U.S.-GEORGIA RELATIONS

Map:  Georgia.  Credit:  CIA World Factbook.

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
The United States established diplomatic relations with Georgia in 1992 following Georgia’s 1991 independence from the Soviet Union. Since 1991, Georgia has made impressive progress fighting corruption, developing modern state institutions, and enhancing global security. The United States is committed to helping Georgia deepen Euro-Atlantic ties and strengthen its democratic institutions. The United States supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, and does not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two regions of Georgia currently occupied by Russia. As a participant of the Geneva International Discussions on the conflict in Georgia, the United States continues to play an active role in support of these principles.

The strength of U.S.-Georgia relations is codified in the 2009 U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. The U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission comprises four bilateral working groups on priority areas identified in the Charter: democracy; defense and security; economic, trade, and energy issues; and people-to-people and cultural exchanges. In addition to holding a high-level plenary session of the Commission each year, senior-level U.S. and Georgian policymakers lead yearly meetings of each working group to review commitments, update activities, and establish future objectives. Since the signing of the Charter, the United States and Georgia have strengthened their mutual cooperation based on U.S. support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its commitment to further democratic and economic reforms.

U.S. Assistance to Georgia

U.S. Government assistance to Georgia supports the consolidation of Georgia's democracy; its eventual integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions; progress toward a peacefully unified nation, secure in its borders; and further development of its free-market economy.
Bilateral Economic Relations

The United States and Georgia seek to identify opportunities for U.S. businesses to invest in Georgia, and for both countries to sell goods and services to each other. They have signed a bilateral investment treaty and a bilateral trade and investment framework agreement. Georgia can export many products duty-free to the United States under the Generalized System of Preferences program. Through a high-level trade and investment dialogue, the two countries have discussed a range of options to improve economic cooperation and bilateral trade, including the possibility of a free trade agreement. They have also discussed ways to improve Georgia’s business climate to attract more investment, underscoring the importance of continued improvements in rule of law, respect for labor rights, and protecting intellectual property rights. From 2006 to 2011, a Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact helped promote Georgian enterprise and economic growth. Georgia is currently working with the MCC to finalize the design of a second compact, focused instead on education.

Georgia's Membership in International Organizations

Georgia and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. Georgia also is an observer to the Organization of American States and a participant in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Partnership for Peace program.


Locator Map.  Credit:  CIA World Factbook.

 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM CIA WORLD FACTBOOK

The region of present day Georgia contained the ancient kingdoms of Colchis and Kartli-Iberia. The area came under Roman influence in the first centuries A.D. and Christianity became the state religion in the 330s. Domination by Persians, Arabs, and Turks was followed by a Georgian golden age (11th-13th centuries) that was cut short by the Mongol invasion of 1236. Subsequently, the Ottoman and Persian empires competed for influence in the region. Georgia was absorbed into the Russian Empire in the 19th century. Independent for three years (1918-1921) following the Russian revolution, it was forcibly incorporated into the USSR in 1921 and regained its independence when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. Mounting public discontent over rampant corruption and ineffective government services, followed by an attempt by the incumbent Georgian government to manipulate national legislative elections in November 2003 touched off widespread protests that led to the resignation of Eduard SHEVARDNADZE, president since 1995. In the aftermath of that popular movement, which became known as the "Rose Revolution," new elections in early 2004 swept Mikheil SAAKASHVILI into power along with his United National Movement party. Progress on market reforms and democratization has been made in the years since independence, but this progress has been complicated by Russian assistance and support to the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Periodic flare-ups in tension and violence culminated in a five-day conflict in August 2008 between Russia and Georgia, including the invasion of large portions of undisputed Georgian territory. Russian troops pledged to pull back from most occupied Georgian territory, but in late August 2008 Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russian military forces remain in those regions.

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION RIBBON CUTTING CEREMONY

Photo:  Little Boy Atomic Bomb.  Credit:  Wikimedia. 

FROM U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) Ribbon Cutting Ceremony
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Washington, DC
October 24, 2012
As Prepared

Thank you to everyone for being here today and thank you to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) Staff for hosting us. It is wonderful to see some old familiar faces, as well as some young new ones. My special thanks to Russian Embassy DCM Oleg Stepanov. We are so glad that you could be here to share in this special celebration.

A little over 25 years ago, this center was just a bold concept generated by foreign policy heavyweights including Senator John Warner, Senator Sam Nunn and the incomparable former Secretary of State George Shultz. In 1985, Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev officially agreed to explore the concept of national centers to reduce nuclear tensions, avoid crisis escalation and create transparency. By September 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the first NRRC Agreement. President Reagan called the agreement "another practical step in our [two nations'] efforts to reduce the risks of conflict."

Less than a year later, the first notifications were transmitted between the United States and the Soviet Union, creating the first direct communications link between the countries since the establishment of the Hot Line in 1963. In the 25 years since its inception, the NRRC has been a key asset and resource for implementing U.S. arms control data sharing and transparency policy initiatives. These initiatives have provided mutual confidence and predictability in U.S.-Russian relations.

In addition to fostering stable communications with Russia, the NRRC’s activities have expanded considerably over the past 25 years. Today, the NRRC exchanges an average of 7,000 messages annually for over a dozen treaties and agreements with fifty-plus countries and international organizations, in six languages.

The NRRC has played a core role in the implementation of New START. The United States and the Russian Federation have exchanged over 3,100 notifications on their respective strategic forces over the life of the Treaty so far. Every one of those notifications has been processed by the staff you see here today. On-site inspections that enable each side to confirm the validity of that data are also going well. Our experience so far demonstrates that New START’s verification regime works and sets an important precedent for future joint work.

Planning for the future is one of the main reasons we are here today in the NRRC’s newly modernized facility. The work done here is highly technical in nature and it is critical that we keep up with the dynamic technological landscape. The new NRRC is designed to improve operational efficiency and treaty notification monitoring using video collaboration systems, computer processing technology, and better office functionality.

The NRRC also continually adapts and evolves to meet our needs. In preparation for the implementation of New START, the NRRC developed an entirely new software protocol and upgraded its automated translation tool to facilitate the required notification regime.

All of these upgrades that you see around you or have heard about will enable the NRRC to continue implementing existing treaties and agreements, as well as prepare for future treaties and agreements.

I want to take a moment to thank the team of professionals who work every day, around-the-clock in the NRRC; you do an outstanding job. It is only fitting that you now have a first-class, modernized, 24-hour a day center to help you to advance international safety and security. I sincerely appreciate your efforts to put this event together today, as well as the work that you do every single day, unseen by the public.

I am now pleased to introduce Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Secretary Clinton has long been an advocate of arms control and nonproliferation and has been a great supporter of this Bureau and this office. We are so pleased that you are here to officially open this new facility.

THE 50th ANNIVERSARY OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

President John F. Kennedy. Photo From: U.S. Department Of Defense.

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Historian Analyzes Immediate Aftermath of Cuban Missile Crisis
By John Valceanu
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Oct. 25, 2012 - Fifty years after the United States stood on the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union, a historian spoke to a Pentagon audience about how President John F. Kennedy and other American leaders dealt with a still-dangerous situation immediately following the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.

David G. Coleman, a professor of history at the University of Virginia, delivered his lecture Oct. 23 as part of the History Speaker Series sponsored by the Defense Department's historical office. Coleman is chairman of the presidential recordings program at the university's Miller Center of Public Affairs, described on its website as a "nonpartisan institute that seeks to expand understanding of the presidency, policy, and political history, providing critical insights for the nation's governance challenges."

Coleman employed secret recordings Kennedy made to provide glimpses into how the president dealt with difficult situations while consulting with leaders such as Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy. Coleman used the recordings as a source for a new book titled "The Fourteenth Day: JFK and the Aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis."

The crisis was a 13-day standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union over Soviet missiles deployed to Cuba that were capable of carrying nuclear warheads and able to reach of the U.S. mainland. The event began Oct. 16, 1962, when Kennedy first received intelligence proving there were missile sites on Cuba. This led to a U.S. military quarantine of the Caribbean nation. The crisis is considered to have ended Oct. 28, 1962, when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sent a message to Kennedy promising that he would withdraw the missiles.

Coleman pointed out that the president and the United States still faced a slew of challenges on the 14th day and in the following weeks. Chief among the problems was how to deal with all the other Soviet assets on the island, Coleman said.

The historian pointed out that, in addition to 42 medium-range ballistic missiles in the communist island nation, there were also 42,000 Soviet troops, 98 tactical nuclear weapons, 42 IL-28 jet bombers and 24 SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites with 500 missiles, as well as torpedo boats, nuclear submarines and MiG-21 jet fighters.

"Cuba is still heavily armed on the 14th day; most of it is under Soviet control," Coleman said. "This is not a crisis that simply evaporated. ... There was still a very serious situation on the ground, and the administration is uncertain how to deal with it."

A big part of the problem lay with a deep distrust of the Soviets on the part of U.S. leaders, based on past dealings, the historian said.

"Significantly, the Soviets had lied directly to the Americans before, and this led to a major trust issue in the wake of the crisis. This is one of the things that really dominated the initial discussions," Coleman said, noting that since Kennedy knew he couldn't trust the Soviets, he would have to find a way to verify that they followed up on their promise to remove the missiles.

This posed a challenge, as Cuban dictator Fidel Castro had said he wouldn't allow any inspectors into the country, and American surveillance aircraft potentially could be shot down.

"Anti-aircraft batteries were still firing on low-level U.S. surveillance planes. The thought was, in the White House and elsewhere, that the Soviets could probably be trusted not to shoot down another plane, but [with] the Cubans, all bets were off," Coleman said.

The historian noted that the president had to make daily decisions about sending out surveillance planes and try to determine what the response would be if they were to be shot down. In fact, an American U-2 surveillance plane was shot down on Oct. 27, 1962, by a Soviet surface-to-air missile.
The plane's pilot, Air Force Maj. Rudolf Anderson Jr., was the only person killed during the crisis.

The United States had begun running low-level surveillance flights over Cuba on Oct. 23, 1962, which yielded intelligence indicating the Soviets had deployed four heavily armed combat brigades to Cuba, likely armed with tactical nuclear weapons. Kennedy received this information on Oct. 26, Coleman said, noting that the commander in chief now knew that if he sent troops into Cuba, he could be sending them into a nuclear battlefield.

Coleman said Kennedy thought it would be absurd for the Soviets to hand over nuclear weapons to the Cubans, though subsequent revelations indicate this was exactly what they had planned. They abandoned the idea because they started perceiving Castro as potentially unstable and capable of starting a nuclear war, the historian said.

But the issue wasn't just about removing the missiles. Coleman said the United States and the Soviets disagreed about what exactly constituted offensive weapons, and there were tense negotiations that lasted until Nov. 20, 1962, when the military quarantine of Cuba was formally ended, about removing the IL-28 bombers from the island.

Kennedy at first didn't believe the issue of removing the aircraft was worth jeopardizing the agreement with the Soviets, Coleman said, but he was reluctantly convinced by his defense secretary, secretary of state and national security advisor.

The historian played snippets of Kennedy's recordings to give the audience a look into the deliberative processes used by the president to work his way through these issues and arrive at courses of action and decisions. The audience listened as Kennedy essentially thought out loud, attempting to see things through Khrushchev's point of view while developing a strategy for dealing with the problems.

In the end, an agreement was reached in which the missiles and the bombers would have to be removed from Cuba, while some troops and tactical weapons were allowed to stay.

Coleman said the crisis and the period immediately afterward was a "pivot point" in the Kennedy administration in which the president stood firm on some things and compromised on others, while simultaneously struggling with how much information to release to the press and the American people. In the end, Kennedy is remembered as a hero for his handling of the situation, and Coleman noted that many consider the peaceful resolution of this crisis one of the high points of presidential accomplishments during the 20th century.

At the time, however, the outcome was far from certain, the historian said.

"We have learned since that neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev had any intention of getting into nuclear war over this," Coleman said. "But, at the same time, we've also learned about how many other things could have gone wrong, since it was hard to control the events down on the ground."