Showing posts with label COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION. Show all posts

Saturday, March 2, 2013

CFTC CHAIRMAN GENSLER'S TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION & FORESTRY

Testimony of Chairman Gary Gensler Before the US Senate Committee On Agriculture, Nutrition & Forestry, Washington, DC

February 27, 2013

Good afternoon Chairwoman Stabenow, Ranking Member Cochran and members of the Committee. I thank you for inviting me to today’s hearing on oversight of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). I also want to thank the CFTC Commissioners and staff for their hard work and dedication.

Introduction

I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss with you the CFTC’s efforts on behalf of the public. The agency has been directed by Congress to oversee and police the nation’s derivatives markets, both in the futures and swaps markets. It strives to promote transparency, fairness and integrity in these markets. The CFTC continues to carry out its historical mission regarding the rapidly changing futures market, while developing and integrating comprehensive standards for the swaps market. The Commission has reorganized its divisions to best ensure ongoing oversight of the futures market, as well as the swaps markets. We also have implemented improvements in protections for customer funds and are developing others. We continue to engage in targeted enforcement efforts in the public interest, such as the historic actions regarding benchmark rates, including the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a reference rate for much of the U.S. futures and swaps markets.

The New Era of Swaps Market Reform

Congress made history with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) and the CFTC now oversees the entire derivatives marketplace – across both futures and swaps. The common-sense rules of the road for the swaps market that Congress included in the law have taken shape and market participants are adapting to them.

For the first time, the public is benefiting from seeing the price and volume of each swap transaction. This post-trade transparency builds upon what has worked for decades in the futures and securities markets. The new swaps market information is available free of charge on a website, like a modern-day ticker tape.

For the first time, the public will benefit from the greater access to the markets and the risk reduction that comes with central clearing. Required clearing of interest rate and credit index swaps between financial entities begins next month.

For the first time, the public is benefitting from specific oversight of swap dealers. More than 70 swap dealers have provisionally registered. They are subject to standards for sales practices, recordkeeping and business conduct to help lower risk to the economy and protect the public from fraud and manipulation.

An earlier economic crisis led President Roosevelt and Congress to enact similar common-sense rules of the road for the futures and securities markets. I believe these critical reforms of the 1930s have been at the foundation of our strong capital markets and many decades of economic growth.

In the 1980s, the swaps market emerged. Until now, though, it had lacked the benefit of rules to promote transparency, lower risk and protect the public, rules that we have come to depend upon in the futures and securities markets. What followed was the 2008 financial crisis – a crisis that was due in part to swaps markets. Eight million American jobs were lost. In contrast, the futures market, supported by earlier reforms, weathered the financial crisis.

Congress and the President responded to the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression and carefully crafted the Dodd-Frank swaps provisions. They borrowed from what has worked best in the futures market for decades: transparency, clearing and oversight of intermediaries.

The CFTC has largely completed swaps market rulewriting, with 80 percent behind us. On October 12, the CFTC and Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) foundational definition rules went into effect. This marked the new era of swaps market reform.

The CFTC is seeking to consider and finalize the remaining Dodd-Frank Act swaps reforms this year. In addition, as Congress directed the CFTC to do, I believe it’s critical that we continue our efforts to put in place aggregate speculative position limits across futures and swaps on physical commodities.

The agency has completed each of these Congressionally-directed reforms with an eye toward ensuring that the swaps market works for end-users, America’s primary job providers. It’s the end-users in the non-financial side of our economy that provide 94 percent of private sector jobs.

Dodd-Frank Act swaps market reforms benefit end-users by lowering costs and increasing access to the markets. They benefit end-users through greater transparency – shifting information from Wall Street to Main Street. Following Congress’ direction, end-users are not required to bring swaps into central clearing. Further, the Commission’s proposed rule on margin provides that end-users will not have to post margin for uncleared swaps. Also, non-financial companies, other than those genuinely making markets in swaps, will not be required to register as swap dealers. Lastly, when end-users are required to report their transactions, they are given more time to do so than other market participants.

Congress also authorized the CFTC to provide relief from the Dodd-Frank Act’s swaps reforms for certain electricity and electricity-related energy transactions between rural electric cooperatives and federal, state, municipal and tribal power authorities. Similarly, Congress authorized the CFTC to provide relief for certain transactions on markets administered by regional transmission organizations and independent system operators. The CFTC is looking to soon finalize exemptive orders related to these transactions, as Congress authorized.

The CFTC has worked to complete the Dodd-Frank reforms in a deliberative way – not against a clock. We have been careful to consider public input, as well as the costs and benefits of each rule. CFTC Commissioners and staff have met more than 2,000 times with members of the public, and we have held 23 public roundtables. The agency has received more than 39,000 comment letters on matters related to reform. The rules also have benefited from close consultation with domestic and international regulators and policymakers.

Throughout this process, the Commission has sought input from market participants on appropriate schedules to phase in compliance with swaps reforms. Now, over two-and-a-half years since Dodd-Frank passed and with 80 percent of our rules finalized, the market is moving to implementation. Thus, it’s the natural order of things that market participants have questions and have come to us for further guidance. The CFTC welcomes inquiries from market participants, as some fine-tuning is expected. As it is sometimes the case with human nature, the agency receives many inquiries as compliance deadlines approach.

My fellow commissioners and I, along with CFTC staff, have listened to market participants and thoughtfully sorted through issues as they were brought to our attention, as we will continue to do.

I now will go into further detail on the Commission’s efforts to implement the Dodd-Frank Act’s swaps market reform, our efforts to enhance protections for futures and swaps customers, and the CFTC’s work with international regulators regarding benchmarks.

Transparency – Lowering Cost and Increasing Liquidity, Efficiency, Competition

Transparency – a longstanding hallmark of the futures market – both pre- and post-trade – lowers costs for investors, consumers and businesses. It increases liquidity, efficiency and competition. A key benefit of swaps reform is providing this critical pricing information to businesses and other end-users across this land that use the swaps market to lock in a price or hedge a risk.

As of December 31, 2012, provisionally registered swap dealers are reporting in real time their interest rate and credit index swap transactions to the public and to regulators through swap data repositories. These are some of the same products that were at the center of the financial crisis. Building on this, swap dealers will begin reporting swap transactions in equity, foreign exchange and other commodity asset classes tomorrow. Other market participants will begin reporting April 10.

With these transparency reforms, the public and regulators now have their first full window into the swaps marketplace.

To further enhance liquidity and price competition, the CFTC is working to finish the pre-trade transparency rules for swap execution facilities (SEFs), as well as the block rule for swaps. SEFs would allow market participants to view the prices of available bids and offers prior to making their decision on a transaction. These rules will build on the democratization of the swaps market that comes with the clearing of standardized swaps.

Clearing – Lowering Risk and Democratizing the Market

Since the late 19th century, clearinghouses have lowered risk for the public and fostered competition in the futures market. Clearing also has democratized the market by fostering access for farmers, ranchers, merchants, and other participants.

A key milestone was reached in November 2012 with the CFTC’s adoption of the first clearing requirement determinations for swaps. The vast majority of interest rate and credit default index swaps will be brought into central clearing. This follows through on the U.S. commitment at the 2009 G-20 meeting that standardized swaps should be brought into central clearing by the end of 2012. Compliance will be phased in throughout this year. Swap dealers and the largest hedge funds will be required to clear March 11, and all other financial entities follow June 10. Accounts managed by third party investment managers and ERISA pension plans have until September 9 to begin clearing.

Consistent with the direction of Dodd-Frank, the Commission in the fall of 2011 adopted a comprehensive set of rules for the risk management of clearinghouses. These final rules were consistent with international standards, as evidenced by the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs) consultative document that had been published by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (CPSS-IOSCO).

In April of 2012, CPSS-IOSCO issued the final Principles. The Commission’s clearinghouse risk management rules cover the vast majority of those standards. Commission staff are working expeditiously to recommend the necessary steps so that the Commission may implement any remaining items from the PFMIs not yet incorporated in our clearinghouse rules. I look forward to the Commission considering action on this in 2013.

I expect that soon we will complete a rule to exempt swaps between certain affiliated entities within a corporate group from the clearing requirement. This year, the CFTC also will be considering possible clearing determinations for other commodity swaps, including energy swaps.

Swap Dealer Oversight - Promoting Market Integrity and Lowering Risk

Comprehensive oversight of swap dealers, a foundational piece of Dodd-Frank, will promote market integrity and lower risk to taxpayers and the rest of the economy. Congress directed that end-users be able to continue benefitting from customized swaps (those not brought into central clearing) while being protected through the express oversight of swap dealers. In addition, Dodd-Frank extended the CFTC’s existing oversight of previously regulated intermediaries to include their swaps activity.

As the result of CFTC rules completed in the first half of last year, more than 70 swap dealers are now provisionally registered. This initial group of dealers includes the largest domestic and international financial institutions dealing in swaps with U.S. persons. It includes the 16 institutions commonly referred to as the G16 dealers. Other entities will register once they reach the de minimis threshold for swap dealing activity.

In addition to reporting trades to both regulators and the public, swap dealers will implement crucial back office standards that lower risk and increase market integrity. These include promoting the timely confirmation of trades and documentation of the trading relationship. Swap dealers also will be required to implement sales practice standards that prohibit fraud, require fair treatment of customers and improve transparency.

The CFTC is collaborating closely domestically and internationally on a global approach to margin requirements for uncleared swaps. We are working along with the Federal Reserve, the other U.S. banking regulators, the SEC and our international counterparts on a final set of standards to be published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The CFTC’s proposed margin rules excluded non-financial end-users from margin requirements for uncleared swaps. We have been advocating with global regulators for an approach consistent with that of the CFTC. I would anticipate that the CFTC, in consultation with European regulators, would take up final margin rules, as well as related rules on capital, in the second half of this year.

Following Congress’ mandate, the CFTC also is working with our fellow domestic financial regulators to complete the Volcker Rule. In adopting the Volcker Rule, Congress prohibited banking entities from proprietary trading, an activity that may put taxpayers at risk. At the same time, Congress permitted banking entities to engage in certain activities, such as market making and risk mitigating hedging. One of the challenges in finalizing a rule is achieving these multiple objectives.

International Coordination on Swaps Market Reform

In enacting financial reform, Congress recognized the basic lessons of modern finance and the 2008 crisis. During a default or crisis, risk knows no geographic border. Risk from our housing and financial crisis contributed to economic downturns around the globe. Further, if a run starts on one part of a modern financial institution, regardless of where it is around the globe, it invariably means a funding and liquidity crisis rapidly spreads and infects the entire consolidated financial entity.

This phenomenon was true with the overseas affiliates and operations of AIG, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup and Bear Stearns.

AIG Financial Products, for instance, was a Connecticut subsidiary of the New York insurance giant that used a French bank license to basically run its swaps operations out of Mayfair in London. Its collapse nearly brought down the U.S. economy.

Last year’s events at JPMorgan Chase, which executed swaps through its London branch, are a stark reminder of stark reality. Transactions may be entered into by an offshore office, but the institution here in the United States absorbs the losses. Trades being booked offshore by U.S. financial institutions should not be confused with keeping that risk offshore.

Failing to incorporate these basic lessons of modern finance into the CFTC’s oversight of the swaps market would fall short of the goals of Dodd-Frank reform. It would leave the public at risk.

More specifically, I believe that Dodd-Frank reform applies to transactions entered into by overseas branches of U.S. entities with non-U.S. persons, as well as between overseas affiliates guaranteed by U.S. entities. Failing to do so would mean American jobs and markets may move offshore, but, particularly in times of crisis, risk would come crashing back to our economy.

Similar lessons of modern finance were evident, as well, with the collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. It was run out of Connecticut, but its $1.2 trillion swaps were booked in its Cayman Islands affiliate. The risk from those activities, as the events of the time highlighted, had a direct and significant effect here in the United States.

The same was true when Bear Stearns in 2007 bailed out two of its sinking hedge fund affiliates, which had significant investments in subprime mortgages. They both were organized offshore. This was just the beginning of the end, as within months, the Federal Reserve provided extraordinary support for the failing Bear Stearns.

We must thus ensure that collective investment vehicles, including hedge funds, that either are managed (or otherwise have their principal place of business) in the United States or are directly or indirectly majority owned by U.S. persons are not able to avoid the clearing requirement – or any other Dodd-Frank requirement – simply due to how they might be organized.

Last July, the Commission published for public comment proposed guidance addressing market participants’ obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act (and Commission regulations) with respect to their cross-border activities. In December, the Commission granted time-limited relief until this July for non-U.S. swap dealers (and foreign branches of U.S. swap dealers) from certain Dodd-Frank swap requirements. The relief is limited to transactions involving such registered non-U.S. swap dealers and was intended to facilitate their transition to the new swaps regime; it does not extend to transactions where neither counterparty is registered as a swap dealer or major swap participant. It also does not extend to transactions between U.S. swap dealers and counterparties that are not registered as swap dealers or major swap participants, such as hedge funds.

We are hearing, though, that some swap dealers may be promoting to hedge funds an idea to avoid required clearing, at least during an interim period from March until July. I would be concerned if, in an effort to avoid clearing, swap dealers route to their foreign affiliates trades with hedge funds organized offshore, even though such hedge funds are managed (or otherwise have their principal place of business) in the United States or they are majority owned by U.S. persons. Such effort is not consistent with the spirit of Dodd-Frank or the international consensus to clear all standardized swaps. The CFTC is working to ensure that this idea does not prevail and develop into a practice that leaves the American public at risk. If we don’t address this, the P.O boxes may be offshore, but the risk will flow back here.

Congress understood these issues and addressed these realities of modern finance in Section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which states that swaps reforms shall not apply to activities outside the United States unless those activities have "a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States." Congress provided this provision solely for swaps under the CFTC’s oversight and provided a different standard for securities-based swaps under the SEC’s oversight.

To give financial institutions and market participants guidance on section 722(d), the CFTC last June sought public consultation on its interpretation of this provision. The proposed guidance is a balanced, measured approach, consistent with the cross-border provisions in Dodd-Frank and Congress’ recognition that risk easily crosses borders.

Pursuant to Commission guidance, foreign firms that do more than a de minimis amount of swap-dealing activity with U.S. persons would be required to register with the CFTC within about two months after crossing the de minimis threshold. A number of international financial institutions are among the swap dealers that are provisionally registered with the CFTC.

Where appropriate, we are committed to permitting foreign firms and, in certain circumstances, overseas branches and guaranteed affiliates of U.S. swap dealers, to meet Dodd-Frank requirements through compliance with comparable and comprehensive foreign rules. We call this substituted compliance.

For foreign swap dealers, the Commission would allow such substituted compliance for entity-level requirements, as well as for certain transaction-level requirements when facing overseas branches of U.S. entities and overseas affiliates guaranteed by U.S. entities. Entity-level requirements include capital, chief compliance officer and swap data recordkeeping. Transaction-level requirements include clearing, margin, real-time public reporting, trade execution, trading documentation and sales practices.

When foreign swaps dealers transact with a U.S. person, though, compliance with Dodd-Frank regulation is required.

To assist foreign swap dealers with Dodd-Frank compliance, the CFTC recently finalized an exemptive order that applies until mid-July 2013. This time-limited Final Order incorporates many suggestions from ongoing consultation on cross-border issues with foreign regulatory counterparts and market participants. For instance, the definition of "U.S. person" in the Order benefited from comments in response to the Commission’s July 2012 proposal.

Under its terms, a foreign swap dealer may phase in compliance with certain entity-level requirements. In addition, foreign dealers will have time-limited relief from specified transaction-level requirements when they transact with overseas affiliates guaranteed by U.S. entities, as well as with foreign branches of U.S. swap dealers.

The Final Order provides time for the Commission to continue working with foreign regulators as they implement comparable swaps reforms and as the Commission considers substituted compliance determinations for the various foreign jurisdictions with entities that have registered as swap dealers under Dodd-Frank.

The CFTC will continue engaging with our international counterparts through bilateral and multilateral discussions on reform and cross-border swaps activity. Earlier this month, SEC Chairman Walter and I had a productive meeting with international market regulators in Brussels.

Given our different cultures, political systems and legislative mandates some differences are inevitable, but we’ve made great progress internationally on an aligned approach to reform. The CFTC is committed to working through any instances where we are made aware of a conflict between U.S. law and that of another jurisdiction.

Customer Protection

Dodd-Frank included provisions directing the CFTC to enhance the protection of swaps customer funds. While it was not a requirement of Dodd-Frank, in 2009 the CFTC also reviewed and updated customer protection rules for futures market customers. As a result, a number of the enhancements affect both futures and swaps market customers. I would like to review these enhancements, as well as an important customer protection proposal.

The CFTC’s completed amendments to rule 1.25 regarding the investment of customer funds benefit both futures and swaps customers. The amendments include preventing in-house lending of customer money through repurchase agreements.The CFTC’s gross margining rules for futures and swaps customers require clearinghouses to collect margin on a gross basis. FCMs are no longer able to offset one customer’s collateral against another or to send only the net to the clearinghouse.

Swaps customers further benefit from the new so-called LSOC (legal segregation with operational comingling) rules, which ensure funds are protected individually all the way to the clearinghouse.

The Commission also worked closely with market participants on new customer protection rules adopted by the self-regulatory organization (SRO), the National Futures Association (NFA). These include requiring FCMs to hold sufficient funds for U.S. foreign futures and options customers trading on foreign contract markets (in Part 30 secured accounts). Starting last year, they must meet their total obligations to customers trading on foreign markets computed under the net liquidating equity method. In addition, withdrawals of 25 percent or more of excess segregated funds would necessitate pre-approval in writing by senior management and must be reported to the designated SRO and the CFTC.

These steps were significant, but market events have further highlighted that the Commission must do everything within our authorities and resources to strengthen oversight programs and the protection of customers and their funds.

In the fall of 2012, the Commission sought public comment on a proposal that would strengthen the controls around customer funds at FCMs. It would set new regulatory accounting requirements and would raise minimum standards for independent public accountants who audit FCMs. And it would provide regulators with daily direct electronic access to the FCMs’ bank and custodial accounts for customer funds. Last week, the CFTC held a public roundtable on this proposal, the third roundtable focused on customer protection.

Further, the CFTC intends to finalize a rule this year on segregation for uncleared swaps.

Benchmark Interest Rates

I’d like to now turn to the three cases the CFTC brought against Barclays, UBS and RBS for manipulative conduct with respect to LIBOR and other benchmark interest rate submissions. The reason it’s important to focus on these matters is not because there were $2.5 billion in fines, though the U.S. penalties against these three banks of more than $2 billion were significant. What this is about is the integrity of the financial markets. When a reference rate, such as LIBOR – central to borrowing, lending and hedging in our economy – has been so readily and pervasively rigged, it’s critical to discuss how to best change the system. We must ensure that reference rates are honest and reliable reflections of observable transactions in real markets.

The three cases shared a number of common traits. At each institution the misconduct spanned multiple years, involved offices in multiple cities around the globe, included numerous people, and affected multiple benchmark rates and currencies. In each case, there was evidence of collusion among banks. In both the UBS and RBS cases, one or more inter-dealer brokers were asked to paint false pictures to influence submissions of other banks, i.e., to spread the falsehoods more widely. At Barclays and UBS, the banks also were reporting falsely low borrowing rates in an effort to protect their reputation.

Why does this matter?

The derivatives marketplace that the CFTC oversees started about 150 years ago. Futures contracts initially were linked to physical commodities, like corn and wheat. Such clear linkage ultimately comes from the ability of farmers, ranchers and other market participants to physically deliver the commodity at the expiration of the contract. As the markets evolved, cash-settled contracts emerged, often linked to markets for financial commodities, like the stock market or interest rates. These cash-settled derivatives generally reference indices or benchmarks.

Whether linked to physical commodities or indices, derivatives – both futures and swaps – should ultimately be anchored to observable prices established in real underlying cash markets. And it’s only when there are real transactions entered into at arm’s length between buyers and sellers that we can be confident that prices are discovered and set accurately.

When market participants submit for a benchmark rate that lacks observable underlying transactions, even if operating in good faith, they may stray from what real transactions would reflect. When a benchmark is separated from real transactions, it is more vulnerable to misconduct.

Today, LIBOR is the reference rate for 70 percent of the U.S. futures market, most of the swaps market and nearly half of U.S. adjustable rate mortgages. It’s embedded in the wiring of our financial system.

The challenge we face is that the market for interbank, unsecured borrowing has greatly diminished over the last five years. Some say that it is essentially nonexistent. In 2008, Mervyn King, the governor of the Bank of England, said of Libor: "It is, in many ways, the rate at which banks do not lend to each other."

The number of banks willing to lend to one another on such terms has been sharply reduced because of economic turmoil, including the 2008 global financial crisis, the European debt crisis that began in 2010, and the downgrading of large banks’ credit ratings. In addition, there have been other factors that have led to unsecured, interbank lending drying up, including changes to Basel capital rules and central banks providing funding directly to banks.

Fortunately, much work is occurring internationally to address these issues. I want to commend the work of Martin Wheatley and the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) on the "Wheatley Review of LIBOR." Additionally, the CFTC and the FSA are co-chairing the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Task Force that is developing international principles for benchmarks and examining best mechanisms or protocols for transition, if needed. On January 11, the IOSCO Task Force published the Consultation Report on Financial Benchmarks. The consultation report said: "The Task Force is of the view that a benchmark should as a matter of priority be anchored by observable transactions entered into at arm’s length between buyers and sellers in order for it to function as a credible indicator of prices, rates or index values." It went on to say: "However, at some point, an insufficient level of actual transaction data raises concerns as to whether the benchmark continues to reflect prices or rates that have been formed by the competitive forces of supply and demand."

Among the questions for the public in the report are the following:
What are the best practices to ensure that benchmark rates honestly reflect market prices?
What are best practices for benchmark administrators and submitters?
What factors should be considered in determining whether a current benchmark’s underlying market is sufficiently robust? For instance, what is an insufficient level of actual transaction activity?
And what are the best mechanisms or protocols to transition from an unreliable or obsolete benchmark?

On February 20, the IOSCO task force hosted a roundtable in London, which was followed by a second public roundtable yesterday at the CFTC to gather input from market participants and other interested parties. I expect the final report incorporating public input will be published this spring.

Resources

The CFTC’s hardworking team of 690 is less than 10 percent more in numbers than at our peak in the 1990s. Yet since that time, the futures market has grown five-fold, and the swaps market is eight times larger than the futures market.

To provide for effective market implementation of swaps reforms by the CFTC requires additional resources. Investments in both technology and people are needed for effective oversight of these markets by regulators.

Though data has started to be reported to the public and to regulators, we need the staff and technology to access, review and analyze the data. Though more than 70 entities have registered as new swap dealers, we need people to answer their questions and work with the NFA on the necessary oversight to ensure market integrity. Furthermore, as market participants expand their technological sophistication, CFTC technology upgrades are critical for market surveillance and to enhance customer fund protection programs.

Without sufficient funding for the CFTC, the nation cannot be assured this agency can closely monitor for the protection of customer funds and utilize our enforcement arm to its fullest potential to go after bad actors in the futures and swaps markets. Without sufficient funding for the CFTC, the nation cannot be assured that this agency can effectively enforce essential rules that promote transparency and lower risk to the economy.

The CFTC is currently funded at $207 million. To fulfill our mission for the benefit of the public, the President requested $308 million for fiscal year 2013 and 1,015 full-time employees.

Thank you again for inviting me today, and I look forward to your questions.

Monday, December 3, 2012

MAN AND COMPANY IN TROUBLE WITH CFTC FOR ALLEGED FRAUD IN COMMODITY AND STOCK FUTURES

Photo Credit:  U.S. Marshals Service.
FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

CFTC Charges North Carolina Resident Michael Anthony Jenkins and his Company, Harbor Light Asset Management, LLC, with Solicitation Fraud, Misappropriation, and Embezzlement in Ponzi Scheme

Defendants charged with fraudulently soliciting and accepting at least $1.79 million from approximately 377 persons

In a related criminal action, Jenkins was indicted for securities fraud and is in custody awaiting trial

Washington, DC
– The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced the filing of a federal civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, charging Michael Anthony Jenkins of Raleigh, N.C., and his company, Harbor Light Asset Management, LLC (HLAM), with operating a Ponzi scheme for the purpose of trading E-mini S&P 500 futures contracts (E-mini futures). From at least January 2011 through January 2012, the defendants fraudulently solicited at least $1.79 million from approximately 377 persons, primarily located in Raleigh, N.C., in connection with the scheme, according to the complaint.

The CFTC complaint also charges Jenkins, the owner and President of HLAM, with embezzlement and failure to register with the CFTC as a futures commission merchant. Furthermore, Jenkins allegedly misappropriated $748,827 of investors’ funds to trade gold and oil futures, stock index futures, and E-mini futures in his personal accounts. Jenkins also used misappropriated funds to pay for charges at department and discount stores and gasoline stations, and for cellular phone bills and airline tickets, according to the complaint.

The CFTC complaint, filed on November 20, 2012, alleges that HLAM’s Investment Agreement falsely represented to investors that their investment was solely for investing in E-mini futures and that investors’ funds would be immediately wired to a specific trading account. However, according to the complaint, most of investors’ funds were misappropriated by HLAM and Jenkins. To conceal and continue the fraud, Jenkins allegedly sent trading spreadsheets and statements to investors that falsely reported trades and profits earned and inflated the value of investments. The defendants’ fraudulent conduct resulted in a loss of approximately $1.3 million in investor funds, consisting of $1.16 million in misappropriated and embezzled funds and $140,000 in trading losses, according to the complaint.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks restitution, return by Jenkins and HLAM of all ill-gotten gains received, civil monetary penalties, trading and registration bans, and permanent injunctions against further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, as charged.

In a related criminal action by the Securities Division of the North Carolina, Department of the Secretary of State, Jenkins was indicted on August 20, 2012 on three counts of securities fraud in The General Court of Justice, State of North Carolina, Wake County, and is in custody awaiting trial.

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the Securities Division of the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State.

Wednesday, September 26, 2012

MAN AND FOUR COMPANIES ARE CHARGED IN COMMODITY POOL FRAUD INVOLVING MADOFF/MF GLOBAL

The Legacy of the Bernie Madoff Ponzi Scheme
FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

CFTC Charges Nikolai S. Battoo and Four Companies He Controls with Fraud In Connection With Commodity Pools that Accepted Over $140 Million from U.S. Investors

Defendants allegedly made fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions to hide losses sustained by a series of commodity pools called "Private International Wealth Management"

Washington, DC
– On September 6, 2012, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) filed an emergency action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to freeze assets under the control of defendants Nikolai S. Battoo (Battoo), BC Capital Group S.A., BC Capital Group International Limited, BC Capital Management LLP, and BC Capital Group Holdings S.A. (the BC Common Enterprise). The action also seeks an order appointing a receiver for the BC Common Enterprise and related entities, prohibiting the defendants from destroying books and records, and granting the CFTC immediate access to evidence.

The CFTC’s complaint alleges that defendants operated a series of commodity pools called "Private International Wealth Management" (PIWM) that solicited more than $140 million from U.S. residents. The complaint also alleges that defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions in connection with significant losses sustained by the PIWM pools through periodic account statements and asset verification documents as well as through telephone calls and letters to pool participants.

Specifically, defendants allegedly committed fraud in 2008 by failing to disclose the PIWM pools’ significant exposure to the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme, as well as trading losses suffered by other of Battoo’s hedge funds in which the PIWM pools were invested. In 2009, defendants sent asset verifications to pool participants that the CFTC alleges overstated the value of the PIWM pools’ investments. Finally, in 2011, defendants allegedly overstated the impact that the bankruptcy of MF Global, Inc. had on the PIWM pools and used it as an excuse for refusing to return pool participants’ funds.

In the continuing litigation against the defendants the CFTC seeks a permanent injunction from future violations of federal commodities laws, permanent registration and trading bans, full restitution to defrauded pool participants, disgorgement of any ill-gotten gains, and the payment of appropriate civil monetary penalties.

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in this matter.

The CFTC Division of Enforcement staff responsible for this action are Andrew Ridenour, Amanda Harding, David Slovick, Stephen Turley, Carlin Metzger, Erica Bodin, Theodore Kneller, Kathleen Banar, Rick Glaser and Richard Wagner.

Monday, August 6, 2012

CFTC COMMISSIONER TESTIMONY ON ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FUTURES MARKET

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, Washington, DC
CFTC Commissioner Jill E. Sommers

August 1, 2012 Good morning Chairman Chairwoman Stabenow, Ranking Member Roberts, and members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me today to discuss "the Continuing Review of MF Global: Accountability in the Futures Markets." Over the past nine months the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has conducted a thorough analysis of the books and records of MF Global and continues to work closely with the Trustee in the SIPA bankruptcy proceeding to recover customer funds. We are also engaging in a comprehensive and ongoing enforcement investigation. It is imperative that the Commission, the industry, and the Congress identify and assess the causes for the collapse and shortfall in customer funds and take corrective action where possible. At Chairman Gensler’ s request, Commission staff has developed recommendations for enhancing Commission and designated self-regulatory organization (DSRO) programs related to the protection of customer funds, which includes changes to Commission rules governing futures commission merchants (FCMs), enhanced Commission oversight of DSROs, and possible statutory changes, among other things. We must do everything in our power to restore confidence in the futures markets so that producers, processors and other end-users of commodities can once again hedge their price risks without fear of their funds being frozen or lost.

On November 9, 2011, the Commission voted to make me the Senior Commissioner with respect to MF Global Matters. This authorizes me to exercise the executive and administrative functions of the Commission solely with respect to the pending enforcement investigation, the bankruptcy proceedings, and other actions to locate or recover customer funds or determine the reasons for shortfalls in the customer accounts. Today I would like to provide you with information regarding the SIPA proceedings, our ongoing coordination with the SIPA Trustee, current protections for customer funds, and regulatory oversight of FCMs. While I am unable to discuss the specifics of our ongoing enforcement investigation, I will provide a brief overview.

Dual Registration/SIPA ProceedingsMF Global, Inc. (MFGI), a subsidiary of MF Global Holdings Ltd., was a dually- registered BD-FCM, and therefore was subject to the jurisdiction of both the CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) was the DSRO for MFGI’s futures market activities, and had primary responsibility for overseeing the FCM’s compliance with the capital, segregation and financial reporting obligations required by the CFTC. The Chicago Board Options Exchange and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority were the SROs for MFGI’s securities market activities, and had primary responsibility for overseeing the BD’s compliance with

Under the Securities Investors Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA), the SEC has the authority to refer an entity registered as a broker-dealer (BD) to the Securities Investors Protection Corporation (SIPC) if there is reason to believe that the BD is in or is approaching financial difficulty. SIPC may initiate a liquidation proceeding to protect customers of an insolvent BD when certain statutory criteria are met. When a BD is also a registered FCM, as MFGI was, there is one dually-registered entity and the entire entity gets placed into liquidation. Because there is one entity, it is not possible to initiate a SIPA liquidation for the BD and a separate bankruptcy proceeding for the

FCM. Indeed, SIPA prevents a BD with even one securities customer from filing for bankruptcy without SIPA’s permission, and a SIPA liquidation proceeding acts to stay any other bankruptcy proceeding for the BD.

It is important to note, however, that when a dually-registered BD-FCM is placed into a SIPA liquidation proceeding, SIPA provides that the relevant provisions and protections of the Bankruptcy Code, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA or Act) and the Commission’s regulations apply to the claims of commodity customers just as they would if the entity were solely an FCM and in a non-SIPA bankruptcy proceeding.

Coordination with the SIPA TrusteeThe Commission has worked closely with the SIPA Trustee, James Giddens, since the outset of the proceedings, to help protect MFGI’s former commodity customers. We have shared information and analysis, including analysis of the movement of commodity customer funds in order to identify potentially improper withdrawals and transfers, and to track down assets for the benefit of the commodity customers. The Commission’s staff has given the SIPA Trustee advice on the requirements of commodity broker liquidation laws, under Title 11 and CFTC regulations, to ensure that customers are protected. We have supported his efforts to return the maximum amount of customer property as quickly as possible, consistent with his obligations. As part of those efforts, we have filed a series of briefs in the bankruptcy court explaining how these laws must be applied to effect Congress’ and the CFTC’s design that customers be repaid in priority to other creditors. Throughout this process, the Commission has maintained, and will continue to maintain, an independent view of the best interests of commodity customers and the requirements of the law. The public interest has been served by this cooperation. The Commission and its staff continue to stand ready to work with the SIPA Trustee to achieve the goal of recovering additional funds for the benefit of MFGI commodity customers, both domestically and abroad.

Current Protections for Customer FundsSection 4d of the CEA and Commission regulations require an FCM holding customer funds to treat such funds as belonging to the customer at all times and to segregate from its own funds any money, securities or property deposited by its customers to margin, guarantee, or secure futures or options positions entered into on Commission designated contract markets (Section 4d funds). FCMs are prohibited from using a customer’s funds to margin or guarantee the trades or contracts of another customer, or of the FCM. The FCM may, however, commingle the funds of one futures customer with funds belonging to other futures customers in a single account or accounts. The FCM is required to maintain sufficient funds in segregated accounts to cover the net liquidating equity (i.e., total account balances due) of each of its customers at any given point in time.

The Act and regulations also require an FCM to hold in separate accounts (designated as "Part 30 secured accounts") customer funds deposited for trading futures and options listed on foreign boards of trade. The FCM may commingle the foreign futures funds deposited by one customer with the funds deposited by other foreign futures customers. An FCM may not, however, commingle Section 4d funds with Part 30 secured account funds.

Customers are required to post margin to support their futures and option positions. Generally, a customer deposits more than the minimum initial margin required for the positions established. The additional funds provide a buffer so a customer can place trades without posting additional margin and lessen the likelihood of repeated margin calls or having positions liquidated if margin calls are not met on a timely basis. In addition to customers depositing additional margin, in practice, FCMs typically maintain significant amounts of their own capital as "excess segregated funds." By doing this, one customer’s deficit due to market moves or unmet margin calls is covered by the FCM’s buffer and does not result in one customer’s funds being exposed to the credit risk of another customer. FCMs are not obligated to provide excess segregated funds, but given the legal obligation to have sufficient funds in segregated accounts at all times to cover all liabilities to customers, FCMs generally find it prudent to have a buffer.

A customer may withdraw excess margin funds or use such funds as the customer deems appropriate. This would include using the funds for non-futures related transactions with the FCM. If the excess funds held by the FCM are used in a manner directed by the customer such that the funds are not maintained in a segregated or secured account, the funds would not have the protections afforded customer funds under the Bankruptcy Code and Part 190 of the Commission’s regulations.

FCMs are also free to withdraw excess funds in Section 4d accounts deposited by and belonging to the FCM. At no time, however, may an FCM withdraw customer funds from a Section 4d account to use those funds for its own purposes, regardless of any intention to replace them at a later date or time.

Oversight of FCMsFCMs are subject to CFTC-approved minimum financial and reporting requirements that are enforced in the first instance by a DSRO, for example, the CME, or the National Futures Association. DSROs also conduct periodic compliance examinations on a risk-based cycle every 9 to 15 months.

Determining compliance with segregation requirements is a mandatory part of each examination. Examinations also include a review of the depository acknowledgement letters, the account titles of segregated accounts, verifying account balances, and ensuring that investment of customer funds is done in accordance with Commission regulations.

FCMs are required to file monthly unaudited financial reports with the Commission and the DSRO. These reports include the FCM’s segregation, secured and net capital schedules, and any "further material information as may be necessary to make the required statements and schedules not misleading." Each financial report must be filed with an oath or attestation, and for a corporation, the oath must be by the Chief Executive Officer or the Chief Financial Officer. FCMs must also file annual certified financial reports with the Commission and the DSRO. The audits require, among other things, that if an auditor resigns or is replaced, the FCM is required to notify the Commission of certain disagreements with statements made in reports prepared by the prior auditor. The FCM is also required to request that the prior auditor provide a letter stating whether the auditor agrees with the statements made by the FCM in its notice to the Commission. Auditors also must test internal controls to identify, and report to the Commission, any "material inadequacy" that could reasonably be expected to: inhibit a registrant from completing transactions or promptly discharging responsibilities to customers or other creditors; result in material financial loss; result in material misstatement of financial statements or schedules; or result in violation of the Commission’s segregation, secured amount, recordkeeping or financial reporting requirements.

Ongoing InvestigationThe Commission’s Division of Enforcement is also actively engaged in the investigation concerning the shortfall of customer funds. Staff is interviewing witnesses and reviewing documents, as well as other information. They are proceeding as expeditiously as they can. As the Committee will understand, I cannot disclose any specific details of the investigation because they are nonpublic, and because I do not want to prejudice any potential enforcement action. In general, however, depending on the specific facts and circumstances, a shortfall in customer segregated funds could amount to a violation of the CEA and Commission regulations including those that: (1) govern segregated funds; (2) prevent theft of customer money; (3) require our registrants to properly supervise accounts; (4) prevent making false statements; and (5) prohibit deceptive schemes. Depending on the specific facts and circumstances, the Commission could file an enforcement action against corporate entities and/or individuals who have violated the CEA or regulations. In addition, depending on the specific facts and circumstances, individuals could also be liable if they are "control persons" of a company that violated the law. A "control person" generally refers to management. Depending on the specific facts and circumstances, an enforcement action could be filed against individuals who "aid and abet" violations by companies. Finally, Commission regulations impose obligations on accountants who audit FCMs and on the banks that hold customer segregated funds for FCMs. My mention of these particular provisions does not in any way limit the Division’s investigation or the relief we can seek, nor does it indicate that the Division has reached any conclusions.

Generally, the Commission has the authority to, among other things, seek and impose civil monetary penalties, require a defendant to disgorge ill-gotten gains, obtain restitution for customers and obtain other injunctive relief. In terms of civil monetary penalties, the Commission can seek the greater of three times the defendant’s gain, or a set amount, which is currently $140,000 per violation. Civil monetary penalties are paid to the U.S. Treasury, while restitution is paid to victims who suffered losses.

The Commission is a civil enforcement agency, so we cannot seek imprisonment as a sanction in an enforcement action. However, a willful violation of the CEA, or our regulations, is a federal crime, which can be prosecuted by a United States Attorney. We do not have any say in whether or not the criminal authorities prosecute, and I understand that they have a higher burden of proof than we have.

ConclusionI understand the severe hardship that MF Global’s bankruptcy has caused for thousands of customers who have not yet been made whole. These customers may have correctly understood the risks associated with trading futures and options, but never anticipated that their segregated accounts were at risk of suffering losses not associated with trading. The shortfall in customer funds was a shock to the markets from which we have not yet recovered.

I believe the Commission can make improvements to our regulatory oversight of FCMs and DSROs to help restore confidence in the futures markets, and I will work with the Commission and Congress to implement the rules necessary to enhance our ability to protect market users and to foster open, competitive, and financially sound markets.

Tuesday, July 10, 2012

OWNER AND COMPANY ORDERED TO PART WITH $9.3 MILLION IN CFTC ANTI-FRAUD CASE


FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Federal Court in Texas Orders Robert Mihailovich, Sr. and Growth Capital Management LLC to Pay over $9.3 Million in CFTC Anti-fraud Action
Washington, DC - The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that it obtained an order of permanent injunction against defendants Robert Mihailovich, Sr. (Mihailovich, Sr.) of Rockwall, Texas, and Growth Capital Management LLC (GCM) requiring Mihailovich, Sr. and GCM to make restitution to defrauded customers, disgorge ill-gotten gains, and pay a civil monetary penalty together, totaling over $9.3 million for fraudulently soliciting over $30 million from customers to trade commodity futures contracts and foreign currency (forex). The order also imposes permanent trading and registration bans against the defendants.

The court’s order, entered on June 26, 2012, arises out of a CFTC complaint filed on July 27, 2010, against Mihailovich, Sr., GCM, and Robert Mihailovich, Jr. (Mihailovich, Jr.), Mihailovich, Sr.’s son. As alleged in the complaint, Mihailovich, Sr. was convicted and incarcerated on federal wire fraud charges, served 27 months, and while on a three-year supervised release, fraudulently solicited and accepted more than $30 million from approximately 93 customers to open managed trading accounts. The complaint also alleged that Mihailovich, Jr., at the time of GCM’s initial registration, failed to disclose Mihailovich, Sr.’s involvement with GCM, and failed to disclose in CFTC registration filings that his father was a controlling principal of GCM.

Previously, the federal court had entered an order of default judgment against GCM on March 15, 2011. The federal court later also entered an order of default judgment against Mihailovich, Sr. on November 22, 2011, as a sanction for discovery violations.

The federal court’s June 26, 2012, order finds that during discovery Mihailovich, Sr. engaged in a pattern of willfulness and bad faith. Mihailovich, Sr. failed to attend a number of court-ordered hearings, repeatedly failed to abide by court orders, failed to communicate with plaintiff CFTC, failed to appear or respond to his scheduled deposition, and failed to respond to written discovery requests, according to the order.

The June 26, 2012 order imposes sanctions against Mihailovich, Sr. and GCM arising out of the prior default judgments against them. The order requires Mihailovich, Sr. and GCM jointly and severally to pay $3,475,112 in restitution, to disgorge $389,006 in ill-gotten gains, and to pay a civil monetary penalty of $5,440,000. The order also permanently prohibits the defendants from violating the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, as charged, and from engaging in certain commodity-related activities, including personal trading and applying for registration or claiming exemption from registration with the CFTC.

The CFTC previously obtained a consent order against Mihailovich, Jr., that imposed a $40,000 civil monetary penalty and banned him from seeking registration with the CFTC for 10 years and from engaging in certain commodity-related activities, including trading, for 5 years.  The CFTC thanks the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Fort Worth Regional Office, and the National Futures Association for their assistance.


Thursday, July 5, 2012

SELLING SYSTEMS TO TRADE IN FUTURES ENDS IN DEFAULT JUDGEMENT AGAINST COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUAL


FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Obtains Default Judgment against The Trade Tech Institute, Inc., Technology Trading International, Inc., and Robert Sorchini for Fraudulent Solicitation of Managed Commodity Trading Accounts and Obtains Consent Judgment against Richard Carter as Controlling Person of Both Companies

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered an order of default judgment and permanent injunction against The Trade Tech Institute, Inc. (Trade Tech), Technology Trading International, Inc. (Tech Trading), and Robert Sorchini (Sorchini), all of Los Angeles, Calif. The same Court previously entered a consent order of permanent injunction against Richard Carter (Carter), also of Los Angeles, Calif.

The default order, entered on June 19, 2012, and the consent order, entered on February 29, 2012, both stem from a CFTC enforcement action filed jointly with the Commissioner of Corporations of the State of California on March 15, 2011, that charged defendants with fraudulently promoting and selling to the public several commodity trading systems pursuant to which customer managed accounts were traded (see CFTC News Release 6005-11, March 21, 2011).

The orders find that from at least 2007 until the CFTC complaint was filed in March 2011, Trade Tech, by and through Sorchini, Carter and other employees, fraudulently promoted and marketed a variety of systems to the public to be used for trading futures contracts and options on futures contracts in managed accounts. Trade Tech’s systems included Trade Tech Analytics, Paradigm, Optimum, Expeditor, MAC, Hybrid, Daytona and Pioneer. The orders also find that beginning in April 2010, Sorchini, Carter and others formed Tech Trading to continue their fraudulent promotion and selling of systems. The orders find that Carter and Sorchini were controlling persons of Trade Tech and Tech Trading.

The default order also finds that while selling these systems, Trade Tech, Tech Trading and Sorchini made fraudulent representations to prospective and existing clients about the systems’ purported past and potential future profitability and track records, failed to adequately warn clients of the risks inherent in trading futures and options, failed to disclose to clients the systems’ losing performance records in client managed accounts and made fraudulent performance-based guarantees. In addition, the default order and consent order find that Trade Tech published a misleading testimonial on its website and failed to inform clients or obtain clients’ consent when switching clients’ managed accounts between systems.

The court’s default order requires Trade Tech and Tech Trading to disgorge $2,910,245.10 and $423,140, respectively, of ill-gotten gains the companies received. The order imposes restitution on Trade Tech and Tech Trading of $2,386,970.38 and $38,847.99, respectively, and civil monetary penalties of $8,730,735.30 and $1,269,420, respectively. Additionally, the order requires Sorchini to disgorge $764,250.97 of ill-gotten gains he received from his fraudulent conduct, imposes joint and several liability on Sorchini for $2,251,766.50 of Trade Tech’s and Tech Trading’s restitution obligations, and a civil monetary penalty of $2,292,752.91.

The court’s consent order requires Carter to disgorge $992,352.93 of ill-gotten gains and imposes a civil monetary penalty of $496,176.46.

The orders permanently bar Trade Tech, Tech Trading, Sorchini and Carter from engaging in any commodity-related activity, including trading and registering or seeking exemption from CFTC registration, and from violating the anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act.



Friday, June 22, 2012

COMMODITY POOL FRAUDSTERS IN TEXAS ORDERED TO PAY MILLIONS IN RESTITUTION BY FEDERAL COURT


FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Federal Court in Texas Orders Linda Harris, Chance Harris, CDH Forex Investments, LLC, and CDH Global Holdings, LLC, to Pay over $5.4 Million in Restitution and a Monetary Sanction for Forex Fraud

Washington, DC — The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that it obtained a federal court order imposing more than $5.4 million in restitution and a civil monetary penalty on defendantsLinda Harris, Chance Harris and their companies, CDH Forex Investments, LLC (CDH Forex) and CDH Global Holdings, LLC (CDH Global), all of Flower Mound, Texas, for fraud in connection with the operation of a commodity pool and managed accounts trading off-exchange foreign currency (forex) contracts.

The default judgment order requires Linda Harris, Chance Harris, CDH Forex, and CDH Global jointly and severally to first pay $1,361,897 to defrauded customers as restitution for their losses and then pay $4,085,691 as a civil monetary penalty. The order also permanently prohibits them from engaging in any commodity- and forex-related activity and from registering with the CFTC.

The order, entered on June 12, 2012, by Senior Judge Royal Furgeson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, stems from a CFTC complaint filed on October 25, 2011, that charged the defendants with fraudulent solicitation, misappropriation, and misrepresentation to pool participants and regulatory organizations in a multi-million dollar forex scheme (see CFTC press release 6127-11, October 25, 2011). The CFTC complaint also charged the defendants with concealing their fraud by issuing false account statements to pool participants regarding the profitability of their investments. Linda Harris, CDH Forex, and CDH Global also were charged with making false statements and submitting falsified bank and account trading statements to the National Futures Association (NFA).

The order finds Linda Harris, Chance Harris, CDH Forex, and CDH Global liable as to all violations alleged in the CFTC’s complaint.

Sunday, June 17, 2012

COURT ORDERS OWNER AND TRADING COMPANY TO PAY RESTITUTION, CIVIL PENALTIES TO SETTLE CFTC CHARGES


FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Federal Court in Illinois Orders Defendants Richard C. Regan and Pro Trading Course, LLC to Pay More than $600,000 in Restitution and Civil Monetary Penalties to Settle CFTC Anti-Fraud Action
Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that Judge James B. Zagel, of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, entered an order of default judgment and permanent injunction against defendants Richard C. Regan (Regan) and Pro Trading Course, LLC(PTC), both of La Jolla, Calif.

The court’s order stems from a CFTC enforcement action filed on December 7, 2011, that charged the defendants with fraudulently soliciting members of the public to enroll in a commodity futures training program .

The order, entered on May 29, 2012, requires the defendants jointly and severally to pay a $461,100 civil monetary penalty and restitution of $232,200. The order also imposes permanent trading and registration bans against the defendants and prohibits them from violating the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, as charged.

The order finds that PTC, through Regan and its employees, used false and misleading promotional material and sales solicitations, which overstated the advancement opportunity and profit potential of PTC’s commodity futures training program. The defendants also failed to disclose that not one of the 126 clients who completed PTC’s training and became PTC proprietary traders ever advanced beyond Level 1 of the program, according to the order. In addition, no PTC trader ever met the monthly profit targets set by Regan or received profit “payouts” approximating those depicted on the “Payout Charts” Regan prepared, the order finds.

The order further finds that PTC, through Regan and its sales associates, used false and misleading promotional material and sales solicitations to sell access to PTC’s Virtual Trading Room (VTR). This created the impression that VTR sessions involved actual commodity futures trading, but they failed to disclose that Regan and his team placed only simulated trades while conducting VTR sessions.

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the National Futures Association.

Sunday, June 10, 2012

NEVADA RESIDENT AND COMPANY TO PAY $2.6 MILLION TO SETTLE ALLEGED FOREIGN CURRENCY TRADING FRAUD WITH CFTC


FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Orders Nevada Resident Luis Salazar-Correa and His Company, Prosperity Team, LLC, to Pay More than $2.6 Million to Settle CFTC Anti-fraud Forex Action
Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today filed and simultaneously settled charges against Luis Salazar-Correa of Las Vegas, Nev., and his Nevada-based company, Prosperity Team, LLC, for fraudulently soliciting individuals to participate in a pooled investment vehicle, misappropriating customer funds, and issuing false statements to conceal trading losses and the fraud.

The CFTC order requires Salazar-Correa and Prosperity Team jointly and severally to pay a $1 million civil monetary penalty and restitution of $1,641,000. The order permanently prohibits Salazar-Correa and Prosperity Team from engaging in certain commodity-related activities, including trading, and from registering or seeking exemption from registration with the CFTC. The order also permanently prohibits the respondents from further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, as charged.

The order finds that from about February 2009 through at least June 2010, Salazar-Correa and Prosperity Team fraudulently solicited and accepted at least $2,482,000 from at least 183 customers primarily for the purpose of trading leveraged or margined off-exchange foreign currency (forex) contracts through a pool investment vehicle, also known as Prosperity Team. In soliciting potential customers, Salazar-Correa falsely guaranteed monthly returns varying from 10 percent to 25 percent, depending on the amount invested, and misrepresented the risks of trading forex, the order finds.

Rather than achieving the claimed returns, the respondents consistently sustained trading losses, which cumulated in overall losses of approximately $1,566,000, and operated a Ponzi scheme by misappropriating customers’ funds to make payments to other customers, the order finds.

Salazar-Correa and Prosperity Team concealed the massive trading losses and their misappropriation of customer funds by issuing false statements, which were accessible to customers online through Prosperity Team’s website, the order finds.
The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office and Federal Bureau of Investigation in Las Vegas, Nev., the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission, the International Financial Services Commission of Belize, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, and the U.K. Financial Services Authority.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Alison Wilson, Jonathan Huth, Heather Johnson, Brandon Tasco, Gretchen L. Lowe, and Vincent A. McGonag

Sunday, May 27, 2012

TWO COMPANIES AND TWO MEN CHARGED IN $11 MILLION FRAUD

Photo:  Chicago Board Of Trade.  Credit:  Wikipedia.
FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Charges CTI Group, LLC, Cooper Trading, Stephen Craig Symons, and James David Kline, all of California, with an $11 Million Fraud in the Sale of Automated Trading Systems
Federal court issues emergency order freezing defendants’ assets and protecting books and records.
Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced the filing of a federal court action against defendants CTI Group, LLC, Cooper Trading, and Stephen Craig Symons of Corona del Mar, Calif., and James David Kline of Van Nuys, Calif., charging them with fraudulent sales practices in connection with the sale of two automated trading systems, known as the Boomer and Victory Trading Systems.

The CFTC complaint was filed under seal May 11, 2012, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, and on May 14, 2012, Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. entered an emergency order freezing the defendants’ assets and prohibiting the destruction or alteration of books and records. The judge set a hearing date on the CFTC’s motion for a preliminary injunction for June 21, 2012.

According to the CFTC complaint, since at least August 2009 and continuing through the present, CTI Group, LLC and Cooper Trading (which allegedly operated as a common enterprise and are collectively referred to in the complaint as “CTI”), by and through Symons, Kline, and others, fraudulently solicited clients to subscribe to the Boomer and Victory Trading Systems, used by clients to trade E-mini Standard and Poor’s 500 Stock Index futures contracts in managed accounts. To carry out the fraud, CTI and Kline allegedly engaged, and continue to engage, in a systematic pattern of material false statements and omissions in connection with the marketing of CTI’s Trading Systems to clients and prospective clients. CTI sells subscriptions to its Trading Systems for $5,000 to $6,000 and has sold subscriptions to well over 1,000 clients, receiving at least $11 million from the sale of its Trading Systems, according to the complaint.

CTI’s misrepresentations and omissions in the sale of its Trading Systems allegedly concern 1) how long CTI has been in business; 2) CTI’s experience developing and marketing Trading Systems, 3) the identities and professional experience of CTI’s personnel (who use fictitious names when communicating with clients), 4) the track record of CTI’s Trading Systems, 5) the past profitability of CTI’s Trading Systems, and 6) the transaction costs associated with trading via CTI’s Trading Systems.

CTI’s salespeople, including Kline, also allegedly made false statements to clients and prospective clients about CTI’s purported money-back guarantee and misrepresented the risks associated with trading futures contracts using CTI’s systems. The complaint further alleges that Symons and Kline controlled CTI and actively participated in CTI’s unlawful conduct.

Two California-based relief defendants named
The CFTC complaint also names as relief defendants California companies Snonys, Inc. and Dragonfyre Magick Incorporated, allegedly owned or operated by Symons and Kline, respectively. The relief defendants allegedly received funds as a result of the defendants’ fraudulent conduct and have no legitimate entitlement to those funds.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks disgorgement of ill-gotten gains from the defendants and the relief defendants, restitution, civil monetary penalties, permanent trading and registration bans, and preliminary and permanent injunctions against further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, as charged.

CFTC establishes special toll-free call-in number for alleged victims
The CFTC has established a special toll-free call-in number – 1-866-720-9071 – for CTI’s clients to leave messages for the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement.

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the National Futures Association.
CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are R. Stephen Painter, Jr., Laura A. Martin, Michael C. McLaughlin, David W. MacGregor, Lenel Hickson, Jr., Stephen J. Obie, and Vincent A. McGonagle.


Monday, May 14, 2012

CFTC CHAIRMAN CHILTON'S SPEECH ON FINANCIAL REFORM


Photo:  CBOT.  Credit:  Wikimedia.
FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Speech of Commissioner Bart Chilton before Americans for Financial Reform, Washington, DC
May 9, 2012
Introduction
Thank you for the introduction. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today to discuss cost/benefit analysis (CBAs). As we know, this has been the matter of lawsuits and countless meetings in the wake of the passage of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, otherwise known as Dodd-Frank. It is an important topic.
Load of Compromisin’

For me, most things that are resolved in this town result from an appropriate equilibrium. The truth or answer isn’t found on the outskirts of issues; they reside on the inside, in the medium. Most things I’ve worked upon or have seen worked upon seem to resolve themselves better when there is cooperation and compromise. That usually means some level of concession from all parties. When something is approved and everyone is grumbling a bit, that typically indicates it is legitimately worthy, in general. At least, that is what I’ve found.

The thing is: in order to reach an agreement, to reach that balance, sometimes it is sort of like that oldRhinestone Cowboy lyric, “There’ll be a load of compromisin’ on the road to my horizon.” For those of you who were too young, or don’t recall the song, made famous by country singer Glen Campbell, it is your loss. It was a huge hit. By the way, I saw a neat tee shirt last weekend. On it was written, “I’m old, but I got to see all the cool bands.” Nevertheless, for most things good to get done in this town, the fact of the matter is that there is a load of compromisin’ on the road to that horizon.
The D.C. Quadrakill

My experience, however, is once upon a time in a faraway land when and where people actually wanted to get some things done. There is a contingent now that simply wishes to take the Nancy Reagan approach to a lot of things and “Just say no.” (By the way, one is getting old when a lot of your references seem like they need references, or foot notes). Not gonna do it on that one. She was a great First Lady. If you don’t know “Just say no,” that’s why we have Google. Nowadays, there are a lot of people who just say “no” to a lot of things. There is no load of compromisin’ going on. There is no compromisin’ period. And, that’s why precious little legislation is coming from the Hill these days and why frustration with Washington is rampant.

I do have a point. We are working toward cost/benefit analysis. Hang on my brothers and sisters. There is a little-articulated Washington play book section. I call it the D.C. Quadrakill. It isn’t an innovative thing, and it is a tried and true strategy, for sure. First, if you don’t like a bill, amendment or provision thereof, you try to defeat it with a vote. Just say, then vote, no (or nay, or whatever). If that fails, go to stage two. You can try to defund it through the appropriations process. If that doesn’t work, there is stage three. This is where you can try to stop it, change it or delay it through the regulatory rulemaking process. If all of those things fail, you can go to DEFCON four: litigation. That’s the D.C. Quadrakill: 1. kill bill; 2. defund it; 3. regulate it; and, 4. litigate it.

There is no shame in availing yourself of this Quadrakill strategy, although not everyone can do the full meal Quadrakill deal. Sure people can lobby their Representatives and Senators regarding voting for, or funding of, some legislation. Maybe they will get some gallery chamber passes, too. Perhaps they will have a quick photo op. That stuff takes place all the time. But the thing is: the other two stages of the Quadrakill—regulate and litigate—those are for serious societies—the class of folks who have some buckaroos. No lobbyist wants a tour of the CFTC or a photo with a Commissioner. It is all work. And as far as litigation, watch out. That’s long, laborious and lavish—only those with the big bucks can do stage four Quadrakill: litigation.

This brings me to my point, and I do have one, despite those that questioned it. The thing is: we are seeing a lot of stage four Quadrakill dialogue and action out there. There is more trash talk and more action regarding litigation related to financial regulation than ever before. Frankly, it has become an unprecedented problem and a dilemma for regulators. Unfortunately, the thing is: that is part of the purpose of those that talk about or live to litigate.

More Perfect Regulation 
I think we all need to take a step back and think about Quadrakill stage four a little more. Let’s take a breath and think thoughtfully, and a little more calmly than seems to me to have been done in the last several months. This event is the perfect venue to do just that.
In the preamble to the Constitution of the United States, there is this wonderful aspirational language:

“We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

“In order to form a more perfect union.”   Those words, “in order to”—they meant that our forefathers were working toward, hoping, aspiring, to form a more perfect union. It wasn’t perfect, and it might not reach perfection, but they were trying to get there.  Here’s something to think about:  those wonderful “planks” toward making that “more perfect union”—establishing justice, insuring domestic tranquility, promoting the general welfare—each one of those distinct factors didn’t in and of themselves create “The More Perfect Union.”  Rather, each facet was a building block that the Founding Fathers intended to use to “get there,” to get to that “More Perfect Union.”   In other words, “providing for the common defense,” wasn’t the be all and end all, but instead it was one of the important pieces used to get to the ultimate goal:  a more perfect union.

 In a similar approach, cost/benefit analyses in regulatory rulemaking are analogous to those discrete building block factors in the Constitution’s preamble.  The thing is: a CBA is not the ultimate goal of rulemaking, although if you listen to some you might think it so.  A CBA is an important piece of reaching the ultimate goal:  a “more perfect regulation.”  Like the framers of our Constitution, regulators aspire to reach objectives that protect the common weal.  That’s our job.  In the recent past, however, our jobs have been made significantly more difficult by a contortion. The thing is: we have seen an obnoxious bastardization of the conduct and use of CBAs in regulatory rulemaking.

This by no means is a new phenomenon. It isn’t a paranormal event.  It has cropped up over the years, time and again, as a convenient tool to scuttle regulatory initiatives.  Its’ use at this moment in history is, however, particularly rampant and greatly galling, given the focus of the regulations that are being decelerated and the harm that was caused to the public as a result of the economic crisis of 2008.

There are a bevy of bellowers booing about the “costs” of regulation.  To those catcalls, I’d simply ask, what were the complete “costs” of the $414 billion taxpayer funded bailout?  What are the “costs” of families losing their homes or of folks who can’t get a job?  What are the “costs” to our economy of skyrocketing oil and gas prices, fueled by unbridled excessive speculative activity?  What could be the added “costs” if regulations that Congress and the President have required are not put in place? My view is that there is not a single benefit to not doing these regulations, but there are unacceptable costs if we don’t go forward. Without these rules and regulations, there will be unacceptable costs to consumers, to businesses, to markets, to our economy and our country.

I wouldn’t go so far as paraphrasing Samuel Johnson and saying that litigation is the last refuge for scoundrels. But, the cost-benefit bellowers are openly trying to impose a discredited economic philosophy (that just happens to serve their financial interests) on regulators by beseeching the courts to adopt their extreme interpretation of our statutory duty to “consider” the costs and benefits of our regulations. This economic philosophy is, in short, that the financial markets work just fine on their own and there’s no need for regulators to ensure a minimum level of safety in these markets or a maximum level of speculation. The market can police itself, thank you very much. They want us to write off the 2008 financial crisis as an aberration and ignore countless reputable scholars who’ve found that the costs of opaque, unregulated derivatives markets are borne by the public. The truth is speculation without limits can fuel bubbles, and left unaccountable, the captains of finance may veer the economy into dangerous waters in search of bigger and riskier profits. In short, these bellowers want us to go beyond a “consideration” of costs and benefits to making their narrow conception of costs (discounting the social costs to the public of deregulation) and benefits (discounting the social benefits of the public of smart regulation), the crucible for judging all financial regulations.

The thing is: CBAs are being used, as I have said before, as a Sword of Damocles over regulatory agencies.  We are virtually paralyzed by intimidation—or, indeed, the reality—of lawsuits brought (haphazardly, in my assessment) on the foundations of allegedly poor CBAs.  When this occurs, regulators are sort of like those ghost hunters seen on television, looking for the scary litigation risk in every corner or closet. Did you hear what it said? “Wha, wha, wha.” We used an especially sensitive machine and after analysis in the lab, it appears that what the voice said was this: “If you regulate, we will litigate,” or perhaps “Ready for stage four Quadrakill.” Hmm, because I thought it just sounded like “Wha, wha, wha.” The thing is: either way, the rulemaking action slows, or slogs to a stop—and that is the clear-cut intent of some of those who threaten, design, and bring, these lawsuits.

Take this example: our position limits rule took up 81 pages in the Federal Register. Guest how much of the text was cost/benefit analysis? 19 pages. Yup, almost a fourth—and yet we’re still getting sued.

At the same time, American citizens and businesses and our economy endure more than is fair for a gallon of gas and the resultant impact on our Gross Domestic Product. We continue to see devalued homes, and continue to face higher-than-they-could-be unemployment rates. The potential for further damage due to a still yet unimplemented new regulatory regime is out there. How do we measure those harsh “costs?”  If those costs are not more scary than the threat of litigation due to cost/benefit analysis, then regulators should seek a new line of work.

So today, I’m suggesting that CBAs be expanded to include not just the quantitative, quantifiable elements of a rule but its qualitative aspects as well. In other words the social costs and benefits need to be taken into account. I by no means want to slow the rulemaking process down in any way but I really believe some of the most important cost-benefit effects of rules go beyond P & L statements, so I’ll ask my colleagues to consider painting a more complete picture of what—without these rules—the societal cost might be. Memories fade with time and we need to be mindful of the costs of not doing these things right in the context of the colossal calamity of late ’08.

The thing is: it’s time to put some sense (and cents) back into CBAs, and to criticisms of rules.  By that I mean, I’d like to see reasonable, accurate, and well-supported analyses, and those who criticize our CBAs should berequired to provide, not “masked data,” with no clear or hard figures, but real, verifiable dollars and cents to rebut our analyses.  If we are all held to the same reasonable standards, not just trying to create ghastly ghosts in an effort to slow the process down, CBAs might actually be useful as they were intended:  as a factor in forming “more perfect regulations.”
Conclusion

Look, I understand that people have to represent themselves and take advantage of the opportunities which exist to make their case, on the Hill, in the agencies, or in court. That doesn’t mean I have to agree with them. It seems to me this has gone too far. They may mean well. I’m just not sure they are well.

The thing is: we had, and have, an economic mess created by lax or non-existent regulations in our financial markets. That isn’t a joke or a scary story for millions of people. It is an unfortunate and seemingly unforgiving reality. We need to do all we can to appropriately implement the Dodd-Frank rules to not only protect consumers, businesses, and markets alike, but to fuel inject the economic engine of our democracy. This new law—and the regulations that go with it if done properly—are the blueprints for how our economy can thrive. If we all work together as honest partners in the rulemaking process, I am confident we not only can, but will move our nation forward.
Thank you.

Friday, May 4, 2012

CFTC CHARGES 2 INDIVIDUALS AND COMPANY WITH FRAUD AND MISAPPROPRIATION



FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Charges Utah Residents Christopher Hales, Eric Richardson and their Company, Bentley Equities, LLC, with Fraud and Misappropriation
CFTC seeks an emergency restraining order freezing defendants’ assets
Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced the filing of a federal court action in Utah charging Bentley Equities, LLC (Bentley), a Delaware corporation, and its principals, Christopher D. Hales and Eric A. Richardson, with fraud and misappropriation in connection with commodity futures trading. Richardson resides in Cedar Hills, Utah, and Hales is currently an inmate at the Florence, Colo., Federal Correction Complex. None of the defendants has ever been registered with the CFTC.

The CFTC’s complaint, filed May 2, 2012, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, alleges that from at least April 2009 through August 2010, the defendants fraudulently solicited and accepted more than $1.1 million from approximately 38 pool participants and clients to trade commodity futures in a commodity pool account and in individual managed accounts.

The CFTC seeks an emergency restraining order freezing the defendants’ assets and prohibiting the destruction or alteration of the defendants’ books and records.

Specifically, according to the CFTC’s complaint, Bentley, Hales, and Richardson misrepresented to customers that their trading was profitable, and that they actively managed more than $1 million in commodity futures accounts. In reality, the complaint charges, the defendants were not successful commodity futures traders and never managed more than $480,000 in commodity futures trading accounts at one time. In fact, the defendants lost approximately $1,296,600 of the Bentley participants’ and managed clients’ funds trading commodity futures contracts, according to the complaint.

The complaint further charges that the defendants misappropriated at least $628,000 of customer funds for personal use, including food, clothing, auto expenses, and utility and credit card payments. The defendants also allegedly used misappropriated funds to make payments to existing participants and clients, as is typical of a Ponzi scheme.

To conceal their trading losses and misappropriation, defendants allegedly issued false account statements to participants and clients by altering trading statements that they received from the futures commission merchant carrying the Bentley pool account. These doctored statements falsely showed inflated account balances and profitable commodity futures trading returns, when, in fact, the defendants’ futures trading for their participants and clients “consistently lost money,” according to the complaint.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks civil monetary penalties, restitution, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, trading and registration bans, and preliminary and permanent injunctions against further violations of the federal commodities laws, as charged.

In November 2011, Hales was sentenced to more than seven years imprisonment and ordered to pay $12,719,236 in criminal restitution in connection with a judgment entered against him in a related criminal matter for the conduct alleged in the CFTC’s case, as well as mortgage fraud. United States v. Christopher D. Hales,No. 2:10-CR-183-TS-SA-1 (D. Utah, Sept. 2, 2010).

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Utah, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development —Office of Inspector General, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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