress in completing the dilution process for near-20% enriched uranium.  Iran will not have access to the final installment of the $4.2 billion until the last day of the six-month period.

The installments will be released on the schedule below, contingent on the IAEA confirming that Iran is fulfilling its commitments.

February 1st - $550 million (installment #1)

March 1st - $450million (contingent on the IAEA confirming that Iran has completed dilution of half of the stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium it is required to dilute)

March 7th - $550 million (installment #2)

April 10th - $550 million (installment #3)

April 15th - $450 million (contingent on the IAEA confirming that Iran has completed dilution of its entire stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium it is required to dilute)

May 14th - $550 million (installment #4)

June 17th - $550 million (installment #5)

July 20th - $550million (installment #6 is on day 180) (contingent on the IAEA confirming that Iran has fulfilled all of its commitments)

A Comprehensive Solution

With this implementation plan, we have made concrete progress.  We will now focus on the critical work of pursuing a comprehensive resolution that addresses our concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.  Shortly after the Joint Plan of Action takes effect on January 20th, the United States will determine with our P5+1 partners our approach to the comprehensive solution.  Discussions with Iran will follow that coordination process.

With respect to the comprehensive solution, nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to.  We have no illusions about how hard it will be to achieve this objective, but for the sake of our national security and the peace and security of the world, now is the time to give diplomacy a chance to succeed.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S TESTIMONY ON P5+1 JOINT PLAN OF ACTION WITH IRAN

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Assessing the P5+1 Joint Plan of Action With Iran
Testimony
Wendy R. Sherman
Under Secretary for Political Affairs 
Written Statement Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Washington, DC
December 12, 2013

Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Crapo, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss the details of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) concluded with Iran and our P5+1 partners on November 24 in Geneva.

Let me begin by noting that the diplomatic opportunity before us is a direct result of the cooperation between Congress and the Administration to put in place and implement a comprehensive and unprecedented sanctions regime designed to press Iran to address international concerns with its nuclear program.

Our collaboration on sanctions is what brought Iran to the table. However, it is important to underscore that what we do from this point forward is just as critical, if not more so, in terms of testing Iran’s intentions. In that regard, I look forward to our consultations over the important weeks and months ahead.

Today, I want to give you the facts about what was agreed to in Geneva, so you can judge the merits of the JPA for yourself.

Iran Commitments

We have long recognized that the Iranian nuclear program constitutes one of the most serious threats to U.S. national security and our interests in the Middle East. Thanks to the sanctions pressure, and a firm and united position from the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, UK, U.S. and Germany, in coordination with the EU), we have reached an understanding that constitutes the most significant effort to halt the advance of Iran’s nuclear program in nearly a decade. As a consequence, the JPA agreed to in Geneva is profoundly in America’s national security interest, and makes our regional partners safer and more secure.

The JPA is sequenced, with a 6-month period designed explicitly to block near-term Iranian pathways to a nuclear weapon, while creating space for a long-term comprehensive solution. The goal of that comprehensive solution is to resolve the international community’s concerns with Iran’s nuclear program. What this initial plan does is help ensure that Iran’s nuclear program cannot advance while negotiations towards that solution proceed.

Upon implementation in the coming weeks, this initial step will immediately: halt progress of the Iranian nuclear program; roll it back in key respects; and introduce unprecedented monitoring into Iran’s nuclear activities. Taken together, these measures will prevent Iran from enhancing its ability to create a nuclear weapon and increase the confidence in our ability to detect any move towards nuclear break-out or diversion of material towards a covert program.

The details demonstrate why this is the case. First, as stated, Iran must halt the progress of its enrichment program. This means, under the express terms of the JPA, that Iran cannot increase its enrichment capacity. Iran’s stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cannot grow – it will be the same amount or less at the end of the six month period as it is as the beginning. Iran cannot build new enrichment facilities for the production of enriched uranium. Iran cannot install additional centrifuges of any type in their production facilities, operate more centrifuges, nor replace existing centrifuges with more advanced types. Moreover, Iran must limit centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines; thus Iran cannot expand its stockpile of centrifuges.

Second, during this initial phase, Iran will roll back or neutralize key aspects of its program. Iran must cease all enrichment over five percent. The piping at Fordow and Natanz that is used to more efficiently enrich uranium over five percent must be dismantled. Iran must neutralize its entire 20 percent stockpile of enriched uranium hexafluoride by diluting it to a lower level of enriched uranium hexafluoride or converting it to oxide for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.

Finally, Iran cannot advance work on the plutonium track. At Arak, Iran cannot commission the heavy water reactor under construction nor transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site. Iran cannot test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor nor install remaining components for the reactor. Iran cannot construct a facility for reprocessing spent fuel. Without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate plutonium from spent fuel and therefore cannot obtain any plutonium for use in a nuclear weapon. As such, this first step freezes the timeline for beginning operations at the Arak reactor and halts progress on any plutonium pathway to a weapon.

Significantly, the monitoring measures outlined in the JPA will provide much more timely warning of a breakout at Iran’s declared enrichment facilities and add new checks against the diversion of equipment for any potential covert enrichment program. Some have rightfully asked why we should trust Iran to live up to these commitments. As Secretary Kerry has said, the JPA is not based on trust, it is based on verification – and the verification mechanisms set forth in the JPA are unprecedented.

Under its express terms, Iran must permit daily access by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to the facilities at Natanz and Fordow and allow more frequent access to the Arak reactor. Iran must allow IAEA inspectors access to sites related to centrifuge assembly and production of centrifuge rotors (both key aspects of the program). Iran must allow IAEA inspectors access to uranium mines and mills. Iran must provide design information for the Arak heavy water reactor. These monitoring mechanisms will provide additional warning of breakout or diversion of equipment all along the nuclear fuel cycle and would not be in place without the understanding reached in Geneva.

In summary, even in its initial phase, the JPA stops any advances in each of the potential pathways to a weapon that has long concerned us and our closest allies. It eliminates Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride. It stops installation of additional centrifuges at production facilities, especially Iran’s most advanced centrifuge design, together with freezing further accumulation of 3.5 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride. And it ensures that the Arak reactor cannot be brought on line while we negotiate a comprehensive solution.

P5+1 Commitments

In return for these concrete actions by Iran and as Iran takes the required steps, the P5+1 will provide limited, temporary, and reversible relief while maintaining the core architecture of our sanctions regime – including key oil and banking sanctions. And we will vigorously enforce these and all other existing sanctions.

We estimate that this limited relief will provide approximately $6-7 billion in revenue.

First, we will hold steady Iran’s exports of crude oil at levels that are down over 60 percent since 2011. This means that Iran will continue to lose $4-5 billion per month while the JPA is in effect compared to 2011. Let me be clear, however. We will not allow Iran’s exports to increase and we will continue collaboration with our international partners to ensure that they understand that any increases in Iranian oil purchases – or any new purchases of Iranian oil – remain subject to sanctions.

Second, we are prepared to allow Iran to access $4.2 billion in its restricted assets, not in a lump sum, but in monthly allocations that keep up with verified Iranian progress on its nuclear commitments. Remember, Iran will continue to lose $4-5 billion a month due to our oil sanctions compared to 2011, so this access to funds is less than one month of those losses. And this is a fraction of Iran’s total needs for imports or its budget shortfall.

Third, the P5+1 agreed to suspend certain sanctions on gold and precious metals, Iran’s auto sector and on Iran’s petrochemical exports. The suspension of the sanctions on gold and precious metals will not allow Iran to use restricted assets to purchase gold and precious metals, rather it allows Iranians to import and export gold and precious metals. The suspension of the sanctions on the auto industry will allow Iran to obtain support and services from third countries for the assembly and manufacturing of light and heavy vehicles. The suspension of sanctions on petrochemical exports means Iran will be able to sell petrochemicals and retain the revenues from these sales. We estimate that Iran will earn approximately $1.5 billion in revenue from the temporary suspension of these sanctions.

We will also license the supply and installation of spare parts for the safety of flight for airplanes to occur in Iran. We will also license safety inspections and related services to occur in Iran. Notably, this will not apply to any airline subject to sanctions under our counter-terrorism authorities.

In addition, solely for the financing of humanitarian transactions and tuition assistance for Iranians studying abroad, we will facilitate access to Iran’s overseas accounts for these specific transactions. Even before the JPA, we never intended to deprive the Iranian people of humanitarian goods, like food and medicine. In fact, Congress has explicitly exempted these transactions from sanctions.

There have been some that have incorrectly represented the limited relief as being far more. So, let me reiterate. The total relief envisioned in the JPA amounts to between $6-7 billion – nowhere near the $20 or $40 billion that some have reported. The total relief for Iran envisioned in the JPA would be a modest fraction of the approximately $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings that are inaccessible or restricted because of our ongoing sanctions pressure. This sanctions pressure, moreover, will continue to increase over the six months of this initial phase through the continued enforcement of our sanctions.

Continued Enforcement of Sanctions

It is important to understand that the overwhelming majority of our sanctions remain in place and we will continue to vigorously enforce those sanctions to ensure that Iran receives only the limited relief that we agreed to. This will include aggressive enforcement of sanctions under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), the Iran Sanctions Act, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012. This means that sanctions will continue to apply to broad swaths of Iran’s economy including its energy, financial, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors. By rigorous monitoring we will also prevent abuse of the relief that is part of the JPA. Were we to see increased purchases of oil or sanctions evasion, we are prepared to act swiftly to sanction the offenders.

Moreover, the U.S. trade embargo remains in place and U.N. Security Council’s sanctions remain in place. All sanctions related to Iran’s military program, state sponsorship of terrorism, and human rights abuses and censorship remain in place. Our vigilance will continue.

What is also important to understand is that we remain in control. If Iran fails to live up to its commitments as agreed to in Geneva, we would be prepared to work with Congress to ramp up sanctions. In that situation, we would be well-positioned to maximize the impact of any new sanctions because we would likely have the support of the international community, which is essential for any increased pressure to work

In comparison, moving forward on new sanctions now would derail the promising and yet-to-be-tested first step outlined above, alienate us from our allies, and risk unraveling the international cohesion that has proven so essential to ensuring our sanctions have the intended effect.

The Way Ahead

In assessing this deal on the merits, we must compare where we would be without it.

Without the JPA, Iran’s program would continue to advance: Iran could spin thousands of additional centrifuges; install and spin next-generation centrifuges that reduce its breakout times; advance on the plutonium track by fueling and commissioning the Arak heavy water reactor and install remaining components ; and grow its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride. It could do all of that, moreover, without the new inspections that are part of this deal and give us new tools to help detect breakout.

With the JPA, we halt the program in its tracks, roll it back in key respects, and put time on the clock to negotiate a long-term, comprehensive solution with strict limits and verifiable assurances that Iran’s nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.

In a perfect world, we could get to such a comprehensive solution right away. But the reality is that in the absence of the JPA, we would have had an Iranian nuclear program that could double its enrichment capacity, grow its stockpile of enriched uranium, and make progress on starting up the Arak reactor.

We are now moving forward to prepare for implementation. This week, our experts are in Vienna discussing with their P5+1 counterparts, Iran, and the IAEA, the mechanisms and timeframes for beginning implementation and setting a start date. These are technical and complex discussions, and it is critical that we do them well and right -- working to protect our national security interests at every step along the way.

At the same time, the JPA and its implementation is only a first step. There are still many issues related to Iran’s nuclear program that must be addressed, and in the process, Iran must work with the IAEA to resolve all past and present issues of concern. That is why our ultimate aim is a comprehensive agreement that fully addresses all of our longstanding concerns.

Conclusion

Finally, let me be clear about one thing: Our policy with regard to Iran has not changed. The President has been clear that he will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapon. While his strong preference is for a diplomatic solution, he is prepared to use all elements of American power to prevent that outcome.

Our commitment to working with our partners, in the region and elsewhere, to hold Iran accountable for all its actions also remains firm. These negotiations will solely focus on Iran’s nuclear program. So we will continue to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. We will continue to hold Iran accountable for its support for terrorism. Iran remains listed as a State Sponsor of Terror and our sanctions for their support of terror remain in place.

Our sanctions on Iran’s human rights abusers will also continue and so will our support for the fundamental rights of all Iranians. Last week, National Security Advisor Rice reiterated our support for the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and called on Iran to allow him to visit Iran. We will continue to speak forcefully for the oppressed inside Iran, including through our support, later this month, for a resolution before the UN General Assembly condemning Iran’s human rights practices

We call on Iran to release Saeed Abedini and Amir Hekmati and support our efforts to bring Robert Levinson home. As Secretary Kerry has said, one day is too long to be in captivity, and one day for any American citizen is more than any American wants to see somebody endure. Mr. Abedini, Mr. Hekmati, and Mr. Levinson have been gone too long and we will continue to do everything we can, using quiet diplomacy.

And we will prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. That is what these negotiations are all about. We have been encouraged that nearly 70 countries have expressed support for the understandings reached in Geneva, including statements of support from our partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council, with whom we remain closely engaged. The sentiment from our partners has been clear: give this process a chance. If Iran lives up to its commitments then the world will become a safer place. If it does not, then we retain all options to ensure that Iran can never obtain a nuclear weapon. The coming months will be a test of Iranian intentions, and of the possibility for a peaceful resolution to this crisis.

Throughout, and as always, we look forward to working closely with the Congress to ensure that U.S. national security interests are protected and advanced.

Thank you.

MAKING X-RAY IMAGING MORE PORTABLE

FROM: LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

Los Alamos/Tribogenics Create Highly Portable Imaging System

Application to be featured at IAEA conference on nuclear security in Vienna

LOS ALAMOS, N.M., and MARINA DEL REY, Calif., June 26, 2013 - Los Alamos National Laboratory and Tribogenics, the pioneer of innovative X-ray solutions, have partnered to create a unique, lightweight, compact, low-cost X-ray system that uses the MiniMAX (Miniature, Mobile, Agile, X-ray) camera to provide real-time inspection of sealed containers and facilities. The innovative technology will be featured at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, July 1-5, in Vienna, Austria.


"Cost and portability are the major barriers to expanding the use of X-ray imaging," said Scott Watson of Los Alamos's Nuclear Engineering and Nonproliferation Division. "We designed MiniMAX to demonstrate that such a system will open up new applications in security inspection, field medicine, specimen radiography and industrial inspection."

Los Alamos has developed MiniMAX as an alternative to the large, expensive and fixed facilities presently required for security inspections using X-ray imaging. The complete MiniMAX portable radiography system weighs less than five pounds, compared to much larger and heavier systems currently available.

Los Alamos Physicists demonstrated MiniMAX using a conventional X-ray source, a radioisotopic source, and a prototype source from Tribogenics operating at 90 keV. The Los Alamos team used the Tribogenics source to produce an X-ray image of a hand-held calculator.

"We were delighted when Los Alamos approached us to explore a partnership," said Carlos Camara, Chief Scientist at Tribogenics. "This is exactly the type of breakthrough, portable application we envision for our disruptive X-ray technology."


About Tribogenics

Tribogenics is a transformative X-ray technology company developing affordable and highly portable solutions for materials analysis and imaging. The Tribogenics range of X-ray sources includes the X-Change™ cartridge, the world’s smallest turnkey X-ray source designed for use in revolutionary new XRF systems. Tribogenics technology is based on a DARPA-funded initiative that originated at UCLA and the company is venture-backed by prominent investors, including Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund.

Photo Caption: A hand-held calculator that was X-rayed by Los Alamos National Laboratory researchers using the MiniMAX camera, a lightweight, portable X-ray machine that could revolution imaging of closed containers. (photo credit: Los Alamos National Laboratory)

SEMINAR HELD ON PROCESING AND CONTROL OF URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Good Practices in the Processing of Uranium Ore Concentrate
Remarks Ambassador Bonnie D. Jenkins
Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs IAEA Regional Seminar
Windhoek, Namibia
April 23, 2012 

Good morning.

I want to thank the Government of Namibia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for hosting and organizing this important seminar on “Good Practices in the Processing and Control of Uranium Ore Concentrate.”

Uranium ore concentrate is the key material for civilian nuclear energy production and for the growth of civilian nuclear energy worldwide and Namibia is a leading supplier of this material. As such, Namibia is a natural host for this seminar, and we are excited that Namibia has taken this opportunity to facilitate these important discussions this week. I would also like to congratulate the Government of Namibia on the recent entry into force of its additional protocol with the IAEA. The AP has great significance in states exploring uranium resources, and I welcome Namibia’s actions in adopting this important safeguards agreement. I am honored to be here this week in Windhoek, and I look forward to the discussions and sharing of best practices in the safety, safeguards, and security of uranium ore concentrate.

This seminar is particularly timely given the increased interest in uranium production among states, especially those in the African region, many of which are represented in this room today. From the list of participants, I see there are 22 countries and 15 commercial nuclear enterprises represented, including some of the largest uranium producing countries and nuclear companies in the world.

That the International Atomic Energy Agency has organized this seminar is a testament to the Agency’s critical role on issues related to nuclear safety, safeguards, and security, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, I would like to thank the IAEA for its leadership on these topics, especially given the post-Fukushima nuclear landscape. Despite the terrible tragedy in Japan, I believe civilian nuclear power development will grow over the next decades given the demand for new energy sources in Africa, Asia, and across the globe. This trend underscores the important need for governments, regulators, and industry to come together to discuss the safety, safeguards, and security of nuclear material such as uranium ore concentrate.

Clearly many countries around the world, including here in Africa, have extensive uranium reserves. In order to make the most of these commercial opportunities in an environmentally safe and secure manner, it is important for governments, nuclear regulators, and the commercial nuclear industry to have a common and agreed-to understanding of how to mine, process, and export uranium responsibly and in compliance with international norms, best practices, national laws and international obligations.

We all know that the commercial value of a drum of uranium ore concentrate is high. While the intention of uranium production is to reap the economic benefits of this commodity, that same drum could be used maliciously to harm the environment, to carry-out terrorist activities, or to support a clandestine nuclear weapons program. These risks have the potential to damage the market and reduce the positive economic impact on producing countries that the safe and effective management of this material can bring.

This week if we can agree on some common best practices for managing and controlling this important strategic commodity at the government, regulatory, and nuclear industry levels, then I think the future will be even more secure for the production and export of uranium ore concentrate and be more prosperous from its trade.

I encourage you all here to not let this be the only time you discuss these important issues. I urge you all to use this forum to network and build contacts among your regional counterparts and the outside experts here and use these relationships to share ideas and learn from each other. Ultimately it will be up to you, the producing and regulating countries, to implement practices that are best for your country, and we are here to offer advice based on our own experiences and share ideas that might help advance your interests. This is a great opportunity for all of us, and we look forward to the IAEA’s continued work on this issue.

While the United States is no longer one of the largest producers of this commodity, I look forward to hearing and learning from you during this seminar so that we can help advance the good practices that are already in place in many of the countries that are represented here this week.

Thank you.

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT DAILY BRIEFING

FROM U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Victoria Nuland
Spokesperson
Daily Press Briefing
Washington, DC
April 9, 2012
TRANSCRIPT:
12:41 p.m. EDT
MS. NULAND: Happy Monday, everybody. I hope that everybody who had holidays this weekend had a great weekend and that everybody else just enjoyed the great weather.
Let’s – I have two things to do at the top, then we’ll go to what’s on your minds. The first is with regard to the attack on Russian journalist Elena Milashina over the weekend. The United States has long been deeply concerned about violent attacks on journalists in Russia. Journalists and representatives of civil society everywhere must be free to report without fear of reprisal or intimidation.
Most recently in Moscow, late on the evening of April 4th, Novaya Gazeta reporter, Elena Milashina and her friend, who was a representative of a nongovernmental organization, Freedom House, were brutally assaulted. We’re concerned that this attack may have been related to the journalistic work of Ms. Milashina as an investigative reporter. We urge the authorities in Russia to work quickly to bring those responsible to justice.
Our second note is with regard to the passing of Chinese democracy advocate Fang Lizhi. We are saddened by the passing of democracy advocate and physicist Fang Lizhi who was a champion of human rights and democratic reform in China. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family and loved ones.
Let’s go to what’s on your minds.
QUESTION: Where to begin?
MS. NULAND: Yes. It is going to be a very, very busy week.
QUESTION: Yeah. I guess, let’s start with what may be the shortest of your answers, and that’s North Korea. So the North has showed off its new missile that they’re – or its new rocket – satellite-bearing rocket that they’re about the launch. And then there are also signs – at least according to the South Koreans – that they’re preparing for a possible nuclear test. I’m wondering what you all have to say about that beyond, “Just don’t do it.”
MS. NULAND: Well, our position remains: Don’t do it. North Korea’s launch of a missile would be highly provocative, it would pose a threat to regional security, and it will be inconsistent with its recent undertakings to refrain from any kind of long-range missile launches. And as you know, we consider that it would be a violation of UN Security Council resolution 1718 and 1874. So we are continuing to make the point that it is a bad idea to do this.
As the President said in Seoul, we are also working with our Six-Party counterparts to try to make the same points to North Korea and to urge all of the countries in the Six-Party Talks to use their influence with the DPRK. We believe in particular that China joins us in its interest in seeing a denuclearized Korean peninsula, and we are continuing to encourage China in particular to act more effectively in that interest.
QUESTION: But what about the signs of a possible nuclear test?
MS. NULAND: Well, obviously, that would be equally bad, if not worse.
QUESTION: Do you see any such signs?
MS. NULAND: I’m not in a position to confirm one way or the other, and certainly not to share any intelligence that we might have.
QUESTION: Are you asking those nations in the region to be on high alert because of this North Korean missile launch and other threats?
MS. NULAND: Well, I think everybody needs to be vigilant at this time, obviously.
QUESTION: What about Japan’s --
MS. NULAND: Behind you, Ros.
QUESTION: Sure.
QUESTION: Do you have any concern if condemning North Korea after the launch it might give them, like, excuse that they will do the nuclear test?
MS. NULAND: Well, they shouldn’t be doing either. And any of these types of action are just going to further isolate them and make it harder for them to be part of the world community and to give their people a better quality of life.
Ros.
QUESTION: Japan has been making some comments suggesting that it might respond in some way if this missile launch does happen. Have you cautioned Tokyo to dial down its rhetoric at all?
MS. NULAND: Well, we’ve been consulting with all of our Six-Party counterparts on all of this; our position, as you know, has been that Japan, Korea, any of the countries in the region, obviously, have the right to self-defense.
Please.
QUESTION: Change topic?
QUESTION: No, no, no. I’m not --
MS. NULAND: Stay on DPRK?
QUESTION: Yeah, North Korea?
MS. NULAND: Yeah. Please.
QUESTION: Yeah. North Korean official announcement yesterday that if and when the United States have additional sanctions against the North Korea, then North Korea will regard it as an act of war. What is your comment on that?
MS. NULAND: Well, I’m not going to get into all kinds of hypothetical, “we do this and they do that,” situations. The bottom line is we strongly urge North Korea not to do this.
Please, right here. And then come back to you, Matt.
QUESTION: North Korea is now all set to launch the long-range rocket. And the sanctions made have not been working very well so far. So do you have any new good ideas to prevent them to doing so?
MS. NULAND: Well, as I said, we’re making clear we think this is a very bad idea. With regard to what kinds of consequences there are going to be, I’m not going to predict at this point.
QUESTION: Well, at this point --
MS. NULAND: Let me go back to Matt.
QUESTION: That’s okay.
MS. NULAND: No? No.
QUESTION: Mine’s very brief.
QUESTION: North Korea?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: North Korea invited all over the world in journalists. Has North Korea invited any U.S. journalists?
MS. NULAND: I don’t know the answer to that. But obviously we would be discouraging of that.
Matt.
QUESTION: I’m sorry. You would be discouraging of what?
MS. NULAND: Of folks going and celebrating this launch, which we consider a violation of --
QUESTION: Celebrating? Or – I’m sorry, celebrating or just witnessing --
QUESTION: Covering.
QUESTION: Covering.
QUESTION: Covering --
MS. NULAND: Well, obviously, there’s been plenty of coverage.
QUESTION: -- this propaganda.
QUESTION: Well, you don’t have a problem with reporters going to cover it, do you?
MS. NULAND: Well, we’re not in a position to tell reporters what to do one way or the other, as you guys well know.
QUESTION: Okay. I was just – right. I just wanted – the last time we talked about this, you were not aware – or you were aware that there had been no direct contact between you and the North Koreas with this warning or this appeal not to do it. Do you know if that’s changed? Has there been any direct contact? Or is your message pretty much – this is how you’re delivering the message?
MS. NULAND: We wouldn’t say anything different in private that we’re not saying here.
QUESTION: No, I know, but --
MS. NULAND: So, to my knowledge, we haven’t had any additional private contact with them, other than the day that they advised us they were going to do this and we said --
QUESTION: That Thursday?
MS. NULAND: Yes. Exactly.
QUESTION: Okay.
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: (Off mike.)
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: The North Koreans inviting the journalists, showing them really it has no armament value whatsoever. You don’t believe them? Do you consider that to be just a public relations stunt?
MS. NULAND: Said, we’ve talked about this many times.
QUESTION: I know, but --
MS. NULAND: They can’t launch the thing without using ballistic missile technology which is precluded by UN Security Council Resolution 1874. So regardless of what they say about it, it’s still a violation.
Please, in the back.
QUESTION: All three stages of the rocket are ready on the launch pad, so how much hope do you actually have that you’re going to be able to convince North Korea to not do this in the next few days? It’s already there.
MS. NULAND: We’re not in the hope business here. We’re simply making clear we think this would be a very bad idea.
QUESTION: The Chinese Government has been convincing North Korea to – not to launch this rocket?
MS. NULAND: Well, you heard me say that we are continuing to urge all of the countries that may have influence on the DPRK, most notably China, to continue to use that influence to make clear that they also disapprove of this and think it would be a bad idea and will just further isolate the DPRK.
QUESTION: It seems like we go through these periodic moments of DPRK appears to be reconciling with the U.S. and other members in the Six-Party talk regime, then we have some sort of provocation, to use the U.S. Government’s term, and then we repeat. What’s it going to take to break this cycle if the DPRK continues to engage in what the U.S. and others country consider provocative and destabilizing behavior?
MS. NULAND: Well, I think we’d share your assessment that it is extremely disheartening that we seem to be in this cycle of thinking that we are coming to some sort of an agreement, as we did on Leap Day, and then having new threats of provocative activity or provocative activity itself. Our concern is for the people of the – of North Korea, who are just further and further in isolated – whose quality of life is not improving, and this – and the regime, who seems bound and determined to isolate their country rather than rejoining the community of nations.
Said.
QUESTION: Can we go to Syria?
MS. NULAND: Say again.
QUESTION: Syria?
MS. NULAND: Syria, yes.
QUESTION: Okay.
QUESTION: Could I just stay on North Korea?
MS. NULAND: One more North Korea; then we’re going to move on. Go ahead.
QUESTION: Is it fair to say you are not very satisfied with the way – how Chinese Government is pressurizing or not pressurizing North Korea, or – and could there be specific measure, action, taken by the Beijing to prevent it?
MS. NULAND: I think we continue to encourage China to do all that it can, and we are hopeful that they will continue to use their influence in the hours and days ahead.
On Syria?
QUESTION: Yes.
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: Just – Victoria, the deadline is fast approaching for a – the Assad regime to pull its forces out of the cities and neighborhoods and so on, and obviously they’re not doing that. So once the deadline has come and gone, what will be your next trip – next step, I’m sorry – to deal with this issue?
MS. NULAND: Well, before we get to the step that might follow a day from now or the day after, let’s start with the news today, which are the reports of cross-border violence across the Turkish border. Let me just start by saying that we strongly condemn any attack by the Syrian regime on refugees in bordering countries, and we’re absolutely outraged by today’s report. We join the Turkish Government in calling for the Syrian regime to immediately cease fire. And these incidents are just another indication that the Assad regime does not seem at all willing to meet the commitments that it made to Kofi Annan. Not only has the violence not abated; it has been worse in recent days.
QUESTION: So does that mean that you are not – you don’t trust the regime in following through on its commitment to cease fire by the 10th of April?
MS. NULAND: Well, we see no indication that it is preparing to do so. It’s done some moving around of its tanks and artillery but only so that it can use them in other places. There are new, horrific reports in addition that over 100 people were summarily executed in the last period outside of Aleppo, that there were 200 bodies found in Idlib in similar conditions. So are we optimistic that he’s going to meet his commitments? No. But obviously, we’re going to wait for tomorrow’s deadline and take it from there.
Ros.
QUESTION: Does this cross-border attack raise any alarms among the NATO alliance? And what sorts of discussions have started because of what happened overnight?
MS. NULAND: Well, I think we’re all consulting with our Turkish counterparts in trying to ascertain what the facts are. I would not be surprised if the Turks do raise this in Brussels. I haven’t heard that that’s the case yet.
Please.
QUESTION: In addition to the attack on Turkey’s (inaudible) killed a Lebanese journalist today inside the Lebanese borders. Are you aware of that?
MS. NULAND: I’m not aware of that, Samir. We’re – we’ll look into that. But again, was this another cross-border incident? Is that what you understood? Again, the violence clearly hasn’t abated at all.
Please.
QUESTION: You stated that all the indications show the Assad regime is not prepared to follow up Annan plan. What is – what are you preparing to do after tomorrow? It is not months; it’s just tomorrow. What are you going to do?
MS. NULAND: Well, tomorrow we’re expecting that there will be a report from Kofi Annan’s representative in the Security Council, probably in the afternoon. I think we will wait and see what his evaluation is and then what he recommends, but as we have said, we expect that we will be having intensive consultations in the Security Council. And then, as you know, we have G-8 countries in Washington this week for ministerial meetings with Secretary Clinton. I’m sure that Syria will be a subject of discussion here, too.
QUESTION: Can we go back to the cross-border incident?
QUESTION: Do you still have any hope for the Annan plan to – at any rate be implemented at this point?
MR. NULAND: Well, again, we’re going to wait until tomorrow. The deadline is tomorrow. But based on what we’re seeing today, we are not hopeful.
QUESTION: What is it that you understand transpired on the border? Our early reports said it was not clear whether people were deliberately targeted or whether this might have been stray or accidental fire. Are you convinced that the people in Turkey were deliberately targeted by Syrian forces?
MR. NULAND: That is the view of the Turkish officials who have been briefing us, that the regime knew that it was firing across the border, that it was pursuing activists and that these were intentional acts. But we are obviously continuing to consult with the Turks who are there.
QUESTION: And how does this – if that is what happened, how does that differ from, say, hot pursuit, say, from Afghanistan into Pakistan?
MR. NULAND: This is – you’re talking about apples and oranges. In the Pakistan-Afghanistan situation, as you know, along that border, we have a complex but very intensive dialogue and set of protocols between Afghan forces, Pakistani forces, and NATO as to how you manage when insurgents are seen crossing the border, et cetera. The reports that we’re having from Turkish officials indicate that these were firings on innocents. These were not in response to any kind of fire.
Said.
QUESTION: Victoria, the regime has requested that the opposition put down in writing that they are ceasing fire. One, how could they possibly do that? And conversely, how would the regime be assured that these groups, who probably number a hundred or something like this, would actually cease fire?
MR. NULAND: Well, precisely. This is just more chaff being thrown up in the air at the last minute to deflect attention from the fact that the regime is not meeting the commitments that they made to Kofi Annan. Remember, it wasn’t simply that the accepted the plan, but that they reported to Annan some – about a week ago or even less that they had started to withdraw - none of which seems to be the case. And now two days before the deadline, they’re asking for written guarantees from groups that are loose and amorphous and have themselves declared that if they saw the regime cease fire that they would also cease fire. So this is just another way to stall for time.
QUESTION: Is there a new estimate on how many people in Syria may have been killed since the – overall since the uprising began? I mean, you just mentioned a hundred people found here, several dozen found over there. I mean, what’s – what figure are we talking about now?
MR. NULAND: My understanding that the figure that the UN Human Rights Council has been using is around 9,000, but I would refer you to their figures. I don’t think anybody has a complete and accurate accounting, obviously, because we’re not able to get into Syria.
QUESTION: Does this death toll, seemingly rising by the day, add any additional urgency? I mean, we’re more than a year on into this and there’s no security, it seems, for the Syrian people. We saw the satellite images put out by Ambassador Ford on Friday afternoon. Tanks are still sitting on Homs, and they’re still sitting across Idlib province. What’s it going to take for the U.S. and other countries to actually do something against Bashar al-Assad’s regime?
MR. NULAND: Ros, let me take issue with the premise. I mean, first of all, let’s start with the fact that this has been urgent for months and months and months. Remember that the President called for Assad to go way back in November, I believe it was, if not earlier. What we have done is marshaled an enormous coalition of countries that are now sanctioning Assad. We talked last week about all of the measures taken at the Friends of the Syrian People conference: crippling sanction not only from the U.S. and the EU and the Arab League, but now globally; the effort to assist now the Syrian opposition, in our case on a nonlethal basis, other countries choosing to do other things to help them to defend themselves; the humanitarian assistance; the effort to take – to stand up an accountability center so that we can help the Syrian people document the abuses; et cetera. And we will keep squeezing and isolating this guy until the violence ends.
Ilhan.
QUESTION: Should people in Syria assume that unless the Assad regime decides to just stop its attacks that each day could be their last?
MR. NULAND: Ros, we are all horrified by the violence, and we are doing what we can to increase the pressure on Assad, and we will continue to stand with the Syrian people until they have the future that they want and that they deserve.
Please.
QUESTION: From the beginning, you have been supporter of the Annan plan. In fact, the UN envoy, Ms. Susan Rice, said this outstanding choice for Mr. Annan and the best solution was cited. My question is: Do you have any regret that the Assad regime agreed to Arab League plan, agreed to different plans, and now you again supported this Annan plan, and now over a thousand people just past week have died. Do you take any kind of responsibility for your choice of policy on the Annan plan?
MR. NULAND: Look, the Annan plan is based on all of the efforts that all of us have been making for months now to try to end this violence. He is a highly respected diplomat. He put forward something that was accepted by the entire international community, which was not the state that we were in before he joined this effort, and that was accepted by Assad. The fact that it hasn’t worked yet doesn’t change the fact that having the international community increasingly united and increasingly willing to pressure Assad will not eventually bring him down. He will go down. The question is when and the question is how many of his supporters, how many of his military are going to continue to execute his orders right up until the end and face the justice that is coming to them as well.
Please, Goyal.
QUESTION: So you don’t have any regret – should we understand that you don’t have any regret supporting the Annan plan?
MS. NULAND: Kofi Annan is doing what he can to represent the will of the international community. We’re going to see what he has to say tomorrow when his representative reports on the outcome, not only in terms of how he appraises what’s happened, but what he proposes for next steps.
Please.
QUESTION: Another subject?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: No. Wait, I just – back to the question about NATO.
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: Is the U.S. – what does the U.S. think about this? Does the U.S. believe that there are NATO implications for the – for what happened?
MS. NULAND: Well, again, I can’t --
QUESTION: Or that there could be? And do you know, given your past expertise or current expertise of NATO, does an aggrieved country have to ask for Article 5 to be invoked? Because I don’t remember what happened after 9/11. Did the U.S. ask for Article 5 to be invoked, or did it – did others invoke it on our behalf?
MS. NULAND: Well, first of all, with regard to whatever the Turkish conversation might be in NATO, Ros asked if that has happened. I said that I didn’t know whether Turkey had briefed the NATO council, so --
QUESTION: No, no, but I don’t – I’m not interested in whether they have or not.
MS. NULAND: Yeah. With regard to --
QUESTION: I’m interested in if the U.S. believes that it – if there are Article 5 – NATO Article 5 implications.
MS. NULAND: I don’t think that we have gotten to that point in our analysis. We’re still trying to ascertain the facts here.
QUESTION: Okay.
MS. NULAND: With regard to how NATO works, Article 5 is invoked by consensus, so any member of the council can propose --
QUESTION: Can say – so the Turks don’t have to go and say we want this invoked; the Greeks could do --
MS. NULAND: Any member of the council can propose something and then the council would have to be unanimous in its support.
QUESTION: Another subject?
QUESTION: (Inaudible) follow-up on Matt’s --
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: -- on the NATO thing. Suppose Turkey decided that this is really a hostile act and decided to take a military response to this thing. Would NATO automatically give support in this case? I mean, from your experience --
MS. NULAND: You’re getting me into 17 layers of hypotheticals, Said --
QUESTION: I mean, from your personal experience in --
MS. NULAND: -- which you can imagine I’m not going to get into.
QUESTION: -- that area, how would it happen? I mean, they --
MS. NULAND: NATO works by consensus. Any NATO action has to be proposed in the council and has to be supported by all member states.
Okay.
QUESTION: India and --
QUESTION: Sorry, what’s that date on the issue of having safe havens for the refugees? Is this an issue under discussion with the Turkish Government?
MS. NULAND: Well, the Turks, as you know, have provided safe haven inside Turkey in a number of locations along the border, and they are continuing to feed and house and care for a growing number of Syrian refugees. We have all offered our support to that effort. International humanitarian organizations are supporting that effort inside Turkey.
QUESTION: India and Pakistan?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: So there is nothing going in Syria? Because even today and yesterday, Turkish officials have been talking about – we have seen different reports that Turkey is seriously considering these safe havens within Turkey. What is your position on this idea right now?
MS. NULAND: You’re talking about expanding the refugee centers --
QUESTION: Inside.
MS. NULAND: -- within Turkey?
QUESTION: Within Syria.
MS. NULAND: Within Syria. We’ve seen the same reports that you have, that various Turkish officials have said that they’re looking at it, studying it. I would refer you to Turkish officials.
QUESTION: But Turkish officials have not told your – briefed U.S. on this matter so far?
MS. NULAND: Our understanding is that at various levels, Turkish officials have studied or are studying this. I don’t think we would have any comment unless and until those studies were complete.
Please, Goyal.
QUESTION: It was a great diplomatic week between India and Pakistan.
MS. NULAND: Yes.
QUESTION: President Zardari of Pakistan, he took a mission – what he called – in Delhi and also at – religious pilgrimage, that this mission is for peace between the two countries and forget the past, whatever we have done. But a new chapter was started between the two countries’ relations. And both agree now that they will work at the highest level, including prime minister visiting Pakistan on the invitation of President Zardari.
So what is the future of this relationship goes as far as the U.S. is concerned, this quasi -- moreover, a diplomatic and religious mission for peace?
MS. NULAND: Well, first of all, we are very pleased that Prime Minister Singh and President Zardari had a chance to meet in New Delhi yesterday, and that Prime Minister Singh has accepted President Zardari’s invitation to visit Pakistan in the near future. As we have said for a long time, we believe that expanded and improved engagement between these neighbors are not only going to help the neighbors - they’re going to help the entire region and provide opportunities for millions of citizens in the neighborhood to live in a more secure and stable region. So we applaud the trend. We hope that India and Pakistan continue to build on this progress, and we look forward to more such meetings.
Please.
QUESTION: On Burma?
MS. NULAND: On Burma.
QUESTION: There are – several reports came out saying Derek Mitchell will be named as a next ambassador to Burma. When will you be ready to make the announcement?
MS. NULAND: Well, as you know, we don’t make announcements about presidential personnel decisions from this podium. If there’s something to announce, I’m sure the White House will announce it.
Please.
QUESTION: The sanctions. In the days which are --
MS. NULAND: Still Burma?
QUESTION: Burma. I’m sorry.
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: Is sanctions in the near future coming down for Burma or are you going up, lifting the sanctions?
MS. NULAND: Well, you heard the Secretary make some announcements when she saw the press after the Thaci meeting. I can review those for you again, but essentially, in addition to continuing to work to name an ambassador as soon as we can; she talked about opening the USAID office in Burma. She talked about normalizing UNDP country program opportunities for Burma, lifting travel restrictions on key Burmese officials and parliamentarians, and also beginning the process of easing some of the restrictions that we’ve had on U.S. financial services and investments into Burma. So those are the things that we are looking at. Remember that we always said action for action, so these come in the wake of the good round of parliamentary elections.
QUESTION: Thank you.
QUESTION: Iraq?
MS. NULAND: Said? Yeah.
QUESTION: Yes, ma’am. Very quickly --
MS. NULAND: Let’s talk to Said and then go to --
QUESTION: -- there are groups in Iraq that are opposing the appointment of Ambassador Brett McGurk to --
MS. NULAND: We’re in Iraq? I heard Iran. Yeah.
QUESTION: In Iraq. Yes, Iraq. I’m sorry. Yeah. The new ambassador-designate to Iraq, they oppose his appointment, including Alawi and many other groups. Does that in any way influence your decision?
MS. NULAND: The President has nominated Brett McGurk to be our new ambassador, and he made a strong statement in his support, that he will greatly – that our nation will be greatly served by his talents and by his experience in Iraq, and we look forward to the Senate’s advice and consent on his appointment.
QUESTION: Okay. And follow-up. Yeah. Go ahead. Follow-up on Iraq?
QUESTION: Go ahead.
QUESTION: Yeah. Okay. Barzani was in town, and he called Maliki the new dictator of Iraq. He says that he’s the minister of defense, the minister of interior - he’s the head of the armed forces, now he’s trying to even become the president of the Central Bank, and this is really unprecedented action. So do you feel that Maliki is the new dictator of Iraq?
MS. NULAND: Well, as you know, the Vice President and the Secretary and Deputy Secretary Burns had a chance to meet with Mr. Barzani and have a full exchange on his views. We continue to believe that the tensions and the concerns and the disagreements between the different political groups in Iraq are best solved by dialogue among them. We want to see them get together in a national unity conversation and air their differences and work through them.
QUESTION: Do you believe that the new appointment of Mr. McGurk, who is apparently close to Mr. Maliki or has had good relations with him, would that in any way influence these negotiations?
MS. NULAND: Well, the President nominated Mr. McGurk because he thought that he would strongly represent U.S. interests --
QUESTION: Right.
MS. NULAND: -- and that his experience in Iraq could be put to good use. As you know, our current ambassador plays a strong role in trying to help the various different political factions stay in contact with each other, encouraging dialogue among them, and I would expect that the same would be true of the future ambassador, assuming confirmation.
QUESTION: Just one follow-up on that, and then I want to go to Iran. But if I understand it correctly, the White House never announces a nomination until you have obtained agrement from the government in question, correct?
MS. NULAND: Correct.
QUESTION: So the fact that some Iraq political figures might be complaining about his choice – yeah, I mean, from your point of view, you’ve got the government’s acceptance, and it’s just a matter for the Senate, correct?
MS. NULAND: I would have to confirm, but it is, I think, always practice that we seek agrement before we put a nomination forward.
QUESTION: Seek and obtain, right?
MS. NULAND: Seek and obtain. Yeah.
QUESTION: Yeah. And then on Iran, so obviously you’re well aware of the decision to hold the P-5+1 meetings in Istanbul on the 14th.
MS. NULAND: Didn’t we tell you guys it was going to be Istanbul?
QUESTION: Is it only going to be on the 14th, or is it possible that it will run for more than one day?
MS. NULAND: Well, the meetings of the P-5+1 with the Iranians are going to be on the 14th. I don’t think there’s any expectation that it will run longer, but I wouldn’t want to preclude it from this podium. Obviously, we’ll see how it goes.
QUESTION: Aren’t there --
QUESTION: Like --
QUESTION: Well, just on the scheduling of this, isn’t – aren’t the P-5+1 minus Iran meeting on the 13th?
MS. NULAND: There may be a preliminary meeting of our group on the 13th. I think there probably will be. That’s usually the practice.
QUESTION: And it will, indeed, be Under Secretary Sherman who represents the United States?
MS. NULAND: It will.
QUESTION: What, if anything, can you say about The New York Times report that came out Saturday night, saying that the United States wants Iran to cease enrichment at 20 percent, turn over its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium, and close the – and immediately close the Fordo facility?
MS. NULAND: Well, we’re obviously not going to conduct our P-5+1 negotiations with Iran before the meeting or from this podium or in public, so I’m not going to get into the details of what the P-5+1 might be proposing to Iran. I’m sure that we’ll have some information for you all as those talks go forward.

What I would say is that our concerns with regard to Iran’s behavior are well-known, they’re well-documented, they’re spelled out clearly in numerous IAEA reports – IAEA reports that we’ve all signed up to. And as the Secretary said at her own press conference in Istanbul about a week ago, we don’t have any problem with peaceful civilian nuclear power by Iran. And the Iranians themselves have said, at the level of the supreme leader, that they don’t have any weapons intention. Well, if it that is, in fact, the case, then it ought to be relatively straightforward for them to demonstrate that to the international community’s satisfaction. And that’s what we’ll be talking about when we see them.
QUESTION: So everything that the Secretary said in that April 1st press conferences still stands?
MS. NULAND: Yes.
QUESTION: Because I’m looking at the transcript of it, and it says, “The government” – this is quoting her. “That government policy” – i.e., the Iranian Government’s policy – “can be demonstrated in a number of ways: by ending enrichment – the enrichment of highly enriched uranium to 20 percent; by shipping out such highly enriched uranium out of the country; and by opening up to constant inspection and – inspections and verifications,” which is basically, I think, the Secretary saying on the record what The New York Times – what The New York Times had to source to senior officials. Isn’t, in fact – did she, in fact, say exactly that?
MS. NULAND: She, in fact, said exactly that.
QUESTION: -- on the record on April 1st --
MS. NULAND: On the record.
QUESTION: -- eight days before this great, exclusive story appeared in The New York Times?
MS. NULAND: Matt has a particular thing with New York Times reporting.
QUESTION: Well, with one in particular, I suppose. But I just – I just – I mean, so I don’t understand your response to Arshad’s question, though.
MS. NULAND: Well, I did make note of the press conference --
QUESTION: I mean, if she said this --
MS. NULAND: I didn’t have an encyclopedic --
QUESTION: She said all of this on the record.
MS. NULAND: She did.
QUESTION: More than a week ago.
MS. NULAND: She did.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MS. NULAND: I mean, look --
QUESTION: Well, why not come out and – why not repeat it?
MS. NULAND: I could have repeated it. I didn’t have it in front of me.
QUESTION: Oh. Okay.
MS. NULAND: But I’m glad you did. Thank you very much, Matt. You did my job for me. I appreciate it, as ever.
QUESTION: So –
MS. NULAND: Still on Iran?
QUESTION: One other one on this.
MS. NULAND: And then to Said.
QUESTION: Is it still – a couple of – actually, on this. Is it still the U.S. Government’s position that in line with multiple UN Security Council resolutions, Iran should cease all uranium enrichment pending its having satisfied the international community with the peaceful nature of its program?
MS. NULAND: Our position with regard to UN Security Council resolutions is unchanged.
QUESTION: So why then does the Secretary make reference to the – only the highly enriched uranium, the 20 percent level, and not the 3.5 percent level?
MS. NULAND: Again, the Secretary’s comments came in the context of a broad answer on Iran on the talks. I don’t think that she was looking to be exhaustive. She was looking to give a set of examples of the kinds of things that we are concerned about as an international community – all things that have been well documented as areas of concern by the IAEA.
QUESTION: But as you know, the Secretary can be exquisitely precise in her language.
MS. NULAND: She can. I think you are parsing the – you are cutting this salami too finely, looking to try to read through it.
QUESTION: I would hate – I would hate to be her spokesperson and suggest that that was a deliberate – that it was just accidental and, in fact, she meant that they should cease enrichment entirely, not just the 20 percent, and she just somehow got it wrong. I mean, I think she said 20 percent for a reason.
MS. NULAND: Arshad, again, we’re not going to have these negotiations with the Iranians from this podium. She’s given the parameters of what we’re seeking, and we’ll have to see how these negotiations go.
QUESTION: So you’re not --
MS. NULAND: Said.
QUESTION: One last one here. You’re not actually then seeking their – at least in the first instance, their suspension of uranium enrichment to 3.5 percent?
MS. NULAND: We are seeking their compliance with all UN Security Council resolutions. We are seeking to be able to verify that compliance through inspections and other means. And beyond that, I’m not going to slice the salami thin enough for you to read through. I’m sorry.
Said.
QUESTION: Toria, you always cite that – Iran’s behavior. I mean, in the old days when they cited Saddam’s behavior - he had attacked Iran, he had attacked Kuwait and occupied Kuwait and all these things. But what in Iran’s behavior that really placed it in such a rogue status where it could not do this or pursue this nuclear thing in a peaceful fashion?
MS. NULAND: Well, again, go back and read this exquisite press conference on April 1st --
QUESTION: I did.
MS. NULAND: -- where the Secretary spoke not only about our concerns vis-a-vis Iran with regard to the nuclear docket, which are about a weapons program. They are not about civilian nuclear power. But she also spoke about the export of terrorism from Iran, about Iran’s internal human rights record, and about its destabilizing behavior in the neighborhood.
QUESTION: So --
MS. NULAND: So all of these are issues of concern. These talks are about our nuclear concerns.
QUESTION: So although the – Khamenei, the supreme leader, said that we have no intention – in fact, there is a fatwa – they issued a fatwa against acquiring nuclear weapons --
MS. NULAND: And the Secretary made reference to that on April 1st, too.
QUESTION: Okay.
MS. NULAND: Please.
QUESTION: Victoria --
MS. NULAND: I’m sorry. Here and then back there. Go ahead.
QUESTION: You were just saying that you don’t want to get into the conversation on the subject, on the P-5+1 talks with Iran. But actually, it seems like the conversation has already started. What the Secretary has said they have already taken as conditions, they’re saying we won’t talk with preconditions. And on the enrichment, again they’re saying we’re going to continue the 20 percent enrichment until we have enough for our research reactor. Don’t you think this is a nonstarter already?
MS. NULAND: Again, we’re going to get to Istanbul. We’re going to sit down with the Iranians. We’ll hear what they have to say. From our perspective, it’s relatively straightforward if, in fact, their program is purely peaceful, for them to be able to demonstrate it to everybody’s satisfaction.
Please, in the back.
QUESTION: I have two questions. One, getting back to Pakistan, is there anything further to add --
MS. NULAND: Sorry. Let’s finish Iran, then we’ll come back to Pakistan. Okay? Arshad.
QUESTION: Iranian media quoted Iran’s nuclear chief Fereidoun Abbasi Davani as dismissing the idea of a revival of the TRR deal under which they would have received more highly enriched uranium to run that reactor. But he then goes on to say that once Iran has obtained sufficient more highly enriched uranium, it would – quote, “We will scale back production and maybe even convert it to 3.5 percent uranium.”
Is it at all hopeful to you that an Iranian official is talking about, however hedged or conditioned, the idea of at some point ceasing to enrich to the higher level?
MS. NULAND: Again, I don’t think it’s productive four days before these talks start to be reacting to Iranian comments to the press. What we want to do is have productive talks in the room that show a sustained effort to demonstrate the peaceful intent of the program. That’s what we’ll be looking for, but I’m not going to react to stray Iranian press comments.
Please. Back to Pakistan?
QUESTION: Do you have anything further to add on the Siachen tragedy? And did Pakistan – you’ve sent nine – the U.S. has sent nine experts to help in rescue efforts in Siachen. Has an effort been made to send – are more experts being sent, or has Pakistan asked for more help from the United States?
MS. NULAND: This is with regard to the avalanche --
QUESTION: Yeah.
MS. NULAND: -- over the weekend or early – at the end of last week. At the request of the Government of Pakistan, the USG did deploy an eight-man U.S. military alpine search-and-rescue team from Kabul to Islamabad. They arrived yesterday. The team is currently in Islamabad, has not yet deployed to the region. We’re discussing with the Pakistani military how best they might be used. But we stand by to assist, and to my knowledge, we haven’t had any additional requests from Pakistan.
QUESTION: I have a follow-up, another question, different matter. Center for Constitutional Rights based in Washington, DC says that a lawyer who represents drone victims in Pakistan isn’t being given a visa by the U.S. Embassy to come attend a conference on drones in Washington later this month. He says that he has not received any reply from the U.S. Embassy. And his name is Shahzad Akbar and he represents drone victims in Pakistan.
MS. NULAND: I can’t speak to an individual visa case. I’ll send you to our Embassy in Islamabad for an update on that one.
QUESTION: This might be better directed to the Pentagon, but do you have any more details on this deployment of an eight-man search and rescue? I mean, the Pakistanis actually invited U.S. military into their country?
MS. NULAND: Yes, yes.
QUESTION: Oh, so it’s okay, then, for them to do that and tell you to – just give you the short end of the stick? I mean, how did they get there? Did they fly in on their own helicopter or plane?
MS. NULAND: I don’t know how they got in. They – this was obviously a humanitarian request, a horrible situation with the --
QUESTION: Well, it’s very nice of you to --
MS. NULAND: -- avalanche and --
QUESTION: Considering how nice they’ve been to you lately, it’s very nice of you to send your troops there.
MS. NULAND: Well, we felt it was --
QUESTION: Are you sure that they’re safe?
MS. NULAND: We felt it was important to respond to their request. As I said, they haven’t left Islamabad yet, but they’re ready to help.
QUESTION: Are they – is their presence there at all covered by the parliamentary review of relations between the two countries? Is this – are they going to make a special exception so that these guys – it’s okay for them to come in?
MS. NULAND: My understanding is that the Pakistanis asked for this specialized help, that we made them available. And we are delighted to have them help in any way they can.
Scott.
QUESTION: Nigeria?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: Still on Pakistan?
MS. NULAND: Still on Pakistan.
QUESTION: This is a follow-up of the avalanche tragedy, which, in a way, the deployment there is a result of the India-Pakistan conflict. And you have been very vocal in the recent past about better relations between both countries and your willingness that they should try to resolve their issues. Could you also play a role in trying to reach a diplomatic and political settlement of the Siachen conflict?
MS. NULAND: Of the Kashmir conflict?
QUESTION: Siachen.
QUESTION: The Siachen conflict.
MS. NULAND: Of the Siachen conflict. Well, we have made clear to both India and Pakistan that we are prepared to be supportive in any way that might be helpful but that primarily we see this being settled by dialogue between them.
On to Nigeria?
QUESTION: Please.
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: Another violent Easter in Nigeria, at least 36 dead now from that blast in Kaduna. Response – the United States has assisted in investigations into Boko Haram in the past. Are you involved in this as well?
MS. NULAND: Well, let me start by saying that the United States strongly condemns yesterday’s attacks on two churches in Kaduna and Jos, Nigeria. Our thoughts and prayers are with the families and the loved ones of those who were killed and injured. This violence has no place in a democracy. We support the Nigerian authorities in their efforts to bring the perpetrators of these violent acts to justice, and we stress the importance nonetheless of respecting the human rights and protecting civilians in any security operation.
To my knowledge, we have not been asked for any direct support for this investigation but obviously would be prepared to consider a request like that if it came to us.
QUESTION: Can I ask an ECOWAS question as well? On Mali, you have, in the last week, 10 days, supported the ECOWAS approach on Mali. ECOWAS has decided to lift its sanctions because it’s satisfied with the deal that was cut on Friday. Will you follow suit and resume your suspended aid?
MS. NULAND: Well, let me start by saying that we commend the strong leadership of ECOWAS throughout this episode in brokering the agreement with the junta leaders and fully restoring civilian rule. As you know, President Toure has now taken the step to stand down in order to restore peace and security and democracy in Mali, and the National Assembly Speaker Traore will now head a transition government. So this is a very good step in the restoration of democracy in Mali.
We obviously want to see these steps consolidated. We will look over the coming days at whether enough progress has been made to restore our full programming, but we don’t have any decisions today.
QUESTION: So the message is the stepping down of a duly elected president following a military coup is a good thing in terms of the restoration of democracy?
MS. NULAND: Well, again, the issue here arose because there were unresolved grievances between the military and the leadership of the country. These escalated to the point of the situation that we saw, which was a complete overturning of the democratic system in Mali.
Is it ideal to have to broker a deal where the president steps down and you have to have an interim president until elections? Of course, it’s not ideal. But it does mark a very important restoration of civilian rule, without which we didn’t think Mali was going to be able to move forward. And as the same time, as you know, there have been very dangerous gains in the north by not only Tuareg militants, but also AQ elements that have taken advantage of the instability.
So we wanted civilian rule reestablished so that dialogue can now commence with the Tuaregs that redresses their grievances within a unified Mali, and real effort can be made to secure the country against the AQ elements that have taken advantage.
QUESTION: The only problem is that in accepting such an outcome, does it not send a signal potentially to other militaries that if they have longstanding – or if they have any grievances with their elected government, they can just mutiny, stage a coup, oust them, and then try to work out a way to make the ouster permanent?
MS. NULAND: Well, recall that that was not the junta leaders’ first choice. The junta leaders’ first choice was to run the country themselves. So from our perspective, restoring civilian rule to Mali was absolutely paramount. There are new elections planned anyway this spring, so we were going to have a government change shortly. And if we have to have an interim head in order to get to that stage where the people of Mali can make their choice – as I said, the situation should never have arisen in the first place. That’s a message that we and ECOWAS and the AU sent, and there were strong sanctions put in place by everyone. That said, we are very pleased now to see civilian rule reestablished so that we can get to the elections that the people of Mali deserve.
QUESTION: And then just to go back to Scott’s question, because maybe you answered it and I didn’t hear it. But have you guys made a decision about restoring your suspended assistance?
MS. NULAND: We have not. We want to see this restoration of civilian rule consolidated. So I don’t have anything to announce today, but we’ll look at it on a day-by-day basis.
QUESTION: So – but just on that, because it’s, I think, an important point, leaving aside the inconsistency over whether or not this is a good thing or a bad thing, I think it’s a good point that you made that all they had to do was to wait for this election anyway. There never had to be a mutiny. Did you – when you suspended the aid, knowing that it took you so long to do it or to figure out how much was suspended, did you actually come to the determination that a coup had taken place, that there had been an undemocratic change in a – or an unconstitutional change to a democratically elected government?
MS. NULAND: Well, in terms of our congressional notification of suspension, we didn’t actually invoke the “c” word --
QUESTION: You did not?
MS. NULAND: -- because it was such a fluid situation --
QUESTION: Okay.
QUESTION: -- which we were hoping was on its way to reversal.
QUESTION: Does that then mean that – normally, when that does happen, there has to be an actual election and an elected government come to power before the aid can be restored. In this case, does it mean that simply you can turn the switch back on as soon as there’s – you’re satisfied that there’s a civilian leadership without an election?
MS. NULAND: We can turn the switch back on when we are satisfied that civilian rule has been reestablished.
QUESTION: New topic?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: Yes, the Palestinian issue.
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: On Wednesday, you’re set to meet on the periphery of the G-8 – the Quartet is set to meet. But also on the same day, Palestinian Prime Minister Fayyad is set to meet with Netanyahu and give him a letter. Basically, the Palestinians are saying that unless you respond positively, we’re going to go back to the UN. So do you have a comment on all this?
MS. NULAND: Well, as you said, we do have Quartet envoys meeting – we have Quartet ministers meeting at Secretary Clinton’s level on Wednesday morning, so I don’t want to get ahead of the events of Wednesday. I think we’ll take it one step at a time, Said.
QUESTION: Are they likely to discuss the topics that are allegedly in the letter that Abbas is sending to Prime Minister Netanyahu?
MS. NULAND: I think you won’t be surprised if they discuss where we are in the proposal that they made in September, where we are in supporting the Palestinian authorities and maintaining stability, maintaining good quality of life for the Palestinian people. They’ll be talking about the full range of issues, I would guess.
QUESTION: I’ve got two very brief --
MS. NULAND: Two. Please.
QUESTION: -- Gulf questions. One on Bahrain. I understand the Administration has taken some interest in the case of this Norwegian Bahraini dual-national.
MS. NULAND: Danish. Yeah.
QUESTION: Danish. Sorry. Danish dual-national who’s on a hunger strike.
MS. NULAND: We are very concerned about the case of Mr. al-Khawaja particularly with regard to his health. We are in touch with the Bahrainis and with our international partners, and we are urging a humanitarian solution.
QUESTION: Do you know how – when you say we’re in touch, do you know who has been in touch with who?
MS. NULAND: Jeff Feltman’s been in touch – Assistant Secretary Feltman. We’ve been in touch at the embassy level, and more contacts are planned.
QUESTION: And what about – on this. What about his daughter, who was reported to – last week was reported to have been arrested? I think the interior ministry, if I’m not mistaken, said that she had – I think an interior ministry source was quoted as saying she had assaulted someone. Do you have any views on her case?
MS. NULAND: We’re also seeking more clarity on her case.
QUESTION: Did you say that someone from the Embassy has been to see Mr. al-Khawaja?
MS. NULAND: No, we’ve been in contact with Bahraini authorities about the case.
QUESTION: But no one has visited and then saw how bad--
MS. NULAND: To my mind – knowledge, no. He’s not an American citizen.
QUESTION: And the other one is on the Emirates and the case – this NDI situation. Is that completely resolved now, as far as you know?
MS. NULAND: In terms of the American who was involved --
QUESTION: Not in terms of the American, because I believe she left the country.
MS. NULAND: Yeah. In terms of the Serb national who worked for NDI, to my knowledge, that is not completely resolved.
QUESTION: And are there contacts going on on that?
MS. NULAND: There are. There was.
QUESTION: And do you know when the last one was?
MS. NULAND: I don’t. I don’t.
QUESTION: Okay.
MS. NULAND: All right, thank you.
QUESTION: Thank you.