SEC ANNOUNCES S&P RATINGS SERVICES WAS INVOLVED WITH FRAUD IN COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES BUSINESS

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2015-10

Washington D.C., Jan. 21, 2015 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced a series of federal securities law violations by Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services involving fraudulent misconduct in its ratings of certain commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).

S&P agreed to pay more than $58 million to settle the SEC’s charges, plus an additional $19 million to settle parallel cases announced today by the New York Attorney General’s office ($12 million) and the Massachusetts Attorney General’s office ($7 million).

“Investors rely on credit rating agencies like Standard & Poor’s to play it straight when rating complex securities like CMBS,” said Andrew J. Ceresney, Director of the SEC Enforcement Division.  “But Standard & Poor’s elevated its own financial interests above investors by loosening its rating criteria to obtain business and then obscuring these changes from investors.  These enforcement actions, our first-ever against a major ratings firm, reflect our commitment to aggressively policing the integrity and transparency of the credit ratings process.”

The SEC issued three orders instituting settled administrative proceedings against S&P.  One order, in which S&P made certain admissions, addressed S&P’s practices in its conduit fusion CMBS ratings methodology.  S&P’s public disclosures affirmatively misrepresented that it was using one approach when it actually used a different methodology in 2011 to rate six conduit fusion CMBS transactions and issue preliminary ratings on two more transactions.  As part of this settlement, S&P agreed to take a one-year timeout from rating conduit fusion CMBS.

Another SEC order found that after being frozen out of the market for rating conduit fusion CMBS in late 2011, S&P sought to re-enter that market in mid-2012 by overhauling its ratings criteria.  To illustrate the relative conservatism of its new criteria, S&P published a false and misleading article purporting to show that its new credit enhancement levels could withstand Great Depression-era levels of economic stress.  S&P’s research relied on flawed and inappropriate assumptions and was based on data that was decades removed from the severe losses of the Great Depression.  According to the SEC’s order, S&P’s original author of the study expressed concerns that the firm’s CMBS group had turned the article into a “sales pitch” for the new criteria, and that the removal of certain information from the article could lead to him “sit[ting] in front of [the] Department of Justice or the SEC.”  The SEC’s order further finds that S&P failed to accurately describe certain aspects of its new criteria in the formal publication setting forth their operation.  Without admitting or denying the findings in the order, S&P agreed to publicly retract the false and misleading Great Depression-related study and correct the inaccurate descriptions in the publication about its criteria.

“These CMBS-related enforcement actions against S&P demonstrate that ‘race to the bottom’ behavior by ratings firms will not be tolerated by the SEC and other regulators.  When ratings standards are compromised in pursuit of market share, a firm’s disclosures cannot tell a different story,” said Michael J. Osnato, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Complex Financial Instruments Unit.

A third SEC order issued in this case involved internal controls failures in S&P’s surveillance of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) ratings.  The order finds that S&P allowed breakdowns in the way it conducted ratings surveillance of previously-rated RMBS from October 2012 to June 2014.  S&P changed an important assumption in a way that made S&P’s ratings less conservative, and was inconsistent with the specific assumptions set forth in S&P’s published criteria describing its ratings methodology.  S&P did not follow its internal policies for making changes to its surveillance criteria and instead applied ad hoc workarounds that were not fully disclosed to investors.  Without admitting or denying the findings in the order, S&P agreed to extensive undertakings to enhance and improve its internal controls environment.  S&P self-reported this particular misconduct to the SEC and cooperated with the investigation, enabling the Enforcement Division to resolve the case more quickly and efficiently and resulting in a reduced penalty for the firm.

The SEC’s orders find that S&P violated Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act (fraud), Section 15E(c)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act  (internal controls violations), Securities Exchange Rules 17g-2(a)(2)(iii) (books and records violations), Rule 17g-2(a)(6) (books and records violations), and 17g-2(a)(2)(iii) (failure to maintain records explaining differences between numerical model output and ratings).

In a separate order instituting a litigated administrative proceeding, the SEC Enforcement Division alleges that the former head of S&P’s CMBS Group fraudulently misrepresented the manner in which the firm calculated a critical aspect of certain CMBS ratings in 2011.  Barbara Duka allegedly instituted the shift to more issuer-friendly ratings criteria, and the firm failed to properly disclose the less rigorous methodology.  The matter against Duka will be scheduled for a public hearing before an administrative law judge for proceedings to adjudicate the Enforcement Division’s allegations and determine what, if any, remedial actions are appropriate.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted by the Enforcement Division’s Complex Financial Instruments Unit and led by John Smith in the Denver office, Robert Leidenheimer and Lawrence Renbaum in the Washington D.C. office, and Joshua Brodsky in the New York office with assistance from Daniel Nigro and Judy Bizu.  The litigation against Duka will be led by Stephen McKenna of the Denver office.  The cases were supervised by Laura Metcalfe, Reid Muoio, and Mr. Osnato.  The Enforcement Division worked closely with the SEC’s Office of Credit Ratings in these matters, particularly Thomas Butler, Michele Wilham, Natasha Kaden, Julia Kiel, Kenneth Godwin, and David Nicolardi.

The SEC appreciates the assistance of the New York Attorney General’s office and the Massachusetts Attorney General’

JP MORGAN TO PAY $200 MILLION PENALTY TO SETTLE SEC CHARGES

FROM:  US. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged JPMorgan Chase & Co. with misstating financial results and lacking effective internal controls to detect and prevent its traders from fraudulently overvaluing investments to conceal hundreds of millions of dollars in trading losses.

The SEC previously charged two former JPMorgan traders with committing fraud to hide the massive losses in one of the trading portfolios in the firm’s chief investment office (CIO).  The SEC’s subsequent action against JPMorgan faults its internal controls for failing to ensure that the traders were properly valuing the portfolio, and its senior management for failing to inform the firm’s audit committee about the severe breakdowns in CIO’s internal controls.

JPMorgan has agreed to settle the SEC’s charges by paying a $200 million penalty, admitting the facts underlying the SEC’s charges, and publicly acknowledging that it violated the federal securities laws.

“JPMorgan failed to keep watch over its traders as they overvalued a very complex portfolio to hide massive losses,” said George S. Canellos, Co-Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.  “While grappling with how to fix its internal control breakdowns, JPMorgan’s senior management broke a cardinal rule of corporate governance and deprived its board of critical information it needed to fully assess the company’s problems and determine whether accurate and reliable information was being disclosed to investors and regulators.”

As part of a coordinated global settlement, three other agencies also announced settlements with JPMorgan today: the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.  JPMorgan will pay a total of approximately $920 million in penalties in these actions by the SEC and the other agencies.

According to the SEC’s order instituting a settled administrative proceeding against JPMorgan, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 established important requirements for public companies and their management regarding corporate governance and disclosure.  Public companies such as JPMorgan are required to create and maintain internal controls that provide investors with reasonable assurances that their financial statements are reliable, and ensure that senior management shares important information with key internal decision makers such as the board of directors.  JPMorgan failed to adhere to these requirements, and consequently misstated its financial results in public filings for the first quarter of 2012.

According to the SEC’s order, in late April 2012 after the portfolio began to significantly decline in value, JPMorgan commissioned several internal reviews to assess, among other matters, the effectiveness of the CIO’s internal controls.  From these reviews, senior management learned that the valuation control group within the CIO – whose function was to detect and prevent trader mismarking – was woefully ineffective and insufficiently independent from the traders it was supposed to police.  As JPMorgan senior management learned additional troubling facts about the state of affairs in the CIO, they failed to timely escalate and share that information with the firm’s audit committee.

Among the facts that JPMorgan has admitted in settling the SEC’s enforcement action:

The trading losses occurred against a backdrop of woefully deficient accounting controls in the CIO, including spreadsheet miscalculations that caused large valuation errors and the use of subjective valuation techniques that made it easier for the traders to mismark the CIO portfolio.

JPMorgan senior management personally rewrote the CIO’s valuation control policies before the firm filed with the SEC its first quarter report for 2012 in order to address the many deficiencies in existing policies.

By late April 2012, JPMorgan senior management knew that the firm’s Investment Banking unit used far more conservative prices when valuing the same kind of derivatives held in the CIO portfolio, and that applying the Investment Bank valuations would have led to approximately $750 million in additional losses for the CIO in the first quarter of 2012.

External counterparties who traded with CIO had valued certain positions in the CIO book at $500 million less than the CIO traders did, precipitating large collateral calls against JPMorgan.

As a result of the findings of certain internal reviews of the CIO, some executives expressed reservations about signing sub-certifications supporting the CEO and CFO certifications required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Senior management failed to adequately update the audit committee on these and other important facts concerning the CIO before the firm filed its first quarter report for 2012.

Deprived of access to these facts, the audit committee was hindered in its ability to discharge its obligations to oversee management on behalf of shareholders and to ensure the accuracy of the firm’s financial statements.
The SEC’s order requires JPMorgan to cease and desist from causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 13a-11, 13a-13, and 13a-15.  The order also requires JPMorgan to pay a $200 million penalty that may be distributed to harmed investors in a Fair Fund distribution.

The SEC’s investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Michael Osnato, Steven Rawlings, Peter Altenbach, Joshua Brodsky, Joseph Boryshansky, Daniel Michael, Kapil Agrawal, Eli Bass, Sharon Bryant, Daniel Nigro, and Christopher Mele.  The SEC appreciates the coordination of the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, Federal Reserve, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as well as the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.

CITY OF VICTORVILLE AND OTHERS CHARGED WITH DEFRAUDING MUNICIPAL BOND INVESTORS

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SEC Charges City of Victorvile, Underwriter, and Others with Defrauding Municipal Bond Investors

Washington, D.C., April 29, 2013 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged that the City of Victorville, Calif., a city official, the Southern California Logistics Airport Authority, and Kinsell, Newcomb & DeDios (KND), the underwriter of the Airport Authority’s bonds, defrauded investors by inflating valuations of property securing an April 2008 municipal bond offering.

Victorville Assistant City Manager and former Director of Economic Development Keith C. Metzler, KND owner J. Jeffrey Kinsell, and KND Vice President Janees L. Williams were responsible for false and misleading statements made in the Airport Authority’s 2008 bond offering, the SEC alleged. It also charged that KND, working through a related party, misused more than $2.7 million of bond proceeds to keep itself afloat.

"Financing redevelopment projects by selling municipal bonds based on inflated valuations violates the public trust as well as the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws," said George S. Canellos, Co-Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. "Public officials have the same obligation as corporate officials to tell the truth to their investors."

Elaine C. Greenberg, Chief of the SEC’s Municipal Securities and Public Pensions Unit, said, "Investors are entitled to full disclosure of material financial arrangements entered into by related parties. Underwriters who secretly line their own pockets by taking unauthorized fees will be held accountable."

The SEC alleges the Airport Authority, which is controlled by the City of Victorville, undertook a variety of redevelopment projects, including the construction of four airplane hangars on a former Air Force base. It financed the projects by issuing tax increment bonds, which are solely secured by and repaid from property-tax increases attributable to increases in the assessed value of property in the redevelopment project area.

According to the SEC’s complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, by April 2008, the Airport Authority was forced to refinance part of the debt incurred to construct the hangars, and other projects, by issuing additional bonds. The principal amount of the new bond issue was partly based on Metzler, Williams, and Kinsell using a $65 million valuation for the airplane hangars even though they knew the county assessor valued the hangars at less than half that amount. The inflated figure allowed the Airport Authority to issue substantially more bonds and raise more money than it otherwise would have. It also meant that investors were given false information about the value of the security available to repay them.

In addition, the SEC’s investigation found that Kinsell, KND, and another of his companies misappropriated more than $2.7 million in bond proceeds that were supposed to be used to build airplane hangars for the Airport Authority. According to the SEC’s complaint, the scheme began when Kinsell learned of allegations that the contractor building the hangars had likely diverted bond proceeds for his own personal use. When the contractor was removed, Kinsell stepped in to oversee the hangar project through another company he owned, KND Affiliates, LLC, even though Kinsell had no construction experience.

The SEC alleges that the Airport Authority loaned KND Affiliates more than $60 million in bond proceeds for the hangar project and agreed that as compensation for the project, KND Affiliates would receive a construction management fee of two percent of the remaining cost of construction. However, Kinsell and KND Affiliates took an additional $450,000 in unauthorized fees to oversee the construction and took $2.3 million in fees that the Airport Authority was unaware of and never agreed to, purportedly as compensation to "manage" the hangars. The SEC alleges that Kinsell and KND Affiliates hid these fees from the Airport Authority representatives and from the auditors who reviewed KND Affiliates’ books and records.

The SEC’s complaint alleges that the Airport Authority, Kinsell, KND, and KND Affiliates violated the antifraud provisions of U.S. securities laws and that KND violated 15B(c)(1) of the Exchange Act and Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Rules G-17, G-27 and G-32(a)(iii)(A)(2). The complaint also alleges that Victorville, Metzler, KND, Kinsell, and Williams aided and abetted various violations. The SEC is seeking the return of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest, financial penalties, and permanent injunctions against all of the defendants, as well as the return of ill-gotten gains from relief defendant KND Holdings, the parent company of KND.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Robert H. Conrrad and Theresa M. Melson in the Municipal Securities and Public Pensions Unit, and Lorraine B. Echavarria, Todd S. Brilliant, and Dora M. Zaldivar of the Los Angeles Regional Office. Sam S. Puathasnanon will lead the SEC’s litigation.