PRESIDENT OBAMA'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS ON NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S.-VIETNAM

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE

Message to the Congress -- Transmitting the Agreement for Cooperation Between the US and Vietnam on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to sections 123 b. and 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153(b), (d)) (the "Act"), the text of a proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the "Agreement"). I am also pleased to transmit my written approval, authorization, and determination concerning the Agreement, and an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) concerning the Agreement. (In accordance with section 123 of the Act, as amended by title XII of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-277), a classified annex to the NPAS, prepared by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified information, will be submitted to the Congress separately.) The joint memorandum submitted to me by the Secretaries of State and Energy and a letter from the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission stating the views of the Commission are also enclosed. An addendum to the NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of Vietnam's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters, including interactions with other countries of proliferation concern and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or missile-related transfers to such countries, pursuant to section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended, is being submitted separately by the Director of National Intelligence.

The proposed Agreement has been negotiated in accordance with the Act and other applicable law. In my judgment, it meets all applicable statutory requirements and will advance the nonproliferation and other foreign policy interests of the United States.

The proposed Agreement provides a comprehensive framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation with Vietnam based on a mutual commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Vietnam has affirmed that it does not intend to seek to acquire sensitive fuel cycle capabilities, but instead will rely upon the international market in order to ensure a reliable nuclear fuel supply for Vietnam. This political commitment by Vietnam has been reaffirmed in the preamble of the proposed Agreement. The Agreement also contains a legally binding provision that prohibits Vietnam from enriching or reprocessing U.S.-origin material without U.S. consent.

The proposed Agreement will have an initial term of 30 years from the date of its entry into force, and will continue in force thereafter for additional periods of 5 years each. Either party may terminate the Agreement on 6 months'advance written notice at the end of the initial 30 year term or at the end of any subsequent 5-year period. Additionally, either party may terminate the Agreement on 1 year's written notice. I recognize the importance of executive branch consultations with the Congress regarding the status of the Agreement prior to the end of the 30-year period after entry into force and prior to the end of each 5-year period thereafter. To that end, it is my strong recommendation that future administrations conduct such consultations with the appropriate congressional committees at the appropriate times.

The proposed Agreement permits the transfer of information, material, equipment (including reactors), and components for nuclear research and nuclear power production. It does not permit transfers of Restricted Data, sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, or major critical components of such facilities. In the event of termination of the Agreement, key nonproliferation conditions and controls continue with respect to material, equipment, and components subject to the Agreement.

Vietnam is a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Vietnam has in force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Vietnam is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which establishes international standards of physical protection for the use, storage, and transport of nuclear material, and has ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention. A more detailed discussion of Vietnam's intended civil nuclear program and its nuclear nonproliferation policies and practices, including its nuclear export policies and practices, is provided in the NPAS and in a classified annex to the NPAS submitted to you separately. As noted above, the Director of National Intelligence will provide an addendum to the NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of Vietnam's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters.

I have considered the views and recommendations of the interested departments and agencies in reviewing the proposed Agreement and have determined that its performance will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. Accordingly, I have approved the Agreement and authorized its execution and urge that the Congress give it favorable consideration.

This transmission shall constitute a submittal for purposes of both sections 123 b. and 123 d. of the Act. My Administration is prepared to begin immediately the consultations with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee as provided for in section 123 b. Upon completion of the 30 days of continuous session review provided for in section 123 b., the 60 days of continuous session review provided for in section 123 d. shall commence.

BARACK OBAMA

DOD WORKS TO CONTROL LOOSE NUKES

The following excerpt is from a U.S. Defense Department American Forces Press Service e-mail:
Official: DOD Improves Posture on 'Loose Nuke' Threat
By Cheryl Pellerin
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 15, 2012 - Though the Defense Department's role in nuclear nonproliferation centers on dismantling weapons of mass destruction in former Soviet Union states, DOD also plans, equips and trains for scenarios in which terrorists get their hands on nuclear weapons, the principal deputy assistant defense secretary for global strategic affairs said yesterday.

Kenneth B. Handelman testified with colleagues from the State Department, the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration and the Government Accountability Office before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee's subcommittee on oversight of government management.

The hearing focused on interagency nuclear nonproliferation efforts around the world.
For fiscal 2013, Handelman said, President Barack Obama's budget request for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, or CTR, is $519 million, roughly $130 million of which would be devoted to nuclear security-related activities, which he called "truly a governmentwide team effort." CTR is an initiative created in 1991 to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction and associated infrastructure in former Soviet Union states.

DOD's contribution to the nuclear security effort "comes primarily through CTR," Handelman said.

"However," he added, "given DOD's overall mission to defend the nation, there's a whole world of separate nuclear-security activities for which my agency plans, equips and trains."

Such activities, he said, "center on a scenario none of us want to confront; namely, what to do when we think the bad guys actually have gotten their hands on really bad things."

Planning for this type of "loose-nukes" situation is evolving substantially, Handelman said, and the watchword for DOD's new thinking focuses on integration across DOD components and across the government.

"For instance," he said, "the instability or collapse of a nuclear-armed state could quickly lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or materials well beyond the country of origin and involve multiple state and nonstate actors as it moves across the globe."
Today, Handelman said, the services are working to improve DOD's defensive posture against the threat by enhancing the homeland's protective posture, working with the intelligence community to better analyze and track terrorist networks, identifying likely paths to proliferation, and improving the ability to characterize the source and nature of loose-nuke threats.

"Our work at DOD has focused on how U.S. military units would coordinate with other U.S. agencies and with allies and partners in the face of such a loose-nuke threat scenario," Handelman said.

Handelman said the first line of defense in attaining global nuclear security is a group of activities in which agencies from across the U.S. government participate, including DOD.

Thomas Countryman, assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, described for the panel a three-tiered U.S. strategy -- site level, country level and global level -- to lock down or remove vulnerable nuclear materials.
"At the site level," he said, "we work with other countries to minimize the civilian use of highly enriched uranium, to eliminate unneeded weapons-usable material, and to improve security at specific sites."

Where site-level assistance is inappropriate," Countryman added, "we cooperate at the country level with foreign governments to exchange best practices and to demonstrate the safe use of equipment."

At the global level, the assistant secretary said, the United States helps to develop global initiatives through the Nuclear Security Summit process, the United Nations and other means to improve nuclear security around the world."
One example is U.S. engagement with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, he added, a partnership of 83 nations that conduct activities to strengthen plans, policies and interoperability on the issue of nuclear terrorism.

The National Nuclear Security Administration also makes important contributions at the site and national levels, Anne Harrington said, including working with partner countries on their nuclear security centers of excellence.

"These centers form an important network that will allow countries and regions to strengthen capabilities to secure facilities and to deter, detect and interdict illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material," she said.

The NNSA also holds quarterly coordination meetings with DOD colleagues at the assistant-secretary level, Harrington said, "to discuss areas of common interest, coordinate on program ideas and do forward planning."

The United States is looking forward into a global nuclear economy, she added, one that, despite the incidents at the tsunami-damaged Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan, will continue to expand in terms of use of nuclear power and uranium commerce.
"As long as nuclear materials exist," Countryman told the panel, "we will have the same need to set the best possible example in the United States of securing those materials and of sharing that capability for protection with other countries, motivating them to do the same."