Wednesday, April 11, 2012
SECRETARY OF HHS KATHLEEN SEBELIUS SPEAKS AT NATIONAL HEALTH PROMOTION SUMMIT
FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
DELIVERED BY SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES KATHLEEN SIEBELIUS
National Health Promotion Summit
April 10, 2012
Washington, DC
I’m glad to be with you this morning because I believe nothing is more important to America’s future than our health. On a national level, you can look at any of our biggest goals as a country – increasing productivity and economic growth, making our businesses more competitive around the world, helping our children succeed in school, reducing our government deficits. Improving health contributes to every single one of them.
On an individual level, health is fundamental to opportunity. The healthier we are, the more freedom we have to pursue our dreams and contribute to our families and communities. A healthier country is one in which many more Americans have the chance to reach their full potential.
We have a clear and powerful national interest in promoting our country’s health. And we know from decades of research that the most effective way to do that is prevention. It’s not only easier to keep people healthy than treat them once they get sick. It’s usually less costly too.
And yet, as you know better than anyone, we have often treated prevention as an afterthought in this country. When this Administration came into office, prevention and public health accounted for less than 4 cents out of every health care dollar.
There were many reasons for this. The benefits of prevention can take a while to appear. When a dramatic surgery saves the life of a heart attack victim, we see the results right away. When a healthy diet helps prevent a deadly heart attack, it may not show up until years later as a data point in a study.
Health promotion is also complicated. There is no prevention pill. Instead, we know that health can be affected by everything from the air we breathe, to the food we eat, to the neighborhood we live in, to our job and income, to our family background. It can be hard to know where to start.
As a result, prevention too often became a talking point – an idea that generated lots of conversation but not enough action, especially from the federal government.
Today, I’m proud to say that this is changing. While much more work remains to be done, this Administration has made prevention a top priority – and an integral part of our health strategy – beginning in our first days in office.
From the First Lady’s historic Let’s Move campaign, to the Recovery Act’s community health investments, to the health care law, to a new emphasis on environmental justice, to a first of its kind National Prevention Strategy – we have made prevention a focus for the federal government over the last three years in a way it has never been before.
And that means the entire federal government. Prevention is no longer just the work of health agencies. Our National Prevention Strategy was developed with input from the Departments of Transportation, Education, Housing and Urban Development and more. And it gives these agencies responsibilities too.
So for those of you working on the front lines to promote better health in cities and towns across the country, my pledge to you this morning is that this Administration is going to be your partner. And today, I want to focus on one of the areas where we have the biggest opportunity to make a difference together, which is our work to reduce tobacco use.
It has now been nearly 50 years since the first Surgeon General’s report on the dangers of smoking. Back then, in the America I grew up in, smoking was everywhere: on airplanes, in offices, at the dinner table. Nearly half of all Americans were smokers.
The work we have done since then to reduce smoking rates is one of the great health triumphs of the last century. A report from the National Cancer Institute earlier this year found that between 1975 and 2000, these efforts saved the lives of 800,000 Americans who would have otherwise died of lung cancer. And that’s looking at a single disease in a 25 year window.
In the late 90s, it looked like this progress would continue as states invested money from the master settlement agreement and tobacco excise taxes in anti-tobacco ad campaigns and other prevention efforts. There was a feeling that tobacco use was on an inevitable decline.
But then we saw a pattern that is too familiar in prevention. Budgets tightened, and resources started getting diverted to areas with a more visible and immediate payoff. By the time this Administration came into office, smoking rates that had been falling for decades were stalled.
Today, smoking remains the leading cause of preventable death, killing an estimated 443,000 Americans – more than died in all of World War II – each year. And for every person who dies from smoking, at least two young smokers take their place. In total, nearly 4,000 young people smoke their first cigarette every day, beginning what may become a deadly addiction before they’re even eligible to vote.
This was the challenge facing the country when this Administration came into office. But there was some good news too: we knew what worked. In large part because of the incredible work many of you have done in states and communities, we already had a set of proven interventions that we knew could prevent illness and save lives.
We know comprehensive smoke-free laws work because states and cities that have put them in place have seen hospitalizations from heart attacks drop an average of up to 17 percent.
We know that helping people quit works because when Massachusetts expanded tobacco cessation benefits for Medicaid recipients, their smoking rates were cut by 26 percent.
And we know how effective comprehensive tobacco control programs can be because California’s has brought smoking levels down to near 12 percent.
These interventions save lives. And they save money too. On average, smokers have $2,000 more in health care costs a year than the general population. That means every time we keep a young person from starting, we could be saving more than $100,000 over his or her lifetime. At a time when health care costs have become one of the biggest items on the budgets of families, businesses, and state and federal government, we can’t afford not to expand these efforts.
So over the last three years, that’s exactly what we’ve done. In areas where the federal government can make a difference, we’re stepping up. For example, using the new regulatory powers it got in the 2009 tobacco control legislation, the FDA is now restricting the use of misleading terms like light or low-tar.
Beginning next year, they’ll also require tobacco companies to disclose the quantities of harmful and potentially harmful chemicals that they put in their products. Today, we know everything about the food we put in our bodies down to the food coloring but have little idea what’s in our cigarettes. That’s going to change.
And FDA has also announced a final rule that will require that cigarette packaging and ads to carry new warning graphic warning labels. This is the most significant change to cigarette warnings in 25 years in the United States, and it ensures that when people pick up a pack of cigarettes, they’ll have much better information about the risk they’re taking.
We’re also doing more to help the 45 million Americans who already smoke quit – something nearly 70 percent of them say they want to do. We know from new research that even long-time smokers’ bodies begin to heal almost immediately if they quit. After just 24 hours, their chances of having a heart attack drop. Within a few weeks, their lungs are working better.
So we’re making it easier for people to break their tobacco addictions. All Americans in new health plans can now get smoking cessation counseling without paying a co-pay or deductible. And we’ve changed a Medicare policy that forced beneficiaries to wait until after symptoms started to appear to get help quitting. Now, seniors can get help before they get sick.
Last month, we also did something that the federal government has never done before: we launched a national tobacco control media campaign. We estimate the new ads will lead more than half a million smokers to seek out the resources they need to quit, saving $170 million over the next three years. And I’m happy to report that in the week after the campaign went on the air, we saw the number of calls to our national quit line more than double.
These are all steps it makes sense to take at the federal level. But we also recognize that most of the work in our battle against tobacco use has and will continue to happen at the state and local level. So with funding from the Recovery Act and the health care law, we’re funding proven community efforts like establishing smoke-free policies in parks and housing projects that we hope can become national models. We’re reaching out to employers too, helping them establish smoke-free workplaces that improve health and productivity. And we’re working with states to step up inspections to ensure that retailers don’t sell tobacco products to kids.
Our approach, in other words, is to take every proven intervention we have – and then do them all. That’s important because, personal decisions around tobacco use are not easy. One person may quit because they see an ad on television. Another may stop because of the inconvenience of not being able to smoke at their workplace or favorite restaurant. A third may kick the habit with the help of a counseling program. But more often, it’s a combination of all these factors that helps people break their addictions. That means we need to cover all the bases.
When you put all these steps together, this is the most ambitious federal tobacco control effort in several decades. But there is much more work to be done. If we are going to get tobacco rates falling again, we need to continue to expand smoke-free policies. We need health care providers to treat start treating tobacco addiction like the potentially deadly condition it is and refer their patients to resources that can help them quit. We need more employers to cover tobacco cessation treatment in their health plans, for the sake of their employees and their bottom lines. We need retailers to continue their efforts to avoid selling tobacco to youth.
If we can do all of this, I believe we have a real shot to achieve our Health People 2020 goal of cutting the share of Americans who smoke to 12 percent. It won’t be easy, but the payoff would be huge. Even if we only got halfway to that goal, we would save millions of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars.
And that’s just tobacco. We’re also seeing new progress in areas from HIV/AIDS, where a new national strategy is in place, to childhood obesity, where the First Lady and others have helped inspire a new sense of urgency and spirit of partnership.
In all these prevention efforts, we’re guided by a few key principles.
First, we need to commit the resources. Prevention cannot just be a talking point.
Second, we need to focus those resources on the interventions that have proven to be effective. We need to pay close attention to the latest science – like the recent discovery that HIV/AIDS treatment is itself one of the best forms of prevention – and let that science inform our work.
Third, we can’t rely on any one intervention. There are no silver bullets. We need a comprehensive approach.
Fourth, no organization can do it on its own. It needs to be the federal, state and local government, schools, the business community, health care providers, community-based organizations, researchers, families and individuals all working together.
Fifth, and most important, we need to sustain these efforts. We have seen time and time again in public health, from tobacco to TB to HIV/AIDS, that we cannot coast to better health. We need to keep our foot down on the accelerator.
No one would ever propose giving our kids half an immunization. Or purifying half a city’s water supply. And we should be just as insistent when it comes to sustaining other life-saving prevention programs too.
We know it will not be easy. But we can no longer afford - from a financial perspective or a health perspective – to rely on delivering better care in intensive care units and emergency rooms as our primary strategy for improving health. It’s about time we as a country got serious about prevention, and this Administration is going to work with you every step of the way to make that happen.
Thank you.
NAVAL COMMANDER ON GUAM SIGNS PROCLAMATION RECOGNIZING SEXUAL ASSAULT AWARENESS MONTH
FROM: U.S. NAVY
SANTA RITA, Guam (April 9, 2012)
Capt. Richard Wood, commanding officer of U.S. Naval Base Guam, signs a proclamation in recognition of Sexual Assault Awareness Month, with the support of Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) advocates from various commands and the Fleet and Family Support Center. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Corey Hensley (Released) 120409-N-UE250-004
PROLIFERATION THREAT AND COUNTER-PROLIFERATION
FROM: U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
The Proliferation Threat and Counter-proliferation: Why It Matters for the GCC
Remarks Vann Van Diepen
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Key Note Address, U.S. Gulf Cooperation Council Workshop
Dubai, United Arab Emirates
April 12, 2012
Introduction
Good Morning, Dr. Saeed Al Shamsi, Consul General Siberell, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen.
I would like to extend my thanks to the Government of the United Arab Emirates for co-hosting with the United States this Gulf Cooperation Council Counterproliferation Workshop. It is a pleasure for me to be back in Dubai.
I am particularly pleased to be here with all of you today, and gratified that we have representatives from all the GCC countries. I think that is an indication of the importance your governments have placed on countering the threat of proliferation -- as well as an indication of the value you have placed on working together on this issue, with each other, and with the United States.
I want to take a few minutes to set the stage for the conference by outlining in broad strategic terms the threat that proliferation poses to international peace and security, to the stability of this region, and to all of the countries gathered here.
I then want to briefly discuss why it is so important for GCC countries to work to counter this proliferation threat, not only nationally, but in cooperation with each other and in cooperation with other friendly countries such as the United States.
I will then briefly note how the rest of the workshop will focus in on the broad spectrum of interlocking measures that each of us can use to combat, impede, and ultimately thwart proliferation – and by so doing improve the national security and economic viability of all of our countries.
Proliferation: The Strategic Threat
The international community has long recognized the threat that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons – and their delivery systems pose to global and regional security. And all of us are fully aware of the fact that this threat is posed not only by countries of concern, but by terrorists.
The use of WMD – especially against cities -- would have horrendous physical, psychological, and economic consequences, and could even threaten the maintenance of civil order in the countries where it is used. Even the presence of WMD in countries of concern:
can lead those countries to threaten their neighbors in order to extract political and economic concessions;
it can embolden those countries to engage in conventional aggression or terrorism against their neighbors; and
it risks promoting arms races where neighboring states decide they must acquire WMD of their own, potentially resulting in an expanding spiral of insecurity and instability.
And you are all well aware this threat is not just theoretical. It exists in the real world, and it affects this region as well as others. For example...
Iran has been acquiring, developing, and deploying for over 20 years ballistic missiles that are inherently capable of delivering WMD, missiles with ranges that easily cover all the GCC countries and even southeastern Europe. It is actively pursuing yet longer-range systems that can cover Western Europe and beyond.
Iran is violating its United Nations (UN) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations by continuing to enrich uranium, in the process clearly demonstrating the technical capability to produce highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons.
The IAEA has formally reported that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device, some of which may be ongoing, and that these past activities included some related to the development of a nuclear payload for a ballistic missile.
There is mounting evidence that Iran did not declare and has not destroyed all aspects of its offensive chemical weapons program under the Chemical Weapons Convention – which raises questions about it declarations concerning biological weapons (BW) as well.
North Korea openly admits to developing and having tested nuclear weapons. It deploys WMD-capable ballistic missiles able to threaten its neighbors, has tried to flight-test missiles able to reach the United States, and sells missiles and missile technology to any country willing to pay – including to countries in the Middle East. North Korea also is widely believed to have substantial CW and BW programs.
Syria, too, has a large CW program and ballistic missiles capable of targeting the entire region. It has been researching biological weapons, and attempted unsuccessfully to conceal construction of a nuclear reactor that had no logical purpose other than the production of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.
Beyond these examples of nation-state proliferation, it is clear that Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups are interested in acquiring WMD. Terrorists – both groups and individuals – can operate in any country, and can engage in attacks against any country. CW and BW in particular can be developed using technology available worldwide. Terrorists actually have used sarin nerve gas and anthrax bioweapons.
Why Counterproliferation Matters
It is very clear from these examples that all of our countries face a direct security threat from the potential for countries of concern or terrorists to use WMD directly against us. We also face the threat of political and economic instability caused by the use of WMD against others, as well as from the mere possession of WMD by countries of concern and terrorists.
In addition, however, the national and economic security of all of our countries is undermined by proliferators’ efforts to acquire WMD and their delivery systems, and the ability to make them, by misusing the territories, economies, and institutions of our countries. Proliferators do so in four key ways.
First, proliferators seek to acquire items for their WMD and missile programs directly from our countries – not just the United States, but increasingly from the other countries in this room as your economies and technology levels develop.
Second, in order to disguise their actual intention to use the items in proliferation programs, proliferators pretend that reputable countries such as yours are the destination for items they buy in third countries. Proliferators do this by:
1. falsely listing countries such as yours as end-users in export paperwork;
2. by diverting to their countries items imported into y countries such as yours from elsewhere; and
3. by having brokers and front companies – often, small import/export companies -- based in countries such as yours purchase the goods from third countries on the proliferant country’s behalf.
For example, a multi-million dollar procurement network has been using a series of companies in a third country to procure steel and aluminum alloys for use in a proliferant ballistic missile program.
Third, proliferators seek to move through countries such as yours goods they have purchased elsewhere for use in their WMD and missile programs, by misusing the common commercial practices of transit and transshipment to camouflage illicit activities. Indeed, proliferators have singled out transshipment hubs such as those in this region as a critical part of their efforts to evade the global framework of trade controls.
For example, in 2009 a UN Member State inspecting a cargo ship passing through its busy transshipment port on the way elsewhere discovered anti-tank ammunition and other munitions. The ship's manifest revealed the weapons were actually on their way to another country in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions.
Nor are proliferant transits and transshipments only by sea. Last year, during a routine check, authorities in another UN Member State discovered weapons aboard a cargo aircraft traveling through its airspace from a neighboring country to a country of concern.
Just a few weeks ago, a UN Member State discovered two independent truck shipments, one with missile-related items and one with CW-related items, moving through its territory from one neighbor to a country of concern.
Fourth, proliferators seek to use banks or middlemen in countries such as yours to pay for the items they need for their WMD and missile programs.
For example, a Chinese citizen who procures items for proliferation programs in another country used front companies and false names to route payments through New York bank accounts to sell graphite to a proliferant ballistic missile program.
Increasingly, proliferators are applying several of these approaches simultaneously.
For example, a proliferator with Canadian citizenship imported from the United States pressure transducers, dual-use items that can be used in uranium enrichment.
Since enrichment is not something that happens in Canada, that part of the transfer did not raise suspicions, as the proliferator intended.
But the proliferator then exported the items from Canada to a proliferation program by falsifying the description and cost of the shipment, and routing it via a third country.
In all of these cases, proliferators are misusing our territories and economies against our will -- using stealth, lies, and manipulation to obtain support for WMD and missile programs that directly threaten our security. These same actions by proliferators also:
subvert legitimate trade,
call into question the good reputations of our companies and ports, and
thus undermine the confidence needed for legitimate trade to grow.
This directly inhibits our countries’ economic prosperity, not just our national security. And the proliferators are not standing still. They are increasingly adaptive and creative:
seeking alternative suppliers, such as overseas distributors;
using front companies, cut-outs, and brokers to facilitate and conceal diversion;
falsifying documentation, end-users, and end-uses; and
using circuitous shipping routes and multiple transshipment points to obscure the actual destination of their shipments.
In addition, proliferators are increasingly interested in procuring items not on multilateral control lists. Proliferators use these non-listed items, which also have legitimate commercial applications, to help produce WMD and missiles, either directly or to substitute for items on the multilateral lists.
Counterproliferation Cooperation is the Answer
I hope I have clearly demonstrated the importance of the issue to all of our countries, and the magnitude of the challenge we face. The threats posed by, and activities of, proliferators are global in scope – and they bear heavily on this region as well.
It is no surprise, therefore, that the answer to countering and reducing this threat also is global in scope, and requires work in this region as well. Fortunately, the international community has developed effective methods against the proliferation threat that our countries and other responsible countries can bring to bear. Analyzing and discussing these various methods, how they work, and how to implement them will be the focus of the bulk of this workshop.
Let me briefly outline the tools and solutions that we will be discussing together.
We will start at the global and multilateral level, briefly examining the international authorities and control regimes that provide foundational sources and legal bases for combating proliferation. We also look forward in that segment to hearing more about the GCC Customs Union.
We then will move to a discussion of national level solutions, where we want to analyze the core elements of strategic trade controls and share experiences.
I noted earlier the challenge of proliferators seeking items not on, or below the thresholds of, the multilateral regime control lists, and their misuse of transshipment – both techniques proliferators commonly use against this region. So the next segment in the workshop will focus on catch-all controls and transshipment best practices.
Then the session on combating proliferation financing will highlight tools to prevent proliferators from misusing your banking systems to facilitate illicit trade.
Finally, we want to make you aware of some of the resources that are available to you to help build capacity in your countries to fight proliferation, and to implement these various tools.
And at the end of our second day together, we will have a “table top” exercise that will give us an opportunity to interact, directly and dynamically, to see how all the tools we’ve been discussing fit together in the real world. I hope this will help us develop some new ideas about how to work together and assist each other.
In conclusion, let me suggest that a recurring theme of this workshop is that the central element of effectively countering proliferation is cooperation:
cooperation between different ministries within each country, and between government and industry;
cooperation between neighbors within a region; and
cooperation with friends and trading partners from outside the region and with the broad international community.
Just as proliferators use networks to procure goods and services, we need to be a network of nonproliferators, employing best practices, and creating a layered, mutually reinforcing defense strategy against proliferation and its associated procurement efforts. All of the countries here today have a key role to play in this network. And I am quite sure that our workshop will promote the cooperation and collaboration needed to combat the proliferation threat that endangers the security and prosperity of us all.
Thank you.
U.S. OFFICIAL REMARKS ON WHY COUNTER-PROLIFERATION MATTERS FOR GCC
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
The Proliferation Threat and Counterproliferation: Why It Matters for the GCC
Remarks Vann Van Diepen
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Key Note Address, U.S. Gulf Cooperation Council Workshop
Dubai, United Arab Emirates
April 12, 2012
Introduction
Good Morning, Dr. Saeed Al Shamsi, Consul General Siberell, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen.
I would like to extend my thanks to the Government of the United Arab Emirates for co-hosting with the United States this Gulf Cooperation Council Counterproliferation Workshop. It is a pleasure for me to be back in Dubai.
I am particularly pleased to be here with all of you today, and gratified that we have representatives from all the GCC countries. I think that is an indication of the importance your governments have placed on countering the threat of proliferation -- as well as an indication of the value you have placed on working together on this issue, with each other, and with the United States.
I want to take a few minutes to set the stage for the conference by outlining in broad strategic terms the threat that proliferation poses to international peace and security, to the stability of this region, and to all of the countries gathered here.
I then want to briefly discuss why it is so important for GCC countries to work to counter this proliferation threat, not only nationally, but in cooperation with each other and in cooperation with other friendly countries such as the United States.
I will then briefly note how the rest of the workshop will focus in on the broad spectrum of interlocking measures that each of us can use to combat, impede, and ultimately thwart proliferation – and by so doing improve the national security and economic viability of all of our countries.
Proliferation: The Strategic Threat
The international community has long recognized the threat that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons – and their delivery systems pose to global and regional security. And all of us are fully aware of the fact that this threat is posed not only by countries of concern, but by terrorists.
The use of WMD – especially against cities -- would have horrendous physical, psychological, and economic consequences, and could even threaten the maintenance of civil order in the countries where it is used. Even the presence of WMD in countries of concern:
can lead those countries to threaten their neighbors in order to extract political and economic concessions;
it can embolden those countries to engage in conventional aggression or terrorism against their neighbors; and
it risks promoting arms races where neighboring states decide they must acquire WMD of their own, potentially resulting in an expanding spiral of insecurity and instability.
And you are all well aware this threat is not just theoretical. It exists in the real world, and it affects this region as well as others. For example...
Iran has been acquiring, developing, and deploying for over 20 years ballistic missiles that are inherently capable of delivering WMD, missiles with ranges that easily cover all the GCC countries and even southeastern Europe. It is actively pursuing yet longer-range systems that can cover Western Europe and beyond.
Iran is violating its United Nations (UN) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations by continuing to enrich uranium, in the process clearly demonstrating the technical capability to produce highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons.
The IAEA has formally reported that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device, some of which may be ongoing, and that these past activities included some related to the development of a nuclear payload for a ballistic missile.
There is mounting evidence that Iran did not declare and has not destroyed all aspects of its offensive chemical weapons program under the Chemical Weapons Convention – which raises questions about it declarations concerning biological weapons (BW) as well.
North Korea openly admits to developing and having tested nuclear weapons. It deploys WMD-capable ballistic missiles able to threaten its neighbors, has tried to flight-test missiles able to reach the United States, and sells missiles and missile technology to any country willing to pay – including to countries in the Middle East. North Korea also is widely believed to have substantial CW and BW programs.
Syria, too, has a large CW program and ballistic missiles capable of targeting the entire region. It has been researching biological weapons, and attempted unsuccessfully to conceal construction of a nuclear reactor that had no logical purpose other than the production of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.
Beyond these examples of nation-state proliferation, it is clear that Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups are interested in acquiring WMD. Terrorists – both groups and individuals – can operate in any country, and can engage in attacks against any country. CW and BW in particular can be developed using technology available worldwide. Terrorists actually have used sarin nerve gas and anthrax bioweapons.
Why Counterproliferation Matters
It is very clear from these examples that all of our countries face a direct security threat from the potential for countries of concern or terrorists to use WMD directly against us. We also face the threat of political and economic instability caused by the use of WMD against others, as well as from the mere possession of WMD by countries of concern and terrorists.
In addition, however, the national and economic security of all of our countries is undermined by proliferators’ efforts to acquire WMD and their delivery systems, and the ability to make them, by misusing the territories, economies, and institutions of our countries. Proliferators do so in four key ways.
First, proliferators seek to acquire items for their WMD and missile programs directly from our countries – not just the United States, but increasingly from the other countries in this room as your economies and technology levels develop.
Second, in order to disguise their actual intention to use the items in proliferation programs, proliferators pretend that reputable countries such as yours are the destination for items they buy in third countries. Proliferators do this by:
1. falsely listing countries such as yours as end-users in export paperwork;
2. by diverting to their countries items imported into y countries such as yours from elsewhere; and
3. by having brokers and front companies – often, small import/export companies -- based in countries such as yours purchase the goods from third countries on the proliferant country’s behalf.
For example, a multi-million dollar procurement network has been using a series of companies in a third country to procure steel and aluminum alloys for use in a proliferant ballistic missile program.
Third, proliferators seek to move through countries such as yours goods they have purchased elsewhere for use in their WMD and missile programs, by misusing the common commercial practices of transit and transshipment to camouflage illicit activities. Indeed, proliferators have singled out transshipment hubs such as those in this region as a critical part of their efforts to evade the global framework of trade controls.
For example, in 2009 a UN Member State inspecting a cargo ship passing through its busy transshipment port on the way elsewhere discovered anti-tank ammunition and other munitions. The ship's manifest revealed the weapons were actually on their way to another country in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions.
Nor are proliferant transits and transshipments only by sea. Last year, during a routine check, authorities in another UN Member State discovered weapons aboard a cargo aircraft traveling through its airspace from a neighboring country to a country of concern.
Just a few weeks ago, a UN Member State discovered two independent truck shipments, one with missile-related items and one with CW-related items, moving through its territory from one neighbor to a country of concern.
Fourth, proliferators seek to use banks or middlemen in countries such as yours to pay for the items they need for their WMD and missile programs.
For example, a Chinese citizen who procures items for proliferation programs in another country used front companies and false names to route payments through New York bank accounts to sell graphite to a proliferant ballistic missile program.
Increasingly, proliferators are applying several of these approaches simultaneously.
For example, a proliferator with Canadian citizenship imported from the United States pressure transducers, dual-use items that can be used in uranium enrichment.
Since enrichment is not something that happens in Canada, that part of the transfer did not raise suspicions, as the proliferator intended.
But the proliferator then exported the items from Canada to a proliferation program by falsifying the description and cost of the shipment, and routing it via a third country.
In all of these cases, proliferators are misusing our territories and economies against our will -- using stealth, lies, and manipulation to obtain support for WMD and missile programs that directly threaten our security. These same actions by proliferators also:
subvert legitimate trade,
call into question the good reputations of our companies and ports, and
thus undermine the confidence needed for legitimate trade to grow.
This directly inhibits our countries’ economic prosperity, not just our national security. And the proliferators are not standing still. They are increasingly adaptive and creative:
seeking alternative suppliers, such as overseas distributors;
using front companies, cut-outs, and brokers to facilitate and conceal diversion;
falsifying documentation, end-users, and end-uses; and
using circuitous shipping routes and multiple transshipment points to obscure the actual destination of their shipments.
In addition, proliferators are increasingly interested in procuring items not on multilateral control lists. Proliferators use these non-listed items, which also have legitimate commercial applications, to help produce WMD and missiles, either directly or to substitute for items on the multilateral lists.
Counterproliferation Cooperation is the Answer
I hope I have clearly demonstrated the importance of the issue to all of our countries, and the magnitude of the challenge we face. The threats posed by, and activities of, proliferators are global in scope – and they bear heavily on this region as well.
It is no surprise, therefore, that the answer to countering and reducing this threat also is global in scope, and requires work in this region as well. Fortunately, the international community has developed effective methods against the proliferation threat that our countries and other responsible countries can bring to bear. Analyzing and discussing these various methods, how they work, and how to implement them will be the focus of the bulk of this workshop.
Let me briefly outline the tools and solutions that we will be discussing together.
We will start at the global and multilateral level, briefly examining the international authorities and control regimes that provide foundational sources and legal bases for combating proliferation. We also look forward in that segment to hearing more about the GCC Customs Union.
We then will move to a discussion of national level solutions, where we want to analyze the core elements of strategic trade controls and share experiences.
I noted earlier the challenge of proliferators seeking items not on, or below the thresholds of, the multilateral regime control lists, and their misuse of transshipment – both techniques proliferators commonly use against this region. So the next segment in the workshop will focus on catch-all controls and transshipment best practices.
Then the session on combating proliferation financing will highlight tools to prevent proliferators from misusing your banking systems to facilitate illicit trade.
Finally, we want to make you aware of some of the resources that are available to you to help build capacity in your countries to fight proliferation, and to implement these various tools.
And at the end of our second day together, we will have a “table top” exercise that will give us an opportunity to interact, directly and dynamically, to see how all the tools we’ve been discussing fit together in the real world. I hope this will help us develop some new ideas about how to work together and assist each other.
In conclusion, let me suggest that a recurring theme of this workshop is that the central element of effectively countering proliferation is cooperation:
cooperation between different ministries within each country, and between government and industry;
cooperation between neighbors within a region; and
cooperation with friends and trading partners from outside the region and with the broad international community.
Just as proliferators use networks to procure goods and services, we need to be a network of nonproliferators, employing best practices, and creating a layered, mutually reinforcing defense strategy against proliferation and its associated procurement efforts. All of the countries here today have a key role to play in this network. And I am quite sure that our workshop will promote the cooperation and collaboration needed to combat the proliferation threat that endangers the security and prosperity of us all.
Thank you.
Tuesday, April 10, 2012
U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT DAILY BRIEFING
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
04/10/2012 03:57 PM EDT
Victoria Nuland
Spokesperson
Daily Press Briefing
Washington, DC
April 10, 2012
TRANSCRIPT:
12:55 p.m. EDT
MS. NULAND: Happy Tuesday, everyone. I have nothing at the top. Let’s go to what’s on your minds.
QUESTION: I guess we could start with Syria. You have seen the report of Kofi Annan or the letter that he has sent to the Security Council and the report of his aide. So I’m wondering what you make of it, and are you okay with him sticking to this timeline, with the regime not withdrawing its forces as best you can tell, but staying with the timeline? In other words, another 48 hours until there’s a ceasefire? Is that okay with you guys?
MS. NULAND: Well, we’ve seen the letter that Joint Envoy Kofi Annan has submitted to the council. I think you know that the council is still in session as we speak asking questions of his deputy, talking about the letter and thinking about next steps. My understanding is that, in her capacity as president of the council this month, Ambassador Rice will have some comments to the press after that session breaks. So I don’t think I will comment from here ahead of the council finishing its consultations.
QUESTION: Okay. So you’re basically deferring to Susan Rice.
MS. NULAND: I am.
QUESTION: Victoria –
QUESTION: There was – sorry. There was talks that this deadline is extended till April 12th. Are you – what is this all about?
MS. NULAND: Again, I think I’m not going to speak to the contents of the report by the special envoy. The – as you remember, the initial – the proposal in the six-point plan was that the Syrian regime would begin or complete, depending upon how you interpret their pull-back, by April 10th, and then the opposition would complete its ceasefire by April 12th. That’s why you have a little bit of confusion here about this delta. So –
QUESTION: So you are comfortable with the 48 hours? Apparently the Syrians had asked for 48 hours to complete the pullout. Is that correct?
MS. NULAND: Again, I’m not going to comment on the substance of any of this until the council finishes deliberating and Susan has a chance to – Ambassador Rice has a chance to speak for the council and us.
QUESTION: Just to quickly follow up, the Syrians are asking for some sort of guarantees or – that the opposition will cease its attacks and so on. And they’re also saying that there is an increased flow of arms into the opposition, apparently by countries such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, which at the time of the conference, apparently the Secretary of State said it’s okay for others to go ahead and give aid. Now, are the Syrians principally correct in demanding that arms stop flowing to the opposition and they cease whatever attacks they’re conducting against government sources?
MS. NULAND: Well, starting with where I started before, which is, I’m not going to wade into any of this while the council is deliberating. I’m going to let Ambassador Rice come out and speak for the council as a whole and then speak for the United States in her national capacity. We know who bears the brunt of the responsibility for the violence in Syria. We also know, as we discussed yesterday, that there has been no evidence at all that the Assad regime is complying with the six-point plan, and in fact, the violence has gotten worse as we discussed at some length yesterday.
QUESTION: Yeah. But forgive me; principally, does the Syrian regime have the right or is it within its right to request that the flow of arms stop going to the opposition?
MS. NULAND: I’m not going to speak to any of these issues until we have a chance to hear from Ambassador Rice.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Toria, you just pointed out that there has been no action by the regime so far. So isn’t it time, if you stand back and look at this, to say that the whole UN approach, Kofi Annan’s plan, really isn’t working? Nothing has indicated that that regime is going to anything.
MS. NULAND: Again, Jill, I don’t think it’s appropriate in the middle of a council deliberation for me to be opining on what’s going on in the council.
QUESTION: Would you respond to a statement from Senators McCain and Lieberman who were in the region today that said, “Diplomacy with Assad has failed”?
MS. NULAND: Well, obviously we have two senators in the region. Our understanding is that they are touring the refugee camps in Turkey today, and they are obviously speaking to what they are seeing. But I don’t think I’m going to comment on any of this while the council is deliberating.
Please.
QUESTION: Will you intensify your efforts to find a solution for Syria in UN Security Council? I mean, is there any –
MS. NULAND: Again, I think I’m going to speak to next steps after the council has finished hearing the report.
QUESTION: Do you believe that Annan carries the last chance for President Assad?
MS. NULAND: I’m not going to put time tables on any of this at the moment.
QUESTION: But you keep asking him to step down. I mean, we’ve been hearing this for so long. I mean, are you asking him to step down now? Is this – the time has come? Or is it you’re talking about giving him more chances? Or when he’s going to step down?
MS. NULAND: Well, our view is that he has lost his legitimacy. The Syrian people appear to be saying the same thing.
Please.
QUESTION: Victoria, do you think that the Russians are sending conflicting signals regarding Syria? On the one hand receiving Muallem and on the other saying that the Syrians should have acted quicker?
MS. NULAND: Well, again, the Russians joined us in supporting the Annan plan, in making clear that it was time for the violence to stop, that the Assad regime had to lead the way in that, and our expectation and understanding is that they used the opportunity of Foreign Minister Muallem’s visit to make those same points.
Please. In the back.
QUESTION: Change of subject?
MS. NULAND: Yeah. Please.
QUESTION: No. One –
MS. NULAND: You can keep trying, but I think we’re not going to do a lot of Syria today.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) on the Russian part.
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: So would you – do you perceive any type of movement perhaps then on the part of the Russians?
MS. NULAND: Well, again, the Russians are represented in the Security Council. They’re receiving the report. We’re having a chance to talk to them there today. As you know, we have the G-8 foreign ministers in town starting tomorrow. So the Secretary will have a chance to consult with Foreign Minister Lavrov tomorrow and Thursday. So we’ll have a chance to compare notes then.
Yeah. Please.
QUESTION: Syria?
MS. NULAND: Yeah. Still Syria.
QUESTION: It seems that the safe-zone option along the Turkish border is (inaudible). So – and according to news report, Turkey has hinted that it will go along if it get the support of U.S. If Kofi Annan plan fail, are you ready to consider that kind of support?
MS. NULAND: You’re taking me into all kinds of hypotheticals. We talked about this a little bit yesterday. We talked about the several Turkish statements to the effect that they were studying this. We obviously haven’t had the results of their study.
Please.
QUESTION: The Indian Embassy this morning received a bomb threat call. Do you have any information on that and who were behind this?
MS. NULAND: I can confirm that there was a bomb threat at the Indian Embassy in Washington earlier today. Appropriate law enforcement personnel responded immediately. All three of the Indian official locations in Washington have now been cleared – the chancery, the ambassador’s residence, and the visa office, and no device was located.
QUESTION: When you say “cleared,” you mean evacuated? Or “cleared,” you mean checked?
MS. NULAND: Both evacuated and checked for bombs.
QUESTION: And now people have come back to them?
MS. NULAND: I don’t know if they’ve gone back to work, but security officials have declared them clear.
QUESTION: So do you think at this point that it’s probably a hoax, then?
MS. NULAND: I think there’ll be an investigation, obviously, and we’ll see what that leads to.
QUESTION: And where was this call from? Have you been able to trace the call back?
MS. NULAND: I don’t have any information as to who called. I would guess that that’ll be part of the investigative steps that go on.
QUESTION: Does this lead to any kind of increase in security or --
MS. NULAND: Say again?
QUESTION: Does this lead to any kind of increase in security presence outside the Indian embassies or the ambassador’s residence?
MS. NULAND: I would guess that part of our evaluation going forward in terms of what happened will be to determine whether the security posture is adequate.
QUESTION: Thank you.
QUESTION: Sorry. Can I just clarify one thing? You guys – someone called here to tell you that there was a bomb at the Indian Embassy?
MS. NULAND: Frankly, I don’t know whether the Indian Embassy was notified that there might be a threat and then they notified law enforcement and us, or whether we were notified and --
QUESTION: Can we move --
MS. NULAND: I don’t know. Yeah. Please.
QUESTION: Move on?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: North Korea.
MS. NULAND: Yes.
QUESTION: I realize that you said probably as much as you’re going to say yesterday, but I’m going to try again.
MS. NULAND: It’s one of those kind of days. Yeah.
QUESTION: Weeks, maybe.
MS. NULAND: Weeks. I’m sorry, sir. Although we were up here for an hour and 10 minutes yesterday.
QUESTION: Well, let me try and go to it at a different angle. The White House yesterday seemed to take alert when you mentioned something about reporting from North Korea yesterday. And I asked you about it, and you seemed to suggest that there wasn’t any problem. But then, now there are White House officials coming out on the record telling news organizations not to be sucked in by this North Korea propaganda campaign. Is this the – does the State Department share those concerns?
MS. NULAND: I haven’t actually seen what White House colleagues have said. Was that something that --
QUESTION: Tommy Vietor.
MS. NULAND: -- that Tommy said? Well, look, I mean, obviously freedom of the press – you all will cover this as you see fit. Our concern obviously would be that the North Koreans would use this for propaganda purposes and that news organizations that cover it extensively might be playing into that. But it’s obviously your call how to cover this story.
QUESTION: You don’t think that North Korea would be using it for propaganda purposes without any – I mean, in the absence of inviting people in to cover it?
MS. NULAND: Well, it obviously has propaganda value. But the more that it is covered and spread and the more stories about it, it just keeps them on the front page in a way that does not enhance peace and security. But you’ll obviously all make your own decisions.
QUESTION: Understood. But I’m just curious about that, because I mean, it’s going to be on the front page whether there are news – Western news organizations there or not. Right? It’s a matter of concern. It’s a newsworthy event if they launch a missile, is it not?
MS. NULAND: It’s obviously a newsworthy event. I think that --
QUESTION: So what’s the concern?
MS. NULAND: If – again, having not seen what Tommy had to say, I would guess that the sentiment expressed was simply that if you have lots of nightly news coverage and long pieces climbing up and down the rocket and all that stuff, it just is free publicity for this --
QUESTION: But doesn’t that illustrate the problem?
MS. NULAND: Well --
QUESTION: And shouldn’t that make people – I mean, increase the concern? I mean, it seems to me that this is a problem for – the idea of the launch is a problem, correct? Yes.
MS. NULAND: We’ve been clear about that.
QUESTION: So the more attention that’s paid to that, the greater understanding there is of this problem, no?
MS. NULAND: I don’t think that it is a matter of the issue going unreported. It’s simply, I would guess, the sense that the more coverage of this, the more long pieces about North Korea, all this kind of stuff, they get exactly what they want. They get lots of attention from all of you about their situation.
QUESTION: Okay.
MS. NULAND: And frankly, this is publicity that --
QUESTION: But here’s the thing. They’re going to get all this attention from you regardless, right? So I don’t get – what difference does it make?
MS. NULAND: Well, I’ll refer you to the White House on what they were thinking. Thanks.
QUESTION: A follow-up on a question about the U.S. team that was sent to Pakistan to help in the avalanche. Are they still in Islamabad?
MS. NULAND: That is my understanding, Cami, that they are still in Islamabad.
QUESTION: Any word on when they might move? Are they going to move? Are they just going to sit in Islamabad?
MS. NULAND: Well, obviously we responded to the request for help. They went to Islamabad to coordinate with Pakistani officials. I really can’t speak to either what the conditions on the mountain are, whether there are issues having to do with getting in, or whether, several days having gone by, there is sort of rethinking about whether the international teams can and should be deployed. I’m just going to send you to the Pakistanis on that. But we are making them available so that they can help in whatever way the Pakistanis might find helpful.
Please.
QUESTION: Can I just go back to North Korea?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: I mean, the White House at its press gaggle in Palm Beach and the comments just said that it would be, quote, “hard to imagine” that the food aid would still be delivered if this launch goes ahead. Is that a statement of policy now that if this launch goes ahead, the food aid will be retracted?
MS. NULAND: We’ve been clear about where we are on this for weeks and weeks, and I think the White House statement reflected that, obviously.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Can we go back to Syria just for a minute?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: Just to follow up on Nadia’s question on the issue of stepping down, Bashar al-Assad to step down, would that be a requirement that he must do immediately, or are you willing to consider – not you but the international community – giving him like maybe a two-year period until the next election? I mean, what is the deal here? What is the demand?
MS. NULAND: You’re getting me into negotiations with Assad now?
QUESTION: I mean, what is your principle position? That he must immediately step down?
MS. NULAND: Our view is that Syria cannot move forward with Assad in power. The President has been clear about that for months and months and months. We had supported the Arab League plan, which gives a detailed roadmap for how this could proceed, looks similar to some of the other situations we’ve seen in the region. Again, this is an issue for the Syrian people to settle. We want to see the fighting stop so we can get to that conversation about how a transition should go forward.
QUESTION: Okay. So your support for the Arab League plan has not changed at all?
MS. NULAND: Correct.
QUESTION: Speaking of roadmaps, I understand the Quartet envoys are meeting today to try and come up with some kind of statement that suggests that there is progress being made when, in fact, there isn’t. Is that correct? And what can you do to – tell us to preview tomorrow’s Quartet meeting, principals meeting?
MS. NULAND: The Quartet envoys are meeting later this afternoon to prepare the meeting at the level of ministers and principals tomorrow. They – so tomorrow the Quartet will meet at the level of principals, which is Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, EU High Representative Ashton, UN Secretary General Ban, and obviously Secretary Clinton. Quartet Representative Tony Blair will also join that meeting.
We do anticipate that there will be a Quartet statement at the conclusion of that meeting tomorrow about midday. The envoys are working on it today, and it’ll be concluded by principals tomorrow.
The focus of the Quartet meetings tomorrow won’t surprise you, will continue to be trying to support the parties and move them closer to dialogue and creating the context for dialogue between them. They will also be looking at how they can build on the work that was done by the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee when it met in Brussels last week, emphasizing the need for robust international support for the Palestinian Authority and institution building. But obviously, we have to see to what the results of the meeting are tomorrow.
QUESTION: Are you still pushing for the Jordan – the Jordanian-sponsored talks to resume? Or is that now a dead duck?
MS. NULAND: Well, we obviously think that the talks that were conducted in Jordan were very useful in January, that they began a process that we would be prepared to see built on. But there are other ways for the parties to reengage with each other, and we would be supportive of any means of reengagement that would be helpful.
QUESTION: So you moved beyond the Jordan --
MS. NULAND: Again, if the parties are ready to go back to Jordan, we continue to support that process. But we also would support other ways that reengagement can happen.
QUESTION: There’s no participation --
QUESTION: They are meeting in the Blair House?
MS. NULAND: Blair House tomorrow. Yeah.
QUESTION: Okay. And just a quick follow-up. There’s also a meeting tomorrow between Fayyad and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu regarding a letter that the Palestinian Authority has submitted. Will that statement in any way reflect what is in the letter or what is being discussed or what comes out of that meeting between Fayyad and Netanyahu?
MS. NULAND: I can’t speak to Fayyad, Netanyahu meeting tomorrow. We’ll have to see if, in fact, the meeting is tomorrow, and if, in fact, there is a letter. I think our goals are obviously all the same, which is how we can get these parties to continue to work together and work on stability and security in the Palestinian territories.
QUESTION: And finally, you keep insisting that the proper venue is the resumption of the talks. Now, on the other hand, the Palestinian Authority is planning some sort of a campaign to reach out to the Israeli public, like YouTube and messages and advertisements and all these things. Is that a good thing or is that in contradiction with what you want them to do?
MS. NULAND: Well, I think all of the parties engaged in this, whether they’re Quartet parties or whether they’re the Israelis and Palestinians, engage in public diplomacy in any way that they deem appropriate. What’s most important is that we all be seeking a negotiated solution.
QUESTION: There is no representation of either the Palestinians or the Israelis in tomorrow’s meeting. Is that correct?
MS. NULAND: Correct. Correct.
QUESTION: Is that normal for them not to be represented?
MS. NULAND: Actually, usually when the Quartet meets, they meet on their own, and then the envoys go off and see the parties. That’s generally the way it happens, yeah.
QUESTION: Just to stay on this --
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: -- with Israel just for one second. And that is – and I realize this is a White House thing, so you’re probably going to send me there, but the Pollard case. Do you – did you at all – are you aware of a letter that was sent by the Israeli president to President Obama asking for Pollard’s release?
MS. NULAND: I understand that the White House has now received the Pollard letter. I will refer you to them.
QUESTION: Okay. Because that’s more than Jay Carney said earlier this morning. They have gotten it?
MS. NULAND: I understand. They have now received it, yep. And that the President obviously appreciates hearing the views, but I’m going to send you to the White House for more on that.
QUESTION: Does the State Department take any position in this?
MS. NULAND: I think the entire Administration’s position on the Pollard case has not changed.
Please.
QUESTION: Can we switch to China?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: There are reports that – there’s a report, excuse me, singular, on Xinhua that Bo Xilai’s wife is under suspicion of having murdered the British businessman, Neil Heywood. I realize this is a Chinese investigation regarding the murder or death of a British citizen, but does it strike you as a step forward that the Chinese at least appear to be investigating the circumstances of his death, which I think were originally attributed to excessive alcohol consumption?
MS. NULAND: We’re aware of these reports. I think we are going to decline to comment on them one way or the other.
Jill.
QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the investigators in Russia dropping the charges against a nurse who was implicated in the death of Sergei Magnitsky?
MS. NULAND: We were waiting for you yesterday, Jill.
QUESTION: I know. I wasn’t here. But I saved it up.
MS. NULAND: Look, you know our view, that the investigation into the circumstances of Magnitsky’s death has been inadequate and has failed to produce justice. We continue to call on Russian authorities to conduct a genuine investigation, to prosecute and punish those responsible for Magnitsky’s death. So obviously we’re not moving in that direction.
Please, Cami.
QUESTION: On Libya, the apparent attack today on the head of the UN mission there. Someone apparently threw an explosive device at the convoy. Just wondering how concerned you are about the continuing violence there and the prospects for Libya making some sort of economic recovery if these sorts of attacks are going to go on against Western or international targets.
MS. NULAND: Well, we strongly condemn today’s attack on the UN convoy travelling through Benghazi. We call for a full investigation, the Libyans cooperating with UN authorities on that. We are, again, taking this opportunity to call on all armed groups in Libya to exercise restraint, to refrain from violence, to work through their issues through dialogue. But I have to tell you, Cami, we don’t have a lot of information as to who was responsible, or what the circumstances of this were. But it’s absolutely unacceptable. We are just thankful that nobody was hurt.
All right?
QUESTION: Yeah. I have one more.
MS. NULAND: Please, Matt?
QUESTION: Two more, actually.
MS. NULAND: Yep.
QUESTION: Bahrain. Yesterday, you said that there were going to be more calls made about this hunger striker? Were those calls made?
MS. NULAND: Our ambassador in Bahrain, Ambassador Krajeski had a number of calls yesterday and today with Bahraini officials making clear our concern about this case.
QUESTION: No one else?
MS. NULAND: No.
QUESTION: And you’re aware of the latest today on this case? I mean, there was – again, the other day, there was the Bahrainis refusing to release them and now that – is it the Danish or the Norwegian, I can’t --
MS. NULAND: Danish.
QUESTION: Danish. The Danish have reupped their – resubmitted their appeal for his release, and apparently it’s been rejected again. So we can be clear: Your – the Administration’s position on this is that he should be allowed to go to Denmark, or what is it that these calls are being made to --
MS. NULAND: We are not – yeah. We are not dictating any particular solution. We are just asking for a humanitarian resolution of this case.
Please.
QUESTION: Toria, have you raised concern about the deteriorating health of Al-Khawaja in prison?
MS. NULAND: This is the case – this is the – yeah. This is case that we talked about it yesterday, and I’ve just responded.
QUESTION: Do you have anything about his daughter? Yesterday, all you said was that you were aware of her arrest.
MS. NULAND: I don’t have anything new on his daughter. I understood that she was arrested – she was detained temporarily and that she’s been released. But if that’s not accurate, we’ll get back to you.
QUESTION: Okay.
MS. NULAND: Yeah. Please, Nadia. Nadia, and then --
QUESTION: Do you have any position on whether former regime – former Mubarak regime’s official should stand in election – presidential election or not? Because there is a committee in the parliament now approved the banning of Omar Suleiman from nominating himself for the presidential election.
MS. NULAND: Yeah. I think we’re not going to comment on these individual issues inside of Egypt other than to say we want to see the election procedures followed. We want to see a transparent, open process with clear rules of the road.
Please.
QUESTION: Afghanistan? Afghanistan interior ministers are here in town. Are they having any meetings in this building?
MS. NULAND: I don’t believe so. I don’t believe so. Okay? Thanks, everybody.
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
04/10/2012 03:57 PM EDT
Victoria Nuland
Spokesperson
Daily Press Briefing
Washington, DC
April 10, 2012
TRANSCRIPT:
12:55 p.m. EDT
MS. NULAND: Happy Tuesday, everyone. I have nothing at the top. Let’s go to what’s on your minds.
QUESTION: I guess we could start with Syria. You have seen the report of Kofi Annan or the letter that he has sent to the Security Council and the report of his aide. So I’m wondering what you make of it, and are you okay with him sticking to this timeline, with the regime not withdrawing its forces as best you can tell, but staying with the timeline? In other words, another 48 hours until there’s a ceasefire? Is that okay with you guys?
MS. NULAND: Well, we’ve seen the letter that Joint Envoy Kofi Annan has submitted to the council. I think you know that the council is still in session as we speak asking questions of his deputy, talking about the letter and thinking about next steps. My understanding is that, in her capacity as president of the council this month, Ambassador Rice will have some comments to the press after that session breaks. So I don’t think I will comment from here ahead of the council finishing its consultations.
QUESTION: Okay. So you’re basically deferring to Susan Rice.
MS. NULAND: I am.
QUESTION: Victoria –
QUESTION: There was – sorry. There was talks that this deadline is extended till April 12th. Are you – what is this all about?
MS. NULAND: Again, I think I’m not going to speak to the contents of the report by the special envoy. The – as you remember, the initial – the proposal in the six-point plan was that the Syrian regime would begin or complete, depending upon how you interpret their pull-back, by April 10th, and then the opposition would complete its ceasefire by April 12th. That’s why you have a little bit of confusion here about this delta. So –
QUESTION: So you are comfortable with the 48 hours? Apparently the Syrians had asked for 48 hours to complete the pullout. Is that correct?
MS. NULAND: Again, I’m not going to comment on the substance of any of this until the council finishes deliberating and Susan has a chance to – Ambassador Rice has a chance to speak for the council and us.
QUESTION: Just to quickly follow up, the Syrians are asking for some sort of guarantees or – that the opposition will cease its attacks and so on. And they’re also saying that there is an increased flow of arms into the opposition, apparently by countries such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, which at the time of the conference, apparently the Secretary of State said it’s okay for others to go ahead and give aid. Now, are the Syrians principally correct in demanding that arms stop flowing to the opposition and they cease whatever attacks they’re conducting against government sources?
MS. NULAND: Well, starting with where I started before, which is, I’m not going to wade into any of this while the council is deliberating. I’m going to let Ambassador Rice come out and speak for the council as a whole and then speak for the United States in her national capacity. We know who bears the brunt of the responsibility for the violence in Syria. We also know, as we discussed yesterday, that there has been no evidence at all that the Assad regime is complying with the six-point plan, and in fact, the violence has gotten worse as we discussed at some length yesterday.
QUESTION: Yeah. But forgive me; principally, does the Syrian regime have the right or is it within its right to request that the flow of arms stop going to the opposition?
MS. NULAND: I’m not going to speak to any of these issues until we have a chance to hear from Ambassador Rice.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Toria, you just pointed out that there has been no action by the regime so far. So isn’t it time, if you stand back and look at this, to say that the whole UN approach, Kofi Annan’s plan, really isn’t working? Nothing has indicated that that regime is going to anything.
MS. NULAND: Again, Jill, I don’t think it’s appropriate in the middle of a council deliberation for me to be opining on what’s going on in the council.
QUESTION: Would you respond to a statement from Senators McCain and Lieberman who were in the region today that said, “Diplomacy with Assad has failed”?
MS. NULAND: Well, obviously we have two senators in the region. Our understanding is that they are touring the refugee camps in Turkey today, and they are obviously speaking to what they are seeing. But I don’t think I’m going to comment on any of this while the council is deliberating.
Please.
QUESTION: Will you intensify your efforts to find a solution for Syria in UN Security Council? I mean, is there any –
MS. NULAND: Again, I think I’m going to speak to next steps after the council has finished hearing the report.
QUESTION: Do you believe that Annan carries the last chance for President Assad?
MS. NULAND: I’m not going to put time tables on any of this at the moment.
QUESTION: But you keep asking him to step down. I mean, we’ve been hearing this for so long. I mean, are you asking him to step down now? Is this – the time has come? Or is it you’re talking about giving him more chances? Or when he’s going to step down?
MS. NULAND: Well, our view is that he has lost his legitimacy. The Syrian people appear to be saying the same thing.
Please.
QUESTION: Victoria, do you think that the Russians are sending conflicting signals regarding Syria? On the one hand receiving Muallem and on the other saying that the Syrians should have acted quicker?
MS. NULAND: Well, again, the Russians joined us in supporting the Annan plan, in making clear that it was time for the violence to stop, that the Assad regime had to lead the way in that, and our expectation and understanding is that they used the opportunity of Foreign Minister Muallem’s visit to make those same points.
Please. In the back.
QUESTION: Change of subject?
MS. NULAND: Yeah. Please.
QUESTION: No. One –
MS. NULAND: You can keep trying, but I think we’re not going to do a lot of Syria today.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) on the Russian part.
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: So would you – do you perceive any type of movement perhaps then on the part of the Russians?
MS. NULAND: Well, again, the Russians are represented in the Security Council. They’re receiving the report. We’re having a chance to talk to them there today. As you know, we have the G-8 foreign ministers in town starting tomorrow. So the Secretary will have a chance to consult with Foreign Minister Lavrov tomorrow and Thursday. So we’ll have a chance to compare notes then.
Yeah. Please.
QUESTION: Syria?
MS. NULAND: Yeah. Still Syria.
QUESTION: It seems that the safe-zone option along the Turkish border is (inaudible). So – and according to news report, Turkey has hinted that it will go along if it get the support of U.S. If Kofi Annan plan fail, are you ready to consider that kind of support?
MS. NULAND: You’re taking me into all kinds of hypotheticals. We talked about this a little bit yesterday. We talked about the several Turkish statements to the effect that they were studying this. We obviously haven’t had the results of their study.
Please.
QUESTION: The Indian Embassy this morning received a bomb threat call. Do you have any information on that and who were behind this?
MS. NULAND: I can confirm that there was a bomb threat at the Indian Embassy in Washington earlier today. Appropriate law enforcement personnel responded immediately. All three of the Indian official locations in Washington have now been cleared – the chancery, the ambassador’s residence, and the visa office, and no device was located.
QUESTION: When you say “cleared,” you mean evacuated? Or “cleared,” you mean checked?
MS. NULAND: Both evacuated and checked for bombs.
QUESTION: And now people have come back to them?
MS. NULAND: I don’t know if they’ve gone back to work, but security officials have declared them clear.
QUESTION: So do you think at this point that it’s probably a hoax, then?
MS. NULAND: I think there’ll be an investigation, obviously, and we’ll see what that leads to.
QUESTION: And where was this call from? Have you been able to trace the call back?
MS. NULAND: I don’t have any information as to who called. I would guess that that’ll be part of the investigative steps that go on.
QUESTION: Does this lead to any kind of increase in security or --
MS. NULAND: Say again?
QUESTION: Does this lead to any kind of increase in security presence outside the Indian embassies or the ambassador’s residence?
MS. NULAND: I would guess that part of our evaluation going forward in terms of what happened will be to determine whether the security posture is adequate.
QUESTION: Thank you.
QUESTION: Sorry. Can I just clarify one thing? You guys – someone called here to tell you that there was a bomb at the Indian Embassy?
MS. NULAND: Frankly, I don’t know whether the Indian Embassy was notified that there might be a threat and then they notified law enforcement and us, or whether we were notified and --
QUESTION: Can we move --
MS. NULAND: I don’t know. Yeah. Please.
QUESTION: Move on?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: North Korea.
MS. NULAND: Yes.
QUESTION: I realize that you said probably as much as you’re going to say yesterday, but I’m going to try again.
MS. NULAND: It’s one of those kind of days. Yeah.
QUESTION: Weeks, maybe.
MS. NULAND: Weeks. I’m sorry, sir. Although we were up here for an hour and 10 minutes yesterday.
QUESTION: Well, let me try and go to it at a different angle. The White House yesterday seemed to take alert when you mentioned something about reporting from North Korea yesterday. And I asked you about it, and you seemed to suggest that there wasn’t any problem. But then, now there are White House officials coming out on the record telling news organizations not to be sucked in by this North Korea propaganda campaign. Is this the – does the State Department share those concerns?
MS. NULAND: I haven’t actually seen what White House colleagues have said. Was that something that --
QUESTION: Tommy Vietor.
MS. NULAND: -- that Tommy said? Well, look, I mean, obviously freedom of the press – you all will cover this as you see fit. Our concern obviously would be that the North Koreans would use this for propaganda purposes and that news organizations that cover it extensively might be playing into that. But it’s obviously your call how to cover this story.
QUESTION: You don’t think that North Korea would be using it for propaganda purposes without any – I mean, in the absence of inviting people in to cover it?
MS. NULAND: Well, it obviously has propaganda value. But the more that it is covered and spread and the more stories about it, it just keeps them on the front page in a way that does not enhance peace and security. But you’ll obviously all make your own decisions.
QUESTION: Understood. But I’m just curious about that, because I mean, it’s going to be on the front page whether there are news – Western news organizations there or not. Right? It’s a matter of concern. It’s a newsworthy event if they launch a missile, is it not?
MS. NULAND: It’s obviously a newsworthy event. I think that --
QUESTION: So what’s the concern?
MS. NULAND: If – again, having not seen what Tommy had to say, I would guess that the sentiment expressed was simply that if you have lots of nightly news coverage and long pieces climbing up and down the rocket and all that stuff, it just is free publicity for this --
QUESTION: But doesn’t that illustrate the problem?
MS. NULAND: Well --
QUESTION: And shouldn’t that make people – I mean, increase the concern? I mean, it seems to me that this is a problem for – the idea of the launch is a problem, correct? Yes.
MS. NULAND: We’ve been clear about that.
QUESTION: So the more attention that’s paid to that, the greater understanding there is of this problem, no?
MS. NULAND: I don’t think that it is a matter of the issue going unreported. It’s simply, I would guess, the sense that the more coverage of this, the more long pieces about North Korea, all this kind of stuff, they get exactly what they want. They get lots of attention from all of you about their situation.
QUESTION: Okay.
MS. NULAND: And frankly, this is publicity that --
QUESTION: But here’s the thing. They’re going to get all this attention from you regardless, right? So I don’t get – what difference does it make?
MS. NULAND: Well, I’ll refer you to the White House on what they were thinking. Thanks.
QUESTION: A follow-up on a question about the U.S. team that was sent to Pakistan to help in the avalanche. Are they still in Islamabad?
MS. NULAND: That is my understanding, Cami, that they are still in Islamabad.
QUESTION: Any word on when they might move? Are they going to move? Are they just going to sit in Islamabad?
MS. NULAND: Well, obviously we responded to the request for help. They went to Islamabad to coordinate with Pakistani officials. I really can’t speak to either what the conditions on the mountain are, whether there are issues having to do with getting in, or whether, several days having gone by, there is sort of rethinking about whether the international teams can and should be deployed. I’m just going to send you to the Pakistanis on that. But we are making them available so that they can help in whatever way the Pakistanis might find helpful.
Please.
QUESTION: Can I just go back to North Korea?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: I mean, the White House at its press gaggle in Palm Beach and the comments just said that it would be, quote, “hard to imagine” that the food aid would still be delivered if this launch goes ahead. Is that a statement of policy now that if this launch goes ahead, the food aid will be retracted?
MS. NULAND: We’ve been clear about where we are on this for weeks and weeks, and I think the White House statement reflected that, obviously.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Can we go back to Syria just for a minute?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: Just to follow up on Nadia’s question on the issue of stepping down, Bashar al-Assad to step down, would that be a requirement that he must do immediately, or are you willing to consider – not you but the international community – giving him like maybe a two-year period until the next election? I mean, what is the deal here? What is the demand?
MS. NULAND: You’re getting me into negotiations with Assad now?
QUESTION: I mean, what is your principle position? That he must immediately step down?
MS. NULAND: Our view is that Syria cannot move forward with Assad in power. The President has been clear about that for months and months and months. We had supported the Arab League plan, which gives a detailed roadmap for how this could proceed, looks similar to some of the other situations we’ve seen in the region. Again, this is an issue for the Syrian people to settle. We want to see the fighting stop so we can get to that conversation about how a transition should go forward.
QUESTION: Okay. So your support for the Arab League plan has not changed at all?
MS. NULAND: Correct.
QUESTION: Speaking of roadmaps, I understand the Quartet envoys are meeting today to try and come up with some kind of statement that suggests that there is progress being made when, in fact, there isn’t. Is that correct? And what can you do to – tell us to preview tomorrow’s Quartet meeting, principals meeting?
MS. NULAND: The Quartet envoys are meeting later this afternoon to prepare the meeting at the level of ministers and principals tomorrow. They – so tomorrow the Quartet will meet at the level of principals, which is Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, EU High Representative Ashton, UN Secretary General Ban, and obviously Secretary Clinton. Quartet Representative Tony Blair will also join that meeting.
We do anticipate that there will be a Quartet statement at the conclusion of that meeting tomorrow about midday. The envoys are working on it today, and it’ll be concluded by principals tomorrow.
The focus of the Quartet meetings tomorrow won’t surprise you, will continue to be trying to support the parties and move them closer to dialogue and creating the context for dialogue between them. They will also be looking at how they can build on the work that was done by the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee when it met in Brussels last week, emphasizing the need for robust international support for the Palestinian Authority and institution building. But obviously, we have to see to what the results of the meeting are tomorrow.
QUESTION: Are you still pushing for the Jordan – the Jordanian-sponsored talks to resume? Or is that now a dead duck?
MS. NULAND: Well, we obviously think that the talks that were conducted in Jordan were very useful in January, that they began a process that we would be prepared to see built on. But there are other ways for the parties to reengage with each other, and we would be supportive of any means of reengagement that would be helpful.
QUESTION: So you moved beyond the Jordan --
MS. NULAND: Again, if the parties are ready to go back to Jordan, we continue to support that process. But we also would support other ways that reengagement can happen.
QUESTION: There’s no participation --
QUESTION: They are meeting in the Blair House?
MS. NULAND: Blair House tomorrow. Yeah.
QUESTION: Okay. And just a quick follow-up. There’s also a meeting tomorrow between Fayyad and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu regarding a letter that the Palestinian Authority has submitted. Will that statement in any way reflect what is in the letter or what is being discussed or what comes out of that meeting between Fayyad and Netanyahu?
MS. NULAND: I can’t speak to Fayyad, Netanyahu meeting tomorrow. We’ll have to see if, in fact, the meeting is tomorrow, and if, in fact, there is a letter. I think our goals are obviously all the same, which is how we can get these parties to continue to work together and work on stability and security in the Palestinian territories.
QUESTION: And finally, you keep insisting that the proper venue is the resumption of the talks. Now, on the other hand, the Palestinian Authority is planning some sort of a campaign to reach out to the Israeli public, like YouTube and messages and advertisements and all these things. Is that a good thing or is that in contradiction with what you want them to do?
MS. NULAND: Well, I think all of the parties engaged in this, whether they’re Quartet parties or whether they’re the Israelis and Palestinians, engage in public diplomacy in any way that they deem appropriate. What’s most important is that we all be seeking a negotiated solution.
QUESTION: There is no representation of either the Palestinians or the Israelis in tomorrow’s meeting. Is that correct?
MS. NULAND: Correct. Correct.
QUESTION: Is that normal for them not to be represented?
MS. NULAND: Actually, usually when the Quartet meets, they meet on their own, and then the envoys go off and see the parties. That’s generally the way it happens, yeah.
QUESTION: Just to stay on this --
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: -- with Israel just for one second. And that is – and I realize this is a White House thing, so you’re probably going to send me there, but the Pollard case. Do you – did you at all – are you aware of a letter that was sent by the Israeli president to President Obama asking for Pollard’s release?
MS. NULAND: I understand that the White House has now received the Pollard letter. I will refer you to them.
QUESTION: Okay. Because that’s more than Jay Carney said earlier this morning. They have gotten it?
MS. NULAND: I understand. They have now received it, yep. And that the President obviously appreciates hearing the views, but I’m going to send you to the White House for more on that.
QUESTION: Does the State Department take any position in this?
MS. NULAND: I think the entire Administration’s position on the Pollard case has not changed.
Please.
QUESTION: Can we switch to China?
MS. NULAND: Yeah.
QUESTION: There are reports that – there’s a report, excuse me, singular, on Xinhua that Bo Xilai’s wife is under suspicion of having murdered the British businessman, Neil Heywood. I realize this is a Chinese investigation regarding the murder or death of a British citizen, but does it strike you as a step forward that the Chinese at least appear to be investigating the circumstances of his death, which I think were originally attributed to excessive alcohol consumption?
MS. NULAND: We’re aware of these reports. I think we are going to decline to comment on them one way or the other.
Jill.
QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the investigators in Russia dropping the charges against a nurse who was implicated in the death of Sergei Magnitsky?
MS. NULAND: We were waiting for you yesterday, Jill.
QUESTION: I know. I wasn’t here. But I saved it up.
MS. NULAND: Look, you know our view, that the investigation into the circumstances of Magnitsky’s death has been inadequate and has failed to produce justice. We continue to call on Russian authorities to conduct a genuine investigation, to prosecute and punish those responsible for Magnitsky’s death. So obviously we’re not moving in that direction.
Please, Cami.
QUESTION: On Libya, the apparent attack today on the head of the UN mission there. Someone apparently threw an explosive device at the convoy. Just wondering how concerned you are about the continuing violence there and the prospects for Libya making some sort of economic recovery if these sorts of attacks are going to go on against Western or international targets.
MS. NULAND: Well, we strongly condemn today’s attack on the UN convoy travelling through Benghazi. We call for a full investigation, the Libyans cooperating with UN authorities on that. We are, again, taking this opportunity to call on all armed groups in Libya to exercise restraint, to refrain from violence, to work through their issues through dialogue. But I have to tell you, Cami, we don’t have a lot of information as to who was responsible, or what the circumstances of this were. But it’s absolutely unacceptable. We are just thankful that nobody was hurt.
All right?
QUESTION: Yeah. I have one more.
MS. NULAND: Please, Matt?
QUESTION: Two more, actually.
MS. NULAND: Yep.
QUESTION: Bahrain. Yesterday, you said that there were going to be more calls made about this hunger striker? Were those calls made?
MS. NULAND: Our ambassador in Bahrain, Ambassador Krajeski had a number of calls yesterday and today with Bahraini officials making clear our concern about this case.
QUESTION: No one else?
MS. NULAND: No.
QUESTION: And you’re aware of the latest today on this case? I mean, there was – again, the other day, there was the Bahrainis refusing to release them and now that – is it the Danish or the Norwegian, I can’t --
MS. NULAND: Danish.
QUESTION: Danish. The Danish have reupped their – resubmitted their appeal for his release, and apparently it’s been rejected again. So we can be clear: Your – the Administration’s position on this is that he should be allowed to go to Denmark, or what is it that these calls are being made to --
MS. NULAND: We are not – yeah. We are not dictating any particular solution. We are just asking for a humanitarian resolution of this case.
Please.
QUESTION: Toria, have you raised concern about the deteriorating health of Al-Khawaja in prison?
MS. NULAND: This is the case – this is the – yeah. This is case that we talked about it yesterday, and I’ve just responded.
QUESTION: Do you have anything about his daughter? Yesterday, all you said was that you were aware of her arrest.
MS. NULAND: I don’t have anything new on his daughter. I understood that she was arrested – she was detained temporarily and that she’s been released. But if that’s not accurate, we’ll get back to you.
QUESTION: Okay.
MS. NULAND: Yeah. Please, Nadia. Nadia, and then --
QUESTION: Do you have any position on whether former regime – former Mubarak regime’s official should stand in election – presidential election or not? Because there is a committee in the parliament now approved the banning of Omar Suleiman from nominating himself for the presidential election.
MS. NULAND: Yeah. I think we’re not going to comment on these individual issues inside of Egypt other than to say we want to see the election procedures followed. We want to see a transparent, open process with clear rules of the road.
Please.
QUESTION: Afghanistan? Afghanistan interior ministers are here in town. Are they having any meetings in this building?
MS. NULAND: I don’t believe so. I don’t believe so. Okay? Thanks, everybody.
REMARKS AT U.S.- AFGHANISTAN SECURITY CONSULTATIONS FORUM
FROM: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Presenter: Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak and Afghan Interior Minister General Bismellah Khan Mohammadi. April 10, 2012
Remarks by Secretary Panetta, Afghan Defense Minister Wardak and Afghan Interior Minister General Mohammadi at U.S.-Afghanistan Security Consultations Forum
SECRETARY LEON PANETTA: Ministers, ladies and gentlemen, let me welcome you all to the third meeting of the Afghanistan Security Consultation Forum. This is our third meeting and the first one that I've had the honor to participate in, and I look forward to it.
Minister Wardak, Minister Mohammadi, we welcome you back to Washington, D.C. I also believe that -- it is truly a pleasure and privilege to see both of you here after our last meeting in Kabul. I had the chance to meet with both of you in Kabul, and many of the issues that we will discuss today are issues that we discussed in Kabul. And so I look forward that continuing discussion with both of you.
I want to -- I want to extend my congratulations to both of you on the progress that the Afghan forces and the Afghan police are making. I have often stated that I believe 2011 was a turning point, that we suddenly were able to see that the Afghan army and police develop the capabilities to provide security and have developed capabilities to implement the kind of operations that are necessary to providing security. And the fact that they have been able to do that is in many ways a compliment to both of you for your leadership and for the leadership of the Afghanistani officials that have had a responsibility to ensure that you are able to develop the kind of security operations that are essential to our ability to make the transition.
I also want to congratulate both of you for the work that was done on developing the very important MOUs on detention and also on night raid operations, special operations. The fact that we were able to achieve an agreement, I think, was a very important step forward to ensure that we will make the transition to Afghan operations, but we will do it in a responsible and effective way. And I thank both of you for the leadership that you've provided in being able to achieve those very important agreements.
We also recognize the sacrifices that your forces have made. ISAF forces, the United States, all of us have endured sacrifices, and we have seen that many of our brave men and women in uniform have in fact given their lives in this war. And I've had the opportunity to get to speak to many of their loved ones and send messages to their loved ones indicating that -- not only our sorrow but the fact that they gave their lives fighting for what they believed in.
And Afghani troops have done the same thing. Many Afghanistanis have lost their lives in fighting for what they believe in, in the hope that you would one day have a country that you could truly call your own, a sovereign country that can secure and govern itself.
And ultimately that's the goal we all seek. It's the goal of the United States, it's the goal of Afghanistan to achieve an Afghanistan that can govern and secure itself.
This forum is an effort to move forward in trying to achieve those goals. So it's another milestone in the important effort to strengthen our partnership, not only now but beyond 2014.
I look forward in this forum to discussing the future of the ANSF, the levels that you will achieve in terms of a surge and ultimately the levels that you can sustain in the future. I look forward to discussing our strategic partnership and our ability to arrive at a strategic partnership agreement, which will again be another important step forward in our relationship, and also the regional security challenges that we will have to continue to confront in order to ultimately have a sovereign Afghanistan that can in fact be secure and govern itself.
We look forward to continuing to work with you, and I'm confident that, as we work with you, we can achieve our shared goal and help your people be able to have a sovereign Afghanistan that can truly govern and secure itself and that can ensure that, never again, will it become a safe haven for those who tried to attack and were successful in attacking this country. That is our mutual goal: to safeguard your people and to safeguard the people of the United States of America
.
Thank you for being here, and I look forward to a successful forum.
Minister Wardak.
MINISTER ABDUL RAHIM WARDAK: Thank you.
Thank you Mr. Secretary. It's always a great pleasure and honor to be here among our closest allies and friends. We thank you most sincerely for inviting us to participate in this third round of U.S.-Afghanistan Security Forum. We are grateful and you have personally our utmost respect and admiration for your leadership and dedication to the status of our joint nations.
Through the U.S.'s sterling contribution, Afghanistan has been delivered from years of destruction, tyranny and oppression. And we are not an ungrateful nation.
We fully recognize your generosity. We acknowledge and honor your sacrifices. We pay tribute to all those brave souls that have paid the ultimate price for the mission in Afghanistan, and we pray for the families of the fallen and wounded.
So allow me, Mr. Secretary that on behalf of my country, my government and the Afghan national security forces, to express our profound gratitude and everlasting appreciation for all the help, assistance, cooperation and genuine support which we have received from U.S. in our struggle for prosperity and stability in Afghanistan.
Mr. Secretary there is no doubt we are at a critical juncture. But after the years of struggle, tomorrow's goal is in sight. What matters today is our wealth. The costs have been high and the stakes even higher, but the good news is that the hope has been replaced by the real progress, though it has been dearly bought. So the continued U.S. support and cooperation will play a decisive and vital role to enable the Afghans to smoothly sail to a to a sound foundation through the transformation decade and beyond and to provide for responsibility and stability and realize the hope and dreams of the Afghan people, who have experienced nothing but miseries and suffering for several decades while they were fighting for themselves, but they have also been fighting, in the past and right now, for the collective freedom of the humanity.
And Mr. Secretary, no one should have any doubt on our firm determination to succeed. It's a question of our national survival. And we do not wish to be a burden on the U.S. or the rest of the international community more than it is required.
So we assure you that we will spare no effort and sacrifices to ensure the inevitability of our victory in this joint endeavor. And we are looking forward to our enduring and long-term partnership. We consider it vital for the survival of our country in that very volatile and dangerous neighborhood.
We thank you Mr. Secretary for inviting us, and we will take the opportunity to further elaborate the issues which will help us to go forward. You have come a long way on this difficult journey with us, so I'm sure that you will stay with us to our final destination.
SEC. PANETTA: Thank you, Mr. Minister.
Minister Mohammadi.
MINISTER GENERAL BISMELLAH KHAN MOHAMMADI: (Through interpreter.) On my own behalf, I would also like to thank you for hosting the third round of the security consultation. And I thank you for your kind invitation and it's an honor to be here with you. And also allow me to express my sincerest gratitude for all of the sacrifices, lost lives and treasures of this country that have been sacrificed for our mutual goals for the survival of our nation in Afghanistan. I do thank you and I offer my condolences to you and to the families of all of those who have lost their loved ones.
As you said, during the past decade we have had many successes, many accomplishments, particularly during the last year, vis-a-vis security advancements. We have seen many victories in southern Afghanistan, in eastern Afghanistan, in all of Afghanistan. This visit that we have embarked upon during a time of destiny, during a time that we're going through a transitional processes.
As you said, this involves having capabilities of conducting night raids, and slowly but surely we have seen a decrease in the presence of security contracting firms, and we do hope that this ongoing cooperation, the strategic collaboration will bring many successes and is signed as soon as possible.
The third round of the security consultation takes place at a time when, next year the start of the transition process from NATO forces to Afghan security forces will start to take place. I am certain that these face-to-face meetings that we have in this framework of the security consultation forum will pave the way for a successful conference in Chicago, and we do hope that the Chicago conference and the decisions that are made there will affect security in Afghanistan towards reaching and bring the scenario towards reaching our mutual national goals.
I do thank all of your unconditional generosity, all of the aid that you have rendered to Afghan national security forces, and we do hope that, shoulder to shoulder, we can reach, sooner rather than later, our mutual objectives.
Thank you so very much.
U.S. OFFICIAL SPEAKS AT THE ECONOMIST'S INVESTMENT ENERGY SUMMIT IN ATHENS
FROM U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Remarks at The Economist's Investment Energy Summit
Remarks Richard Morningstar
Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy The Economist Conference
Athens, Greece
March 28, 2012
Thank you for inviting me to speak at The Economist’s Investment Energy Summit in Athens. I will jump right into the details, as I know we all want to eat.
Let me just briefly outline our overall policy with respect to Eurasia, and then I'll get into some of the specifics, particularly relating to the Southern Corridor and the Eastern Mediterranean.
First, we encourage the development of new oil and gas resources while at the same time promoting efficiency and conservation in the use of all of our energy resources. Because there is a world market for oil, new production contributes to meeting growing demand anywhere in the world, including in the United States. When we're talking about natural gas in this neighborhood, whether it's the Caspian region, the Mediterranean, Iraq, Russia or Central Asia, it's unlikely that any of that gas is ever going to reach the United States. But it's still important, because it's going to add to the international gas supply. Additional supply in one place naturally frees up supply in another, and as the market for liquefied natural gas continues to grow, we can start to think about gas moving around markets in much the same way oil does. One item that may not be for debate today, but it's going to be interesting looking down the road several years, is whether fixed pipelines become somewhat archaic, given the ultimate development of liquefied natural gas and unconventional gas. I think there will always be fixed pipeline, but there is going to have to be more flexibility in take or pay contracts.
Second, we want to assist Europe in its quest for energy security. One might ask, why does the United States care about European energy security? You are 4,000 miles away. Europe is our partner in any number of different areas. The U.S. and Europe have the world’s largest trade and investment relationship. We have an interest in an economically strong Europe. Europe has a major interest in an economically strong United States. And energy security is a major factor in the economy of any country. And in spite of all the difficulties we're facing in the world today, we can't forget the relationship between energy security and a strong economy.
Of course, Europe is composed of many different states, and energy security is a more pressing issue to some than others. Some countries in Europe do not have a diverse energy mix and depend largely or, even in a few cases, entirely on a single supplier and transport group. So, our aim is to encourage the development of a balanced and diverse energy strategy with multiple energy sources, with multiple routes to market – a competitive, efficient market which offers the best prices for consumers. We say this for all countries. It's not just Europe. It's for the United States; it's for Russia. For example, if Europe wants to diversify its energy supply, Russia should be diversifying its consumers as well.
The third component of our policy is our desire to help Caspian, Central Asian and Middle Eastern - and Eastern Mediterranean - countries find new routes to market for their hydrocarbons. We want to help foster economic growth and prosperity in all of these countries. By expanding export routes, they can increase competition for their resources, demand a fair price and create strong links to the global economy. And most of all, I think maybe the most important part of this prong of our strategy is that we are not in a zero-sum game with Russia. We only care that these countries should be able to make their own choices as to how they deal with their energy resources.
While by no means our only interest, the Southern Corridor is a key component of our Eurasian Energy policy. The Obama administration strongly supports the establishment of the Southern Corridor to bring natural gas to Europe via Turkey from the Caspian and potentially other sources beyond Europe's southeastern frontiers. Gas from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz (SD) field represents the first significant volumes available to supply the Southern Corridor. Development of the second phase of Shah Deniz is well under way. The Shah Deniz consortium recently narrowed the field to three potential pipelines a scalable Nabucco, SEEP, and TAP. Nabucco West is a modified version of the Nabucco project which would be built to accommodate the current gas production realities of SD II, while also having the capabilities to expand when more gas becomes available in the future. TAP would bring Caspian gas through Greece, Albania, and Italy via the Adriatic Sea. They're all vying for the right to ship Shah Deniz gas into the EU. I recognize that there are issues. BP has also suggested the SEEP pipeline, which stands for Southeastern Europe Pipeline. This possibility would provide for a capillary approach, combining existing pipelines and new construction, throughout the Balkans and Eastern Europe.
We support the Southern Corridor, which will consist of one or more pipeline projects that are commercially viable and strategically significant. A full Nabucco would be a highly desirable political and strategic option, but as with any pipeline it must be able to demonstrate commercial viability. There will ultimately be large amounts of gas to ship through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey to Europe. We support any pipeline through the Southern Corridor that provides gas to the most vulnerable countries in Europe and that includes concrete, written guarantees that the pipeline will be expanded as more gas becomes available. Additional gas will become available; it's just a question of when. If TAP is ultimately selected, it is generally accepted that it would have to be done in conjunction with an interconnector to SE Europe.
I would like to make one more point regarding Europe. The most important thing that Europe can do – more so than any pipeline or any single gas field - is what Europe does itself with respect to liberalizing its market, with respect to creating interconnectors between countries, by looking at alternative sources of energy, whether it be shale or renewables, by taking advantage of opportunities to improve energy efficiency, by increasing LNG facilities, by increasing storage facilities, doing all the things that are necessary for Europe to have its own balanced and diverse energy policy.
Moving beyond the Southern Corridor, recent, large finds in the Eastern Mediterranean are very important, new components for diversification and energy security for countries in the region and elsewhere in Europe. These developments are complementary to the Southern Corridor. With these valuable finds come some serious political considerations and risks, as well as a variety of legal issues. Yet, at the same time, there is much to gain for all stakeholders.
As to Cyprus, as we have repeatedly said, the United States recognizes Cyprus’ right to drill in its offshore zone. We also believe American companies bring unparalleled world-class experience in offshore exploration, and we support their bids to do work in this region, as we do in other regions. As we have also said, we believe that any potential revenue from future oil and gas resources in Cyprus should be equitably shared between both communities. Our key message to both the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey reflects our long-standing policy, which is to support the Cypriot-led efforts under UN auspices to reunify the island into a bizonal, bicommunal federation and encouraging the two sides to come to a peaceful settlement - this issue could help us get there. This would allow all of Cyprus and other countries to share in the benefits of the Eastern Mediterranean.
In addition, Israel’s significant offshore natural gas finds, including the Tamar Leviathan field – one of the largest offshore gas finds of the past decade – have put Israel on the hydrocarbon map and initiated significant changes in Israel’s energy economy and investment and energy policies. The gas will significantly enhance Israel’s energy security, and Israel is presently examining export potential, including LNG.
Greece also is working to identify potential hydrocarbons for exploitation. The Greek government has announced tenders for seismic studies and hydrocarbon exploration onshore, in the Ionian Sea, and south of the island of Crete.
Having said all of this – the issues in the Eastern Mediterranean go beyond Cyprus, go beyond Israel, and affect the whole region. There are a myriad of legal issues, including law of the sea questions, and political issues that will have to be resolved. At the risk of oversimplifying, I would make the following conclusions. Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean is a good thing. It helps to create diversification and helps Europe, but most of all it helps the region. All countries from Egypt and all the way around the Mediterranean to Turkey and Greece will benefit. There are multiple pots of gold in the Eastern Mediterranean. If equitable solutions are found, all will gain. If not, nobody will reap the full benefits. Voices should be kept low; the parties involved should look reasonably at their interests and talk to each other so that solution can be found and all can benefit.
Thank you.
STATE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCES FUNDING NGO PROGRAMS BENEFITING DISPLACED SYRIANS IN JORDAN
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
FY 2012 Funding Opportunity Announcement for NGO programs benefiting displaced Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon
Democracy, Human Rights, Refugees: FY 2012 Funding Opportunity Announcement for NGO programs benefiting displaced Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon
Funding Opportunity Announcement
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
April 9, 2012
Funding Opportunity Number: PRM-ANE-12-CA-001-NEA-040912-Syrians.
Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) number:
19.519 - Overseas Refugee Assistance Programs for Near East and South Asia
Announcement issuance date: April 9, 2012
Proposal submission deadline: April 23, 2012 at 12:00 p.m. (noon) EDT. Proposals submitted after this deadline will not be considered.
ADVISORY: PRM strongly recommends submitting your proposal early to allow time to address any difficulties that may arise.
Proposed Program Start Dates: Proposed new projects may begin between June 1, 2012 and June 15, 2012.
Duration of Activity: No more than 12 months. In funding a project one year, PRM makes no representations that it will continue to fund the project in successive years and encourages applicants to seek a wide array of donors to ensure long-term funding possibilities.
Current Funding Priorities for Displaced Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon: PRM will prioritize funding for proposed NGO activities that fall within the UN Regional Response Plan and meet the Bureau’s priorities for displaced Syrians as identified below.
NGOs submitting proposals in response to this funding announcement must be a part of the UN Regional Response Plan and be registered to operate in each of the countries of the proposed activities by the program start date. Within the body of the proposal, NGOs should clearly state their role within the UN Regional Response Plan and their ability to operate in the proposed areas and include documentation providing verification of their registration status as an attachment.
(a) Because of PRM’s mandate to provide protection, assistance, and durable solutions for refugees and conflict victims, PRM will only consider funding projects that include a direct beneficiary base of at least 50 percent displaced Syrians. PRM will consider proposals for activities in a single country as well as programs operating in both Jordan and Lebanon.
(b) Proposals for programs should focus on health, psychosocial support, protection, and/or education. Proposals should include detailed information on planned coordination with and referral mechanisms to both local and international organizations.
Programs must focus on one or more of the following sectors (not listed by priority):
· Health care, including health education and preventative health care, reproductive health services, with a focus on capacity building for local service providers, mainstreaming into local health care infrastructure, and clinical management of rape and other forms of gender-based violence. Proposals should demonstrate how clinical services for survivors of gender-based violence, including men, boys, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) individuals, are incorporated into the project.
· Mental health and psychosocial programs offering individual as well as family/group counseling and/or therapy. Proposals should adhere to the IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings and articulate how beneficiaries are identified; previous coordination with other mental health providers, including training; efforts to improve local capacity to provide adequate mental healthcare; the extent to which the NGO is able to utilize local organizations/resources to meet the mental healthcare needs of its beneficiaries; and an overview of the most prevalent mental health needs among the displaced Syrian population that the NGO intends to address. Proposals should demonstrate how clinical services for survivors of gender-based violence are incorporated into the project and should adhere to the IASC Guidelines on Gender-Based Violence.
· Humanitarian assistance and protection, including: non-food items; gender-based violence prevention and response programs, including services for both female and male survivors; programs aimed at addressing the interrelated assistance and protection needs of vulnerable beneficiaries by providing services and referral networks; and other emergency assistance to extremely vulnerable individuals. Proposals should indicate how this assistance is filling an identified gap, including how the gap and the beneficiaries were identified.
· Education, including remedial education and non-formal education programs, with special attention to adolescents, particularly those at risk of losing educational opportunities due to their interrupted educational career due to displacement, the need to generate income, or to their lack of documentation of prior education in Syria. Proposals should address how the educational assistance will assist with integration into local educational structures. Education programs should adhere to the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) minimum Standards.
(c) All program design should take into account the following guidance:
· Programs are encouraged to prioritize the needs of women and girls in a way that strengthens their roles in families and in the broader community. Programs should also target the needs of the most vulnerable groups among the Syrian refugee population (e.g., female-headed households; disabled or isolated refugees; GBV survivors; LGBTI individuals; separated or unaccompanied children; the elderly, etc.). Younger single men are also considered a vulnerable group for which PRM would consider targeted programming. Programs are encouraged to demonstrate how they will train their staff to meet the specific protection and assistance needs of these vulnerable groups effectively. Programs should be accessible to physically disabled persons.
· NGOs should demonstrate the application of lessons learned in previous programming and changes necessitated by the dynamic social and economic situation of Syrians and Iraqis in the region. NGOs should assess the continuing effectiveness of the humanitarian assistance they currently provide, highlighting best practices developed and any programmatic adjustments that should be made in follow-on activities.
· Proposals should include a realistic and detailed assessment of the sustainability of the project after PRM funding ends.
· As all NGOs will be operating within the UN Regional Response Plan, they will participate in UNHCR-designed and -managed refugee assistance information systems.
(d) PRM will accept proposals only from NGOs included in the UN Regional Response Plan and will give priority to proposals that demonstrate the capability to be operational immediately using PRM funding as well as:
· A proven track record in providing proposed assistance both in the sector and specified location;
· A concrete implementation plan with well-conceived objectives and indicators that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and reliable, time-bound and trackable (SMART), have established baselines, and include at least one outcome or impact indicator per objective; objectives should be clearly linked to the sectors in the RFP;
· Projects, if feasible, must include strong transition plans in their proposals that detail specific benchmarks and/or a timeline for turning over the project to local organizations, governmental authorities, or development organizations;
· A budget that is appropriate for meeting the objectives and demonstrates co-funding by non-U.S. government sources;
· Adherence to relevant international standards for humanitarian assistance. See PRM’s General NGO Guidelines for a complete list of sector-specific standards.
International Organizations
International Organizations (IOs) that are engaged in programs relevant to the assistance addressed by this PRM funding announcement should ensure that these programs are made known to PRM on or before the closing date of this funding announcement so that PRM can evaluate all IO and NGO programs for funding consideration.
Funding Limits:
PRM will consider project proposals up to $1.5 million. Project proposals with solid and compelling budget justifications will be considered. Budgets based on a realistic and well-articulated assessment of needs and expenses will be noted favorably.
Budgets for regional projects should be broken down by country. As much as possible, all budgets should be broken down by objective, as per the revised budget template.
As stated in the General NGO Guidelines, PRM looks favorably on cost-sharing efforts and seeks to support projects with a diverse donor base and/or resources from the submitting organization.
Proposal Submission Requirements:
See “How to Apply” (http://www.grants.gov/applicants/applicant_faqs.jsp#applying) on Grants.gov for complete details on requirements, and note the following highlights:
· Proposals must be submitted via Grants.gov. Organizations not registered with Grants.gov should register well in advance of the deadline as it can take up to two weeks to finalize registration (sometimes longer for non-U.S. based NGOs to get the required registration numbers). To register with Grants.gov, organizations must first receive a DUNS number and register with the Central Contract Registry (CCR) which can take weeks and sometimes months. See “Applicant FAQs” section on Grants.gov (http://www.grants.gov/help/applicant_faqs.jsp#applying) for complete details on registering.
· If you encounter technical difficulties with Grants.gov please contact the Grants.gov Help Desk at support@grants.gov or by calling 1-800-518-4726. Applicants who are unable to submit applications via Grants.gov due to Grants.gov technical difficulties and who have reported the problem(s) to the Grants.gov help desk and received a case number and had a service request opened to research the problem(s), should contact PRM Program Officer Jennifer Williams at (202) 453-9202 or WilliamsJL4@state.gov to determine whether an alternative method of submission is appropriate.
· Do not wait until the last minute to submit your application on Grants.gov. Applicants who have done so in the past and experienced technical difficulties were not able to meet the deadline.
PRM strongly recommends submitting your proposal early to avoid submission delays. We recommend that organizations submit applications via Grants.gov as soon as possible to avoid last-minute technical difficulties that could result in an application not being considered.
· Applications must be submitted under the authority of the Authorized Organization Representative (AOR) at the applicant organization. Having proposals submitted by agency headquarters helps to avoid possible technical problems.
· Pursuant to U.S. Code, Title 218, Section 1001, stated on OMB Standard Form 424 (SF-424), Department of State is authorized to consolidate the certifications and assurances required by Federal law or regulations for its federal assistance programs. The list of certifications and assurances can be found at: http://fa.statebuy.state.gov/content.asp?content_id=161&menu_id=68 )
Proposal Content, Formatting and Template:
Please refer to the “Proposal Submission and Review Process” section in PRM’s General NGO Guidelines. PRM strongly encourages organizations applying for PRM funding to use the PRM recommended proposal and budget templates. Templates can be requested by sending an email to PRM's NGO Coordinator. You must type “PRM NGO Templates” in the subject line to receive an automated reply containing the template.
PLEASE TAKE SPECIAL NOTE OF THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED IN THE PRM’s NGO GUIDELINES:
This announcement is designed to accompany PRM’s General NGO Guidelines, which contain additional administrative information and explain in detail PRM’s NGO funding strategy and priorities. Please use both the General NGO Guidelines and this announcement to ensure that the proposed activities are in line with PRM’s priorities and that your proposal submission is in full compliance with PRM requirements. Proposal submissions that do not meet all of the requirements outlined in these guidelines will not be considered. PRM recommends using the proposal and budget templates that are available upon email request from PRM's NGO Coordinator. Please send an email, with the phrase “PRM NGO templates” in the subject line, to PRM's NGO Coordinator.
· Proposals should outline how the NGO will acknowledge PRM funding. If an organization believes that publicly acknowledging the receipt of USG funding for a particular PRM-funded project could potentially endanger the lives of the beneficiaries and/or the organization staff, invite suspicion about the organization's motives, or alienate the organization from the population it is trying to help, it must provide a brief explanation in its proposal as to why it should be exempted from this requirement.
· Focus on outcome or impact indicators as much as possible. At a minimum, each objective should have one outcome or impact indicator. Wherever possible, baselines should be established before the start of the project.
· To increase PRM’s ability to track the impact of PRM funding, include specific information on locations of projects and beneficiaries. Any project involving the building or maintenance of physical infrastructure must include coordinates of site locations (place name, P-Code, latitude and longitude coordinates).
· Budget must include a specific breakdown of funds being provided by UNHCR, other USG agencies, other donors, and your own organization. PRM strongly encourages multi-lateral support for humanitarian programs.
Reports and Reporting Requirements:
Program reporting: PRM requires quarterly and final program reports describing and analyzing the results of activities undertaken during the validity period of the agreement. It is highly suggested that NGOs receiving PRM funding use the PRM recommended program report template. To request this template, send an email with the phrase “PRM NGO templates” in the subject line to PRM's NGO Coordinator.
Financial Reports: Financial reports are required within thirty (30) days following the end of each calendar year quarter during the validity period of the agreement; a final financial report covering the entire period of the agreement is required within ninety (90) days after the expiration date of the agreement.
For more details regarding reporting requirements please see PRM’s General NGO Guidelines.
Proposal Review Process:
PRM will conduct a formal competitive review of all proposals submitted in response to this funding announcement. A review panel will evaluate submissions based on the above-referenced proposal evaluation criteria and PRM priorities in the context of available funding.
PRM may request revised proposals and/or budgets based on feedback from the panel. PRM will provide formal notifications to NGOs of final decisions taken by Bureau management.
PRM Points of Contact:
Should NGOs have technical questions related to this announcement, they should contact the PRM staff listed below prior to proposal submission. (Note: Responses to technical questions from PRM do not indicate a commitment to fund the program discussed.)
PRM Program Officer Jennifer Williams (WilliamsJL4@state.gov, 202-453-9202), Washington, D.C.
Regional Refugee Assistance Coordinator Rebecca Fong (FongRA2@state.gov), U.S. Embassy, Amman, Jordan.
FY 2012 Funding Opportunity Announcement for NGO programs benefiting displaced Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon
Democracy, Human Rights, Refugees: FY 2012 Funding Opportunity Announcement for NGO programs benefiting displaced Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon
Funding Opportunity Announcement
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
April 9, 2012
Funding Opportunity Number: PRM-ANE-12-CA-001-NEA-040912-Syrians.
Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) number:
19.519 - Overseas Refugee Assistance Programs for Near East and South Asia
Announcement issuance date: April 9, 2012
Proposal submission deadline: April 23, 2012 at 12:00 p.m. (noon) EDT. Proposals submitted after this deadline will not be considered.
ADVISORY: PRM strongly recommends submitting your proposal early to allow time to address any difficulties that may arise.
Proposed Program Start Dates: Proposed new projects may begin between June 1, 2012 and June 15, 2012.
Duration of Activity: No more than 12 months. In funding a project one year, PRM makes no representations that it will continue to fund the project in successive years and encourages applicants to seek a wide array of donors to ensure long-term funding possibilities.
Current Funding Priorities for Displaced Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon: PRM will prioritize funding for proposed NGO activities that fall within the UN Regional Response Plan and meet the Bureau’s priorities for displaced Syrians as identified below.
NGOs submitting proposals in response to this funding announcement must be a part of the UN Regional Response Plan and be registered to operate in each of the countries of the proposed activities by the program start date. Within the body of the proposal, NGOs should clearly state their role within the UN Regional Response Plan and their ability to operate in the proposed areas and include documentation providing verification of their registration status as an attachment.
(a) Because of PRM’s mandate to provide protection, assistance, and durable solutions for refugees and conflict victims, PRM will only consider funding projects that include a direct beneficiary base of at least 50 percent displaced Syrians. PRM will consider proposals for activities in a single country as well as programs operating in both Jordan and Lebanon.
(b) Proposals for programs should focus on health, psychosocial support, protection, and/or education. Proposals should include detailed information on planned coordination with and referral mechanisms to both local and international organizations.
Programs must focus on one or more of the following sectors (not listed by priority):
· Health care, including health education and preventative health care, reproductive health services, with a focus on capacity building for local service providers, mainstreaming into local health care infrastructure, and clinical management of rape and other forms of gender-based violence. Proposals should demonstrate how clinical services for survivors of gender-based violence, including men, boys, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) individuals, are incorporated into the project.
· Mental health and psychosocial programs offering individual as well as family/group counseling and/or therapy. Proposals should adhere to the IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings and articulate how beneficiaries are identified; previous coordination with other mental health providers, including training; efforts to improve local capacity to provide adequate mental healthcare; the extent to which the NGO is able to utilize local organizations/resources to meet the mental healthcare needs of its beneficiaries; and an overview of the most prevalent mental health needs among the displaced Syrian population that the NGO intends to address. Proposals should demonstrate how clinical services for survivors of gender-based violence are incorporated into the project and should adhere to the IASC Guidelines on Gender-Based Violence.
· Humanitarian assistance and protection, including: non-food items; gender-based violence prevention and response programs, including services for both female and male survivors; programs aimed at addressing the interrelated assistance and protection needs of vulnerable beneficiaries by providing services and referral networks; and other emergency assistance to extremely vulnerable individuals. Proposals should indicate how this assistance is filling an identified gap, including how the gap and the beneficiaries were identified.
· Education, including remedial education and non-formal education programs, with special attention to adolescents, particularly those at risk of losing educational opportunities due to their interrupted educational career due to displacement, the need to generate income, or to their lack of documentation of prior education in Syria. Proposals should address how the educational assistance will assist with integration into local educational structures. Education programs should adhere to the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) minimum Standards.
(c) All program design should take into account the following guidance:
· Programs are encouraged to prioritize the needs of women and girls in a way that strengthens their roles in families and in the broader community. Programs should also target the needs of the most vulnerable groups among the Syrian refugee population (e.g., female-headed households; disabled or isolated refugees; GBV survivors; LGBTI individuals; separated or unaccompanied children; the elderly, etc.). Younger single men are also considered a vulnerable group for which PRM would consider targeted programming. Programs are encouraged to demonstrate how they will train their staff to meet the specific protection and assistance needs of these vulnerable groups effectively. Programs should be accessible to physically disabled persons.
· NGOs should demonstrate the application of lessons learned in previous programming and changes necessitated by the dynamic social and economic situation of Syrians and Iraqis in the region. NGOs should assess the continuing effectiveness of the humanitarian assistance they currently provide, highlighting best practices developed and any programmatic adjustments that should be made in follow-on activities.
· Proposals should include a realistic and detailed assessment of the sustainability of the project after PRM funding ends.
· As all NGOs will be operating within the UN Regional Response Plan, they will participate in UNHCR-designed and -managed refugee assistance information systems.
(d) PRM will accept proposals only from NGOs included in the UN Regional Response Plan and will give priority to proposals that demonstrate the capability to be operational immediately using PRM funding as well as:
· A proven track record in providing proposed assistance both in the sector and specified location;
· A concrete implementation plan with well-conceived objectives and indicators that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and reliable, time-bound and trackable (SMART), have established baselines, and include at least one outcome or impact indicator per objective; objectives should be clearly linked to the sectors in the RFP;
· Projects, if feasible, must include strong transition plans in their proposals that detail specific benchmarks and/or a timeline for turning over the project to local organizations, governmental authorities, or development organizations;
· A budget that is appropriate for meeting the objectives and demonstrates co-funding by non-U.S. government sources;
· Adherence to relevant international standards for humanitarian assistance. See PRM’s General NGO Guidelines for a complete list of sector-specific standards.
International Organizations
International Organizations (IOs) that are engaged in programs relevant to the assistance addressed by this PRM funding announcement should ensure that these programs are made known to PRM on or before the closing date of this funding announcement so that PRM can evaluate all IO and NGO programs for funding consideration.
Funding Limits:
PRM will consider project proposals up to $1.5 million. Project proposals with solid and compelling budget justifications will be considered. Budgets based on a realistic and well-articulated assessment of needs and expenses will be noted favorably.
Budgets for regional projects should be broken down by country. As much as possible, all budgets should be broken down by objective, as per the revised budget template.
As stated in the General NGO Guidelines, PRM looks favorably on cost-sharing efforts and seeks to support projects with a diverse donor base and/or resources from the submitting organization.
Proposal Submission Requirements:
See “How to Apply” (http://www.grants.gov/applicants/applicant_faqs.jsp#applying) on Grants.gov for complete details on requirements, and note the following highlights:
· Proposals must be submitted via Grants.gov. Organizations not registered with Grants.gov should register well in advance of the deadline as it can take up to two weeks to finalize registration (sometimes longer for non-U.S. based NGOs to get the required registration numbers). To register with Grants.gov, organizations must first receive a DUNS number and register with the Central Contract Registry (CCR) which can take weeks and sometimes months. See “Applicant FAQs” section on Grants.gov (http://www.grants.gov/help/applicant_faqs.jsp#applying) for complete details on registering.
· If you encounter technical difficulties with Grants.gov please contact the Grants.gov Help Desk at support@grants.gov or by calling 1-800-518-4726. Applicants who are unable to submit applications via Grants.gov due to Grants.gov technical difficulties and who have reported the problem(s) to the Grants.gov help desk and received a case number and had a service request opened to research the problem(s), should contact PRM Program Officer Jennifer Williams at (202) 453-9202 or WilliamsJL4@state.gov to determine whether an alternative method of submission is appropriate.
· Do not wait until the last minute to submit your application on Grants.gov. Applicants who have done so in the past and experienced technical difficulties were not able to meet the deadline.
PRM strongly recommends submitting your proposal early to avoid submission delays. We recommend that organizations submit applications via Grants.gov as soon as possible to avoid last-minute technical difficulties that could result in an application not being considered.
· Applications must be submitted under the authority of the Authorized Organization Representative (AOR) at the applicant organization. Having proposals submitted by agency headquarters helps to avoid possible technical problems.
· Pursuant to U.S. Code, Title 218, Section 1001, stated on OMB Standard Form 424 (SF-424), Department of State is authorized to consolidate the certifications and assurances required by Federal law or regulations for its federal assistance programs. The list of certifications and assurances can be found at: http://fa.statebuy.state.gov/content.asp?content_id=161&menu_id=68 )
Proposal Content, Formatting and Template:
Please refer to the “Proposal Submission and Review Process” section in PRM’s General NGO Guidelines. PRM strongly encourages organizations applying for PRM funding to use the PRM recommended proposal and budget templates. Templates can be requested by sending an email to PRM's NGO Coordinator. You must type “PRM NGO Templates” in the subject line to receive an automated reply containing the template.
PLEASE TAKE SPECIAL NOTE OF THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED IN THE PRM’s NGO GUIDELINES:
This announcement is designed to accompany PRM’s General NGO Guidelines, which contain additional administrative information and explain in detail PRM’s NGO funding strategy and priorities. Please use both the General NGO Guidelines and this announcement to ensure that the proposed activities are in line with PRM’s priorities and that your proposal submission is in full compliance with PRM requirements. Proposal submissions that do not meet all of the requirements outlined in these guidelines will not be considered. PRM recommends using the proposal and budget templates that are available upon email request from PRM's NGO Coordinator. Please send an email, with the phrase “PRM NGO templates” in the subject line, to PRM's NGO Coordinator.
· Proposals should outline how the NGO will acknowledge PRM funding. If an organization believes that publicly acknowledging the receipt of USG funding for a particular PRM-funded project could potentially endanger the lives of the beneficiaries and/or the organization staff, invite suspicion about the organization's motives, or alienate the organization from the population it is trying to help, it must provide a brief explanation in its proposal as to why it should be exempted from this requirement.
· Focus on outcome or impact indicators as much as possible. At a minimum, each objective should have one outcome or impact indicator. Wherever possible, baselines should be established before the start of the project.
· To increase PRM’s ability to track the impact of PRM funding, include specific information on locations of projects and beneficiaries. Any project involving the building or maintenance of physical infrastructure must include coordinates of site locations (place name, P-Code, latitude and longitude coordinates).
· Budget must include a specific breakdown of funds being provided by UNHCR, other USG agencies, other donors, and your own organization. PRM strongly encourages multi-lateral support for humanitarian programs.
Reports and Reporting Requirements:
Program reporting: PRM requires quarterly and final program reports describing and analyzing the results of activities undertaken during the validity period of the agreement. It is highly suggested that NGOs receiving PRM funding use the PRM recommended program report template. To request this template, send an email with the phrase “PRM NGO templates” in the subject line to PRM's NGO Coordinator.
Financial Reports: Financial reports are required within thirty (30) days following the end of each calendar year quarter during the validity period of the agreement; a final financial report covering the entire period of the agreement is required within ninety (90) days after the expiration date of the agreement.
For more details regarding reporting requirements please see PRM’s General NGO Guidelines.
Proposal Review Process:
PRM will conduct a formal competitive review of all proposals submitted in response to this funding announcement. A review panel will evaluate submissions based on the above-referenced proposal evaluation criteria and PRM priorities in the context of available funding.
PRM may request revised proposals and/or budgets based on feedback from the panel. PRM will provide formal notifications to NGOs of final decisions taken by Bureau management.
PRM Points of Contact:
Should NGOs have technical questions related to this announcement, they should contact the PRM staff listed below prior to proposal submission. (Note: Responses to technical questions from PRM do not indicate a commitment to fund the program discussed.)
PRM Program Officer Jennifer Williams (WilliamsJL4@state.gov, 202-453-9202), Washington, D.C.
Regional Refugee Assistance Coordinator Rebecca Fong (FongRA2@state.gov), U.S. Embassy, Amman, Jordan.
SECREATARY CLINTON SENDS BEST WISHES TO THAILAND ON SONGKRAN
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Songkran Festival - Thai New Year
Press Statement Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State Washington, DC
April 10, 2012
On behalf of President Obama and the people of the United States, I am delighted to send best wishes to the people of Thailand on the occasion of Songkran.
The United States values our longstanding alliance and close ties with the people of Thailand. Working together, we have made progress on critical issues. Today, we are strengthening public health, building closer economic ties, and promoting a safe and secure region. We look forward to deepening our partnership even more for the benefit of both our people and the Asia-Pacific region we share.
As you celebrate this special occasion with family and friends, know that the United States stands with you, and we are committed to a brighter future for all of our people.
CANNON TEST FIRE ON BOARD USS SIMPSON
Sailors aboard the guided-missile frigate USS Simpson (FFG 56) conduct a pre-action aim calibration test fire of a 76mm canon. Simpson, homeported in Mayport, Fla., is conducting theater security cooperation and maritime security operations in the U.S. Naval Forces Africa area of responsibility. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Brian T. Glunt (Released) 120406-N-RN782-074
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