NAVY REAR ADM. HANEY SAYS DETERRENT INCLUDES "TRIAD OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY PLATFORMS"

FROM:  U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 

Right:  Adm. Cecil D. Haney, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, addresses guests as Rear Adm. Chas Richard, commander, Submarine Group 10, (left) and Vice Adm. Michael Connor, commander, Submarine Forces, look on at the 4000th Strategic Deterrent Patrol Commemoration Ceremony at Naval Submarine Base, Kings Bay in Georgia. The ceremony marked the milestone of the ballistic-missile submarine conducting 4,000 successful patrol periods since the first patrol of the USS George Washington in 1961. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Rex Nelson.  

Haney: Strategic Deterrent is More Than a Nuclear Triad
By Cheryl Pellerin
DoD News, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, Jan. 15, 2015 – The United States’ strategic deterrent includes a triad of nuclear delivery platforms, but other critical elements range from intelligence and missile defense to space and cyber capabilities and a capable workforce, Navy Adm. Cecil Haney said here today.

The strategic deterrent includes a robust and agile intelligence apparatus, a synthesis of dedicated space and ground sensors that provide critical early warning for missile launchers and bomber threats, national nuclear command and control and the necessary infrastructure to sustain nuclear weapons without fully testing the warheads, the admiral said.

Other parts of the deterrent are a credible missile defense system that defends against limited attacks from rogue nations, cyberspace and space capabilities, trained and ready people, a campaign plan that orients assigned capabilities and activities toward a common purpose, and synchronized treaties, policies and strategies, Haney added.

A Whole-of-Government Approach

“This is not just capability but a whole-of-government approach that requires our attention and the necessary resources,” Haney said, adding that the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group recently established by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel provides important support for the nation's deterrent.

Even in an era of significant resource constraints the nation must get 21st century deterrence right, Haney said, and must make clear to adversaries or potential adversaries that restraint is always the better course.

“It will require us to work together as a team, as partners -- the government, the private sector and academia,” he said, “to shape policy that will have a meaningful impact on our national security.”

Haney recalled President Barack Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, in which Obama publicly stated his goal for a world free of nuclear weapons, and said the new START treaty between the United States and Russia -– formally called Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms -– is an effort to work toward that goal.

Deterrents Can Fail

“The president's 2013 Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy and strategic documents such as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review make it clear that as long as nuclear weapons exist,” Haney said, “the United States must maintain a strong and credible safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent and … be prepared for the possibility that deterrents can fail.”

Of the multiple states around the globe who have nuclear weapons or aspirations of acquiring them, the admiral mentioned Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.
Russia has had more than a decade of investments and modernization across its strategic nuclear forces, he said, adding that the U.S. approach to dealing with Russia in this context today is not about continuing the Cold War.

“This is about emerging capability at a time of significant concerns about Russians' execution of their near and abroad strategy,” Haney said, adding that Russia has significant cyber capability.

A Time of Significant Concerns

Russia also has significant cyber capability and Russian leaders have publicly stated that they are developing counter-space capabilities and that Russia’s armed forces have anti-satellite weapons and conduct anti-satellite research.
China also is modernizing its strategic forces, the admiral said, by enhancing silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, conducting the first fleet tests of a new mobile missile and making progress on a successor expected to be another road-mobile ICBM capable of carrying multiple warheads. China is also testing and integrating new ballistic missile submarines, providing that nation with its first sea-based strategic nuclear deterrent, Haney said.

“As I'm sure you're aware,” he told the audience, “they're also developing multidimensional space capabilities supporting their access-denial campaign. But with more than 60 nations operating satellites in space, it's extremely problematic to see China conducting missiles designed to destroy satellites.”

North Korea continues to advance its nuclear ambitions, the admiral added, and Iran has made no secret of its desire to acquire nuclear weapons.
21st Century Deterrents

Haney said, “21st century deterrents must be tailored to specific adversaries and threats, and in an integrated manner, so we can predict what deters and what prevents escalation.”

Haney’s top priority is to deter strategic attack and provide the nation with a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent force, but he’s also interested in international partnerships and promoting innovation for future capabilities.
In the past year he’s had meetings with defense ministers of South Korea, France and Australia, a former Japanese defense minister, the United Kingdom’s vice defense chief, and five partners involved in space-sharing agreements.
In October, he said, “we conducted a command-and-control exercise designed to train our Defense Department forces and access our joint operational readiness across all my mission areas with a specific focus on nuclear readiness.”
Accessing Joint Operational Readiness

Stratcom did this in conjunction with U.S. Northern Command, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and Canadian partners in exercises that included Vigilant Shield, Positive Response and Determined Dragon.
Another of Haney’s high priorities is bolstering Stratcom’s ability to anticipate change and confront uncertainty with agility and innovation.

“Last summer we cut the ribbon at U.S. Strategic Command's War Gaming Center back there at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, to help enable and challenge our thinking with the ability to look at alternative scenarios, some plausible today and some unthinkable tomorrow,” the admiral explained.
“We need to grow innovative leaders, identify new operational concepts and continue to develop cutting-edge technology so we can continue to evolve our ideas on how to deter our adversaries and potential adversaries and, of course, assure our allies.”

Finding Problems, Plucking Them Out

But Haney said the nation would not have a credible strategic deterrent today if it were not for the men and women, military and civilian, “who conduct and contribute to our strategic deterrent mission day in and day out, across all areas. From under the sea to geosynchronous orbit, they are making concrete contributions to our security 24/7, 365 days a year.”

About the much-publicized problems over the past year with some members of the nuclear force, Haney said that when such problems are found, no matter where they are, “we pluck [them] out of our system … and get through some root-cause analysis to figure out what we should be doing associated with that particular problem.”

He added, “When you look at 90 percent of our team, [they] come to work every day to do the right thing, passionate over the mission.”

In any organization, the admiral said, “You have to continue to work on that other percentage of folks … and in this case I'm very happy that we found the problem, eradicated the problem from our system and went to work with this Nuclear Enterprise Review business to work on those problems.”
Charged About the Mission

Haney said he spent 2014 traveling and meeting with all of those involved in the strategic deterrent mission.

“I can say unequivocally that those folks are fired up and charged about the mission,” he said. “I think the rest of us need to support them in how we talk about it and associate it with the plans we have now.”

The admiral added, “I am proud of working with those great Americans.”

GEN. BAYER DISCUSSES THE WARRIOR OF THE FUTURE

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General Discusses Focus on Younger Force, Cyber Capabilities
By Amaani Lyle
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, March 28, 2013 - NATO officials are closely analyzing what the future cyber warrior will look like as the war landscape shifts from air, ground and sea to cyberspace, Allied Command Transformation's deputy chief of staff for strategic plans and policy said here this week.

In an interview during a March 26 "Young Professionals Forging the Future" event at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Army Maj. Gen. Peter C. Bayer Jr. said it's time to lean into the younger generation in preparation for new and more complex challenges.

Enhanced e-training and application of cyber skill sets need to be customized to the millennial generation born into, rather than adapting to the information age, Bayer said.

"The folks that are going to solve the problems of 2030 [are] not me; I'll be doing something else," the general said. "It's some 25-year-old already in the uniform of their nation. They already have experience in Afghanistan or somewhere else. They're going to be the two- or three-star generals or admirals solving problems."

Bayer said his charge is to develop ongoing training and an open problem-solving environment to tap into the minds of young leaders who can bring an innovative perspective as NATO and its transformation command shift from operational to contingency-based missions.

"I want the junior leaders already in uniform [to be immersed] in this future world of complex problem-solving and begin to develop skills they need to work in an ambiguous uncertain, complex, fast-paced [environment]," Bayer said.

As U.S. forces pivot to the Pacific during the simultaneous drawdown in Afghanistan, Bayer said, NATO priorities should adjust accordingly.

"When Afghanistan is over, we go from an operations-centric alliance to a contingency-based alliance, which means being ready for the next thing, but unsure what that thing might be," he explained.

And NATO, he added, has played a large role in the United States being able to focus its attention on new challenges.

"The only reason the U.S. can think about shifting priorities and emphasis to the Pacific is because we have a secure flank, and it's called NATO," Bayer said. "NATO should see this as an opportunity, not a threat, [as] increasingly, centers of power are going to be in that part of the world -- less so on the traditional East-West axis."

The general acknowledged the occasional challenges of consensus.
"It's frustrating to have 28 [nations] trying to work on something, but there's nothing more powerful than when we get to the point where 28 say, 'Yep, that's the answer we can live with,' because now we're speaking as one."

After spending most of the last 20 years in operations since the advent of missions in the Balkans, Bayer said, it's vital for NATO to update its training concept and revitalize its exercises program, the general said. "I could see the day where the security interests of the alliance will be challenged by some adversary who will employ information, influence, cyber and space," he added.

The response from the alliance, Bayer said, would not necessarily require the alliance to use air, sea or land forces in the way it traditionally has.

"We've already forced [younger people] to operate very decentralized, and they're ready for it, so we've got to figure out now how to get the institutions to catch up."

U.S. CYBER CAPABILITIES

Cyber Command.  Credit:  U.S. Navy.

FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Pacom Promotes Regional Cyber Capabilities, Defenses
By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, March 11, 2013 - Two years ago, U.S. Pacific Command set out on a big experiment during its Terminal Fury exercise, subjecting participants for the first time to simulated cyber intrusions and network access denials, among other unexpected curve balls the exercise planners threw their way.

Pacom's cyber cell, serving as a testbed for the newly established U.S. Cyber Command, grappled with scenarios that shot holes through their cyber defenses, compromising their command-and-control systems and, by extension, their ability to control their forces.

The exercise underscored what already had become abundantly clear throughout Pacom and the entire Defense Department: the cyber domain is the new military "high ground" -- an advantage to those to use it effectively, and the downfall of those who don't.

So in officially standing up its Joint Cyber Center last year at the direction of then-Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, Pacom officials set out to capitalize on cyber capabilities and make them integral to the entire command structure.

"The intent is to be a fusion center to integrate cyber in all its versions in the entire cyber portfolio into the command's daily and warfighting battle rhythm," Air Force Brig. Gen. John "Mark" Hicks, Pacom's director of command, control, communications and cyber, told American Forces Press Service during a telephone interview from Camp Smith, Hawaii.

Pacom's vast area of responsibility -- more than half the globe -- makes it particularly reliant on its secure and unsecure networks to operate, Hicks explained.

"Nothing happens out here -- we don't have visibility on anything, we can't command and control anything, my boss, [Navy] Adm. [Samuel J.] Locklear [III] can't do his mission -- without assured and secure communications," Hicks said. "That means communications, not just with his own forces, but also between our allies and partners, because that is a very big part of our job here."

Collaborating closely with Cyber Command, the Defense Information Systems Agency and the services, the CyberPac team helps to ensure the command's networks provide a reliable command-and-control platform. In addition, they coordinate with other U.S. government agencies to promote the global debate on the future of cyberspace.

"We view cyber as a global common, much like sea, air and space," Hicks said. "So we are advocates for unfettered, free and secure use of the Internet and other telecommunications."

Unfortunately, not everyone sees it that way. Cyberthreats come in many forms, Hicks said. They range from hackers intent on stealing intellectual property to well-organized campaigns by state and nonstate actors to exploit national secrets, deny service or bring down vital military networks.

Recognizing that cyber threats have no respect for national borders, CyberPac increasingly is reaching out to regional allies and partners to encourage closer cooperation across the cyber domain.

"As I like to put it, communications interoperability is both an agent of and a necessary condition for improved relationships," Hicks said. "So by helping partner nations build their military communications and cyber capacity and capability, we are building partner capacity, improving our relationships with them in a non-threatening way. That potentially opens the door and allows greater access for other U.S. military activities."

So in addition to its other activities, CyberPac is leveraging Pacom's exercise program and hosting workshops and other bilateral and multilateral forums that promote closer military-to-military cyber engagement.

"There is a very palpable sense of concern with respect to cyber vulnerability in the Asia-Pacific," Hicks said, citing the frequency of software pirating and intellectual property theft through cyber intrusions. "This is a very needed capability in the Asia-Pacific."

Vietnam participated for the first time in the Cyber Endeavor workshop that ran concurrently with the Pacific Endeavor exercise. And despite widespread criticism of China's suspected role in cyber incursions, Pacom officials hope it will agree to join other regional countries at future cyber venues.

"We are continuing to reach out and hope to include the People's Republic of China in that list in the new future," Hicks said. "This is something about which everyone in the Asia-Pacific can agree. It provides a nonthreatening opportunity for us to work together toward a common goal, with the collateral benefit of building relationships."

CARTER WANTS MORE PROGESS ON CYBER DEFENSE

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Carter Urges Stepped Up Progress on Cyber Defense
By Cheryl Pellerin
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Sept. 19, 2012 - Even as the Defense Department increases investments in cyber capabilities, officials are working to reduce vulnerabilities in their own networks and in those of contractors who build sensitive defense systems, Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter said today.

Speaking at the Air Force Association's Annual Air and Space Conference and Technology Exposition in Maryland, Carter said DOD's cyber concerns are threefold.

"Two of [these parts] we can get our hands on, including by managerial moves within the department, and a third ... is harder to get our hands on," the deputy secretary said.

The first is DOD's defense of its own networks, he said, noting that task is "technically very challenging."

It's paramount that DOD maintains security and integrity across its cyber networks, Carter said, because "we depend on them ... today in everything we do."

The second part involves developing cyber weapons as weapons of war, he said, "doing the intelligence preparation of the battlefield for their employment and planning for their employment. Again, that's something we can do within our own walls and are doing."

The third part is protecting the nation at large from cyberattack, he added, a job that's harder because DOD plays only a role in a larger cast.

The scope of DOD's responsibility for domestic cyber defense extends to the dependence of DOD installations and bases on the U.S. cyber infrastructure, and on the use of DOD data and plans by contractors who build the department's sensitive systems.

"First of all, other parts of the government have capabilities and responsibilities and we work with them. But the most important thing is that most of those networks are ... owned and controlled by private entities who typically fail to invest, or underinvest, in their security," the deputy secretary said.

"When we offer to assist them in protecting [the networks], we run up against barriers that we're slowly trying to knock down and reason our way through," he added.

Such barriers could include antitrust issues if the department provides information to a particular business, he said.

"Do we have to provide the same information to company B? Can company A provide information to company B or does that violate the antitrust laws?" Carter said. "Can company A provide information back to the United States or is that providing personal information to the government that is on their networks?"

He questioned whether DOD should require private industry to control and strengthen its cyber networks, or whether that would be interpreted as excessive government regulation.

"These are all tough problems," he said.

When it comes to dealing with issues of safeguarding the nation as a whole from cyberattack, "we're working our way through all these issues, and my own view is [we're doing it] way too slowly," Carter said.

The Cybersecurity Act of 2012, which called for minimum cyber security performance standards for critical infrastructure that the U.S. government would help develop with private industry, fell short of passage during an Aug. 8 Senate vote.

"We were hoping for some legislative relief this summer that we didn't get out of the Congress," Carter said.

Meanwhile, he said, the Defense Department is considering making U.S. Cyber Command, an armed forces subunified command subordinate to U.S. Strategic Command and led by Army Gen. Keith B. Alexander, a separate combatant command.