STATE DEPARTMENT SPECIAL BRIEFING ON P5+1 TALKS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Background Briefing on the Upcoming P5+1 Talks on Iran's Nuclear Program

Special Briefing

Senior Administration Official

Via Teleconference

April 4, 2014

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MODERATOR: Thank you so much, and welcome, everyone, to today’s conference call backgrounder. We have a Senior Administration Official with us. For your knowledge, it’s [Senior Administration Official]. From now on, just will be referred to as a Senior Administration Official. Again, all of this is on background. So [Senior Administration Official] will make some opening remarks, and then we will open it up to folks for question per the instructions the operator just gave.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon, everybody, and happy Friday. Thank you for calling into this backgrounder today. We thought it made sense, as we did last time, to do this prior to landing in Vienna to ensure that we can get more of you on the line and sort of tee up what’s upcoming. I’ll start with a few words about this third round of talks in the comprehensive negotiations, and then, of course, take your questions as usual.
We head back to Vienna for this round of talks clear-eyed about the challenges ahead and determined to keep making progress on these very difficult issues. We will have more topical discussions like we had in March, with both sides laying out their positions and trying to better understand where each of us are on the various issues. This process has been helpful in setting the table as we prepare to dive much more deeply into what a comprehensive agreement might actually look like on paper and what everyone might be able to agree to.

As always, these political director conversations follow on the tremendous work of our experts, who have been and are still now in Vienna meeting with their counterparts and will be doing so through probably mid-day on Saturday. And they have had quite intense, and from the initial readouts I’ve gotten, continue to be productive and constructive conversations. As we’ve said, putting this agreement together will really be like solving a Rubik’s cube. We can’t look at any one issue in isolation, but rather will have to consider what package we can all agree to that will meet the objectives that we have.

We are looking to ensure we have the right combination of measures in place to ensure Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon and that it’s program is exclusively peaceful. As we work to bridge the gaps that exist to see if we can find that right combination, the pace of our work will intensify even more than it is today.
And with that, I will be glad to take your questions.

MODERATOR: Great. Thank you. Looks like our first question is from Indira with Bloomberg News.

QUESTION: Thank you. I wanted to ask you two things. First off, about the reports that have resurfaced of a possible Iran-Russia $20 billion oil-for-goods deal. And in the past, the White House and other senior Administration officials have expressed concern that this would be a serious concern, but they have also said that there is no sign of Russia or anyone else violating the oil sanctions. So could we find out from you what is your latest on that? What information do you have about that deal possibly going ahead?

And related to that, has the problems – have the problems with Russia over Crimea bled over into the Iran negotiations at any level? We’ve seen some remarks from Sergei Ryabkov, that suggested that in the aftermath of the last talks that Russia might play the Iran card against the U.S. in this Crimea-Ukraine issue.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks, Indira. On the Russia-Iran oil-for-goods, we’ve seen reports that you all have written on the purported deal or potential for a deal between Russia and Iran. We do not have any information to suggest this deal has been culminated or implemented or begun to be executed or finalized. We’ve been very clear about our concerns with both parties regarding this or any similar deal. If such a deal were to happen, it appears it would be inconsistent with the terms of the P5+1 plus European Union Joint Plan of Action and could potentially trigger U.S. sanctions against the entity and individuals involved in any related transaction. But we have conveyed this directly to all parties, as we do in any situation that we see developing where there might be concerns of sanctionable activity.
Regarding Russia and its illegitimate action in Crimea, which we still do not and the international community does not recognize as legal and legitimate – we believe in the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including Crimea. It has not had any appreciable or substantive impact on the negotiations. As I said at the end of the last round, Sergei Ryabkov was constructive, professional, and very much focused, as were all the members of the P5+1 and the European Union on our work. My understanding is in the experts talks that have been ongoing the same is true. And I’m aware of the remarks, obviously, that Sergei made after the last round. We have all understood privately that we have to be very mindful of the tremendous responsibility that the United Nations has given to the P5+1 and the European Union to try to reach an agreement with Iran, and that has to be the focus of our attention.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MODERATOR: Thanks. It looks like our next question is from Elise Labott of CNN.

QUESTION: Thank you for doing this one, Senior Administration Official. (Laughter.) I’m just wondering – I mean, I know that there’s been this goal to do it within a year, but I mean, how far along do you really think you are in terms of – I know you say it’s a Rubik’s cube, you’ll need to fit all the pieces together. But do you find that you’re making progress towards that goal? And I mean, are you confident that you’re going to be able to finish it within the year? I guess that’s my main question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, thank you, CNN. (Laughter.) Elise, we are committed to – all of the parties are committed to not finishing this in a year but finishing this in the six-month frame of the Joint Plan of Action by July 20^th. And I’m absolutely convinced that we can, though the real issue is not about whether you can write the words on paper, do the drafting; it’s about the choices that Iran has to make, and some of them are very difficult. And in order to ensure that they will not obtain a nuclear weapon and that the international community has the assurances it needs that their program is entirely and exclusively peaceful, they will have to make some significant changes and some significant choices. So this will be about the decisions that Iran makes, but the drafting is certainly doable.

QUESTION: But how close are you? Not – I don’t expect at this point in the process that you would be close to a deal. But in terms of how the negotiations are progressing, do you see --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have – we set out a work plan of how we were going to proceed to get to a comprehensive agreement, and we are on pace with the work plan that was set out. We were very conscious that we were going to use the March and April rounds to go over every single issue that we believed had to be addressed in a comprehensive agreement and make sure we understood each other on those issues, both at a macro level as well as at a technical level, because this is a highly, highly, highly technical agreement. And that’s why – pardon me while I take a sip of water, the allergy season has gotten to me. That is why it’s so critical that our experts spend quite a bit of time in conversation going through the technical details of what each other means by what they are saying.

So we are on pace with that work plan, looking toward beginning drafting in May and as we get through this month and begin to start to work that process. So we’re on pace with the work plan that we all set out with each other.

MODERATOR: Great, thanks. Our next question is from Lou Charbonneau of Reuters.

QUESTION: Hi, thanks for doing this. I wanted to follow up on the question that the – that CNN asked. And the fact that you just said that you’re not going to start drafting until May, I mean, my understanding is that there are still some pretty serious fundamental disagreements on some of the main things expected from the beginning would be difficult, namely enrichment, R&D, the scope of that, how much uranium they’re going to be able to keep and what level at that to keep at any given time. How much progress have you made in the last few weeks in overcoming the differences on those very difficult issues which are going to be the ones that ultimately decide success or failure of this whole process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think I’ve told you all before so you won’t be surprised to hear me say again that I’m not going to negotiate in public. What I will say is that we understand each other very well. We know where we can see points of agreement. We know where the gaps are that have to be bridged. But I’ve also said this is a Rubik’s cube, and where one makes progress on one element may mean there’s more trade space on another element. So it’s very – it’s literally impossible to say okay, I can see a way forward here without understanding its impact on the way forward there. So it has to be looked at in its entirety, not just element by element.

QUESTION: But if I can just follow up quickly, even though – I mean, stepping away from the Rubik’s cube analogy for a moment, what percentage of the issues would you say that you’ve managed to reach some kind of understanding and what percentage remains difficult? And I realize that some – there could be 2 percent of the issues that are unresolved, and those could ultimately break the deal.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think you’ve answered your own question, which is the percentages don’t matter, even if I could give you a percentage, which I can’t. But the percentages don’t matter because the Joint Plan of Action says nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, and I would add to that nothing is agreed till everyone agrees to it.
So it doesn’t matter, exactly as you said. Even if you got agreement on everything but there were two last sticking points, you have to resolve those two last sticking points. As we finished the Joint Plan of Action, there were a handful of brackets, and until you resolved all of those brackets, there was no agreement, even though you’d resolved a great deal of the text. So it only matters when you get to an agreement.

MODERATOR: Great. Thanks, Lou. Our next question is from Barak Ravid of Haaretz.

QUESTION: Hi. Thanks. I was wondering – the last round of talks the U.S. negotiations team didn’t go to Israel after the talks to brief, while that usually used to be the case. I was wondering if there’s any plan to do it now.

And the second question: There was – there were reports that the U.S. gave Iran some kind of a proposal about transforming the Arak reactor from a heavy-water reactor to a light-water reactor. Can you say anything about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So we maintain very close consultations with a number of partners and countries of interest all around the world, including Israel. And sometimes that means that I’ve traveled with my team to brief. Sometimes that means we do it by a video conference or phone or meetings here in Washington. So there are a variety ways, but that close consultation with Israel and with a number of other countries continues on a regular basis, and will for this round as well.

In terms of proposals about the Arak reactor, I’m not going to discuss any specifics in these briefings, as you can imagine. This is a negotiation, and that means it has to stay in the room.

MODERATOR: Great. Thanks. Our next question is from Karen DeYoung of The Washington Post.

QUESTION: Hi. I think this is sort of a variation on the theme that others have spoken on before. The Iranians said at the close of the last negotiations that we’ve done the framework planning, we’ve done the technical stuff, and the next time we’re going to get down to real issues. But it doesn’t sound, from what you’re saying, that that’s necessarily the case, that you’re still – at least until the first of May, you’re still kind of laying the table. Is that – would that be a fair assessment?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: No. Well, Karen, when you lay the table, you get down to real and serious issues. I think Minister Zarif laid out the issues that we held discussions on in the last round, and believe me, they were quite substantive discussions, quite detailed, quite technical. And in those discussions, one begins to – in fact begin to see the areas of agreement and the areas where there are still gaps that have to be overcome.
So I would say we’ve been getting down to the serious business even in the last round. We will do that on all of the remaining issues as well as revisit some of the issues from the last round, because we sent our experts away with a set of work products that we wanted from them to try to be able to advance our discussions further. So all of this work is quite substantive, quite detailed, quite technical, and meant to make the actual drafting an easier process.

QUESTION: Can I just follow up on that for a second? The Iranians have made several comments over the past couple of weeks basically saying under no circumstances will we give up the Arak reactor and things along those lines. Are those things that you just consider part of the chaff as the negotiations go on, or to what extent do you feel that you have to clarify those issues with the negotiators when you sit down?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We’re quite direct and quite straightforward with each other, so I don’t think there’s any mystery about positions. And what we are focused on is what is discussed in the room, not what anyone says on the outside.

MODERATOR: Great. Thanks. Our next question is from Michael Adler.

QUESTION: Hi. Thank you for doing this. Just – I don’t want to beat this to death, but – (laughter) – but when you say you’re getting down to drafting, does that mean that that’s when the give-and-take of finding out how much

concessions people are willing to make is going on, or will that be more in June than in May?
And a second question: What is your assessment at this point about how the sanctions regime overall is holding up? And do you see any signs that the Iranians might be using the time you’re taking to lay the table to determine just how much they’re going to have to give in terms of where the sanctions regime is in May or June?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So what I would say, Michael, is from day one, we were already testing each other, looking at assumptions, seeing where there might be areas of agreement, areas that had to be bridged. So that give-and-take starts the moment you begin a discussion. The negotiations have been going on since before the Joint Plan of Action over the comprehensive agreement, and the Joint Plan of Action, in fact, laid a framework for the comprehensive agreement. So give-and-take has been going on for months now. So we’re not talking about, all of a sudden, this is going to start one day. It began many months ago. And all of it set a frame and all of it set the conditions for a comprehensive agreement.
So I don’t think you can say we’re going to wait until May or going to wait until June or going to wait until July. It is constant. It is constant. And it’ll get refined and refined and refined until we hope we can reach a comprehensive agreement that ensures that Iran will not obtain a nuclear weapon and that the international community is assured that its program is entirely and exclusively peaceful.

As far as the sanctions regime is holding up, I think that it is. We gave limited, targeted relief for the six-month period of the Joint Plan of Action. We have fulfilled our commitments in that regard. And that is all moving forward in the way that had been agreed to. And so Iran is getting that limited targeted relief, and I’m sure that Iran is assessing what it needs for the future, how it needs it, and what impact that has on getting to a comprehensive agreement, just as we are assessing it from the other side of the table.

QUESTION: Can I just – a quick follow-up? If the give-and-take has started, do you already have an idea about how likely it is that you’re going to get an acceptable package and get compromise on those key terms that make up the Rubik’s Cube?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I go back to what I said a moment ago: Until everything is agreed, nothing is agreed.

QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question is from Elliot Waldman of Tokyo Broadcasting.

QUESTION: Hello, hi. Thanks for doing this. I have just a couple questions, one on levels of Iranian oil exports. There are reports that those export levels are rising, have been rising rapidly the past few months. Is it still your understanding that this level is within what’s allowed by the JPOA? And what are you – are you coordinating not only with China but also countries like Japan and the ROK and India, who have shown quite an appetite for Iranian oil?

And then also, how do you expect this issue of the Iranian ambassadorial nomination to the UN, Mr. Aboutalebi, to impact the nomination – the negotiations? I know Marie has said that they’re separate, but realistically, given the importance of congressional involvement and the fact that so many members of Congress have expressed outrage about this, what’s your level of concern that this could be an issue going forward? Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In terms of the oil exports, as we have always said, we expect there to be fluctuations. They go up and down month to month. What we care about is the aggregate over the period of time that’s agreed to. We have had teams talk to each of the remaining importers of Iranian oil, and we feel comfortable that in fact, they will meet the target that we have, and there’s nothing to lead us to believe otherwise at this time. We, of course, keep continuous eye on this and in continuous discussion with all of the importers.
In terms of the report that there is a possible nomination for the Iranian permanent representative at the United Nations, we of course have seen these reports. If in fact this possible nomination were in fact the person nominated, it would be extremely troubling, as both our deputy spokesperson has said and as the White House spokesperson has said. We are taking a close look at this case now and we have raised our serious concerns about this possible nomination with the Government of Iran through a variety of channels that we use to convey our concerns.

QUESTION: All right. Do you expect it to have any specific impact on the P5+1 negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All I can say at this time regarding this is that if this possible nomination were the nomination, it would be extremely troubling, and we have raised those concerns with the Iranians.

QUESTION: All right. Thank you.

MODERATOR: Great, thanks. Our next question is from Kasra Naji of BBC.

QUESTION: Yes. I just wondered – I’ve got two or three questions, actually. The first one: In recent days in Washington, there have been suggestions that there should be some kind of a threat of use of force by President – by the President of the United States to strengthen any kind of agreement that is going to be reached, hopefully. Is that a new development? Is that going to change attitudes in Iran, do you think? A.

B, on the issue of Russia and how they’re going to play this Iranian card or not playing the Iranian card, I just wondered, you said, if they do come with – on that agreement about this huge deal on oil exports and so on, you said it would be inconsistent with Iran +5 talks and its aims. If that happens, what will be the position of the United States within the P5+1?

And a third question: The third question is about these reports from Iran that Iran is actually having trouble getting its hands on the money that was supposed to be released under the Geneva agreement. Have you heard that? Can you confirm that? And do you know why that – there’s a problem there? Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. I think you’re referring to a report about a Brookings Institution publication, and we very much value all of the think tanks in Washington, D.C. Obviously, members of Congress, leaders and thinkers all over the world who have suggested things to us in the negotiation have put down on paper their ideas about how things go forward, and all of this is a very valuable input to our thinking through this negotiation. I would point out, just for a factual matter, I think the way that particular report is written, as you said, is that Congress would take such action if Iran pulled out of a negotiated agreement. So it’s really something that I think they were discussing down the road. But regardless, we listen to all variety of voices with very, very different positions because this is tough, this is difficult, and we’re happy to hear everybody’s ideas.

In terms of the Russia for oil deal, if it – a Russia-Iran oil deal, if it happened, we would take a look at the deal, and if it in fact was sanctionable, we would take the appropriate action. All of the members – rest of the members of the P5+1 and the European Union are well aware of the implications if such an agreement were to occur.

And third, your question about Iran having trouble getting their hands – you’ll have to ask the Iranians for their comments on that. The United States, the European Union, we have done everything that we made a commitment to do in the Joint Plan of Action and our teams have been working very hard to facilitate everything that was required in the JPOA.

MODERATOR: Great, thank you. And I think we have time for one more question from Hannah Kaviani of Radio Free Europe.

QUESTION: Yeah, thank you. Hi. I have a question about a few reports which we’re seeing there about Congress going to move towards a new set of sanctions, non-nuclear terrorism related, on Iran. Al-Monitor also reported on this first. And I wanted to see if the – you’re aware of this move, and if yes, how do you think or how the Administration think it’s going to affect the talks with Iran?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We’ve seen reports that folks are considering some additional legislation that are non-nuclear related. I can’t comment on legislative proposals that I haven’t seen.

MODERATOR: Great. Thank you. I think --

QUESTION: Wait.

MODERATOR: Oops, sorry. Did you have a quick follow-up, or did you say thank you?

QUESTION: No, it’s okay. Thank you.

MODERATOR: Okay, thank you. Well, thanks to everyone for jumping on the phone on a Friday afternoon. As always, this was on background, Senior Administration Official. We’ll send the transcript out, and we will see hopefully many of you very soon in Vienna.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OBAMA ON NEW SANCTIONS REGARDING SITUATION IN UKRAINE

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE 

Statement by the President on Ukraine

South Lawn

11:05 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT:  Good morning, everybody.  I wanted to provide an update on the situation in Ukraine and the steps that the United States is taking in response.

Over the last several days, we’ve continued to be deeply concerned by events in Ukraine.  We've seen an illegal referendum in Crimea; an illegitimate move by the Russians to annex Crimea; and dangerous risks of escalation, including threats to Ukrainian personnel in Crimea and threats to southern and eastern Ukraine as well.  These are all choices that the Russian government has made -- choices that have been rejected by the international community, as well as the government of Ukraine.  And because of these choices, the United States is today moving, as we said we would, to impose additional costs on Russia.

Based on the executive order that I signed in response to Russia’s initial intervention in Ukraine, we’re imposing sanctions on more senior officials of the Russian government.  In addition, we are today sanctioning a number of other individuals with substantial resources and influence who provide material support to the Russian leadership, as well as a bank that provides material support to these individuals.

Now, we’re taking these steps as part of our response to what Russia has already done in Crimea.  At the same time, the world is watching with grave concern as Russia has positioned its military in a way that could lead to further incursions into southern and eastern Ukraine.  For this reason, we’ve been working closely with our European partners to develop more severe actions that could be taken if Russia continues to escalate the situation.

As part of that process, I signed a new executive order today that gives us the authority to impose sanctions not just on individuals but on key sectors of the Russian economy.  This is not our preferred outcome.  These sanctions would not only have a significant impact on the Russian economy, but could also be disruptive to the global economy.  However, Russia must know that further escalation will only isolate it further from the international community.  The basic principles that govern relations between nations in Europe and around the world must be upheld in the 21st century.  That includes respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity -- the notion that nations do not simply redraw borders, or make decisions at the expense of their neighbors simply because they are larger or more powerful.

One of our other top priorities continues to be providing assistance to the government of Ukraine so it can stabilize its economy and meet the basic needs of the Ukrainian people.  As I travel to Europe next week to meet with the G7 and other European and Asian allies, I once again urge Congress to pass legislation that is necessary to provide this assistance -- and do it right away.  Expressions of support are not enough.  We need action.  I also hope that the IMF moves swiftly to provide a significant package of support for Ukrainians as they pursue reforms.

In Europe, I’ll also be reinforcing a message that Vice President Biden carried to Poland and the Baltic states this week:  America’s support for our NATO allies is unwavering.  We’re bound together by our profound Article 5 commitment to defend one another, and by a set of shared values that so many generations sacrificed for.  We’ve already increased our support for our Eastern European allies, and we will continue to strengthen NATO’s collective defense, and we will step up our cooperation with Europe on economic and energy issues as well.

Let me close by making a final point.  Diplomacy between the United States and Russia continues.  We’ve emphasized that Russia still has a different path available -- one that de-escalates the situation, and one that involves Russia pursuing a diplomatic solution with the government in Kyiv, with the support of the international community.  The Russian people need to know, and Mr. Putin needs to understand that the Ukrainians shouldn’t have to choose between the West and Russia.  We want the Ukrainian people to determine their own destiny, and to have good relations with the United States, with Russia, with Europe, with anyone that they choose.  And that can only happen if Russia also recognized the rights of all the Ukrainian people to determine their future as free individuals, and as a sovereign nation -- rights that people and nations around the world understand and support.

Thank you very much, everybody.

PRESIDENT OBAMA ANNOUNCES SANCTIONS IN RESPONSE TO RUSSIA'S ACTIONS IN UKRAINE

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE 

Statement by the President on Ukraine

James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

10:45 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT:  Good morning, everybody.  In recent months, as the citizens of Ukraine have made their voices heard, we have been guided by a fundamental principle -- the future of Ukraine must be decided by the people of Ukraine.  That means Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected, and international law must be upheld.

And so, Russia’s decision to send troops into Crimea has rightly drawn global condemnation.  From the start, the United States has mobilized the international community in support of Ukraine to isolate Russia for its actions and to reassure our allies and partners.  We saw this international unity again over the weekend, when Russia stood alone in the U.N. Security Council defending its actions in Crimea.  And as I told President Putin yesterday, the referendum in Crimea was a clear violation of Ukrainian constitutions and international law, and it will not be recognized by the international community.

Today, I’m announcing a series of measures that will continue to increase the cost on Russia and on those responsible for what is happening in Ukraine.  First, as authorized by the executive order I signed two weeks ago, we are imposing sanctions on specific individuals responsible for undermining the sovereignty, territorial integrity and government of Ukraine.  We’re making it clear that there are consequences for their actions.

Second, I have signed a new executive order that expands the scope of our sanctions.  As an initial step, I’m authorizing sanctions on Russian officials -- entities operating in the arms sector in Russia and individuals who provide material support to senior officials of the Russian government.  And if Russia continues to interfere in Ukraine, we stand ready to impose further sanctions.

Third, we’re continuing our close consultations with our European partners, who today in Brussels moved ahead with their own sanctions against Russia.  Tonight, Vice President Biden departs for Europe, where he will meet with the leaders of our NATO allies -- Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  And I’ll be traveling to Europe next week.  Our message will be clear.  As NATO allies, we have a solemn commitment to our collective defense, and we will uphold this commitment.

Fourth, we’ll continue to make clear to Russia that further provocations will achieve nothing except to further isolate Russia and diminish its place in the world.  The international community will continue to stand together to oppose any violations of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and continued Russian military intervention in Ukraine will only deepen Russia’s diplomatic isolation and exact a greater toll on the Russian economy.

Going forward, we can calibrate our response based on whether Russia chooses to escalate or to de-escalate the situation.  Now, I believe there’s still a path to resolve this situation diplomatically in a way that addresses the interest of both Russia and Ukraine.  That includes Russia pulling its forces in Crimea back to their bases, supporting the deployment of additional international monitors in Ukraine, and engaging in dialogue with the Ukrainian government, which has indicated its openness to pursuing constitutional reform as they move forward towards elections this spring.

But throughout this process, we’re going to stand firm in our unwavering support for Ukraine.  As I told Prime Minister Yatsenyuk last week, the United States stands with the people of Ukraine and their right to determine their own destiny.  We’re going to keep working with Congress and our international partners to offer Ukraine the economic support that it needs to weather this crisis and to improve the daily lives of the Ukrainian people.

And as we go forward, we’ll continue to look at the range of ways we can help our Ukrainian friends achieve their universal rights and the security, prosperity and dignity that they deserve.  Thanks very much.  And Jay, I think, will be available for questions.  Thank you.

END
10:49 A.M. EDT

PRESS GAGGLE EN ROUTE TO TOLUCA, MEXICO

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE 
Press Gaggle en route Toluca, Mexico
PRESS GAGGLE BY
PRESS SECRETARY JAY CARNEY
AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS BEN RHODES

Aboard Air Force One
En Route Toluca, Mexico

9:50 A.M. EST

MR. CARNEY:  Good morning.  Thank you for joining us on our early start this morning.  We are making our way to Mexico for the North American Leaders Summit.  And I have with me today Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes, who can assist on questions you may have about national security and foreign affairs.

Let me just start by saying, as I think you know, later on this flight, the President will sign an executive order on streamlining the export-import process for America’s businesses. In his State of the Union address, President Obama set an ambitious agenda to make 2014 a “Year of Action,” using his pen and his phone to take steps to expand opportunity for America’s middle class, including helping small, American businesses compete in a global economy.

Today, as I said, aboard Air Force One, the President will sign a new executive order on streamlining the export-import process for America’s businesses, specifically the executive order that cuts processing and approval times from days to minutes for small businesses that export American-made goods and services by completing the International Trade Data System by December 2016.  

Today, businesses must submit information to dozens of government agencies, often on paper forms -- sometimes waiting on process for days to move goods across the border.  The ITDS will allow businesses to electronically transmit through a single window the data required by the U.S. government to import or export cargo.  This new electronic system will speed up the shipment of American-made goods overseas, eliminate often duplicative and burdensome paperwork, and make our government more efficient.

I have no other announcements to make, so if you have questions on domestic matters, why don't you fire away?  And then we'll turn it over to Ben.

Q    Ben, can you talk about -- (laughter.)  Sorry, Jay, I’ll get back to you.  Can you comment on the U.S. response to what’s going on in Ukraine, the violence there?  Have there been conversations with both President Putin and with Ukrainian leadership?

MR. RHODES:  Well, I think the scenes that we saw in Kyiv yesterday were completely outrageous and have no place in the 21st century.  The fact of the matter is we have made it very clear to the Ukrainian government that it is their responsibility to allow for peaceful protest.  We consistently oppose any use of violence by all sides, but the responsibility is on the government to pull back its riot police, to call a truce and to engage in a meaningful discussion with the opposition about the way forward.

Clearly, the people of Ukraine feel that their legitimate aspirations are not being met in the current political context, and it's incumbent on the Ukrainian government to reach out to the opposition and to find a way forward that can unify the country.

We have also made clear that Ukraine has a future that is a part of the Atlantic community, that Ukraine’s orientation towards Europe and the Transatlantic community is an important priority of U.S. foreign policy; that it is not a zero-sum game with Russia.  We understand that Ukraine is a neighbor of Russia, has historic ties to Russia, but that that need not preclude Ukraine from, again, continuing to pursue a European path as well.

So Vice President Biden communicated our position to President Yanukovych yesterday.  I know that Secretary Kerry, Victoria Nuland are working this with their counterparts, particularly as the EU prepares for a meeting.  The only additional thing I'd say is that we continue to watch events very closely, including who we believe is responsible for violence, and we've made clear that we would consider taking action against individuals who are responsible for acts of violence within Ukraine.  And we have a tool kit for doing that that includes sanctions.

Q    Can you say whether the United States would consider following the European Union’s lead if they impose sanctions against the Ukraine as an institution?

MR. RHODES:  Well, I think as a general matter we aim to be coordinated with the European Union and we have generally had a common position and spoken with a similar voice on issues related to Ukraine because we both have an interest in seeing an end to the violence and seeing the unity of Ukraine upheld and seeing Ukraine on a European orientation.  So I think we are in consultation with the European Union on the questions like which individuals should be held responsible for the violence, and in consideration of issues like imposing sanctions related to the ongoing violence.

Q    You guys have been talking about sanctions now for a while.  What would it actually take to pull the trigger?

MR. RHODES:  Well, I think the events that we saw yesterday are certainly heightening our focus on this issue and I think we'll be reviewing this, as we have been, on a near daily basis. And we also will be talking to the Europeans as they have their meeting of the EU foreign ministers, and we'll make a determination both on our own and, again, in consultation with the European Union about the next steps.

Q    Is that near-term thing, though?  I mean, would there be a determination like this within days, weeks?

MR. RHODES:  Well, obviously, the situation is very fluid, so I don’t want to put a timeline on it or get ahead of any particular announcement.  I will say that events like what we saw yesterday are clearly going to impact our decision-making.  On the other hand, if the government takes the appropriate steps of pulling back riot police, of respecting the right of peaceful protest, releasing prisoners and pursuing serious dialogue with the opposition about how to pursue a more unified government and way forward, that would obviously factor into our calculus as well.

But, clearly, the United States and the European Union believe that the events of yesterday were unacceptable.  And I think that’s why you see renewed diplomatic activity this week.

Q    To what extent does Russia have a role in either reducing the violence or creating additional disturbances?

MR. RHODES:  Well, I think the message that we delivered to the Russians is that, again, we are not in some competition for the future of Ukraine.  Frankly, our interest is that the people of Ukraine are able to determine their future, not any external actor.  Clearly, we believe that a significant number of Ukrainians believe very deeply in the importance of Ukraine pursuing a European orientation, even as they maintain relations with Russia as a neighbor.

And so the role we would like to see Russia play is of constructive support for reducing these tensions and allowing the Ukrainian people to determine their own future, and that we don’t think that there should be, again, a situation where Russia is viewing this as some competition with the European Union or the United States; rather, we all have an interest in a Ukraine that is stable.  And, clearly, the status quo is not a recipe for stability, because too many Ukrainians are feeling like their own aspirations are not being met in this government and in this plan that turns away from Europe.  So that’s the message we delivered to the Ukrainian government and the Russian government as well.

Q    So far, Vice President Biden has been your main interlocutor on this.  Is there a point at which the President gets to follow up directly?

MR. RHODES:  Yes, I would expect the President -- he’s been involved in the sense that he’s followed the situation very closely.  He’s discussed it with counterparts in the past; with President Hollande this was a subject of discussion.  And I’d expect the President to be involved in the days to come as well.

Again, he has pressed us to make sure we’re doing everything we can to try to reduce tensions and to try to stabilize the situation and support the democratic aspirations of the Ukrainian people for a more unified government and a government that has the ability to pursue a European orientation as well as good relations with Russia.

So I’d expect him to be involved.  I’d expect it to come up today, frankly.  It’s a pressing global issue and I’m sure he’ll be discussing this with President Peña Nieto and Prime Minister Harper.

Q    Is he watching any of the television footage from Kyiv or anything?

MR. RHODES:  I don’t know if he’s -- we’d have to ask him that.  I’m not aware that he’s seen particular footage, but he has been getting very regular updates on the situation in Ukraine.

Q    Do you expect the President to say anything publicly today or for it to be more in the meetings with the other leaders?

MR. RHODES:  I mean, obviously, it’s not the focus of these meetings.  The focus of these meetings is our North American partnership, trade and commerce, and increasing economic competitiveness in the North American region, security issues.

However, it being a significant global issue, I’d anticipate that he will have some public comment on it, as well as comment with the other leaders.

Q    Jay, can you talk about the executive order a little bit?  This system has been in the works for a while.  Why was an executive order necessary?

MR. CARNEY:  Because the President has the authority through an executive order to streamline the process on behalf of American businesses, in particular small businesses.  And, as you know, while he has taken an approach since he took office that includes not just acting legislatively, but using his executive authority where he can on behalf of the American people, he has tasked his team with finding opportunities for him to use that authority in a way that benefits the American economy and the American people.  This is an example of that.

Q    Jay, you said numerous times in recent days that it's no surprise that Democrats as well as Republicans have their problems with trade-expanding agreements.  But the enthusiasm among Democrats seems particularly slight this time around compared to last -- past rounds of big trade deals.  What can the President say to reassure Peña Nieto and Harper that there’s any hope whatsoever for accomplishing trade deals this year?

MR. CARNEY:  Well, as you know, Mark, the President has made clear that expanding American exports and trade, especially in the Pacific region, is a priority.  And the reason for that is that there’s enormous growth and opportunity in that region, and absent an agreement that allows for expansion we would cede that territory to our competitors, which would be detrimental to our economy, to our middle class.  He is pursuing an agreement, the TPP, that explicitly protects American workers and the environment, and that he believes would be highly beneficial to our economy and the middle class.  So it’s a conversation he has and others have with lawmakers of both parties.

I think it’s worth noting that this is an issue around which there is not a uniform point of view in either party.  And the President has long understood that.  And I think it is worth noting that this is nothing new, especially for those of us who have been around Washington for more than 20 years.

But that doesn’t mean that there’s not a reason to make it a priority.  The President believes it's a priority and he’ll continue to have those conversations.  And I’m sure he'll make his views known in his conversations with the other two leaders today.

MR. RHODES:  One thing to add is that this has been an ongoing negotiation for several years, so there’s been a very sustained effort over a period of years, precisely because this represents an agreement that would encompass 40 percent of the global economy and have huge opportunity for the United States and the countries involved.  That’s part of the reason why Canada and Mexico came into this process.

What I’d say also, though, is that, first of all, we see this as an opportunity to introduce elevated standards on issues like labor and the environment that were not in NAFTA.  So, in many respects, it’s an opportunity to, again, elevate the standards that were absent from the NAFTA agreement so that we are dealing with issues like labor and environmental standards that are important to 21st century trade.

The other thing I’d say, though, is that as you get further along in a trade negotiation, there are sensitive issues in every country.  Trade is not simply an issue that has a significant range of opinions in the United States.  Every country in a negotiation always has constituencies that have a divergence of views on issues in a trade agreement.

So I think these leaders, like all leaders involved in the agreement, understand and appreciate that.  As you continue towards the end of a negotiation, you get into sensitive issues and you will have an effort undertaken to build support for an agreement.  And so I think the leaders know exactly where things are in the negotiation and appreciate that.

Q    Can you explain the decision to make this such a short trip?  Any concern at all that this could be viewed as a bit of a snub by Mexico?

MR. RHODES:  No, I don’t think so.  This is our second visit to Mexico since President Peña Nieto became President.  We had a full bilateral summit in Mexico City and had two days of good meetings and a dinner with the President the last time we were here.  So this is not the first time the President has been to Mexico since President Peña Nieto took office.

I think if you look at the history of the North American Leaders Summit, it’s generally a one-day meeting, so this is consistent with summits that have been held in the past, including summits in the United States.

Q    Jay, on Keystone, Harper told reporters yesterday his message to our President will be the same as he said publicly.  What will President Obama’s message be back to Harper on that discussion today?

MR. CARNEY:  He will say the same thing that he and I and others have said publicly, which is this a process that is run out of the State Department in keeping with past practice of administrations of both parties.  We have reached a stage in that process with the release of the environmental impact statement.  We’re now in a phase where there is input from agencies -- others agencies and from the public, and that that process needs to be insulated from politics -- that’s the President’s view -- and that he will explain that to both leaders.  I’m sure they’re fully aware of that dynamic.

Q    Do you think you can say the timeline of a likely decision, though, without commenting on the substance of it?

MR. CARNEY:  The timeline is as I just relayed to you and we’ve discussed publicly, and it’s something that is institutionalized by the State Department.  And we’re now in a phase of input from agencies and the public, and the process will move forward.  But we’re not going to alter the process; we’re going to let it proceed the way it should, because these are issues, as the President said, that have to be determined based on what is viewed as in the best national interest of the United States.

Q    Immigration is a big issue in Mexico.  In his bilat with President Peña Nieto, what will be the President’s assessment of the best chances on the timing of passage of immigration reform?

MR. CARNEY:  The President continues to believe that 2014 presents the best opportunity we’ve had to see comprehensive immigration reform become law.  We obviously have a ways to go, but the Senate has passed a bill with bipartisan support and a large majority.  The House, through its leadership, has taken steps by putting forth standards and principles.  That’s a new development this year that represents progress and demonstrates that Republican leaders recognize the value of immigration reform and the benefit that it would provide to our economy, to our border security, to our middle class, and to innovation for our businesses.

So I’m sure the President will update both leaders on where that stands, and his hope and belief that the question around comprehensive immigration reform is not if but when, and we hope it’s this year.

Q    Are you guys having any kind of communiqué or deliverable-specific tangible things you’re planning to announce as a result of today?  Or is it mainly a matter of catching up and sort of updating each other on where things stand?

MR. RHODES:  I’d expect there to be a leaders’ statement at the conclusion of the summit that addresses the agenda that we will have worked on.  And again, I think if you look at the North American Leaders Summit, it’s been a venue for us to do two things:  in the near term, to work through specific issues related to trade and commerce.  That gets at cross-border trade, customs issues, supporting the free flow of commerce, but also secure borders, efforts to promote security in North America more broadly.  We have energy cooperation and cooperation on climate change.  So there’s a range of near-term steps that they’ll be discussing today and I think we’ll be able to address at the conclusion of the summit.

At the same time, we’re also looking to what is our vision for North America more broadly going forward.  It’s a huge asset of the United States, frankly, to have such close relationships with our two neighbors, two significant trading partners.  And we cooperate on issues that run the gamut from trade to the environment, to energy and climate change, to security.  And so what is the vision of a stable, secure, prosperous North America looking ahead, I think they’ll also be addressing that as well.

Q    Obviously, going at a time when we’re marking the 20th anniversary of NAFTA, a lot of debate -- good, bad.  What is the President’s assessment of NAFTA?  Even though he’s had some issues with it, was it overall a success?  Was it something that he wishes didn’t happen?  What is his view of that?

MR. RHODES:  Well, I think, on the one hand, NAFTA supports a huge amount of trade that supports a significant number of U.S. jobs.  If you look at the trade between the United States and Mexico and Canada, millions of U.S. jobs are associated with that.  I think it has led to a more prosperous and competitive North America as a whole within the global economy.  So there has been progress that is rooted in the trade relationship between the United States, Canada and Mexico.

At the same time, there are issues that were not addressed in NAFTA, like the labor and environmental standards that the President has spoken about in the past and that, frankly, are a part of the TPP agreement.

So we see NAFTA as providing, clearly, a foundation for trade in North America that can be improved and enhanced by elevating the standards of trade to include the issues that are of increasing attention to us.  And if you look at TPP, that’s labor and the environment, but also issues related to intellectual property and state-owned enterprises, access to the Pacific markets.

So what you really want, Peter, is a dynamic where the North American competitiveness allows us to be drivers in terms of getting into the fastest emerging markets in the world, which are in this Asia Pacific region.  And so we’re in a good position to do that given our own trade relationship, but we also can, frankly, go back and elevate some of the issues that were not a part of the original agreement through the TPP.

Q    Ben, last year when we were in Mexico, one of the issues that hung over at those meetings was the level of cooperation taking place between the new Peña Nieto administration and the U.S. over security.  What’s the status of that?  Has the Peña Nieto administration made inroads on the security issue to the satisfaction of the U.S.?  What’s the U.S. view of security?

MR. RHODES:  We have maintained our security cooperation with Mexico.  We are very pleased with the level of cooperation that we have with the Mexican government in addressing the narcotrafficking issue.  President Peña Nieto is focused on reducing the levels of violence, broadly.  We continue to provide whatever support the Mexican government asks us for and requires as they deal with huge border security -- huge issues of violence around the border, and because of the narcotrafficking issue.  At the same time, we’ve continued to make clear our own responsibilities to crack down, for instance, on the flow of guns southward, which has been an element of the violence there.

So the cooperation has continued.  It’s certainly been good from our perspective, and I’m sure that they’ll address it in their bilateral meeting, as well as in the trilat.

MR. CARNEY:  Can I just say, since nobody asked -- hey, Christi, did you have a question?

Q    No.

MR. CARNEY:  Well, so a couple of things have happened this week related to the President’s primary focus on growing the economy and expanding opportunity that are rather remarkable.  First of all, you see Republicans lining up en masse against raising the minimum wage, which is a remarkable development if you think about it.  You have Americans across the country working full-time and yet being paid a wage that keeps them in poverty.  That’s not something that should happen in this country.  And the American people, including Republicans’ constituents, overwhelmingly support lifting the minimum wage.  As the CBO report demonstrated, that would lift something on the order of 900,000 Americans out of poverty and raise the wages for 16 million-plus Americans across the country.  And as Jason Furman said, the substantial consensus among economists is that it would not have a negative impact on jobs.

The second thing that happened was the five-year anniversary of the Recovery Act.  And as a point of personal privilege as somebody who was covering these matters back in the early ‘90s, I find it remarkable that Speaker Boehner attacks the President for the Recovery Act.  I remember when Speaker Boehner powerfully argued against President Clinton’s economic agenda, said that it would lead to stagnation and job loss.  He could not have been more wrong then.  We saw record job creation.  Speaker Boehner was wrong.

Speaker Boehner argued powerfully against the Recovery Act and President Obama’s economic agenda.  In the wake of the worst recession since the Great Depression, we've seen the creation of 8.5 million private sector jobs.  Speaker Boehner could not have been more wrong.  In between, Speaker Boehner supported economic policies that helped to precipitate the worst financial crisis and economic crisis in our lifetimes and, by the way, led to record deficits, which were handed over to President Obama when he took office.

It's very important to have the long view here.  And what we know about the Recovery Act is that it delivered tax cuts, it delivered investments in clean energy, it delivered an infusion in an economy that was teetering on the brink of collapse.  And the alternative at the time, as you remember if you saw the headlines, was the potential for depression, some predicting 20 to 25 percent unemployment.  Republicans refused to support a plan that saved the country from that kind of disaster and set us on the course towards job creation and economic growth.

This is not a project that's anywhere near done.  That's why the President remains focused principally on growing the economy, helping the middle class.  And certainly raising the minimum wage is a way to do that.

Q    Jay, since you brought it up, on the CBO, it’s been remarkable cherry-picking of the results of the conclusions of that report by both sides.  How can it be that those economists can be right on one issue from your side, the raising people out of poverty, but so wrong on the job costs of that report?  And is there a danger in going after what is usually considered a fairly neutral arbiter of economic issues and budget issues?

MR. CARNEY:  Jim, we're not going after anyone.  As Jason Furman, the President’s chief economist, said yesterday, we respectfully disagree with that particular conclusion and point to the deep and wide body of academic research on this that supports our view.  But it’s not about -- obviously we have enormous respect for the CBO, and I think that’s reflected in the fact that we point to some of the other conclusions in that report.

It’s just demonstrated by history and, again, by the work of many experts in the field that there’s likely to have no negative impact in terms of job creation by raising the minimum wage, which spurs economic activity, lifts people out of poverty, and raises the wages for Americans across the country, including middle-class Americans.  But again, that’s a respectful disagreement on a particular finding in which the experts in the field have expressed a different view.

Q    But you must have felt that that report was damaging to your efforts to get support for raising the minimum wage.

MR. CARNEY:  Look, I think that Republicans who, against the overwhelming opinion of the American people, rally around that particular item in the report to suggest that we can’t give Americans a raise risk more damage to themselves and politically, as well as to the middle class economically, and to Americans economically.

So I don’t think we view it that way.  Support for raising the minimum wage is broad and deep.  We’ve seen states take action, and we’re going to continue to press the Congress to take action.

Thank you.

END

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S TESTIMONY ON P5+1 JOINT PLAN OF ACTION WITH IRAN

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Assessing the P5+1 Joint Plan of Action With Iran
Testimony
Wendy R. Sherman
Under Secretary for Political Affairs 
Written Statement Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Washington, DC
December 12, 2013

Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Crapo, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss the details of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) concluded with Iran and our P5+1 partners on November 24 in Geneva.

Let me begin by noting that the diplomatic opportunity before us is a direct result of the cooperation between Congress and the Administration to put in place and implement a comprehensive and unprecedented sanctions regime designed to press Iran to address international concerns with its nuclear program.

Our collaboration on sanctions is what brought Iran to the table. However, it is important to underscore that what we do from this point forward is just as critical, if not more so, in terms of testing Iran’s intentions. In that regard, I look forward to our consultations over the important weeks and months ahead.

Today, I want to give you the facts about what was agreed to in Geneva, so you can judge the merits of the JPA for yourself.

Iran Commitments

We have long recognized that the Iranian nuclear program constitutes one of the most serious threats to U.S. national security and our interests in the Middle East. Thanks to the sanctions pressure, and a firm and united position from the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, UK, U.S. and Germany, in coordination with the EU), we have reached an understanding that constitutes the most significant effort to halt the advance of Iran’s nuclear program in nearly a decade. As a consequence, the JPA agreed to in Geneva is profoundly in America’s national security interest, and makes our regional partners safer and more secure.

The JPA is sequenced, with a 6-month period designed explicitly to block near-term Iranian pathways to a nuclear weapon, while creating space for a long-term comprehensive solution. The goal of that comprehensive solution is to resolve the international community’s concerns with Iran’s nuclear program. What this initial plan does is help ensure that Iran’s nuclear program cannot advance while negotiations towards that solution proceed.

Upon implementation in the coming weeks, this initial step will immediately: halt progress of the Iranian nuclear program; roll it back in key respects; and introduce unprecedented monitoring into Iran’s nuclear activities. Taken together, these measures will prevent Iran from enhancing its ability to create a nuclear weapon and increase the confidence in our ability to detect any move towards nuclear break-out or diversion of material towards a covert program.

The details demonstrate why this is the case. First, as stated, Iran must halt the progress of its enrichment program. This means, under the express terms of the JPA, that Iran cannot increase its enrichment capacity. Iran’s stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cannot grow – it will be the same amount or less at the end of the six month period as it is as the beginning. Iran cannot build new enrichment facilities for the production of enriched uranium. Iran cannot install additional centrifuges of any type in their production facilities, operate more centrifuges, nor replace existing centrifuges with more advanced types. Moreover, Iran must limit centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines; thus Iran cannot expand its stockpile of centrifuges.

Second, during this initial phase, Iran will roll back or neutralize key aspects of its program. Iran must cease all enrichment over five percent. The piping at Fordow and Natanz that is used to more efficiently enrich uranium over five percent must be dismantled. Iran must neutralize its entire 20 percent stockpile of enriched uranium hexafluoride by diluting it to a lower level of enriched uranium hexafluoride or converting it to oxide for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.

Finally, Iran cannot advance work on the plutonium track. At Arak, Iran cannot commission the heavy water reactor under construction nor transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site. Iran cannot test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor nor install remaining components for the reactor. Iran cannot construct a facility for reprocessing spent fuel. Without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate plutonium from spent fuel and therefore cannot obtain any plutonium for use in a nuclear weapon. As such, this first step freezes the timeline for beginning operations at the Arak reactor and halts progress on any plutonium pathway to a weapon.

Significantly, the monitoring measures outlined in the JPA will provide much more timely warning of a breakout at Iran’s declared enrichment facilities and add new checks against the diversion of equipment for any potential covert enrichment program. Some have rightfully asked why we should trust Iran to live up to these commitments. As Secretary Kerry has said, the JPA is not based on trust, it is based on verification – and the verification mechanisms set forth in the JPA are unprecedented.

Under its express terms, Iran must permit daily access by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to the facilities at Natanz and Fordow and allow more frequent access to the Arak reactor. Iran must allow IAEA inspectors access to sites related to centrifuge assembly and production of centrifuge rotors (both key aspects of the program). Iran must allow IAEA inspectors access to uranium mines and mills. Iran must provide design information for the Arak heavy water reactor. These monitoring mechanisms will provide additional warning of breakout or diversion of equipment all along the nuclear fuel cycle and would not be in place without the understanding reached in Geneva.

In summary, even in its initial phase, the JPA stops any advances in each of the potential pathways to a weapon that has long concerned us and our closest allies. It eliminates Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride. It stops installation of additional centrifuges at production facilities, especially Iran’s most advanced centrifuge design, together with freezing further accumulation of 3.5 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride. And it ensures that the Arak reactor cannot be brought on line while we negotiate a comprehensive solution.

P5+1 Commitments

In return for these concrete actions by Iran and as Iran takes the required steps, the P5+1 will provide limited, temporary, and reversible relief while maintaining the core architecture of our sanctions regime – including key oil and banking sanctions. And we will vigorously enforce these and all other existing sanctions.

We estimate that this limited relief will provide approximately $6-7 billion in revenue.

First, we will hold steady Iran’s exports of crude oil at levels that are down over 60 percent since 2011. This means that Iran will continue to lose $4-5 billion per month while the JPA is in effect compared to 2011. Let me be clear, however. We will not allow Iran’s exports to increase and we will continue collaboration with our international partners to ensure that they understand that any increases in Iranian oil purchases – or any new purchases of Iranian oil – remain subject to sanctions.

Second, we are prepared to allow Iran to access $4.2 billion in its restricted assets, not in a lump sum, but in monthly allocations that keep up with verified Iranian progress on its nuclear commitments. Remember, Iran will continue to lose $4-5 billion a month due to our oil sanctions compared to 2011, so this access to funds is less than one month of those losses. And this is a fraction of Iran’s total needs for imports or its budget shortfall.

Third, the P5+1 agreed to suspend certain sanctions on gold and precious metals, Iran’s auto sector and on Iran’s petrochemical exports. The suspension of the sanctions on gold and precious metals will not allow Iran to use restricted assets to purchase gold and precious metals, rather it allows Iranians to import and export gold and precious metals. The suspension of the sanctions on the auto industry will allow Iran to obtain support and services from third countries for the assembly and manufacturing of light and heavy vehicles. The suspension of sanctions on petrochemical exports means Iran will be able to sell petrochemicals and retain the revenues from these sales. We estimate that Iran will earn approximately $1.5 billion in revenue from the temporary suspension of these sanctions.

We will also license the supply and installation of spare parts for the safety of flight for airplanes to occur in Iran. We will also license safety inspections and related services to occur in Iran. Notably, this will not apply to any airline subject to sanctions under our counter-terrorism authorities.

In addition, solely for the financing of humanitarian transactions and tuition assistance for Iranians studying abroad, we will facilitate access to Iran’s overseas accounts for these specific transactions. Even before the JPA, we never intended to deprive the Iranian people of humanitarian goods, like food and medicine. In fact, Congress has explicitly exempted these transactions from sanctions.

There have been some that have incorrectly represented the limited relief as being far more. So, let me reiterate. The total relief envisioned in the JPA amounts to between $6-7 billion – nowhere near the $20 or $40 billion that some have reported. The total relief for Iran envisioned in the JPA would be a modest fraction of the approximately $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings that are inaccessible or restricted because of our ongoing sanctions pressure. This sanctions pressure, moreover, will continue to increase over the six months of this initial phase through the continued enforcement of our sanctions.

Continued Enforcement of Sanctions

It is important to understand that the overwhelming majority of our sanctions remain in place and we will continue to vigorously enforce those sanctions to ensure that Iran receives only the limited relief that we agreed to. This will include aggressive enforcement of sanctions under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), the Iran Sanctions Act, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012. This means that sanctions will continue to apply to broad swaths of Iran’s economy including its energy, financial, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors. By rigorous monitoring we will also prevent abuse of the relief that is part of the JPA. Were we to see increased purchases of oil or sanctions evasion, we are prepared to act swiftly to sanction the offenders.

Moreover, the U.S. trade embargo remains in place and U.N. Security Council’s sanctions remain in place. All sanctions related to Iran’s military program, state sponsorship of terrorism, and human rights abuses and censorship remain in place. Our vigilance will continue.

What is also important to understand is that we remain in control. If Iran fails to live up to its commitments as agreed to in Geneva, we would be prepared to work with Congress to ramp up sanctions. In that situation, we would be well-positioned to maximize the impact of any new sanctions because we would likely have the support of the international community, which is essential for any increased pressure to work

In comparison, moving forward on new sanctions now would derail the promising and yet-to-be-tested first step outlined above, alienate us from our allies, and risk unraveling the international cohesion that has proven so essential to ensuring our sanctions have the intended effect.

The Way Ahead

In assessing this deal on the merits, we must compare where we would be without it.

Without the JPA, Iran’s program would continue to advance: Iran could spin thousands of additional centrifuges; install and spin next-generation centrifuges that reduce its breakout times; advance on the plutonium track by fueling and commissioning the Arak heavy water reactor and install remaining components ; and grow its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride. It could do all of that, moreover, without the new inspections that are part of this deal and give us new tools to help detect breakout.

With the JPA, we halt the program in its tracks, roll it back in key respects, and put time on the clock to negotiate a long-term, comprehensive solution with strict limits and verifiable assurances that Iran’s nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.

In a perfect world, we could get to such a comprehensive solution right away. But the reality is that in the absence of the JPA, we would have had an Iranian nuclear program that could double its enrichment capacity, grow its stockpile of enriched uranium, and make progress on starting up the Arak reactor.

We are now moving forward to prepare for implementation. This week, our experts are in Vienna discussing with their P5+1 counterparts, Iran, and the IAEA, the mechanisms and timeframes for beginning implementation and setting a start date. These are technical and complex discussions, and it is critical that we do them well and right -- working to protect our national security interests at every step along the way.

At the same time, the JPA and its implementation is only a first step. There are still many issues related to Iran’s nuclear program that must be addressed, and in the process, Iran must work with the IAEA to resolve all past and present issues of concern. That is why our ultimate aim is a comprehensive agreement that fully addresses all of our longstanding concerns.

Conclusion

Finally, let me be clear about one thing: Our policy with regard to Iran has not changed. The President has been clear that he will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapon. While his strong preference is for a diplomatic solution, he is prepared to use all elements of American power to prevent that outcome.

Our commitment to working with our partners, in the region and elsewhere, to hold Iran accountable for all its actions also remains firm. These negotiations will solely focus on Iran’s nuclear program. So we will continue to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. We will continue to hold Iran accountable for its support for terrorism. Iran remains listed as a State Sponsor of Terror and our sanctions for their support of terror remain in place.

Our sanctions on Iran’s human rights abusers will also continue and so will our support for the fundamental rights of all Iranians. Last week, National Security Advisor Rice reiterated our support for the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and called on Iran to allow him to visit Iran. We will continue to speak forcefully for the oppressed inside Iran, including through our support, later this month, for a resolution before the UN General Assembly condemning Iran’s human rights practices

We call on Iran to release Saeed Abedini and Amir Hekmati and support our efforts to bring Robert Levinson home. As Secretary Kerry has said, one day is too long to be in captivity, and one day for any American citizen is more than any American wants to see somebody endure. Mr. Abedini, Mr. Hekmati, and Mr. Levinson have been gone too long and we will continue to do everything we can, using quiet diplomacy.

And we will prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. That is what these negotiations are all about. We have been encouraged that nearly 70 countries have expressed support for the understandings reached in Geneva, including statements of support from our partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council, with whom we remain closely engaged. The sentiment from our partners has been clear: give this process a chance. If Iran lives up to its commitments then the world will become a safer place. If it does not, then we retain all options to ensure that Iran can never obtain a nuclear weapon. The coming months will be a test of Iranian intentions, and of the possibility for a peaceful resolution to this crisis.

Throughout, and as always, we look forward to working closely with the Congress to ensure that U.S. national security interests are protected and advanced.

Thank you.

SECRETARY OF STATE KERRY MAKES REMARKS AFTER P5+1 TALKS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Press Availability After P5+1 Talks
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Geneva, Switzerland
November 24, 2013

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, good very early morning to all of you. It’s been a long day and a long night, and I’m delighted to be here to share some thoughts with you about the recent negotiations. I particularly want to thank the Swiss Government. I want to thank the United Nations. It’s been a (inaudible) and we’re honored to be here, even at this very early hour of the morning. I particularly want to thank my colleagues from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, China, and especially Lady Cathy Ashton, who is not only a good friend but a persistent and dogged negotiator and somebody who’s been staying at this for a long period of time. And we’re very grateful for her stewardship of these negotiations.

And if I can take a moment, I really want to thank the team from the United States. There have been a great many people involved in this effort for a long period of time now, both here in Switzerland with us now, but also back in the United States, and they know who they are. But I will single out our Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, who has been a dogged, unbelievably patient hand and a skillful hand, and she has helped through long and arduous months – years of stewardship of our part of this within the P5+1, and I’m very grateful to her for those long efforts and all of her team.

At the United Nations General Assembly in September, President Obama asked me and our team to work with our partners in order to pursue a negotiated settlement or solution with respect to the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. Last month, the P5+1 entered into a more accelerated negotiation after a number of years of meetings in various parts of the world and efforts to engage Iran in serious negotiations. The purpose of this is very simple: to require Iran to prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and to ensure that it cannot acquire a nuclear weapon. And the reason for this is very clear. The United Nations Security Council found that they were not in compliance with the NPT or other IAEA and other standards. And obviously, activities such as a secret, multi-centrifuge mountain hideaway, which was being used for enrichment, raised many people’s questions, which is why ultimately sanctions were put in place.

Today, we are taking a serious step toward answering all of those important questions that have been raised through the United Nations Security Council, through the IAEA, and by individual countries. And we are taking those steps with an agreement that impedes the progress in a very dramatic way of Iran’s principal enrichment facilities and parts of its program, and ensures they cannot advance in a way that will threaten our friends in the region, threaten other countries, threaten the world. The fact is that if this step – first step – leads to what is our ultimate goal, which is a comprehensive agreement that will make the world safer. This first step, I want to emphasize, actually rolls back the program from where it is today, enlarges the breakout time, which would not have occurred unless this agreement existed. It will make our partners in the region safer. It will make our ally Israel safer. This has been a difficult and a prolonged process. It’s been difficult for us, and it’s been difficult for our allies, and it’s obviously been difficult for the Government of Iran. The next phase, let me be clear, will be even more difficult, and we need to be honest about it. But it will also be even more consequential.

And while we obviously have profound differences with Iran yet to be resolved, the fact is that this agreement could not have been reached without the decision of the Iranian Government to come to the table and negotiate. And I want to say tonight that Foreign Minister Zarif worked hard, deliberated hard, and we are obviously, we believe, better that the decision was made to come here than not to, and to work hard to reach an agreement. And we thank the Foreign Minister for those efforts.

Together now, we need to set about the critical task of proving to the world what Iran has said many times – that its program is in fact peaceful. Now, with this first step, we have created the time and the space in order to be able to pursue a comprehensive agreement that would finish the work that President Obama began on the very first day in office, and that is to ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon. President Obama worked intensively and his Administration worked intensively before I even came in; when I was in the Congress and voted for sanctions, the President worked in order to put in place a significant sanctions regime, an unprecedented regime. And he worked with countries around the world in order to ensure broad participation and support for these sanctions. That has been essential to the success of these sanctions. And we believe that it is the sanctions that have brought us to this negotiation and ultimately to the more significant negotiation to follow for a comprehensive agreement.

Make no mistakes, and I ask you, don’t interpret that the sanctions were an end unto themselves. They weren’t. The goal of the sanctions was always to have a negotiation. And that is precisely what is now taking place, and that negotiation’s goal is to secure a strong and verifiable agreement that guarantees the peacefulness of Iran’s nuclear program. For more than 40 years, the international community has been united in its willingness to negotiate in good faith. And we have been particularly crystal clear that we will do whatever is necessary in order to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon. We have also said that we prefer a peaceful solution, a peaceful path for Iran to respond to the international community’s concerns. And as a result of those efforts, we took the first step today to move down that path.

The measures that we have committed to will remain in place for six months, and they will address the most urgent concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. Since there have been many premature and even misleading reports, I want to clearly outline what this first step entails. First, it locks the most critical components of a nuclear program into place and impedes progress in those critical components in a way that actually rolls back the stockpile of enriched uranium and widens the length of time possible for breakout. That makes people safer. With daily access – we will gain daily access to key facilities. And that will enable us to determine more quickly and with greater certainty than ever before that Iran is complying. Here’s how we do that: Iran has agreed to suspend all enrichment of uranium above 5 percent. Iran has agreed to dilute or convert its entire stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium.

So let me make clear what that means. That means that whereas Iran today has about 200 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium, they could readily be enriched towards a nuclear weapon. In six months, Iran will have zero – zero. Iran will not increase its stockpile of 3.5 percent lower-enriched uranium over the next six months, and it will not construct additional enrichment facilities. Iran will not manufacture centrifuges beyond those that are broken and must be replaced. Very importantly, Iran will not commission or fuel the Arak reactor – Arak, A-r-a-k, reactor – an unfinished facility, that if it became operational would provide Iran with an alternative plutonium path to a nuclear weapon.

And to ensure that these commitments are met, Iran has agreed to submit its program to unprecedented monitoring. For the international community, this first step will provide the most far-reaching insight and view of Iran’s nuclear program that the international community has ever had. This first step – let me be clear. This first step does not say that Iran has a right to enrichment. No matter what interpretive comments are made, it is not in this document. There is no right to enrich within the four corners of the NPT. And this document does not do that. Rather, the scope and role of Iran’s enrichment, as is set forth in the language within this document, says that Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is subject to a negotiation and to mutual agreement. And it can only be by mutual agreement that enrichment might or might not be able to be decided on in the course of negotiations.

So what is on the other side of the ledger here? Again, there have been a number of premature reports and reactions, so I want to be clear about what this step provides, this first step, and what it doesn’t provide. In return for the significant steps that Iran will take that I just listed – and there are more, incidentally, than I just listed; those are the principal – the international community will provide Iran with relief that is limited and, perhaps most importantly, reversible. The main elements of this relief would hold Iran’s oil sales steady and permit it to repatriate $4.2 billion from those sales. And that would otherwise be destined for an overseas account restricted by our sanctions. In addition, we will suspend certain sanctions on imports of gold and precious metals, Iran’s auto sector, and Iran’s petrochemical exports, potentially – potentially – providing Iran with about $1.5 billion in additional export revenues.

For the benefit of the Iranian people, we will also facilitate humanitarian transactions that are already allowed by U.S. law. No U.S. law will be changed. Nothing will have to be different. In fact, the sanctions laws specifically exempt humanitarian assistance. So this channel will not provide Iran any new source of funds, but we will help them in order to try to provide the people of Iran with additional assistance. It simply improves access to goods that were never intended to be denied to the Iranian people.

Now, I want to emphasize the core sanctions architecture that President Obama, together with allies and friends around the world, have put together, that core architecture remains firmly in place through these six months, including with respect to oil and financial services. To put this number in perspective, during this six-month phase, the oil sanctions that will remain in place will continue to cause over 25 billion in lost revenues to Iran, or over $4 billion a month. That is compared to what Iran earned before this took effect – the sanctions. And while Iran will get access to the 4.2 billion that I talked about of the restricted oil revenues, 14 to 16 billion of its sales during this period will be locked up and out of reach.

Together with our partners, we are committed to maintaining our commitment to vigorously enforcing the vast majority of the sanctions that are currently in place. Again, let me repeat: This is only the first step. But it is a first step that guarantees while you take the second step and move towards a comprehensive agreement, Iran’s fundamentals of its program are not able to progress – Fordow, Natanz, Arak, and other centrifuge and other things that matter. So that is a critical first step.

And I will say to all of you that as we conclude this first round of negotiation, with the beginning of the possibility of a much broader accomplishment down the road, it is our responsibility to be as firmly committed to diplomacy and as relentless in our resolve over the years as we have been to bring the concerted pressure that brought us to this moment. For the Iranian Government, it’s their responsibility to recognize that this first phase is a very simple test. Many times, Iran, I think you heard the Foreign Minister here tonight reiterate, that they have a peaceful program and that’s their only intention. Folks, it is not hard to prove peaceful intent if that’s what you want to do. We are anxious to try to make certain that this deal ultimately will do exactly that – prove it.

And I will just say finally, I know that there are those who will assert that this deal is imperfect. Well, they too bear a responsibility, and that is to tell people what the better alternative is. Some might say we should simply continue to increase pressure – just turn up the screws, continue to put sanctions on, and somehow that’s going to push Iran towards capitulation or collapse. Not by any interpretation that we have from all the experts and all of the input that we have, and from all of the countries – the P5+1 – that took place in this today, none of them believe that would be the outcome.

Instead, we believe that while we are engaged in that effort, Iran’s program would actually march forward. It would gain. And while it gains, it would become more dangerous in the region and countries like Israel and the Emirates, other people in the region who are threatened, would in fact be more threatened.

So we believe that you would wind up with an Iran with bigger stockpiles, with more advanced centrifuges and more progress at pursuing a plutonium track. And President Obama believes that doesn’t benefit anybody.

In 1973 – 19 – excuse me, in 2003, when the Iranians made an offer to the former Administration with respect to their nuclear program, there were 164 centrifuges. That offer was not taken. Subsequently, sanctions came in, and today there are 19,000 centrifuges and growing. So people have a responsibility to make a judgment about this choice. And I am comfortable, as is President Obama, that we have made the right choice for how you proceed to get a complete agreement.

Moreover, making sanctions the sum total of our policy will not strengthen the international coalition that we have built in order to bring Iran to the negotiating table. Instead, it would actually weaken that coalition, and many people believe that to merely continue at a time where Iran says, “We’re prepared to negotiate,” would in fact break up the current sanctions regime. Others argue for military action as a first resort. Well, President Obama and I do not share a belief that war is a permanent solution, and it should never be the first option. Instead, that particular option involves enormous risks in many different ways, and as President Obama has often said, while that option remains available to us – and the President will not take it off the table – he believes that that can only be entertained after we have made every effort to resolve the dispute through diplomacy, barring some immediate emergency that requires a different response.

So I close by saying to all of you that the singular objective that brought us to Geneva remains our singular objective as we leave Geneva, and that is to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. In that singular object, we are resolute. Foreign Minister Zarif emphasized that they don’t intent to do this, and the Supreme Leader has indicated there is a fatwa, which forbids them to do this. We want to see the process put in place by which all of that is proven, not through words but with actions. And we are prepared to work in good faith, with mutual respect, to work in a way as we did in the last days – cordially, with an atmosphere that was respectful, even as it was tough, as we move towards the process of making certain that this threat will be eliminated. In that singular object, we are absolutely resolute, and in that mission, we are absolutely committed, and in that endeavor, we will do everything in our power to be able to succeed.

On that note, I’m happy to answer a couple of questions.

MODERATOR: The first question will be from Anne Gearan of The Washington Post.

SECRETARY KERRY: Anne, hi.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you started with your – about (inaudible) who want this on Iran, and you’re opposed for what it will do on a sort of a technical level. I would hope that you might just take a moment and reflect on what this agreement may mean or signify longer term or in a larger sense. And this is – you just came through several months that represent the first time that a diplomatic level from the United States and one from Iran sat together and talked about anything, much less something of this moment. What is your view and what is your hope for the next steps as far as the U.S. relationship with Iran will be?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, I – the – obviously it is not insignificant, nor does it just fly be me, nor the President, who took great risks in committing on this and making certain that we would proceed forward with this endeavor. It’s no small thing, I think, that since 1979, for about 34 years, Iran and the United States have not been able to talk to each other. And there’s been enormous buildup of suspicion and an enormous buildup of animosity, and there have been moments here and there where there might have been some kind of minor assistance one way or the other. For instance, when we went into Afghanistan in 2001, there actually was some assistance back home (inaudible) from Iran. So there have been these moments.

But I think by and large, it is fair to say that Iran’s choices have created a very significant barrier, and huge security concerns for our friends in the region, for Israel, for Gulf states and others, and obviously they have made certain choices that are deeply, profoundly unsettling in terms of stability in the region and the possibility of anything except our focus on (inaudible). It’s too early for us to talk about other things. It’s just not right. Obviously, one would hope that Iran will make choices that it will rejoin the community of nations in full. The first step is to resolve the nuclear issue, and it shouldn’t be hard if you are in fact absolutely determined to make good on the promise that this is a peaceful program.

So our hope is that the (inaudible) engagement and the resolution of its differences with respect to the UN and the international community can indeed lead to what the Foreign Minister and President Rouhani have talked about, which is a new relationship with the West and with its neighbors. But nobody that I know of is going to accept the words at face value. It is going to be proven by the choices Iran makes, by the actions that it takes. We are open. President Obama has made clear that he is prepared to put in motion the steps that can improve those attributes, to put these words to the test. And that’s exactly what we’re doing now with this first step. And we look forward to, hopefully in a short span of time, being able to put together a comprehensive agreement that will provide the guarantees necessary to our friends in the region.

Let me be crystal clear to Israel, to our other friends in the region, to any neighbor who feels threatened, that the next step requires proof certain of a failsafe set of steps which eliminate the current prospect of a breakout and the creation of a nuclear weapon. That will require dismantling certain things. It will require stopping certain kinds of activities. It will require some fundamental choices, and we’re prepared to work with Iran in order to put in place a protocol that achieves those ends.

So I think this is potentially a significant moment, but I’m not going to stand here in some triumphal moment and suggest to you that this is an end unto itself. It is not. It is a step towards the much more significant goal and the much harder to achieve goal of having a program that is absolutely failsafe provable to be only possible to be peaceful. And that’s what we have to work for now.

MODERATOR: The last question will be from Nicole Gaouette of Bloomberg News.

QUESTION: Hi, Mr. Secretary. Congratulations to you and your team. I’m wondering (inaudible) and how you answer the criticism from Israel that by easing sanctions, you have less leverage over Iran, say, than you did yesterday. They’re (inaudible) reach that settlement. I also just wondered if you have a brief comment about more sanctions being in place. That’s been true for a long time, and for a long time (inaudible) Congress.

SECRETARY KERRY: (Inaudible.)

QUESTION: (Inaudible) by the Congress and designed to give new sanctions. And in my email feed, there are already statements from Republican senators saying it’s not good enough. The – my understanding is that this deal --

SECRETARY KERRY: Gee, you mean members of the other party (inaudible). (Laughter.)

QUESTION: (Inaudible.) My understanding is that you – the P5+1 are pledging not to increase nuclear-review sanctions for the next six months if Iran complies? How can you assure that you can get the majority in the Congress (inaudible)?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, those are two very good questions. Let me answer both of them very directly. First of all, with respect to Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu, Prime Minister Netanyahu is a friend of mine, a man I have great respect for and I’ve worked with very closely, particularly right now, on the Middle East peace process. I talk to him several times a week. I’ve talked to him as recently as the last days about this very issue, on several occasions. And the fact that we might disagree about a tactic does not mean there is a sliver of daylight between us with respect to our strategy. The tactic is whether or not you increase sanctions or take advantage of this moment to pull the progress and guarantee you have insight into their program while you keep the pressure on. And it’s a difference of judgment. It would be nice, but there is no difference whatsoever between the United States and Israel and what the end goal must be here. We cannot have an Iran that is going to threaten its neighbors, and that has a nuclear weapon. From the day President Obama came into office, he made it clear that a centerpiece of his policy is that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon.

Now, Iran says it doesn’t want a nuclear weapon, it is going after a nuclear weapon. Therefore, it ought to be really easy to do the things that other nations do who enrich, and prove that their program is peaceful. So that’s what we’re looking for. We’re looking for it in absolute sync with our friends in Israel. And I have said frequently, no deal is better than a bad deal. We are not going to strike, ultimately, a bad deal. And you have to be able to prove that this program is peaceful. That means you’re going to have to look at putting on the grave uranium and what happens to it. You’re going to have to have limitations on certain components. You’re going to have to have limitations on the type of facilities. Arak, a heavy-water plutonium facilities, has no business within the framework of a peaceful program. We’ve been very clear about that.

So there are many things. I’m not going to go through them all right now, but it is crystal clear that Israel and the United States have the same goal, the same strategic interest, and we will stand with Israel with respect to this policy and the other allies in the region who are equally concerned about what Iran might or might not choose to do.

Now, with respect to the second part of your question, the Congress, look, I have great confidence in my colleagues in the Congress. I think they are going to look at this very carefully, and they should. And I look forward to going up on the Hill. I look forward to engaging with my former colleagues, explaining what we’ve done, why we can keep the – and working together with Congress in order to achieve the goal that Congress embraced when they put these sanctions in place in the first place. Congress sought to have negotiations.

Now ultimately, if somehow we wind up (inaudible) and Congress – midterm election obviously – the President obviously has a possibility of a veto. There have been. But I don’t think it should come to that. We don’t want it to come to that. I don’t if it will come to that. I believe Congress will see the wisdom of pursuing this for the very specific purposes that I’ve articulated with very straight delineation of exactly how we’re going to achieve our goals. And it was really a cooperative effort. And we will brief Congress readily. We will work for Congress in a very cooperative way. And I think Congress will be a very important partner in helping us put this to the test over the course of the next six months.

MODERATOR: That’s it, everyone.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you all very much. Appreciate it.