FROM: U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
In First FTC Cases Against Car Title Lenders, Companies Settle Charges They Deceptively Advertised the Cost of Their Loans
Businesses Failed to Disclose Qualifications for “Zero Percent” Loan Offers
FOR RELEASE
January 30, 2015
The Federal Trade Commission has taken action for the first time against two car title lenders, reaching settlements that will require them to stop their use of deceptive advertising to market title loans.
A car title loan is typically a high cost, short-term loan, secured with the consumer’s car title. In administrative complaints issued against two title lenders, First American Title Lending of Georgia, LLC, and Finance Select, Inc., the FTC charged that the companies advertised, both online and in print, zero percent interest rates for a 30-day car title loan without disclosing important loan conditions or the increased finance charge imposed after the introductory period ended.
“This type of loan is risky for consumers because if they fail to pay, they could lose their car – an asset many of them can’t live without,” said Jessica Rich, director, FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “Without proper disclosures, consumers can’t know what they’re getting, so when we see deceptive marketing of these loans we’re going to take action to stop it.”
While advertised as short-term loans, title loans can become longer-term, high cost installment loans with payments due over several months. The annual percentage rate of a car title loan can be over 300 percent. If a consumer does not repay the loan within 30 days, high finance charges can add up quickly, with a consumer paying hundreds or thousands of dollars in fees or forfeiting the vehicle.
The FTC charged that First American Title Lending, which operates over 30 locations in Georgia, advertised a zero percent offer (in English and Spanish) and failed to disclose that the borrower had to meet specific conditions to receive that rate. The borrower had to be a new customer, repay the loan within 30 days, and pay with a money order or certified funds, not cash or a personal check. If a borrower failed to meet those conditions, the offer did not apply, and he or she would be required to pay a finance charge from the start of the loan. The company’s advertisements also failed to disclose the amount of the finance charge after the introductory period ended.
The FTC alleged Finance Select, doing business as Fast Cash Title Pawn, failed to disclose that unless a loan was paid in full in 30 days, the zero percent offer did not apply, and that a borrower would have to pay a finance charge for the initial 30 days of the loan in addition to any finance charges incurred going forward. Fast Cash, which has five locations across Georgia and two in Alabama, also failed to disclose how much the finance charge would cost a borrower after the 30-day introductory period was over.
As part of the proposed settlements with First American Title Lending and Fast Cash Title Pawn, the respondents are prohibited from:
failing to disclose all the qualifying terms associated with obtaining a loan at its advertised rate;
failing to disclose what the finance charge would be after an introductory period ends; and
misrepresenting any material terms of any loan agreements.
In addition, First American Title Lending is also prohibited from stating the amount of any down payment, number of payments or periods of repayment, or the amount of any payment or finance charge without clearly and conspicuously stating all the terms required by the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z.
These cases are part of the FTC’s ongoing effort to protect consumers in the short-term lending and auto marketplaces. The agency’s guidance, Caution: Car Title Loans Can Leave You Stranded, encourages consumers to shop around for their loan, and to look to their bank or other lenders for options that may be more affordable than a car title loan.
The Commission vote to issue the administrative complaints and accept the proposed consent orders for public comment was 5-0. The agreements will be subject to public comment for 30 days, beginning today and continuing through March 3, 2015, after which the Commission will decide whether to make the proposed consent orders final. Submit comments for Fast Cash Title Pawn and First American Title Lending online.
NOTE: The Commission issues an administrative complaint when it has “reason to believe” that the law has been or is being violated, and it appears to the Commission that a proceeding is in the public interest. When the Commission issues a consent order on a final basis, it carries the force of law with respect to future actions. Each violation of such an order may result in a civil penalty of up to $16,000.
The Federal Trade Commission works for consumers to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair business practices and to provide information to help spot, stop, and avoid them.
A PUBLICATION OF RANDOM U.S.GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASES AND ARTICLES
Showing posts with label AUTO LOANS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AUTO LOANS. Show all posts
Monday, February 2, 2015
Friday, April 26, 2013
SEC CHARGES CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION WITH UNDERSTATING AUTO LOAN LOSSES
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., April 24, 2013 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Capital One Financial Corporation and two senior executives for understating millions of dollars in auto loan losses incurred during the months leading into the financial crisis.
An SEC investigation found that in financial reporting for the second and third quarters of 2007, Capital One failed to properly account for losses in its auto finance business when they became higher than originally forecasted. The profitability of its auto loan business was primarily derived from extending credit to subprime consumers. As credit markets began to deteriorate, Capital One’s internal loss forecasting tool found that the declining credit environment had a significant impact on its loan loss expense. However, Capital One failed to properly incorporate these internal assessments into its financial reporting, and thus understated its loan loss expense by approximately 18 percent in the second quarter and 9 percent in the third quarter.
Capital One agreed to pay $3.5 million to settle the SEC’s charges. The two executives – former Chief Risk Officer Peter A. Schnall and former Divisional Credit Officer David A. LaGassa – also agreed to settle the charges against them.
"Accurate financial reporting is a fundamental obligation for any public company, particularly a bank’s accounting for its provision for loan losses during a time of severe financial distress," said George Canellos, Co-Director of the Division of Enforcement. "Capital One failed in this responsibility by underreporting expenses relating to its loan losses even as its own internal forecasting tool had signaled an increase in incurred losses due to the impending financial crisis."
According to the SEC’s order instituting settled administrative proceedings, beginning in October 2006 and continuing through the third quarter of 2007, Capital One Auto Finance (COAF) experienced significantly higher charge-offs and delinquencies for its auto loans than it had originally forecasted. The elevated losses occurred within every type of loan in each of COAF’s lines of business. Its internal loss forecasting tool assessed that its escalating loss variances were attributable to an increase in a forecasting factor it called the "exogenous" – which measured the impact on credit losses from conditions external to the business such as macroeconomic conditions. A change in this exogenous factor generally had a significant impact on COAF’s loan loss expense, and it was closely monitored by the company through its loss forecasting tool. Capital One determined that incorporating the full exogenous levels into its loss forecast would have resulted in a second quarter allowance build of $72 million by year-end. Since no such expense was incorporated for the second quarter, it would have resulted in a third quarter allowance build of $85 million by year-end.
However, according to the SEC’s order, instead of incorporating the results of its loss forecasting tool, Capital One failed to include any of COAF’s exogenous-driven losses in its second quarter provision for loan losses and included only one-third of such losses in the third quarter. The exogenous losses were an integral component of Capital One’s methodology for calculating its provision for loan losses. As a result, Capital One’s second and third quarter loan loss expense for COAF did not appropriately estimate probable incurred losses in accordance with accounting requirements.
The SEC’s order also finds that Schnall and LaGassa caused Capital One’s understatements of its loan loss expense by deviating from established policies and procedures and failing to implement proper internal controls for determining its loan loss expense. Schnall, who oversaw Capital One’s credit management function, took inadequate steps to communicate COAF’s exogenous treatment to the senior management committee in charge of ensuring that the company’s allowance was compliant with accounting requirements. Despite warnings, he also failed to ensure that the exogenous treatment was properly documented. LaGassa, who managed the COAF loss forecasting process, failed to ensure that the proper exogenous levels were incorporated into the COAF loss forecast. He also failed to ensure that the exogenous treatment was documented consistent with policies and procedures.
"Financial institutions, especially those engaged in subprime lending practices, must have rigorous controls surrounding their process for estimating loan losses to prevent material misstatements of those expenses," said Gerald W. Hodgkins, Associate Director of the Division of Enforcement. "The SEC will not tolerate deficient controls surrounding an issuer’s financial reporting obligations, including quarterly reporting obligations."
Capital One’s material understatements of its loan loss expense and internal controls failures violated the reporting, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the federal securities laws, namely Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 12b-20 and 13a-13. Schnall and LaGassa caused Capital One’s violations of Section 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13a-13 thereunder and violated Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1 by indirectly causing Capital One’s books and records violations.
Schnall agreed to pay an $85,000 penalty and LaGassa agreed to pay a $50,000 penalty to settle the SEC’s charges. Capital One and the two executives neither admitted nor denied the findings in consenting to the SEC’s order requiring them to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations of these federal securities laws.
The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Senior Counsel Anita Bandy and Assistant Chief Accountant Amanda deRoo and supervised by Assistant Director Conway Dodge.
Washington, D.C., April 24, 2013 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Capital One Financial Corporation and two senior executives for understating millions of dollars in auto loan losses incurred during the months leading into the financial crisis.
An SEC investigation found that in financial reporting for the second and third quarters of 2007, Capital One failed to properly account for losses in its auto finance business when they became higher than originally forecasted. The profitability of its auto loan business was primarily derived from extending credit to subprime consumers. As credit markets began to deteriorate, Capital One’s internal loss forecasting tool found that the declining credit environment had a significant impact on its loan loss expense. However, Capital One failed to properly incorporate these internal assessments into its financial reporting, and thus understated its loan loss expense by approximately 18 percent in the second quarter and 9 percent in the third quarter.
Capital One agreed to pay $3.5 million to settle the SEC’s charges. The two executives – former Chief Risk Officer Peter A. Schnall and former Divisional Credit Officer David A. LaGassa – also agreed to settle the charges against them.
"Accurate financial reporting is a fundamental obligation for any public company, particularly a bank’s accounting for its provision for loan losses during a time of severe financial distress," said George Canellos, Co-Director of the Division of Enforcement. "Capital One failed in this responsibility by underreporting expenses relating to its loan losses even as its own internal forecasting tool had signaled an increase in incurred losses due to the impending financial crisis."
According to the SEC’s order instituting settled administrative proceedings, beginning in October 2006 and continuing through the third quarter of 2007, Capital One Auto Finance (COAF) experienced significantly higher charge-offs and delinquencies for its auto loans than it had originally forecasted. The elevated losses occurred within every type of loan in each of COAF’s lines of business. Its internal loss forecasting tool assessed that its escalating loss variances were attributable to an increase in a forecasting factor it called the "exogenous" – which measured the impact on credit losses from conditions external to the business such as macroeconomic conditions. A change in this exogenous factor generally had a significant impact on COAF’s loan loss expense, and it was closely monitored by the company through its loss forecasting tool. Capital One determined that incorporating the full exogenous levels into its loss forecast would have resulted in a second quarter allowance build of $72 million by year-end. Since no such expense was incorporated for the second quarter, it would have resulted in a third quarter allowance build of $85 million by year-end.
However, according to the SEC’s order, instead of incorporating the results of its loss forecasting tool, Capital One failed to include any of COAF’s exogenous-driven losses in its second quarter provision for loan losses and included only one-third of such losses in the third quarter. The exogenous losses were an integral component of Capital One’s methodology for calculating its provision for loan losses. As a result, Capital One’s second and third quarter loan loss expense for COAF did not appropriately estimate probable incurred losses in accordance with accounting requirements.
The SEC’s order also finds that Schnall and LaGassa caused Capital One’s understatements of its loan loss expense by deviating from established policies and procedures and failing to implement proper internal controls for determining its loan loss expense. Schnall, who oversaw Capital One’s credit management function, took inadequate steps to communicate COAF’s exogenous treatment to the senior management committee in charge of ensuring that the company’s allowance was compliant with accounting requirements. Despite warnings, he also failed to ensure that the exogenous treatment was properly documented. LaGassa, who managed the COAF loss forecasting process, failed to ensure that the proper exogenous levels were incorporated into the COAF loss forecast. He also failed to ensure that the exogenous treatment was documented consistent with policies and procedures.
"Financial institutions, especially those engaged in subprime lending practices, must have rigorous controls surrounding their process for estimating loan losses to prevent material misstatements of those expenses," said Gerald W. Hodgkins, Associate Director of the Division of Enforcement. "The SEC will not tolerate deficient controls surrounding an issuer’s financial reporting obligations, including quarterly reporting obligations."
Capital One’s material understatements of its loan loss expense and internal controls failures violated the reporting, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the federal securities laws, namely Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 12b-20 and 13a-13. Schnall and LaGassa caused Capital One’s violations of Section 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13a-13 thereunder and violated Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1 by indirectly causing Capital One’s books and records violations.
Schnall agreed to pay an $85,000 penalty and LaGassa agreed to pay a $50,000 penalty to settle the SEC’s charges. Capital One and the two executives neither admitted nor denied the findings in consenting to the SEC’s order requiring them to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations of these federal securities laws.
The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Senior Counsel Anita Bandy and Assistant Chief Accountant Amanda deRoo and supervised by Assistant Director Conway Dodge.
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