Showing posts with label CFTC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CFTC. Show all posts

Friday, April 12, 2013

CFTC CHAIRMAN GENSLER ADDRESSES U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE


FROM: U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
Remarks of Chairman Gary Gensler Before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Seventh Annual Capital Markets Summit
April 10, 2013

Good afternoon, thank you David for that kind introduction. I’d also like to thank the Chamber of Commerce for inviting me to speak at your annual Capital Markets Summit. I’m honored to be joining this summit for the fourth year in a row.

Your conference is about managing risk in a global economy so I want to start by addressing what may be one of the most significant risks you’re facing in the capital markets.

That is the risk to market integrity of the continued use of LIBOR, Euribor and similar benchmark interest rates.

Interest rate benchmarks – central to borrowing, lending and hedging in our economy – are of critical importance to members of the Chamber.

LIBOR, as you may know, purports to represent the rate at which unsecured borrowing occurs between large banks. The insufficient number of transactions in this market, though, undermines market integrity.

Given their fundamental role in the capital markets and our economy, benchmark rates must be based on facts, not fiction.

Prices and rates formed by the competitive forces of supply and demand in a robust, transparent marketplace are the best guarantee of a reliable price or rate. Yet hundreds of trillions of dollars of financial instruments and contracts rely upon a benchmark referencing a market where essentially no borrowing occurs.

Banks simply are not lending to each other as they once did. In 2008, Mervyn King, the governor of the Bank of England, said of LIBOR: "It is, in many ways, the rate at which banks do not lend to each other."

This is a result of many factors: the 2008 crisis, the continuing European debt crisis, the downgrading of large banks’ credit ratings, as well as central banks providing significant funding directly to banks. Recent changes to Basel capital rules, including the new liquidity coverage ratio, suggest that banks may not return to interbank lending on an unsecured basis.

The shift away from banks funding each other in the unsecured market (without posting collateral) has led to a scarcity or outright absence of actual transactions underpinning LIBOR and other benchmark rates.

This situation – having benchmark rates that are not anchored in actual transactions – undermines market integrity and leaves the financial system with benchmarks that are prone to misconduct.

Indeed, as law enforcement actions brought by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority and the U.S. Justice Department have shown, LIBOR and other benchmark rates have been readily and pervasively rigged.

These cases resulted in Barclays, UBS and RBS paying fines of approximately $2.5 billion for manipulative conduct relating to these rates. At each bank, the misconduct spanned many years.

At each bank it took place in offices in several cities around the globe.

At each bank it included numerous people – sometimes dozens, among them senior management.

Each case involved multiple benchmark rates and currencies. In one case, there were over 2,000 instances of misconduct over a six-year period.

And in each case, there was evidence of collusion.

In the UBS and RBS cases, one or more inter-dealer brokers painted false pictures to influence submissions of other banks, i.e., to spread the falsehoods more widely.

Barclays and UBS also were reporting falsely low borrowing rates in an effort to protect their reputations.

Beyond these cases, there is a significant amount of publicly available market data that further calls the integrity of LIBOR into question.

A comparison of LIBOR submissions to the volatilities of other short-term rates reflects that LIBOR is curiously more stable than any comparable rate. For instance, how is it that in 2012 – if we look at the 252 submission days for three-month U.S. dollar LIBOR – the banks didn’t change their rate 85 percent of the time?

When comparing LIBOR submissions to the same banks’ credit default swaps spreads or to the broader markets’ currency forward rates, why is there a continuing disconnect between LIBOR and what those other market rates tell us?

Whether we consider the broad structural shift away from unsecured, interbank lending; the recent enforcement actions; or questions about market data, confidence in the continued use of LIBOR and other similar interest rate benchmarks is undermined.

For capital and risk to be efficiently allocated within the economy – which is of vital importance to Chamber members – interest rate benchmarks should reflect actual price discovery anchored in observable transactions.

While ongoing international efforts targeting benchmarks, which I am pleased to be a part of, will focus on governance principles for benchmarks, these efforts cannot address a central vulnerability of LIBOR: the lack of transactions in the underlying market.

The time has come for U.S. regulators to work with our counterparts abroad, along with market participants, such as the people in this room, to promptly identify alternative benchmarks that are anchored in observable transactions and determine how to transition to such alternatives. The transition must be as smooth and orderly as possible, but given the vulnerabilities in the system, I believe that a transition is warranted.

The market has some experience with benchmark transitions, albeit for smaller contracts. When the euro was created, a number of interest rate benchmarks were discontinued. How many of you remember PIBOR, RIBOR, MIBOR and FIBOR? Transitions have also occurred for energy and shipping rate benchmarks.

I recognize that moving on from LIBOR and Euribor may be challenging. But continuing to support LIBOR and Euribor in the name of stability may have the opposite effect. Using benchmarks that threaten market integrity may create more instability in the long run.

The status quo leaves your members at risk that benchmarks that were rigged in the past may be exposed to rigging again in the future.

That risk is neither good for the capital markets nor for our economy.

Swaps Market Reform

Now, let me turn to swaps market reform.

Your members benefit from transparent and efficient derivatives markets. Both futures and swaps markets provide the opportunity to hedge a risk by locking in a future price or rate. Managing the price risk of energy or agriculture or the rate risk of interest rates or foreign currency allows your members to focus on what they do best – innovating and producing goods and services for the economy.

The derivatives markets work best for farmers, ranchers, producers and commercial companies when they are transparent; competitive; and free of fraud, manipulation and other abuses. The implementation of the common-sense reforms in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) brings these benefits to the once opaque and unregulated swaps market.

Transparency lowers costs for businesses and consumers, as it shifts information from dealers to the broader public. Post-trade transparency has come to the marketplace. The price and volume of transactions is available to the public on a website, like a modern-day ticker tape.

Seventy-five swap dealers and two major swaps participants are now provisionally registered. With this new oversight, they are subject to standards for sales practices, recordkeeping and business conduct to help lower risk to the economy and protect the public from fraud and manipulation.

As of last month, the public is benefiting from the greater access to the swaps market and risk reduction that comes with central clearing. Swap dealers and the largest hedge funds began clearing the vast majority of interest rate and credit default index swaps. Compliance will continue to be phased in throughout this year.

Swaps Reforms Benefit End-users

Each component of swaps market reform has been done with an eye toward ensuring they work for end-users, America’s job providers. It’s the end-users in the non-financial side of our economy that provide 94 percent of private sector jobs.

Congress provided in the Dodd-Frank Act that end-users should be able to choose whether or not to clear swaps that hedge or mitigate commercial risks. Last summer, the Commission finalized rules to implement this exception, including for small financial institutions.

As the Chamber calls for in your Financial Regulatory Reform 2013 Report Card, the Commission’s proposed rule on margin provides that end-users will not have to post margin for uncleared swaps. We also continue to advocate with global regulators for an approach consistent with that of the CFTC.

Non-financial companies, other than those genuinely making markets in swaps, will not have to register as swap dealers.

Further, the CFTC has ensured that when end-users are required to report their transactions, they are given more time to do so than other market participants.

Exceptions for Inter-affiliate swaps

Also of importance to your members, last week the CFTC finalized a rule to exempt swaps between certain affiliated entities within a corporate group from the clearing requirement.

In addition, CFTC staff issued a letter last week exempting swaps between affiliated counterparties that are not swap dealers or major swap participants from certain swap reporting requirements. This "no-action" letter extends to swaps between almost all non-financial affiliates.

Treasury Affiliates

We’ve received many comments and had many meetings with non-financial end-users that about required clearing if they use a treasury affiliate when entering into their market facing swaps. Though I don’t have any announcements today, let me assure you that the staff and Commission are taking a close look at how to appropriately address these issues in the context of the Dodd-Frank Act.

Further Implementation of Swaps Market Reform

Pre-trade Transparency

Looking forward, it’s a priority that the Commission finishes rules to promote pre-trade transparency, including those for swap execution facilities (SEFs) and the block rule for swaps.

Pre-trade transparency will allow buyers and sellers to meet and compete in the marketplace, just as they do in the securities and futures marketplaces. Market participants will be able to view the prices of available bids and offers prior to making their decision on a transaction.

End-users will get to see the pricing and volume of swap transactions on these platforms, but get to choose whether or not to use them. Furthermore, companies will continue to be able to rely on customized transactions to meet their particular needs, as well as to enter into large block trades.

Cross-border

Looking forward, it’s also a priority that the Commission ensures the cross-border application of swaps market reform appropriately covers the risk of U.S. affiliates operating offshore. During a default, risk knows no geographic border.

If a run starts in one part of a modern financial institution, whether it's here or offshore, the risk comes back to our shores. That was true with AIG, which ran most of its swaps business out of the London neighborhood Mayfair. It was also true at Lehman Brothers, Citigroup, Bear Stearns and Long-Term Capital Management.

Thus, as the CFTC completes the cross-border guidance, I believe it’s critical that Dodd-Frank swaps reform applies to transactions entered into by branches of U.S. institutions offshore, between guaranteed affiliates offshore, and for hedge funds that are incorporated offshore but operate in the U.S. Where there are comparable and comprehensive home country rules abroad, we can look to substituted compliance, but the transactions would still be covered.

If we fail to provide common-sense oversight to offshore affiliates of U.S. entities, American jobs and markets may move offshore, but, particularly in times of crisis, risk would come crashing back to our economy and could affect your businesses all over again. As I’m standing here speaking with the American Chamber of Commerce, which has the words "JOBS" in giant letters on the front of your building, I would imagine we would agree that this would not be a good result for the American public.

Ensuring we get the cross-border application of swaps reforms right is critical to protecting you members from the risk of another foreign-affiliate failure.

Conclusion

I was flattered to see that this year, the CFTC got a slightly better grade in your annual report card than last year – you moved us up to a C+ from a C.

I also noticed that derivatives reform was graded higher than all the other issues you covered, except "Preserving the Integrity of Accounting and Auditing."

More seriously, I was pleased to see that we agree on your overall statement on derivatives reform: moving the vast majority of swaps into central clearing and onto transparent exchanges increases transparency and lowers risk.

As I’ve said in past speeches to you, why aren’t we more aligned? We both want more transparency, openness and competition in these markets, which lowers costs for companies and their customers.

And we cannot forget the real scorecard for so many Americans that resulted in eight million jobs lost.

Friday, February 8, 2013

RBS ORDERED TO PAY $325 MILLION TO SETTLE ATTEMPTED INTEREST RATE MANIPULATION

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

CFTC Orders The Royal Bank of Scotland plc and RBS Securities Japan Limited to Pay $325 Million Penalty to Settle Charges of Manipulation, Attempted Manipulation, and False Reporting of Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR

With this Order, the CFTC has now imposed penalties of more than $1.2 billion on banks for manipulative conduct with respect to LIBOR and other benchmark interest rates

Washington, DC
The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced an Order against The Royal Bank of Scotland plc and RBS Securities Japan Limited (collectively, RBS or the Bank), bringing and settling charges of successful manipulation, attempted manipulation, and false reporting relating to LIBOR for Yen and Swiss Franc, which are benchmark interest rates critical to financial markets and the public. The Order requires RBS to pay a $325 million civil monetary penalty, cease and desist from further violations as charged, and take specified steps to ensure the integrity and reliability of LIBOR and other benchmark interest rate submissions, including improving related internal controls.

"The integrity of LIBOR depends on truthful information provided by a select group of some of the world’s most important banks. The public is deprived of an honest benchmark interest rate when a group of traders sits around a desk for years falsely spinning their bank’s LIBOR submissions, trying to manufacture winning trades. That’s what happened at RBS," said David Meister, the CFTC’s Director of Enforcement.

The Order finds that:

• As recently as 2010 and dating back to at least mid-2006, RBS made hundreds of attempts to manipulate Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR, and made false LIBOR submissions to benefit its derivatives and money market trading positions; RBS succeeded at times in manipulating Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR;

• At times, RBS aided and abetted other panel banks’ attempts to manipulate those same rates;

• The misconduct involved more than a dozen RBS derivatives and money market traders, one manager, and multiple offices around the world, including London, Singapore, and Tokyo; and

• The unlawful conduct continued even after RBS traders learned that a LIBOR investigation had been commenced by the CFTC.

With this Order, the CFTC has now imposed penalties of more than $1.2 billion on banks for manipulative conduct with respect to LIBOR submissions and other benchmark interest rates, and has required each bank to comply with undertakings specifying the factors upon which submissions should be made, including making the determination of submissions transactions focused, and requiring implementation of internal controls and policies needed to ensure the integrity and reliability of submissions. With the undertakings, each bank represents that its benchmark interest rate submissions "shall be based on a rigorous and honest assessment of information, and shall not be influenced by internal or external conflicts of interest, or other factors or information extraneous to any rules applicable to the setting of a [b]enchmark [i]nterest [r]ate," according to the Order.

According to the CFTC’s Order against RBS, the various ways in which RBS conducted its manipulative scheme all followed a similar pattern. The profitability of RBS’s Yen and Swiss Franc derivatives positions, such as interest rate swaps, depended on Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR, as did certain of RBS’s money market positions. RBS traders would ask their colleagues to make false LIBOR submissions that were beneficial to RBS’s trading positions. The traders’ requests were either for falsely high submissions or falsely low ones, whatever was needed to turn a profit. The submitters often accommodated those requests by making false submissions. Some of these submitters were even traders themselves, and skewed their LIBOR submissions to drive the profitability of their own money market and derivatives trading positions.

RBS created an environment for a number of years that eased the path to manipulation by placing derivatives traders and submitters together on the same desk, heightening the conflict of interest between the profit motives of the traders and the responsibility of submitters to make honest submissions. When derivatives traders and submitters eventually were separated (for business, not compliance reasons), the misconduct continued through Bloomberg chats and an internal instant messaging system.

According to the Order, RBS derivatives traders also unlawfully worked in concert with a trader from a UBS AG subsidiary (UBS), another LIBOR panel bank, in attempts to manipulate Yen LIBOR, and with a trader at another panel bank in attempts to manipulate Swiss Franc LIBOR. RBS also aided and abetted UBS’s attempts to manipulate Yen LIBOR by executing wash trades (trades that result in financial nullities) to generate extra brokerage commissions to compensate two interdealer brokers for assisting UBS in its unlawful manipulative conduct. On at least one occasion, RBS also requested the assistance of an interdealer broker to influence the submissions of multiple panel banks in an attempt to manipulate Yen LIBOR.

The Order finds that RBS attempted to manipulate Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR even after questions arose in the media in 2007 and 2008 about the integrity of banks’ LIBOR submissions, LIBOR reviews and guidance by the British Banker’s Association in 2008 and 2009, and the CFTC’s request in April 2010 that RBS conduct an internal investigation relating to its U.S. Dollar LIBOR practices. In fact, certain RBS employees involved in the misconduct were aware of the LIBOR investigation, yet continued their manipulative conduct and tried to conceal the conduct by minimizing their use of written messages to conduct the scheme.

The Order further finds that RBS’s traders were able to carry out their many attempts to manipulate Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR for years because RBS lacked internal controls, procedures and policies concerning its LIBOR submission processes, and failed to adequately supervise its trading desks and traders. RBS did not institute any meaningful controls, procedures or policies concerning LIBOR submissions until on or about June 2011. During this time, RBS was experiencing significant growth on its Yen and Swiss Franc trading desks, generating revenues for RBS that were multiplying over the years.

The CFTC Order also recognizes the cooperation of RBS with the Division of Enforcement in its investigation.

In related actions by the U.S. Department of Justice, RBS Securities Japan Limited agreed to plead guilty to a criminal charge of wire fraud, The Royal Bank of Scotland plc entered into a deferred prosecution agreement whereby it would continue to cooperate with the U.S. Department of Justice in exchange for the deferral of criminal wire fraud and antitrust charges, and RBS collectively accepted a penalty of $150 million. In addition, the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued a Final Notice regarding its enforcement action against The Royal Bank of Scotland plc and imposed a penalty of £87.5 million, the equivalent of approximately $137 million.

The CFTC thanks and acknowledges the valuable assistance of the FSA, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Washington Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Financial Services Agency of the Government of Japan, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, and the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Jonathan K. Huth, Aimée Latimer-Zayets, Brian G. Mulherin, Maura M. Viehmeyer, Rishi K. Gupta, Timothy M. Kirby, Terry Mayo, Elizabeth Padgett, Anne M. Termine, Philip P. Tumminio, Jason T. Wright, Gretchen L. Lowe, and Vincent A. McGonagle. CFTC Staff from the Division of Market Oversight and Office of the Chief Economist also assisted with the investigation of this matter.

Friday, December 14, 2012

CFTC BRINGS COMMODITY POOL FRAUD CHARGES AGAINST CALIFORNIA COMPANY

FROM: U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

CFTC Charges Calif. Company Arista LLC and Calif. Residents Abdul Sultan Walji and Reniero Francisco with Fraud in Operating $9.5 Million Commodity Pool

Federal court issues emergency order freezing the defendants' assets, permitting expedited asset discovery, and protecting books and records

Washington, DC
– The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that it filed a civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against Arista LLC, a registered Commodity Pool Operator (CPO) with its principal place of business in Newport Coast, Calif., and its principals Abdul Sultan Walji (a/k/a Abdul Sultan Valji) and Reniero Francisco, both California residents. The CFTC complaint charges the defendants with defrauding investors in connection with operating a commodity pool to trade commodity futures contracts and options, making false statements to pool participants, misappropriating pool funds, and making false statements in filings with the National Futures Association (NFA). The CFTC complaint also charges the defendants with failing to register with the CFTC during Arista’s first year of operating as a CPO.

On December 12, 2012, the same day the complaint was filed, U.S. District Court Judge Paul A. Engelmayer entered an ex parte restraining order freezing the defendants' assets, authorizing expedited discovery by the CFTC, and prohibiting the defendants from destroying or concealing books and records. The judge set a hearing date on the CFTC’s motion for a preliminary injunction for December 21, 2012.

The CFTC complaint alleges that from at least February 2010 through January 2012, the defendants carried out a fraudulent scheme to misappropriate millions of dollars from investors in commodity futures and options. The defendants allegedly collected funds from 39 investors totaling more than $9.5 million, of which the defendants paid themselves $4.125 million in purported fees while losing over $4.8 million trading. In order to perpetuate their scheme, the defendants allegedly provided false quarterly statements to investors and filed false quarterly reports with the NFA. For example, the complaint alleges that the NFA, as a result of its examination, determined that Arista’s September 2011 pool quarterly report (PQR) had falsely reported a positive 99 percent rate of return in September 2011, when in reality Arista’s rate of return was negative 46.98 percent. NFA also determined that Arista’s PQR had falsely reported a net asset value (NAV) of $8,421,139 as of September 30, 2011, when in reality Arista’s NAV as of that date was approximately $523,000, according to the complaint.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks restitution and a return of ill-gotten gains, civil monetary penalties, trading and registration bans, and permanent injunctions against further violations of the federal commodities laws, as charged.

In a parallel criminal action, on December 12, 2012, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announced that it filed a criminal complaint charging both Walji and Francisco with conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud offenses. Walji is also charged with commodities fraud. Both defendants were arrested in California by agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, the FBI, and the NFA.

Saturday, December 8, 2012

COURT PERMANENTLY BARS DEFENDANTS FROM COMMODITIES INDUSTRY

FROM: U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Federal Court in New York Orders Defendants Forex Capital Trading Group, Forex Capital Trading Partners, and Highland Stone Capital Management to Pay over $1.8 Million for Fraud in Off-Exchange Foreign Currency Scheme

Washington, DC - The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that Judge Katherine B. Forrest of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a default judgment and permanent injunction order against defendants Forex Capital Trading Group, Inc. (Forex Group), Forex Capital Trading Partners, Inc. (Forex Partners), both of New York, N.Y., and Highland Stone Capital Management, L.L.C. (Highland Stone) of Rutherford, N.J. The order requires these defendants to pay a civil monetary penalty of $1,352,293 and to disgorge $450,764 of ill-gotten gains for the benefit of defrauded customers. The order also imposes permanent trading and registration bans against the defendants and prohibits them from violating the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, as charged.

The order stems from a CFTC anti-fraud enforcement action filed on July 27, 2011 against these three companies and their principals (see CFTC Press Release 6083-11, July 28, 2011). The order finds that Forex Group, Forex Partners, and Highland Stone fraudulently solicited 106 customers who invested more than $2.8 million to trade retail foreign currency (forex). In soliciting customers, the defendants falsely claimed, on their websites and elsewhere, that their forex trading for customers was profitable for a period of several years, the order finds. The defendants’ claims included a falsely reported customer gain of 51.94 percent in 2010, a year, in fact, in which their customers lost more than $1.2 million. Overall, customers lost more than 93 percent of their total invested principal through the defendants’ forex trading, the order finds.

The order also finds that the defendants distributed false account statements to prospective customers showing profitable trading and acted in capacities requiring registration with the CFTC, but were not registered.

The CFTC’s litigation is continuing against the principals of Forex Partners and Forex Group, namely Susan G. Davis of Jersey City, N.J., and David E. Howard II, of New York, N.Y., and against the principal of Highland Stone, Joseph Burgos, of Rutherford, N.J.

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the U.K. Financial Services Authority in this matter.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Susan B. Padove, Joy McCormack, Elizabeth Streit, Michael Geiser, Janine Gargiulo, Scott Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard B. Wagner.

Thursday, December 6, 2012

PONZI SCHEME DEFENDANT ORDERED TO RETURN $20.6 MILLION TO VICTIMS


FROM: U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
December 5, 2012

Federal Court in Idaho Orders CFTC Defendant Trigon Group, Inc. to Return More than $20.6 million of Ill-Gotten Gains to Victims of its Fraud

Washington, DC -
The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that Judge Edward J. Lodge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho entered a consent order of permanent injunction that requires defendant Trigon Group, Inc. (Trigon), an Idaho-based business, to disgorge more than $20.6 million of ill-gotten gains to the victims of its fraud. The consent order also imposes permanent trading and registration bans against Trigon and prohibits it from violating the anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, as charged.

The consent order stems from a CFTC complaint filed on February 27, 2009, that charged the defendant Trigon as well as defendant Daren L. Palmer with solicitation fraud and misappropriation in operating a commodity pool Ponzi scheme (see CFTC Press Release 5623-09, February 27, 2009, under Related Links). Earlier, on October 4, 2010, Judge Lodge entered a summary judgment order requiring Palmer to disgorge more than $20.6 million and to pay a civil monetary penalty of more than $20.6 million. The order also permanently bars Palmer from engaging in any commodity-related activity, including trading, and from registering or seeking exemption from registration with the CFTC (see CFTC Press Release 5919-10, October 6, 2010, under Related Links).

The consent order finds that, from at least September 2000 to date of the complaint, defendants directly and indirectly solicited at least $40 million from at least 57 individuals or entities to invest in Trigon entities. Pool participants understood that their funds would be used for trading commodity futures on their behalf, among other things, S&P 500 index futures contracts. Defendants made repeated misrepresentations that the pool was profitable and growing. In fact, defendants misappropriated the vast majority of the funds invested by pool participants. The consent order also finds that the defendants violated registration requirements as charged.

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Idaho Department of Finance. The SEC filed a related action against Palmer and Trigon that also resulted in sanctions against them.

The CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Alison Wilson, John Dunfee, Mary Kaminski, A. Daniel Ullman, Paul G. Hayeck, and Joan Manley.

Monday, October 29, 2012

ILLINOIS RESIDENT SETTLES FRAUD CHARGES FOR $1.8 MILLION

FROM: U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

CFTC Orders Illinois Resident Joshua T.J. Russo to Pay More than $1.8 Million in Restitution and Penalties for Futures and Options Fraud and Unauthorized Trading

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today issued an order filing and settling charges against Joshua T.J. Russo of Chicago, Ill., for fraudulently soliciting at least one customer to participate in a fictitious commodity futures and options pool, engaging in unauthorized trading, and issuing false account statements.

The CFTC order requires Russo to pay restitution of $960,000, a $645,000 civil monetary penalty, and disgorgement of $215,000. The order permanently prohibits Russo from engaging in any commodity-related activity, including trading, and from registering or seeking exemption from registration with the CFTC. The order also permanently prohibits Russo from further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, as charged.

The CFTC order finds that, from around March 2007 through April 2011, Russo, as a registered Associated Person of an independent Introducing Broker (IB), fraudulently solicited at least one of the IB’s customers by telling the customer that he would be a general partner in a fictitious pool called Peak Performance Fund, LP (PPF). According to the order, Russo issued false statements to the PPF customer in the form of purported PPF audited financial statements and in the form of weekly spreadsheets that Russo represented were summaries of the customer’s account values. In fact, however, the statements grossly overinflated the value of the customer’s accounts, the order finds.

In addition, the order finds that Russo provided at least five other customers with similar spreadsheets that grossly inflated the value of the customers’ accounts. Russo also engaged in a significant amount of unauthorized trading in these customers’ accounts, and in the accounts of three other customers, the order finds. Russo engaged in speculative trading for at least one customer, contrary to the hedging strategy that Russo represented he would utilize, according to the order.

According to the order, Russo’s eight customers deposited at least $3 million into trading accounts to trade commodity futures and options in managed and self-directed accounts. Russo, through his false statements to the eight customers, concealed his unauthorized trading and overall trading losses of approximately $1.7 million, the order finds.

On October 25, 2012, Russo was charged with a single count of commodities fraud in a related criminal action (USA v. Russo, 1: 12-cr-00836). His arraignment is currently scheduled for November 1, 2012.

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois and the National Futures Association.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Katherine S. Driscoll, Michael Solinsky, Michelle Bougas, Kassra Goudarzi, Melanie Bates, Gretchen L. Lowe, and Vincent A. McGonagle

Saturday, September 1, 2012

CFTC CHARGES CALIFORNIA RESIDENT IN ALLEGED COMMODITY POOL FRAUD SCHEME


FROM: U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Washington, DC
– The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced the filing of a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, charging defendant Jeffrey Gustaveson of Carlsbad, Calif., with fraud, misappropriation, and issuing false statements in an approximate $2.5 million commodity pool scheme.

According to the CFTC complaint, filed on August 29, 2012, from at least January 2010 through approximately July 2010, Gustaveson accepted at least $2,495,000 million from at least four individuals to invest in a commodity futures pool. However, rather than trade pool participants’ funds as promised, Gustaveson allegedly only used approximately $400,000 of the funds to trade commodity futures, which resulted in a net loss. Gustaveson kept the remaining funds in a checking account from which he used at least $400,000 of pool funds to pay his personal expenses, including hotels, restaurants, and online gambling, according to the complaint.

Furthermore, to conceal his fraud, Gustaveson allegedly distributed false trading account statements to pool participants that misrepresented the value of the pool, reported false profits, and failed to disclose Gustaveson’s misappropriation of pool participants’ funds. When his fraud was exposed, Gustaveson allegedly repaid a portion of pool participants’ funds, but, despite repeated requests to do so, Gustaveson allegedly has not returned $415,000 of pool participants’ money. According to the CFTC complaint, Gustaveson admitted in a California state court proceeding that he had misappropriated investor money and falsified financial statements in connection with the acts described in the CFTC complaint.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks restitution to defrauded customers, a return of ill-gotten gains, civil monetary penalties, trading and registration bans, and permanent injunctions against further violations of federal commodities laws, as charged.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Lindsey Evans, Mary Beth Spear, Diane Romaniuk, Ava M. Gould, Scott R. Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard B. Wagner.

Wednesday, June 13, 2012

CFTC COMMISSIONER CHILTON ON "OPRISK EUROPE"


Photo:  London.  Credit:  Wikimedia.
FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
“Where the History Comes From”
Speech of Commissioner Bart Chilton, OpRisk Europe London, England
June 13, 2012
Introduction: Hey Lama
Hey, OpRisk Europe 2012. “Hey” isn’t one of our more formal American salutations. It is colloquial, and I mean it in a friendly way. Of course, it is still used to gain attention, “hey!” We Americans aren’t always so formal. You never hear, as a farewell, an American saying “cheerio” for example.

At any rate, thank you for that generous introduction and for the invitation to be here this morning. It really is an honor and personal privilege to be with you—folks who work to make these global economic engines, these seemingly boundless and exciting financial markets, work.

A lot of times you—the people in this room—don’t get the reverence and respect you merit. Your work is important and imperative to our economies. Being someone from government, I really know how not getting respect feels. Nonetheless, I appreciate what you do, although, the value of that praise is questionable.

Anyone recall the old movie Caddyshack? I know it wasn’t a hit in Europe, except reportedly in Denmark—those Danes have a great sense of humor. There is a scene where Carl Spackler (actor/comedian Bill Murray) tells a story about when he was a looper, a golf caddy, in the Himalayas. One day, he caddies for the Dalai Lama, the Dalai Lama! At the end of the golf round, Carl thinks he is not going to get a tip, a gratuity, so he says, “Hey, Lama, hey, how about a little something, you know, for the effort, you know.” And the Dalai Lama says, “Oh, uh, there won’t be any money, but when you die, on your deathbed, you will receive total consciousness.” And, Carl explains, “So, I got that going for me, which is nice.” Thus, I think each of you is often under-recognized for your important work, but I thank you. So, you got that going for you, which is (maybe) nice.
International Context

I speak often about what and how we are developing U.S. financial regulations in the wake of our regulatory reform law—the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, otherwise known as Dodd-Frank. That is, however, only one part of the story. As hard as it is for many in the States to sometimes comprehend, there is an entire world out there. So today, let’s talk financial reform with a focus on the international context. This is something which we must address if these rules are going to be efficient and effective. When I say “we” must address, I am suggesting all regulators and those, including you here, involved in these incredible markets.

The only true method for financial regulations to work well is if they are harmonized, to a robust degree, among nations. I appreciate there will be individual and idiosyncratic issues. I appreciate we all need to respect each other’s sovereignty. There is no suggestion here that financial regulation has to be word-for-word identical. Of course it doesn’t have to be identical. But to the extent we can, we should realize and address the interconnectedness of these markets. Not to do so would be a faulty premise on which to establish these new and improved regulatory regimes. Sounds like a laundry detergent: new and improved regulatory regimes, with added transparency for cleaner markets!

Where the History Comes From
As we undertake these challenges, we need not only to be respectful of others, but learn from each other, from various experiences, and from each other’s history.
Eddie Izzard (another actor/comic) does a stand-up bit where he says, “I grew up in Europe, where the history comes from.” He’s so funny. I bet the Danes love him. He says, “We’ve got tons of history, lying about the place—big old castles.” He talks about Euro Disney and building the Disney fairytale castle. One of European engineers says to an American: “You’d better make it a bit bigger. They’ve actually got them here . . . and they’re not made of plastic.”

Nevertheless, this is where the history comes from. You have a lot of experience—a plentiful past. You have thousands of years of financial know-how. I’m not suggesting that the market economy from the 1500s, or joint-stock companies in the late seventeenth century are terribly apropos to our global markets these days. However, we should learn from all of our applicable experiences and be determined to craft considerate rules and regulations which reflect the experiences and history of others, while harmonizing to the greatest extent attainable.

Ace and Amazing
Just think about the improbable inter-related global markets that exist at the present time. Every single business day, there are at least 160 million, million, financial transactions. And I’m talking market-related transactions, not something resembling a check being cashed, an ATM withdrawal, or a commercial store purchase. There are 160 million global financial market transactions per day. However, it isn’t just the number that is staggering; it is how all of those mind-boggling transactions work together, in harmony, between markets, crossing borders, trading venues and regulatory jurisdictions. It is simply incredible.

It is almost too difficult to process with a normal brain. It’s ace and amazing that it all works so well. But then again, we only need to look at recent history to know it doesn’t always work so well. In fact, given 2008, “it didn’t work so well” is a fairly substantial sarcasm.

Thing One and Thing Two
There are a couple of causes to the crisis—“Things,” if you will—that led to the system pretty much failing the entire world.

Thing One—shout out to good Dr. Seuss—were lax or non-existent laws and regulations that allowed the free markets to rock ‘n’ roll so much that they rolled right over our economies—and our citizens. There is an old saying about how the best things in life are free—well, the worst things in life are also sometimes free, like unbridled free markets with no oversight. Of course, it wasn’t just the lax laws, rules and regulations. Nope, Thing One just set the table for the banquet to come.

Thing Two were the cooks in the kitchen: the Wall Street wizards, the global gatherings of gurus all things financial, the economic intelligencia. They wholly developed these very pioneering products, these innovative investments to be traded and re-traded. Don’t get me wrong. Some were full stop dodgy, but party on they did. Yep, they cooked and prepared this big buffet of myriad exotic economic products that were progressively consumed by traders, investors, big banks and small banks; a wide panoply of the financial world taste tested the treats. And, many of them did so over and over, again and again.

Even on the regulated exchanges, markets were unbelievably morphing in new and exciting ways. There were new investors bringing in hundreds of billions in fresh dough and new technologies. A lot of the trading was occurring at lightning speeds. It was all enormously exhilarating.

Boy oh boy: Thing One and Thing Two, those troublemakers. Dark markets, lighter markets, monster markets of unprecedented size and girth, mini-markets with bantam volumes trading this or that—sometimes being pushed or pulled due to the slim liquidity, here markets, there markets, now markets, later markets. Traders were burning and churning up the fiber optics, and phones were on fire, nearly 24-7-365, with all of the action-packed bartering and bargaining.

Plus, think about the portability of risk in these global markets with worldwide institutions. The risk can be true and tried, freeze dried, flash fried and moved all around. It can be done abruptly, to boot. You don’t want risk in one nation? No problemo. Hasta la vista, baby. With a few clicks of the mouse, presto change-o, your risk can be transmitted, transferred or transported from one firm to another, from one market to another, from one country to another. And from a regulator’s view, I can tell you that it might sometimes look more like of one of those shell games than anything else.

This risk transferring isn’t just hypothetical, as many of you know. We all recall American International Group (AIG) Financial Products. Well, while they were initially structured in the U.S., they were managed from here, in London. Mammoth risks ended up in the States. In fact, U.S. taxpayers, as part of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), bailed out AIG to the not-so-tasty tune of 40 billion buckaroos. Bottom line: these are global markets with interconnectedness that is simply part and parcel to the sheer existence of how the world’s finances function today.

Wow. Whew. I’m dog-tired describing it! Thing One and Thing Two: those harmless numskulls, what could gopossibly go wrong? Gulp. Wait until mom gets home.

Greatly Grubby
Well, unfortunately—shocker—we know all too well what went wrong. There were totally unregulated markets in the dark over-the-counter (OTC) space, trading in the hundreds-of-trillions of dollars.

To give you a size comparison, and size does matter, we at the CFTC currently oversee roughly $5 trillion in annualized trading volume, but the global OTC market is roughly $650 trillion—$650 trillion! That’s ginormously humongous—a term of art. The Danes are writing that one down. Plus, as I said, there was absolutely no government oversight. No government in the world had the OTC markets on their plate. Not an iota of enforcement or regulatory oversight—zippo, zilch, nil. No requirements for trades to be cleared or backed with some orderly accounting technique or standard existed. No requirements for transparency for pre-trade or post-trade reporting. There is a line that people use. I’ve used it—perhaps even today—that transparency is the best market disinfectant. Well, the OTC markets had no transparency, and it was greatly grubby. We just didn’t know how soiled or huge it was.

It’s astonishing, still today. Each party to a trade could value what was being exchanged at whatever amount they desired to accommodate their own balance sheets. Things were traded and re-traded to such a degree that nobody knew what was worth what. The result is that some firms were excessively over-leveraged—much more than made sense to any economist on the planet.

Take for example Lehman Brothers, before they were another one bites the dust, (yeah, shout out Queen). Who recalls how excessively they were leveraged? Are you ready? Are you ready for this? Are you hanging on the edge of your seat? They were leveraged at 30 to one. Their last financial report had the firm with $691 billion in assets, yet only $22 billion in shareholder equity. The trading that was going on in the OTC world allowed them to put whatever valuation they required on their balance sheets. And, it appears they did at Lehman. That risk wasn’t just a U.S. risk, but a U.K. risk and a risk transferred to other places around the globe.

What Now?
Now, there is not only an acknowledgement that Thing One and Thing Two led to the crisis, but there are laws, rules and regulations in various stages of being implemented to guard against a sequel to the economic calamity. There is an acknowledgement that new regulatory rules are required—particularly in the other major market jurisdictions like here in Europe, in Japan and in Canada. There is agreement that we should never again allow our economies and our citizens to be defenseless against unregulated or poorly regulated markets and the collateral risks associated with such markets.

The ET: Borderlines
As we seek to harmonize rules and regulations, however, there will be issues that ruffle the feathers of our colleagues here or there, and we too, will get concerned at certain points. It has happened in our history when things cross borderlines and it will continue to happen. Amongst the significant remaining issues we are communicating with our colleagues in the European Union (E.U.) and other jurisdictions is trying to ensure we have a sensible approach to the cross-border application of the Dodd-Frank swaps market reforms. This is commonly referred to as the “ET”—not E.T.: The Extra Terrestrial (although some of what we discuss seems alien)—but the extra territoriality issue, ET— extra territoriality.

On one hand, if a transaction takes place, let’s say, here in London, should I care about it as U.S. regulator? Well, I can understand the argument of those that say it shouldn’t involve anything U.S. However, on the other hand, what about that transference of risk? What about risk being shifted from one nation to another, that movement I equated to sometimes looking like a shell game. Isn’t that something which should be of interest, if not concern, for all of us? And believe me, we watch carefully when we see problems in the Eurozone—it has a direct and immediate impact on our markets. Did you know, for example, that 21% of all U.S. exports go to Eurozone countries? So when there’s a problem in one or two or three of them, it has a real impact in the States.

For our part as U.S. regulators, Dodd-Frank requires—Section 722(d)—that swaps reforms shall apply to activities outside the U.S. if those activities have “a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce” of the United States.

Consider JPMorgan Chase (JPM). We all know they recently experienced a multi-billion dollar trading loss. These trades were transactions out of here, out of London. But you know where the losses are being absorbed—in the United States at JPM. As a U.S. bank, JPM has direct access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). So, do I care about JPM’s trading in London when U.S. consumers and taxpayers might theoretically be on the hook in the future for a loss insured by the FDIC? I sure as shooting do! Besides, as a matter of U.S. law, billions in JPM trading losses, regardless if the transactions took place in London, Luxembourg or Lisbon, would certainly constitute a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, the commerce of the United States.

How do we deal with this somewhat troubling set of circumstances? Well, first we need to treat each other with dignity and respect. Regulators have done a good job on this count to date. Additionally, we need to learn from each other’s experiences, including the place where the history comes from: Europe. Vitally important is that we need to harmonize our laws, rules and regulations to the greatest extent possible. Here’s why: if we do that, for example and we have comparable rules and regulations, then there would be no need for U.S. regulators, or other global regulators, to impose some seemingly over-reaching provision involving ET.

We have the authority to rely upon another nation’s ability to oversee these things even if the trading has a direct and significant effect on U.S. commerce if the foreign nation’s regulatory structure is comprehensive and comparable. This, “substituted compliance” is how to best address the thorny ET issue. However, it requires that vital harmonization occur, and not just between the U.S. and E.U.

In that regard, one of the problems is that at this point, we (my Agency) haven’t put any more meat on the bones of the issue—our bad. In order to flesh the issue out some more, we will, I expect very soon, show a little leadership and release some interpretive guidance on the subject. We will let folks know how the reforms might apply and provide a synopsis about when and how overseas swaps market participants and swap dealers, might comply with the Dodd-Frank reforms. Significantly, we will spell out how we might be able to rely upon these comparable and comprehensive foreign regulatory regimes.

I look forward to having this proposed interpretive guidance out in the public, and soon. More importantly, however, I look forward to receiving public comments. I am confident and optimistic that we will see increased efforts at greater harmonization of the main regulatory issues being considered here, and in other nations. That really is in all of our collective interests.

Of particular consequence from my perspective are rules and regulations regarding clearing, margining, capital, trading and transparency, limits on speculation, and with regard to high frequency traders (HFTs).

Customer Protection—Full Segregation
We also need to address the protection of customer money. Recently, both in Europe and in the U.S., we’ve seen the apparent misuse of customer funds.  Here is where we can take a good idea from the E.U. The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) has some thoughtful protections for customers that the CFTC should adopt.  Article 39.5 of EMIR, for example, allows customers to elect to choose between “omnibus client segregation” (which is similar to what the CFTC requires) and “individual client segregation” or what I call “full segregation.”  While we don’t offer full segregation in the U.S., I believe we should.  We ought to let customers elect to have their fully segregated funds and the excess margin to be deposited in a separate account under the custody of the clearing organization. We should allow customer money to literally be off-limits to a firm.  If that means that a firm charges the customer extra, and the customer agrees to pay it, so be it. Let the firms compete in the free market and customers can choose that, too. (See, I’m a free market guy, too).

And by the way, we need to hold firm executives accountable for any misuse of customer funds. By that, I mean they should be personally accountable and personally liable.

The Van Gogh
Another fundamental issue that I’ve talked about for years, but which only seems to gain public attention when petrol prices are high, is speculative position limits. As we all know, prices were very high just in March and April, so there was a lot of attention to the subject. Today, not so much, although it is still very important, and I’m like a dog with a bone on this one. I won’t back down.

You may have heard about the Paris thief who tried to steal some valuable art from the Louvre. It is all very valuable there I suppose. Anyway, the thief was caught by the authorities only a few blocks from the museum when his van ran out of fuel. When he was asked about it, he said, “That was the entire problem: I had no Monet to buy Degas to make the Van Gogh.” Sorry, I wondered if I’d have de Gaulle to tell you that one. I figured I had nothing Toulouse.

Numerous studies show a link between speculation and prices. Studies from Oxford, the International Monetary Fund and from the

U.S. Federal Reserve all show it. Why does a trader need to have so much concentration that they can push prices around? I just don’t get it. So, speculative position limits are another key area where I hope we will harmonize to a great extent. I’ll leave it at that for now.

An App for That
One final policy issue I want to address is another topic that has been more of a concern in the E.U. than in the U.S., and is an example of where I think my regulator colleagues in the States need to pay more attention. Specifically, I’m talking about how the regulated markets are transforming with technology.

High frequency traders—those folks I call cheetahs due to their incredible speed, are out there all the time trying to scoop up micro dollars in milliseconds. I’m not saying they are unscrupulous or that these cheetahs should be an endangered species. What I am saying is that they are either unregulated or under-regulated and that needs to change.

The largest futures exchange in the World is in Chicago. Their third largest trader has been a cheetah based in Prague. Hooray for that cheetah. Hooray for Prague. But if we, the U.S. regulators simply want to look at books and records, that cheetah is not required to provide us with diddly squat—another term of art. We won’t get anything. Furthermore, we don’t even have the ability to command books and records information from domestic cheetahs. These cats are not required to provide a thing to the U.S. regulators, under the current set of circumstances, unless we get a judge to issue a subpoena. It is simply wacky. I do, however, have an app for that. At the very least, the cheetahs need to be registered. Yet, there are no places in the Dodd-Frank law where these traders are even mentioned. That is how quickly the markets are morphing.

Take the Flash Crash in the U.S., when the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped by nearly 1,000 points in 20 minutes. That precipitous and speedy drop and the ensuing bounce back, would not have occurred if cheetahs weren’t involved. They didn’t start the fire. No, they didn’t light it, but they were ignited by it.
Think about this: The Flash Crash took place on May 6, 2010 at 2:45 in the afternoon. What if it had taken place very early in the trading day when these E.U. markets were open? The damage could have been much worse.

Why didn’t Dodd-Frank even address the cheetahs? Well, the legislation was in the final stages of being negotiated. It passed just over two months following the Flash Crash.

Here is what we know: There is a need for regulators to do something now to ensure that we aren’t vulnerable to some feral cheetah’s, or cheetahs’ action(s) in the future. In addition to being registered, shouldn’t the cheetahs be required to test their programs? Shouldn’t they be required to have kill switches in the event that they do go feral? I think so. I’m calling for that and today for the cheetahs to be required to establish pre-trade risk controls to prevent wash trades—period. And when I’m talking about cheetahs, I don’t only mean those with faster- than- speeding- bullet computers. This registration should include automated trading systems (ATSs), too. We need to ensure that cheetahs do not intentionally or unintentionally screw up price discovery. I’m also suggesting that there be periodic compliance reports from the cheetahs and that senior executives sign their names and be held personally liable for any false or misleading information. The days of “he said, she said” accountability in financial markets needs to stop, and now.

I anticipate our Agency will issue a concept release in the very near future to spell out some of these issues, and others. We will gather comments on this one, too. I also hope that we keep looking to the E.U. for leadership, coordination and cooperation on these critical matters that really are on the cutting edge of our markets around the globe.

The Cheerio Effect
You have an action-packed day, so in a bit here, I'll make like a tree and leave. However, I want to leave you with two quick final thoughts on what we've spoken about today.
The first involves breakfast cereals. Yeah, breakfast cereals—hang with me. As we move to harmonize rules and regulations—addressing cross border ET issues, customer segregation, position limits and caging the financial cheetahs, we understand that we aren't alone in the world. Yes, the markets in the U.S. and the E.U. are large, but we certainly aren't alone. There are a bunch of us in the bowl together.

There are other nations and other regulators looking at what we are doing. In fact, some are looking to gain from our regulation implementation. Not many people talk about it, but it has been happening for a while. Many of you may have already been given a sales pitch to move your trading to another nation. I’ve heard many stories about this. I know it to be the case.

Some believe with fewer requirements for reporting, clearing and registration that they can capture a portion of markets that are subject to new regulation. The idea is there will be some massive market migration as a result of overly-prescriptive rules and regulations. I won't mention nation names, although I have before, but there are some out there, right now.

Contrary to all that, I don't think that this market migration will occur. I don’t see a regulatory race to the bottom. The global trading environment requires thoughtful and harmonized regulations. Suitable regulations will make jurisdictions more competitive, not less. I don't believe, as long as we are cautious and careful, that we will see market migration to nations with the thinnest of rulebooks. In fact, I don’t think there will ultimately be many thin rulebooks.

Here is why, and here is where we get to what is called, in fluid dynamics, and that lovely British expression, “cheerio”—the Cheerio Effect. The Cheerio Effect is the predisposition for slight, wet-able, floating substances to attract one another. In a breakfast cereal, like Cheerios, we see a phenomenon in which the cereals tend to cluster together or stick to the edges of a bowl of milk. You’ve all seen this phenomenon at breakfast or even in a soup with oyster crackers. The Cheerio Effect: it all has to do with the surface tension and buoyancy. In the financial world these days, there certainly is tension, and if we’re going to have the buoyancy to rise above it, we, like Cheerios, need to stick together.

My point, and I do have one, is this: like the Cheerio Effect, I believe financial regulations will cling together in the proper environment. They will attract each other. So, if the U.S. and the E.U. implement harmonized financial regulations, it will attract others to adhere to similar financial rules.

Fuel-Injecting Economies
The second takeaway and final thing today, is this: there has been a lot of talk about how these regulatory changes will stifle innovation. They'll be so wicked evil restrictive that no financial business will ever survive—never—they just couldn't. The cost of compliance alone will run firms straightaway to death’s dark door.

I consider that rubbish—raving rubbish. In fact, there is an abundant amount of competition out there already, right now, today. We see it all the time. These regulatory reforms are going to create more jobs, more innovation, and fuel-inject our economies more than anyone ever would have thought possible. Firms are already making strategic moves. Their tactical teams are reckoning what to do when and how. All of this, before we have even completed all our rules. New clearing houses, swaps data repositories, and swaps execution facilities are all not only on the drawing tables; some are already up and running.

I have confidence in the Cheerio Effect and that the rest of the world will cling to our harmonized financial regulations. I believe these regulations will provide a competitive advantage to first-movers on the regulatory front.

This is all very exciting, indeed, and isn’t it neat that you are all part of it? You are right in the smack dab ma-diddle of it all. There are myriad opportunities out there and more presenting themselves all the time. It is exhilarating. There's a lot going on in these incredible financial markets, even beyond the 160 million transactions per day, and guess what? There's a lot more to come—a lot more.

So, buckle up. Enjoy OpRisk Europe 2012. The Danes and I will do a little debriefing. Hasta la vista, baby . . . and, cheerio.

Thank you.

Last Updated: June 13, 2012

Friday, June 1, 2012

CHAIRMAN CFTC COMMENTS ON PROPOSED VOLKER RULE TO CURB FINANCIAL RISKS




FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Statement Regarding Public Roundtable to Discuss the Proposed Volcker Rule
Chairman Gary Gensler
May 31, 2012
Welcome to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) roundtable on the proposed Volcker Rule. Thank you, Dan, for that introduction, and thank you for working with the rest of the team, particularly Steven Seitz from your office and Steve Kane from the Office of the Chief Economist, to put together this important roundtable.

I’d like to thank the Treasury Department staff and the staff of the financial regulators tasked with implementing the Volcker Rule for joining us for this roundtable and for your efforts in coordinating with the CFTC on the rule. I’d also like to thank Sheila Bair, the former Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, for participating today.

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker was unfortunately on international travel today, but I’d like to acknowledge his many years of public service.

In 2008, the financial system and the financial regulatory system failed. The crisis – caused in part by the unregulated swaps market -- plunged the United States into the worst recession since the Great Depression with eight million Americans losing their jobs, millions of families losing their homes and thousands of small businesses closing their doors. The financial storms continue to reverberate with the debt crisis in Europe affecting the economic prospects of people around the globe.

In 2010, Congress and the President came together to pass the historic Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), to promote transparency in the markets and to lower risk to the public from large, complex financial institutions. Amongst these protections is the Volcker Rule, which prohibits banking entities from proprietary trading, an activity that may put taxpayers at risk.

This is the CFTC’s 17th roundtable on important topics related to Dodd-Frank reforms. These roundtables are an additional opportunity – beyond the 30,000 comments we’ve received and 1,600 meetings with the public we’ve held -- for dialogue and helpful input from market participants and the public. Our 18th roundtable related to promoting the price discovery function on designated contract markets and related issues of swap execution facilities will be on June 5.

In adopting the Volcker rule, Congress prohibited banking entities from proprietary trading while at the same time permitting banking entities to engage in certain activities, such as market making and risk mitigating hedging. One of the challenges in finalizing this rule is achieving these multiple objectives.

I’m looking forward to a lively discussion. I’d like to highlight three main issues that I’m particularly interested in getting feedback on today.

First, as prescribed by Congress, the Volcker rule prohibits proprietary trading while permitting risk-mitigating hedging. These two provisions are consistent with each other in that they are both meant to lower the risks of banking entities to the broader public. The question is how we as regulators achieve both of these risk-lowering provisions in a balanced way.

Some commenters have said if we’re too prohibitive in one area, we may limit banking entities ability to engage in risk-mitigating hedging. On the other hand, if we follow comments of some of the banking entities, then the rule’s allowance for permitted hedging might swallow up Congress’ intent to limit the risk of proprietary trading.

Specifically, under the statute, banking entities may engage in “risk-mitigating hedging activities in connection with and related to individual or aggregated positions, contracts, or other holdings.”

To qualify as hedging, these activities must be “designed to reduce the specific risks to the banking entity in connection with and related to such positions, contracts, or other holdings.”

The criteria for the hedging exemption as included in the proposed Volcker Rule are the following: hedges must mitigate one or more specific risks on either individual positions or aggregated positions, they cannot generate significant new exposures, they must be subject to continuous monitoring and management, compensation for hedging cannot reward proprietary trading, and the hedges must be reasonably correlated to the specific risks of the positions.

A further question about hedging activity that was asked by the agencies ( question 109 of the CFTC’s proposal) is whether “certain hedging strategies or techniques that involve hedging the risk of aggregated positions (e.g. portfolio hedging) create the potential for abuse of the hedging exemption.”

A related question on which it would be helpful to hear from the panel: is it possible, and if so how, could a separate trading desk with its own profit and loss statement engage in risk-mitigating hedges?

The further removed hedging activities are from the specific positions the banking entity intends to hedge, is it not more likely that such trading activity is prone to express something other than hedging?

As Dan will explain in a moment, we’re not going to be speaking about the specifics of the credit derivative product trading of JPMorgan Chase’s Chief Investment Office. I do think, though, it may be instructive for regulators as we finalize key reforms.

Second, in addition to hedging, Dodd-Frank permits market making, which is important to well-functioning markets as well as to the economy. The question for regulators once again is finding a balance, but this time between prohibiting proprietary trading and permitting market making. The agencies ask in the proposal (question 89 in the CFTC’s proposal): “Is the proposed exemption overly broad or narrow? For example, would it encompass activity that should be considered proprietary trading under the proposed rule?”

The criteria for market making in the proposed rule included seven requirements. A number of commenters suggested that these requirements may be more applicable to the listed securities markets than to the swaps market. During the second panel today, we are looking for your input on this issue. If some of these requirements are not appropriate, what would be more appropriate with regard to market making in swaps?

Third, I’m particularly interested in hearing about how the prohibition on proprietary trading should best be applied to banking entities transacting in futures and swaps. The CFTC’s role with regard to the Volcker Rule and banking entities is primarily with regard to these derivatives traded by swap dealers and futures commission merchants within the banking entity.

In particular, banking entities’ market making in swaps is likely to leave them with significant open positions for many years in customized swaps. When would a banking entity’s decision not to hedge or to only partially hedge open swaps positions be considered prohibited proprietary trading? We at the CFTC will benefit from your input on how the Volcker Rule can best protect the public against risk in the swaps and futures markets.

Thank you again for coming, and I’ll turn it back to Dan.


Monday, May 14, 2012

CFTC CHAIRMAN CHILTON'S SPEECH ON FINANCIAL REFORM


Photo:  CBOT.  Credit:  Wikimedia.
FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Speech of Commissioner Bart Chilton before Americans for Financial Reform, Washington, DC
May 9, 2012
Introduction
Thank you for the introduction. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today to discuss cost/benefit analysis (CBAs). As we know, this has been the matter of lawsuits and countless meetings in the wake of the passage of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, otherwise known as Dodd-Frank. It is an important topic.
Load of Compromisin’

For me, most things that are resolved in this town result from an appropriate equilibrium. The truth or answer isn’t found on the outskirts of issues; they reside on the inside, in the medium. Most things I’ve worked upon or have seen worked upon seem to resolve themselves better when there is cooperation and compromise. That usually means some level of concession from all parties. When something is approved and everyone is grumbling a bit, that typically indicates it is legitimately worthy, in general. At least, that is what I’ve found.

The thing is: in order to reach an agreement, to reach that balance, sometimes it is sort of like that oldRhinestone Cowboy lyric, “There’ll be a load of compromisin’ on the road to my horizon.” For those of you who were too young, or don’t recall the song, made famous by country singer Glen Campbell, it is your loss. It was a huge hit. By the way, I saw a neat tee shirt last weekend. On it was written, “I’m old, but I got to see all the cool bands.” Nevertheless, for most things good to get done in this town, the fact of the matter is that there is a load of compromisin’ on the road to that horizon.
The D.C. Quadrakill

My experience, however, is once upon a time in a faraway land when and where people actually wanted to get some things done. There is a contingent now that simply wishes to take the Nancy Reagan approach to a lot of things and “Just say no.” (By the way, one is getting old when a lot of your references seem like they need references, or foot notes). Not gonna do it on that one. She was a great First Lady. If you don’t know “Just say no,” that’s why we have Google. Nowadays, there are a lot of people who just say “no” to a lot of things. There is no load of compromisin’ going on. There is no compromisin’ period. And, that’s why precious little legislation is coming from the Hill these days and why frustration with Washington is rampant.

I do have a point. We are working toward cost/benefit analysis. Hang on my brothers and sisters. There is a little-articulated Washington play book section. I call it the D.C. Quadrakill. It isn’t an innovative thing, and it is a tried and true strategy, for sure. First, if you don’t like a bill, amendment or provision thereof, you try to defeat it with a vote. Just say, then vote, no (or nay, or whatever). If that fails, go to stage two. You can try to defund it through the appropriations process. If that doesn’t work, there is stage three. This is where you can try to stop it, change it or delay it through the regulatory rulemaking process. If all of those things fail, you can go to DEFCON four: litigation. That’s the D.C. Quadrakill: 1. kill bill; 2. defund it; 3. regulate it; and, 4. litigate it.

There is no shame in availing yourself of this Quadrakill strategy, although not everyone can do the full meal Quadrakill deal. Sure people can lobby their Representatives and Senators regarding voting for, or funding of, some legislation. Maybe they will get some gallery chamber passes, too. Perhaps they will have a quick photo op. That stuff takes place all the time. But the thing is: the other two stages of the Quadrakill—regulate and litigate—those are for serious societies—the class of folks who have some buckaroos. No lobbyist wants a tour of the CFTC or a photo with a Commissioner. It is all work. And as far as litigation, watch out. That’s long, laborious and lavish—only those with the big bucks can do stage four Quadrakill: litigation.

This brings me to my point, and I do have one, despite those that questioned it. The thing is: we are seeing a lot of stage four Quadrakill dialogue and action out there. There is more trash talk and more action regarding litigation related to financial regulation than ever before. Frankly, it has become an unprecedented problem and a dilemma for regulators. Unfortunately, the thing is: that is part of the purpose of those that talk about or live to litigate.

More Perfect Regulation 
I think we all need to take a step back and think about Quadrakill stage four a little more. Let’s take a breath and think thoughtfully, and a little more calmly than seems to me to have been done in the last several months. This event is the perfect venue to do just that.
In the preamble to the Constitution of the United States, there is this wonderful aspirational language:

“We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

“In order to form a more perfect union.”   Those words, “in order to”—they meant that our forefathers were working toward, hoping, aspiring, to form a more perfect union. It wasn’t perfect, and it might not reach perfection, but they were trying to get there.  Here’s something to think about:  those wonderful “planks” toward making that “more perfect union”—establishing justice, insuring domestic tranquility, promoting the general welfare—each one of those distinct factors didn’t in and of themselves create “The More Perfect Union.”  Rather, each facet was a building block that the Founding Fathers intended to use to “get there,” to get to that “More Perfect Union.”   In other words, “providing for the common defense,” wasn’t the be all and end all, but instead it was one of the important pieces used to get to the ultimate goal:  a more perfect union.

 In a similar approach, cost/benefit analyses in regulatory rulemaking are analogous to those discrete building block factors in the Constitution’s preamble.  The thing is: a CBA is not the ultimate goal of rulemaking, although if you listen to some you might think it so.  A CBA is an important piece of reaching the ultimate goal:  a “more perfect regulation.”  Like the framers of our Constitution, regulators aspire to reach objectives that protect the common weal.  That’s our job.  In the recent past, however, our jobs have been made significantly more difficult by a contortion. The thing is: we have seen an obnoxious bastardization of the conduct and use of CBAs in regulatory rulemaking.

This by no means is a new phenomenon. It isn’t a paranormal event.  It has cropped up over the years, time and again, as a convenient tool to scuttle regulatory initiatives.  Its’ use at this moment in history is, however, particularly rampant and greatly galling, given the focus of the regulations that are being decelerated and the harm that was caused to the public as a result of the economic crisis of 2008.

There are a bevy of bellowers booing about the “costs” of regulation.  To those catcalls, I’d simply ask, what were the complete “costs” of the $414 billion taxpayer funded bailout?  What are the “costs” of families losing their homes or of folks who can’t get a job?  What are the “costs” to our economy of skyrocketing oil and gas prices, fueled by unbridled excessive speculative activity?  What could be the added “costs” if regulations that Congress and the President have required are not put in place? My view is that there is not a single benefit to not doing these regulations, but there are unacceptable costs if we don’t go forward. Without these rules and regulations, there will be unacceptable costs to consumers, to businesses, to markets, to our economy and our country.

I wouldn’t go so far as paraphrasing Samuel Johnson and saying that litigation is the last refuge for scoundrels. But, the cost-benefit bellowers are openly trying to impose a discredited economic philosophy (that just happens to serve their financial interests) on regulators by beseeching the courts to adopt their extreme interpretation of our statutory duty to “consider” the costs and benefits of our regulations. This economic philosophy is, in short, that the financial markets work just fine on their own and there’s no need for regulators to ensure a minimum level of safety in these markets or a maximum level of speculation. The market can police itself, thank you very much. They want us to write off the 2008 financial crisis as an aberration and ignore countless reputable scholars who’ve found that the costs of opaque, unregulated derivatives markets are borne by the public. The truth is speculation without limits can fuel bubbles, and left unaccountable, the captains of finance may veer the economy into dangerous waters in search of bigger and riskier profits. In short, these bellowers want us to go beyond a “consideration” of costs and benefits to making their narrow conception of costs (discounting the social costs to the public of deregulation) and benefits (discounting the social benefits of the public of smart regulation), the crucible for judging all financial regulations.

The thing is: CBAs are being used, as I have said before, as a Sword of Damocles over regulatory agencies.  We are virtually paralyzed by intimidation—or, indeed, the reality—of lawsuits brought (haphazardly, in my assessment) on the foundations of allegedly poor CBAs.  When this occurs, regulators are sort of like those ghost hunters seen on television, looking for the scary litigation risk in every corner or closet. Did you hear what it said? “Wha, wha, wha.” We used an especially sensitive machine and after analysis in the lab, it appears that what the voice said was this: “If you regulate, we will litigate,” or perhaps “Ready for stage four Quadrakill.” Hmm, because I thought it just sounded like “Wha, wha, wha.” The thing is: either way, the rulemaking action slows, or slogs to a stop—and that is the clear-cut intent of some of those who threaten, design, and bring, these lawsuits.

Take this example: our position limits rule took up 81 pages in the Federal Register. Guest how much of the text was cost/benefit analysis? 19 pages. Yup, almost a fourth—and yet we’re still getting sued.

At the same time, American citizens and businesses and our economy endure more than is fair for a gallon of gas and the resultant impact on our Gross Domestic Product. We continue to see devalued homes, and continue to face higher-than-they-could-be unemployment rates. The potential for further damage due to a still yet unimplemented new regulatory regime is out there. How do we measure those harsh “costs?”  If those costs are not more scary than the threat of litigation due to cost/benefit analysis, then regulators should seek a new line of work.

So today, I’m suggesting that CBAs be expanded to include not just the quantitative, quantifiable elements of a rule but its qualitative aspects as well. In other words the social costs and benefits need to be taken into account. I by no means want to slow the rulemaking process down in any way but I really believe some of the most important cost-benefit effects of rules go beyond P & L statements, so I’ll ask my colleagues to consider painting a more complete picture of what—without these rules—the societal cost might be. Memories fade with time and we need to be mindful of the costs of not doing these things right in the context of the colossal calamity of late ’08.

The thing is: it’s time to put some sense (and cents) back into CBAs, and to criticisms of rules.  By that I mean, I’d like to see reasonable, accurate, and well-supported analyses, and those who criticize our CBAs should berequired to provide, not “masked data,” with no clear or hard figures, but real, verifiable dollars and cents to rebut our analyses.  If we are all held to the same reasonable standards, not just trying to create ghastly ghosts in an effort to slow the process down, CBAs might actually be useful as they were intended:  as a factor in forming “more perfect regulations.”
Conclusion

Look, I understand that people have to represent themselves and take advantage of the opportunities which exist to make their case, on the Hill, in the agencies, or in court. That doesn’t mean I have to agree with them. It seems to me this has gone too far. They may mean well. I’m just not sure they are well.

The thing is: we had, and have, an economic mess created by lax or non-existent regulations in our financial markets. That isn’t a joke or a scary story for millions of people. It is an unfortunate and seemingly unforgiving reality. We need to do all we can to appropriately implement the Dodd-Frank rules to not only protect consumers, businesses, and markets alike, but to fuel inject the economic engine of our democracy. This new law—and the regulations that go with it if done properly—are the blueprints for how our economy can thrive. If we all work together as honest partners in the rulemaking process, I am confident we not only can, but will move our nation forward.
Thank you.

Friday, May 11, 2012

WALL STREET FIRM CHARGED WITH FOREX FRAUD


Photo:  Currency Sign.  Credit:  Wikimedia
FROM:  COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Charges New York Firm Madison Dean, Inc., and its Principals, George Athanasatos and Laurence Dodge, with Forex Fraud

Washington, DC - The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced the filing of a civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York charging Madison Dean, Inc. (Madison Dean), of Wantagh, N.Y., and its principals, George Athanasatos, also of Wantagh, and Laurence Dodge of Fresh Meadows, N.Y., with fraudulently soliciting approximately 19 persons to invest approximately $415,000 in managed trading accounts to trade off-exchange foreign currency (forex) contracts on a leverage or margined basis. None of the defendants has ever been registered with the CFTC.

The CFTC complaint, filed on May 8, 2012, alleges that from approximately December 2008 through approximately July 2010, defendants Madison Dean, Athanasatos, and Dodge, through an Internet website, written solicitation materials, and other actions, misrepresented and omitted material facts about Madison Dean, including the background and qualifications of Madison Dean employees and the firm’s performance record, to create a false impression that it was a well-established and successful company.

Specifically, according to the complaint, the defendants allegedly fraudulently claimed that 1) Madison Dean had been in existence since 1998, 2) Madison Dean’s customers included high net worth individuals, financial institutions, and institutional clients, 3) Madison Dean provided “professional money managers” who would be in charge of the forex trading for the customers’ managed accounts, and 4) Madison Dean had been making money for its customers for years.

Contrary to these claims, Madison Dean had not been making money for its customers for years, as it did not exist prior to December 2008, and its customers were “neither high net worth individuals, financial institutional or other institutional clients, hedge funds, nor millionaires,” according to the complaint. Also, according to the complaint, Madison Dean did not have professional money managers in charge of customer trading. Rather, Athansatos allegedly managed the trading of customer accounts, and on various occasions, Dodge and Athanasatos’ mother – neither a professional money manager – also traded customer accounts.

The complaint further alleges that Madison Dean’s customers lost approximately $250,000, “as a result of its poor trading.” As further alleged, after being in operation for a little over a year, during which time the firm collected approximately $112,000 in commissions and fees, Madison Dean shut down its operation with no notice to its customers and no way for those customers to contact the company or anyone associated with it.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks civil monetary penalties, restitution, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, trading and registration bans, and preliminary and permanent injunctions against further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, as charged.
The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority in this matter.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Alan I. Edelman, James H. Holl, III, Michelle Bougas, Gretchen L. Lowe, and Vincent McGonagle.

Friday, May 4, 2012

CFTC CHARGES 2 INDIVIDUALS AND COMPANY WITH FRAUD AND MISAPPROPRIATION



FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Charges Utah Residents Christopher Hales, Eric Richardson and their Company, Bentley Equities, LLC, with Fraud and Misappropriation
CFTC seeks an emergency restraining order freezing defendants’ assets
Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced the filing of a federal court action in Utah charging Bentley Equities, LLC (Bentley), a Delaware corporation, and its principals, Christopher D. Hales and Eric A. Richardson, with fraud and misappropriation in connection with commodity futures trading. Richardson resides in Cedar Hills, Utah, and Hales is currently an inmate at the Florence, Colo., Federal Correction Complex. None of the defendants has ever been registered with the CFTC.

The CFTC’s complaint, filed May 2, 2012, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, alleges that from at least April 2009 through August 2010, the defendants fraudulently solicited and accepted more than $1.1 million from approximately 38 pool participants and clients to trade commodity futures in a commodity pool account and in individual managed accounts.

The CFTC seeks an emergency restraining order freezing the defendants’ assets and prohibiting the destruction or alteration of the defendants’ books and records.

Specifically, according to the CFTC’s complaint, Bentley, Hales, and Richardson misrepresented to customers that their trading was profitable, and that they actively managed more than $1 million in commodity futures accounts. In reality, the complaint charges, the defendants were not successful commodity futures traders and never managed more than $480,000 in commodity futures trading accounts at one time. In fact, the defendants lost approximately $1,296,600 of the Bentley participants’ and managed clients’ funds trading commodity futures contracts, according to the complaint.

The complaint further charges that the defendants misappropriated at least $628,000 of customer funds for personal use, including food, clothing, auto expenses, and utility and credit card payments. The defendants also allegedly used misappropriated funds to make payments to existing participants and clients, as is typical of a Ponzi scheme.

To conceal their trading losses and misappropriation, defendants allegedly issued false account statements to participants and clients by altering trading statements that they received from the futures commission merchant carrying the Bentley pool account. These doctored statements falsely showed inflated account balances and profitable commodity futures trading returns, when, in fact, the defendants’ futures trading for their participants and clients “consistently lost money,” according to the complaint.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks civil monetary penalties, restitution, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, trading and registration bans, and preliminary and permanent injunctions against further violations of the federal commodities laws, as charged.

In November 2011, Hales was sentenced to more than seven years imprisonment and ordered to pay $12,719,236 in criminal restitution in connection with a judgment entered against him in a related criminal matter for the conduct alleged in the CFTC’s case, as well as mortgage fraud. United States v. Christopher D. Hales,No. 2:10-CR-183-TS-SA-1 (D. Utah, Sept. 2, 2010).

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Utah, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development —Office of Inspector General, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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