Friday, August 17, 2012

HUNGARY: PROFILE FROM U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
PROFILE

Geography
Area: 93,030 sq. km. (35,910 sq. mi.); about the size of Indiana.
Cities: Capital--Budapest (est. pop. 2 million). Other cities--Debrecen (208,000); Miskolc (170,000); Szeged (170,000); Pecs (157,000).
Terrain: Mostly flat, with low mountains in the north and northeast and north of Lake Balaton.
Climate: Temperate.


People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Hungarian(s).
Population (July 2011 est.): 9,996,000.
Ethnic groups: Magyar 89.9%, Romany 4% (est.), German 2.6%, Serb 2%, Slovak 0.8%, Romanian 0.7%.
Religions (2001 census): Roman Catholic 51.9%, Calvinist 15.9%, Lutheran 3%, Greek Catholic 2.6%, Jewish 1%, others, including Baptist Adventist, Pentecostal, Unitarian 3%.
Languages: Magyar 98.2%, other 1.8%.
Education: Compulsory to age 16. Attendance--96%. Literacy--99.4%.
Health (2007 est.): Infant mortality rate--8.21/1,000. Life expectancy--men 69.2 years, women 77.3 years.
Work force (2006 est., 4.21 million): Agriculture--5.0%; industry and commerce--31.0%; services--64.0%.


Government
Type: Republic.
Constitution: Adopted April 18, 2011; entered into effect January 1, 2012.
Branches: Executive--president (head of state), prime minister (head of government), cabinet. Legislative--National Assembly (386 members, 4-year term). Judicial--Curia (supreme court) and Constitutional Court.
Administrative regions: 19 counties plus capital region of Budapest.
Principal political parties: Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party--center-right; Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP)--center-right; Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)--center-left; Democratic Coalition (DK)--center-left; Politics Can Be Different (LMP)--Green party; Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)--far-right.


Economy
GDP: HUF 27,947 billion (approx. $115.96 billion, at year-end 2011 exchange rate of U.S. $1=HUF 241).
Annual growth rate (2011): 1.9%.
Per capita GDP (2011): $11,596.
Natural resources: bauxite, coal, natural gas, and arable land.
Agriculture/forestry (2010, 2.94% of GDP): Products--meat, corn, wheat, sunflower seeds, potatoes, sugar beets, and dairy products.
Industry and construction (2010, 25.9% of GDP): Types--machinery, vehicles, chemicals, precision and measuring equipment, computer products, medical instruments, pharmaceuticals, and textiles.
Trade (2010): Exports ($112.7 billion)--machinery, vehicles, food, beverages, tobacco, crude materials, manufactured goods, fuels and electric energy. Imports ($103.11 billion)--machinery, vehicles, manufactured goods, fuels and electric energy, food, beverages, and tobacco. Major markets--EU (Germany, Austria, Italy, France, U.K., Romania, Poland). Major suppliers--EU (Germany, Austria, Italy, France, Netherlands, Poland), Russia, and China.


PEOPLE AND HISTORY
Ethnic groups in Hungary include Magyar (nearly 90%), Romany, German, Serb, Slovak, and others. The majority of Hungary's people are Roman Catholic; other religions represented are Calvinist, Lutheran, Jewish, Baptist, Adventist, Pentecostal, and Unitarian. Magyar is the predominant language. Hungary has long been an integral part of Europe. It converted to Western Christianity before AD 1000. Although Hungary was a monarchy for nearly 1,000 years, its constitutional system preceded by several centuries the establishment of Western-style governments in other European countries.


Following the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy (1867-1918) at the end of World War I, Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and one-third of its population. It experienced a brief but bloody communist dictatorship and counterrevolution in 1919, followed by a 25-year regency under Admiral Miklos Horthy. Although Hungary fought in most of World War II as a German ally, it fell under German military occupation on March 19, 1944 following an unsuccessful attempt to switch sides. Under Nazi occupation, the Hungarian Government executed or deported and seized the property of hundreds of thousands of its minority citizens, mostly members of the Jewish community. On January 20, 1945, a provisional government concluded an armistice with the Soviet Union and established the Allied Control Commission, under which Soviet, American, and British representatives held complete sovereignty over the country. The Commission's chairman was a member of Stalin's inner circle and exercised absolute control.


Communist Takeover
The provisional government, dominated by the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP), was replaced in November 1945 after elections which gave majority control of a coalition government to the Independent Smallholders' Party. The government instituted a radical land reform and gradually nationalized mines, electric plants, heavy industries, and some large banks. The communists ultimately undermined the coalition regime by discrediting leaders of rival parties and through terror, blackmail, and show trials. In elections tainted by fraud in 1947, the leftist bloc gained control of the government.


By February 1949, all opposition parties had been forced to merge with the MKP to form the Hungarian Workers' Party. In 1949, the communists held a single-list election and adopted a Soviet-style constitution, which created the Hungarian People's Republic. Between 1948 and 1953, the Hungarian economy was reorganized according to the Soviet model. In 1949, the country joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or Comecon.) All private industrial firms with more than 10 employees were nationalized. Freedom of the press, religion, and assembly were strictly curtailed. The head of the Roman Catholic Church, Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty, was sentenced to life imprisonment.


Forced industrialization and land collectivization soon led to serious economic difficulties, which reached crisis proportions by mid-1953. Imre Nagy replaced Rakosi as prime minister in 1953 and repudiated much of Rakosi's economic program of forced collectivization and heavy industry. He also ended political purges and freed thousands of political prisoners. However, the economic situation continued to deteriorate, and Rakosi succeeded in disrupting the reforms and in forcing Nagy from power in 1955 for "right-wing revisionism." Hungary joined the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization the same year.


1956 Revolution
Pressure for change reached a climax on October 23, 1956, when security forces fired on Budapest students marching in support of Poland's confrontation with the Soviet Union. The ensuing battle quickly grew into a massive popular uprising. Fighting did not abate until the Central Committee named Imre Nagy as prime minister on October 25. Nagy dissolved the state security police, abolished the one-party system, promised free elections, and negotiated with the U.S.S.R. to withdraw its troops.


Faced with reports of new Soviet troops pouring into Hungary, despite Soviet Ambassador Andropov's assurances to the contrary, on November 1 Nagy announced Hungary's neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. In response, the Soviet Union launched a massive military attack on Hungary on November 3. Some 200,000 Hungarians fled to the West. Nagy and his colleagues took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy. Party First Secretary Janos Kadar defected from the Nagy cabinet, fleeing to the Soviet Union. On November 4 he announced the formation of a new government. He returned to Budapest and, with Soviet support, carried out severe reprisals; thousands of people were executed or imprisoned. Despite a guarantee of safe conduct, Nagy was arrested and deported to Romania. In June 1958, Nagy was returned to Hungary, and, following a secret trial, was executed by the communist government.


Reform Under Kadar
In the early 1960s, Kadar announced a new policy under the motto of "He Who is Not Against Us is With Us," and introduced a relatively liberal cultural and economic course aimed at overcoming the post-1956 hostility toward him and his regime. In 1966, the Central Committee approved the "New Economic Mechanism," through which it sought to overcome the inefficiencies of central planning, increase productivity, make Hungary more competitive in world markets, and create prosperity to ensure political stability. By the early 1980s, it had achieved some lasting economic reforms and limited political liberalization and pursued a foreign policy which encouraged more trade with the West. Nevertheless, the New Economic Mechanism led to mounting foreign debt incurred to shore up unprofitable industries.


Transition to Democracy
Hungary's transition to a Western-style parliamentary democracy was the first and the smoothest among the former Soviet bloc. By 1987, activists within the party and bureaucracy and Budapest-based intellectuals were increasingly pressing for change. Young liberals formed the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz); a core from the so-called Democratic Opposition formed the Association of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), and the neo-populist national opposition established the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). Civic activism intensified to a level not seen since the 1956 revolution.


In 1988, Kadar was replaced as General Secretary of the MSZMP (the Communist Party), and that same year, the Parliament adopted a "democracy package," which included trade union pluralism; freedom of association, assembly, and the press; a new electoral law; and a radical revision of the constitution, among others. The Soviet Union reduced its involvement by signing an agreement in April 1989 to withdraw Soviet forces by June 1991.


National unity culminated in June 1989 as the country reburied Imre Nagy, his associates, and, symbolically, all other victims of the 1956 revolution. A national roundtable, comprising representatives of the new parties and some recreated old parties--such as the Smallholders and Social Democrats--the Communist Party, and different social groups, met in the late summer of 1989 to discuss major changes to the Hungarian constitution in preparation for free elections and the transition to a fully free and democratic political system.


Free Elections and a Democratic Hungary
The first free parliamentary election, held in March-April 1990, was a plebiscite of sorts on the communist past with the Democratic Forum (MDF) winning 43% of the vote and the Free Democrats (SZDSZ) capturing 24%. Under Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, the MDF formed a center-right coalition government with the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP) and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) to command a 60% majority in the Parliament. Parliamentary opposition parties included SZDSZ, the Socialists (MSZP--successors to the Communist Party), and the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz). Peter Boross succeeded as Prime Minister after Antall died and the Antall/Boross coalition governments achieved a reasonably well-functioning parliamentary democracy and laid the foundation for a free market economy.


In May 1994, the Socialists came back to win a plurality of votes and 54% of the seats after an election campaign focused largely on economic issues and the substantial decline in living standards since 1990. A heavy turnout of voters swept away the right-of-center coalition but soundly rejected extremists on both right and left. The MSZP continued economic reforms and privatization, adopting a painful, but necessary, policy of fiscal austerity (the "Bokros plan") in 1995. However, dissatisfaction with the pace of economic recovery, rising crime, and cases of government corruption convinced voters to propel center-right parties into power following national elections in May 1998. Fidesz captured a plurality of parliamentary seats and forged a coalition with the Smallholders and the Democratic Forum. The new government, headed by 35-year-old Prime Minister Viktor Orban, promised to stimulate faster growth, curb inflation, and lower taxes. Although the Orban administration also pledged continuity in foreign policy, and continued to pursue Euro-Atlantic integration as its first priority, it was a more vocal advocate of minority rights for ethnic Hungarians abroad than the previous government. During Orban’s tenure, Hungary acceded to NATO on March 12, 1999.


In April 2002, the country voted to return the MSZP-Free Democrat coalition to power with Peter Medgyessy as Prime Minister. The Medgyessy government placed special emphasis on solidifying Hungary's Euro-Atlantic course, which culminated in Hungary’s accession to the European Union on May 1, 2004. Prime Minister Medgyessy resigned in August 2004 after losing coalition support following an attempted cabinet reshuffle. Ferenc Gyurcsany succeeded Medgyessy as Prime Minister in September 29, 2004.


In the April 2006 election, Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany and his Socialist-liberal coalition were re-elected, the first time since communism that a sitting government renewed its mandate. The SZDSZ pulled out of the coalition in April 2008, leaving the MSZP to govern alone.


The global economic crisis spilled over into Hungary in autumn 2008, and severely impacted the country. Prime Minister Gyurcsany resigned in March 2009 and was succeeded by a technocratic crisis management government led by Gordon Bajnai, the former Minister of Economy and National Development.


Parliamentary elections in April 2010 brought a Fidesz-KDNP coalition back to power with a two-thirds majority (262 seats). Viktor Orban became Prime Minister. Joining the MSZP in opposition were the newly elected far-right Jobbik party and the Green party, Politics Can Be Different (LMP). Today, Fidesz-KDNP has 263 seats. In the opposition, MSZP has 48 seats, Jobbik 46, and LMP 15; 10 Members of Parliament (MPs) have left MSZP to create a new party, the Democratic Coalition. There are four independent MPs. The Fidesz-dominated Parliament quickly launched an ambitious legislative agenda that has promised to reduce the overall number of seats in Parliament to 199 effective for the next election in 2014, cut by half the number of local representatives, and extended citizenship and voting rights to ethnic Hungarians living beyond the country’s present borders. In April 2011, Parliament adopted the country’s new constitution, which entered into effect January 1, 2012. Among other changes, the document makes reference to the role of Christianity in "preserving the nation" and sets the term of local government members at 5 years. Additionally, it mandated a process requiring the passage of several dozen so-called cardinal laws on issues such as religion, the media, the restructuring of the judiciary, elections, and the central bank. The majority of these laws were passed in 2011, and their future modification would require a two-thirds majority in Parliament.


GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
The president of Hungary, elected by the National Assembly every 5 years, has a largely ceremonial role, but powers include requesting the winner of a parliamentary election to form a cabinet. That person then presents his program to Parliament, and is in turn ratified by that body as prime minister. The prime minister selects cabinet ministers and has the exclusive right to dismiss them. Each cabinet nominee appears before one or more parliamentary committees in consultative open hearings and must be formally approved by the president. The unicameral, 386-member National Assembly is the highest state legislative body and initiates and approves legislation sponsored by the prime minister. The number of seats will decrease to 199 for the 2014 election. National parliamentary elections are held every 4 years (the last in April 2010). A party must win at least 5% of the national vote to enter Parliament. A 15-member Constitutional Court may challenge legislation on grounds of unconstitutionality; members are appointed by a two-thirds vote in Parliament for a 12-year term of office.


Principal Government Officials
President--Pal Schmitt
Prime Minister--Viktor Orban (Fidesz)
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Janos Martonyi
Ambassador to the United States--Gyorgy Szapary
Ambassador to the United Nations--Csaba Korosi


ECONOMY
Prior to World War II, the Hungarian economy was primarily oriented toward agriculture and small-scale manufacturing. Hungary's strategic position in Europe and its relative lack of natural resources dictated a traditional reliance on foreign trade. In the early 1950s, the communist government forced rapid industrialization following the standard Stalinist pattern in an effort to encourage a more self-sufficient economy. Most economic activity was conducted by state farms and state-owned enterprises or cooperatives. In 1968, Stalinist self-sufficiency was replaced by the "New Economic Mechanism," which gave limited freedom to the workings of the market, reopened Hungary to foreign trade, and allowed a limited number of small businesses to operate in the services sector.


Although Hungary enjoyed one of the most liberal and economically advanced economies of the former Eastern Bloc, both agriculture and industry began to suffer from a lack of investment in the 1970s. Belated reaction to the economic crisis of the early 1970s and deteriorating terms of trade resulted in increasing indebtedness. In response, the Hungarian Government launched a restrictive economic policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, followed by the "Dynamization Program of 1985," which increased consumer subsidies and investments--mainly in unprofitable state enterprises--eventually leading to a doubling of foreign debt levels. By 1993, Hungary's net foreign debt rose significantly--from $1 billion in 1973 to $15 billion. Liberalization of the economy continued, however, and in 1988-89 Hungary passed a joint venture law, adopted tax legislation, and joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. By 1988, Hungary developed a two-tier banking system and enacted significant corporate legislation which paved the way for the ambitious market-oriented reforms of the post-communist years.


The Antall government of 1990-94 began market reforms with price and trade liberation measures, a revamped tax system, and a nascent market-based banking system. As a result of the collapse of Eastern markets and the inability of state-owned companies to compete with foreign competitors, industrial production fell by 50% between 1989 and 1994, and the country faced high unemployment and inflation rates, as well as a deteriorating trade balance. By 1994, the costs of government overspending and hesitant privatization had become clearly visible. In 1996, austerity measures referred to as the "Bokros package" (for then-Finance Minister Lajos Bokros) improved both the fiscal and external balance situation, and increased investor confidence. Simplified and accelerated privatization led to significant inflow of foreign capital in industry, energy, and telecommunications sectors, and a number of greenfield investments were launched. Hungary's early openness to foreign direct investment (FDI) led to a sustained period of high growth and made Hungary a magnet for FDI in the late 1990s and early parts of this century.


In 1995, Hungary's currency--the forint (HUF)--became convertible for all current account transactions, and subsequent to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) membership in 1996, for almost all capital account transactions as well. In 2001, the Orban government lifted remaining currency controls and broadened the band around the exchange rate, allowing the forint to appreciate by more than 12% in a year. Trade with European Union (EU) and OECD countries now comprises over 75% and 85% of Hungary's total trade, respectively. Germany is Hungary's most important trading partner, followed by Italy and France. The United States has become Hungary's sixth-largest export market, while Hungary is ranked as the 72nd-largest export market for the United States. Bilateral trade between the two countries has increased to more than $1 billion per year.


With more than $60 billion in FDI since 1989, Hungary has been a leading destination for FDI in central and eastern Europe, although this level is beginning to decline. The largest U.S. investors include GE, Alcoa, General Motors, Coca-Cola, Ford, IBM, and PepsiCo, with the overall level of direct U.S. investment estimated at $9 billion. As a result of extensive and continuing liberalization, the private sector produces about 80% of Hungary’s output.


Close relationship with the economies of the EU helped pave the way for Hungary's EU accession in 2004. As part of its EU membership agreement, Hungary agreed to meet the economic criteria necessary to adopt the euro. In 2005 and 2006, however, it became clear that not only was a high budget deficit hurting the economy (nearly surpassing 10% of GDP in 2006), but that Hungary was moving away from meeting euro entry requirements, and would be subject to EU excessive deficit procedures. Against this backdrop, in fall 2006, Prime Minister Gyurcsany launched a program of fiscal consolidation by raising taxes, decreasing subsidies, and streamlining the public sector. Businesses complained, however, that increased taxes, particularly on labor, decreased Hungary's economic competitiveness compared to other countries in the region. Greater fiscal discipline allowed the government to reduce its deficit to 3.4% of GDP by 2008, but decreasing government spending during this period also reduced domestic consumption and contributed to a decrease in Hungary's GDP growth.


In October 2008, the effects of the global financial crisis spilled into Hungary. Despite its success in reducing its fiscal deficit, years of high budget deficits and Hungary’s high external debt levels fueled investor risk aversion, and negatively affected the foreign exchange, government securities, and equity markets in Hungary. The country was hit hard by global de-leveraging, and weak demand for government bonds. A sharp decline in the share of non-resident investors in the government securities market raised concerns that Hungary would be unable to meet its external financing requirements. In order to increase investor confidence and ensure liquidity in domestic financial markets, Hungary concluded a $25 billion financial stabilization package with the IMF, EU, and World Bank in November 2008.


Under this agreement, Hungary committed to further fiscal consolidation, financial sector reforms, and enacting banking sector support measures. Terms also included periodic assessment of macroeconomic and fiscal targets. Taking into consideration the worsening global economic and financial crisis, the IMF and the EU revised their projections of Hungary’s GDP decline in 2009 to -6.7%, and agreed to increase the 2.9% deficit target to 3.9% for 2009. Public debt was expected to increase to 83% of GDP in 2009 before returning to more sustainable levels through fiscal tightening.


To respond to the crisis, the Bajnai government in 2009 enacted a series of economic reforms and spending cuts intended to reduce the tax burden on labor, encourage employment, improve Hungary's economic competitiveness, and offset lost government revenue due to the deeper-than-expected recession. These measures included reforms to the pension and entitlement systems, as well as tax changes to shift the tax burden from labor to wealth and consumption. In addition to cuts in taxes for businesses and employees, tax changes included raising the value added tax (VAT), and a proposal for the introduction of a property tax. In 2009 GDP declined by 6.3%, and the Hungarian Government was able to meet the 3.9% deficit target.


Elected in 2010, the Orban government adopted what Economy Minister Gyorgy Matolcsy described as an "unorthodox economic policy" to help steer Hungary through the economic crisis. This included the introduction of "crisis taxes" targeting banking, energy, telecommunications, and retail sectors. Originally unveiled as 3-year, limited-duration, and extraordinary measures, the crisis taxes were meant to shore up the government budget until more long-term, structural changes were made. In November 2010, the government acknowledged that the "crisis taxes" would exist in some form until 2014, 2 years later than previously asserted. In addition, in 2010 the government discontinued contributions to the voluntary private pillar of the pension system, and imposed financial disincentives on those who chose not to return to the state system. The government has used the resulting budgetary windfall to help reduce the country's debt levels and meet its deficit target of less than 3% for 2011 and 2012.


In March 2011, the government launched its Szell Kalman Plan, which outlines structural reform plans in the areas of local government finance, education, healthcare, employment, and public transportation for 2011-2014. The government began developing more detailed reform implementation plans in each of these areas. Initial market reaction to the plan was positive, and by May 2011, the country had already met its foreign currency financing requirements for 2011 through two large dollar and euro bond issuances.


Amid worsening investor sentiment and distrust toward the government’s economic policy, all three credit rating agencies in December 2011-January 2012 downgraded Hungary to non-investment grade, which resulted in a sharp depreciation of the Hungarian forint to almost 350 to the euro and a corresponding increase in government bond yields from below 7% to about 10%. Rising yields and the depreciating forint made the Debt Management Agency’s plan to issue 4.8 billion euros worth (approx. $6.3 billion) of foreign-currency denominated bonds questionable and prompted the government to seek a credit line from the EU and the IMF. Discussions are ongoing, but conditions are strict. The EU Commission initiated an infringement procedure in January 2012 requiring Hungary to change legislation hampering independence of the Central Bank, restore the authority of the Data Protection Ombudsman, and other issues. At the same time the ECOFIN Council voted to proceed with an Excessive Deficit Procedure against Hungary on the grounds that its 3% budget deficit target is unsustainable in 2013 unless corrective measures are implemented. The stakes are high for Hungary, which might partially or entirely lose support from the EU Cohesion Funds in 2013.


NATIONAL SECURITY
Hungary's key national security focus since joining NATO in 1999 has been contributing to the stability of the region while integrating its armed forces into NATO's force structure. Hungary takes a keen interest in NATO expansion and in the transatlantic link. It shares a more acute sense of the threat than many other European countries and is watching events in the Balkans, Ukraine, and Russia with great interest. Hungarians believe that Hungary's own security and that of its ethnic minorities in neighboring countries will be best served by a peaceful, unified region, which will be achieved when EU and NATO membership is extended to the entire region.


Hungary has been slowly modernizing and downsizing its armed forces since it left the Warsaw Pact in 1990. Transitioning from a heavy, slow-moving Warsaw Pact force to a lighter, versatile NATO force, the Hungarian military went from 130,000 in 1989 to approximately 24,000 combat and combat support forces in 2008. Implementing a new training, logistics, and leadership system and a new Joint Forces Command structure, the Hungarian military has gained considerable practical experience working with NATO and other forces serving in international military missions (about 1,000 at any given time). Hungary was especially helpful during the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords in the Balkans from 1995-2004, when its airbase at Taszar was used by coalition forces transiting the region. Hungary currently leads a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. It deployed an additional Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT)--operating in partnership with the Ohio National Guard--an Air Mentor Team, and Special Forces personnel in Afghanistan. The Hungarian military is also deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Cyprus, and the Sinai Peninsula on international peacekeeping and stabilization missions. Hungary’s Papa Airbase is the home base of the Strategic Airlift Consortium’s C-17 operations, expanding its contribution to NATO and other European partners. Hungary’s military still faces numerous challenges to its modernization program, as reflected in the country’s defense budget, which in recent years has dropped to less than 1% of GDP, well below the NATO target of 2%.


FOREIGN RELATIONS
Except for the short-lived neutrality declared by Imre Nagy in November 1956, Hungary's foreign policy generally followed the Soviet lead from 1947 to 1989. During the communist period, Hungary maintained treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria. It was one of the founding members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact and Comecon, and it was the first central European country to withdraw from those now-defunct organizations.


As with any country, Hungarian security attitudes are shaped largely by history and geography. For Hungary, this is a history of more than 400 years of domination by great powers--the Ottomans, the Habsburgs, the Germans during World War II, and the Soviets during the Cold War. Hungary's foreign policy priorities, largely consistent since 1990, represent a direct response to these factors. Since 1990, Hungary's top foreign policy goal has been achieving integration into Western economic and security organizations. To this end, Hungary joined NATO in 1999 and the European Union in May of 2004. Hungary also has improved its often-chilled neighborly relations by signing basic treaties with Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. These renounce all outstanding territorial claims and lay the foundation for constructive relations. However, the issue of ethnic Hungarian minority rights in Slovakia and Romania periodically causes bilateral tensions to flare, including in June 2010 when the Parliament offered Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living outside its borders. Hungary was a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, has signed all of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) follow-on documents since 1989, and served as the OSCE's Chairman-in-Office in 1997. Hungary's record of implementing CSCE Helsinki Final Act provisions, including those on reunification of divided families, remains among the best in eastern Europe. Hungary has been a member of the United Nations since December 1955.


During the first 6 months of 2011, Hungary held the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union for the first time. The priorities of the Hungarian presidency, as outlined in its program entitled "Strong Europe," included the promotion of Roma integration, supporting growth and increasing employment in the EU, expansion of the Schengen border regime area, and the enlargement of the European Union, with special emphasis on Croatia’s accession.


U.S.-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS
Relations between the United States and Hungary immediately following World War II were affected by the Soviet armed forces' occupation of Hungary. Full diplomatic relations were established at the legation level on October 12, 1945, before the signing of the Hungarian peace treaty on February 10, 1947. After the communist takeover in 1947-48, relations with Hungary became increasingly strained by the nationalization of U.S.-owned property, unacceptable treatment of U.S. citizens and personnel, and restrictions on the operations of the American legation. Though relations deteriorated further after the suppression of the Hungarian national uprising in 1956, an exchange of ambassadors in 1966 inaugurated an era of improving relations. In 1972, a consular convention was concluded to provide consular protection to U.S. citizens in Hungary.


In 1973, a bilateral agreement was reached under which Hungary settled the nationalization claims of American citizens. In January 1978, the United States returned to the people of Hungary the historic Crown of Saint Stephen, which had been safeguarded by the United States since the end of World War II. Symbolically and literally, this event marked the beginning of improved relations between the two countries. A 1978 bilateral trade agreement included extension of most-favored-nation status to Hungary. Cultural and scientific exchanges were expanded. As Hungary began to pull away from the Soviet orbit, the United States offered assistance and expertise to help establish a constitution, a democratic political system, and a plan for a free market economy.


Between 1989 and 1993, the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act provided more than $136 million for economic restructuring and private sector development. The Hungarian-American Enterprise Fund offered loans, equity capital, and technical assistance to promote private-sector development. The U.S. Government has provided expert and financial assistance for the development of modern and Western institutions in many policy areas, including national security, law enforcement, free media, environmental regulations, education, and health care. American direct investment has had a direct, positive impact on the Hungarian economy and on continued good bilateral relations. When Hungary acceded to NATO in April 1999, it became a formal ally of the United States. This move has been consistently supported by the 1.5 million-strong Hungarian-American community. The U.S. Government supported Hungarian European Union accession in 2004, and continues to work with Hungary as a valued partner in the transatlantic relationship. Hungary joined the Visa Waiver Program on November 17, 2008.

DISCOVERY MAY CHANGE THEORIES ON GALAXY EVOLUTION

A galaxy cluster was discovered by this 10-meter wide South Pole Telescope, which is located at NSF's Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station in Antarctica and funded by NSF's Office of Polar Programs. NSF manages the U.S. Antarctic Program, through which it coordinates all U.S. research and required logistical support on the continent as well as aboard ships in the Southern Ocean.  Credit: Keith Vanderlinde, National Science Foundation

FROM: NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
National Science Foundation-funded radio telescope in Antarctica has found an extraordinary galaxy cluster that may force astronomers to rethink how galaxy clusters and the galaxies that inhabit them evolve.
 
The galaxy cluster was discovered some 5.7 billion light years from Earth by the 10-meter wide South Pole Telescope (SPT) located at NSF's Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station in Antarctica, which is funded by NSF's Office of Polar Programs.
 
NSF manages the U.S. Antarctic Program, through which it coordinates all U.S research and required logistical support on the continent as well as aboard ships in the Southern Ocean.
 
Officially known as SPT-CLJ2344-4243, the cluster has been dubbed the "Phoenix Cluster" because it is located in the constellation of the Phoenix and because of its remarkable properties. Scientists taking part in the SPT collaboration found the cluster using the Sunyaev-Zel'dovich (SZ) effect, the result of high energy electrons distorting the cosmic microwave background (CMB) radiation through inverse Compton scattering, in which the low energy CMB photons receive an average energy boost during collision with the high energy cluster electrons.
 
Galaxy clusters, which are among the largest objects in the universe, contain enough hot gas to create detectable "shadows" in the light left over from the Big Bang, which also is known as CMB radiation.
 
"The mythology of the Phoenix--a bird rising from the dead--is a perfect way to describe this revived object," said Michael McDonald, a Hubble Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the lead author of a paper appearing in the August 16 issue of the journal Nature. "While galaxies at the center of most clusters have been dead for billions of years, the central galaxy in this cluster seems to have come back to life."
 
Observations made by NASA's Chandra X-ray Observatory in space and by the NSF-managed Gemini Observatory and the Blanco 4-meter and Magellan telescopes in Chile corroborate the SPT discovery and show that stars are forming in this object at the highest rate ever seen in the middle of a galaxy cluster. The object also is the most powerful producer of X-rays of any known cluster, and among the most massive of clusters. The data also suggest that the rate of hot gas cooling in the central regions of the cluster is the largest ever observed.
 
This light has travelled for 14 billion years across the entire observable universe to get to Earth. If it passes through a massive cluster on its way, then a tiny fraction of the light gets scattered to higher energies--the SZ effect.
 
Predicted in 1972, the SZ effect was first demonstrated to detect previously unknown clusters of galaxies by the SPT collaboration in 2009. Observations of the effect have since opened a new window for astronomers to discover the most massive, distant clusters in the universe.
 
"The beauty of the SZ effect for cosmology is that it is as easy to detect a cluster of galaxies in the distant reaches of the observable universe as it is for one nearby," said John Carlstrom, the S. Chandrasekhar Distinguished Service Professor in Astronomy & Astrophysics at the University of Chicago and the SPT's principal investigator. "The magnitude of the effect depends on the mass of the object and not its distance from Earth."
 
Like other galaxy clusters, Phoenix contains a vast reservoir of hot gas, containing more normal matter than all of the galaxies in the cluster combined. The emission from this reservoir can only be detected with X-ray telescopes like NASA's Chandra X-ray Observatory. The prevailing wisdom had once been that this hot gas should cool over time and sink to the center of the cluster, forming huge numbers of stars.
 
However, central galaxies in the cluster have formed very few stars over the last few billion years. Astronomers think that the super-massive black hole in the central galaxy of a cluster pumps energy into the system, preventing cooling of gas from causing a burst of star formation. The famous Perseus Cluster is an example of a black hole bellowing out energy and preventing the gas from cooling to form stars at a high rate.
 
With the black hole not producing powerful enough jets to halt cooling, the center of the Phoenix cluster is buzzing with stars that are forming 20 times faster than in the Perseus Cluster. This rate is the highest seen in the center of a galaxy cluster and is comparable to the highest seen anywhere in the universe.
 
The frenetic pace of star birth and cooling of gas in Phoenix are causing both the galaxy and the black hole to add mass very quickly--an important phase that the researchers predict will be relatively short-lived.
 
"The galaxy and its black hole are undergoing unsustainable growth," said co-author Bradford Benson, of the University of Chicago. "This growth spurt can't last longer than about a hundred million years; otherwise the galaxy and black hole would become much bigger than their counterparts in the nearby universe."
 
Remarkably, the Phoenix Cluster and its central galaxy and super-massive black hole are already among the most massive known objects of their type. Because of their tremendous size, galaxy clusters are crucial objects for studying cosmology and galaxy evolution, so finding one with such extreme properties as the Phoenix Cluster is significant.
 
The SPT collaboration has now completed an SZ survey of the 2500 square degrees of the southern sky that began in February 2007. It has found approximately 500 "SZ effect" galaxy clusters and published more than 20 papers in peer-reviewed journals. Further analysis of the collected data could reveal the existence of additional galaxy clusters.
 
The NSF-funded Physics Frontier Center of the University of Chicago's Kavli Institute for Cosmological Physics, the Department of Energy's Argonne National Laboratory, the Kavli Foundation, and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation also provide partial support for the SPT.

Thursday, August 16, 2012

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT ROUNDTABLE REGARDING EUROPE AND EURASIA

Map From:  U.S. State Department
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Press Roundtable
Remarks
Philip H. Gordon
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Bucharest, Romania
August 13, 2012
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON:
Let me just start by thanking you all for coming. It’s a good opportunity to share some views.
 
I want to say how pleased I am to be back in Bucharest. This is my first official visit as Assistant Secretary. I was actually just in Istanbul with Secretary Clinton and wanted to come here to see key leaders and share some messages from Washington and get a better understanding of the situation.
 
So I did have a chance to meet today with suspended President Basescu, acting President Antonescu and Prime Minister Ponta.
 
I came here, obviously, because we are following developments very closely. We care a lot about the partnership between the United States and Romania, and the people of Romania as indicated in our Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century that we agreed last year, and it’s because of this care for Romania and its future and its democracy that we’re concerned about some of the recent developments regarding the conduct of the referendum and the process by which it is being reviewed, and I came here in part to share those concerns.
 
There have been, as everybody knows, credible allegations about widespread illegal voting in the referendum. There have been efforts to change voter lists that would affect the quorum threshold and apparently attempts to coerce the Constitutional Court regarding the validation of the referendum. All of these things, if confirmed, would raise questions about the legitimacy of whatever outcome were to emerge, and all of these steps would be counter to the values and principles that unite Europe and the United States, and it’s not something we would want to see in a NATO ally and a member of the European Union that is committed to democratic institutions.
 
I should add that these are not just concerns of the State Department or the United States, but I think they’ve been expressed by others, the European Commission, the Venice Commission, prominent NGOs, and other key NATO allies.
 
We, the United States, fully support the 11 points provided by the European Commission to help Romania on its democratic path. Ambassador Gitenstein has made our views known both publicly and privately, and I also came here to stress that he is absolutely speaking for Washington, for the Obama administration, when he makes those public and private comments.
 
I also want to make clear as I made clear to the leaders throughout the course of discussions today, we’re not taking sides and we’re not here to support one party or one leader over any other -- we’re here to support shared principles and democratic institutions and respect for democratic institutions.
 
Again, as the Ambassador has said, governments come and go in both Romania and in the United States, but what is important is the relationship between our countries and I would add what is important is respect for independent, democratic institutions and values.
 
So it was in that spirit of care about the relationship, the friendship, that I came here to express these concerns and views with the leadership of this country, to hear from them their perspectives, and to encourage absolute respect for democratic values and institutions and their independence in this process moving forward so that whatever the result might be, it emerges legitimately and allows us to continue to work together as partners.
 
With that, I’m open to your questions.
 
QUESTION: I’d like to know if you bring into discussion the strategic partnership agreement between Romania and the United States. If this partnership is in danger by events in Romania. This is my first question.
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Well, no, I made clear, as I just expressed, the United States wants to see an enduring strategic partnership between our two countries. We agreed recently to formalize that partnership and we want to see that move forward.
 
But I also made clear that it’s hard to bring projects like that into fruition, or it would be hard if there were questions about the legitimacy of democratic processes here. We want a strategic partnership with a democratic NATO ally, and I made clear that when there are questions raised about the common practices and values on which that partnership is based, it’s more difficult to pursue it, so that’s why I hope and expect that leaders will respect these common values and principles so that we can move forward with the partnership.
 
QUESTION: A second question about the anti-missile shield from Deveselu, have you ever discussed a possibility to replace that elements from Romania if the situation will grow worse in Romania?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: No, we haven’t discussed that. I didn’t discuss that today. It is our full intention to proceed with the plans as agreed. The leaders I met with today expressed the same view, and I don’t think anybody is questioning the importance of moving forward together with that project.
 
QUESTION: What do you expect concretely from the political leaders of Romania, and more exactly from Victor Ponta and Mr. Antonescu? Concretely, which steps are you expecting from them at this point?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I’m always careful to avoid specific prescriptions in other countries’ detailed constitutional processes. It’s not for me to say exactly how voter lists should be treated or what schedule the Constitutional Court should do its business on. What I asked of them is that they respect the rule of law in Romania and the independence of the institutions of Romania. That’s what we expect from them and all leaders in this country. As I said, we’re not taking sides. It’s not a message directed at any particular individual or individuals, it’s respected across the spectrum and we expect respect for the independent institutions; we expect credible allegations of fraud or interference to be investigated and pursued, and we expect them to support what will be perceived to be a legitimate democratic outcome, and I put it that way meaning it’s not for me to say precisely what that is in some cases or for others, but you often know it when you see it. And it’s their responsibility as leaders and elected leaders to pursue outcomes that would be widely judged by the people of Romania and by outside actors as legitimate and sometimes it helps to bring in a third party validator. We discussed the role that the Venice Commission might be able to play, because when things are partisan domestically and when they’re complicated, it’s sometimes useful to have an external validator put a stamp of approval and that could be useful in some circumstances here. But the bottom line is avoid any actions that Romania’s friends and the Romanian public would question as not fully legitimate.
 
QUESTION: Did you discuss with the President how he would deal with his opponents in case he returns?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Which President are you talking about?

QUESTION: Basescu.
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I’ve met with several different presidents in the course of the day.
 
Yes. We envisaged a number of different scenarios, but I did discuss with him the scenario in which he might be returned if that’s what the rule of law and constitutional processes bring him back, and urged him to -- like I urged everybody -- respect the rule of law in the country and to the extent possible pragmatically work with the government. Nobody expects these political rivals to be best of friends and to be forming coalitions and happily doing business together, but we do expect them to work within the constitutional structures of the country and to work together in the interests of the people of the country and of our partnership.
 
There are a number of common projects, some of them have been mentioned already, that shouldn’t be partisan, and I would think leaders on all sides of the spectrum want to see the economy recover; want to see the NATO partnership with the United States and the missile shield go ahead; want to see energy security. So I reminded them that we in our country sometimes often have cohabitation where the leaders of the executive branch and the leaders of the legislative branch are not always the best of friends with the same agendas, but we work within our constitutional structures, and that’s what I encouraged him to do if he’s returned as president.
 
QUESTION: The ambassador said that governments come and go, and you were repeating this. Does this imply that presidents are not coming and going that easily? Do you have a vested interest in keeping as your main partner in this country, Basescu. We all know that the Brits say "you vote the devil you know." Probably you have a devil in Basescu and this is it.
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Let me clarify. It’s a welcome question. Just to be clear, I could have easily said presidents come and go, administrations come and go. In a democratic process it’s the leadership -- we’re not trying to make a distinction between, as one does in Europe, between the presidency and the government. Leaderships in democracies come and go. And that of course applies to presidencies as well.
 
This president, like all presidents, will come and go. So don’t misunderstand that expression, and also, just to repeat, no, it’s not about wanting to see the government come and go and the president stay the same. It’s not up to us to decide who should be the president of Romania -- that’s up to the people of the country.
 
QUESTION: And another question. Do you read the recent political developments in this country in a broader map where the Russian Federation, the events going on in Syria, Turkey, Greece, are also playing their role? So do you see it place Romania on this broader Middle East map so that you could see in this country, given the recent developments, a weak link within the greater map?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Yes, we place Romania in a broader strategic context. Obviously we care about it because we care about the people in the country, but it’s a NATO ally, and NATO is an organization that plays a role all around the world in some of the cases you mentioned, and even further afield like Afghanistan where we appreciate the Romanian contribution.
 
So of course we care about the health of the democracy in a key NATO ally, not just for the sake of the people but for the sake of our partnership. It’s strategically located, there are a lot of energy issues going on in the region, environmental, trafficking, you mentioned some of the important neighbors -- Russia and Turkey, not too far from the Middle East, refugees --so of course we place it in a wider context and we want a healthy, strong, prosperous democratic partner to help us deal with the challenges we face all around the world.
 
QUESTION: Are you satisfied with the answers you received from the Romanian officials in your conversations today?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I think it’s fair to say that I heard the right things. I heard -- I shared with you what my message was about respect for democracy and institutions and legitimacy, and I think it’s fair to say that the leaders I spoke to expressed support for those same values and practices. Now obviously it’s what people do more than what they say, but all I can expect in an initial day’s meeting is that they acknowledge the importance of these issues and pledge to respect those principles -- but you’ll have to turn to them and they should tell you themselves where they stand.
 
QUESTION: Do you think Romania is capable to deal with the situation? Institutionally, does Romania have the institutions working for dealing democratically with this situation, do you think?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: It certainly has the institutions, they just need to be used properly, and that’s what’s being tested now and it is being tested. Again, that’s why I’m here -- because we’re concerned about the trend and the potential outcome.

Institutions can be fragile. It obviously has the institutions and the constitution necessary to be a healthy democracy. But it can be challenged, it’s often challenged in tough times. This is not the first country to face a tricky political situation with questions about removal of a president or governments falling and pending elections and cohabitation. These are all -- these things stress the system, and there’s no question that it’s a challenge for Romania. We want to help Romania pass the test; it would not be in Romania’s interest to fail the test.
 
Certain leaders might emerge as the, at least nominal leadership, but if their legitimacy is challenged it will not be healthy for them or the country. Financial markets would be spooked, investors would find other places to go, allies would be less comfortable moving forward with common projects, so there are real consequences for actions that would challenge the legitimacy of the country, and I appealed to all of the leaders I saw today to keep that in mind for the sake of Romania’s national interest.
 
QUESTION: But what will happen if Romania doesn’t pass the test from U.S. point of view?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I think I just described some of the consequences that would emerge if its legitimacy – if these practices and institutions weren’t respected. It’s not a question of anything the United States or any other particular actor might do but no doubt there would be consequences.
 
QUESTION: You came here, so that means your concern grew after the referendum, because the concern of Washington was expressed at a meeting about the crisis. So how would you describe your concerns today? Actually they grew in intensity after the vote.
 
The second thing, you talked about the Venice Commission. How would you see it intervene? Did you go into details, how --
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Not great details. That would be up to Romanians and the Venice Commission itself. I just noted that it can sometimes be helpful to have this sort of external validator.
 
Yeah, I think it’s fair to say that our concerns have grown. We expressed them initially in reaction to some ideas about changing the makeup of the court and about questioning the court’s decision that there should be a 50 percent plus one quorum necessary, so we had concerns all along and we expressed them. Sometimes they were taken into account which was a positive thing. But they grew with the questions about the Constitutional Court’s role in validating the referendum, and so when we heard allegations of interfering with the court, when we heard allegations about fraudulent votes, when we heard questions about recounts to change the quorum threshold, yes, we grew more concerned because any of those things could result in questioning the legitimacy of the outcome.
 
QUESTION: When you say recounts, you mean changing the --
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: The voter lists, that’s right. Certain electoral rolls were used for -- and then the question came up well maybe we should take a different look at electoral rolls, and that’s not the normal process to examine the electoral rolls after they’ve been used.
 
QUESTION: But this process of recounting the electoral list is ongoing. When you met Prime Minister Victor Ponta, this process was still ongoing. Did you ask him if he’s going to stop this process or it was not an issue?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: As I said, I expressed our concern about a process that would put into question the electoral rolls that were used. It’s our understanding that the Constitutional Court asked for the original lists to be delivered, that’s what Mr. Barroso communicated in a letter which we support, and that’s the view that I expressed to Prime Minister Ponta and others here today. So that those initial voter rolls and lists can be examined as part of the validation process by the Constitutional Court. That’s what the court asked for and we said that that’s what should be delivered.
 
QUESTION: Do you have the impression that the acting president, and the prime minister, got your message in an appropriate way?
 
QUESTION: I will complete the question. Did they assume something to do in order to calm down Washington and the Western countries?
 
QUESTION: Because there was a kind of ambivalence during the last weeks between statements done by the acting president and especially by the prime minister abroad and inside the country?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: You ask if they got my message. I can’t speak for them. I can say that I clearly delivered the message that I’ve been sharing with you now. I said earlier that they said the right things. They expressed an absolute commitment to rule of law and the independence of the institutions and a willingness to see that serious allegations of fraud or interference are addressed.
 
So yes, I can say that I heard the right things about these issues. I believe that my message was heard loud and clear. Now we’d like to see the results so that the outcome in Romania is the democratic legitimate one that will serve everybody.
 
QUESTION: But there was not anything concrete on this issue of the voters of the electoral rolls? To update them or not to update them. Because the government is clearly saying that they are updating them according to nine categories.
 
QUESTION: That’s a little bit unclear. I think he refers very clear that among the concerns is the recounting of the electoral lists --
 
QUESTION: The updating?
 
QUESTION: Updating, yeah, of the electoral lists.
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: That’s up to the court to say exactly what lists it wants to see and what it intends to do with them, and we’d like to see the court address that as quickly as possible and move forward. So it’s not for me to say exactly in what ways lists might be updated or not updated. My understanding is the court asked for the lists that were used. Those lists should be made available. No one should allow for any ambiguity about whether they want to see those lists turned over or not. I did make clear -- again, while the bottom line being it’s up to the court to decide what lists should be used -- that I think everybody needs to be careful about giving the impression that they’re looking for ways to make the numbers different from what they actually were. It is not the normal process to revisit electoral lists after the result and after votes have been counted. Maybe in exceptional circumstances there can be reasons to look at certain factors, but that will be judged, and so that’s what I say from the outside and that’s why I say it might be useful to have the Venice Commission or someone else look at this. If the result were one in which certain lists were used and then they were updated, changed, revised in such a way that changed the outcome, I believe that people would have real questions about that outcome.
 
QUESTION: In that case, the answer of the acting president, the interim president, the answer of – prime minister should be like this: Okay, we will stop revisiting lists or updating lists and so on. Did they say that?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I communicated the view that I just expressed to them and you can ask them where they stand on the issue.
 
QUESTION: What do you think about the double standard, the double language of the Romanian Prime Minister outside and inside.
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Well, I’ll leave you to characterize his language. I described it.
 
QUESTION: Mr. Gordon knows only one standard: what he said today, the prime minister today. You didn’t witness him say the other way around. Probably, [inaudible] but only theoretically.
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I know what he told me today and we’ll see how this process develops moving forward.
 
QUESTION: There are some benefits being older, being older than you, with an important exception here. I was witnessing two equally important visits done by high officials of the State Department in the last [20] years. I’ve been here in this house in May ’90 when former State Secretary Eagleburger was here in order to convince Iliescu and his team to let the opposition parties taking part in the elections.
 
Then I’ve been here in April 2007 when they first dismissed Basescu and when the [Assistant] Secretary of State Daniel Fried came in in order to warn the opposition parties, especially the Liberals, not to withdraw, not to take advantage of this unsure period and to withdraw the Romanian military from Iraq.
 
Now you are here. Is your visit signaling the same level of concern as the two precedents?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: It’s hard to compare levels of concern with very different circumstances so I’m not going to get into that comparison. I expressed at the beginning that I am concerned, we are concerned. I don’t -- as much as I’d love to visit Romania at any time, a mid-August trip during a constitutional challenge suggests some level of concern about developments rather than just a nice opportunity to have a visit with my friend the ambassador, or some of you.
 
So yes, I’m not hiding that it reflects a certain degree of concern about developments, but I also want to be clear, as I said, that I’m confident that the message was received. The leaders I saw said the right things, and I’m very hopeful that they’ll also do the right things because I think ultimately they care about the country, and they must agree that a result whose legitimacy is in question will not be good for them or for the country. So I do think it was a very worthwhile visit and I’m glad I had the chance to come, and we’ll look forward to working with what I hope will be a very positive result.
 
QUESTION: So you didn’t come just because you have been already in the corner in Turkey? That was not an around the corner visit.
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: No. I came for the reasons expressed. I would have come anyway. I have been following this closely and discussing with the ambassador the right time to come, because it was important to reinforce the message he’s been giving and convey a message from Secretary Clinton. I’m glad I had the opportunity to do so.
 
QUESTION: Just to be clear. So you would ask the government to stop updating the lists you think or not?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: That’s not for --
 
QUESTION: I‘m sorry, because you said that it’s not up to you to exactly say what the court should get. But on the other hand you say that changing the list after the votes are -- Just to clarify what you -- Do you see the government is entitled to do this update or not?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I think that question has to be answered by the Constitutional Court. They need to say what lists they want to see and decide what to do with it. They need to be able to do that absolutely freely without any pressure from the outside. Those are the principles. It’s not for me to second guess. If they make decisions based on Romanian law and constitution, it’s not for me to second-guess that. I believe it would be reinforced by outside validators like the Venice Commission. So those are the principles that guide the way we’re thinking about this.
 
But I would repeat what I said, that if the result of this process were one in which the court’s opinions seem to have evolved, possibly under pressure, and that the original lists that were used were revisited and the numbers were changed and that changed the outcome of the vote, I think there would be serious questions from the outside about its legitimacy. That’s not the same as me dictating what it should be. I just note that as an outside observer. I think there would be questions if that’s -- That’s not the typical way of having a referendum, starting with a list, having a vote, having one outcome, looking at the list again and changing it and having a different outcome -- that would not be an ideal way forward.
 
QUESTION: But the lists are revisited at this moment as a fact.
 
QUESTION: The process is ongoing.
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I think I’ve been clear.
 
QUESTION: Recently the Poles said that they would prefer to have their own segment, fragmented segment of the missile shield. That was two weeks ago. Do you think that this has something to do with Romanian, I don’t know, unbalanced perspective?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: No. I don’t think so. I don’t think so -- Poland has its own interests in air and missile defense, but I would say about Poland what I said about Romania. We are absolutely clear about the President's intention to deploy all four phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to European missile defense --
 
QUESTION: Integrated into NATO?
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: -- and integrated into NATO, and we’re going to move forward with that.
 
Thanks everybody.

AFHANISTAN NEWS: FROM ISAF AUGUST 16, 2012

FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Combined Force Kills Taliban Leader, Detains Insurgents

From an International Security Assistance Force Joint Command News Release
KABUL, Afghanistan, Aug. 16, 2012 - In the Muqer district of Ghazni province today, a combined force searched for, engaged and killed Taliban leader Jihadmal, military officials reported.
Jihadmal had planned, coordinated and led multiple attacks in the region against Afghan and coalition forces, officials said.


The combined force also detained two suspected insurgents during the operation, officials said.
In other news today:


-- A combined force arrested two suspects during a search for a Taliban weapons distributer in the Washer district of Helmand province.


-- Afghan and coalition officials confirmed Taliban leader Ahmad Shah was killed Aug. 14 by a precision airstrike in the Panjwai district of Kandahar province. Shah provided heavy weapons and bomb-making materials to insurgents operating in the region. He also coordinated and directed insurgent attacks, frequently using improvised explosive devices to attack security forces.
In operations yesterday:


-- A combined force airstrike killed multiple insurgents in the Nizam-e Shahid district of Herat province. The deceased insurgents belonged to an insurgent cell controlled by Abdulla Akbari, and were planning a large-scale attack against Afghan government officials and Afghan security forces in Herat. Akbari is responsible for directing IED attacks throughout the province and rocket attacks against Herat Airfield.


-- A combined force airstrike killed multiple insurgents, including Mullah Anwar, a senior Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader, while the security force also detained two suspects and seized weapons and explosives in the Ishkamish district of Takhar province. Anwar was the senior IMU military leader in the Burkah district of Baghlan province, and was involved in the Aug. 13 assassination of the Ishkamish district mayor.

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK AND AIRCRAFT EXPORTS TO ETHIOPIA

MAP CREDIT: U.S. State Department
FROM: U.S. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK
First Ex-Im Bank-Supported 787 Aircraft Delivered to Ethiopian Airlines

Washington, D.C. – The delivery of the first Export-Import Bank of the United States-supported Boeing 787 Dreamliner to Ethiopian Airlines was celebrated at a ribbon-cutting ceremony in the main terminal of Washington Dulles International Airport here today.


Earlier in May, the Bank approved a loan guarantee of more than $1 billion to Ethiopian Airlines for the export of a new fleet of Boeing 787 Dreamliners. The transaction, which was co-financed by Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI), also supported the export of G.E. spare engines.


"This aircraft is an example of the kind of American innovation that sets us apart and will drive our export competitiveness in the manufacturing sector," said Patricia M. Loui, director of Ex-Im Bank. "These themes are central to the President's National Export Initiative."


The Boeing 787 aircraft is the first of its kind to be delivered to any airline outside of Japan, and it is the first one to be financed by Ex-Im Bank.


"At Ex-Im Bank," continued Loui, "we look for opportunities that will meet the objectives of President Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive on Africa, which includes stimulating economic growth, trade, and investment in Africa. Ex-Im Bank financing support for Ethiopian Airlines’ Boeing 787 aircraft is helping to achieve these important objectives."


Ex-Im Bank has worked with Ethiopian Airlines since 2002 to support its ongoing fleet renewal and expansion program.


"Ex-Im Bank's reliable and consistent support for Ethiopian Airlines' acquisition of state-of-the-art Boeing aircraft, including our first Boeing 787 Dreamliner, has been an important factor in the successful implementation of our growth strategy. Ethiopian Airlines is proud of being a good client of Ex-Im Bank, and we intend to maintain such a win-win partnership between our two organizations forever," said Kassim Geresu, chief financial officer of Ethiopian Airlines.


Ex-Im Bank authorized a record $1.4 billion to support U.S. export sales to buyers in Sub-Saharan Africa in FY 2011, and the Bank has already topped last year’s figures with $1.5 billion in the first three quarters of FY 2012.

VCNO Visits Bahrain, Thanks Sailors for Service

VCNO Visits Bahrain, Thanks Sailors for Service

SEC CHARGES ORACLE CORPORATION WITH VIOLATING FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN INDIA

FROM: U.S. SECURITES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C., Aug. 16, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Oracle Corporation with violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) by failing to prevent a subsidiary from secretly setting aside money off the company's books that was eventually used to make unauthorized payments to phony vendors in India.
 
 
The SEC alleges that certain employees of the India subsidiary of the Redwood Shores, Calif.-based enterprise systems firm structured transactions with India's government on more than a dozen occasions in a way that enabled Oracle India's distributors to hold approximately $2.2 million of the proceeds in unauthorized side funds. Those Oracle India employees then directed the distributors to make payments out of these side funds to purported local vendors, several of which were merely storefronts that did not provide any services to Oracle. Oracle's subsidiary documented certain payments with fake invoices.
 
Oracle agreed to pay a $2 million penalty to settle the SEC's charges.
 
"Through its subsidiary's use of secret cash cushions, Oracle exposed itself to the risk that these hidden funds would be put to illegal use," said Marc J. Fagel, Director of the SEC's San Francisco Regional Office. "It is important for U.S. companies to proactively establish policies and procedures to minimize the potential for payments to foreign officials or other unauthorized uses of company funds."
 
According to the SEC's complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, the misconduct at Oracle's India subsidiary - Oracle India Private Limited - occurred from 2005 to 2007. Oracle India sold software licenses and services to India's government through local distributors, and then had the distributors "park" excess funds from the sales outside Oracle India's books and records.
 
For example, according to the SEC's complaint, Oracle India secured a $3.9 million deal with India's Ministry of Information Technology and Communications in May 2006. As instructed by Oracle India's then-sales director, only $2.1 million was sent to Oracle to record as revenue on the transaction, and the distributor kept $151,000 for services rendered. Certain other Oracle India employees further instructed the distributor to park the remaining $1.7 million for "marketing development purposes." Two months later, one of those same Oracle India employees created and provided to the distributor eight invoices for payments to purported third-party vendors ranging from $110,000 to $396,000. In fact, none of these storefront-only third parties provided any services or were included on Oracle's approved vendor list. The third-party payments created the risk that the funds could be used for illicit purposes such as bribery or embezzlement.
 
The SEC's complaint alleges that Oracle violated the FCPA's books and records provisions and internal controls provisions by failing to accurately record the side funds that Oracle India maintained with its distributors. Oracle failed to devise and maintain a system of effective internal controls that would have prevented the improper use of company funds.
 
Without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, Oracle consented to the entry of a final judgment ordering the company to pay the $2 million penalty and permanently enjoining it from future violations of these provisions. The settlement takes into account Oracle's voluntary disclosure of the conduct in India and its cooperation with the SEC's investigation, as well as remedial measures taken by the company, including firing the employees involved in the misconduct and making significant enhancements to its FCPA compliance program.
 
The SEC's investigation was conducted by staff attorney Elena Ro and Assistant Regional Director Jina Choi in the San Francisco Regional Office. The SEC acknowledges the assistance of the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Internal Revenue Service.

BRIEFING ON AFGHANISTAN ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
On-the-Record Briefing with International Media
Press Availability
Robert O. Blake, Jr.
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
Almaty, Kazakhstan
August 15, 2012

A/S Blake: I am in Kazakhstan for a few hours. Right after this I will be having a meeting with business community to talk a little bit about all our efforts to promote regional economic integration and help Afghanistan and so forth. I thought it would be useful to talk to each of you as well about Kazakhstan and some of our regional integration efforts. I will just make a few opening comments and I will be glad to take your questions.

We are on the record unless we say otherwise. Just to start with, I am really delighted to be back here in Almaty and particularly delighted to be here in the wake of Kazakhstan’s great Olympics success, which I gather got quite a lot of attention here and got a lot of attention in the U.S. A relatively small country like Kazakhstan getting six gold medals and ten medals overall was quite a bit, so congratulations.

Reuters: Seven medals.

Blake: Was it?

Reuters: Seven gold medals and twelfth ranking among the countries.

Blake: Right. In terms of our relations with Kazakhstan, I think they are deepest and broadest of all countries in Central Asia. That is reflected in our decision earlier this year to establish a strategic partnership dialogue with Kazakhstan because we are increasingly working not just bilaterally with Kazakhstan but increasingly multilaterally. Not only in terms of Kazakhstan’s efforts in regional organizations, such the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, but also increasingly Kazakhstan is looking to expand its own assistance programs, to play a larger role in the regional integration process and work a lot on some of the very important regional issues, such as non-proliferation and so on. All of these are very consistent with what we are trying to accomplish and again one of the reasons why we have a very good partnership with Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan, and really Almaty in particular, is also important, I think, because it is a regional hub, not just for business, but also for a lot of the international organizations that we work with to try to promote this regional integration idea. Again it is a good opportunity for me to have a few hours to come here. Secretary Clinton has talked a lot about our goals helping Afghanistan to become a secure state and a prosperous country and a secure, stable, and prosperous country within a secure, stable, and prosperous region. There have been a tremendous number of efforts over the last few years to help that goal. You know about a number of international conferences that took place, including the NATO Summit in Lisbon in 2010, continuing with conferences in Istanbul and Bonn and recently the NATO summit in Chicago and the Tokyo Conference in early July. I think all of those, particularly the last two conferences, have sent a very strong message of the strong long-term commitment of the international community to Afghanistan’s future, and I want to say that we appreciate very much Kazakhstan’s role in all of this.

Kazakhstan sent a representative to the NATO Summit and was also strongly represented in all these conferences. It is also taking a leadership role and is helping to develop all these transport corridors. For example, a rail line going down through Turkmenistan to Afghanistan and also some other important efforts they are helping with, for example, training young Afghan students here in Kazakhstan. I think it is quite an important time and it is important that we have Kazakhstan working with us. In terms of our wider efforts, you have all heard Secretary Clinton talk about this New Silk Road vision. She has talked about how we want to help these three important transitions that are going to occur in Afghanistan. The security transition, you are all aware of, whereby all of the NATO troops will leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014. There will be a residual force that will remain and that remains to be negotiated, the exact composition of that.

In the meantime, we are all working to build up the Afghan national security forces so that they can take complete control over their own security. There is equally important political transition that will occur with the elections that will take place in 2014. And then last but not least, the economic transition as well, to help Afghanistan become more self-sufficient economically, to build up a private sector, and a very important part of that is the regional integration piece.

There are really two different parts to this. First is what we call the software, which is trade liberalization, reduction of non-tariff trade barriers, reducing delays on border clearances, and those kinds of obstacles to trade. The second is the equally important task of all the infrastructure – the web of roads, pipelines, electricity transmission lines and so forth that are really the nuts and bolts of regional economic connectivity. I think quite a lot of progress has been made on projects like the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline and a lot of these railroads that I talked about.

Again, we appreciate very much the role Kazakhstan played in that. In March of this year, many of you may have been at this conference in Tajikistan, the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference for Afghanistan, RECCA, which for the first time resulted in quite a good detailed blueprint that all of the region endorsed. It was developed by Afghanistan and endorsed by the whole region and included series of projects and also all these software projects that I talked about. So, there is a good clear regional consensus on the way forward. Progress has been made and again we do appreciate the support Kazakhstan has provided to that. With those opening remarks, let me turn it over to you. We have about 20 minutes and then I have to run off to another event. Thank you for your time and thanks for coming.

AP: On the software issue, I am interested about Uzbekistan in particular because they seem to be the country that creates a lot of problems, seems to me, in terms of the political situation and actually lately the investment situation is looking as grim as ever, latest problem over there, with one of the mobile service providers. Given how little progress we see in Uzbekistan, how realistic it is to talk about the software being in place for Uzbekistan’s role in the region.

Blake: You are right there are challenges now in the investment climate in Uzbekistan. I am going to Uzbekistan later today and we are bringing with us a fairly large delegation of American companies. So, there is still a lot of private sector interest. But I think there is still quite a lot Uzbekistan needs to do to improve its investment climate, such as the currency convertibility issue, and a lot of bureaucratic procedures that still make it difficult to do business in Uzbekistan. As to your wider question, I think, first of all, it is important to note that Uzbekistan has been quite an important leader in developing many of the kinds of things that I talked about. For example, Uzbekistan built a rail line south to Mazar-e-Sharif in cooperation with the Asian Development Bank.

That is now the main rail line that goes through Central Asia, and a lot of the equipment and supplies for our troops in Afghanistan go through that rail line. Secondly, Uzbekistan has provided a great deal of electricity to Afghanistan that helped light Kabul and many other parts of Afghanistan. That’s been a tremendous help. I think they are cooperating in a lot of these efforts that the ADB has on the way, for example the CAREC effort, where there is I think quite a lot of important work to get at these issues, like how do you reduce the border clearance and delays, how do you address corruption, how do you begin to harmonize customs and other types of regulations. I think Uzbekistan is cooperating. They have an interest in that. They are the most centrally located country. So, this is a work in progress. This is something very much on our agenda. This is something that we want to work on with our friends in Uzbekistan to try to make progress on.

Bloomberg: As I am from Bloomberg, a gas pipeline is what we are more interested more in. You mentioned TAPI. Taking into account that China has built a big pipeline. And Russia has a project for another pipeline from Turkmenistan. Do you think the project will be feasible and when it can be realized?

Blake: Do you mean feasible in terms of gas supplies?

Bloomberg: Yes.

Blake: I think there are sufficient gas supplies. We have always supported the development of multiple pipelines out of Turkmenistan and other countries as well to support their energy independence. But we see that the TAPI gas pipeline is particularly important because it’s going to join two of the most important end-points in this regional connectivity that we talk about, Turkmenistan and India. India, of course, has gigantic energy needs because of its fast-growing economy. They need lots of gas. I think that is what really helped drive this project. There is now a real market in India and they can afford to pay for the gas. Turkmenistan has sufficient gas to fuel this pipeline.

The pipeline would also provide significant transit revenues for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is also quite important to this vision that I talked earlier about for Afghanistan. So, in terms of the pipeline I think there has been good progress on what they call gas sale-purchase agreements between these countries. The next milestone is that there will be a road show that will take place sometime in September, at which they will begin to have concrete discussions about who is going to form and lead this consortium to actually build this pipeline. This is a crucial series of discussions that will take place.

Bloomberg: Are American companies going to be engaged?

Blake: Certainly. The road show will be going to the United States but also other countries as well. Many American companies are very interested in participating.

Bloomberg: Do you mean investors or contractors?

Blake: It depends on what’s on offer. There are a lot of risks to participating in such a pipeline. Part of their consideration will be what kind of incentives Turkmenistan will be prepared to offer international companies to get involved in that project. We will see when the road show takes place.

Reuters: Tajikistan - How do you assess the security situation given the recent events in Gorno-Badakhshan? What has the Tajikistan government asked for in terms of security assurances ahead of the drawdown role that the U.S. will play in Tajikistan?

Blake: First of all, I think the situation in Khorogh has stabilized somewhat. I think the curfew and so forth still remains there. We have been very active in helping to evacuate some of the American citizens that were in that part of the country. We continue to follow the situation very closely. This is something of significant concern to us. This is an area that has not always been under the control of the central government in Tajikistan. This is an area where a lot of drug smuggling takes place. So, it shows importance of some of the work that we and others have underway, to help the government provide border security, to be able to monitor what comes across that border, particularly in that region. It also reinforces the need for the government to continue to take its own measures to stop the drug trade, to stop a lot of these narco-criminal networks that are operating in that part of the country. So, we support them in their efforts to do so. We have various efforts underway to help the Tajik government. One of the important things that they must do is to address some of the corrupt activities of their own border guards and others who are helping to facilitate some of this trade. I think it is a two-way street, where the international community can help with border security and other things, and the Tajik government itself must take steps to address some of the corrupt activities.

As to the future, I think Tajikistan has been a very strong supporter of what we are trying to accomplish in Afghanistan. They hosted this very important RECCA conference. They have always been open to any way they can help Afghanistan. They, of course, are themselves very poor. But they strongly support these regional integration efforts that we are trying to promote. So, we see Tajikistan as an important partner and we want to try to work with them as much as possible to address some of the challenges that they face, particularly the narcotics trafficking and the border security issues. They have legitimate concerns about attempts from groups that are based either in Afghanistan or Pakistan trying to cross their borders, either to attack their own government or move up to Kyrgyzstan or potentially even Kazakhstan. It is very important for them to work not only with the international community, but also with Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region to address these problems.

AP: Going back to Uzbekistan…Would you have a chance to talk to raise the issue of accreditation for foreign journalists, which has been an issue for number of years. There is that issue.

Blake: Accreditation to visit or to be based there?

AP: Actually, to visit. I have been here for four years and I have never been granted any kind of permission, even to attend a conference or something like that. And I tried.

Blake: In general, we do talk a lot about freedom of the press and freedom of the media. We have problems with some of the American human rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch and others. But I was not aware that there was that obstacle. I will be glad to talk about that.

AP: The only international agency that is allowed is AFP.

Blake: I know that CNN was recently granted access. They went and generated quite a lot of reports.

AP: They did, although it’s a long story... It is quite conditional given the content of their reports. Also in Uzbekistan, there have been some reports from Russian media recently suggesting the possibility that during the drawdown during 2014 that military equipment might be left along. What assurances can be made making certain that the wrong things do not end in the wrong hands, by which I mean weaponry.

Blake: First of all, the process of allocating Excess Defense Articles is only just beginning. We are beginning the consultations on that. It won’t be just for Uzbekistan but for all countries partnering on NDN. There will be quite detailed conversations with our military people based in embassies in each of these posts, with host nation counterparts on this thing. With respect to Uzbekistan, I do not think there will be any lethal weapons of any kind that will be offered. I think most of the kind of things that will be on offer will be military vehicles, Humvees, those kind of things. It is in our interests to provide those kinds of equipment. Uzbekistan has been a strong supporter of the NDN. That has in turn raised their profile with international terrorist organizations, who may want to target Uzbekistan in retribution. So, it is very much in our interest to help Uzbekistan defend itself against such attacks.

We are certainly prepared to think about how we can do that. I myself have been engaged over the last year in the U.S. Congress to get a waiver so that we can provide non-lethal military assistance to Uzbekistan, even though they have not met a lot of the human rights conditions that would allow for more regular military assistance. That waiver has been approved. We are providing non-lethal military assistance now and will continue to do so, and the EDA process will be one way that we could help.

AP: There have been concerns expressed that perhaps in an informal fashion that somehow things might end in the wrong hands. I am wondering how much forward thinking there have been to make sure that has not happened because it is one thing to say we do not anticipate this to happen and another is … I mean the area of material not covered by the waiver would end up with Uzbek soldiers…

Blake: I wouldn’t worry about that. We have a very detailed and a very careful process of vetting all these things. We follow where these things are going. In some cases there has to be end-use monitoring.

Reuters: On Kazakhstan -- I wonder how closely you have been following the situation with Vladimir Kozlov, the opposition leader who goes on trial on Thursday. To what extent has Kazakhstan as an important partner, how has Kazakhstan progressed in judicial reform and human rights record?

Blake: First of all, this is an important issue that we talk about a lot with our friends in Kazakhstan. We think that Kazakhstan as a former chair of OSCE has a particular responsibility to show that it is making progress on these issues. We will be following very closely the trial of Mr. Kozlov and we hope it is going to be conducted in a fair, impartial, and open way, that we and others will be able to monitor the trial. We also hope that the trial itself will not undermine some of the progress that Kazakhstan is making to develop a multi-party democracy. We are pleased that for the first time, as a result of the most recent elections, there are now three parties in the Parliament. We want to try to encourage these parties to take an active role. Again, we do not want to see this trial undermine that progress.

AP: Do you think it will?

Blake: I don’t want to speculate. We will see. Obviously that is why we are going to monitor it closely.

Bloomberg: Talking about Kazakhstan….There was a riot and a few terrorist attacks, attempts I mean. Are you more concerned about political stability here? What is your impression?

Blake: I wouldn’t say we are concerned about political stability. I would say we share the concern of the local authorities about these attacks. It underlines again the importance of the counter-terrorism cooperation that we have with our friends in Kazakhstan. But it also underlines the importance of the authorities’ doing everything they can to respond to the needs and grievances of Kazakhstani citizens and not allowing these grievances to go unaddressed and perhaps give rise to terrorism or violent confrontation as opposed to peaceful means of resolving disputes. These are all part of our dialogue with our friends in the government and an important part of what we talk about all the time. We will have another session at the UN General Assembly in September. We strongly support what Kazakhstan is trying to achieve here. We are working with them. But we do believe they need to take further steps on things like religious freedom. You all have heard us talk about our concerns on the new religion law, which requires many groups now to re-register. Those kinds of things, if not properly handled, can give rise to greater grievances against the government and indirectly fuel the kinds of incidents that we have seen. It is important for the government to take steps not only on the counter-terrorism front but also on a wider democracy front.

Reuters: In these negotiations, how receptive are the authorities to these recommendations?

Blake: I think they are receptive. We always hear that they want to proceed in a measured but steady way to make progress on those things. We want to see that. Again, it is in their interests to do that. I think, candidly, many Kazakhstanis that we have spoken to have said that they understand that a lot of attacks that we have seen from groups like Jund al-Khalifa are not from international terrorist networks. These are due to grievances that are locally based, and therefore it underlines the importance of the government’s taking actions to address those grievances. Thank you for your time.

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