RBS SECURITIES JAPAN LTD SENTENCED FOR MANIPULATION OF YEN LIBOR

FROM:  JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 

WASHINGTON — RBS Securities Japan Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS) that engages in investment banking operations with its principal place of business in Tokyo, Japan, was sentenced today for its role in manipulating the Japanese Yen London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a leading benchmark used in financial products and transactions around the world.

Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brent Snyder of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and Assistant Director in Charge Valerie Parlave of the FBI’s Washington Field Office made the announcement.

RBS Securities Japan was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Michael P. Shea in the District of Connecticut.  RBS Securities Japan pleaded guilty on April 12, 2013, to one count of wire fraud for its role in manipulating Yen LIBOR benchmark interest rates.  RBS Securities Japan signed a plea agreement with the government in which it admitted its criminal conduct and agreed to pay a $50 million fine, which the court accepted in imposing sentence.  In addition, RBS plc, the Edinburgh, Scotland-based parent company of RBS Securities Japan, entered into a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the government requiring RBS plc to pay an additional $100 million penalty, to admit and accept responsibility for its misconduct as set forth in an extensive statement of facts and to continue cooperating with the Justice Department in its ongoing investigation.  The DPA reflects RBS plc’s cooperation in disclosing LIBOR misconduct within the financial institution and recognizes the significant remedial measures undertaken by new management to enhance internal controls.

Together with approximately $462 million in regulatory penalties and disgorgement – $325 million as a result of a Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) action and approximately $137 million as a result of a U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) action – the Justice Department’s criminal penalties bring the total amount of the resolution with RBS and RBS Securities Japan to approximately $612 million.

“Today’s sentencing of RBS is an important reminder of the significant consequences facing banks that deliberately manipulate financial benchmark rates, and it represents one of the numerous enforcement actions taken by the Justice Department in our ongoing LIBOR investigation” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Raman. “As a result of the department’s investigation, we have charged five individuals and secured admissions of criminal wrongdoing by four major financial institutions.  Our enforcement actions have had a lasting impact on the global banking system, and we intend to continue to vigorously investigate and prosecute the manipulation of this cornerstone benchmark rate.”

“By colluding to manipulate the Yen LIBOR benchmark interest rate, RBS Securities Japan reaped higher profits for itself at the expense of unknowing counterparties, and in the process undermined the integrity of a major benchmark rate used in financial transactions throughout the world,” said Deputy Assistant Attorney General Snyder.  “Today’s sentence, in conjunction with the department’s agreement with parent company RBS, demonstrates the Antitrust Division’s commitment to prosecuting these types of far-reaching and sophisticated conspiracies.”

“The manipulation of LIBOR impacts financial products the world over, and erodes the integrity of the financial markets,” said Assistant Director in Charge Parlave.  “Without a level playing field in our financial marketplace, banks and investors do not have a threshold to which they can measure their hard work.  I commend the Special Agents, forensic accountants and analysts, as well as the prosecutors, for the significant time and resources they committed to investigating this case.”

According to court documents, LIBOR is an average interest rate, calculated based upon submissions from leading banks around the world, reflecting the rates those banks believe they would be charged if borrowing from other banks.  LIBOR serves as the primary benchmark for short-term interest rates globally, and is used as a reference rate for many interest rate contracts, mortgages, credit cards, student loans and other consumer lending products.  The Bank of International Settlements estimated that as of the second half of 2009, outstanding interest rate contracts were valued at approximately $450 trillion.

LIBOR is published by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), a trade association based in London.  At the time relevant to the conduct in the criminal information, LIBOR was calculated for 10 currencies at 15 borrowing periods, known as maturities, ranging from overnight to one year.  The LIBOR for a given currency at a specific maturity is the result of a calculation based upon submissions from a panel of banks for that currency (the Contributor Panel) selected by the BBA.

According to the plea agreement, at various times from at least 2006 through 2010, certain RBS Securities Japan Yen derivatives traders engaged in efforts to move LIBOR in a direction favorable to their trading positions, defrauding RBS counterparties who were unaware of the manipulation affecting financial products referencing Yen LIBOR.  The scheme included efforts to manipulate more than one hundred Yen LIBOR submissions in a manner favorable to RBS Securities Japan’s trading positions.  Certain RBS Securities Japan Yen derivatives traders, including a manager, engaged in this conduct in order to benefit their trading positions and thereby increase their profits and decrease their losses.

The prosecution of RBS Securities Japan is being handled by Deputy Chief Patrick Stokes and Trial Attorney Gary Winters of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, and New York Office Assistant Chief Elizabeth Prewitt and Trial Attorneys Eric Schleef and Richard Powers of the Antitrust Division.  Deputy Chiefs Daniel Braun and William Stellmach and Trial Attorney Alex Berlin of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, Trial Attorneys Daniel Tracer and Kristina Srica of the Antitrust Division, Jeremy Verlinda of the Antitrust Division’s Economic Analysis Group, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eric Glover and Liam Brennan of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Connecticut, and the Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs have also provided valuable assistance in this matter.  The investigation is being conducted by special agents, forensic accountants and intelligence analysts of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.

The investigation leading to these cases has required, and has greatly benefited from, a diligent and wide-ranging cooperative effort among various enforcement agencies both in the United States and abroad.  The Justice Department acknowledges and expresses its deep appreciation for this assistance.  In particular, the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement referred this matter to the department and, along with the FCA, has played a major role in the investigation.  Various agencies and enforcement authorities from other nations are also participating in different aspects of the broader investigation relating to LIBOR and other benchmark rates, and the department is grateful for their cooperation and assistance.  In particular, the Securities and Exchange Commission has played a significant role in the LIBOR investigation, and the department expresses its appreciation to the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office for its assistance and ongoing cooperation.

This prosecution is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.  President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.  The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources.  The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.

RABOBANK AGREES TO PAY $325 MILLION CRIMINAL PENALTY IN LIBOR/EURIBOR INTEREST RATE MANIPULATION SCHEME

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Tuesday, October 29, 2013
Rabobank Admits Wrongdoing in Libor Investigation, Agrees to Pay $325 Million Criminal Penalty

Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. (Rabobank)   has entered into an agreement with the Department of Justice to pay a $325 million penalty to resolve violations arising from Rabobank’s submissions for the London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor), which are leading benchmark interest rates around the world, the Justice Department announced today.

A criminal information will be filed today in U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut that charges Rabobank as part of a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA).  The information charges Rabobank with wire fraud for its role in manipulating the benchmark interest rates LIBOR and Euribor.  In addition to the $325 million penalty, the DPA requires the bank to admit and accept responsibility for its misconduct as described in an extensive statement of facts.  Rabobank has agreed to continue cooperating with the Justice Department in its ongoing investigation of the manipulation of benchmark interest rates by other financial institutions and individuals.

“For years, employees at Rabobank, often working with traders at other banks around the globe, illegally manipulated four different interest rates – Euribor and LIBOR for the U.S. dollar, the yen, and the pound sterling – in the hopes of fraudulently moving the market to generate profits for their traders at the expense of the bank’s counterparties,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division.  “Today’s criminal resolution – which represents the second-largest penalty in the Criminal Division’s active, ongoing investigation of the manipulation of global benchmark interest rates by some of the largest banks in the world – comes fast on the heels of charges brought against three former ICAP brokers just last month.  Rabobank is the fourth major financial institution that has admitted its misconduct in this wide-ranging criminal investigation, and other banks should pay attention: our investigation is far from over.”

“Rabobank rigged multiple benchmark rates, allowing its traders to reap higher profits at the expense of their unsuspecting counterparties,” said Deputy Assistant Attorney General Leslie C. Overton of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division.  “Not only was this conduct fraudulent, it compromised the integrity of globally-used interest rate benchmarks – undermining financial markets worldwide.”

“Rabobank admitted to manipulating LIBOR and Euribor submissions which directly affected the rates referenced by financial products held by and on behalf of companies and investors around the world,” said Assistant Director in Charge Valerie Parlave of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.  “Rabobank’s actions resulted in the deliberate harm to counterparties holding products referencing the manipulated rates.  Today’s announcement is yet another example of the tireless efforts of the FBI special agents and forensic accountants who are dedicated to investigating complex fraud schemes and, together with prosecutors, bringing to justice those who participate in such schemes.”

Together with approximately $740 million in criminal and regulatory penalties imposed by other agencies in actions arising out of the same conduct – $475 million by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) action, $170 million by the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) action and approximately $96 million by the Openbaar Ministerie (the Dutch Public Prosecution Service) – the Justice Department’s $325 million criminal penalty brings the total amount to be paid by Rabobank to more than $1 billion.

According to signed documents, LIBOR is an average interest rate, calculated based upon submissions from leading banks around the world and reflecting the rates those banks believe they would be charged if borrowing from other banks.  LIBOR serves as the primary benchmark for short-term interest rates globally and is used as a reference rate for many interest rate contracts, mortgages, credit cards, student loans and other consumer lending products.  The Bank of International Settlements estimated that as of the second half of 2009, outstanding interest rate contracts were valued at approximately $450 trillion.

LIBOR is published by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), a trade association based in London.  At the time relevant to the conduct in the criminal information, LIBOR was calculated for 10 currencies at 15 borrowing periods, known as maturities, ranging from overnight to one year.  The LIBOR for a given currency at a specific maturity is the result of a calculation based upon submissions from a panel of banks for that currency (the Contributor Panel) selected by the BBA.  From at least 2005 through 2011, Rabobank was a member of the Contributor Panel for a number of currencies, including United States dollar (dollar) LIBOR, pound sterling LIBOR, and yen LIBOR.

The Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor) is published by the European Banking Federation (EBF), which is based in Brussels, Belgium, and is calculated at 15 maturities, ranging from overnight to one year.  Euribor is the rate at which Euro interbank term deposits within the Euro zone are expected to be offered by one prime bank to another at 11:00 a.m. Brussels time.  The Euribor at a given maturity is the result of a calculation based upon submissions from Euribor Contributor Panel banks.  From at least 2005 through 2011, Rabobank was also a member of the Contributor Panel for Euribor.

According to the statement of facts accompanying the agreement, from as early as 2005 through at least November 2010, certain Rabobank derivatives traders requested that certain Rabobank dollar LIBOR, yen LIBOR, pound sterling LIBOR, and Euribor submitters submit LIBOR and Euribor contributions that would benefit the traders’ trading positions, rather than rates that complied with the definitions of LIBOR and Euribor.

In addition, according to the statement of facts accompanying the agreement, from as early as January 2006 through October 2008, a Rabobank yen LIBOR submitter and a Rabobank Euribor submitter had two separate agreements with traders at other banks to make yen LIBOR and Euribor submissions that benefitted trading positions, rather than submissions that complied with the definitions of LIBOR and Euribor.

The Rabobank LIBOR and Euribor submitters accommodated traders’ requests on numerous occasions, and on various occasions, Rabobank’s submissions affected the fixed rates.

According to the statement of facts, Rabobank employees engaged in this conduct through electronic communications, which included both emails and electronic chats.  For example, on Sept. 21, 2007, a Rabobank Yen derivatives trader emailed the Rabobank Yen LIBOR submitter at the time with the subject line “libors,” writing: “Wehre do you think today’s libors are?  If you can, I would like 1mth libors higher today.”  The submitter replied: “Bookies reckon 1m sets at .85.”  The trader wrote back: “I have some fixings in 1 mth so would appreciate if you can put it higher mate.”  The submitter replied: “No prob mate let me know your level.”  The trader responded: “Wud be nice if you could put 0.90% for 1mth cheers.”  The submitter wrote back: “Sure no prob. I’ll probably get a few phone calls but no worries mate!”  The trader replied: “If you may get a few phone calls then put 0.88% then.”  The submitter responded: “Don’t worry mate – there’s bigger crooks in the market than us guys!”  That day, as requested, Rabobank’s 1-month Yen LIBOR submission was 0.90, an increase of seven basis points from its previous submission, whereas the other panel banks’ submissions decreased by approximately a half of a basis point on average.  Rabobank’s submission went from being tied as the tenth highest submission on the Contributor Panel on the previous day to being the highest submission on the Contributor Panel.

On Nov. 29, 2006, a Rabobank dollar derivatives trader wrote to Rabobank’s Global Head of Liquidity and Finance and the head of Rabobank’s money markets desk in London, who supervised rate submitters: “Hi mate, low 1s high 3s LIBOR pls !!! Dont tell [another Rabobank U.S. Dollar derivatives trader] haa haaaaaaa.  Sold the market today doooooohhhh!”  The money markets desk head replied: “ok mate , will do my best …speak later.”  After the LIBOR submissions that day, Rabobank’s ranking compared to other panel banks dropped as to 1-month dollar LIBOR and rose as to 3-month dollar LIBOR. Two days later, on Dec. 1, 2006, the trader again wrote to the money markets desk head: “Appreciate 3s go down, but a high 3s today would be nice… cheers chief.”  The money markets desk head wrote back: “I am fast turning into your LIBOR bitch!!!!”  The trader replied: “Just friendly encouragement that’s all , appreciate the help.”  The money markets desk head wrote back: “No worries mate , glad to help ….We just stuffed ourselves with good ol pie , mash n licker !!”

In an example of an agreement with traders at other banks, on July 28, 2006, a Rabobank rate submitter and Rabobank trader discussed their mutual desires for a high fixing.  The submitter stated to the trader: “setting a high 1m again today - I need it!” to which the trader responded: “yes pls mate…I need a higher 1m libor too.”  Within approximately 20 minutes, the submitter contacted a trader at another Contributor Panel bank and wrote: “morning skipper.....will be setting an obscenely high 1m again today...poss 38 just fyi.”  The other bank’s trader responded, “(K)...oh dear..my poor customers....hehehe!! manual input libors again today then!!!!”  Both banks’ submissions on July 28 moved up one basis point, from 0.37 to 0.38, a move which placed their submissions as the second highest submissions on the Contributor Panel that day.

As another example, on July 7, 2009, a Rabobank trader wrote to a former Rabobank yen LIBOR submitter: “looks like some ppl are talking with each other when they put libors down. . . quite surprised that 3m libors came down a lot.”  The former submitter replied: “yes deffinite manipulation – always is tho to be honest mate. . . i always used to ask if anyone needed a favour and vise versa. . . . a little unethical but always helps to have friends in mrkt.”

By entering into a DPA with Rabobank, the Justice Department took several factors into consideration, including that Rabobank has no history of similar misconduct and has not been the subject of any criminal enforcement actions or any significant regulatory enforcement actions by any authority in the United States, the Netherlands, or elsewhere.  In addition, Rabobank has significantly expanded and enhanced its legal and regulatory compliance program and has taken extensive steps to remediate the misconduct.  Significant remedies and sanctions are also being imposed on Rabobank by several regulators and an additional criminal law enforcement agency (the Dutch Public Prosecution Service).

This ongoing investigation is being conducted by special agents, forensic accountants, and intelligence analysts of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.  The prosecution of Rabobank is being handled by Assistant Chief Glenn S. Leon and Trial Attorney Alexander H. Berlin of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Trial Attorneys Ludovic C. Ghesquiere, Michael T. Koenig and Eric L. Schleef of the Antitrust Division.  Deputy Chiefs Daniel Braun and William Stellmach of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, Criminal Division Senior Counsel Rebecca Rohr, Assistant Chief Elizabeth B. Prewitt and Trial Attorney Richard A. Powers of the Antitrust Division’s New York Office, and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eric Glover and Liam Brennan of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Connecticut, along with Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs, have provided valuable assistance in this matter.

The investigation leading to these cases has required, and has greatly benefited from, a diligent and wide-ranging cooperative effort among various enforcement agencies both in the United States and abroad.  The Justice Department acknowledges and expresses its deep appreciation for this assistance.  In particular, the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement referred this matter to the department and, along with the FCA, has played a major role in the investigation.  The department has also worked closely with the Dutch Public Prosecution Service and De Nederlandsche Bank (the Dutch Central Bank) in the investigation of Rabobank.  Various agencies and enforcement authorities from other nations are also participating in different aspects of the broader investigation relating to LIBOR and other benchmark rates, and the department is grateful for their cooperation and assistance.  In particular, the Securities and Exchange Commission has played a significant role in the LIBOR investigation, and the department expresses its appreciation to the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office for its assistance and ongoing cooperation.

CFTC CHAIRMAN GENSLER'S REMARKS ON BENCHMARK INTEREST RATES

FROM: U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Remarks of Chairman Gary Gensler at London City Week on Benchmark Interest Rates
April 22, 2013


Good afternoon. Thank you, Anthony, for that kind introduction. I’m honored to be joining you for City Week.

I’d like to talk about one of the most significant risks facing the capital markets today. That is the risk to market integrity as well as financial stability of the continued use of LIBOR, Euribor and similar benchmark interest rates.

Given their fundamental role in the capital markets and our economy, such benchmark rates must be based on facts, not fiction.

Coordinating with the FCA

The U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) (along with its predecessor the Financial Services Authority (FSA)) and Martin Wheatley have been valued partners of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) on this matter.

The CFTC initiated an investigation in 2008 related to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). It is the reference rate for 70 percent of the U.S. futures market. It is also referenced by over half of the swaps market, which the CFTC was recently tasked to oversee.

The FCA has been instrumental in the CFTC’s investigations, leading to charges against Barclays and other banks for manipulative conduct regarding LIBOR and similar benchmarks.

Following the Barclays announcement, the international community asked Martin Wheatley and me to co-chair the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Task Force on Financial Market Benchmarks.

Last week, the task force published its second consultation paper outlining a set of international principles to enhance the integrity, reliability and oversight of benchmarks.

The IOSCO principles state that for benchmarks to be robust and reliable, among other things, they must have two essential elements: be anchored in observable transactions and supported by appropriate governance structures.

The IOSCO report further notes that in order to provide confidence that the price discovery system is reliable, benchmarks must be based on prices and rates formed by the competitive forces of supply and demand entered into at arm’s length between buyers and sellers in the market.

Unsecured, Interbank Market: Essentially Nonexistent

LIBOR, Euribor and similar interest rate benchmarks purport to represent the rate at which unsecured borrowing occurs between large banks.

The challenge we face, however, is that banks simply are not lending to each other as they once did. As Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England, said in 2008 of LIBOR: "It is, in many ways, the rate at which banks do not lend to each other." He went on further to say: "[I]t is not a rate at which anyone is actually borrowing."

The lack of transactions in the unsecured, interbank lending market along with weak governance structures for related benchmarks undermines market integrity.

The dearth of transactions in this market is a result of many factors: the 2008 crisis, the continuing European debt crisis, the downgrading of large banks’ credit ratings, as well as central banks providing significant funding directly to banks.

There has been a significant structural shift in how financial market participants finance their balance sheets and trading positions. There is an increasing move from borrowing unsecured (without posting collateral) toward borrowings that are secured by posting collateral. In particular, this shift has occurred within the funding markets between banks.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, for understandable reasons, banks have been hesitant to take on each other’s credit risk.

Recent changes to Basel capital rules further suggest that banks are unlikely to return to interbank lending on an unsecured basis.

Basel III includes a new asset correlation factor, which requires additional capital when a bank is exposed to another bank. This was included in the new standards to reduce financial system interconnectedness.

Basel III also includes a new requirement called the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). Banks will have to hold a sufficient amount of high quality liquid assets to cover their projected net outflows over 30 days.

A number of major banks have indicated that this new LCR requirement alone would make it prohibitively expensive for banks to lend to each other in the interbank market for tenors greater than 30 days. Thus, it is unlikely that banks will return to the days when they would lend to each other for three months, six months or a year.

The shift away from banks funding each other in the unsecured market has led to a scarcity or outright absence of actual transactions underpinning LIBOR and other interest rate benchmarks.

Enforcement Actions

This situation – having benchmark rates that are not anchored in actual transactions – undermines market integrity and leaves the financial system with benchmarks that are prone to misconduct.

Further, significant incentives for misconduct exist when hundreds of trillions of dollars of financial instruments reference benchmarks based on essentially nonexistent markets.

Indeed, as law enforcement actions brought by the CFTC, the FCA and the U.S. Justice Department, among others, have shown, LIBOR and other benchmark rates have been readily and pervasively rigged.

Barclays, UBS and RBS paid fines of approximately $2.5 billion for manipulative conduct relating to these rates.

At each bank, the misconduct spanned many years.

At each bank it took place in offices in several cities around the globe.

At each bank it included numerous people – sometimes dozens, among them senior management.

Each case involved multiple benchmark rates and currencies. In one case, there were over 2,000 instances of misconduct during a six-year period.

And in each case, there was evidence of collusion with other banks.

In the UBS and RBS cases, one or more inter-dealer brokers painted false pictures to influence submissions of other banks, i.e., to spread the falsehoods more widely.

Barclays and UBS also were reporting falsely low borrowing rates in an effort to protect their reputations.

Thus we find ourselves in a situation where there are both the incentives and ability to manipulate a critical rate in our markets.

Market Data

Beyond these cases, there is a significant amount of publicly available market data that calls into question the integrity of LIBOR today.

Let’s take a look at what happened just in the last few weeks as the Cyprus crisis infected the Eurozone. Here is a view of one Eurozone bank’s one-year credit default swap (CDS) spread versus that same bank’s daily submissions to the U.S. dollar LIBOR panel (Slide 1).

The bank’s CDS spread, one market measure of its credit risk, widened dramatically. The bank, however, didn’t change its submission as to where it could borrow from other banks. Though CDS trade in a different market and are for a bank’s holding company, the disconnect, as shown in this slide, raises questions about the credibility of LIBOR.

In Slide 2, we look at the average of all five Eurozone banks that submit to LIBOR. The picture is similar.

Next, let’s turn to the volatility of three-month U.S. dollar LIBOR in comparison with the volatility of other short-term interest rates. LIBOR, the blue line, is far more stable than any other comparable rate. Other short-term rates have much higher volatility (Slide 3).

Also of note, is that the 18 banks submitting to U.S. dollar LIBOR collectively did not change their submissions on 85 percent of the 252 submission days in 2012. You can see in Slide 4 just how few times the banks actually changed their submissions over the course of last year.

In fact, some of the banks didn’t change their submissions for four to five straight months. This was during a period when there were a number of uncertainties in the market driven by elections, changing economic outlook and other events. And yet somehow these banks said they could still borrow at exactly the same rate for four to five months. Slide 5 represents the longest consecutive period last year that the submissions remained unchanged.

Taking another look at CDS spreads versus LIBOR submissions, this time over the last three years, highlights another query. As we see in Slides 6 and 7, during significant market upheavals in the second half of 2011, the market’s views of these two banks’ credit risk changed dramatically. Yet their LIBOR submissions moved only modestly.

While we’re done with slides today, two last points reflected in market data:

There is a well-known concept in finance called interest rate parity, basically that currency forward rates will align with interest rates in two different economies. Since the financial crisis, that has not been the case, whether looking at the dollar versus the euro, sterling or yen. Theory hasn’t been aligning with practice. The borrowing rate implied in the currency markets is quite different than LIBOR.

Lastly, why are the results of two leading interbank benchmark surveys – one done for LIBOR and the other for Euribor – so different when each asks about U.S, dollar borrowing? The same difference occurs in the surveys for euro borrowing. These rates are calculated on the basis of the banks’ answers to roughly the same question. For LIBOR, a bank is asked at what rate it thinks it can borrow, while for Euribor, a bank is asked at what rate it thinks other banks are able to borrow.

Promoting Market Integrity and Financial Stability

Whether we consider the broad structural shift away from unsecured, interbank lending; the recent enforcement actions; or questions that arise from current market data, I believe that LIBOR, Euribor and other similar interest rate benchmarks are unsustainable in the long run.

These benchmarks – referencing markets with insufficient transactions, particularly in longer tenors – undermine market integrity and threaten financial stability.

Market integrity

For capital and risk to be efficiently allocated within the economy, interest rate benchmarks should reflect actual price discovery anchored in observable transactions.

Without transactions in the underlying market, the situation is similar to trying to buy a house, when your estate agent can’t give you comparable transaction prices in the neighborhood – because no houses were sold in the neighborhood in years.

As IOSCO notes, a benchmark should derive its value from the competitive forces of buyers and sellers meeting in an underlying cash market.

Derivatives derive their value from an underlying cash market. Market integrity dictates that whether that underlying cash market is oil, corn or the rate at which banks are borrowing, it must be based on something that is real. It should be anchored in observable transactions.

Further, these rates were readily and pervasively rigged in the past, and incentives for and ability to rig it in the future remain.

When market integrity is compromised, this also undermines the public’s confidence in the financial system.

Financial stability

The financial system’s reliance on interest rate benchmarks, such as LIBOR and Euribor, leaves the system in a fragile state.

Further, continuing to support LIBOR and Euribor in the name of stability may have the opposite effect. Using benchmarks that threaten market integrity may create more instability in the long run.

Given the structural changes in the interbank market, a number of banks have withdrawn from Euribor and some other interest rate benchmarks. Though IOSCO’s task force recommends that users of benchmarks have robust fallback provisions in contracts, many contracts do not currently have such fallback provisions. Thus, there is a risk to financial stability absent a planned, smooth and orderly transition.

I believe to promote market integrity as well as financial stability, we must move forward in a coordinated global effort to identify alternative interest rate benchmarks anchored in observable transactions and plan a smooth and orderly transition from benchmarks referencing unsecured, interbank markets.

Moving Forward

There is no doubt there will be challenges to transitioning from these rates.

But the market does have experience with transitioning from benchmarks that have become obsolete in the past. When the euro was created, a number of interest rate benchmarks were discontinued. How many of you remember PIBOR, RIBOR, MIBOR and FIBOR? Transitions also have occurred for energy and shipping rate benchmarks.

Further Canadian dollar LIBOR and Australian dollar LIBOR will be discontinued this year, leading to necessary transitions in those markets.

The basic components of past transitions include: first, identifying a new and reliable benchmark, one that is anchored in transactions.

Market participants and regulators are currently considering alternative interest rate benchmarks anchored in observable transactions. For instance, the Bank of International Settlements’ (BIS) Economic Consultative Committee’s March report lists possible alternatives anchored in observable transactions: the overnight swaps rate (OIS) and short-term collateralized financing rates such as general collateral repo rates (GC repo).

Second, the new and existing benchmarks run in parallel for a period of time allowing market participants to see and compare the price or rate of the alternative benchmark versus the soon-to-be-discontinued benchmark. This period of the two benchmarks running in parallel has been used to facilitate a smooth transition.

Third, a date is announced well in advance of when the old or obsolete benchmark will be discontinued.

Conclusion

While ongoing international efforts targeting benchmarks have focused on governance principles, these efforts cannot address the central vulnerability of LIBOR, Euribor and similar interest rate benchmarks: the lack of transactions in the underlying market.

Given the known issues with these benchmarks, their scale and effect on market integrity, it is critical that international regulators work with market participants to promptly identify alternative interest rate benchmarks anchored in observable transactions with appropriate governance, as well as determine how to best smoothly transition to such alternatives.

Just as Canadian dollar LIBOR and Australian dollar LIBOR are being discontinued due to the lack of an underlying interbank market, U.S. dollar, sterling, yen and euro LIBOR face similar underlying market challenges. The scope, as we all know, is bigger.

But it’s best that we not fall prey to accepting that LIBOR or any benchmark is "too big to replace."

Just imagine if the quality and integrity of the drinking water across the globe had been compromised. Then, the official sector and the utilities react by addressing the problem in Australia and Canada, but not in England or the United States. They say that there are too many people relying on the current drinking water in those countries.

If this were to occur, how could the public be confident in continuing to drink this water?

I believe market participants and regulators around the globe do have the ability and the ingenuity to tackle the challenges of benchmark interest rates, even in the face of their scale, to restore integrity and promote financial stability.

RBS ORDERED TO PAY $325 MILLION TO SETTLE ATTEMPTED INTEREST RATE MANIPULATION

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

CFTC Orders The Royal Bank of Scotland plc and RBS Securities Japan Limited to Pay $325 Million Penalty to Settle Charges of Manipulation, Attempted Manipulation, and False Reporting of Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR

With this Order, the CFTC has now imposed penalties of more than $1.2 billion on banks for manipulative conduct with respect to LIBOR and other benchmark interest rates

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced an Order against The Royal Bank of Scotland plc and RBS Securities Japan Limited (collectively, RBS or the Bank), bringing and settling charges of successful manipulation, attempted manipulation, and false reporting relating to LIBOR for Yen and Swiss Franc, which are benchmark interest rates critical to financial markets and the public. The Order requires RBS to pay a $325 million civil monetary penalty, cease and desist from further violations as charged, and take specified steps to ensure the integrity and reliability of LIBOR and other benchmark interest rate submissions, including improving related internal controls.

"The integrity of LIBOR depends on truthful information provided by a select group of some of the world’s most important banks. The public is deprived of an honest benchmark interest rate when a group of traders sits around a desk for years falsely spinning their bank’s LIBOR submissions, trying to manufacture winning trades. That’s what happened at RBS," said David Meister, the CFTC’s Director of Enforcement.

The Order finds that:

• As recently as 2010 and dating back to at least mid-2006, RBS made hundreds of attempts to manipulate Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR, and made false LIBOR submissions to benefit its derivatives and money market trading positions; RBS succeeded at times in manipulating Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR;

• At times, RBS aided and abetted other panel banks’ attempts to manipulate those same rates;

• The misconduct involved more than a dozen RBS derivatives and money market traders, one manager, and multiple offices around the world, including London, Singapore, and Tokyo; and

• The unlawful conduct continued even after RBS traders learned that a LIBOR investigation had been commenced by the CFTC.

With this Order, the CFTC has now imposed penalties of more than $1.2 billion on banks for manipulative conduct with respect to LIBOR submissions and other benchmark interest rates, and has required each bank to comply with undertakings specifying the factors upon which submissions should be made, including making the determination of submissions transactions focused, and requiring implementation of internal controls and policies needed to ensure the integrity and reliability of submissions. With the undertakings, each bank represents that its benchmark interest rate submissions "shall be based on a rigorous and honest assessment of information, and shall not be influenced by internal or external conflicts of interest, or other factors or information extraneous to any rules applicable to the setting of a [b]enchmark [i]nterest [r]ate," according to the Order.

According to the CFTC’s Order against RBS, the various ways in which RBS conducted its manipulative scheme all followed a similar pattern. The profitability of RBS’s Yen and Swiss Franc derivatives positions, such as interest rate swaps, depended on Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR, as did certain of RBS’s money market positions. RBS traders would ask their colleagues to make false LIBOR submissions that were beneficial to RBS’s trading positions. The traders’ requests were either for falsely high submissions or falsely low ones, whatever was needed to turn a profit. The submitters often accommodated those requests by making false submissions. Some of these submitters were even traders themselves, and skewed their LIBOR submissions to drive the profitability of their own money market and derivatives trading positions.

RBS created an environment for a number of years that eased the path to manipulation by placing derivatives traders and submitters together on the same desk, heightening the conflict of interest between the profit motives of the traders and the responsibility of submitters to make honest submissions. When derivatives traders and submitters eventually were separated (for business, not compliance reasons), the misconduct continued through Bloomberg chats and an internal instant messaging system.

According to the Order, RBS derivatives traders also unlawfully worked in concert with a trader from a UBS AG subsidiary (UBS), another LIBOR panel bank, in attempts to manipulate Yen LIBOR, and with a trader at another panel bank in attempts to manipulate Swiss Franc LIBOR. RBS also aided and abetted UBS’s attempts to manipulate Yen LIBOR by executing wash trades (trades that result in financial nullities) to generate extra brokerage commissions to compensate two interdealer brokers for assisting UBS in its unlawful manipulative conduct. On at least one occasion, RBS also requested the assistance of an interdealer broker to influence the submissions of multiple panel banks in an attempt to manipulate Yen LIBOR.

The Order finds that RBS attempted to manipulate Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR even after questions arose in the media in 2007 and 2008 about the integrity of banks’ LIBOR submissions, LIBOR reviews and guidance by the British Banker’s Association in 2008 and 2009, and the CFTC’s request in April 2010 that RBS conduct an internal investigation relating to its U.S. Dollar LIBOR practices. In fact, certain RBS employees involved in the misconduct were aware of the LIBOR investigation, yet continued their manipulative conduct and tried to conceal the conduct by minimizing their use of written messages to conduct the scheme.

The Order further finds that RBS’s traders were able to carry out their many attempts to manipulate Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR for years because RBS lacked internal controls, procedures and policies concerning its LIBOR submission processes, and failed to adequately supervise its trading desks and traders. RBS did not institute any meaningful controls, procedures or policies concerning LIBOR submissions until on or about June 2011. During this time, RBS was experiencing significant growth on its Yen and Swiss Franc trading desks, generating revenues for RBS that were multiplying over the years.

The CFTC Order also recognizes the cooperation of RBS with the Division of Enforcement in its investigation.

In related actions by the U.S. Department of Justice, RBS Securities Japan Limited agreed to plead guilty to a criminal charge of wire fraud, The Royal Bank of Scotland plc entered into a deferred prosecution agreement whereby it would continue to cooperate with the U.S. Department of Justice in exchange for the deferral of criminal wire fraud and antitrust charges, and RBS collectively accepted a penalty of $150 million. In addition, the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued a Final Notice regarding its enforcement action against The Royal Bank of Scotland plc and imposed a penalty of £87.5 million, the equivalent of approximately $137 million.

The CFTC thanks and acknowledges the valuable assistance of the FSA, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Washington Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Financial Services Agency of the Government of Japan, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, and the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Jonathan K. Huth, Aimée Latimer-Zayets, Brian G. Mulherin, Maura M. Viehmeyer, Rishi K. Gupta, Timothy M. Kirby, Terry Mayo, Elizabeth Padgett, Anne M. Termine, Philip P. Tumminio, Jason T. Wright, Gretchen L. Lowe, and Vincent A. McGonagle. CFTC Staff from the Division of Market Oversight and Office of the Chief Economist also assisted with the investigation of this matter.