Friday, March 9, 2012
FORMER COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO. EXECUTIVE IS CHARGED WITH INSIDER TRADING
The following excerpt was from the SEC website:
“SEC Charges Former Executive at Coca-Cola Bottling Company with Insider Trading
Washington, D.C., March 8, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a former executive at a Coca-Cola bottling company with insider trading based on confidential information he learned on the job about potential upcoming business with The Coca-Cola Company.
The SEC alleges that Steven Harrold, who was a Vice President at Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., purchased company stock in his wife’s brokerage account after learning that his company had agreed to acquire The Coca-Cola Company’s bottling operations in Norway and Sweden. The stock price jumped 30 percent when the deal was announced publicly the following day, enabling Harrold to make an illicit $86,850 profit.
“Harrold deliberately flouted the federal securities laws and specific company restrictions in his purchases and trades of Coca-Cola Enterprises stock,” said Rosalind R. Tyson, Director of the SEC’s Los Angeles Regional Office. “His employer entrusted him with critical nonpublic information, and Harrold shattered that trust to bottle up extra cash.”
Coca-Cola Enterprises is one of the world’s largest marketers, producers and distributors of Coca-Cola products, and its stock trades on the New York Stock Exchange under the stock symbol CCE. The Coca-Cola Company (ticker symbol: KO) develops and sells its products and syrup concentrate to Coca-Cola Enterprises and other bottlers.
According to the SEC’s complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Harrold was regularly in possession of sensitive, confidential information as an executive at CCE. On numerous occasions, Harrold signed non-disclosure agreements requiring him to keep confidential any information he learned about acquisitions being considered. Harrold also periodically received blackout notices prohibiting him from trading in company stock for a defined period in which he was likely to be in possession of confidential information.
The SEC alleges that Harrold, who lives in Los Angeles and London, was informed in early January 2010 that CCE was considering the acquisition of The Coca-Cola Company’s Norwegian and Swedish bottling operations. He signed a non-disclosure agreement requiring him to maintain the confidentiality of any nonpublic information he learned about the potential transaction. Harrold also received an e-mail from CCE’s legal counsel informing him that he was subject to a blackout period and was prohibited from trading in CCE stock “until further notice.”
Nevertheless, the SEC alleges that Harrold purchased 15,000 CCE shares in his wife’s brokerage account on Feb. 24, 2010, the day before the announcement of the transaction with The Coca-Cola Company. The insider trading was based on certain confidential information that Harrold learned in the days leading up to the announcement, including that the transaction was internally valued at more than $800 million and was viewed as creating significant positive growth opportunities for CCE.
The SEC’s complaint charges Harrold with violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder. The complaint seeks a final judgment ordering Harrold to pay a financial penalty and disgorge his ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest, preventing him from serving as an officer or director of a public company, and permanently enjoining him from future violations of those provisions of the federal securities laws.
The SEC acknowledges the assistance of FINRA in this matter.
APOLLO 9 TESTING OF ORBITAL DOCKING
"This image, taken on March 6, 1969, shows the Apollo 9 Command and Service Modules docked with the Lunar Module. Apollo 9 astronaut Dave Scott stands in the open hatch of the Command Module, nicknamed "Gumdrop," docked to the Lunar Module "Spider" in Earth orbit. His crewmate Rusty Schweickart, lunar module pilot, took this photograph from the porch of the lunar module. Inside the lunar module was Apollo 9 commander Jim McDivitt. The crew tested the orbital rendezvous and docking procedures that made the lunar landings possible. Image Credit: NASA "
The picture and excerpt above are from the NASA website:
ISAF COMMANDER CONDEMNS TERRORIST ATTACK IN AFGHANISTAN'S SPIN BOLDAK DISTRICT
The following excerpt is from a Department of Defense American Forces Press Service e-mail:
"ISAF Commander Condemns Spin Boldak Murders
From an International Security Assistance Force News Release
KABUL, Afghanistan, March 8, 2012 - The commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan joined Afghan President Hamid Karzai in condemning yesterday's terrorist attack in the Spin Boldak district of Afghanistan's Kandahar province that killed four people and wounded eight others, military officials reported.
"Our thoughts and prayers are with the families and loved ones who mourn this evening, and we wish for a quick recovery of those who were injured," Marine Corps Gen. John R. Allen said after yesterday's attack. "More innocent Afghans died today at the hands of the insurgency."
Two children and a woman were among those killed when a motorcycle loaded with explosives detonated in a crowd.
"The blatant murdering of Afghan civilians must stop, and the Taliban leadership needs to hold their own members accountable for their actions against the innocent," Allen said. ISAF service members will continue to work with Afghan security forces "to identify these enemies of the Afghan people, and hold them to account," the general added."
Two children and a woman were among those killed when a motorcycle loaded with explosives detonated in a crowd.
"The blatant murdering of Afghan civilians must stop, and the Taliban leadership needs to hold their own members accountable for their actions against the innocent," Allen said. ISAF service members will continue to work with Afghan security forces "to identify these enemies of the Afghan people, and hold them to account," the general added."
SEC CHARGES CEO OF PENNY STOCK COMPANY OF PUMP-AND-DUMP SCHEME
The following excerpt is from the Securities and Exchange Commission website:
“Washington, D.C., March 7, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a Las Vegas-based food and beverage company and its CEO with conducting a fraudulent pump-and-dump scheme, and charged several consultants for their illegal sales of company shares into the markets.
The SEC alleges that Prime Star Group Inc. under the direction of CEO Roger Mohlman issued false and misleading press releases that touted lucrative agreements for the company’s food and beverage products. For example, Prime Star falsely claimed in a March 2010 press release that it had entered in a distribution agreement with another company in the beverage business valued at up to $16 million annually. Furthermore, certain Prime Star reports filed with the SEC understated the company’s net losses or overstated its cash balance.
The SEC suspended trading in Prime Star in June 2011 due to questions about the adequacy and accuracy of information about the company.
“Prime Star and Mohlman used backdated consulting agreements and forged attorney opinion letters as a means to issue millions of shares to the consultants who then dumped them on unsuspecting investors,” said Eric I. Bustillo, Director of the SEC’s Miami Regional Office. “The SEC will persist in its efforts to stamp out microcap fraud schemes.”
Since the beginning of fiscal year 2011, the SEC has filed more than 50 enforcement actions for misconduct related to penny stocks, and issued more than 65 orders suspending the trading of suspicious microcap issuers. Microcap stocks are issued by the smallest of companies and tend to be low priced and trade in low volumes. Many penny stock companies do not file financial reports with the SEC, so investing in them entails many risks. The SEC has published a microcap stock guide for investors and an Investor Alert about avoiding microcap fraud perpetrated through social media.
The SEC’s complaint against Prime Star and Mohlman alleges that they fraudulently issued free-trading
Joshua Konigsberg of Palm Beach Gardens, Fla.
The SEC alleges that Prime Star and Mohlman pumped the stock by exaggerating the company’s operations and contracts in a series of press releases issued in October 2009 and March 2010. For instance, they issued an October 14 press release claiming Prime Star’s subsidiary Wild Grill Foods had received purchase orders for more than $1.25 million of seafood products. Mohlman was quoted saying, “Prime Star Group is thrilled at the growth of this business unit. We will continue to grow the Wild Grill brand, its domestic distribution, and have begun exploring international opportunities for distribution abroad.” However, in reality, Prime Star’s just-established Wild Grill subsidiary had no operations and there were no purchase orders.
According to the SEC’s complaint, Prime Star’s press releases coincided with the illegal issuance of millions of unregistered shares of Prime Star stock to the purported business consultants from August 2009 to March 2010. Although Prime Star had a class of shares registered pursuant Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that section does not permit transfers of those shares. To transfer Prime Star stock in compliance with the securities laws, Mohlman, Prime Star and the consultants had to either register an offering of the company’s shares or meet an exemption to the offering registration requirement. However, they did neither.
The SEC alleges that Mohlman and Prime Star’s fraudulent promotional activities caused Prime Star’s stock price and trading volume to increase markedly. For instance, on March 16, a prior day press release caused trading volume to spike to more than 16 million shares, which was 10 times more than the previous day’s trading volume. Prime Star’s stock price plummeted the following day.
The SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in Nevada alleges Prime Star and Mohlman violated Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The complaint also alleges that Prime Star violated Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1 and 13a-13 thereunder. The complaint further alleges that Mohlman violated Section 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act and Rules 13a-14, 13b2-1 and 13b2-2 thereunder and aided and abetted Prime Star’s violations of Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, 13a-1 and 13a-13 thereunder. The SEC also alleges Section 5(a) and 5(c) violations against Colon, Morera, Rivera, DC International Consulting, Carson, Gullatt, The Stone Financial Group, and Konigsberg.
One of the consultants — Konigsberg — has agreed to settle the SEC’s charges without admitting or denying the allegations by consenting to the entry of a judgment that would enjoin him from future violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act. The SEC is seeking penalties and disgorgement plus prejudgment interest against the other consultants and Mohlman as well as an officer and director bar against Mohlman, penny stock bars against Mohlman, Colon, Morera, Rivera, Carson, and Gullatt, and permanent injunctions against all defendants. Separately, the Commission instituted administrative proceedings to determine whether the registration of each class of Prime Star securities should be revoked or suspended based on its failure to file required periodic reports.
The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Julie Russo, Elisha Frank, and Karaz Zaki of the Miami Regional Office, and Edward McCutcheon is leading the SEC’s litigation.”
Thursday, March 8, 2012
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED UNEMPLOYMENT ROSE BY 8,000 LAST WEEK
The following excerpt is from the Department of Labor website:
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE WEEKLY CLAIMS REPORT
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED DATA
In the week ending March 3, the advance figure for seasonally adjusted initial claims was 362,000, an increase of 8,000 from the previous week's revised figure of 354,000. The 4-week moving average was 355,000, an increase of 250 from the previous week's revised average of 354,750.
In the week ending March 3, the advance figure for seasonally adjusted initial claims was 362,000, an increase of 8,000 from the previous week's revised figure of 354,000. The 4-week moving average was 355,000, an increase of 250 from the previous week's revised average of 354,750.
The advance seasonally adjusted insured unemployment rate was 2.7 percent for the week ending February 25, unchanged from the prior week's unrevised rate.
The advance number for seasonally adjusted insured unemployment during the week ending February 25, was 3,416,000, an increase of 10,000 from the preceding week's revised level of 3,406,000. The 4-week moving average was 3,417,500, a decrease of 27,500 from the preceding week's revised average of 3,445,000.
UNADJUSTED DATA
The advance number of actual initial claims under state programs, unadjusted, totaled 365,754 in the week ending March 3, an increase of 31,513 from the previous week. There were 407,299 initial claims in the comparable week in 2011.
The advance unadjusted insured unemployment rate was 3.1 percent during the week ending February 25, unchanged from the prior week's unrevised rate. The advance unadjusted number for persons claiming UI benefits in state programs totaled 3,979,563, an increase of 97,038 from the preceding week. A year earlier, the rate was 3.6 percent and the volume was 4,460,146.
The total number of people claiming benefits in all programs for the week ending February 18 was 7,387,648, a decrease of 111,222 from the previous week.
Extended benefits were available in Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin during the week ending February 18.
Initial claims for UI benefits by former Federal civilian employees totaled 1,136 in the week ending February 25, a decrease of 133 from the prior week. There were 2,286 initial claims by newly discharged veterans, a decrease of 176 from the preceding week.
There were 27,150 former Federal civilian employees claiming UI benefits for the week ending February 18, a decrease of 1,520 from the previous week. Newly discharged veterans claiming benefits totaled 41,594, a decrease of 576 from the prior week.
States reported 2,929,210 persons claiming EUC (Emergency Unemployment Compensation) benefits for the week ending February 18, an increase of 24,377 from the prior week. There were 3,600,522 claimants in the comparable week in 2011. EUC weekly claims include first, second, third, and fourth tier activity.
The highest insured unemployment rates in the week ending February 18 were in Alaska (6.5), Rhode Island (4.6), Montana (4.5), Wisconsin (4.5), Idaho (4.4), Oregon (4.4), Pennsylvania (4.4), New Jersey (4.2), Puerto Rico (4.2), Massachusetts (4.0), and Michigan (4.0).
The largest increases in initial claims for the week ending February 25 were in Massachusetts (+3,475), Rhode Island (+1,275), New Jersey (+1,274), Connecticut (+1,186), and Michigan (+564), while the largest decreases were in California (-4,531), Pennsylvania (-2,238), Texas (-1,535), New York (-1,321), and Florida (-1,124).
2 MORE ROUNDS OF BASE SPENDING CUTS ARE NEEDED PENTAGON OFFICIAL SAYS
The following excerpt is from the Department of Defense American Forces Press Service:
Pentagon Official Makes Case for New BRAC Rounds
By Lisa Daniel
American Forces Press Service
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 8, 2012 - The Defense Department needs two rounds of the Base Realignment and Closure process this year and next to shed excess building space and save money, the deputy undersecretary of defense for installations and environment told a congressional panel today.
The two BRAC rounds would align with the department's strategic guidance for a leaner, more flexible force as it rebalances after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Dorothy Robyn told the House Armed Services Committee's readiness subcommittee in prepared remarks.
"Of all the efficiency measures that the department has undertaken over the years, BRAC is perhaps the most successful and significant," she said.
The department's fiscal 2013 budget request calls for a 5.5 percent reduction in military end strength in the next five years.
"Simply stated, the cuts in force structure that we are implementing must be accompanied by cuts in supporting infrastructure, including military bases," Robyn said. "Absent a process for closing and realigning bases, the department will be locked in a status quo configuration that does not match its evolving force structure, doctrine and technology."
Robyn said the expense of maintaining bases that are excess to strategic and mission requirements would force the department to cut spending on forces, training and modernization.
The department needs to close installations not only in the United States, for which it needs congressional approval, but also overseas, where it doesn't, she said.
"The department's request for additional rounds of BRAC comes at a time when we are looking aggressively at where we can close bases overseas—particularly in Europe," Robyn said. The department already has made significant cuts in Europe, turning over more than 100 sites to host nations since 2003, she said. By fiscal 2015, the Army is expected to close another 23 European sites, she added.
Still, Robyn said, the department "can do more to consolidate our infrastructure with the goal of reducing long-term costs while still supporting our operational requirements and strategic commitments."
To do that, Robyn said, the department can reduce the number of "discrete" installation sites in Europe from more than 300 to about 200 -- those which currently house most activities -- and eliminate excess support infrastructure such as warehouses, administrative space and housing.
While acknowledging that BRAC closures are painful, Robyn said they "have left our military far better prepared to take on changing strategic challenges than it would have been had Congress and the department not had the courage to undertake them."
While the department retains some authority to close and downsize installations, Robyn said, BRAC is a better process, allowing for more community support.
The department spends about $40 billion annually on building construction, sustainment and recapitalization, Robyn said, and an additional $15 billion on support programs ranging from air traffic control to payroll to religious and recreational services. "Wecannot afford to maintain excess capacity," she said.
In 2004, the department had 24 percent excess capacity relative to its force structure plans, Robyn said. The 2005 BRAC eliminated only about 3 percent of the department's capacity, as it was designed mostly to reconfigure excess space, rather than close it, because the military was in a growth stage, she said.
While some have criticized the 2005 BRAC as unexpectedly expensive at $35.1 billion, the savings also exceeded that of any other BRAC round, at $4 billion each year, she said.
Robyn asked that Congress move quickly to approve the BRAC rounds.
"While some may view our request for a round in 2013 as aggressive, the magnitude of the cuts we are making in force structure means we simply can't wait," she said. "Leading U.S. corporations retain their vitality and market position by being able to adapt quickly to changed circumstances, and the U.S. military is no different."
The two BRAC rounds would align with the department's strategic guidance for a leaner, more flexible force as it rebalances after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Dorothy Robyn told the House Armed Services Committee's readiness subcommittee in prepared remarks.
"Of all the efficiency measures that the department has undertaken over the years, BRAC is perhaps the most successful and significant," she said.
The department's fiscal 2013 budget request calls for a 5.5 percent reduction in military end strength in the next five years.
"Simply stated, the cuts in force structure that we are implementing must be accompanied by cuts in supporting infrastructure, including military bases," Robyn said. "Absent a process for closing and realigning bases, the department will be locked in a status quo configuration that does not match its evolving force structure, doctrine and technology."
Robyn said the expense of maintaining bases that are excess to strategic and mission requirements would force the department to cut spending on forces, training and modernization.
The department needs to close installations not only in the United States, for which it needs congressional approval, but also overseas, where it doesn't, she said.
"The department's request for additional rounds of BRAC comes at a time when we are looking aggressively at where we can close bases overseas—particularly in Europe," Robyn said. The department already has made significant cuts in Europe, turning over more than 100 sites to host nations since 2003, she said. By fiscal 2015, the Army is expected to close another 23 European sites, she added.
Still, Robyn said, the department "can do more to consolidate our infrastructure with the goal of reducing long-term costs while still supporting our operational requirements and strategic commitments."
To do that, Robyn said, the department can reduce the number of "discrete" installation sites in Europe from more than 300 to about 200 -- those which currently house most activities -- and eliminate excess support infrastructure such as warehouses, administrative space and housing.
While acknowledging that BRAC closures are painful, Robyn said they "have left our military far better prepared to take on changing strategic challenges than it would have been had Congress and the department not had the courage to undertake them."
While the department retains some authority to close and downsize installations, Robyn said, BRAC is a better process, allowing for more community support.
The department spends about $40 billion annually on building construction, sustainment and recapitalization, Robyn said, and an additional $15 billion on support programs ranging from air traffic control to payroll to religious and recreational services. "Wecannot afford to maintain excess capacity," she said.
In 2004, the department had 24 percent excess capacity relative to its force structure plans, Robyn said. The 2005 BRAC eliminated only about 3 percent of the department's capacity, as it was designed mostly to reconfigure excess space, rather than close it, because the military was in a growth stage, she said.
While some have criticized the 2005 BRAC as unexpectedly expensive at $35.1 billion, the savings also exceeded that of any other BRAC round, at $4 billion each year, she said.
Robyn asked that Congress move quickly to approve the BRAC rounds.
"While some may view our request for a round in 2013 as aggressive, the magnitude of the cuts we are making in force structure means we simply can't wait," she said. "Leading U.S. corporations retain their vitality and market position by being able to adapt quickly to changed circumstances, and the U.S. military is no different."
DARK MATTER CORE DEFIES EXPLANATION IN NASA HUBBLE IMAGE
The following excerpt is from the NASA website:
"WASHINGTON -- Astronomers using data from NASA's Hubble Telescope have
observed what appears to be a clump of dark matter left behind from a
wreck between massive clusters of galaxies. The result could
challenge current theories about dark matter that predict galaxies
should be anchored to the invisible substance even during the shock
of a collision.
Abell 520 is a gigantic merger of galaxy clusters located 2.4 billion
light-years away. Dark matter is not visible, although its presence
and distribution is found indirectly through its effects. Dark matter
can act like a magnifying glass, bending and distorting light from
galaxies and clusters behind it. Astronomers can use this effect,
called gravitational lensing, to infer the presence of dark matter in
massive galaxy clusters.
This technique revealed the dark matter in Abell 520 had collected
into a "dark core," containing far fewer galaxies than would be
expected if the dark matter and galaxies were anchored together. Most
of the galaxies apparently have sailed far away from the collision.
"This result is a puzzle," said astronomer James Jee of the University
of California in Davis, lead author of paper about the results
available online in The Astrophysical Journal. "Dark matter is not
behaving as predicted, and it's not obviously clear what is going on.
It is difficult to explain this Hubble observation with the current
theories of galaxy formation and dark matter."
Initial detections of dark matter in the cluster, made in 2007, were
so unusual that astronomers shrugged them off as unreal, because of
poor data. New results from NASA's Hubble Space Telescope confirm
that dark matter and galaxies separated in Abell 520.
One way to study the overall properties of dark matter is by analyzing
collisions between galaxy clusters, the largest structures in the
universe. When galaxy clusters crash, astronomers expect galaxies to
tag along with the dark matter, like a dog on a leash. Clouds of hot,
X-ray emitting intergalactic gas, however, plow into one another,
slow down, and lag behind the impact.
That theory was supported by visible-light and X-ray observations of a
colossal collision between two galaxy clusters called the Bullet
Cluster. The galactic grouping has become an example of how dark
matter should behave.
Studies of Abell 520 showed that dark matter's behavior may not be so
simple. Using the original observations, astronomers found the
system's core was rich in dark matter and hot gas, but contained no
luminous galaxies, which normally would be seen in the same location
as the dark matter. NASA's Chandra X-ray Observatory was used to
detect the hot gas. Astronomers used the Canada-France-Hawaii
Telescope and Subaru Telescope atop Mauna Kea to infer the location
of dark matter by measuring the gravitationally lensed light from
more distant background galaxies.
The astronomers then turned to the Hubble's Wide Field Planetary
Camera 2, which can detect subtle distortions in the images of
background galaxies and use this information to map dark matter. To
astronomers' surprise, the Hubble observations helped confirm the
2007 findings.
"We know of maybe six examples of high-speed galaxy cluster collisions
where the dark matter has been mapped," Jee said. "But the Bullet
Cluster and Abell 520 are the two that show the clearest evidence of
recent mergers, and they are inconsistent with each other. No single
theory explains the different behavior of dark matter in those two
collisions. We need more examples."
The team proposed numerous explanations for the findings, but each is
unsettling for astronomers. In one scenario, which would have
staggering implications, some dark matter may be what astronomers
call "sticky." Like two snowballs smashing together, normal matter
slams together during a collision and slows down. However, dark
matter blobs are thought to pass through each other during an
encounter without slowing down. This scenario proposes that some dark
matter interacts with itself and stays behind during an encounter.
Another possible explanation for the discrepancy is that Abell 520 has
resulted from a more complicated interaction than the Bullet Cluster
encounter. Abell 520 may have formed from a collision between three
galaxy clusters, instead of just two colliding systems in the case of
the Bullet Cluster.
A third possibility is that the core contained many galaxies, but they
were too dim to be seen, even by Hubble. Those galaxies would have to
have formed dramatically fewer stars than other normal galaxies.
Armed with the Hubble data, the group will try to create a computer
simulation to reconstruct the collision and see if it yields some
answers to dark matter's weird behavior.
The Hubble Space Telescope is a project of international cooperation
between NASA and the European Space Agency. NASA's Goddard Space
Flight Center in Greenbelt, Md., manages the telescope. The Space
Telescope Science Institute (STScI) in Baltimore, Md., conducts
Hubble science operations. STScI is operated by the Association of
Universities for Research in Astronomy, Inc., in Washington, D.C."
LARGE GROUPING OF NEW STARS
"This massive, young stellar grouping, called R136, is only a few million years old and resides in the 30 Doradus Nebula, a turbulent star-birth region in the Large Magellanic Cloud, a satellite galaxy of the Milky Way. There is no known star-forming region in the Milky Way Galaxy as large or as prolific as 30 Doradus. Many of the diamond-like icy blue stars are among the most massive stars known. Several of them are 100 times more massive than our sun. These hefty stars are destined to pop off, like a string of firecrackers, as supernovas in a few million years. The image, taken in ultraviolet, visible and red light by Hubble's Wide Field Camera 3, spans about 100 light-years. The nebula is close enough to Earth that Hubble can resolve individual stars, giving astronomers important information about the stars' birth and evolution. The brilliant stars are carving deep cavities in the surrounding material by unleashing a torrent of ultraviolet light, and hurricane-force stellar winds (streams of charged particles), which are etching away the enveloping hydrogen gas cloud in which the stars were born. The image reveals a fantasy landscape of pillars, ridges, and valleys, as well as a dark region in the center that roughly looks like the outline of a holiday tree. Besides sculpting the gaseous terrain, the brilliant stars can also help create a successive generation of offspring. When the winds hit dense walls of gas, they create shocks, which may be generating a new wave of star birth. These observations were taken Oct. 20-27, 2009. The blue color is light from the hottest, most massive stars; the green from the glow of oxygen; the red from fluorescing hydrogen. Image Credit: NASA, ESA, and F. Paresce (INAF-IASF, Bologna, Italy), R. O'Connell (University of Virginia, Charlottesville), and the Wide Field Camera 3 Science Oversight Committee"
The above picture and excerpt are from the NASA website:
SOME SERVICE MEMBERS MAY PASS MORE QUICKLY THROUGH RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT
T
he following excerpt is from the Department of Defense American Forces Press Service website:
Program to Expedite Security for Troops at Reagan Airport
By Elaine Sanchez
American Forces Press Service
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 7, 2012 - Some service members traveling out of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport soon will be able to speed through security as part of a joint Defense Department and Transportation Security Administration program.
In cooperation with the Defense Department, TSA is expanding its trusted traveler program, known as Pre-Check, to include active duty service members and activated Guard and Reserve members traveling on domestic flights out of the airport, officials announced on a conference call today.
"This program is good news for our service members," Paul N. Stockton, assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and Americas' security affairs, said on the call. "It recognizes their service defending our country, and ... it will enhance their travel experience by making it easier whenever possible."
In the coming weeks, eligible service members -- whether in uniform or not -- will be able to present a valid common access card, better known as a CAC, to a TSA officer in the Pre-Check lane to see if they qualify for expedited screening, TSA spokesman Kawika Riley explained on the call. If they qualify, they'll be able to pass through security without having to remove certain items, such as shoes or boots, belt, jacket or laptops.
By offering expedited screening to lower-risk travelers, TSA can allocate resources to areas of higher risk, Riley explained. "We're talking about a population we trust to defend this country, to defend this country's security," he said. "It makes sense for that reason. This is a known and a trusted population."
TSA continues to explore Pre-Check's expansion to additional groups who could benefit from expedited screening, such as military family members, he added.
TSA selected Reagan National for its high volume of military travelers, Riley said, noting that, on average, more than 400 active duty service members fly out of the airport each day.
Overall, TSA has successfully screened more 460,000 passengers through Pre-Check since its launch late last year, he said. The program is operational in nine airports, he added, with plans to expand to a total of 35 by the end of the year.
Stockton said he looks forward to the TSA-DOD program's future expansion to other airports. "The DOD is fully committed to continuing its long-standing partnership with the Homeland Security Department and TSA to strengthen aviation security," he said.
This program, he added, enables TSA not only to focus its resources on potentially higher-risk areas, but also offers the nation a tangible way to recognize troops' service and sacrifice.
"We're enormously grateful to the members of the armed forces for what they do at home and abroad for the nation," Stockton said."
SECRETARY OF STATE CLINTON MAKES REMARKS AT 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO CHINA
The following excerpt is from a State Department e-mail:
“Remarks Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State U.S. Institute of Peace
Washington, DC
March 7, 2012
Thank you. Thank you all very much. Thank you. I am so honored to be here to join you in celebrating the 40thanniversary of President Nixon’s extraordinary trip to China.
And I want to thank everyone at the U.S. Institute of Peace, especially Richard Solomon, who knows China well from his days as Policy Planning Director and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia. And it’s a special delight, Richard, to be visiting this beautiful building for the first time. And Tara, I want to thank you and if the Senate so agrees, we are very much looking forward to Tara joining us at the State Department. So thank you so very much.
I also particularly want to recognize all the members of the Nixon-Cox families. And Tricia, thank you, because you’re absolutely right; there is a bond that is hard to describe to those who have not lived through the incredible honor and challenge of being part of a first family. But I have such great appreciation for what you and your sister have done that has really bestowed great honor on your parents. And this is not only the anniversary of your father’s trip to China but also of your mother’s, and I think that is worth reminding us.
I want to thank Ron Walker and everyone with the Richard Nixon Foundation, the members of Congress, ambassadors who have joined us, including the Chinese ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Zhang. Thank you so much for being here.
The events of that remarkable week in 1972 have been studied, analyzed, debated, reenacted on stage and screen, even commemorated in song. And yet, there is still more to be said about that journey to Beijing and the relationship it set into motion—and how we, who are the great beneficiaries of that work 40 years ago, are cultivating the relationship so it meets the challenges and seizes the opportunities of this time.
And I want to begin by saluting all who contributed to President Nixon’s journey, to all the subsequent milestones in the U.S.-China relationship. And I know that during the day you have been fortunate in hearing from some of the master architects of those early years, including Henry Kissinger, who extended that first handshake to Zhou Enlai in 1971 and continues to speak and write eloquently about China today; Zbig Brzezinski, who oversaw the normalization of relations during the Carter Administration; Brent Scowcroft, who I see there appropriately in the front row, who skillfully managed the tumultuous period during the Tiananmen Square protests; Win Lord, the young note taker at the Nixon meetings who later became our ambassador to China.
I also salute the Foreign Service officers and civil servants who worked behind the scenes. I’ve learned a lot about that as Secretary of State. Those of us who are out front are only out front because of all the work that has been done to lay the groundwork. And for that trip in particular, I want to recognize Stape Roy, one of the renowned “missionary kids” who later served as ambassador; Jeff Bader, who went to China in 1981 and became a caretaker of our China policy for the next three decades; Chas Freeman, the interpreter for President Nixon’s talks with Mao who later became our deputy chief of mission in Beijing.
There are those who aren’t with us—including Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who was the youngest ever Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Jim Lilley, who expertly served as our ambassador to China during the challenging events of 1989 and after.
And the journalists who traveled with President Nixon and covered every angle of his time there, including Ted Koppel, who I see in the audience. Thanks to them, people across our country were able to follow President Nixon at every step.
Now, I was a law student in 1972. I was a poor law student. I did not own a television set. But I was not about to miss history being made, so I rented one – a portable model with those rabbit ears. I lugged it back to my apartment and tuned in every night to watch scenes of a country that had been blocked from view for my entire life. Like many Americans, I was riveted and proud of what we were accomplishing through our president.
President Nixon called it “the week that changed the world.” Well, if anything, that turned out to be an understatement.
Then, the People’s Republic of China was profoundly isolated. Poverty was pervasive. The Cultural Revolution had banished nearly all foreigners, as well as foreign businesses, foreign books, even foreign ideas. When President Nixon’s motorcade drove through Beijing, the American delegation noted how eerily silent the city was. Now there were people everywhere, but there was hardly a sound.
Yet within a few short decades, China has become the second largest economy in the world. Hundreds of millions of Chinese have been lifted out of poverty and have joined the global economy. Beijing, Shanghai and other cities have turned into noisy, fast-paced, 24-hour centers of commerce and culture. The 2008 Olympics and the 2010 Expo were very successful coming out parties. And China, a rising geopolitical power, has a seat at virtually every table and a role in virtually every institution of importance in the world.
So there is no doubt that the China of today is a very different country from the China of 1972. Now that transformation is due, first and foremost, to the hard work and determination of the Chinese people and their leaders. It was encouraged, however, by people around the world who supported and invested in their progress. And it can also be traced back in a straight line to that week 40 years ago.
Before Air Force One was wheels down in Beijing, China was firmly on the outside of the international order. That visit was the start of China coming in. And since then, China has worked to move beyond its isolation of that time to engage more cooperatively with other nations, and those efforts have delivered great benefits to the Chinese people. And now, completing that journey is essential if China is to cement its newfound standing and build upon the extraordinary gains it has made.
Whether it does has profound implications, not only for China, but for the United States and the world. Because it’s not just China that’s been transformed during the past 40 years; the U.S.-China relationship has as well.
In 1972, our countries were connected only through a narrow official channel – one member of government talking to another. Today, the web of connections linking our nations is vast and complex, and reaches into just about every aspect of our societies. Our economies are tightly entwined. And so is our security. We face shared threats like nuclear proliferation, piracy, and climate change, and we need each other to solve these problems. The opportunities before us are also shared, and they define our relationship much more than the threats. So therefore, we have the chance, if we seize it, to work together to advance prosperity, pursue innovation, and improve the lives of our people and others worldwide.
Now when I say “we,” I do not mean only our governments, as important as they are. Every day, across both of our countries, executives and entrepreneurs, scientists and scholars, artists and athletes, students and teachers, family members and citizens of all kinds shape and pull and add to this relationship. Together, they represent a vast range of priorities, concerns, and points of view. And they are all stakeholders in how we build toward a shared future. Engaging their talents, ideas and energies makes the U.S.-China relationship far deeper and more durable than anything our governments could do on our own.
It’s like that television I rented in 1972. Back then, we had just a few channels to choose from. In fact, as I vaguely remember, we had three broadcast channels and I guess by that time, we might have had public broadcasting, although I’m not quite sure. Today, there are something like 900 channels and more to come. The channels between China and us have multiplied at an astronomical rate.
But there are challenges that come with a relationship this consequential and this personal to so many. It does get bound up in our domestic politics, yes, in both countries. The United States and China both have politics, you know. People’s voices are heard in ways they weren’t or couldn’t have been heard in years past. This political dimension presents complications for both sides, which makes it that much more important that we ensure our partnership delivers results.
All this adds up to a very different kind of relationship than the one we had. We’ve gone from being two nations with hardly any ties to speak of, little bearing on each other, to being thoroughly, inescapably interdependent. For two nations with long traditions of independence, deeply rooted in our cultures and our histories, these are unusual circumstances to say the least. They require adjustments in our thinking and our actions, on both sides of the Pacific. And so, how do we respond to what is not just a new challenge to our two countries, but I would argue, an unprecedented challenge in history?
Back in 1972, the U.S.-China project was, in many ways, a signature 20th century diplomatic endeavor embedded in the context of the Cold War, focused on establishing official ties and laying the groundwork for peaceful engagement, and building a basic understanding of each other. Well, the U.S.-China project of 2012 is something altogether different; indeed, it is unprecedented in the history of nations. The United States is attempting to work with a rising power to foster its rise as an active contributor to global security, stability and prosperity while also sustaining and securing American leadership in a changing world. And we are trying to do this without entering into unhealthy competition, rivalry, or conflict; without scoring points at each other’s expense and thereby souring the relationship; and without falling short on our responsibilities to the international community. We are, together, building a model in which we strike a stable and mutually acceptable balance between cooperation and competition. This is uncharted territory. And we have to get it right, because so much depends on it.
After three years of intensive engagement, and the successes and frustrations that have come with it, we are clear-eyed about the obstacles that still remain. There are, understandably so, difficult questions that we must answer, and misconceptions we must address. For example, here in the United States and elsewhere in the world, there are those who make the case – maybe it was made today – that a rising China signals bad news, that as China grows more prosperous and wields greater international power, our relationship will automatically turn adversarial, or the United States will inevitably experience decline as a result. Now meanwhile, some in China fear that the United States is determined to contain their rise and limit their progress to advance our interests at their expense.
And there still remains suspicion and mistrust of the other’s intentions, particularly in the military realm. As Dr. Kissinger recently wrote in Foreign Affairs, “Both sides must understand the nuances by which apparently traditional and apparently reasonable courses can evoke the deepest worries in each other.” We must address this head-on and constructively by creating a framework for building trust over time. That means returning to first principles of the relationship: There is no intrinsic contradiction between supporting a rising China and advancing America’s interests. A thriving China is good for America, and a thriving America is good for China.
That’s why we helped break China’s isolation in 1972, and it’s why, for more than 60 years, we have underwritten regional peace and security that helped make room for China’s extraordinary economic progress; we have championed China’s inclusion in international fora like the WTO; we have elevated the G-20 as a forum for international engagement, in part because China plays a key role in it; at Copenhagen and subsequent climate summits, we made cooperation with China a priority; on issue after issue, we have not only welcomed, we have advocated for China’s participation and we have called for its leadership.
So to those who ask, “Is the United States attempting to contain China?” Our answer is a clear no. In fact, the United States helped pave the way for China to be where it is today in its own development. We are a country that welcomes others’ success, because we believe that it’s good for everyone when people anywhere are able to work their way to better lives. If China’s rise means that we have an increasingly capable and engaged partner, that’s good news for us. And we will seize every chance to engage, because we’re not a country that sits on our lead. We’re a country with confidence in our own standing and in our ability to compete and succeed.
The choices that America has made diplomatically, economically, and strategically reflect that fundamental belief. But of course, to say that a thriving China is good for America, and vice versa, is not the end of the story, because as we all know, there are different ways for countries to get ahead. And for China, for everyone, success must be achieved responsibly; that is not at the expense of others, but in a way that contributes to the regional and global good.
And this is where China has its own choices to make. Its power, wealth, and influence have pushed it rapidly to a new echelon in the international order. What China says and does reverberates around the globe, and simply by changing itself, China affects the world around it. At the same time, it is still working on its great economic mission, bringing development to millions more of the Chinese people. My Chinese counterparts often talk to me in passionate terms about how far their country still has to go. So China is faced with the complicated task of balancing the demands of development with its responsibilities as an emerging global power, or as my Chinese friends sometimes say, a reemerging global power, because of course China has hundreds, thousands of years of history as an influential nation and culture.
And I’ve pointed out to my counterparts China’s response at times has been to seek to have it at both ways, acting like what I call a selective stakeholder. In some forums, on some issues, China wants to be treated as a great power; in others, as a developing nation. That’s perfectly understandable, because China has attributes of both. Nonetheless, the world is looking for China to play a role that is commensurate with its new standing. And that means it can no longer be a selective stakeholder.
Now, I’m well aware that debates about the rise of China and other emerging powers, and they usually start and too often stop with people simply saying, “With great power comes great responsibility” – I think that is a quote from the movie Spiderman, if I remember – (laughter) – and just leaving it at that. Well, it is worth pushing ourselves further on what this really means in action on a pragmatic, day-to-day basis.
Well, for starters, the link between power and responsibility is built into the logic of global politics. As countries become more powerful, their stake in the success of the international system naturally rises, because they have more to lose when that system fails. At the same time, the world’s expectations of them naturally rise as well, because they have more to contribute to strengthen the system. But more than this, it is understandable that the international community wants some confidence that a country’s growing power will be used for the benefit of all. And given the historic challenges to security and stability posed by rising powers, they do have a special obligation to demonstrate in concrete ways that they are going to pursue a constructive path. This is particularly true for a country that has grown as rapidly and as dramatically as China has.
Ultimately, because emerging powers have such a large and growing impact, allowing them to selectively pick and choose elements of the rules-based international system that may on a short-term basis suit their interests would render the system unworkable. And that would end up impoverishing everyone. Having said that, the international system is not static. Rules and institutions designed for an earlier age may not be suited to today. So we need to work together to adapt and update them. Indeed, we have already begun that work. On issues like trade and climate, efforts to develop new norms and mechanisms are well underway. We have no interest in holding onto elements of the system that have become irrelevant, or unsuited to the challenges of our time, or that work only to benefit some countries and not others. That would give countries incentives to walk away from cooperation and go it alone, which would not serve them or us.
But there are principles that we know work. And we cannot afford to abandon them, like maintaining an economic order that is open, free, transparent, and fair; pursuing security in a manner that is measured and transparent to avoid misunderstandings and unnecessary conflicts; and promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, which do reflect universal values and the inherent dignity of all humankind. China has already shown increased leadership on some regional and global issues, like countering piracy and sustaining the global economic recovery. It has also contributed substantially to UN peacekeeping missions worldwide, and we applaud these steps. But we do believe China will have to go further to fully embrace its new role in the world to give the world confidence that it is going to, not just today or on one set of issues, but for the long run, play a positive role that will enhance security, stability, and prosperity.
So the world is looking to China and asking questions like these: Will China adapt its foreign policy so it contributes more to solving regional and global problems to make it possible for others to succeed as well? Will it use its power to help end brutal violence against civilians in places like Syria? Will it explain its military buildup and the ultimate goals of its military strategies, policies, and programs to relieve unease, to reassure its neighbors, to avoid misunderstandings, and to contribute to maintaining regional security? Will it uphold international maritime laws and norms, which for decades have made it possible for nations to engage in peaceful trade? Will it work more vigorously to establish international standards in cyberspace, so the internet works for everyone and so people in China and elsewhere can harness its economic and social benefits? And will it use its economic standing to enforce a rules-based system for global trade and investment so it can advance its own economic development while contributing to global growth?
As economic partners, we can make it possible for more people in both countries to work, trade, invest, create, and prosper. Whether we do or not depends on how we deal with some of our differences. China has things it wants, including more opportunities to invest in the United States, and we have things we want, including an end to discrimination against U.S. companies and protection for their intellectual property; an end to unfair preferences for domestic firms; and more opportunities for American goods, products and services; and of course, an end to what we see as unfair, distorting currency practices.
We want to engage in more trade and investment with China, because we believe in the benefits that come with greater economic activity and healthy competition. But for it to be healthy, it has to be fair, rules-based and transparent. So we will continue to work with China to urge it to make reforms, and we, in turn, will hear and act on those changes it wants from us.
Finally, we do ask, can China meet its obligations to protect universal human rights and fundamental freedoms? Now, this is an area in which we have had long and profound disagreements. And even as our two countries become more interdependent, the United States will, of course, continue to stand by our principles and universal standards of human rights. And we believe that with development comes an opportunity for the aspirations of people everywhere to express themselves freely, whether on the Internet, or in a public square, or on the factory floor. And so like people everywhere, we do believe that the Chinese people have their own legitimate aspirations, and we do believe that everyone should have a legal system that is independent and will protect them from arbitrary action. And we do believe, not just in China but everywhere, in religious and linguistic differences, cultural differences being respected. Reforms that support these goals give people a greater stake in the success of their nations, which in turn makes societies more stable, prosperous and peaceful.
Now, questions like these are the kind that we kick around all the time with our Chinese counterparts. And I personally am very grateful for the open, candid dialogues that we have been holding for the last three years. We have the greatest respect for what China has accomplished in 40 years, and we want to see those accomplishments continue to build into the future.
I think that our outreach to China during the past three years has been a continuation of a bipartisan tradition that every president since President Nixon has upheld. We consult on every single issue of significance; not a day goes by when our governments are not in touch. In this Administration, we’ve launched our Strategic and Economic Dialogue and a Strategic Security Dialogue, and we’ve had intensive discussions on just about every issue you can imagine, from trade policy to counterterrorism to human rights to border security. Each of our countries has hosted multiple high-level visits from the other. Our presidents have met in person more than 10 times. And later this year, in May, I’ll make my sixth trip to China as Secretary of State.
All of this effort has taken place within a larger regional push to strengthen our ties throughout the Asia Pacific. We’ve enhanced our relationships with our treaty allies Japan, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. We’ve broadened our relationships with other emerging powers, including India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore. We’ve strengthened our unofficial relationship with Taiwan. We’ve reengaged with Burma. We’ve invested in regional multilateral institutions, including the East Asia Summit and ASEAN. We’ve increased our economic engagement, updated our regional military posture and amplified our advocacy for the rule of law and universal human rights. In short, we are working around the clock to do everything we can to defend and advance security and prosperity throughout the Asia Pacific. And having that positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China is vital to every one of those objectives.
So we are committed to this partnership. And now, we and others around the world are looking for even greater leadership from China. China and the United States cannot solve all the problems of the world together. But without China and the United States, I doubt that any of our global problems can be solved. We want China to be a full stakeholder, embracing its role as a major global player, to helping strengthen the international system that makes its own and our success possible. All the while, we will continue to seek every opportunity for engagement with China, but not just at the government-to-government level. We will keep discussing our differences openly, developing as many avenues for cooperation as we possibly can. In short, we will continue the journey begun by many in this room 40 years ago.
In 1972, when President Nixon disembarked in Beijing and shook Zhou Enlai’s hand, the premier said, “Your handshake came over the vastest ocean in the world, 25 years of no communication.” A few days later, President Nixon toasted his hosts and said, “The Great Wall is a reminder that for almost a generation there has been a wall between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America. In these past four days we have begun the long process of removing that wall.” Both sides were taking a risk. But they decided that engagement was worth it. They knew that if the summit went smoothly, the conversation between our two countries would continue, and that would lead to cooperation, and that in time we both would benefit from it.
That is precisely what has happened. Nearly everything that China and the United States disagreed about before that trip, we disagreed about after the trip. But we began a conversation that has helped us mitigate our differences and broaden those areas on which we agree. And the result is the relationship we have today, as consequential and multifaceted as any in the world.
We are now trying to find an answer, a new answer to the ancient question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet. We need a new answer. We don’t have a choice. Interdependence means that one of us cannot succeed unless the other does as well. We need to write a future that looks entirely different from the past. This is, by definition, incredibly difficult. But we have done difficult things before.
I wish that all of the leaders from 40 years ago could have been with me when I visited the U.S.A. Pavilion at the Shanghai Expo. I’m very proud to be called the mother of the U.S.A. Pavilion by our Chinese friends. And what was most striking to me is that we had invited young Americans who were studying Chinese to be the guides and the hosts at our pavilion. And many of the Chinese people who had come from around that vast and magnificent country were stunned to be greeted by Hispanic children, African American, Asian American, Caucasian, every kind of person that we have in the United States speaking to them in their language. And the incredible connections that were being made as people were asking questions, telling jokes, recounting where they had come from was as strong an endorsement of the courageous step taken 40 years ago as any that I personally have seen. But it also was a reminder that we do the work we do as secretaries of state or as presidents or premiers or foreign ministers – we do that work because we all have to be committed to making a better future for those young people, that we are the stewards of their future in terms of the kind of opportunities that they will enjoy.
So let us remember and take inspiration from how far apart our countries were when President Nixon landed in Beijing and how much we have accomplished together since then. It is irrefutable proof of the progress that is possible when people work together to overcome their differences and find common ground not only for their own good, but for others’. It is now up to us to make sure that the future is even more promising than the past. Thank you very much. (Applause.)”
SOUTHCOM'S COMMANDER SAYS CURBING INTERNATIONAL CRIME TOO BIG FOR SOUTHCOM TO HANDLE ALONE
The following excerpt is from a Department of Defense American Forces Press Service e-mail:
"Southcom 'Part of Solution' to Drug Crime, Commander Says
By Karen Parrish
American Forces Press Service
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 7, 2012 - U.S. Southern Command's central mission -- disrupting transnational trafficking in drugs, weapons, cash and people in Central and South America –- is too large and complex for even a U.S. combatant command to tackle alone, Southcom's commander said today.
At a Defense Writers Group breakfast, Air Force Gen. Douglas M. Fraser said that in line with the president's strategy targeting transnational organized crime, Southcom works with other U.S. government agencies and international partners' military and law enforcement agencies to track, capture and prosecute people who have made several countries in the Americas the most violent in the world.
Success in that effort rests on the command's other primary mission of building international and interagency partnership and cooperation, the general told reporters.
Southcom is "only one part of the solution" to transnational organized crime and its effects in Central and South America, Fraser noted. Both the United States and the international community are intent on the issue, he added.
"We're working to pull together all the various agencies, capabilities, and [the] international community to improve our ability to coordinate and focus our efforts to address this larger problem," he said.
While transnational organized crime is not a traditional military threat, Fraser said, the violence and corruption stemming from the global drug trade in countries south of the United States has, in many cases, destroyed law enforcement and judicial processes.
Fraser said he doesn't see either an internal or external conventional military threat in the region, but many countries are using their militaries to augment too-small or corrupt police forces.
Transnational crime's greatest impact is in Central America, he said. Honduras in 2011 led the world in per capita murders, with 86 per 100,000 people, Fraser noted. El Salvador's murder rate is 66 per 100,000, he added, while Guatemala's overall rate is 41 per 100,000, with higher peaks in parts of the country.
Those three countries do use their military forces in crime-fighting efforts, Fraser said. He noted Honduras has committed half of its forces to the effort, and Guatemala has employed forces in 60-day sieges against high-crime areas.
While he doesn't think military forces should serve in law enforcement over the long term, the general said, he supports the approach as a bridging strategy.
"[Southcom's] efforts along those lines are to help support the militaries with training, with some equipping -- to help them work with law enforcement as well as address the traffic as it enters Central America," he added.
Fraser said Southcom's forces pursue a more conventional military mission along the region's coastlines, where for 20 years they have spotted and monitored air- and sea-based drug movement from northern South America through the Caribbean to various destinations -- most commonly, now, in Central America.
Drug traffic -- mostly cocaine but increasingly including methamphetamine precursors coming from India and China, routed through the Americas by transnational criminal networks -- then typically moves inland, by ground or air, through Mexico and into the United States, still the world's largest consumer of illegal drugs, the general said.
"Brazil has become the second-largest user of cocaine in the world," he noted, adding drug movement is also increasing from South America to West Africa, then into Europe and the Middle East.
Southcom still conducts training and disaster-preparedness exercises and other traditional military-to-military engagements with partner forces in the region, Fraser said, but international and U.S. efforts are mostly aimed at disrupting drug trade.
Operation Martillo, or "Hammer," is focused on air and maritime surveillance of the Caribbean and eastern Pacific using Southcom assets including Navy and Coast Guard ships and Navy, Air Force and U.S. Customs and Border Protection aircraft, Fraser noted.
About 80 percent of Colombia's cocaine moves by ship, whether traditional coast-hugging "go-fast" drug smuggling boats, fishing vessels, or "pretty sophisticated" wood and fiberglass submersibles and semi-submersibles drug traffickers craft in the region's jungles, Fraser said.
The general said Southcom and its regional partners interdict some 25 to 35 percent of the drug supply they know about, but he acknowledged the overall actual percentage likely is lower. And as traffickers shift from larger shipments to using smaller, more numerous boats, he said, more drugs are getting through.
Operation Hammer has in 45 days netted 3.5 metric tons of cocaine and 10 smuggling vessels, but the effort's overall aim is to use persistent surveillance to force traffickers to move their shipping routes into international waters, the general said.
That shift would prolong transit time and offer more opportunities for U.S. and other nations' vessels to stop illegal shipments, seize cargoes and prosecute traffickers, Fraser explained. Dutch and French ships are active in counterdrug efforts in the Caribbean, he added.
The general said while Southcom may see the number of its own ships decline over time as the Navy reshapes its fleet, some countries in the region are bringing more to bear in the counterdrug effort.
Colombia's recent strategy against the narcoterrorist group FARC -- Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -- demonstrates what is possible, Fraser said. Colombia has focused more task forces against the group, and paired with forces in neighboring Venezuela to target illicit activity across the border.
"FARC has been diminished in half, ... and they've reverted back to very traditional guerilla tactics," he noted.
Southcom supports Colombia's efforts, and the United States has spent some $8 billion on counterdrug efforts in that nation over 10 years, Fraser said, but Colombia itself has invested $100 billion in defense during that time. Colombia can serve as a model for other regional nations, particularly in its whole-of-government approach anti-corruption efforts, the general said. The government first moves in security forces to stop drug production and quell violence in a given region, then follows up with economic development experts to help build sustainable, legal means of livelihood, he explained.
Colombian troops get anti-corruption training, and spend two months at time in postings in the field before rotating to a new assignment elsewhere in the country, Fraser added. Through these means, the Colombian government has gained control over the country's cities and large towns, he said.
Colombian troops get anti-corruption training, and spend two months at time in postings in the field before rotating to a new assignment elsewhere in the country, Fraser added. Through these means, the Colombian government has gained control over the country's cities and large towns, he said.
Other nations in the region can take those lessons and determine how to apply them to their situation, the general said."
SEC COMMISSIONER GALLAGHER SPEAKS ON GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKET REFORMS
The following excerpt is from the U.S. SEC website:
“Ongoing Regulatory Reform in the Global Capital Markets
by Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Annual Conference of the Institute of International Bankers
Washington, D.C.
March 5, 2012
Thank you for that very nice introduction. I am very pleased to be here today.
Before I continue, I need to provide the standard disclaimer that my comments today are my own, and do not necessarily represent the positions of the Commission or my fellow Commissioners.
My topic today is “Ongoing Regulatory Reform in the Global Capital Markets.” I’d like to discuss the SEC’s role in that process, with a special emphasis on the Volcker Rule. After all, the IIB, writing jointly with the European Banking Federation, shared 51 pages worth of thoughts on the Rule in a February 13th comment letter, so it seems only fair that I share a few of mine with you this afternoon.
The IIB’s comment letter went to all of the agencies involved in the joint rulemaking process for implementing the Volcker Rule: Treasury, the Fed, the FDIC, the OCC, the CFTC, and the SEC. The leaders of all of these agencies, as well as those of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and the National Credit Union Administration, along with an independent member “having insurance expertise,” all serve as voting members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, or FSOC. Before moving on to the Volcker Rule, I’d like to take a moment to say a few words about that unique regulatory body.
Those of you hanging on my every word — the vast majority of the audience, I’m sure — may have noted my emphasis on the word “leaders.” The membership of FSOC, as set forth explicitly in the Dodd-Frank Act,1consists not of the regulatory agencies themselves, but of the heads of agencies, ex officio. This is an almost unprecedented arrangement for a formal inter-agency group charged with matters of such great import to the country.
As such, while the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission is a member of FSOC, the Commission itself is not. This distinction is especially important given the structure and composition of the SEC — indeed, of almost all of the agencies whose leaders sit on FSOC. While the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the FHFA can speak in a single voice on behalf of their agencies, the Chairman of the SEC is only one of a five member, bipartisan commission, with each Commissioner having a single vote on all matters that come before the Commission. The heads of the CFTC, the FDIC, the NCUA, and Fed are similarly situated, each leading an agency that has multiple voting members, each with an equal vote. What’s more, with the exception of the Fed, the board or commission of each of those agencies is statutorily mandated to be comprised of members with differing political affiliations. Although the leader of each of these agencies is generally from the President’s party, his or her vote counts no more than that of any other member of the commission or board.
In addition, while all of the agencies whose leaders sit on FSOC are constitutionally part of the executive branch, only Treasury is a federal executive department led by a Cabinet secretary who serves at the pleasure of the President. All of the other agencies are either independent agencies or government corporations, and their governing boards or commissions are comprised of appointees with fixed terms designed to guarantee a measure of independence for the agencies. The Chair of FSOC, however, is the Secretary of the Treasury — the only member of the group who may be removed by the President at will.
So to sum up, the membership of FSOC is comprised primarily of theindividual leaders of independent agencies, who will usually almost exclusively be drawn from the same party. What’s more, this group of leaders of agencies that were deliberately designed, and are statutorily required, to be bipartisan is led by the individual in the most partisan position of all, a Cabinet appointee that the President can dismiss at will. One would hope that these agency chiefs would always be sure to represent the views of their colleagues — from both parties — and the interests of their agencies. The statute, however, is silent on that point.
Not surprisingly for a body comprised primarily of banking regulators, FSOC is tasked with a “safety and soundness” mandate. The purposes of FSOC, as set forth in the establishing provisions of Dodd-Frank, are:
…to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies, or that could arise outside the financial services marketplace; to promote market discipline, by eliminating expectations on the part of shareholders, creditors, and counterparties of such companies that the Government will shield them from losses in the event of failure; and to respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial system.
This mandate has some overlap with the SEC’s; specifically, the goal of promoting market discipline would seem to be in accordance with the SEC’s mission to “maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets.” Absent from the FSOC mandate, however, are references to the goals of protecting investors and facilitating capital formation that are also at the core of the SEC’s mission.
Were FSOC simply an advisory body, this omission might not be cause for concern. FSOC, however, is vested with unprecedented authority with respect to the agencies from which its members are drawn. Perhaps the most important of these authorities is to “provide for more stringent regulation of a financial activity by issuing recommendations to the primary financial regulatory agencies to apply new or heightened standards and safeguards” in critical areas of regulation, including capital, leverage, and disclosure requirements as well as leverage limits, concentration limits, and overall risk management. Pursuant to the statute, FSOC may provide such recommendations if it “determines that the conduct, scope, nature, size, scale, concentration, or interconnectedness of such activity or practice could create or increase the risk of significant liquidity, credit, or other problems spreading among bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies, financial markets of the United States, or low-income, minority, or underserved communities.”
In addition to this “recommendation” authority, Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act vests FSOC with even greater power with respect to certain financial market utilities and, even more broadly, certain payment, clearing, or settlement activities conducted by “financial institutions.” Specifically, upon FSOC’s designation, by a two-thirds vote, of a financial market utility or a payment, clearing, or settlement activity as “systemically important,” it may direct the Fed, in consultation with the relevant supervisory agencies and FSOC itself, to prescribe risk management standards. With respect to “designated” utilities or to “designated” activities conducted by financial institutions for which the SEC or CFTC is the primary regulator, Title VIII sets forth “special procedures” pursuant to which the Fed may, if it determines that the risk management standards set by the SEC or the CFTC are “insufficient,” impose its own standards. If the SEC or CFTC object within 60 days, FSOC decides, again by a two-thirds vote of its ten voting members, which standards apply.
In other words, FSOC has the power to make “recommendations” to the primary regulators of any “financial companies” regarding their core areas of regulation, and can even allow the Fed to supplant the primary regulators. The decisions made by this group of presidential appointees, which will almost always be comprised exclusively or almost exclusively by members of the same party led by a member of the President’s Cabinet, can take place behind closed doors.
This is not a political or partisan concern. Although the work being performed by the present membership of FSOC may be some of the most important work the council ever does, with consequences to financial markets that could last for decades, Presidents from both parties will have the authority to appoint the agency heads that will serve on FSOC, and as administrations change, so will the political affiliations of FSOC’s members. Instead, this is a concern over the concentration of power in a group made up of leaders of agencies with different goals and missions, including leaders of bipartisan, multi-member agencies who have no statutory requirement to consult with their agency colleagues.
Now, let me stress that FSOC’s mandate, broadly speaking, to preserve the financial stability of the U.S., is of crucial importance — indeed, those of us who were in the trenches during the financial crisis would have been surprised if Congress had not created a systemic risk regulator. But FSOC’s mandate is not the SEC’s mandate. The core of bank regulation is safety and soundness, both on an individual scale, by, for example, guaranteeing bank customers’ deposits, and on a national — indeed, global — scale by managing systemic risk. The SEC, on the other hand, regulates markets that are inherently risky. Indeed, the risks taken by investors are absolutely critical to capital allocation, which in turn is critical to economic growth. The SEC works to protect investors willing to accept the risk of securities markets in the hopes of greater returns by ensuring that those markets are fair and efficient, not risk-free, and does so with the benefit of nearly eight decades of experience in regulating those markets. Were FSOC to interpret its bank-oriented mandate as a license to impose a bank-oriented model of regulation on the SEC and the markets it regulates, the results could have a devastating effect on markets.
Which brings me to the Volcker Rule and the SEC’s role in its implementation. The Volcker Rule, which may have a more dramatic impact on world markets and U.S. competitiveness than perhaps any other rule regulators are promulgating under Dodd-Frank, addresses, at its heart, a topic about which the SEC traditionally has — among all the regulators writing rules in this space — the most experience and expertise in regulating. For those reasons — because it is potentially so significant and because it implicates areas of the SEC’s core competence — it is a perfect case study for how to think about approaching Dodd-Frank rulemaking and the SEC’s role in that rulemaking.
I want to begin by talking a bit about the statute and the proposed rules. Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, commonly known as the “Volcker Rule” even though it is a statutory provision, imposes two significant prohibitions on banking entities and their affiliates. First, the Rule generally prohibits banking entities that benefit from federal insurance on customer deposits or access to the discount window, as well as their affiliates, from engaging in proprietary trading. Second, the Rule prohibits those entities from sponsoring or investing in hedge funds or private equity funds. The Rule identifies certain specified “permitted activities,” including underwriting, market making, and trading in certain government obligations, that are excepted from these prohibitions but also establishes limitations on those excepted activities. The Volcker Rule defines — in expansive terms — key terms such as “proprietary trading” and “trading account” and grants the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, the OCC, the SEC, and the CFTC the rulemaking authority to further add to those definitions.
The statute also charges the three Federal banking agencies, the SEC, and the CFTC with adopting rules to carry out the provisions of the Volcker Rule. It requires the Federal banking agencies to issue their rules with respect to insured depositary institutions jointly and mandates that all of the affected agencies, including the Commission, “consult and coordinate” with each other in the rulemaking process. In doing so, the agencies are required to ensure that the regulations are “comparable,” that they “provide for consistent application and implementation” in order to avoid providing advantages or imposing disadvantages to affected companies, and that they protect the “safety and soundness” of banking entities and nonbank financial companies supervised by the Fed.
In October of last year, the Commission jointly proposed with the Federal banking agencies a set of implementing regulations for the Volcker Rule,2with the CFTC issuing a substantively identical set of proposals in January. The proposing release includes extensive commentary designed to assist entities in distinguishing permitted trading activities from prohibited proprietary trading activities as well as in identifying permitted activities with respect to hedge funds and private equity funds.
In her Opening Statement introducing the joint rule proposals at an SEC Open Meeting last October, Chairman Schapiro praised the collaborative effort among the five agencies involved in the drafting process, noting that it involved “more than a year of weekly, if not more frequent, interagency staff conference calls, interagency meetings, and shared drafting.”3 It is telling, however, that in his recent testimony before a House Financial Services Subcommittee, CFTC Chairman Gensler, noting his agency’s role as a “supporting member” in the rulemaking process, stated, “The bank regulators have the lead role.”4
I think, however, that both the statute and our expertise compel the SEC to play a strong and vigorous role in the rulemaking. The Volcker Rule applies to “banking entities” and their affiliates, affecting a wide range of financial institutions regulated by the five different agencies. Regardless of the nature of the regulated entities, however, the Rule addresses a set of activities — the trading and investment practices of those entities — that fall within the core competencies of the SEC. Indeed, the Rule expressly envisions that quintessential market-making activity continue within these firms.
As such, if we at the SEC play our role properly, we can and should ensure that the Volcker Rule meets the aims of Congress without destroying critically important market activity explicitly contemplated by the statute. The issues addressed in the proposed rules — prohibited activities with exceptions to those prohibitions — and limitations to those exceptions — that make complex issues exponentially more so — are the bread and butter of the SEC. For almost eighty years, the SEC has addressed these and similar issues with commensurate levels of complexity. For example, many of you are familiar with the SEC’s extensive array of rulemaking and interpretive releases concerning exceptions for bona fide hedging or market making in the context of short sales. These exceptions, which date back to the early 1980s, built upon the bona fide hedging exceptions to the Commission’s proprietary trading rules for members of national securities exchanges set forth in a 1979 rulemaking.5 The SEC has been dealing with these issues for a long, long time.
By taking a leadership role, the SEC can also ensure that the final rule is consistent with our core mission of protecting investors, maintaining fair and efficient markets and promoting capital formation. These considerations, coupled with the expertise that the SEC brings to the table, should ensure that the bank regulators’ focus on safety and soundness and Dodd-Frank’s overarching focus on managing systemic risk (although many have argued whether the statute will in the end reduce such risk) are balanced by legitimate considerations of investor protection and the maintenance of robust markets.
The Volcker Rule comment period — during which commenters were asked to share their thoughts on over 1,300 questions on nearly 400 topics — ended last month, and although it would of course be premature to share my thoughts on the proposed rules today, even a quick review of the many substantial comment letters the Commission received reveals widespread fears regarding the effect of the proposed rules on the proper functioning of global markets and the competitiveness of the U.S. financial industry might — fears that I share with the commenters.
Our foreign regulatory counterparts have also expressed serious concerns with the proposed rules. The Japanese FSA and the Bank of Japan filed a comment letter to express their concerns over “the potentially serious negative impact on the Japanese markets and associated significant rise in the cost of related transactions for Japanese banks” that they believe would arise from the extraterritorial application of the Volcker Rule.6 British Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne wrote recently to Fed Chairman Bernanke to express his fear that the proposed rules’ effect on market making services for non-U.S. debt would make it “more difficult and costlier” for banks to trade non-U.S. sovereign bonds on behalf of clients.7 Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney — who was recently named Chairman of the G-20’s Financial Stability Board — has stated that he and other Canadian officials have “obvious concerns” about the proposed rules. He cited the lack of clarity in the proposed rules’ definitions of “market making” versus “proprietary trade,” the effect the rules would have on non-U.S. government bond markets, and what he viewed as the Rule’s inappropriate “presumption” that trades are proprietary.8 Lastly, Michel Barnier, the European Commissioner for Internal Markets and Services, has written to Fed Chairman Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Geithner that “[t]here is a real risk that banks impacted by the rule would also significantly reduce their market-making activities, reducing liquidity in many markets both within and outside the United States.”
The aggregate impact of the rulemakings we and our fellow regulators are promulgating is massive, the costs are enormous, and we are introducing these massive and costly rule proposals at a time when our economy is still — hopefully — limping towards recovery. These factors all argue for an approach that is careful, systematic, but most importantly regulatorily incremental. It is important to remember that regulators’ authority and oversight responsibilities do not end when final rules are promulgated, and that continued oversight will ensure that regulators can refine and improve the rules as markets organize and develop in response to the rules we write. Importantly, we can and should recalibrate the rules as markets develop and regulators learn more and gather and analyze relevant data. We must avoid regulatory hubris and should not regulate — particularly where the changes are so novel or comprehensive — with the belief that we completely understand the consequences of the regulations we may impose. In many of these areas, including Volcker, missing the mark could have dire and perhaps irreversibly negative consequences. As such, I believe that this approach - careful, systematic, and regulatorily incremental — should serve as an appropriate guiding principle as we undertake not only our consideration of the Volcker Rule but also other significant rulemaking mandated under Dodd-Frank.
Consistent with this approach, especially in light of the voluminous comments received, regulators must be willing to re-examine our initial efforts and, if necessary, go back to the drawing board to make sure we regulate wisely, rather than just quickly. In a recent speech, my colleague and friend Commissioner Troy Paredes stated that if the proposed implementing regulations for the Volcker Rule need to change as much as it looked to him like they do, the responsible course for the Commission to follow would be to issue a reproposal.10 I couldn’t agree with him more, both regarding the potential need for extensive changes to the proposed rule and the wisdom of reproposing the amended rule to garner the benefit of another round of comment. The comments we’ve received so far, including those I've cited today, provide invaluable insights as to the potential impact of the Volcker Rule. These comments provide powerful evidence that the benefits the proposed rule was designed to provide may come at an unacceptably high cost. It would be a dereliction of our duty as regulators to ignore them.
As Commissioner Paredes stated in his recent speech, the virtue of a reproposal is the benefit of another round of comment. We owe it to investors and all market participants to review each and every comment letter with the goal of learning more about the potential real-world impact of the rules, and given the extensive revisions that I believe the proposed rule requires, we owe it to them to provide another opportunity to comment on a set of reproposed rules.
Thank you for your attention and for inviting me here today. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.”
“Ongoing Regulatory Reform in the Global Capital Markets
by Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Annual Conference of the Institute of International Bankers
Washington, D.C.
March 5, 2012
Thank you for that very nice introduction. I am very pleased to be here today.
Before I continue, I need to provide the standard disclaimer that my comments today are my own, and do not necessarily represent the positions of the Commission or my fellow Commissioners.
My topic today is “Ongoing Regulatory Reform in the Global Capital Markets.” I’d like to discuss the SEC’s role in that process, with a special emphasis on the Volcker Rule. After all, the IIB, writing jointly with the European Banking Federation, shared 51 pages worth of thoughts on the Rule in a February 13th comment letter, so it seems only fair that I share a few of mine with you this afternoon.
The IIB’s comment letter went to all of the agencies involved in the joint rulemaking process for implementing the Volcker Rule: Treasury, the Fed, the FDIC, the OCC, the CFTC, and the SEC. The leaders of all of these agencies, as well as those of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and the National Credit Union Administration, along with an independent member “having insurance expertise,” all serve as voting members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, or FSOC. Before moving on to the Volcker Rule, I’d like to take a moment to say a few words about that unique regulatory body.
Those of you hanging on my every word — the vast majority of the audience, I’m sure — may have noted my emphasis on the word “leaders.” The membership of FSOC, as set forth explicitly in the Dodd-Frank Act,1consists not of the regulatory agencies themselves, but of the heads of agencies, ex officio. This is an almost unprecedented arrangement for a formal inter-agency group charged with matters of such great import to the country.
As such, while the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission is a member of FSOC, the Commission itself is not. This distinction is especially important given the structure and composition of the SEC — indeed, of almost all of the agencies whose leaders sit on FSOC. While the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the FHFA can speak in a single voice on behalf of their agencies, the Chairman of the SEC is only one of a five member, bipartisan commission, with each Commissioner having a single vote on all matters that come before the Commission. The heads of the CFTC, the FDIC, the NCUA, and Fed are similarly situated, each leading an agency that has multiple voting members, each with an equal vote. What’s more, with the exception of the Fed, the board or commission of each of those agencies is statutorily mandated to be comprised of members with differing political affiliations. Although the leader of each of these agencies is generally from the President’s party, his or her vote counts no more than that of any other member of the commission or board.
In addition, while all of the agencies whose leaders sit on FSOC are constitutionally part of the executive branch, only Treasury is a federal executive department led by a Cabinet secretary who serves at the pleasure of the President. All of the other agencies are either independent agencies or government corporations, and their governing boards or commissions are comprised of appointees with fixed terms designed to guarantee a measure of independence for the agencies. The Chair of FSOC, however, is the Secretary of the Treasury — the only member of the group who may be removed by the President at will.
So to sum up, the membership of FSOC is comprised primarily of theindividual leaders of independent agencies, who will usually almost exclusively be drawn from the same party. What’s more, this group of leaders of agencies that were deliberately designed, and are statutorily required, to be bipartisan is led by the individual in the most partisan position of all, a Cabinet appointee that the President can dismiss at will. One would hope that these agency chiefs would always be sure to represent the views of their colleagues — from both parties — and the interests of their agencies. The statute, however, is silent on that point.
Not surprisingly for a body comprised primarily of banking regulators, FSOC is tasked with a “safety and soundness” mandate. The purposes of FSOC, as set forth in the establishing provisions of Dodd-Frank, are:
…to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies, or that could arise outside the financial services marketplace; to promote market discipline, by eliminating expectations on the part of shareholders, creditors, and counterparties of such companies that the Government will shield them from losses in the event of failure; and to respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial system.
This mandate has some overlap with the SEC’s; specifically, the goal of promoting market discipline would seem to be in accordance with the SEC’s mission to “maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets.” Absent from the FSOC mandate, however, are references to the goals of protecting investors and facilitating capital formation that are also at the core of the SEC’s mission.
Were FSOC simply an advisory body, this omission might not be cause for concern. FSOC, however, is vested with unprecedented authority with respect to the agencies from which its members are drawn. Perhaps the most important of these authorities is to “provide for more stringent regulation of a financial activity by issuing recommendations to the primary financial regulatory agencies to apply new or heightened standards and safeguards” in critical areas of regulation, including capital, leverage, and disclosure requirements as well as leverage limits, concentration limits, and overall risk management. Pursuant to the statute, FSOC may provide such recommendations if it “determines that the conduct, scope, nature, size, scale, concentration, or interconnectedness of such activity or practice could create or increase the risk of significant liquidity, credit, or other problems spreading among bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies, financial markets of the United States, or low-income, minority, or underserved communities.”
In addition to this “recommendation” authority, Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act vests FSOC with even greater power with respect to certain financial market utilities and, even more broadly, certain payment, clearing, or settlement activities conducted by “financial institutions.” Specifically, upon FSOC’s designation, by a two-thirds vote, of a financial market utility or a payment, clearing, or settlement activity as “systemically important,” it may direct the Fed, in consultation with the relevant supervisory agencies and FSOC itself, to prescribe risk management standards. With respect to “designated” utilities or to “designated” activities conducted by financial institutions for which the SEC or CFTC is the primary regulator, Title VIII sets forth “special procedures” pursuant to which the Fed may, if it determines that the risk management standards set by the SEC or the CFTC are “insufficient,” impose its own standards. If the SEC or CFTC object within 60 days, FSOC decides, again by a two-thirds vote of its ten voting members, which standards apply.
In other words, FSOC has the power to make “recommendations” to the primary regulators of any “financial companies” regarding their core areas of regulation, and can even allow the Fed to supplant the primary regulators. The decisions made by this group of presidential appointees, which will almost always be comprised exclusively or almost exclusively by members of the same party led by a member of the President’s Cabinet, can take place behind closed doors.
This is not a political or partisan concern. Although the work being performed by the present membership of FSOC may be some of the most important work the council ever does, with consequences to financial markets that could last for decades, Presidents from both parties will have the authority to appoint the agency heads that will serve on FSOC, and as administrations change, so will the political affiliations of FSOC’s members. Instead, this is a concern over the concentration of power in a group made up of leaders of agencies with different goals and missions, including leaders of bipartisan, multi-member agencies who have no statutory requirement to consult with their agency colleagues.
Now, let me stress that FSOC’s mandate, broadly speaking, to preserve the financial stability of the U.S., is of crucial importance — indeed, those of us who were in the trenches during the financial crisis would have been surprised if Congress had not created a systemic risk regulator. But FSOC’s mandate is not the SEC’s mandate. The core of bank regulation is safety and soundness, both on an individual scale, by, for example, guaranteeing bank customers’ deposits, and on a national — indeed, global — scale by managing systemic risk. The SEC, on the other hand, regulates markets that are inherently risky. Indeed, the risks taken by investors are absolutely critical to capital allocation, which in turn is critical to economic growth. The SEC works to protect investors willing to accept the risk of securities markets in the hopes of greater returns by ensuring that those markets are fair and efficient, not risk-free, and does so with the benefit of nearly eight decades of experience in regulating those markets. Were FSOC to interpret its bank-oriented mandate as a license to impose a bank-oriented model of regulation on the SEC and the markets it regulates, the results could have a devastating effect on markets.
Which brings me to the Volcker Rule and the SEC’s role in its implementation. The Volcker Rule, which may have a more dramatic impact on world markets and U.S. competitiveness than perhaps any other rule regulators are promulgating under Dodd-Frank, addresses, at its heart, a topic about which the SEC traditionally has — among all the regulators writing rules in this space — the most experience and expertise in regulating. For those reasons — because it is potentially so significant and because it implicates areas of the SEC’s core competence — it is a perfect case study for how to think about approaching Dodd-Frank rulemaking and the SEC’s role in that rulemaking.
I want to begin by talking a bit about the statute and the proposed rules. Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, commonly known as the “Volcker Rule” even though it is a statutory provision, imposes two significant prohibitions on banking entities and their affiliates. First, the Rule generally prohibits banking entities that benefit from federal insurance on customer deposits or access to the discount window, as well as their affiliates, from engaging in proprietary trading. Second, the Rule prohibits those entities from sponsoring or investing in hedge funds or private equity funds. The Rule identifies certain specified “permitted activities,” including underwriting, market making, and trading in certain government obligations, that are excepted from these prohibitions but also establishes limitations on those excepted activities. The Volcker Rule defines — in expansive terms — key terms such as “proprietary trading” and “trading account” and grants the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, the OCC, the SEC, and the CFTC the rulemaking authority to further add to those definitions.
The statute also charges the three Federal banking agencies, the SEC, and the CFTC with adopting rules to carry out the provisions of the Volcker Rule. It requires the Federal banking agencies to issue their rules with respect to insured depositary institutions jointly and mandates that all of the affected agencies, including the Commission, “consult and coordinate” with each other in the rulemaking process. In doing so, the agencies are required to ensure that the regulations are “comparable,” that they “provide for consistent application and implementation” in order to avoid providing advantages or imposing disadvantages to affected companies, and that they protect the “safety and soundness” of banking entities and nonbank financial companies supervised by the Fed.
In October of last year, the Commission jointly proposed with the Federal banking agencies a set of implementing regulations for the Volcker Rule,2with the CFTC issuing a substantively identical set of proposals in January. The proposing release includes extensive commentary designed to assist entities in distinguishing permitted trading activities from prohibited proprietary trading activities as well as in identifying permitted activities with respect to hedge funds and private equity funds.
In her Opening Statement introducing the joint rule proposals at an SEC Open Meeting last October, Chairman Schapiro praised the collaborative effort among the five agencies involved in the drafting process, noting that it involved “more than a year of weekly, if not more frequent, interagency staff conference calls, interagency meetings, and shared drafting.”3 It is telling, however, that in his recent testimony before a House Financial Services Subcommittee, CFTC Chairman Gensler, noting his agency’s role as a “supporting member” in the rulemaking process, stated, “The bank regulators have the lead role.”4
I think, however, that both the statute and our expertise compel the SEC to play a strong and vigorous role in the rulemaking. The Volcker Rule applies to “banking entities” and their affiliates, affecting a wide range of financial institutions regulated by the five different agencies. Regardless of the nature of the regulated entities, however, the Rule addresses a set of activities — the trading and investment practices of those entities — that fall within the core competencies of the SEC. Indeed, the Rule expressly envisions that quintessential market-making activity continue within these firms.
As such, if we at the SEC play our role properly, we can and should ensure that the Volcker Rule meets the aims of Congress without destroying critically important market activity explicitly contemplated by the statute. The issues addressed in the proposed rules — prohibited activities with exceptions to those prohibitions — and limitations to those exceptions — that make complex issues exponentially more so — are the bread and butter of the SEC. For almost eighty years, the SEC has addressed these and similar issues with commensurate levels of complexity. For example, many of you are familiar with the SEC’s extensive array of rulemaking and interpretive releases concerning exceptions for bona fide hedging or market making in the context of short sales. These exceptions, which date back to the early 1980s, built upon the bona fide hedging exceptions to the Commission’s proprietary trading rules for members of national securities exchanges set forth in a 1979 rulemaking.5 The SEC has been dealing with these issues for a long, long time.
By taking a leadership role, the SEC can also ensure that the final rule is consistent with our core mission of protecting investors, maintaining fair and efficient markets and promoting capital formation. These considerations, coupled with the expertise that the SEC brings to the table, should ensure that the bank regulators’ focus on safety and soundness and Dodd-Frank’s overarching focus on managing systemic risk (although many have argued whether the statute will in the end reduce such risk) are balanced by legitimate considerations of investor protection and the maintenance of robust markets.
The Volcker Rule comment period — during which commenters were asked to share their thoughts on over 1,300 questions on nearly 400 topics — ended last month, and although it would of course be premature to share my thoughts on the proposed rules today, even a quick review of the many substantial comment letters the Commission received reveals widespread fears regarding the effect of the proposed rules on the proper functioning of global markets and the competitiveness of the U.S. financial industry might — fears that I share with the commenters.
Our foreign regulatory counterparts have also expressed serious concerns with the proposed rules. The Japanese FSA and the Bank of Japan filed a comment letter to express their concerns over “the potentially serious negative impact on the Japanese markets and associated significant rise in the cost of related transactions for Japanese banks” that they believe would arise from the extraterritorial application of the Volcker Rule.6 British Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne wrote recently to Fed Chairman Bernanke to express his fear that the proposed rules’ effect on market making services for non-U.S. debt would make it “more difficult and costlier” for banks to trade non-U.S. sovereign bonds on behalf of clients.7 Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney — who was recently named Chairman of the G-20’s Financial Stability Board — has stated that he and other Canadian officials have “obvious concerns” about the proposed rules. He cited the lack of clarity in the proposed rules’ definitions of “market making” versus “proprietary trade,” the effect the rules would have on non-U.S. government bond markets, and what he viewed as the Rule’s inappropriate “presumption” that trades are proprietary.8 Lastly, Michel Barnier, the European Commissioner for Internal Markets and Services, has written to Fed Chairman Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Geithner that “[t]here is a real risk that banks impacted by the rule would also significantly reduce their market-making activities, reducing liquidity in many markets both within and outside the United States.”
The aggregate impact of the rulemakings we and our fellow regulators are promulgating is massive, the costs are enormous, and we are introducing these massive and costly rule proposals at a time when our economy is still — hopefully — limping towards recovery. These factors all argue for an approach that is careful, systematic, but most importantly regulatorily incremental. It is important to remember that regulators’ authority and oversight responsibilities do not end when final rules are promulgated, and that continued oversight will ensure that regulators can refine and improve the rules as markets organize and develop in response to the rules we write. Importantly, we can and should recalibrate the rules as markets develop and regulators learn more and gather and analyze relevant data. We must avoid regulatory hubris and should not regulate — particularly where the changes are so novel or comprehensive — with the belief that we completely understand the consequences of the regulations we may impose. In many of these areas, including Volcker, missing the mark could have dire and perhaps irreversibly negative consequences. As such, I believe that this approach - careful, systematic, and regulatorily incremental — should serve as an appropriate guiding principle as we undertake not only our consideration of the Volcker Rule but also other significant rulemaking mandated under Dodd-Frank.
Consistent with this approach, especially in light of the voluminous comments received, regulators must be willing to re-examine our initial efforts and, if necessary, go back to the drawing board to make sure we regulate wisely, rather than just quickly. In a recent speech, my colleague and friend Commissioner Troy Paredes stated that if the proposed implementing regulations for the Volcker Rule need to change as much as it looked to him like they do, the responsible course for the Commission to follow would be to issue a reproposal.10 I couldn’t agree with him more, both regarding the potential need for extensive changes to the proposed rule and the wisdom of reproposing the amended rule to garner the benefit of another round of comment. The comments we’ve received so far, including those I've cited today, provide invaluable insights as to the potential impact of the Volcker Rule. These comments provide powerful evidence that the benefits the proposed rule was designed to provide may come at an unacceptably high cost. It would be a dereliction of our duty as regulators to ignore them.
As Commissioner Paredes stated in his recent speech, the virtue of a reproposal is the benefit of another round of comment. We owe it to investors and all market participants to review each and every comment letter with the goal of learning more about the potential real-world impact of the rules, and given the extensive revisions that I believe the proposed rule requires, we owe it to them to provide another opportunity to comment on a set of reproposed rules.
Thank you for your attention and for inviting me here today. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.”
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