Tuesday, March 27, 2012
U.S. DEFENSE TO MOVE FROM "MAD" TO MUTUALLY ASSURED STABILITY "MAS"
The following excerpt is from the Department of Defense website:
Ballistic Missile Defense: Progress and Prospects
Remarks Ellen Tauscher
Special Envoy10th Annual Missile Defense Conference
Washington, DC
March 26, 2012
Thank you, Pat for that introduction. I have worked with Pat for a long time now and I appreciate his support, advice and service to this nation. When I retired from full-time government service, I kept the missile defense portfolio, in part, because I wanted to keep working with Pat.
Two-and-a-half years ago—and that seems like a lifetime ago in terms of government years—the Obama Administration rolled out the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Several months later, we completed the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. In Lisbon, last year, NATO committed to adopt missile defense as an Alliance mission. I continue to work with my Russian counterparts to find a path forward on missile defense cooperation. And we’re working more closely than ever with Israel on Arrow, Arrow 3, David Sling and more.
The Obama Administration has not only talked about supporting missile defense, we’ve actually done it. And, we have focused on effective systems. We have worked to protect and enhance our important homeland defense capabilities and to expand our regional missile defense capabilities. We demonstrated that again in the FY13 budget request, where every program and every agency is subject to cuts, we protected our most critical BMD capabilities to protect the U.S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners.
I am going to focus on two issues. To start, I want to talk about the European Phased Adaptive Approach. And then I want to make the case for Missile Defense cooperation with Russia.
I’m not going to dwell on the specifics of what the EPAA will and will not do. Pat has undoubtedly given you a much better briefing on that than I can. I want to talk about the progress we have made in implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach.
When I spoke at last year’s conference, we were hard at work on the agreements that would allow the implementation of all four phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Then, during one incredible week last September, we made three announcements.
First, Turkey agreed to host the Phase 1 AN/TPY-2 radar.
Second, we signed the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement with Romania to host the Phase 2 land-based SM-3 site. Today, both of those agreements have been finalized. The U.S.-Poland agreement for the Phase 3 land-based site entered into force as well.
And, last October, Spain agreed to serve as a home port for four Aegis destroyers. That’s not bad for government work.
The Obama Administration has put into place the key agreements needed to implement all four phases of the EPAA. Most importantly, we met President Obama’s goal to implement the first phase of the EPAA by the end of 2011. Right now, the Aegis Cruiser, the USS Vella Gulf, is providing our at-sea Phase 1 missile defense presence along with the AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey.
The next big demonstration of our progress will come at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May. We expect NATO to announce that it has achieved an “interim capability.” That basically means that Allies will start operating under the same “playbook.”
NATO has done tremendous work in preparing the way for this interim capability since the agreement in Lisbon to develop a NATO BMD capability whose aim is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territories, and forces. We are especially grateful to those allies that have agreed to contribute to the NATO BMD system. We especially appreciate Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain for their willingness to host elements of NATO’s missile defense capabilities on their territory.
Other countries are making significant contributions as well. The Netherlands has decided to modify the SMART-L radars on their air defense frigates to give the ships a BMD sensor capability that can contribute to NATO missile defense. Germany is exploring developing an airborne infrared sensor. France has proposed a concept for a shared early warning satellite.
After Chicago, we will continue to cooperate with our NATO Allies to achieve full operational capability for NATO territorial missile defense, including all four phases of the EPAA as the U.S. contribution.
At the same time, I have been working with my Russian counterpart to develop mutually beneficial areas of cooperation. This could be a game changer for European security and for U.S.-Russian relations. And any cooperative agreement will not limit our ability to deploy missile defense systems and it can and will be done in a way that doesn’t compromise our commitment to NATO missile defense and all four phases of the EPAA.
Missile defense is one area where we can work together with Russia to end Cold War thinking and move away from Mutually Assured Destruction toward Mutually Assured Stability.
That means getting Russia inside the missile defense tent now, working alongside the U.S. and NATO, while we are in Phase 1. This way Russia will be able to see with its own eyes what all the phases of the EPAA really mean. Russia also will be able to see that we are focused on the threat from countries like Iran. NATO missile defense systems will not threaten Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities. I’ll say it again: These systems will not threaten Russia’s strategic forces.
This cooperation is essential because Russia has not been convinced by our technical arguments that the NATO system isn’t a threat even despite Pat’s best efforts and I am grateful to him and MDA for their detailed technical responses to Russia’s inaccurate assumptions about our missile defense capabilities.
Cooperation will also allow Russia to see that the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense is designed to be flexible. Should the ballistic missile threat from nations like Iran be reduced, our missile defense system can adapt accordingly.
Russia has raised the issue of a legal guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria” that could, in effect, create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems. They want a piece of paper they can point to when a U.S. ship enters certain waters or when an interceptor has a certain speed.
We certainly cannot accept limitations on where we deploy our Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of missions around the world, not just for missile defense. We also will NOT accept limitations on the capabilities and numbers of our missile defense systems.
We would be willing to agree to a political statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. In fact, this is what we have been saying all along. Let me say it again: any statement will be politically binding and it would publicly proclaim our intent to cooperate and chart the direction for cooperation, not limitations.
In order to reach the point where we can engage in genuine missile defense cooperation with Russia in ways that truly benefit U.S. national security, we may need to be more transparent and continue to build trust between our two nations. We would not give away “hit to kill technology,” telemetry, or any other types of information that would compromise our national security.
We must look for opportunities for transparency measures with the Russian Federation. To that end, we have offered for the Russian Federation to view one of our Aegis SM-3 missile defense flight tests. We are not proposing to provide them with classified information.
Rather, we are offering for them to operate in international waters, giving them the time of launch of our target (which we provide to mariners and airmen as normal course). This will be a good first step in transparency measures with the Russian Federation, allowing them to see for themselves, what we are saying about our system is accurate.
I would argue that we cannot let this opportunity pass. It is too important for the future of U.S. and European security.
Now that Russia has wrapped up its elections, I am hoping my Russian colleagues see this is an opportunity that they should take sooner rather than later. Confidence takes time to build. If Russia is truly concerned about Phases 3 and 4, it would be best for Russia to start cooperating as early as possible to better understand our capabilities as they evolve. We prefer future decision-making on this issue to be made according to on-the-ground realities, not worst-case guesses. We prefer letting data and facts inform our decision making, rather than lingering Cold War paranoia.
So we will keep working to see if we can come up with a plan for cooperation. That is one of the reasons I have stayed on as Special Envoy. I want to see this cooperation reach fruition.
On March 13th, I took the full interagency Arms Control and International Security Working Group of the Presidential Bilateral Commission to Moscow for a meeting with the Russians. I then followed up with a one-on-one meeting with my counterpart Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov last weekend. We also continue to press in the Defense and Joint Staff channels, and we will keep moving forward in the run up to May and we will keep going long after May.
Our objective is not just winning some public relations points. It’s about creating lasting cooperation and changing outdated thinking to the benefit of U.S. security.
Transforming missile defense from an issue of contention to one of cooperation will also help move us forward on the road toward greater nuclear reductions and, eventually, elimination.
Let me close by reiterating that our cooperation with Russia will not come at the expense of our plans to defend Europe from regional ballistic missile threats or for the defense of the U.S. homeland.
President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and others have all reaffirmed our commitment to the implementation of the EPAA. We look forward to continuing our work implementing the EPAA with our NATO partners as well as consulting closely with Congress and others as we move forward.
Thank you and with that, I would be happy to take a few [easy] questions.
BIOMET INC., CHARGED BY SEC WITH BRIBING DOCTORS IN THREE COUNTRIES
The following excerpt is from a Securities and Exchange Commission e-mail:
Washington, D.C., March 26, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Warsaw, Ind.-based medical device company Biomet Inc. with violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) when its subsidiaries and agents bribed public doctors in Argentina, Brazil, and China for nearly a decade to win business.
Biomet, which primarily sells products used by orthopedic surgeons, agreed to pay more than $22 million to settle the SEC’s charges as well as parallel criminal charges announced by the U.S. Department of Justice today. The charges arise from the SEC and DOJ’s ongoing proactive global investigation into medical device companies bribing publicly-employed physicians.
The SEC alleges that Biomet and its four subsidiaries paid bribes from 2000 to August 2008, and employees and managers at all levels of the parent company and the subsidiaries were involved along with the distributors who sold Biomet’s products. Biomet’s compliance and internal audit functions failed to stop the payments to doctors even after learning about the illegal practices.
“Biomet’s misconduct came to light because of the government’s proactive investigation of bribery within the medical device industry,” said Kara Novaco Brockmeyer, Chief of the Enforcement Division’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit. “A company’s compliance and internal audit should be the first line of defense against corruption, not part of the problem.”
According to the SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in Washington D.C., employees of Biomet Argentina SA paid kickbacks as high as 15 to 20 percent of each sale to publicly-employed doctors in Argentina. Phony invoices were used to justify the payments, and the bribes were falsely recorded as “consulting fees” or “commissions” in Biomet’s books and records. Executives and internal auditors at Biomet’s Indiana headquarters were aware of the payments as early as 2000, but failed to stop it.
The SEC alleges that Biomet’s U.S. subsidiary Biomet International used a distributor to bribe publicly-employed doctors in Brazil by paying them as much as 10 to 20 percent of the value of their medical device purchases. Payments were openly discussed in communications between the distributor, Biomet International employees, and Biomet’s executives and internal auditors in the U.S. For example, a February 2002 internal Biomet memorandum about a limited audit of the distributor’s books stated:
Brazilian Distributor makes payments to surgeons that may be considered as a kickback. These payments are made in cash that allows the surgeon to receive income tax free. …The accounting entry is to increase a prepaid expense account. In the consolidated financials sent to Biomet, these payments were reclassified to expense in the income statement.
According to the SEC’s complaint, two additional subsidiaries – Biomet China and Scandimed AB – sold medical devices through a distributor in China who provided publicly-employed doctors with money and travel in exchange for their purchases of Biomet products. Beginning as early as 2001, the distributor exchanged e-mails with Biomet employees that explicitly described the bribes he was arranging on the company’s behalf. For example, one e-mail stated:
[Doctor] is the department head of [public hospital]. [Doctor] uses about 10 hips and knees a month and it’s on an uptrend, as he told us over dinner a week ago. …Many key surgeons in Shanghai are buddies of his. A kind word on Biomet from him goes a long way for us. Dinner has been set for the evening of the 24th. It will be nice. But dinner aside, I’ve got to send him to Switzerland to visit his daughter.
The SEC alleges that some e-mails described the way that vendors would deliver cash to surgeons upon completion of surgery, and others discussed the amount of payments. The distributor explained in one e-mail that 25 percent in cash would be delivered to a surgeon upon completion of surgery. Biomet sponsored travel for 20 Chinese surgeons in 2007 to Spain, where a substantial part of the trip was devoted to sightseeing and other entertainment.
Biomet consented to the entry of a court order requiring payment of $4,432,998 in disgorgement and $1,142,733 in prejudgment interest. Biomet also is ordered to retain an independent compliance consultant for 18 months to review its FCPA compliance program, and is permanently enjoined from future violations of Sections 30A, 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Biomet agreed to pay a $17.28 million fine to settle the criminal charges.
The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Brent S. Mitchell with Tracy L. Price of the Enforcement Division’s FCPA Unit and Reid A. Muoio. The SEC acknowledges the assistance of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Fraud Section and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The investigation into bribery in the medical device industry is continuing.
SEC FILES ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST WELLS FARGO
The following excerpt is from the SEC website:
March 23, 2012
SEC Files Subpoena Enforcement Action Against Wells Fargo for Failure to Produce Documents in Mortgage-Backed Securities Investigation
The Securities and Exchange Commission announced today that it has filed a subpoena enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against Wells Fargo & Company. According to the filing, the Commission is investigating possible fraud in connection with Wells Fargo’s sale of nearly $60 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities to investors. Pursuant to subpoenas dating back to September 2011, the bank was obligated to produce (and agreed to produce) documents to the Commission, but has failed to do so. Accordingly, the Commission filed its Application for an Order Requiring Compliance with Administrative Subpoenas.
The Commission’s action relates to its investigation into whether Wells Fargo made material misrepresentations or omitted material facts in a series of offerings between September 2006 and early 2008. The Commission’s application explains that, in connection with the securitization of the loans, a due diligence review of a sample of the loans in each offering was performed. Certain loans within that sample would be dropped from the offering for failure to comply with Wells Fargo’s loan underwriting standards. However, according to the Commission, it does not appear that Wells Fargo took any steps to address similar deficiencies in the remainder of the loans in the pool, which were securitized and sold to investors. The Commission is investigating, among other things, whether Wells Fargo misrepresented to investors that the loans being securitized complied with the bank’s loan underwriting standards.
The staff in the Commission’s San Francisco Regional Office issued several subpoenas to Wells Fargo since September 2011 seeking, among other things, materials related to due diligence and to the bank’s underwriting guidelines. According to the Commission, Wells Fargo agreed to produce the documents, and set forth a timetable for doing so, yet has failed to produce many of the materials.
Pursuant to its Application, the Commission is seeking an order from the federal district court compelling Wells Fargo to comply with the Commission’s administrative subpoenas and to produce all responsive materials to the staff. The Commission notes that it is continuing to conduct a fact-finding inquiry and has not concluded that anyone has broken the law.
Monday, March 26, 2012
U.S. MEXICO AND CANADA COMPLETE JOINT NUCLEAR SECURITY PROJECT
The following excerpt is from a Department of Defense American Forces Press e-mail:
Trilateral Agreement Highlights Nuclear Security Summit
By Army Sgt. 1st Class Tyrone C. Marshall Jr.
American Forces Press Service
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 26, 2012 - The United States, Canada and Mexico have completed a joint nuclear security project to convert the fuel in Mexico's research reactor from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium.
Representatives from the three nations presented the project's completion today at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea.
The project was initiated at the Nuclear Security Summit here two years ago and the three countries worked closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying it out, officials said. The full conversion of the reactor supports the goal of minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, they added, and by converting its research nuclear reactor, Mexico has contributed to nonproliferation.
"With this decision, Mexico reaffirms its commitment to building a world free of the nuclear threat," Mexican President Felipe Calderon said. "Each country must do its share to reach a safer North America and a safer planet. This is a clear example of the significant work we can do together in the North American region."
President Barack Obama, who is in Seoul, South Korea, for the Nuclear Security Summit, praised the effort.
"I would like to thank Mexico, Canada and the IAEA for their support of our joint nuclear security efforts," Obama said. "Our strong trilateral partnership, supported by the IAEA, has made our people safer and advanced our international nuclear security effort leading into the Seoul Summit."
Canadian Prime Minister Steven Harper said the project's completion demonstrates concrete steps countries can take collectively.
"We will continue to work with the United States and Mexico to enhance nuclear security in our region and worldwide," Harper said.
GENERAL JOHN ALLEN, COMMANDER INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN SPEAKS AT PENTAGON
The following excerpt is from the Department of Defense website:
Presenter: General John Allen, Commander, International Security Assistance Force March 26, 2012
DOD News Briefing with Gen. Allen from the Pentagon
Assistant Secretary Doug Wilson: Good morning. I'd like to welcome to the Pentagon Press Room and to the podium General John Allen, the commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. General Allen will have a short statement, and then we'll take your questions. Captain John Kirby, Pentagon spokesman, will moderate and answer -- direct your questions to him, and he'll call on you.
General Allen.
GENERAL JOHN ALLEN: Ladies and gentlemen, good morning, and thanks for your coming and for giving me this opportunity to join you today.
Now, some of you may have seen my congressional testimony last week. And in fact, I have seen a good bit of the coverage from those hearings, so I suspect you're familiar with the basic points that I tried to make about the progress that we're making in Afghanistan. I won't repeat it all for your here this morning, but I'd like to make a few points before we take your questions.
First, in the case of Staff Sergeant Bales, I extend once again my sincere condolences to the loved ones, family members and friends of those who were killed and injured in that senseless act of violence. I also extend my deepest sympathies to the Bales family, who are going through a great deal right now. They too deserve our support as they come to grips with the inevitable and drastic changes that will cause change in their lives.
Charges, as you know, have been preferred against Staff Sergeant Bales. Compensation payments to the family -- the families of the victims, in keeping with cultural norms, have been paid. And both the criminal investigation as well as an administrative investigation continues.
I'm sure you can understand that because these investigations are ongoing and jurisdiction has been passed to officials at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, I will not be able to go into more detail about this case today. But I can assure you that the investigators have and will retain my full support to let the facts take them where they may. We must let the investigative and judicial processes play out in their own time in accordance with our own regulations. Speculation in the media and through anonymous commentary serves no one's purpose in our interest and in our earnest desire to see justice done here.
Second, on the issue of future troop levels, I was very clear in my testimony that after we recover the surge this September, I'll conduct an analysis of the kinds of combat power we will need in 2013. I said I believe the power -- that power to be significant, but I do not say that it will need to rest at any certain level throughout this year or 2013. The truth is there is no way I can know that right now, certainly not until after we've emerged from the fighting season and not until after I've had the chance to assess the state of the insurgency in the aftermath of the fighting season, the operational environment that we anticipate in 2013.
And the capabilities of the Afghan national security forces going forward is not just a matter of what to do with the remaining 68,000 U.S. troops. I must also carefully consider the combination of forces in theater. There will still be some 40,000 ISAF forces in the field and an increasingly capable and increasingly numerous Afghan security forces. Force levels then will represent a composite number. That's a key point. It's American forces as a component of the international and indigenous force, not a separate and distinct entity.
And as I said, it is not just about the numbers either. It's about the operational environment in which we will find ourselves in 2013.
We've done much to degrade the Taliban's capabilities this winter, to deny them resources and sanctuary. I believe we've made it harder for them to succeed in a spring offensive of their own, but we need to get through this fighting season for me to fully understand that amount of combat power that we'll need in 2013.
I owe the president and my chain of command a comprehensive recommendation about all of this. I owe them options to consider and to think through. And I know I have their support to take the time I need in the fall to develop those options further.
Finally, a word about transition: I meant what I said about translation being the linchpin of our success. Of the four priorities I laid out to our command when I took command on the 18th of July, the first of these was to keep up the pressure on the enemy, and we've certainly done that. But a very close second was to focus even more sharply on our efforts to grow and to develop ANSF capabilities. They really are better than we thought that they would be at this point. More critically, they are better than they thought that they would be at this point.
I use as an example the bravery and the skill which they demonstrated when they attempted to quell the violence that resulted from the protests last month, bravery that cost them two lives and more than 60 wounded. But I could just as easily point to the literally thousands of operations, some large, some small, that they conduct alongside ISAF troops and often in the lead every month as we go forward. In just the last two weeks alone Afghan security forces across the country on their own arrested more than 50 and killed nearly half a dozen insurgents, including several who were planning to assassinate the governor of Balkh province. And over the course of what turned out to be more than 20 operations nationwide, they've also captured several caches of explosives, weapons and bomb-making materials.
And it isn't just about their Army doing good work. The police too have been contributing to the security in the cities and the towns, most recently protecting the Nowruz celebrations.
I know people will look at these and other examples and say they're anecdotal, that we still face real challenges in attrition and ethnic composition, even corruption in some of the ranks. I'm not saying things are perfect, and much work remains to be done. But for every bribe accepted and for every insider threat, or what is known as a green-on-blue incident -- and I think you're aware that tragically we had one overnight, as two young British soldiers were killed in Helmand province -- for every one Afghan soldier that doesn't return from leave, I can cite hundreds of other examples where they do perform their duties, where the partnership is strong, where the competence of the Afghan forces is building, and where the trust and confidence we have in them and that they have in themselves grows steadily.
Those who would make the argument otherwise will never convince me that these brave men don't have the will to fight for their government and for their country and for their fellow citizens, and that willingness, I believe, is the thing most hopeful about the entire effort of transition. They want this responsibility, they want to lead, and we're going to help them to do that.
With that, I'll happily take your questions.
Q: General, one quick housekeeping thing and then a question. There's been some ongoing confusion over the jump in the number of casualties from 16 to 17. I was wondering if you might be able to discuss that briefly.
And then secondly, considering the corruption and the green-on-blue incidents, can you talk a little bit about how you think the United States can give the Afghans some advance notice or use some sort of warrant-like procedure for the night raids? And how do you think that can be done without damaging or hurting operations?
GEN. ALLEN: I'm getting your one question in three parts here, so give me just a second. And if I miss one, let me -- just tell me.
There is a -- there was an increase in the number of what we believe to have been those who were killed tragically in this event. But this is -- the number increased was based upon the initial reporting by the Afghans. And so we should not be surprised that in fact, as the investigation went forward, that an -- that an additional number was added to that. So that is something that we understand and we accept, and as the investigation goes forward, we'll get greater clarity in that.
On green on blue, what we also call the insider threat, we're going to continue very closely to partner with the Afghans. As I think you're aware, we've done that significantly in the last several months. The Afghans themselves, who also suffer from what is euphemistically called green on green, they have taken a lot of steps themselves with an eight-step vetting process. They've worked very closely within the National Directorate of Security to place counterintelligence operatives inside their schools, inside their recruiting centers and inside their ranks, the idea being to spot and assess the potential emergence of an individual who could be an extremist or in fact a Taliban infiltrator.
They've done that themselves. We've taken action within ISAF with respect to a tactical directive, orders that I have issued, pre- deployment -- that we have asked the services to undertake both within the U.S. context, but the NATO context as well, to better prepare our forces across the board.
So I think between what the Afghans have done for themselves, what we're doing for ourselves and how we're partnering together, we seek to reduce this tragedy to the maximum extent possible.
And with respect to the night operations MOU, we are actually at a -- at a pretty delicate moment in the negotiations. I am confident that we will end up where we want to be on both sides, and I'll just leave it there.
So thank you for the questions.
STAFF: Yeah, Craig.
Q: General, Craig Whitlock with The Washington Post.
GEN. ALLEN: Hi, Craig.
Q: Speaking of green on blue, about a month ago, at the Afghan Interior Ministry, there were two American military officers who were killed, murdered, as people here at the Pentagon put it. Initially Afghan officials said they had a suspect in that case, a driver for an Afghan official. I think recently you told CNN that there are no suspects in the case at this point. Could you elaborate on where that investigation stands? And how can there be no suspect or arrest made in a case where a building's highly secured, where there're cameras, where people would know who was going in and out of that building?
GEN. ALLEN: We'll need -- we'll need to let this develop a bit more. At this juncture, I think there is still significant investigation that remains not just on who they believe might have conducted the shooting, but also where ties may be elsewhere outside the building into the Taliban. So more investigation needs to be conducted at this point.
Q: Is there a suspect in that case?
GEN. ALLEN: Not that we have been -- not that we have been presented at this point.
Q: And have you allowed all the advisers to go back into the ministries?
GEN. ALLEN: I have permitted my commanders to do assessments on all those areas where our advisers are involved, and they will come back to me with their assessment that the situation is now sufficiently secure for our advisers to go back. Most of them are back at this point. But we'll continue to evaluate the security situation as it develops.
Q: Thank you.
GEN. ALLEN: You're welcome.
Q: If I could follow up, General, there were 15 -- with the two deaths today, 15 ISAF service members have been killed in these green- on-blue incidents.
That's about 25 percent -- almost 25 percent of all the ISAF casualties so far this year. Is this -- what accounts for the increase in these kinds of attacks on ISAF forces? Is it a -- do you consider it a significant threat? And is there evidence that the Taliban is actually purposely planting, infiltrating the Afghan forces, or are these just random acts?
GEN. ALLEN: That's an important question. The Taliban of course takes credit for all of them when in fact the majority are not in fact a direct result of Taliban infiltration.
It's also no secret that the Taliban has had as an objective for some period of time infiltrating the ranks of both the ANSF and those elements that support us directly on board our camps.
It's difficult to tell right now whether this is an increase in the operational tempo, but I think that we can all probably assume that with the some of the incidents that have occurred in the last several months, that that has been a potential causal factor in some of the extremism that resulted in a green-on-blue event.
Q: And if I could follow, how does a -- how does a U.S. -- how does a British -- a French -- how can they work side by side, and in many cases sleeping in the same encampment, with this kind of threat looming over them?
GEN. ALLEN: In many cases the relationship is very strong. In fact in most cases the relationship is very strong. They know each other well.
We have taken steps necessary on our side to protect ourselves with respect to, in fact, sleeping arrangements, internal defenses associated with those small bases in which we operate, the posture of our forces, to have someone always overwatching our forces.
On the Afghan side, they're doing the same thing. I mean they're -- they are helping the troops to understand how to recognize radicalization or the emergence of extremism in some of those -- in individuals who may in fact be suspect. But they're also being trained, and through the use of the NDS, they're also very quick to be able to report this as well.
There have been some breakthroughs, in fact, in Afghan investigations, in arrests that have been made of elements that have been found in ranks that potentially could have been a perpetrator for a green-on-blue. So the process is actually working. But your question is a very important one, and we will watch that very closely to see if this is a trend over which we have to take even more measures. Thank you.
CAPTAIN JOHN KIRBY: Tony.
Q: Could I follow up on that? To what extent are you concerned about revenge killings based upon the Bales case and perceptions in Afghanistan that he may be getting a free ride or justice isn't being done? And then I have a second -- a second question.
GEN. ALLEN: Yeah, I don't connect the two of those. But in any case, there -- it is prudent for us to recognize that, as you know, revenge is an important dimension in this culture. So we would be prudent ourselves in looking for the potential for that to emerge. So it is something that we will keep an eye on. I have seen no indications yet that it has emerged as a potential factor, but we will certainly keep an eye on that.
Q: A quick -- on a second question, on Pakistan and the FATA, the safe havens, the two major challenges you pointed out last week to Congress was corruption and the safe havens. What level of degradation to the safe havens do you need to see over the next year to give the president some comfort level that as you transition, the safe havens still won't remain a vibrant sanction for the Taliban and Haqqani network?
GEN. ALLEN: Sure, an important question. We'll need to see the cross-border movement of insurgents, have the safe havens reduced. We believe that, as a result, if you've been following -- and I'm sure you have -- the reduction in enemy-initiated attacks over the year, if we see that a second year, we think that there will be important indicators about whether the safe havens have in fact or are operationally relevant to the insurgency, but we'll also continue to push for as much velocity as we can achieve in reintegration. That has also helped us, recalling that many of the folks who live in the safe havens actually live in Afghanistan; they're there for a short period of time. If we can accelerate the value of reintegration in their minds, that's another means of neutralizing the safe havens.
And then, of course, the process of reconciliation -- I'm not personally involved in reconciliation, but it is a peacemaking process which could, in fact, should a political outcome ultimately emerge from reconciliation, in conjunction with the reintegration process, it could in fact deflate in fact the value of the safe havens ultimately to the insurgency because many insurgents will simply go home, to become part of the future rather than to become continued insurgents.
Q: (Off mic) -- you see more Pakistan military involvement and a greater offensive thrust there?
GEN. ALLEN: Well, we would always enjoy Pakistani military assistance across the border, but I will tell you that they're deeply engaged across the border. In the last couple of years, they've suffered 3,000 dead and a couple of thousand wounded, and they have an IED problem from the Taliban on their side of the border that is substantial as well.
So while I would not purport to dictate to General Kayani how he should conduct his operations, there are vigorous operations across the border. And my hope is that as his relationship and mine continues to unfold, we could perhaps cooperate with complementary operations across the border.
CAPT. KIRBY: (Off mic.)
Q: Can I just follow up?
CAPT. KIRBY: (Off mic) -- one question, please.
Q: General, given the string of incidents that you've talked about, do you think that there is a problem with leadership by your senior NCOs? Have they been worn out by repeated deployments and so therefore are missing things or not enforcing things? Is leadership breakdown a common thing, between the urination incident, the Quran burning, the killing of the Afghan civilians? And what might you be doing about that, if so?
GEN. ALLEN: Well, each one of those was a result of a leadership failure in some form or another. But I think as I understand your question, as I think back across how many tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of our forces have served in Afghanistan and these incidents have been so infrequent; as I know the force myself -- and I have to speak more as a Marine, necessarily, than as a soldier, although I believe that there's virtually no difference in the institution of the Army and the Marine Corps in this regard -- after this period of time of war, we find that our staff NCOs and our noncommissioned officers -- and our young officers are extraordinarily well-trained; and so repeated tours in Afghanistan and, prior to that, in Iraq, don't inherently reduce the effectiveness of the force or reduce the effectiveness of small-unit leadership.
Indeed, over the years in our school systems -- and I recently spoke at one of the schools down at Quantico, for example -- the kinds of institutional emphasis by our great Army and Marine Corps on ensuring that high standards of leadership and supervision are not just sustained, but enhanced, still remains at the core of those two institutions.
And so those were failures.
But when I think back across so many of our service members that have served successfully in Afghanistan, I'm encouraged, frankly, by the NCO leadership, by the staff NCO leadership and that of our junior officers. And so I think we can always work to look at the individual incidents in an after-action review to ensure we understand how those incidents occurred and then learn from them and then roll those lessons learned back into our training institutions and our leadership academies. And so I'm confident that the institution is solid and that we will continue to work to develop those small-unit leaders, which, as you well know, Julian (sp), at the -- at the -- in a counterinsurgency is where the most important leadership occurs on any given day.
CAPT. KIRBY: Luis.
Q: Sir, can you please explain why there was a decision to pay out compensation to victims' relatives before we even have a verdict?
GEN. ALLEN: It is a natural and a cultural norm that we would pursue. We've done that in the past. And in this case, it was appropriate, we believed, given the circumstances of this particular tragedy.
CAPT. KIRBY: (Off mic.)
Q: Sorry, follow-up? (Inaudible.)
CAPT. KIRBY: (Off mic.)
Q: Can we get a total of the compensation paid out for this incident and for the war on whole? And can you explain a little bit of how it's done? Are these, you know, suitcases of cash given to poor families and their -- what's --
GEN. ALLEN: We can provide all that to you. We'll get you that information.
CAPT. KIRBY: Cami.
Q: General, could you elaborate at all about this Defense Department-ordered review of the anti-malaria drug, when you were made aware of that, including for deployed troops, and what explanation you were given for it?
GEN. ALLEN: I was actually made aware of this morning. The review was a natural course of periodic reviews, as I understand it, within the department. So that -- I think that's the best I can do for you on this.
Q: You were not told that there was a specific concern regarding troops that were deployed being given this drug?
GEN. ALLEN: No.
There are reviews constantly of our medical processes and procedures. That's not uncommon at all. And so when I hear that one of the anti-malarial prophylaxis drugs is under a periodic review, I think that's a very natural and important process that is pursued regularly in the Office of Secretary of Defense. So I would suggest that you ask them that question.
CAPT. KIRBY: We'll come back to the front here again.
Q: Sir, when do you expect the border with Pakistan to be opened? And have you asked that the Haqqani group be listed as a terrorist group?
GEN. ALLEN: I think the border -- I don't know specifically on when the border might be opened. But as you know, there's a review of the relationship under way in the Pakistani parliament, and I believe that probably, as a result of that review of the policy relationship by the Parliamentary Committee of National Security, I believe it's called, we might find a recommendation in that -- in that review. Otherwise, I have no particular indicators at this point.
Q: Have you asked for the Haqqani group to be listed?
GEN. ALLEN: I did, yes.
Q: And why not charge anyone in the killing of the 24 Pakistani troops?
GEN. ALLEN: Well, the investigation was clear that there was no criminal dereliction of duty that was found in the investigation. But I did take administrative measures.
CAPT. KIRBY (?): (Please watch ?) the follow-ups -- (inaudible).
Q: Sir, do you share the analysis of some in NATO that most of the heavy lifting for transition is on track to be completed by mid- 2013?
If so, how does that affect your analysis of what continued troop components you'll need? And when you talk about analyzing the combat power that you'll need, after this fighting season, where are you looking for that distribution, to consolidate gains in the south, to perhaps launch a greater offensive in the east?
GEN. ALLEN: Those are two very different questions, but I'll try to bring them together.
I'm -- and I'm not sure that there has been analysis that says specifically, the heavy lifting on transition is done by the latter part of 2013. What will happen -- if you know about the Lisbon summit transition, there are five tranches of Afghan geography which ultimately move into a process of transition. The fifth and final of those tranches will occur -- President Karzai will announce it probably in the latter part of the summer of 2013. We'll begin to implement that tranche in the -- probably the early fall. And with that, technically, the ANSF moves into security lead, with that fifth tranche, across the entire country.
But that process will continue until we reach the end of 2014, where technically, the ANSF is fully in the lead across the country. So from that point where the fifth tranche enters implementation, enters into the transition process, we will then be in support of the ANSF as they move into the lead for security across the country.
Did I get to your question then?
Q: Well, do you think that we are on -- that you are on track to actually do that? And if so, how does that impact your thinking -- (inaudible)?
GEN. ALLEN: Great, thank you. Thanks for the follow-up on that.
As you might imagine, some of those tranches or some of the components, the elements of the tranche four and five, are in the east. And so we would both anticipate that in the -- in the natural course of the campaign, which we'll emphasize this coming year consolidating our holds in the south while still operating -- conducting counterinsurgency operations in the east, we will see eventually a confluence of the movement of geography into the transition process and the campaign seeking ultimately to facilitate and accelerate Afghan security operations in the south and ultimately in the east.
So the two come together.
Q: And they will come together, you believe, in 2013?
GEN. ALLEN: Probably 2013, but it will continue in '14.
CAPT. KIRBY: We have time for just -- two more.
Elizabeth?
Q: General, going back to green -- to the green-on-blue incidents, Secretary Panetta has suggested in his comments recently that this -- we're not seeing -- we're not going to see the end of these and that this is part of the price of war. Would you agree with that?
GEN. ALLEN: I think it is a characteristic of counterinsurgencies that we've experienced before. We experienced these in Iraq. We experienced them in Vietnam. And on any occasion where you're dealing with an insurgency and where you're also growing an indigenous force which ultimately will be the principal opposition to that insurgency, the enemy's going to do all that they can to disrupt both the counterinsurgency operations, but also disrupt the integrity of the indigenous forces that developed. So we should be -- we should expect that this will occur in counterinsurgency operations and as we saw it in Iraq and we've seen it in -- historically in counterinsurgencies, but also in Vietnam. It is a characteristic of this kind of warfare.
Q: (Off mic) -- 16 versus 17, did the -- just to be clear -- did the Afghans miscount? Did someone die after the initial assessment?
GEN. ALLEN: We'll have to let that come out in the investigation.
CAPT. KIRBY: This'll be the last question.
(Off mic.)
Q: General Allen, I want to go back to Julian's question if I might.
On the question of command climate, if you will, how do you know -- how do you know yourself that the troops aren't exhausted to a breaking point, commanders, NCOs aren't exhausted? The notion that there is alcohol on a base, that people go off and on a base is not what anyone would think of as typical in your area of command.
So how do you know? How do you know that you don't have troops at the breaking point, some troops, from PTSD or traumatic brain injury?
GEN. ALLEN: Well --
Q: What are you doing -- what are YOU doing you look at these questions yourself?
GEN. ALLEN: Well, I -- on a regular basis I talk with our command chaplain, I talk to our command surgeon, I talk to my command sergeant major, all of whom are traveling, all of whom are taking the temperature, if you will, within their areas of responsibility, and all of those have a very important interconnection.
I'm traveling myself on a regular basis. Just before I came back here, I met with the commanders of every one of the regional commands, and they gave me an assessment on the state of their command and the state of their campaign as they see it unfolding right -- not just today, but how they see it unfolding in 2012. And I'm very interested in small-unit leadership because small-unit leadership, in the end, is what generates success at the point of impact in a counterinsurgency.
So there could be, Barbara --- as your question implies -- there could be troops that at an individual level do in fact demonstrate or evidence the traits of PTSD. But I have to compliment the services on this regard. The Army and the Marine Corps have gone a very long way to try to help both in pre-deployment preparation for the deployments to Afghanistan but also while we're in theater, with our behavioral health and operational stress teams, the religious support teams, the constant review by leaders of how the troops are doing in the context of an after-action review, and then when they go home what the services do for the troops on the return from their deployment.
Q: But sir, to be blunt, something went terribly wrong. Investigation pending. Something went terribly wrong. How are you making sure something like that doesn't happen again?
GEN. ALLEN: Yeah, very important question. We're investigating this one very thoroughly, and I'm looking at command climate, in fact, as --
Q: Of the unit?
GEN. ALLEN: -- of that unit, in fact, as a direct result of these actions. And while I'm not going to get into the details about describing the unit or the -- this particular event, I will be satisfied when I get the report that we have looked closely at the potential contributing factors that might have permitted this event to have unfolded tragically.
CAPT. KIRBY: Thanks, everybody. Appreciate it. That's all the time we have .
GEN. ALLEN: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Have a good morning.
Presenter: General John Allen, Commander, International Security Assistance Force March 26, 2012
DOD News Briefing with Gen. Allen from the Pentagon
Assistant Secretary Doug Wilson: Good morning. I'd like to welcome to the Pentagon Press Room and to the podium General John Allen, the commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. General Allen will have a short statement, and then we'll take your questions. Captain John Kirby, Pentagon spokesman, will moderate and answer -- direct your questions to him, and he'll call on you.
General Allen.
GENERAL JOHN ALLEN: Ladies and gentlemen, good morning, and thanks for your coming and for giving me this opportunity to join you today.
Now, some of you may have seen my congressional testimony last week. And in fact, I have seen a good bit of the coverage from those hearings, so I suspect you're familiar with the basic points that I tried to make about the progress that we're making in Afghanistan. I won't repeat it all for your here this morning, but I'd like to make a few points before we take your questions.
First, in the case of Staff Sergeant Bales, I extend once again my sincere condolences to the loved ones, family members and friends of those who were killed and injured in that senseless act of violence. I also extend my deepest sympathies to the Bales family, who are going through a great deal right now. They too deserve our support as they come to grips with the inevitable and drastic changes that will cause change in their lives.
Charges, as you know, have been preferred against Staff Sergeant Bales. Compensation payments to the family -- the families of the victims, in keeping with cultural norms, have been paid. And both the criminal investigation as well as an administrative investigation continues.
I'm sure you can understand that because these investigations are ongoing and jurisdiction has been passed to officials at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, I will not be able to go into more detail about this case today. But I can assure you that the investigators have and will retain my full support to let the facts take them where they may. We must let the investigative and judicial processes play out in their own time in accordance with our own regulations. Speculation in the media and through anonymous commentary serves no one's purpose in our interest and in our earnest desire to see justice done here.
Second, on the issue of future troop levels, I was very clear in my testimony that after we recover the surge this September, I'll conduct an analysis of the kinds of combat power we will need in 2013. I said I believe the power -- that power to be significant, but I do not say that it will need to rest at any certain level throughout this year or 2013. The truth is there is no way I can know that right now, certainly not until after we've emerged from the fighting season and not until after I've had the chance to assess the state of the insurgency in the aftermath of the fighting season, the operational environment that we anticipate in 2013.
And the capabilities of the Afghan national security forces going forward is not just a matter of what to do with the remaining 68,000 U.S. troops. I must also carefully consider the combination of forces in theater. There will still be some 40,000 ISAF forces in the field and an increasingly capable and increasingly numerous Afghan security forces. Force levels then will represent a composite number. That's a key point. It's American forces as a component of the international and indigenous force, not a separate and distinct entity.
And as I said, it is not just about the numbers either. It's about the operational environment in which we will find ourselves in 2013.
We've done much to degrade the Taliban's capabilities this winter, to deny them resources and sanctuary. I believe we've made it harder for them to succeed in a spring offensive of their own, but we need to get through this fighting season for me to fully understand that amount of combat power that we'll need in 2013.
I owe the president and my chain of command a comprehensive recommendation about all of this. I owe them options to consider and to think through. And I know I have their support to take the time I need in the fall to develop those options further.
Finally, a word about transition: I meant what I said about translation being the linchpin of our success. Of the four priorities I laid out to our command when I took command on the 18th of July, the first of these was to keep up the pressure on the enemy, and we've certainly done that. But a very close second was to focus even more sharply on our efforts to grow and to develop ANSF capabilities. They really are better than we thought that they would be at this point. More critically, they are better than they thought that they would be at this point.
I use as an example the bravery and the skill which they demonstrated when they attempted to quell the violence that resulted from the protests last month, bravery that cost them two lives and more than 60 wounded. But I could just as easily point to the literally thousands of operations, some large, some small, that they conduct alongside ISAF troops and often in the lead every month as we go forward. In just the last two weeks alone Afghan security forces across the country on their own arrested more than 50 and killed nearly half a dozen insurgents, including several who were planning to assassinate the governor of Balkh province. And over the course of what turned out to be more than 20 operations nationwide, they've also captured several caches of explosives, weapons and bomb-making materials.
And it isn't just about their Army doing good work. The police too have been contributing to the security in the cities and the towns, most recently protecting the Nowruz celebrations.
I know people will look at these and other examples and say they're anecdotal, that we still face real challenges in attrition and ethnic composition, even corruption in some of the ranks. I'm not saying things are perfect, and much work remains to be done. But for every bribe accepted and for every insider threat, or what is known as a green-on-blue incident -- and I think you're aware that tragically we had one overnight, as two young British soldiers were killed in Helmand province -- for every one Afghan soldier that doesn't return from leave, I can cite hundreds of other examples where they do perform their duties, where the partnership is strong, where the competence of the Afghan forces is building, and where the trust and confidence we have in them and that they have in themselves grows steadily.
Those who would make the argument otherwise will never convince me that these brave men don't have the will to fight for their government and for their country and for their fellow citizens, and that willingness, I believe, is the thing most hopeful about the entire effort of transition. They want this responsibility, they want to lead, and we're going to help them to do that.
With that, I'll happily take your questions.
Q: General, one quick housekeeping thing and then a question. There's been some ongoing confusion over the jump in the number of casualties from 16 to 17. I was wondering if you might be able to discuss that briefly.
And then secondly, considering the corruption and the green-on-blue incidents, can you talk a little bit about how you think the United States can give the Afghans some advance notice or use some sort of warrant-like procedure for the night raids? And how do you think that can be done without damaging or hurting operations?
GEN. ALLEN: I'm getting your one question in three parts here, so give me just a second. And if I miss one, let me -- just tell me.
There is a -- there was an increase in the number of what we believe to have been those who were killed tragically in this event. But this is -- the number increased was based upon the initial reporting by the Afghans. And so we should not be surprised that in fact, as the investigation went forward, that an -- that an additional number was added to that. So that is something that we understand and we accept, and as the investigation goes forward, we'll get greater clarity in that.
On green on blue, what we also call the insider threat, we're going to continue very closely to partner with the Afghans. As I think you're aware, we've done that significantly in the last several months. The Afghans themselves, who also suffer from what is euphemistically called green on green, they have taken a lot of steps themselves with an eight-step vetting process. They've worked very closely within the National Directorate of Security to place counterintelligence operatives inside their schools, inside their recruiting centers and inside their ranks, the idea being to spot and assess the potential emergence of an individual who could be an extremist or in fact a Taliban infiltrator.
They've done that themselves. We've taken action within ISAF with respect to a tactical directive, orders that I have issued, pre- deployment -- that we have asked the services to undertake both within the U.S. context, but the NATO context as well, to better prepare our forces across the board.
So I think between what the Afghans have done for themselves, what we're doing for ourselves and how we're partnering together, we seek to reduce this tragedy to the maximum extent possible.
And with respect to the night operations MOU, we are actually at a -- at a pretty delicate moment in the negotiations. I am confident that we will end up where we want to be on both sides, and I'll just leave it there.
So thank you for the questions.
STAFF: Yeah, Craig.
Q: General, Craig Whitlock with The Washington Post.
GEN. ALLEN: Hi, Craig.
Q: Speaking of green on blue, about a month ago, at the Afghan Interior Ministry, there were two American military officers who were killed, murdered, as people here at the Pentagon put it. Initially Afghan officials said they had a suspect in that case, a driver for an Afghan official. I think recently you told CNN that there are no suspects in the case at this point. Could you elaborate on where that investigation stands? And how can there be no suspect or arrest made in a case where a building's highly secured, where there're cameras, where people would know who was going in and out of that building?
GEN. ALLEN: We'll need -- we'll need to let this develop a bit more. At this juncture, I think there is still significant investigation that remains not just on who they believe might have conducted the shooting, but also where ties may be elsewhere outside the building into the Taliban. So more investigation needs to be conducted at this point.
Q: Is there a suspect in that case?
GEN. ALLEN: Not that we have been -- not that we have been presented at this point.
Q: And have you allowed all the advisers to go back into the ministries?
GEN. ALLEN: I have permitted my commanders to do assessments on all those areas where our advisers are involved, and they will come back to me with their assessment that the situation is now sufficiently secure for our advisers to go back. Most of them are back at this point. But we'll continue to evaluate the security situation as it develops.
Q: Thank you.
GEN. ALLEN: You're welcome.
Q: If I could follow up, General, there were 15 -- with the two deaths today, 15 ISAF service members have been killed in these green- on-blue incidents.
That's about 25 percent -- almost 25 percent of all the ISAF casualties so far this year. Is this -- what accounts for the increase in these kinds of attacks on ISAF forces? Is it a -- do you consider it a significant threat? And is there evidence that the Taliban is actually purposely planting, infiltrating the Afghan forces, or are these just random acts?
GEN. ALLEN: That's an important question. The Taliban of course takes credit for all of them when in fact the majority are not in fact a direct result of Taliban infiltration.
It's also no secret that the Taliban has had as an objective for some period of time infiltrating the ranks of both the ANSF and those elements that support us directly on board our camps.
It's difficult to tell right now whether this is an increase in the operational tempo, but I think that we can all probably assume that with the some of the incidents that have occurred in the last several months, that that has been a potential causal factor in some of the extremism that resulted in a green-on-blue event.
Q: And if I could follow, how does a -- how does a U.S. -- how does a British -- a French -- how can they work side by side, and in many cases sleeping in the same encampment, with this kind of threat looming over them?
GEN. ALLEN: In many cases the relationship is very strong. In fact in most cases the relationship is very strong. They know each other well.
We have taken steps necessary on our side to protect ourselves with respect to, in fact, sleeping arrangements, internal defenses associated with those small bases in which we operate, the posture of our forces, to have someone always overwatching our forces.
On the Afghan side, they're doing the same thing. I mean they're -- they are helping the troops to understand how to recognize radicalization or the emergence of extremism in some of those -- in individuals who may in fact be suspect. But they're also being trained, and through the use of the NDS, they're also very quick to be able to report this as well.
There have been some breakthroughs, in fact, in Afghan investigations, in arrests that have been made of elements that have been found in ranks that potentially could have been a perpetrator for a green-on-blue. So the process is actually working. But your question is a very important one, and we will watch that very closely to see if this is a trend over which we have to take even more measures. Thank you.
CAPTAIN JOHN KIRBY: Tony.
Q: Could I follow up on that? To what extent are you concerned about revenge killings based upon the Bales case and perceptions in Afghanistan that he may be getting a free ride or justice isn't being done? And then I have a second -- a second question.
GEN. ALLEN: Yeah, I don't connect the two of those. But in any case, there -- it is prudent for us to recognize that, as you know, revenge is an important dimension in this culture. So we would be prudent ourselves in looking for the potential for that to emerge. So it is something that we will keep an eye on. I have seen no indications yet that it has emerged as a potential factor, but we will certainly keep an eye on that.
Q: A quick -- on a second question, on Pakistan and the FATA, the safe havens, the two major challenges you pointed out last week to Congress was corruption and the safe havens. What level of degradation to the safe havens do you need to see over the next year to give the president some comfort level that as you transition, the safe havens still won't remain a vibrant sanction for the Taliban and Haqqani network?
GEN. ALLEN: Sure, an important question. We'll need to see the cross-border movement of insurgents, have the safe havens reduced. We believe that, as a result, if you've been following -- and I'm sure you have -- the reduction in enemy-initiated attacks over the year, if we see that a second year, we think that there will be important indicators about whether the safe havens have in fact or are operationally relevant to the insurgency, but we'll also continue to push for as much velocity as we can achieve in reintegration. That has also helped us, recalling that many of the folks who live in the safe havens actually live in Afghanistan; they're there for a short period of time. If we can accelerate the value of reintegration in their minds, that's another means of neutralizing the safe havens.
And then, of course, the process of reconciliation -- I'm not personally involved in reconciliation, but it is a peacemaking process which could, in fact, should a political outcome ultimately emerge from reconciliation, in conjunction with the reintegration process, it could in fact deflate in fact the value of the safe havens ultimately to the insurgency because many insurgents will simply go home, to become part of the future rather than to become continued insurgents.
Q: (Off mic) -- you see more Pakistan military involvement and a greater offensive thrust there?
GEN. ALLEN: Well, we would always enjoy Pakistani military assistance across the border, but I will tell you that they're deeply engaged across the border. In the last couple of years, they've suffered 3,000 dead and a couple of thousand wounded, and they have an IED problem from the Taliban on their side of the border that is substantial as well.
So while I would not purport to dictate to General Kayani how he should conduct his operations, there are vigorous operations across the border. And my hope is that as his relationship and mine continues to unfold, we could perhaps cooperate with complementary operations across the border.
CAPT. KIRBY: (Off mic.)
Q: Can I just follow up?
CAPT. KIRBY: (Off mic) -- one question, please.
Q: General, given the string of incidents that you've talked about, do you think that there is a problem with leadership by your senior NCOs? Have they been worn out by repeated deployments and so therefore are missing things or not enforcing things? Is leadership breakdown a common thing, between the urination incident, the Quran burning, the killing of the Afghan civilians? And what might you be doing about that, if so?
GEN. ALLEN: Well, each one of those was a result of a leadership failure in some form or another. But I think as I understand your question, as I think back across how many tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of our forces have served in Afghanistan and these incidents have been so infrequent; as I know the force myself -- and I have to speak more as a Marine, necessarily, than as a soldier, although I believe that there's virtually no difference in the institution of the Army and the Marine Corps in this regard -- after this period of time of war, we find that our staff NCOs and our noncommissioned officers -- and our young officers are extraordinarily well-trained; and so repeated tours in Afghanistan and, prior to that, in Iraq, don't inherently reduce the effectiveness of the force or reduce the effectiveness of small-unit leadership.
Indeed, over the years in our school systems -- and I recently spoke at one of the schools down at Quantico, for example -- the kinds of institutional emphasis by our great Army and Marine Corps on ensuring that high standards of leadership and supervision are not just sustained, but enhanced, still remains at the core of those two institutions.
And so those were failures.
But when I think back across so many of our service members that have served successfully in Afghanistan, I'm encouraged, frankly, by the NCO leadership, by the staff NCO leadership and that of our junior officers. And so I think we can always work to look at the individual incidents in an after-action review to ensure we understand how those incidents occurred and then learn from them and then roll those lessons learned back into our training institutions and our leadership academies. And so I'm confident that the institution is solid and that we will continue to work to develop those small-unit leaders, which, as you well know, Julian (sp), at the -- at the -- in a counterinsurgency is where the most important leadership occurs on any given day.
CAPT. KIRBY: Luis.
Q: Sir, can you please explain why there was a decision to pay out compensation to victims' relatives before we even have a verdict?
GEN. ALLEN: It is a natural and a cultural norm that we would pursue. We've done that in the past. And in this case, it was appropriate, we believed, given the circumstances of this particular tragedy.
CAPT. KIRBY: (Off mic.)
Q: Sorry, follow-up? (Inaudible.)
CAPT. KIRBY: (Off mic.)
Q: Can we get a total of the compensation paid out for this incident and for the war on whole? And can you explain a little bit of how it's done? Are these, you know, suitcases of cash given to poor families and their -- what's --
GEN. ALLEN: We can provide all that to you. We'll get you that information.
CAPT. KIRBY: Cami.
Q: General, could you elaborate at all about this Defense Department-ordered review of the anti-malaria drug, when you were made aware of that, including for deployed troops, and what explanation you were given for it?
GEN. ALLEN: I was actually made aware of this morning. The review was a natural course of periodic reviews, as I understand it, within the department. So that -- I think that's the best I can do for you on this.
Q: You were not told that there was a specific concern regarding troops that were deployed being given this drug?
GEN. ALLEN: No.
There are reviews constantly of our medical processes and procedures. That's not uncommon at all. And so when I hear that one of the anti-malarial prophylaxis drugs is under a periodic review, I think that's a very natural and important process that is pursued regularly in the Office of Secretary of Defense. So I would suggest that you ask them that question.
CAPT. KIRBY: We'll come back to the front here again.
Q: Sir, when do you expect the border with Pakistan to be opened? And have you asked that the Haqqani group be listed as a terrorist group?
GEN. ALLEN: I think the border -- I don't know specifically on when the border might be opened. But as you know, there's a review of the relationship under way in the Pakistani parliament, and I believe that probably, as a result of that review of the policy relationship by the Parliamentary Committee of National Security, I believe it's called, we might find a recommendation in that -- in that review. Otherwise, I have no particular indicators at this point.
Q: Have you asked for the Haqqani group to be listed?
GEN. ALLEN: I did, yes.
Q: And why not charge anyone in the killing of the 24 Pakistani troops?
GEN. ALLEN: Well, the investigation was clear that there was no criminal dereliction of duty that was found in the investigation. But I did take administrative measures.
CAPT. KIRBY (?): (Please watch ?) the follow-ups -- (inaudible).
Q: Sir, do you share the analysis of some in NATO that most of the heavy lifting for transition is on track to be completed by mid- 2013?
If so, how does that affect your analysis of what continued troop components you'll need? And when you talk about analyzing the combat power that you'll need, after this fighting season, where are you looking for that distribution, to consolidate gains in the south, to perhaps launch a greater offensive in the east?
GEN. ALLEN: Those are two very different questions, but I'll try to bring them together.
I'm -- and I'm not sure that there has been analysis that says specifically, the heavy lifting on transition is done by the latter part of 2013. What will happen -- if you know about the Lisbon summit transition, there are five tranches of Afghan geography which ultimately move into a process of transition. The fifth and final of those tranches will occur -- President Karzai will announce it probably in the latter part of the summer of 2013. We'll begin to implement that tranche in the -- probably the early fall. And with that, technically, the ANSF moves into security lead, with that fifth tranche, across the entire country.
But that process will continue until we reach the end of 2014, where technically, the ANSF is fully in the lead across the country. So from that point where the fifth tranche enters implementation, enters into the transition process, we will then be in support of the ANSF as they move into the lead for security across the country.
Did I get to your question then?
Q: Well, do you think that we are on -- that you are on track to actually do that? And if so, how does that impact your thinking -- (inaudible)?
GEN. ALLEN: Great, thank you. Thanks for the follow-up on that.
As you might imagine, some of those tranches or some of the components, the elements of the tranche four and five, are in the east. And so we would both anticipate that in the -- in the natural course of the campaign, which we'll emphasize this coming year consolidating our holds in the south while still operating -- conducting counterinsurgency operations in the east, we will see eventually a confluence of the movement of geography into the transition process and the campaign seeking ultimately to facilitate and accelerate Afghan security operations in the south and ultimately in the east.
So the two come together.
Q: And they will come together, you believe, in 2013?
GEN. ALLEN: Probably 2013, but it will continue in '14.
CAPT. KIRBY: We have time for just -- two more.
Elizabeth?
Q: General, going back to green -- to the green-on-blue incidents, Secretary Panetta has suggested in his comments recently that this -- we're not seeing -- we're not going to see the end of these and that this is part of the price of war. Would you agree with that?
GEN. ALLEN: I think it is a characteristic of counterinsurgencies that we've experienced before. We experienced these in Iraq. We experienced them in Vietnam. And on any occasion where you're dealing with an insurgency and where you're also growing an indigenous force which ultimately will be the principal opposition to that insurgency, the enemy's going to do all that they can to disrupt both the counterinsurgency operations, but also disrupt the integrity of the indigenous forces that developed. So we should be -- we should expect that this will occur in counterinsurgency operations and as we saw it in Iraq and we've seen it in -- historically in counterinsurgencies, but also in Vietnam. It is a characteristic of this kind of warfare.
Q: (Off mic) -- 16 versus 17, did the -- just to be clear -- did the Afghans miscount? Did someone die after the initial assessment?
GEN. ALLEN: We'll have to let that come out in the investigation.
CAPT. KIRBY: This'll be the last question.
(Off mic.)
Q: General Allen, I want to go back to Julian's question if I might.
On the question of command climate, if you will, how do you know -- how do you know yourself that the troops aren't exhausted to a breaking point, commanders, NCOs aren't exhausted? The notion that there is alcohol on a base, that people go off and on a base is not what anyone would think of as typical in your area of command.
So how do you know? How do you know that you don't have troops at the breaking point, some troops, from PTSD or traumatic brain injury?
GEN. ALLEN: Well --
Q: What are you doing -- what are YOU doing you look at these questions yourself?
GEN. ALLEN: Well, I -- on a regular basis I talk with our command chaplain, I talk to our command surgeon, I talk to my command sergeant major, all of whom are traveling, all of whom are taking the temperature, if you will, within their areas of responsibility, and all of those have a very important interconnection.
I'm traveling myself on a regular basis. Just before I came back here, I met with the commanders of every one of the regional commands, and they gave me an assessment on the state of their command and the state of their campaign as they see it unfolding right -- not just today, but how they see it unfolding in 2012. And I'm very interested in small-unit leadership because small-unit leadership, in the end, is what generates success at the point of impact in a counterinsurgency.
So there could be, Barbara --- as your question implies -- there could be troops that at an individual level do in fact demonstrate or evidence the traits of PTSD. But I have to compliment the services on this regard. The Army and the Marine Corps have gone a very long way to try to help both in pre-deployment preparation for the deployments to Afghanistan but also while we're in theater, with our behavioral health and operational stress teams, the religious support teams, the constant review by leaders of how the troops are doing in the context of an after-action review, and then when they go home what the services do for the troops on the return from their deployment.
Q: But sir, to be blunt, something went terribly wrong. Investigation pending. Something went terribly wrong. How are you making sure something like that doesn't happen again?
GEN. ALLEN: Yeah, very important question. We're investigating this one very thoroughly, and I'm looking at command climate, in fact, as --
Q: Of the unit?
GEN. ALLEN: -- of that unit, in fact, as a direct result of these actions. And while I'm not going to get into the details about describing the unit or the -- this particular event, I will be satisfied when I get the report that we have looked closely at the potential contributing factors that might have permitted this event to have unfolded tragically.
CAPT. KIRBY: Thanks, everybody. Appreciate it. That's all the time we have .
GEN. ALLEN: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Have a good morning.
GENERAL ALLEN SAYS SPECULATION IN BALES CASE SERVES NO PURPOSE
The following excerpt is from a Department of Defense American Forces Press Service e-mail:
Allen: Speculation About Bales Case 'Serves No Purpose'
By Karen Parrish
American Forces Press Service
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 26, 2012 - Criminal and administrative investigations continue following charges announced March 23 against Army Staff Sgt. Robert Bales, the NATO International Security Assistance Force commander said here today.
Bales, who is being held at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., is charged with killing 17 Afghan civilians and trying to kill six others March 11.
U.S. officials have paid compensation to the victims' families, Marine Corps Gen. John R. Allen confirmed to reporters during a Pentagon news conference, noting that such payments are according to Afghan cultural norms.
"I extend once again my sincere condolences to the loved ones, family members and friends of those who were killed and injured in that senseless act of violence," Allen said. "I also extend my deepest sympathies to the Bales family, who are going through a great deal right now. They, too, deserve our support as they come to grips with the inevitable and drastic changes ... in their lives."
Allen said because investigations continue and jurisdiction rests with officials at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., he could not to go into more detail about the case. He added that investigators "have and will retain my full support to let the facts take them where they may."
Investigative and judicial processes will proceed according to military regulations, Allen said.
"Speculation in the media and through anonymous commentary serves no one's purpose in our interest and in our earnest desire to see justice done here," he added.
The special court-martial convening authority at Joint Base Lewis-McChord must next decide whether to direct an investigation of the charges under Article 32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. No case can proceed to a general court-martial unless a command first conducts an Article 32 investigation.
The special court-martial convening authority at Joint Base Lewis-McChord must next decide whether to direct an investigation of the charges under Article 32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. No case can proceed to a general court-martial unless a command first conducts an Article 32 investigation.
Under the UCMJ, the maximum possible punishment for a premeditated murder conviction is dishonorable discharge from the armed forces, reduction to the lowest enlisted grade, forfeiture of pay and allowances, and death. The minimum sentence is life imprisonment with eligibility for parole.
U.S. OFFICIAL SAYS NUMBER OF U.S. COMPANIES INVESTING IN VIETNAM IS PROLIFERATING
The following excerpt is from a U.S. State Department e-mail:
Remarks at American Chamber of Commerce Vietnam
Remarks Robert D. Hormats
Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs Hanoi, Vietnam
March 20, 2012
As prepared for delivery
Introduction
I would like to thank the AmCham for hosting this luncheon today and to all of you for coming.
All of you are on the cutting edge of a bilateral economic relationship that is growing in leaps and bounds.
Not only are U.S. exports to Vietnam expanding rapidly – from $3.1 billion in 2009 to $4.3 billion in 2011 – but the number of U.S. companies invested in Vietnam also is proliferating, as is evidenced by your presence here today.
I’m looking forward to learning from all of you today about how we can further strengthen the U.S.-Vietnam economic relationship.
I want to take a moment to thank Adam Sitkoff from AmCham Hanoi and Sesto Vecchi from AmCham Ho Chi Minh City for their participation in Secretary Clinton’s Global Business Conference last month in Washington.
It was the first-ever Global Business Conference at the State Department in Washington. We brought together senior U.S. officials with more than 160 business leaders from over 120 countries.
The Global Business Conference had one goal: to figure out how the United States can make it easier for companies to do business internationally and create American jobs.
The State Department and Economic Statecraft
Now you may be asking yourselves “Why is the State Department spending so much time thinking about the U.S. economy and America’s commercial interests abroad? This is not something the State Department has spent so much time worrying about in the past.”
Strengthening the U.S. economy and creating jobs is a top priority back home. With the launch of the President’s National Export Initiative in early 2010, all agencies with a role in U.S. international trade, including the Department of State, were asked to play a more active role in export promotion. And given the numbers of state of the U.S. economy, no issue is more important today.
In addition, Secretary Clinton recognizes “that America’s economic strength and our global leadership are a package deal and that you’re not going to have one without the other.”
In a speech she delivered last fall describing this challenge, she said “Our power in the 21st century depends not just on the size of our military but also on what we grow, how well we innovate, what we make, and how effectively we sell. Rising powers like China, India, and Brazil understand this as well, and we can’t sit on the sidelines while they put economics at the center of their foreign policies.”
And so the State Department is engaging in Economic Statecraft. That was why we hosted the Global Business Conference, and brought together senior U.S. government officials and U.S. multinational business executives from around the world to exchange information and ideas on how best to shape our work going forward.
At the time of the conference, the Secretary announced the creation of “Jobs Diplomacy,” a series of programs to promote American business competitiveness overseas and equip Foreign Service Officers with the skills and tools they need to better advocate for America’s economic interests abroad.
Through the Jobs Diplomacy initiative, the Secretary stated her commitment to meet with business leaders on every foreign trip. She also launched the “Direct Line to American Business” program, in which ambassadors in key markets are being asked to conduct regular conference calls to brief the U.S. business community on economic opportunities in their countries, as well as answer questions.
But, very importantly for this audience, the Secretary also fully recognizes the positive role played by U.S. companies that are investing overseas.
While export promotion remains a critical component of the U.S. government’s support of business, we also recognize that working with foreign governments to improve their investment environments for companies like yours here in Vietnam also benefits the U.S. economy.
Economic Shift to Asia
I don’t need to tell you that much of future global economic growth will be centered in the Asia-Pacific.
Asian economies and populations are growing rapidly and so are the opportunities to expand our exports to the region.
In 2011, the United States exported nearly $900 billion in goods to APEC countries. That’s more exports than we sent to any other group of regional economies.
We hope that our economic shift to Asia has been obvious and beneficial. We were able to get KORUS passed, we hosted a successful APEC year in 2011, and we are increasing our engagement with ASEAN.
In Southeast Asia in particular, the U.S. government is looking to launch a couple of new initiatives to support our private sectors interests in the region.
The U.S. Trade Development Agency (USTDA) is leading a Connectivity Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN. As part of this effort, TDA is planning to hold a workshop on “Smart Grid and Power Transmission” with ASEAN in July.
In addition, the State Department is collaborating with the U.S. ASEAN Business Council to organize a Lower Mekong Initiative Infrastructure Best Practices Exchange.
We want to look for innovative ways to be more proactive in Southeast Asia – to partner with ASEAN and to help give a boost to U.S. business interests.
Rules-based System
As we make this shift to Asia, though, it is imperative that we do it in the right way.
The decisions Asia’s emerging economies make together with the United States will help govern a rules-based system that will guide us through the 21st century. If we get the rules right, all of our countries will prosper together.
The Trans Pacific Partnership is a big part of forging this new system.
TPP members, including the United States and Vietnam, are working to complete the TPP negotiations as expeditiously as possible, recognizing that all members need to share a high level of ambition for this agreement.
As we build a more prosperous future through the TPP and other initiatives, we should be clear.
We are striving to build a global, rules-based system in which all businesses stand a chance to succeed. Secretary Clinton has clearly articulated our vision that economic competition should be open, free, transparent, and fair.
In the case of Vietnam, this vision should include enhanced protection of intellectual property rights. While Vietnam has made some progress in this area, I know I don’t need to tell you that Vietnamese enforcement agencies are overwhelmed by high levels of copyright and patent infringements, counterfeiting and piracy, internet piracy, and fake goods.
The U.S. Government will continue to cooperate with Vietnam to improve intellectual property protection here, including by providing training and technical assistance to Vietnamese enforcement agencies.
Our vision of open, free, transparent and fair competition also will need to include continued discussions with Vietnam on the proper role of its state-owned enterprises.
We will continue to advocate for policies that support “competitive neutrality.” In other words, while we do not object to SOEs per se, we do not believe they should enjoy unfair advantages from government support that private companies – including U.S. companies – do not receive.
Private Sector Collaboration is Critical
And we want to do everything we can to support U.S. companies in Vietnam.
As the Secretary noted in her speech at the Global Business Conference on February 21st, we want to work with the AmChams around the world to best support U.S. businesses abroad and drive recovery at home.
As part of this effort our embassies have identified best practices that demonstrate how the U.S. government and AmChams can better collaborate to expand opportunities for U.S. businesses worldwide.
However, we can and must do much more in the coming years to advance this economic statecraft agenda, and we need the business community to be our full partner.
We need to sit down together more, in forums like this one or the State Department Global Business Conference.
Building sustainable global growth and creating jobs at home is a joint venture.
The private sector innovates and allocates capital, and the government opens doors to new markets and ensures that the system is fair.
We must take our partnership between business and government to the next level.
We are relying on you to think big, to generate new ideas, to open doors with jobs and capital. And the government will be right beside you – knocking down barriers, connecting partners, protecting everyone’s interests.
Together, we can build a system of healthy economic competition that will be sustainable and profitable for many years to come.
Strong commercial ties lead to prosperity at home and abroad and I look forward to our discussion about what we can do to strengthen those ties.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would just say that we should all be asking: What can the government and the State Department do to improve opportunities for business in Vietnam? How can we do better?
We really want to hear from you – the U.S. business community – about the best way forward for our trade and investment relations with Vietnam.
I look forward to hearing your insights and am more than willing to answer any questions you might have.
Thank you.
GLOBULAR STAR CLUSTER MESSIER 9
The Hubble Space Telescope has produced the most detailed image so far of Messier 9, a globular star cluster located close to the center of the galaxy. This ball of stars is too faint to see with the naked eye, yet Hubble can see over 250,000 individual stars shining in it. Messier 9, pictured here, is a globular cluster, a roughly spherical swarm of stars that lies around 25,000 light-years from Earth, near the center of the Milky Way, so close that the gravitational forces from the galactic center pull it slightly out of shape. Globular clusters are thought to harbor some of the oldest stars in our galaxy, born when the universe was just a small fraction of its current age. As well as being far older than the sun -- around twice its age -- the stars of Messier 9 also have a markedly different composition, and are enriched with far fewer heavier elements than the sun. In particular, the elements crucial to life on Earth, like oxygen and carbon, and the iron that makes up our planet’s core, are very scarce in Messier 9 and clusters like it. This is because the universe’s heavier elements were gradually formed in the cores of stars, and in supernova explosions. When the stars of Messier 9 formed, there were far smaller quantities of these elements in existence. As well as showing the individual stars, Hubble’s image clearly shows the different colors of the stars. A star’s color is directly related to its temperature -- counter-intuitively, perhaps, the redder it is, the cooler it is; and the bluer it is, the hotter. The wide range of stellar temperatures here is clearly displayed by the broad palette of colors visible in this image. Image Credit: NASA and ESA
U.S. TO EXPAND SECURITY MISSION IN PACIFIC
The following excerpt is form a U.S. Department of State American Forces Press Service e-mail:
U.S. to Expand Security Role in Pacific Region
By Army Sgt. 1st Class Tyrone C. Marshall Jr.
American Forces Press Service
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 26, 2012 - President Barack Obama today reaffirmed the U.S. intention to take a larger role in the future of security in the Asia-Pacific region.
During a news conference with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak in conjunction with the Nuclear Security Summit in South Korea's capital of Seoul, Obama talked about upcoming plans for the Asia-Pacific region.
"My visit to Korea reflects the fact that the United States is leading again in the Asia-Pacific -- a region that will affect American security and prosperity in the 21st century like no other," he said.
The president noted that in a November speech to the Australian parliament, he said the United States, as a Pacific nation, will play a larger and long-term role in shaping the region and its future. "And the cornerstone of our efforts is our strong alliances, including our alliance with the Republic of Korea," he added.
Obama said South Korea is on track to assume operational control on the Korean peninsula for the alliance in 2015.
"We reviewed our ongoing efforts to modernize our security alliance," he said. "We agreed to have our foreign and defense ministers meet in June to discuss concrete measures we can take to continue strengthening that alliance."
Obama also said he and Lee discussed the future in light of fiscal constraints that will reduce U.S. defense spending.
"I reaffirmed, as I said in Australia, that reductions in U.S. defense spending will not come at the expense of the Asia Pacific -- and that includes South Korea," he said. "America's armed forces are going to stay ready for the full range of contingencies and threats. And the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea remains unshakable."
Obama said he and Lee also discussed regional security, which starts with the issue of North Korea. Lee said he and Obama will continue to enhance and strengthen the two nations' combined defense capabilities, and he called on North Korea to end its pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
"We will firmly respond to any threats or provocations from the North," the South Korean president said. Both countries can work together along with the international community, he added, if North Korea gives up nuclear weapon and missile development.
Both presidents noted North Korea's contradiction of its own recent commitments to the international community.
"Last month, North Korea agreed to a series of steps, including a moratorium on long-range missile launches," Obama said. "This month, North Korea announced its intention to conduct a missile launch. This would constitute a direct violation of Pyongyang's own commitments and its international obligations. Moreover, it would only deepen North Korea's isolation, damage further its relations with its neighbors, and seriously undermine the prospect of future negotiations."
Lee said the United States and South Korea agree that North Korea's announcement that it will test-fire its long-range missile is a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, not to mention the latest agreement between the U.S. and North Korea.
"Therefore," he said, "President Obama and I both agreed that North Korea must immediately repeal its decision and abide by its international obligations."
Noting that he and Obama reaffirmed the value and importance of the U.S.-South Korean alliance in their meeting today, Lee said they also discussed their vision of the partnership's future.
"Following the adoption of the future vision of the alliance, which was adopted in June 2009, our alliance is evolving into a truly global partnership where we are working shoulder-to-shoulder to resolve global challenges," he said.
NEW COOPERATION BETWEEN SEC AND FOREIGN COUNTERPARTS
The following excerpt is from the SEC website:
SEC Establishes New Supervisory Cooperation Arrangements with Foreign Counterparts
Washington, D.C., March 23, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that it has established comprehensive arrangements with the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority (CIMA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) as part of long-term strategy to improve the oversight of regulated entities that operate across national borders.
The two memoranda of understanding (MOUs) reached this month follow on a similar supervisory arrangement that the SEC concluded with the Quebec Autorité des marchés financiers and the Ontario Securities Commission in 2010 and expanded to include the Alberta Securities Commission and the British Columbia Securities Commission last September.
The SEC’s latest supervisory cooperation arrangements will enhance SEC staff ability to share information about such regulated entities as investment advisers, investment fund managers, broker-dealers, and credit rating agencies. The Cayman Islands is a major offshore financial center and home to large numbers of hedge funds, investment advisers and investment managers that frequently access the U.S. market. ESMA is a pan-European Union agency that regulates credit rating agencies and fosters regulatory convergence among European Union securities regulators.
“Supervisory cooperation arrangements help the SEC build closer relationships with its counterparts to cooperate and consult on each other’s oversight activities in ways that may help prevent fraud in the long term or lessen the chances of future financial crises,” said Ethiopis Tafara, Director of the SEC’s Office of International Affairs.
The SEC’s approach to supervisory cooperation with its overseas counterparts follows on more than two decades of experience with cross-border cooperation, starting in the late 1980s with MOUs facilitating the sharing of information between the SEC and other securities regulators in securities enforcement matters. The SEC’s enforcement cooperation arrangements — which now encompass partnerships with approximately 80 separate jurisdictions via bilateral MOUs and a Multilateral MOU under the auspices of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) — detail procedures and mechanisms by which the SEC and its counterparts can collect and share investigatory information where there are suspicions of a violation of either jurisdiction’s securities laws, and after a potential problem has arisen.
In contrast, the SEC’s supervisory cooperation arrangements generally establish mechanisms for continuous and ongoing consultation, cooperation and the exchange of supervisory information related to the oversight of globally active firms and markets. Such information may include routine supervisory information as well as the types of information regulators need to monitor risk concentrations, identify emerging systemic risks, and better understand a globally-active regulated entity’s compliance culture. These MOUs also facilitate the ability of the SEC and its counterparts to conduct on-site examinations of registered entities located abroad.
Although they are designed to achieve different things, enforcement and supervisory cooperation arrangements are complimentary tools. Supervisory cooperation involves ongoing sharing of information regarding day-to-day oversight of regulated entities. Enforcement cooperation MOUs, by contrast, help the Commission collect information abroad that is necessary to help ensure that the SEC’s enforcement program deters violations of the federal securities laws, while also helping to compensate victims of securities fraud when possible.
The SEC entered into its first supervisory cooperation MOU in March 2006 with the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority. Following the recent financial crisis, the Commission has expanded its emphasis on this form of continuous supervisory cooperation in an effort to better identify emerging risks to U.S. capital markets and the international financial system. As part of this effort, SEC commissioners and staff co-chaired an international task force in 2010 to develop principles for cross-border supervisory cooperation. These principles have since proven to be a useful guideline for structuring MOUs around the type of information to be shared, the mechanisms which regulators can use to share information, and the degree of confidentiality this information should be accorded.
U.S. AND JAPAN ISSUE JOINT STATEMENT ON THE INTERNET ECONOMY
The following excerpt is from the Department of State
U.S.-Japan Policy Cooperation Dialogue on the Internet Economy Third Director General-Level Meeting
Media Note Office of the Spokesperson Washington, DC
March 23, 2012
Following is the text of a joint statement issued by the United States of America and Japan at the conclusion of the United States - Japan Policy Cooperation Dialogue on the Internet Economy.
Begin Text:
On March 22 and 23, 2012, the third Director General-level meeting of the U.S.-Japan Policy Cooperation Dialogue on the Internet Economy was held in Tokyo. Hajime Tonegawa, Director General of the Global ICT Strategy Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), and officials representing MIC, the IT Policy Office, the National Information Security Center, the Consumer Affairs Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry participated in the dialogue from Japan. Ambassador Philip Verveer and officials representing the U.S. Department of State, the Federal Communications Commission, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security participated in the dialogue from the United States. In addition, representatives from both U.S. and Japanese industry participated in some of the discussions.
Recognizing that the Internet is transforming the global economy and improving the lives of people around the world, participants from both countries concurred that close cooperation and commitment to shared values is essential. During the dialogue, participants exchanged views on important topics in Internet and information and communications technology (ICT) policy, emphasizing the need for openness, innovation, and increased opportunities for U.S. and Japanese industry.
On March 22, industry representatives from both countries submitted a “U.S.-Japan Business Dialogue on the Internet Economy Joint Statement,” which addressed the need for:
(i) Coordination on Internet policy issues;
(ii) Promotion of cloud computing services;
(iii) Continued collaboration on cyber security;
(iv) Promotion of ICT in the public sector;
(v) Coordination on disaster response;
(vi) Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) deployment; and
(vii) Cooperation on research development, training, and promotion of digital literacy.
Taking account of the “U.S.-Japan Business Dialogue on the Internet Economy Joint Statement,” government participants from both countries emphasized the need to ensure the free flow of information in order to foster innovation and stimulate economic growth. Participants discussed the following topics:
(1) Internet Policy Issues
(a) Participants reaffirmed the importance of the principles mentioned in the joint press statement of the 2nd Director General-level meeting last year, including:
Preserving the open and interoperable nature of the global Internet, which underpins the global free flow of data; and
Protecting Internet freedom, which includes the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly online.
To advance these principles, participants recognized the importance of:
Coordination on Internet policy issues, including Internet governance, protecting personal information, and protecting children online;
Cooperation on Internet policy issues at international and multilateral fora; and
Encouraging other countries to develop trade principles consistent with the “U.S.-Japan trade principles for ICT services,” finalized in January 2012.
(b) Recognizing the concerns of users about the proper use of personal information by ICT service providers, participants shared the view that service providers should be accountable for protecting users’ personal information, regardless of national boundaries.
Taking note that the European Union (EU) has proposed a new privacy framework, participants emphasized the importance of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Data Privacy Subgroup, which plans to pursue international engagement, including with the EU, to promote the interoperability of regional approaches to data protection.
(2) Development of a U.S.-Japan Cloud Computing Working Group
Participants concurred that they will develop a U.S.-Japan Cloud Computing Working Group at the Director level, which will convene around fall 2012 after identifying key policy issues based on views expressed by U.S. and Japanese industry.
Participants recognized that the adoption of cloud computing services will expand business opportunities and foster economic growth. In addition, participants concurred that cloud computing technology has specific advantages in times of disaster, providing a key infrastructure to help us respond to emergencies and restore our lives.
(3) Continued Cyber Security Cooperation for Commercial Networks
Participants acknowledged the importance of improving cyber security measures, and recognized that international cooperation is imperative to addressing the issue, since cyber incidents cross our borders. Participants concurred that the U.S. and Japanese governments, private sector partners, and research institutions in the United States and Japan, should share information relating to cyber incidents and accelerate collaborative research and development in order to prevent and respond quickly to cyber incidents that may occur. In addition, participants acknowledged their commitment to greater bilateral and international cyber security collaboration.
(4) Promotion of ICT in the Public Sector
Participants recognized the importance of sharing best practices for the use of ICT – including the use of cloud computing technology – in the field of public administration, as well as public-private collaboration for open government.
(5) IPv6 Deployment
Participants recognized the importance of sharing the current status of IPv6 deployment and best practices in both countries, given that companies are beginning to deploy IPv6-based services and products. Participants concurred that they should continue to share best practices and status updates on IPv6 deployment.
(6) Cooperation on Research Development and Training
Participants concurred that they will continue to conduct joint research and development, and exchange personnel, in order to promote the research and development of the New Generation Network (NWGN) / Future Internet.
(7) Protecting Children Online
Participants recognized the importance of protecting children online. In particular, participants concurred that public-private initiatives, voluntary industry-led efforts, and consumer and business education, are all important complements to law enforcement. Working together, these elements represent the best approach to providing a safe Internet environment for young people. Participants also concurred that further coordination would be beneficial.
(8) Mobile Broadband and Spectrum Auctions
Participants provided an update of their policies on frequency allocation for mobile broadband services and spectrum auctions, and acknowledged the importance of further information sharing.
DEDICATION OF THE NAVY'S LABORATORY FOR AUTONOMOUS RESEARCH
Director of the Institute for Nanoscience at the NRL, Dr. Eric Snow, briefs Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, Dr. John P. Holdren, during a tour of NRL prior to attending the opening of the Laboratory for Autonomous Systems Research. (U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams/Released)
Advisor to President Barack Obama for the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Dr. John P. Holdren visited the Navy’s corporate laboratory, March 16, to dedicate the opening of the Laboratory for Autonomous Systems Research (LASR) and tour the sprawling 130-acre Washington, D.C., campus.
“For nearly 90 years NRL has served the Navy, Marine Corps and our Nation in ever evolving capacities,” said Dr. Holdren, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. “This new facility, dedicated today, builds on a grand NRL tradition of military research and innovation.”
The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), established through Congress in 1976, is mandated to advise the President and others within the Executive Office of the President on the effects of science and technology (S&T) on domestic and international affairs and lead interagency efforts to develop and implement sound S&T policies and budgets to provide the greatest benefit to society.
With the objective to enable continued scientific leadership in autonomy, the state-of-the-art laboratory will become the nerve center for autonomy research for the Department of Defense (DoD) and will provide specialized facilities to support highly innovative research in intelligent autonomy, sensor systems, power and energy systems, human-system interaction and network and communications platforms.
“Today, the Navy and Marine Corps rely on robotics and autonomous systems for a host of missions, including unmanned air vehicles providing intelligence in Afghanistan, robots that defeat improvised explosive devices, and submersibles that explore the depths of the ocean,” added Holdren.
To see a photo album form Dr. Holdren’s tour of the research facilities, visit the Naval Research Laboratory’s Facebook Page.
U.S. MARINE CORPS GENERAL ALLEN WILL GIVE PRESIDENT OPTIONS ON FORCES NEEDED IN AFGHANISTAN
The following excerpt is from the U.S. Department of Defense American Forces Press Service e-mail:
Allen to Examine Afghanistan Force Package
By Army Sgt. 1st Class Tyrone C. Marshall Jr.
American Forces Press Service
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 24, 2012 - The starting point of analysis for the U.S.-coalition fighting force in Afghanistan in 2013 will be the withdrawal of 23,000 surge troops after this year's fighting season, the International Security Assistance Force commander said yesterday.
"After we recover the surge, I'm going to give the President some options, with respect to the kinds of combat power that we will need in 2013," Marine Corps Gen. John R. Allen said during an interview with PBS's Charlie Rose.
"I have to evaluate the state of the insurgency and have to look at the operational environment in 2013," he added. "And the combination of forces ultimately will be the distinguishing dimension of the recommendation that I'll give to the president."
Allen emphasized there will be more than just a U.S. force presence in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the 23,000 U.S. surge forces.
"It's not just about 68,000 U.S. forces. There will still be 40,000 ISAF forces as well so the recommendation will also go up to the NATO chain," he noted. "But there will also be an increasingly capable and increasingly numerous ANSF as well, so it isn't just a recommendation about 68,000.
"I owe the president analysis of that," the general continued, "and ... my views on the courses of action of how much combat power will be needed in 2013."
Allen said he wouldn't speculate as to how many troops would be necessary.
"I don't know yet exactly how much force I'm going to need among the U.S. forces in 2013," he said. "It isn't just a single number -- it's a composite number and that's the key point. It's the U.S. force as a component of ISAF and in partnership with the ANSF. That is the key issue."
Allen noted there will be international discussion between ISAF partners about the remaining presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014.
Allen noted there will be international discussion between ISAF partners about the remaining presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014.
"We're constantly in conversation about the strategic partnership that's coming," he said. "We're in conversation about the future and the role of U.S. forces today, and ISAF and NATO forces over the long term."
Allen advised the Taliban to "listen closely" to conversations unfolding between the U.S., Afghanistan and international partners.
"First of all, in the Bonn Two Conference recently, there was a very clear determination by the international community to support Afghanistan well beyond the concept of transition which ends at the end of 2014," he said.
"It means that the international community is interested in creating stability in Afghanistan and supporting Afghanistan with development and that process is beginning to unfold," Allen said, adding that during a Chicago conference in May, the heads of state of ISAF nations will discuss a long-term security relationship with Afghanistan.
Allen said the idea is to support Afghanistan in a security mode for a period of time beyond 2014. It would be "faulty assumption," he said, for the Taliban to believe December 31, 2014, was the end of the international presence in Afghanistan.
"There will be an international presence in Afghanistan for a very long time," Allen said, noting there will be government, diplomatic and economic relationships.
"But there will also be, very importantly, a security relationship between the United States and Afghanistan [and] the broader international community as well," the general said.
Allen reaffirmed his commitment to accomplishing President Barack Obama's goals in Afghanistan and he noted that the timeline for withdraw was not a hindrance.
"I believe we can achieve this mission," he said. "The campaign as it is unfolding, the campaign as we have developed it, and as it is being resourced right now, is a campaign which I believe can accomplish this mission based on the concept of Lisbon-based transition. And, in the aftermath of that, an enduring presence.
"And that international force will be there to continue the development of the Afghan National Security Forces," Allen added.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)